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_____________________________________ CARA LESLIE ALEXANDER, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, et al., Defendants. _____________________________________ |
) ) ) ) ) ) Civil No. 96-2123/97-1288 (RCL) ) ) ) ) ) |
PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM CONCERNING
SUBSTITUTION AND CLASS CERTIFICATION
Plaintiffs, by counsel and pursuant to the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 21, 1999, respectfully submit this Supplemental Memorandum Concerning Substitution and Class Certification.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
I. Introduction.
Today is the 25th anniversary of President Nixon’s resignation. Over the years, many liberal pundits and journalists, including Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, have dismissed the myriad of Clinton Administration scandals as not being the equal of Watergate. Ironically, however, even just one Clinton scandal -- which George Stephanopoulos admits ". . . had the potential to be [the] most serious scandal yet" -- surpasses the Nixon-era legacy. See George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human: A Political Education, attached as Exhibit 1 at 416. In Watergate, political "plumbers" acting under the direction of President Nixon’s top advisors broke into the Democratic National Committee ("DNC") to conduct political espionage. In Filegate, the Clinton Administration’s own "plumbers," acting under the direction of Hillary Rodham Clinton, broke into hundreds, if not thousands, of FBI and other government files. This represents the most widespread violation of constitutionally-protected privacy rights in American history. And, as was true of the Nixon scandals, monies (albeit this time at the U.S. taxpayers’ expense) have been paid to key witnesses in Filegate, perhaps to keep them silent, such as Anthony Marceca , who took the Fifth Amendment, and Clifford Bernath, who remains the principal "fall guy" in the release of information from Linda Tripp’s confidential Pentagon file.
In this class-action lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek to hold the Clinton White House and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), among others, legally accountable for Filegate, which FBI Director Louis J. Freeh himself has admitted constituted "egregious violations of privacy . . . ‘without justification.’ " Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI, dated June 14, 1996, attached as Exhibit 2, at 1. Plaintiffs are among the several hundred former Reagan and Bush Administration appointees, employees and others whose FBI background investigation summaries were unlawfully requested and disclosed to the Clinton White House. As a result, Plaintiffs suffered serious harm and adverse effects, including but not limited to out-of-pocket expenses, emotional distress, mental anguish, loss of privacy and reputation, and embarrassment, among other damages. Indeed, as former White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum, who was in charge of The White House Counsel’s Office during Filegate, was forced to admit, under oath, to Congressional investigators:
Those whose files were wrongly obtained, have every right to be agitated, to be angry, knowing that even one person reviewed their private FBI files, when he should not have done so. I know I would be agitated if that happened to my file. I know I would be angry. It was a serious breach of privacy.
See Statement of Bernard W. Nussbaum before the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives ("House Committee"), 104th Congress, 2d Session, June 26, 1996, attached as Exhibit 3, at 2; see also Nussbaum Depo. at 381-82.
The Court has requested the parties to submit supplemental memoranda concerning whether the United States should be substituted for former White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum, former Director of The White House Office of Personnel Security ("OPS") David Craig Livingstone and former detailee to OPS Anthony Marceca, three (3) key actors in Filegate, and whether this matter should be certified as a class action.
With regard to the issue of substitution, it is important to note at the outset that, in its June 12, 1997 Memorandum Opinion, this Court categorically ruled that obtaining files for political purposes could not fall within the scope of employment:
The court must note that it expressly rejects the argument advanced by the United States that because the defendants were political appointees, it was within the scope of their employment to gather these FBI files for partisan political purposes, as plaintiffs allege. Such alleged conduct is not acting in the interests of the United States as [an] employer.
See June 12, 1997 Order at 18 (emphasis added). Evidence obtained during discovery in this case, combined with other, publicly available evidence, such as Congressional findings, leads to the firm and inevitable conclusion that the FBI background summaries of Plaintiffs and other members of the class were knowingly and intentionally obtained and misused. Moreover, in response to a subpoena duces tecum served by Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Clinton Justice Department’s designee failed to identify a single fact that she reviewed concerning the Clinton Justice Department’s certification that Nussbaum, Livingstone and Marceca were acting in the scope of their employment. Consequently, not only was the certification a sham, but the United States cannot be substituted for Nussbaum, Livingstone and Marceca.
With regard to the issue of class certification, the evidence obtained during discovery, combined with other, publicly available evidence, also leads to the firm and inevitable conclusion that this case satisfies all of the requirements for class certification.
Consequently, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reject the Clinton Justice Department’s sham certification that Nussbaum, Livingstone and Marceca were acting within the scope of their employment and certify this case as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with Plaintiffs as the class representatives.
II. Procedural Background.
Early in this case, Defendants Executive Office of the President ("the Clinton White House" or "EOP"), FBI and Hillary Rodham Clinton moved to strike Plaintiffs’ class action allegations. The United States also intervened to substitute itself for Defendants Bernard Nussbaum, Craig Livingstone and Anthony Marceca, then not too cleverly moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on the purported basis that Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In doing so, the Clinton Justice Department submitted a "certification" that Nussbaum, Livingstone and Marceca were acting within the scope of their employment with respect to Plaintiffs’ common-law tort claim for invasion of privacy. This conclusory certificate, dated February 18, 1997, states:
I, Eva M. Plaza, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, acting pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2), and by virtue of the authority vested in me by 28 C.F.R. § 15.2 (1996), and appendix, hereby certify that I have read the complaint in this action. On the basis of the information now available with respect to the allegations therein, I find that the invasion of privacy claim asserted against individual defendants Bernard W. Nussbaum, David Craig Livingstone, and Anthony Marceca in this lawsuit arises from conduct performed by them within the scope of their former federal employment by the White House.
See February 18, 1997 Certification of Eva M. Plaza, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, attached as Exhibit 4.
Discovery was stayed for approximately eleven (11) months while the Court considered this and other issues raised by Defendants in various motions to dismiss. Ultimately, however, the Court saw through Defendants’ ruse, denied their various motions, and ordered the parties to participate in discovery before taking up the substitution and class certification issues. See Memorandum Opinion and Order dated June 12, 1997. Discovery has since proceeded along two (2) overlapping tracks: (1) discovery specific to issues of substitution and class certification; and (2) general discovery. General discovery continues. However, the Court has yet to extend the initial limit it set on depositions.
Nonetheless, the discovery obtained to date by Plaintiffs provides substantial, compelling evidence relevant to the issues of substitution and class certification, and the case as whole. Plaintiffs’ discovery has also revealed that the Clinton Justice Department’s certification on the substitution issue was nothing more than a sham. Specifically, Plaintiffs served a subpoena duces tecum on the Clinton Justice Department under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, which required the Clinton Justice Department to designate:
. . . one or more of its officers or employees to testify on its behalf about all matters relevant to the basis of the Certification of the United States Department of Justice, dated and signed by Eva M. Plaza, deputy Assistant Attorney General on February 18, 1997, stating that the Plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claims against David Craig Livingstone, Anthony Marceca and Bernard W. Nussbaum arise from conduct performed by them within the scope of their former employment by the [W]hite House.
See Subpoena dated June 7, 1999, attached as Exhibit 5.
Rather than attempt to comply with Plaintiffs’ subpoena, the Clinton Justice Department moved to quash, claiming that the person who signed the original certification, Ms. Plaza, was no longer employed by the Clinton Justice Department, and, consequently, that only its litigation counsel in this action could testify. For good measure, the Clinton Justice Department added the now all too familiar, disingenuous "Clintonian" doublespeak that this would violate the attorney-client and other privileges.
The Court rejected the Clinton Justice Department’s arguments. See June 22, 1999 Memorandum and Order. It then conjured up Ms. Helene Goldberg as its Rule 30(b)(6) designee. However, Plaintiffs’ Rule 30(b)(6) deposition made clear that Ms. Goldberg had virtually no knowledge of the factual basis for the certification. Apparently, Ms. Goldberg had been "pony-ed up" by the Clinton Justice Department shortly before the deposition:
Q: The information that you’re going to provide today, does it come from your firsthand knowledge, or is it information that was provided to you so you could testify today?
A: The vast majority of it is information that was provided to me so that I could testify.
Q: When was it provided to you?
A: Over the course of the last week.
See Goldberg Depo. at 8. Rather than identify a single fact that the Clinton Justice Department relied on in issuing the certification, Ms. Goldberg referred to a series of interviews allegedly conducted by the Clinton Justice Department, then pointed Plaintiffs to a huge body of documents, including approximately forty (40) transcripts of depositions, interviews and hearings before Congressional committees. Ms. Goldberg’s testimony made clear, however, that she had not reviewed any of this material, and, consequently, had no understanding of the alleged factual basis for the certification. Id. at 8-11, 49-50, 82-96. In referring to a written memorandum purporting to list the information and documents upon which the Clinton Justice Department allegedly relied in issuing its certification, which hinged on alleged communications with certain witnesses, she had no knowledge of any substantive communication. For instance, Mrs. Goldberg typically responded as follows:
Q: Are there any facts underlying communications between Mr. Hughes and the Department of Justice that you have knowledge of?
* * *
A: No.
Q: Same question with regard to Mari Anderson?
A: No.
* * *
Q: Same question with regard to Bernard Nussbaum?
A: No.
Q: Same question with regard to Craig Livingstone?
A: No.
Q: Same question with regard to Anthony Marceca?
A: No.
Id. at 80-96. Ms. Goldberg’s testimony was so lacking that it constitutes an admission that there was simply no basis for certification on behalf of Nussbaum, Livingstone or Marceca.
As this Court recognized when it authorized discovery into the issues of substitution, a bona fide Justice Department certification is entitled to de novo review. See June 12, 1997 Memorandum Opinion at 18, citing Kimbro v. Velten, 30 F.3d. 1501, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Because the Clinton Justice Department failed to provide any verifiable factual basis for its certification in response to Plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) subpoena duces tecum, that certification is not only entitled to no weight, but it is obviously fraudulent and sanctionable. A de novo review -- or indeed any level of review -- thus requires that the attempted substitution be rejected, if not for its lack of a factual foundation, then as a sanction for the Clinton Justice Department’s failure to respond to Plaintiffs’ Rule 30(b)(6) subpoena duces tecum in a proper manner.
Finally, it must also be noted that there are several motions to compel currently pending before the Court. These include a motion for leave to depose Hillary Rodham Clinton and Kennedy’s ex-wife, who witnessed Kennedy illegally loading FBI files onto his laptop computer at home. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that, as explained in these motions, the additional testimony as sought by Plaintiffs, the need for which became apparent as Plaintiffs exhausted limited witness discovery during the initial discovery period, is highly relevant and necessary for the Court’s rulings on substitution and class certification. Thus, Plaintiffs respectfully request that they be allowed to supplement this memorandum after the Court has granted them leave to obtain this additional testimony.
III. Factual Background.
A. The Filegate Mentality.
Filegate is a mentality, if not a way of life for the Clintons and their allies. Realizing their long history of ethical and legal lapses, if not criminality, and the political challenges this has spawned since the Clintons’ days in Arkansas, Filegate represents a desperate but also chillingly pragmatic willingness to acquire and use confidential information against perceived adversaries to coerce and extort silence or some other desired action or inaction. It includes, but is certainly not limited to, the Clinton White House’s gathering and misuse of FBI background summaries and other materials on former Reagan and Bush Administration staffers, among others. It can also be seen in the past histories of Defendants and other key individuals in the Clinton Administration, and includes the use of private investigators, the investigation of the "personal peccadilloes" of political opponents, and the calculated, but ruthless willingness to try to destroy innocent persons who might stand in the way of the Clintons’ political plans. Most recently, it can be seen in the efforts to destroy the credibility and reputations of Ms. Linda Tripp and Ms. Kathleen Willey and other innocent female witnesses during the impeachment and trial of President Clinton. Dick Morris, the Clintons’ political advisor and representative, has called this the Clintons’ "Secret Police." See, e.g., Dick Morris, "Bill’s Secret Police Strike Again," New York Post, March 17, 1998, attached as Exhibit 6.
The Filegate mentality dates back to at least 1982. According to a new book by Christopher Anderson, a former contributing editor to Time magazine and liberal journalist, in that year Mrs. Clinton hired an ex-FBI agent to investigate and "get dirt" on her own husband and women to whom he had been linked. See Excerpt from Christopher Anderson, Bill and Hillary: The Marriage, attached as Exhibit 7, at 185 and 220. Like the President, Mrs. Clinton effectively admitted recently that she has lied over the years about the women who have been tied to her husband -- despite knowing the truth about their relationships with him -- in an apparent attempt to destroy the credibility of these women and thus prevent harm to her and her husband’s political ambitions and maintain their hold on The White House. See Nick Pisa, "While I Still Love Bill, ‘Weaknesses Were Caused by Childhood Abuse,’ Says Hillary," Sunday Mirror, August 1, 1999, attached as Exhibit 8 (discussing Mrs. Clinton’s recent interview in Talk magazine).
The mentality of Filegate manifested itself again in 1984. Mr. Dennis Casey, a Democratic political consultant who testified before the House Committee investigating Filegate "despite a great deal of personal and professional risk," recalled a telling incident involving Livingstone and Marceca during Sen. Gary Hart’s 1984 presidential campaign that eerily presaged both Filegate and presidential advisor George Stephanopoulos’ reference to an "Ellen Rometsch strategy" among White House allies. Specifically, Mr. Casey testified that, during the 1984 campaign, Livingstone and Marceca wanted to use "dirt" Livingstone himself had gathered on labor leaders and public officials in the hopes of neutralizing them or getting them to switch their support from Vice-President Walter Mondale to Sen. Hart:
I first came in contact with Craig Livingstone in the William Penn Hotel. A meeting was held because of concern that local and State labor leaders and some prominent public officials were strongly allied behind the candidacy of Walter Mondale.
Mr. Livingstone, had a legal pad with him and he began to report on some of the peccadilloes and vulnerabilities of these persons in hopes of either neutralizing them or getting their support switched from Mondale to Hart. . . .
I was greatly upset with Mr. Livingstone, as I viewed the matters he was reporting as personal matters that would adversely affect the lives and families of these people. I told him that I wanted no such work done in this area . . . .
Mr. Livingstone disagreed, and I reenforced my direction to him to stop that type of work. He, as I recall, left the room angrily.
That evening I met, Mr. [Anthony] Marceca, who I understand was a member of the Hart national campaign staff assigned to Pittsburgh . . . .
[Marceca] talked to me about the worth of Mr. Livingstone’s information, and I recall he stated it was time for the Hart Campaign to play "hardball’" with the dirt Mr. Livingstone had gathered. I stated I would have no part of it and that was not how I viewed the political process as working . . . .
I never heard of these guys again until I read newspaper accounts of the FBI files matter. I then saw on CNN a film clip of Mr. Livingstone and it triggered my memory of the events. And that’s really what I know about these gentleman.
See Excerpt from June 26, 1996 Hearing Before the House Committee, attached as Exhibit 9, at 470-71 (emphasis added); see also "Investigation into The White House and Department of Justice on Security of FBI Background Investigation Files," Nineteenth Report by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, Second Session, September 28, 1996, ("House Report"), attached as Exhibit 10, at 38.
The mentality of Filegate manifested itself again during the 1992 presidential campaign. At his deposition in this matter, Bernard Nussbaum admitted that, during the campaign, he and other Clinton campaign staffers (Nussbaum believes he consulted with Clinton confidante Susan Thomases) seriously considered bringing both criminal and civil charges against Gennifer Flowers for "lying" about her affair with Bill Clinton, an affair which Clinton himself confirmed under oath six (6) years later and about which Mrs. Clinton had information from her private investigator confirming that it had, in fact, taken place. See Nussbaum Depo. at 190-193; Excerpt from Christopher Anderson, Bill and Hillary: The Marriage, attached as Exhibit 7, at 185 and 220.
Also during the 1992 campaign -- which was run by James Carville -- Betsey Wright, one of Bill Clinton’s closest confidantes, investigated "bimbo eruptions" such as the Gennifer Flowers story and attempted to intimidate and silence women who, like Gennifer Flowers, might go public with embarrassing details about the candidate. One of the methods used to threaten women was to dig up "dirt" on them in order to blackmail them into silence or destroy their credibility and reputations if they decided to speak out. Top Clinton adviser and representative Dick Morris and respected, award-winning journalist Michael Isikoff reported that the Clinton presidential campaign funneled $100,000 in campaign funds, subsidized with federal tax dollars, to a team of private investigators to help track down and stamp out these "bimbo eruptions." The monies were passed through a Colorado law firm to mask the true nature of their intended use. One recipient of these funds was "gumshoe" Jack Palladino, who later reportedly worked for the Clintons on the Lewinsky and Jones matters. See Excerpt from Michael Isikoff, Uncovering Clinton, attached as Exhibit 12, at 30-33; Michael Isikoff, "Clinton Team Works to Deflect Allegations on Nominee’s Private Life," The Washington Post, July 26, 1992, attached as Exhibit 13; Dick Morris, "Bill’s Secret Police Strike Again," The New York Post, March 17, 1998, attached as Exhibit 6; see also Dick Morris, "Clinton’s Secret Police in Overdrive," The New York Post, April 28, 1998, attached as Exhibit 11; Howard Kurtz, "The Power Couple at Scandal’s Vortex," The Washington Post, February 27, 1998, attached as Exhibit 14.
Meanwhile, also during the 1992 Clinton campaign, Craig Livingstone "graduated" from investigating personal peccadilloes to supervising an effort to disrupt President George Bush’s political campaign. According to his resume, Livingstone was the "Senior Consultant to Counter Event Operations." See Exhibit 10 at 24. What this really meant was that Livingstone was responsible for placing a person in a chicken suit at Bush campaign events. See Livingstone Depo. at 254-56; Exhibit 10 at 24.
However, the Filegate mentality emerges even more graphically after Clinton won the 1992 election. Shortly after their victory, the Clintons’ top advisers met for dinner at a restaurant in Little Rock, Arkansas:
[T]he definitive Rahm Emanuel story takes place in Little Rock, Ark., in the heady days after Bill Clinton was first elected President.
It was there that Emanuel, then Clinton’s chief fund-raiser, repaired with George Stephanopoulos, Mandy Grunwald and other aides to Doe’s, the campaign hangout. Revenge was heavy in the air as the group discussed the enemies -- Democrats, Republicans, members of the press who wronged them during the 1992 campaign. Clifford Jackson, the ex-friend of the President and peddler of the Clinton draft-dodging stories, was high on the list. So was William Donald Schaefer, then the Governor of Maryland and a Democrat who endorsed George Bush. Nathan Landow, the fund-raiser who backed the candidacy of Paul Tsongas, made it, too.
Suddenly Emanuel grabbed his steak knife and, as those who were there remember it, shouted out the name of another enemy, lifted the knife, then brought it down with full force into the table.
"Dead!" he screamed.
The group immediately joined in the cathartic release. "Nate Landow! Dead! Cliff Jackson! Dead! Bill Schaefer! Dead!"
See Elisabeth Bumiller, "The Brothers Emanuel," The New York Times, June 15, 1997, attached as Exhibit 15. Here was the Filegate mentality in a nutshell. Perceived political enemies were to be destroyed, or made "dead." Mandy Grunwald, a friend and advisor of Defendant Clinton who later helped to conjure up the "right wing conspiracy" defense to all of the Clinton scandals, "couldn’t remember" if she engaged in the death chant, but confirmed the events as reported by The New York Times in her deposition in this case. See Grunwald Depo. at 358-65.
The Filegate mentality carried over into the Clinton Administration with the placement of key political operatives in sensitive positions. See Filegate Flowchart, attached as Exhibit 16. Livingstone was made Director of OPS by Mrs. Clinton, a strategic position from which he could obtain confidential FBI and Internal Revenue Service information, among other confidential information, on former Reagan and Bush administrations staffers, holdover employees, and other appointees or employees who got in the way or were otherwise mistrusted. To assist him, Livingstone then brought in Marceca, his old buddy and "hatchetman" from the Hart campaign.
Not coincidentally, William H. Kennedy, III, a friend and colleague of Mrs. Clinton from the Rose Law Firm, where he had served as managing partner, was made Associate White House Counsel. From The White House Counsel’s Office, Kennedy would have access to FBI and other confidential information obtained by Livingstone and Marceca, as well as to "raw data" from FBI files that could be obtained by telephone calls and other contacts with key persons in the FBI.
Vince Foster, an intimate friend and confidante of Mrs. Clinton and former partner at the Rose Law Firm, was made Deputy White House Counsel. Bernard Nussbaum, another long-time friend and trusted ally dating back to the Watergate impeachment proceedings, was made White House Counsel. From these respective perches, Livingstone, Kennedy, Foster and Nussbaum would have access to FBI files and other confidential information as needed to further the President and Mrs. Clintons’ agenda. In effect, Mrs. Clinton brought her own law firm to The White House for her and her husband’s partisan political purposes.
Mrs. Clinton thus succeeded in placing these four (4) individuals, Livingstone, Kennedy, Foster and Nussbaum, in strategic positions in The White House. True to their past, these and other allies close to and inside the Clinton White House, including the President himself, would cause scandal after scandal. Although they may have different names -- "Travelgate" (which involves the malicious prosecution of Filegate victim Billy Dale), "Filegate" (the improper gathering of FBI file information on hundreds of staffers from the Reagan and Bush administrations), "Ushergate" (the misuse of the FBI background investigatory process against "disloyal" staffers such as Chris Emery) and "Sexgate" (the effort to destroy Kathleen Willey and Linda Tripp with the illegal release of Privacy Act-protected materials), not to mention the repeated efforts to cover-up these and other scandals -- the Filegate mentality runs throughout them like a common thread. What follows is a detailed exposition of how the Clintons’ defense of their various scandals -- which is based on threats, intimidation, smear tactics and sometimes even blackmail and the use of law enforcement agencies (such as the indictments of Linda Tripp and Nolanda Hill ) -- relate to both the core issues of this case and the issues of substitution and class certification now before the Court.
B. The Privacy Act.
Although the Clinton White House and Clinton Justice Department have disingenuously claimed throughout this litigation that the Privacy Act does not apply to them, the Clinton White House’s own internal documents, and its own employees, admit otherwise. A June 30, 1993 internal White House memorandum to John D. Podesta, which apparently accompanied the personnel files of the seven (7) White House Travel Office employees fired by Mrs. Clinton, specifically states:
Andre Oliver, of the Chief of Staff’s office, requested that I forward the Official Personnel Folders of seven White House travel office personnel for your review. They are attached.
The contents of these records are covered by the Privacy Act of 1974, have restricted use and should be protected carefully. Please keep these folders in a locked place when not in use. Their contents should not be disclosed to anyone unless they demonstrate an official need.
When you have completed your review, please call me on 395-1147, so that I may have them picked up.
See June 30, 1993 Memorandum to John D. Podesta, attached as Exhibit 17 (emphasis added).
During his deposition in this matter, Assistant White House Counsel William H. Kennedy also admitted that the Privacy Act applied :
Q: And it was your understanding, after reviewing those manuals and memoranda, that the Privacy Act applied to security procedures, clearance procedures?
A: . . . I believed that the Privacy Act applied to those procedures. But I’ve never had reason, you know, to request memoranda and what not. I believe that it did.
Q: And at all times in carrying out your functions, you attempted to comply with Privacy Act procedures?
A: A better way to answer the question would be to simply say that I tried to do what was required by the law at all times.
Q: Which included the Privacy Act?
A: If it was applicable, yes.
* * *
Q: Releasing FBI files to the public, it’s your understanding that would be prohibited by the Privacy Act?
A: . . . Mr. Klayman, as I understand how the Privacy Act is to work, that’s probably something it’s designed to stop, yes.
See Kennedy Depo. at 73-74; see also id. at 76-78.
Mari Anderson, an assistant to Livingstone in OPS (the office that actually requested and maintained the FBI background summaries of Plaintiffs and other members of the class), also admitted at her deposition in this matter, without qualification, that she and everyone in OPS knew the Privacy Act applied to their activities:
Q: You were aware that FBI files are covered by the Privacy Act?
A: Yes.
Q: Everybody to the best of your knowledge was aware of that when you worked there?
A: Yes . . . All of our actions were based on the understanding that everything that we did in our office was confidential and was to be kept confidential . . . [Nancy Gemmell] would say we are covered by the Privacy Act. This is what it entails.
See Anderson Depo. at 279-81; see also id. at 277-78, 282-83.
Moreover, Terry W. Good, head of The White House Office of Records Management ("ORM"), which later stored at least some of the FBI background summaries at issue, testified at his deposition in this matter that both The White House Counsel’s Office and the Clinton Justice Department advised ORM that the Privacy Act applied to records of the President’s and Mrs. Clinton’s Health Care Task Force. Good Depo. at 55-57; 386-387.
Clearly, the Clinton White House has long understood and operated under the assumption that the Privacy Act applied to it, and the arguments the Clinton Administration and its Justice Department made to the contrary to this Court in trying vainly to dismiss this case, which caused both Plaintiffs and the Court to expend substantial time and resources, were simply fraudulent.
C. The White House’s Historic Use of FBI Files.
One of the functions of OPS was to maintain security files on persons requiring routine access to The White House complex. See Declaration of Nancy A. Gemmell, attached as Exhibit 18, at para. 6. The security files maintained by OPS include summary reports provided by the FBI of full field background investigations that the FBI conducts of persons requiring routine access to The White House complex. Id. at para. 9. Those reports are used to determine suitability for White House access. Id.
However, the Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., provides for the removal of most records from The White House at the conclusion of each administration. Id. at para. 8. Among the many records routinely removed from The White House pursuant to the Presidential Records Act are the security files maintained by the OPS, including the files of those persons who require continuing access to The White House complex in the new administration. Id. Thus, when there is a change of administrations, it is necessary to recreate the OPS files on persons who require continuing access to The White House complex. Id. at paras. 8 and 10. This task is known within OPS as the "Update Project." Id. at para. 6. It involves requesting from the FBI copies of summary reports previously provided to OPS concerning "holdover" employees and others. Id. OPS historically accomplishes this task after each change of administration by filling out pre-printed forms, under the name of the Counsel to the President, which request copies of "previous reports" on the individuals named in the forms. Id. at para. 10.
The recreation of the files on persons requiring continuing access to The White House complex is necessary for two reasons. Id. at para. 11. First, all persons with routine access to The White House must be reinvestigated every five (5) years. Id. It is thus necessary to recreate the files on holdover employees from the prior administration to determine when those persons’ reinvestigations are due. Id. Second, after each change of administration, the summary reports obtained from the FBI on holdover employees from the prior administration are routinely reviewed, if time and work pressures permit, to determine whether the reports contain any information potentially affecting the employee’s suitability for White House access that should be brought to the attention of the new administration through The White House Counsel’s Office. Id.
In order to assist The White House in making appointments and in determining who should be granted access to The White House, the FBI established a White House liaison office in the Old Executive Office Building. The FBI details special agents to work in this office, from which they conduct interviews of White House appointees and employees in order to determine their suitability for work in The White House.
One of these agents was M. Dennis Sculimbrene. Special Agent Sculimbrene was first detailed to The White House in 1980. See Declaration of M. Dennis Sculimbrene, attached as Exhibit 19, at para. 1. He thus had worked in The White House during each of the Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations. Id. Indeed, Sculimbrene was the senior FBI Special Agent in The White House when the Clinton Administration commenced. Id.
As Special Agent Sculimbrene sets forth in his sworn declaration, a long-standing policy required FBI agents detailed to The White House to interact with OPS personnel routinely. Id. at para. 8. Beginning with the Reagan Administration, Special Agent Sculimbrene also had a mail box in OPS, where he would receive copies of requests for FBI background investigation summaries sought by OPS. Id. Notes of Anthony Marceca, the Department of Defense detailee who requested and obtained the FBI background summaries of Plaintiffs and the other members of the putative class, confirm this practice, which served as a backstop to avoid unnecessary background requests on persons who no longer required access to The White House. See Marceca Notes, attached as Exhibit 20.
Beginning in May 1993, however, Special Agent Sculimbrene was told to avoid liaison activity with OPS and was no longer provided with copies of background requests. See Declaration of M. Dennis Sculimbrene, attached as Exhibit 19, at para. 8. His mail box in OPS no longer used. Id. The practice of providing Special Agent Sculimbrene with copies of background requests was resumed in late Fall or early Winter 1994, after in excess of 900 FBI background summaries on Plaintiffs and other former Reagan and Bush Administration appointees, employees and others had already been obtained. Id. Thus, the one person who could have prevented Filegate -- and a potential eyewitness -- was, not coincidentally, himself denied access to key information about OPS’s activities and to OPS itself during this crucial time period. Id. Clearly, this important fact raises a strong adverse evidentiary inference, if it is not powerful direct evidence itself, that FBI background summaries were obtained for an improper political purpose. As the Court has already ruled, obtaining FBI files for partisan political purposes cannot be within the scope of any official duties or responsibilities.
D. Hillary Rodham Clinton "Packs" The Clinton White House Counsel’s Office and the Office of Personnel Security and Plays a Substantial, Unlawful Role in the Official Workings of the Clinton White House.
As First Lady, Mrs. Clinton had no legal authority over White House personnel (except in her immediate office), White House security, or even over The White House Counsel’s Office. Nonetheless, the evidence uncovered by Plaintiffs in this matter demonstrates that Mrs. Clinton is no ordinary First Lady. Ms. Linda Tripp has testified that "[s]he was every bit as Presidential as he was, and we treated her that way." See Tripp Depo. at 359 (emphasis added). Mrs. Clinton made key personnel decisions concerning The White House Counsel’s Office and OPS, among other offices, directed the activities of the persons she had hired, and otherwise thrust herself into the official workings of The White House. Thus, when any of the actors involved in Filegate were acting at the direction of Mrs. Clinton instead of furthering the interests of the United States, they were, ipso facto, operating outside the scope of their employment, because Mrs. Clinton had no lawful authority to direct their conduct.
This is confirmed by Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 813 F. Supp. 82, 87 (D.D.C. 1993), in which this Court ruled that Mrs. Clinton did not qualify as an "officer" or "employee" of the federal government as defined by 5 U.S.C. §§ 2104 & 2105, and hence the Health Care Task Force that she chaired was not exempt from the open meetings requirement of § 10 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.App. 2, §§1-15.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") held that Mrs. Clinton is a de facto officer or employee of the federal government, but only for the limited purpose of the Health Care Task Force. Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F. 2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The D.C. Circuit predicated its decision on the fact that "[t]he President named his wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton, as Chairman of the Task Force," along with various Cabinet Secretaries and White House advisors, and "charged the body with the task of ‘listen[ing] to all parties’ and then ‘prepar[ing] health care reform legislation to be submitted to Congress within 100 days of our taking office.’" Id. at 901-02 (citing 29 Weekly Comp.Pres.Doc. 96 (Feb. 1, 1993).
It is this explicit grant of authority by the President to Mrs. Clinton that makes Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons readily distinguishable from Mrs. Clinton’s actions in Filegate. Whereas her chairmanship of the Health Care Task Force was under authority of an Executive Order, here Mrs. Clinton has acted under no basis of authority whatsoever, but has operated covertly as the secret and unauthorized head or "managing senior partner" of The White House Counsel’s Office. Indeed, the Court’s original analysis of her legal standing in Association of Am. Physician & Surgeons -- that she is not an officer or employee of the federal government -- should be given full force once more. She must, respectfully, be regarded as an outsider, operating illegally within The White House.
Nonetheless, Mrs. Clinton "packed" The White House Counsel’s office with loyalists. She "recommended" Bernard Nussbaum, her former colleague from the Nixon impeachment proceedings, to be White House Counsel. See McLarty Depo. at 245; Nusbaum Depo. at 187. She was instrumental in the hiring of Vincent Foster, her intimate friend and confidante and former partner at the Rose Law Firm, as Deputy White House Counsel. See Nussbaum Depo. at 108, 112-13. She strongly recommended William Kennedy, another of her former partners and the managing partner of the Rose Law Firm, as Associate White House Counsel. See Nussbaum Depo. at 130-31. Mrs. Clinton was also responsible for the hiring of Joel Klein as Deputy White House Counsel after Vincent Foster’s death. See Tripp Depo. at 817-18.
Once Mrs. Clinton had her key people in place in The White House Counsel’s Office, she had substantial input into its operations. She "ruled the school," as Linda Tripp, who worked in The White House Counsel’s Office, put it. See Tripp Depo. at 359. It was therefore no accident that Mrs. Clinton’s West Wing office was "directly adjacent" to The White House Counsel’s Office. See Tripp Depo. at 354. Her "interaction and visiting and phone calling between Vince [Foster]’s office and her’s was routine." "It was regular. It was constant." See Tripp Depo. at 354. Mrs. Clinton also had interacted frequently with Kennedy. See Tripp Depo. at 778-82; see also Waudby Depo. at 257-58. While the President had little, if any interaction with Nussbaum or Foster, "the interaction was all lateral to Hillary’s office, sidesways I always thought of it, because that’s where the interaction was." See Tripp Depo. at 361; see also Tripp Depo. at 360-61.
In addition to hiring personnel, Mrs. Clinton also took it upon herself to be involved in firing decisions. Both Nussbaum and Kennedy were ultimately fired from The White House Counsel’s Office. Thomas "Mack" McLarty, who was White House Chief of Staff during Filegate, testified that Mrs. Clinton’s views about whether Nussbaum and Kennedy should be fired "were important to be taken into consideration. . . . " See McLarty Depo. at 331- 33; see also Nussbaum Depo. at 219-20.
Mrs. Clinton was involved in, if not directly responsible for, The White House Travel Office firings, which, in turn, lead to the discovery of the Filegate scandal. Her Chief of Staff, Maggie Williams, attended a key meeting in Vince Foster’s office, along with Foster, Kennedy, David Watkins, Catherine Cornelius and Hollywood megaproducer and multimillionaire Harry Thomason, before the firings, who also had no "business" being involved in White House affairs. See Tripp Depo. at 32-33, 35-51, 58-59, 61-62. Tripp’s testimony about this meeting is confirmed by Bernard Nussbaum, Betsy Pond and Deborah Gorham, who worked with her in The White House Counsel’s Office suite. Nussbaum testified that Vince Foster held meetings in his office about the Travel Office, and that it "may well be true" that on at least one of those occasions, David Watkins, Harry Thomason and Catherine Cornelius were present. See Nussbaum Depo. at 226-27. Nussbaum further testified that this "probably happened." Id. Betsy Pond confirms seeing Maggie Williams, David Watkins and Harry Thomason in the office suite, as well as the fact that Foster held meetings in his office behind closed doors. See Pond Depo. at 286-92. Deborah Gorham recalls Catherine Cornelius and Harry Thomason in Vince Foster’s office for a meeting. See Gorham Depo. at 253. After the meeting, Tripp and Gorham went into Foster’s office to clean up, whereupon Tripp saw files on Billy Dale and others laying on Foster’s desk. See Tripp Depo. at 41-47, 58-59, 61-62. These same files would later be identified to Tripp as being FBI files. Id.
Importantly, Linda Tripp also described an "official White House letterhead memorandum" from Mrs. Clinton to Foster and Kennedy ordering that the Travel Office workers be fired:
In handwriting on a memo in Mrs. Clinton’s hand signed HRC, which said . . . we need these people out, out underlined, we need our people in, in underlined, HRC.
See Tripp Depo. at 633; see also Tripp Depo. at 772-73, 888-91. McLarty testified that he had conversations with Mrs. Clinton about The White House Travel Office before the firings. See McLarty Depo. at 52-53; 98. A memorandum by a former White House official lays the responsibility for the firings directly at Mrs. Clinton’s feet. See Memorandum from David Watkins as reproduced in "Investigation of The White House Travel Office Firings and Related Matters," Fifteenth Report by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, Second Session, September 26, 1996, attached as Exhibit 23. While carefully avoiding any reference to Mrs. Clinton’s having ordered the Travel Office firings, McLarty’s testimony implied no less. He testified that Mrs. Clinton was aware of the allegations involving the Travel Office, wanted the matter looked into "in a timely way," "took it seriously, was concerned about it and wanted the matter to be taken seriously." Id. at 98-99. This "hands-on" conduct is not the "ordinary" activity of a First Lady.
Without legal basis, Mrs. Clinton also injected herself into security issues. FBI Special Agent Gary Aldrich, who was detailed to the FBI’s White House Liaison Office to assist with background investigations on appointees, employees and other persons requiring access to The White House, was told by Livingstone that he had to speak with Mrs. Clinton to address security concerns he had raised regarding White House access. See Declaration of Gary W. Aldrich, attached as Exhibit 24, at para. 3. Livingstone himself largely confirmed this conversation at his deposition in this case. Livingstone Depo. at 445-53. Because the stated reason for obtaining the FBI files of "holdover" employees was to reconstruct OPS’ access records, Mrs. Clinton’s thrusting herself into security issues bears directly on Filegate.
So it should be no surprise that substantial, credible evidence ties Mrs. Clinton to the selection of Livingstone as Director of OPS. During the course of conducting a background investigation on Livingstone in March 1993 -- long before the Filegate scandal would erupt -- former FBI Special Agent M. Dennis Sculimbrene interviewed Livingstone’s supervisors in The White House Counsel’s Office, including Nussbaum and Kennedy. See Declaration of M. Dennis Sculimbrene, attached as Exhibit 19, at para. 2. As documented by a contemporaneous "insert" memorandum prepared by Agent Sculimbrene shortly after his interview with Nussbaum, Livingstone "had come highly recommended to him by HILLARY CLINTON." Id.; Sculimbrene Insert, attached as Exhibit 27. Nussbaum added that Mrs. Clinton ‘‘has known his mother for a longer period of time.’’ Id. This document was produced to Plaintiffs by the FBI. Moreover, as documented in a January 11, 1996 memo Agent Sculimbrene submitted to his supervisor, Supervisory Special Agent Brad Wambach, states, "LIVINGSTONE is a political appointee. His mother and MRS. CLINTON are personal friends." See January 11, 1996 Memorandum to SSA A-1, Brad Wambach from SA M. Dennis Sculimbrene, attached as Exhibit 27.
After Filegate broke, Agent Sculimbrene testified before the House Committee that, while interviewing Livingstone in March 1993 for his background investigation, Livingstone himself linked his hiring to Mrs. Clinton. See Declaration of M. Dennis Sculimbrene, attached as Exhibit 19, at para. 4. Shortly after the background investigation, Kennedy told Agent Sculimbrene that he was "stuck" with Livingstone, from which Agent Sculimbrene understood that Mrs. Clinton had been responsible for Livingstone’s hiring. Id. at para. 5.
Likewise, Special Agent Aldrich recalls a conversation with Kennedy about who had hired Livingstone. See Declaration of Gary W. Aldrich, attached as Exhibit 24 at para. 4. During this conversation, Kennedy asked Special Agent Aldrich what type of person should be the head of OPS. Id. Special Agent Aldrich replied that it should be "somebody squeaky clean, meticulous, careful, discreet, mature, someone with a depth of understanding of security issues." Id. Kennedy later told Special Agent Aldrich, "It doesn’t matter anyway; it’s a done deal. Hillary wants him [Livingstone] for that slot." Id. Kennedy’s claim that he now doesn’t know how Livingstone came to be hired as Director of OPS is simply incredible. See Kennedy Depo. at 206.
Livingstone seemed to have told many people about his connection and allegiance to Mrs. Clinton. He told Linda Tripp, who worked in The White House Counsel’s Office with Nussbaum, Foster, Kennedy and Livingstone, that he had been hired by Mrs. Clinton. See Tripp. Depo. at 288-89.
Livingstone, in turn, was responsible for having Anthony Marceca, an investigator with the U.S. Department of Defense, detailed to OPS. Importantly, Marceca and Livingstone shared a long history of working together as political "dirty tricks" operatives. It was Marceca, acting under Livingstone’s supervision, who subsequently requested and obtained in excess of 900 FBI background investigation summaries on former Reagan and Bush White House appointees, employees and others, including such notable persons as Former Secretary of State James A. Baker and former Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, in addition to Plaintiffs and countless others. In addition to being Marceca’s supervisor at OPS, Livingstone reviewed each file Marceca obtained. See Excerpt from Anderson Senate Depo., attached as Exhibit 28, at 110.
Thus, of the major actors in Filegate -- Nussbaum, Kennedy, Livingstone and Marceca -- Mrs. Clinton is inextricably tied to all of them. She had substantial input into, if not control over The White House Counsel’s Office, of which OPS is a part. Despite repeated efforts to cover-up her key role, she is also responsible for The White House Travel Office firings, which subsequently gave rise to the uncovering of the Filegate scandal, and to security issues, including issues about White House access, that lie at the heart of Filegate. Because Mrs. Clinton had no legal authority to inject herself into these areas, Nussbaum, Kennedy, Livingstone and Marceca were all acting outside the scope of their employment when they acted to further the partisan, political interests of Mrs. Clinton instead of the interests of the United States.
E. Nussbaum’s Hands-Off Management.
Nussbaum was a long-time friend of Mrs. Clinton dating back to the days of their work together on House Judiciary Committee’s Watergate impeachment panel. See Nussbaum Depo. at 175-77, 184-86. Nussbaum was also a trusted advisor to the 1992 presidential campaign. Id. at 185-86. He and Peter Edelman then jointly headed the Justice Department transition team for the new Clinton Administration. Id. at 186. Nussbaum was then asked to serve in the Clinton White House as Counsel to the President. Id. Nussbaum admits that Mrs. Clinton recommended him for the position and that "she was the most important one obviously . . . quite important in my becoming White House Counsel." Id. at 187.
At his deposition in this matter, Nussbaum testified that the handling of FBI files was an important, sensitive function. Id. at 234. However, Nussbaum also testified that he intentionally was not a "hands on" manager with respect to the Clinton White House’s requisition of FBI files:
Q: Now, . . . its my understanding that you weren’t hands on with regard to what Livingstone was doing or Kennedy was doing or Foster was doing with regard to reviewing FBI materials, correct?
A: . .. That’s correct. I wasn’t hands on. I knew generally the procedures that we were following, but I was not hands on with respect to that. That’s not a function I really wanted to participate in, you know, reading FBI files . . . It’s not my role or my style to micromanage my employees.
* * *
Q: . . . [Y]ou didn’t require either Livingstone, Marceca, Kennedy or Foster to come to you and say, show me the list of the FBI files you’re ordering up?
A: No, I did not.
Q: You never did that, correct?
A: That’s correct.
Id. at 233-34, 236 (emphasis added).
Nussbaum made it readily apparent that he left the handling of FBI files to Foster and Kennedy:
Q: You really didn’t get involved in what they were doing, you just told them to go do it?
* * *
A: Most of the time that is true. Virtually all of the time that is true, especially with Foster and Kennedy.
Id. at 234-45. In fact, it was Foster and Kennedy who told Nussbaum that Livingstone would continue to act as Director of OPS after the early days of the new administration. Id. at 86-89. Nussbaum apparently did not even know Livingstone. According to Nussbaum’s own testimony, he only knew Livingstone "to a limited extent, to a lesser extent." Id. at 236. According to Linda Tripp, Nussbaum repeatedly called Livingstone by the wrong name. See Tripp Depo. at 260-61 ("Bernie always called him Cliff. . . . It annoyed Craig [Livingstone] to no end"). Nussbaum could not recall ever meeting or knowing of Anthony Marceca during his entire time in The White House. See Nussbaum Depo. at 153.
Moreover, at his deposition, Nussbaum claimed to be almost completely unfamiliar with the process by which FBI files were ordered:
Q: I take it you never reviewed procedures on how to get material from the FBI?
A: No. That was a -- no, I never reviewed material.
Q: In fact, you don’t know any procedures in The White House Counsel’s Office for [getting background material from the FBI], do you?
A: . . . Of course there were procedures in The White House Counsel’s Office.
Q: Were they in writing?
A: The White House Counsel’s Office were instructed to follow the procedures -- the basic procedures followed by the previous administration, and I was informed that is the procedure that we were following.
Q: Whatever they were?
A: Whatever they were.
Q: But you never knew what they were?
A: No, I never paid attention to the details of the procedures, that’s correct. It wasn’t important as long as I had the right people doing it, and they were following proper procedures.
Id. at 266-67.
Nussbaum did not even want to know that the requisition forms for FBI files bore his name. Id. at 31. Nor did he want to know who was actually handling the FBI files when they arrived in The White House:
Q: Let me ask you these questions. Did you ever ask Kennedy or Foster, who was actually handling these FBI files when they came in?
A: The actual individuals handling them?
Q: Yes.
A: No, I never asked Kennedy or Foster that. That was their responsibility or Kennedy’s responsibility particularly to organize his office in effect.
Id. at 390-91. Nussbaum apparently did not want to know that interns were also handling FBI files in OPS. Id. at 392-93. And when confronted with the testimony of Mari Anderson, one of Livingstone’s assistants, which directly contradicted the Clinton White House’s explanations for Filegate, Nussbaum casually dismissed it by saying, "I don’t know who she is." Id. at 384.
The House Committee, in reviewing Nussbaum’s role in the Clinton White House’s unlawful acquisition and misuse of FBI files, concluded, "The confidentiality of all of the FBI background files was jeopardized once the Counsel to the President, Bernard Nussbaum, denounced any responsibility for this unpleasant yet necessary work." See Exhibit 10 at 33. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this complete lack of any meaningful supervision was intentional. In order to further its unlawful scheme to misuse information in FBI files for partisan political purposes, the Clinton White House turned to Nussbaum, a trusted friend, to fill the White House Counsel’s Office slot but not get in the way. The obvious reason for this was to allow his functional superior, Mrs. Clinton, to call the shots in the White House Counsel’s Office and unlawfully obtain access to FBI files. See, e.g., Tripp Depo. at 354, 359-61, 778-82. By his purposeful and complete failure to exercise any supervisory responsibility, Nussbaum thus enabled the Clinton White House to further its unlawful scheme and, as a result, acted outside the scope of his duties and responsibilities. In short, either by design or by recklessness, Nussbaum ceded authority to Mrs. Clinton and her "yes men" such as Kennedy, Foster, Livingstone and Marceca, in order to maintain his own "plausible deniability" if the scheme were ever exposed.
F. Livingstone is Unsuited to be Director of OPS.
Livingstone’s selection as Director of OPS provides further evidence that Filegate was not an "innocent bureaucratic snafu," but was an intentional misuse of confidential information in FBI files for partisan political purposes far outside any official duties and responsibilities. Indeed, even Bill Clinton did not think this excuse would be acceptable. In his recent book Shadow, Bob Woodward reports that even President Clinton dismissed the idea of characterizing Filegate as a "bureaucratic snafu." Woodward writes, "They discussed what the president’s public response might be. Because of the uproar, he was going to have to say something. Stephanopoulos had already sought to frame it as a bureaucratic blunder. The president was scornful of that approach." See Excerpt from Bob Woodward, Shadow, attached as Exhibit 29 at 327. Not only did Livingstone lack any security credentials, but his background as a political "dirty tricks" operative with a history of gathering "dirt" on persons to further political goals was entirely inappropriate for someone who would be making sensitive security decisions and reviewing highly confidential background investigations. See Exhibit 10 at 38. As the House Report finds:
Livingstone did not have the professional background necessary to perform the sensitive functions of the Personnel Security Office. Yet he was put in charge of that office, and then managed to remain in that role despite the frequent turnover of White House Counsels. Conventional wisdom would suggest that management turnovers bring staff reorganizations. Instead, over a 3 year period, he enjoyed a 40 percent salary increase by touting his record as a "team player" while keeping bankers’ hours.
See Exhibit 10 at 10-11. Renowned author Joyce Milton reached a similar conclusion in her recently-published biography of Mrs. Clinton:
Livingstone’s office was responsible for coordinating FBI background investigation files and other paperwork used by the counsel’s office to issue White House security passes. A strange choice for this post, which usually went to a civil servant of unquestioned discretion, Livingstone was best known as a campaign "dirty tricks" operative. According to Dennis Casey, a consultant with the Gary Hart campaign, Livingstone had written a report detailing certain "peccadilloes and vulnerabilities" of Hart’s opponents and their supporters, weaknesses that might be used against them. In 1992, he had been responsible for getting a man in a chicken suit to heckle George Bush on the campaign trail. (The operation backfired, because Bush got a kick out of the chicken and always seemed to perk up when he was around).
Joyce Milton, The First Partner, at 321-22.
At a minimum, Livingstone’s unusual placement in so sensitive a position raises a strong evidentiary inference that he was present in The White House for an illegal, political purpose. Livingstone, after all, continued to advance work for the Clintons’ travel even while he was supposed to be running OPS. Among the trips he arranged was the Clintons’ return to Arkansas for the funeral of Virginia Kelley, the President’s mother, when she died of cancer in January 1994. See Exhibit 10 at 28. Livingstone was also heavily involved in advance work for the President’s trip to Normandy, France, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Allied invasions of Europe during World War II. Id. After Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster was found dead in Fort Marcy Park, Virginia, it was Livingstone who went to the morgue to identify his body. See Tripp Depo. at 303. In fact an abundance of evidence supports the conclusion that Livingstone was Mrs. Clinton’s "errand boy." See Collective Exhibit 30.
Livingstone’s own background contained ample reasons, to put it mildly, for questioning his placement, if not disqualifying him from heading up OPS or even having a White House pass. In addition to his previous political "dirty tricks" operations, [ ]
While working on the Presidential Inaugural Committee ("PIC") after the 1992 election, Livingstone was charged with securing the PIC computer network against fraud and theft. See Exhibit 10 at 25. According to theft reports by the Federal Protective Service, more than $174,000 worth of computers, video cassette records, radios, cellular telephones, pagers and other electronic gear disappeared from PIC’s headquarters. Id.
After he was hired as Director of OPS, Livingstone gave inconsistent information to the FBI during course of a background investigation to determine whether he should be granted a permanent White House access pass. Livingstone [ ]
Also intentionally "overlooked" by the Clinton White House was [ ] See Livingstone Depo. at 223-28.
That Livingstone, a political "lowlife," was grossly unfit for a sensitive position was further confirmed by Presidential Cabinet Secretary Christine Varney, who testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform and Oversight Committee that Livingstone was being considered for a low-level, administrative position at OPS, not for the directorship. See Deposition of Christine Varney before the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, United States House of Representatives, attached as Exhibit 31, at 13-14. Associate White House Counsel Cheryl Mills similarly testified that Livingstone was being considered for a low-level, administrative position. Deposition of Cheryl Mills before the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, United States House of Representatives, attached as Exhibit 16, at 559; 560-63.
After Filegate had occurred, but before it had become publicly known, The White House itself was apparently concerned about the public’s perception of Livingstone. A December 1994 internal "task list" created by Jane Sherburne, Special Counsel to the President, enumerated no fewer than thirty-nine (39) areas of scandal vulnerability. See House Travel Office Report, attached as Exhibit 32, at 759-71. The list began with "Foster document handling" -- of which one subheading was "security/Livingstone issues." It went on to cover such items as "Travel Office," "Use of White House resources for response efforts" and "White House operations (drugs, passes, helicopters)," among others. The problem described as "security/Livingstone issues" is especially revealing because it showed that The White House even at that point had a problem with Livingstone.18
Livingstone was thus a far cry from what even Democratic Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-NM), writing on behalf of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, suggested during a 1994 review of White House procedures regarding the issuance of White House access passes and other security-related functions. After noting that "certain operational inefficiencies during the early stages of [the Clinton] Administration . . . contributed to the severe backlog of the issuance of permanent White House passes for White House employees," DeConcinci recommended that the functions performed by Livingstone be assigned to a full-time, non-partisan security professional:
1. The White House Office of Administration should be assigned a Secret Service Agent or other appropriate government official in a full-time position to function as the Director of Security. Such a person would be a non-partisan individual responsible for overseeing all security-related functions within the Office of Administration. The person filling this position would be a security professional to provide The White House with broad security-related specialties, to include but not limited to: knowledge of investigative and adjudicative procedures; classified document handling procedures; communication security procedures; and a law enforcement background. This person would be directly involved in the decisionmaking process for final adjudication of White House access passes and Top Secret security clearances. This person could provide The White House with institutional knowledge that would ensure continuity across Administrations.
2. A single office within The White House should coordinate all background investigations. Currently, the Executive Office of the President has two separate offices that initiate, track, control, and process background investigations. One office processes political appointees and another processes career employees. In addition to these arrangements, The White House Counsel’s Office processes the background investigations of Presidential Appointees who require Senate confirmation. This practice gives the appearance of an enormous amount of redundancy and lack of centralized control. These offices should be combined and headed by a senior security official (preferably the Director of Security identified in item #1) in The White House. It is my understanding that past Administrations functioned in this manner.
See August 11, 1994 letter to President Clinton, attached as Exhibit 34 (emphasis added). Senator DeConcini’s recommendations, which were ignored by the Clinton White House, only serve to further demonstrate that Livingstone, a political "dirty tricks" operative with no security credentials, was entirely unsuited to be Director of OPS. Why was he left as head of OPS in the face of serious questions about his background? Why did he continue in this position over the recommendation of a Democratic Senator and in the face of public controversies about the failures of the personnel security process for which Livingstone was responsible? That Livingstone was a political "low-life," [],19 but was given and allowed to maintain such a sensitive position raises a further, strong, evidentiary inference, if it is not direct evidence itself, that Mrs. Clinton placed and kept him there to gather information from FBI background investigation files on perceived and potential adversaries.
G. Anthony Marceca: Another Political Operative.
While Plaintiffs took Marceca’s deposition in this matter on June 9, 1999, rather than answer Plaintiffs’ questions, Marceca tellingly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. While the Court should thus draw strong adverse factual inferences from Marceca’s refusal to answer see, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-20 (1976), Plaintiffs’s efforts to obtain evidence directly from Marceca himself were hindered. Nonetheless, Marceca was deposed by the House Committee, and the House Report collects and synthesizes some very revealing information about both Livingstone and Marceca and their backgrounds. Such findings are entirely appropriate for the Court to rely on. See Hobson, 556 F. Supp. at 1181; see also Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 170.
As set forth in the House Report, Marceca met Livingstone while they were both doing advance work for the Gary Hart presidential campaign in 1984. See Exhibit 10 at 37. The two became friends and discovered that they worked well together. Id. at 37-38. Livingstone and Marceca thus formed an "advance team," where Livingstone would handle the public relations end of advance work and Marceca would handle the logistics end. Id. at 38. During the Hart campaign, Marceca advocated using "dirt" gathered by Livingstone on political opponents and other persons to advance Senator Hart’s campaign. Id. However, after Marceca took $200 from the campaign’s petty cash, he was barred from the campaign. See Exhibit 10 at 38.
The team of Livingstone and Marceca worked on several other campaigns. Id. After the Hart campaign in 1984, they both moved on to the Mondale campaign. Id. According to Marceca, the management of the Mondale campaign knew both him and Livingstone and kept them together as a team. Id. In 1986 the two were asked to work advance for the Hart for President announcement in Colorado. Id. Both Marceca and Livingstone accepted the invitation and worked on advance with the campaign until Hart dropped out of the race. Id. In 1987, Livingstone asked Marceca to work with him on Al Gore’s announcement. See Exhibit 10 at 38. Marceca agreed and worked several advance trips with Livingstone for the Gore Campaign. Id.
After the Clinton victory in 1992, Livingstone contacted Marceca and was instrumental in Marceca’s joining the Presidential Inaugural Committee, where the two worked together closely. Id. at 38-39. When Livingstone became director of OPS, he was then instrumental in The White House’s requesting that Marceca be detailed from the Department of Defense, where he was working as an investigator for the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division, to The White House. Id. at 36, 39-40. In a letter from Assistant White House Counsel William H. Kennedy, III to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin requesting that Marceca be detailed to The White House, Kennedy wrote that he had "learned of Agent Marceca’s unique investigative abilities and background and would greatly appreciate his full-time assistance here." Id. at 36.
Marceca’s detail was ultimately approved on August 5, 1993. Id. at 40. On August 9, 1993, Marceca went to The White House and received an access pass granting him access to The White House. Id. However, Livingstone had placed Marceca on The White House access list as early as March 24, 1993.20 Id. at 41. Because Livingstone had placed Marceca on the access list in March 1993, Marceca could thus enter and exit The White House, without appointment, at any time throughout the four (4) month period before his detail began and without there being any record of it. Id.
H. The Clinton White House Obtains the FBI Files.
Nancy A. Gemmell had worked in OPS since 1981 and was knowledgeable about the duties and procedures of that office. See Exhibit 18 at paras. 3-4. Ms. Gemmell was due to retire about the time the Clinton Administration took over. Id. at para. 4. However, Livingstone asked Ms. Gemmell to postpone her retirement to ensure that the office was functioning properly and that new personnel were properly trained before she left. Id.
Ms. Gemmell began the Update Project herself. Id. at para. 13. She requested a customized list of all active pass holders from the Secret Service in order to identify those persons requiring routine access to The White House. Id.; see also id. at para. 20. The list Ms. Gemmell received from the Secret Service consisted only of active pass holders because she had only requested an active passholder list. Id. Moreover, the list she received from the Secret Service did not state that any of the persons included on the list were inactive passholders. Id.
Ms. Gemmell did not complete the Update Project, but retired during its early stages. However, before leaving OPS, she fully explained the proper procedures for conducting the Update Project to Ms. Anderson. Id. at paras. 12 and 26. At her deposition in this case, Ms. Anderson testified that Ms. Gemmell was "considered the expert in the office on the rules and procedures for conducting the [U]pdate [P]roject" and that she relied on Ms. Gemmell’s "knowledge as to what needed to be done and how it should be done in the course of the [U]pdate [P]roject." See Anderson Depo. at 80. Ms. Anderson also testified that she did not understand Ms. Gemmell to have intended the Update Project be conducted "in any fashion differently than it had been conducted in prior administrations." Id. at 81. Rather, she understood Ms. Gemmell "intended to conduct the project in the same fashion that it had been conducted in prior administrations." Id.
Upon learning that Marceca would be detailed to OPS from the Defense Department to assist with office functions, Ms. Gemmell also met with Marceca for several hours. See Exhibit 18 at para. 27. In addition to discussing generally the many functions and procedures of the office with Marceca, Ms. Gemmell specifically mentioned the Update Project to him. Id. at paras. 27 and 28. As set forth in the House Report, Marceca admits that he met Ms. Gemmell, Livingstone and Lisa Wetzl, one of Livingstone’s assistants. See Exhibit 10 at 42. Marceca states that at the meeting, Ms. Gemmell explained to him the procedures to follow for the duties he would be performing while working in OPS. Id. Marceca took notes during the meeting of what he was told. Id. Marceca stated that Ms. Gemmell showed him the procedures he should follow in completing the Update Project, as well as other duties he was expected to perform.21 Id. Ms. Gemmell left behind a written sheet of instructions that Marceca would be able to refer to after she left. Id. In addition, Ms. Gemmell advised other OPS staff, including Ms. Anderson, of the procedure to be followed in performing the Update Project. See Exhibit 18 at para. 28. In fact, Ms. Anderson testified at her deposition in this matter that she was not aware of Ms. Gemmell giving "any instructions to conduct the update project in any fashion differently than it had been conducted in prior administrations." See Anderson Depo. at 82-83.
Importantly, before the Update Project had begun, Livingstone had written a memorandum to Kennedy explaining the process and stating, "Once the initial rush subsides, we will begin to request copies of files from the FBI on carryovers. This will be our first glance into background information of their employees." See Defendants’ Third Supplemental Response to Plaintiffs’ First Request for Production of Documents to Def. EOP, attached as Exhibit 35, at 11. In describing this memorandum to Senator Orrin Hatch of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Livingstone would later testify:
I think it is pretty self-explanatory. The first part where it says that I was giving him an update on carryover employees. To answer your question directly, sir, on the issue that you are interested on "their employees," I assume that meant on previous administration people as related to the topic covered under carryover.
Id. This is not credible. A more accurate explanation is that the use of the phrase "their employees" reconfirms the Filegate mentality and demonstrates that FBI files were being obtained for improper, partisan political purposes.
Contrary to Ms. Gemmell’s express instructions to obtain a Secret Service list of only active passholders, Marceca apparently obtained a master list of both active and inactive passholders from the Secret Service when he took over the Update Project.22 Indeed, this was the conclusion reached by the House Committee, which found:
The data compiled by the Secret Service clearly demonstrated that the only way Marceca could have obtained all of the names he sought files on would have been by utilizing a master list with both "Active" and "Inactive" employees, with the notations "A" and "I" clearly indicated on the printout.
See Exhibit 10 at 98. Marceca testified at a deposition before the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee that the list he requested -- which has since conveniently disappeared -- had "A" and "I" designations on it.23 See Exhibit 10 Report at 46 and 98. Marceca also testified that he believed "A" stood for "access" and "I" stood for "intern." Secret Service Agent Arnold Cole testified that he briefed Marceca’s supervisor, Livingstone, on the "Active" and "Inactive" list notations:
Q: You would have meetings where you instructed -- I believe you testified you instructed Craig Livingstone on procedures and how to get materials from your office and get updated lists, that type of thing?
A: Yes, we have had conversations about that.
Q: In terms of reading the lists, what "A" and "I" meant, active and inactive; that kind of thing had been explained to Mr. Livingstone?
A: Yes.
See Exhibit 10 at 98. Thus, and as the House Report concluded, Marceca’s testimony is simply not credible:
The list Marceca used also contains the date of birth on each passholder. If one were to accept Marceca’s testimony regarding his belief that the letters stood for "access" and "intern," then it follows that Marceca also believed that he was ordering background files on holdover interns who were 30 to 70 years old, and who had interned during the Reagan and Bush administrations. Contrary to his already incredible testimony, the request forms Marceca sent to the FBI on these "interns," as in the case of Billy Dale, identified them not as interns, but as staff members.
* * *
To believe this story, one would have to accept that Marceca, whose involvement in political campaigns is extensive, believed that such well known former White House officials as James Baker, A.B. Culvahouse, Ken Duberstein and many others were "holdover interns," a category of passholders which does not exist.
See Exhibit 10 at 46, 98. The only logical and reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that, using a master list, Marceca deliberately ordered the files of hundreds of individuals identified as "Inactive." See Exhibit 10 at 98.
The Clinton White House has nonetheless insisted that the Secret Service’s list was simply inaccurate. As a result, the Secret Service undertook an exhaustive audit of their electronic White House access pass system, known as the "E-Pass" system, and any lists that may have been provided to The White House. See Exhibit 10 at 96. According to Supervisory Special Agent ("SSA") John Libonati of the Secret Service, "Upon receipt of two lists which total 476 individuals [whose FBI background files The White House obtained improperly]24 the Secret Service set out to determine, if, in fact, we had provided ANY LIST which would have inaccurately reflected any or all of these 476 names as ACTIVE passholders in 1993 or 1993." See Exhibit 10 at 96-97 (emphasis original). According to SSA Libonati, "The audit confirms that from 1984 to July of 1993, 379 of the 476 names on the subject list were made Inactive. We can account for 8 errors . . . ." See Exhibit 10 at 97. In addition:
Names were made inactive only at the request of The White House. However, many of the names mentioned above were entered into the E-Pass system when it was installed, and they were entered as Inactive. Thus, at no time were many of the names on the list of 476 in the E-Pass system as active passholders.
See Exhibit 10 at 97. Moreover, according to SSA Libonati, the audit showed that in a printout of active passholders as of July 31, 1993, "379 of the 476 names in question do not appear on this list." See Exhibit 10 at 97. Thus, if Marceca had been working off an active passholder list of that date, he could not have ordered FBI background investigation summaries on 379 of the 476 persons whose FBI files were known at the time to have been improperly, because those persons’ names would not have been on any active passholder list.25 In analyzing the results of the Secret Service audit, the House Committee itself found, "The only logical conclusion to the audits conducted, was that no active Secret Service list could have produced the list of names of those whose FBI files were wrongfully requested by The White House." See Exhibit 10 at 100.
Regardless of whether Marceca used a master list of both active and inactive passholders, or an inaccurate list of only active passholders, it was widely known within OPS that FBI files of persons who no longer needed access to The White House were being requested and obtained. According to Anderson, Livingstone’s assistant, "everyone" knew OPS was obtaining files on persons who no longer required access to The White House:
Q: When did you first hear that the Office of Personnel Security had received [background investigations files] of prior administration officials who, in fact, no longer had access to The White House or had a need for a pass?
A: Specficially? Specifically, I don’t remember when I first learned it . . . . I do know that after everybody was aware of it that we did say, well, what are we going to do.
Q: Everyone was aware of the list being complete or the FBI files actually coming into the office?
A: Of the files coming into the office of people who had not been there.
Q: Of people who no longer had access --
A: Who were no longer working there. So, therefore, there was no need for the files; is that correct?
Q: No.
See Anderson Senate Depo. at 102-03; see also id. at 157-61. Anderson specifically stated that Livingstone was aware that FBI files were being obtained on persons who no longer required access to The White House:
Q: Did you inform Mr. Livingstone that this had occurred?
A: I asked Craig if -- I said Craig, or we thought -- do you know that -- it was sort of like an in passing type thing, because we had already known that we were getting background investigations on people who had left, and he said yes; that is just -- it’s part of the process.
See Anderson Senate Depo. at 161 (emphasis added); see also id. at 157 ("No, he did know that we had gotten files on people who were no longer there.").
Anderson also testified that she and others at OPS even "joked" about some prominent Republicans, including James Baker and Marlin Fitzwater, being listed as current pass holders, and requested that they be taken off list. See Anderson Senate Depo. at 150 ("I have a specific memory of marking out James Baker and Marlin Fitzwater, because there was a big joke that those were the only two names I could remember"). In point of fact, Secret Service Agent Jeff Undercoffer testified to the House Committee that, "in August of 1993, we were requested to remove Mr. Baker and Mr. Fitzwater, two other individuals, I can’t recall their names, from the list of active passholders." See Undercoffer House Depo., attached as Exhibit 36, at 14. Agent Undercoffer specifically testified that Baker’s name was removed for the list of active passholders on August 26, 1993. Id. at 15. Nonetheless, Baker’s FBI background summary was obtained by the Clinton White House in December 1993. See Defendants’ Response to Request No. 3, attached as Exhibit 37.
Anderson also confirmed that Livingstone reviewed all FBI files obtained by OPS, even those files on persons who no longer required access to The White House:
Q: Do you recall Mr. Livingstone ever looking through these files?
A: As far as going into the vault and looking through them?
Q: At any point in the --
A: Any time a background investigation came in to our office, Craig reviewed it.
Q: How about the once they were identified as -- for simplicity sake, we’ll say to be archived. I think we all understand what that means.26
A: He would have already reviewed it by that point.
See Anderson Senate Depo. at 109-10 (emphasis added). Again, politically active persons such as Livingstone and Marceca would certainly know if they were properly reviewing the FBI file of former Secretary of State James A. Baker. Livingstone did not rule out reviewing Baker’s files. See Livingstone Depo. at 480.
Moreover, Livingstone certainly would have known that it was not proper for him to review the FBI file of Billy Dale or any other fired White House Travel Office worker. Livingstone himself had escorted Dale and his Travel Office colleagues out of The White House on May 19, 1993, the day they were fired, then put Dale and at least some of the others on a "do not admit" list. See Declaration of Billy Ray Dale at paras. 3, 5 and 6. In his declaration, Mr. Dale swears, under oath:
Immediately following the meeting [where Dale and his colleagues were notified that they had been fired] my Travel Office colleagues and I proceeded back to our office where Craig Livingstone, the then-head of the Office of Personnel Security, stood watch over us. Mr. Livingstone had with him check-out lists, which were already prepared specifically for each fired employee of the Travel Office, to help with the check-out procedure. Routinely, these check-out lists were not prepared in advance. After clearing out my desk of my personal belongings, I handed my White House keys to the storage room to Mr. Livingstone and told him I had personal effects in a storage room. Mr. Livingstone then escorted me to the storage room where I obtained by personal effects as he stood watch over me.
Mr. Livingstone shortly thereafter placed me and some of my former colleagues on a "do not admit list" which was meant to bar our access to The White House complex.
Mr. Livingstone knew that I did not require access to The White House. Therefore, the explanation that he and others have offered that my FBI background materials were requested in the mistaken belief that I required access to The White House is not accurate.
See Declaration of Billy Ray Dale, attached as Exhibit 38 at paras. 5, 6 and 7. According to Special Agent Undercoffer, Dale was listed as inactive on the Secret Service access list as of May 24, 1993, as were his other Travel Office colleagues, including Mr. Barnaby Brasseux. See Undercoffer House Depo. at 9. Nonetheless, Dale’s FBI file was requested by the Clinton White House on December 28, 1993, Brasseux’s file was requested on or about December 16, 1993. See Defendants’ Response to Request No. 3, attached as Exhibit 37.
Desperate to diminish the impact of Anderson’s Senate deposition, the Clinton Justice Department flew her to Washington, D.C. to take her testimony in this case. Anderson was only one of two witnesses called by the Clinton White House and the FBI. However, this effort to salvage their "story" backfired badly.
In her testimony in this case, Anderson verified in all key respects her testimony before the Senate concerning how she, Livingstone, and Marceca knew that there were problems with the list that Marceca was supposed to use to obtain FBI background summaries and other materials for the Update Project. In fact, Anderson supplemented her prior Senate testimony by admitting at her deposition in this case that Livingstone was "shocked" that Republican names were on the active passholder list. Despite this "shock," individuals such as James Baker and Marlin Fitzwater nonetheless had their FBI information requested by Livingstone and Marceca. See Anderson Depo. at 354-58.
In response to obvious coaching by the Clinton Justice Department, Anderson reaffirmed that the list Ms. Gemmell obtained to use in the Update Project would have only included active passholders, i.e. those who were Clinton White House staffers. See Anderson Depo. at 90.
However, Anderson again admitted that, in the Fall 1993, the OPS office "as a whole" knew FBI information had been obtained on employees "who were no longer working there" at The White House. The office staff, including Livingstone and Marceca, knew about the "problem," yet the wrongly-obtained FBI information was not sent back to the FBI. See Anderson Depo. at 269-73.
At her deposition in this case, Anderson tried to backtrack only in a minor way as to whether Marceca was involved in allegedly striking names from the list and joking about high-level Republicans on the list, saying her earlier, detailed description of Marceca’s involvement in these events "may" have been a "mistaken memory." See Anderson Depo. at 356. However, Anderson was quite clear in her Senate testimony -- which was much closer in time to the actual events she was testifying about -- about Marceca’s active involvement in allegedly striking Republican staffers’ names from list. see Anderson Senate Depo. at 150-52. Anderson admitted the obvious point during her deposition in this case that one’s memory generally gets worse "the longer [one is] away from events that have occurred." See Anderson Depo. at 219-20.
During her deposition in this case, Anderson also testified about OPS’ response to the alleged lists of active passholders provided by the Secret Service:
Q: You were aware at the time that you picked up that list or shortly thereafter that there were people’s names on that list who were not current employees of The White House, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And you brought that to somebody’s attention, did you not?
A: Yes.
Q: Whose attention did you bring it to?
A: Craig Livingstone’s.
Q: And what did you say to Mr. Livingstone?
A: I said, Craig, look, we have James Baker, Marlin Fitzwater, and the Bushes still on the list, and he said you can’t be serious. This is, of course, just the gist of the conversation, and I said yeah, they’re still here. He said they can’t be on there, so we decided we need to go through the list, see who else on there we might recognize still had a pass or was still listed as what we had assumed active to the Secret Service and take them off of the active pass list.
Q: And how did you do that?
A: We went through it and we read down the list and said James Baker does not need access, wrote his name down, and then went through and submitted it to Secret Service.
Q: And did you do that at the direction of Mr. Livingstone or did you do that on your own?
A: Mr. Livingstone.
Q: At the time didn’t you comment to Mr. Livingstone and to Tony Marceca that you were striking out Baker and Fitzwater’s names because those were the only names you could remember of the previous Republican administration?
A: It was Baker and Fitzwater and the Bushes and the Quayles.
Q: Those four groupings?
A: I think it was more than -- yeah, those four groupings.
Q: And those names -- and Marceca was aware of that as well at the time, correct?
A: Well, if you notice the date on this list, speaking generally, this list is August 1, and Tony, I believe, it was not in the office at that time, so that might have been a mistaken memory, but I do know I did say it to Craig.
Q: I take it Craig expressed shock?
A: Yes.
Q: And what occurred after you struck the names off the list, if anything?
A: I’m not sure.
Q: Were the names struck off the list?
A: We marked through them on our list and then we sent a memo over to Secret Service asking them to strike the names from their list.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I believe -- I’m not a hundred percent certain, but I think some of the names may have still appeared, some of them may have disappeared. I can’t remember. But I know that we did send a memo over to Secret Service.
Q: And in fact another list came back, did it not, which did not have their names struck?
A: I do not remember at this time.
Q: Well, tell me what happened after that, what you remember at this time?
A: What I remember is that we sent the memo over, and then as we became aware of more people who were on the list who were inactive, we sent other memos to Secret Service asking them to strike those names as well.
Q: What happened after that?
A: The process continued.
Q: But ultimately some of the files whose names had been stricken wound their way into The White House nevertheless, correct?
A: I do not know. I did not see those files.
Q: You are aware from talking with others that some of them were ultimately delivered from the FBI to The White House?
A: I am aware that -- I have been told that they have.
See Anderson at 354-58.
Another OPS employee, Lisa Wetzl, who completed the Update Project after Marceca’s detail ended in the Spring of 1994, testified that in the Fall of 1994 she discovered OPS had obtained files on persons who no longer needed access to The White House. See Wetzl House Depo., attached as Exhibit 39, at 31-33, 50. Wetzl specifically recognized Marlin Fitzwater’s name on a file and told Livingstone about her discovery: "I said, ‘Craig, Tony ordered all these files of previous administration people that we don’t need.’" Id. at 63. Wetzl testified that Livingstone had no reaction to her statement, nor did he instruct her to do anything with the files. Id. at 48-49. Sometime between December 1994 and February 1995, Wetzl boxed up the files and archived them with the Office of Records Management. Id. at 67-68.
Thus, the evidence shows that Livingstone and Marceca knowingly requested FBI background information on individuals who did not require access to The White House. Since the files at issue were not requested for purposes related to White House access, then they must have been requested for another purpose. In this case, any purpose other than "certifying" access is inherently improper. Given Livingstone’s and Marceca’s history of political "dirt-digging," that purpose must have been political espionage.
I. Misuse of the FBI Files by the Clinton White House.
Not only did OPS improperly obtain and maintain FBI background reports and other FBI materials on former Reagan and Bush Administration appointees, employees and others, but Plaintiffs have obtained compelling evidence that the information in these reports was being misused. Ms. Linda Tripp, a key witness who worked in The White House Counsel’s Office during the relevant time period, actually witnessed White House personnel working with and referencing what she was told were FBI files, and even entering data from them into a computer database.
Specifically, at her deposition, Ms. Tripp testified that she observed "stacks and stacks" of what were later identified to her as being FBI files in William Kennedy’s Office:
Q: Were there other persons whose files you saw in The White House Counsel’s Office?
A: Yes, in Bill Kennedy’s Office.
Q: And who were they?
A: This is -- I don’t have a specific recollection of a lot of the names that I did see. I can tell you that my impression from the names I did see from different stacks -- my impression was that these were people from the Bush Administration whose names were familiar to me . . . .27
* * *
Q: . . . [W]hen did you see these files in Kennedy’s office. Was it on one occasion? More than one occasion?
A: Many. Many. Now, remember, I didn’t know what they were. I just knew -- in fact I had thought to myself on more than one occasion that this must be why the vetting process is so cumbersome and slow . . . [b]ut I learned during the time that Bobby Inman that the vetting files and all about vetting was completely different looking than these files. . . . [A]s a matter of fact he [Kennedy] intimated to me that these weren’t vetting files early on when I first asked him the question . . . .
* * *
Q: Did you discuss the stacks and stacks of files in his office with him?
A: Yeah. I made a joke that the -- it’s no wonder vetting is [such] a significant problem, if this is was an indication of the files of those yet to be vetted or those in the midst of being vetted. He said, "These aren’t those. They’re over there," and he pointed to the area in which he later said Beth Nolan sat, and I made some comment about, well, then what are these, and he just shook his head and never told me what they were.
* * *
Q: Did the files that he was shaking his head about look physically like the other files that were part of the vetting process?
A: . . . [O]h no, vetting, no, not at all like the vetting ones based on what I later saw with Bobby Inman and a few other candidates that were being vetted during the -- it wasn’t the attorney general vetting. It was vetting for one of the Supreme Court -- two of the Supreme Court justice nominees . . . .
Tripp Depo. at 173; 175-76; 179-80. When Plaintiffs questioned Kennedy about whether he had the FBI files of Republicans stacked on his desk, the videotape of his deposition shows Kennedy, who was extremely nervous and fidgety, literally choking before making a weak and nervous denial and trying to mask his culpability by drinking a glass of water to quiet his trembling.28 See Kennedy Depo. at 133-34; Kennedy Videotape, attached as Exhibit 40.
Tripp would later receive confirmation from Kennedy’s secretary, Ms. Betsy Pond, that the files Kennedy was using were, in fact, FBI files:
Q: In terms of the files that he pointed to and shook his head, did you understand those files to FBI files?
A: At the time?
Q: Yes.
A: At the time I don’t think so. At the time I didn’t know what I was seeing.
Q: Did you subsequently understand those files to concern FBI files?
A: Well, it was the same stacks, literally, of files with little exception or at least not discernable exception that Betsy Pond [Kennedy’s secretary] later referred to as FBI files many months later.
Q: She pointed to those files and said those are FBI files?
A: Mm-hmm. That was during the conversation in which she identified them, yes.
* * *
Q: Where were these files located that he was shaking his head about?
A: Everywhere in stacks.
Q: What do you mean by "everywhere?"
A: He had a large office, and Old EOB offices are rather roomy, and they were everywhere . . . the stacks were what caught one’s eye.
Q: Were they stacked up on a table?
A: Yes, and on the floor, and I didn’t know how they didn’t fall.
Q: How high were the stacks?
A: Relatively high. For instance, I would stand in front of his desk when I would speak to him, and some of the files were hip high. I’m five-eight and he’s five-ten, so do the math.
Q: How many stacks were there at any given point in time, generally?
A: I never counted them. A lot. My impression of Bill Kennedy’s office from that day forward never changed, and that was that he was the keeper of more files than I’d ever seen in my life, which is why when the FBI issued -- excuse me, FBI files became a public issue I was surprised at the number that seemed to be associated with the file issues because it seemed so very many more than 900 . . . .29
See Tripp Depo. at 181, 182-84.
Tripp also testified that White House Counsel’s Office employees did more than simply reference these files. Rather, data from these files was being entered into a computer database:
Q: Before we get into Bill Kennedy, let me ask you did you ever have a discussion where you discussed these files with Betsy Pond after that initial identification of the files as FBI files?
A: Oh, only in regard to her participation in inputting date from the files into a computer , but it again was not a covert conversation or a -- it was more or less -- its’s something we don’t -- by her demeanor and her voice and the way she spoke, it was quite apparent to me that she -- this was confidential, but it didn’t seem illegal at the time or anything. I mean, I didn’t get that sense. And she never said she was inputting data from the FBI files into her computer. What she was doing was continually inputting data into the computer, and, on a subsequent conversation said "the files" when I asked her what she was doing.
* * *
Q: Who raised the issue, you or Ms. Pond, about what she was doing at the time?
A: Oh, I think she did, actually, in the beginning because she asked if I wanted to go have a cigarette break. When she saw me she said, "I’m so sick to death of -- that’s all I do all day," blah blah, and she mad this kind of motion with her hands which would be her forefingers up and down pecking on the -- and I said, "Does he do a lot of mail?" And she said, "No, no, its not. It’s the files." And she pointed back, which to me indicated a direct sort of reference to our previous discussion."
Q: When she said "the files," she said FBI files?
A: She had said "FBI files" prior to that. No, this day she said "the files.
Q: Did you subsequently confirm from her that she was talking about FBI files that she was putting into the computer?
A: I don’t recall asking her specifically. My sense was that I had but I don’t know that for this purpose I can be any more accurate than that.
Q: You took it to mean FBI files?
A: I did.
Q: And why did you take it to mean FBI files?
A: Because of our prior conversation and the way she motioned to the location of those files.
Q: . . . And the use of the term "the files" between you and Ms. Pond took on a meaning "the FBI files" in the course of time."
A: . . . Well, I thought so.
See Tripp Depo. at 86-87, 88-90; see also id. at 92.
Ms. Tripp overheard a conversation between Kennedy and Marsha Scott (an long-time friend of the President and a White House official), in which they discussed loading data from FBI files into a computer system, at the direction of Mrs. Clinton, to share with the Democratic National Committee:
Q: Did you ever see Bill Kennedy with files that you believed were FBI files?
A: Yes.
Q: When was that?
A: . . . At one point, and I’m uncertain with the date, I observed Bill Kennedy in the hallway of the Old EOB in close proximity to his office holding some of those same file folders which had that familiar look by that point in a conversation with Marsha Scott. The conversation I overheard had to do with a database.
Q: Did you hear anything more?
A: Yes.
Q: What else did you hear?
A: . . . What little there was. There were two such conversations which I recall. One was in the hallway in close proximity to Bill Kennedy’s Old EOB office with Marsha Scott, and the very brief portion of the conversation that I heard before I was seen was referencing the files in his hand, which again shared that same commonality with all the other ones, but it was as though Marsha Scott was instructing Bill Kennedy, which was somewhat unusual, in my opinion, based on their differing roles, about the database. And the portion of the conversation that I overheard involved entering this information into a database here at The White House and shared with the DNC so that both would have access to this database, whatever that database might be.
* * *
Q: Did there come a point in time when you heard Mr. Kennedy or Ms. Scott talk about entry into [a] White House database other than that one instance?
A: Yeah, another conversation. Actually, this was the second conversation. This time it was outside the counsel’s office, which was directly adjacent to -- it was immediately adjacent to Mrs. Clinton’s office, and it was in the hallway right in front of those two offices. I don’t believe at the time that if Bill Kennedy had files with him that I noticed. He had something with him. I didn’t make the connection to files during that particular conversation, but he and Marsha referenced files again and database and referenced input of file material into the database. Again, it was more Marsha instructing Mr. Kennedy, and she named Mrs. Clinton and said that she, Mrs. Clinton, wanted this done. And actually stressed the point by pointing.
Q: Pointing to where? To Mrs. Clinton’s office?
A: Correct.
Tripp Depo. at 141-45; 163-64 (emphasis added).
Apparently in accordance with these instructions, Ms. Tripp even saw Kennedy’s secretary, Betsy Pond, entering data from the files into a computer:
Q: When she said she was inputting the files on this day that you had the discussion, did she have a stack of them on her desk.
A: Yes.
Q: About how big was the stack?
A: Again, I can’t give you a measurement. There was a good -- I would say a good number of files there.
Q: About a foot worth?
A: Let me just state that Betsy Pond operated in a cluttered environment much as I did, so there were many, many things out on her desk and area, but I did notice this, again, commonality to the stack that she was inputting which --
Q: Commonality with what?
A: With the ones that I had seen in the stacks in Mr. Kennedy’s office, the ones I had seen on Mr. Foster’s desk, the ones I had seen in Mr. Foster’s safe in Bernie Nussbaum’s office and --
A: Such as the Dale file?
Q: Such as the Dale file -- and ones I had seen in Mr. Livingstone’s office.
A: And it was that commonality which caused you to equate FBI with "those files?"
A: Yes, and by that time, as you can well imagine, I was far more sensitized to the danger of those files, although not knowing how dangerous, because of what subsequently happened with Mr. Dale.
Q: Why specifically were you more sensitized to the danger of those files at that time?
A: Because it was shortly thereafter that they were unceremoniously removed from The White House, and they were all known to be professional decent, honorable people, and they were not treated that way.
Tripp Depo. at 93-95.
In point of fact, according to Kennedy’s ex-wife, Leslie Gail Kennedy, Kennedy himself spent "hours reviewing information in the files and making entries into a database he maintained on his laptop computer."30 See Declaration of Christopher J. Farrell, attached as Exhibit 41, at para. 2. Mrs. Kennedy stated that the database her husband created was intended to make FBI file information accessible to the Clinton Administration. Id. at 3. When Mrs. Kennedy was asked whether these files included files of Reagan and Bush administration staffers, she responded by asking rhetorically, "Who would benefit from having this information available?" Id. She then added, "Why would [my] husband bother to review files of Democrats and make entries on his laptop -- especially since the files of Democrats would be routinely available in his White House office?" Id. Mrs. Kennedy also intimated that Mrs. Clinton had ordered the misuse of Republicans’ FBI files because she had come to Washington with an agenda and anticipated resistance to her agenda from many people. Id. Clearly, and as the Court has already held, any such misuse of FBI files cannot have been within the scope of anyone’s employment. July 12, 1997 Memorandum Opinion at 18.
Even the removal of FBI materials by Kennedy from The White House violated not only the Privacy Act, but also by analogy or otherwise, various other federal statutes, including but not limited to 18 U.S.C. § 2071, 18 U.S.C. § 1924, 18 U.S.C. § 798, 18 U.S.C. § 793 and 18 U.S.C. § 1905. Ironically, and by analogy, suspected Chinese Agent Wen Ho Lee will likely be charged with transferring classified information from a secure to a non-secure computer. FBI security background materials are entitled to similar treatment. Indeed, Special Agent Sculimbrene attested to the illegality of removing security background FBI materials from government premises. See Declaration of M. Dennis Sculimbrene, attached as Exhibit 19, at para. 18.
There is other evidence from which it also can easily be concluded that information from FBI background summaries was being misused. For example, Anderson, one of Livingstone’s assistants at OPS, kept a sign-out log for FBI background summaries. During a crucial period of time after the files had been obtained, however, there is a mysterious six (6) month gap in the log much akin to the infamous eighteen (18) minute gap in the Nixon Oval Office recordings. See Anderson Depo. at 148-55, 382; Sign Out Log, attached as Exhibit 42.
Moreover, Secret Service logs demonstrate that Livingstone and Marceca, two political low-lifes, had unexplained access to The White House residence. See Secret Service Logs, attached as Exhibit 43. These logs are corroborated by Linda Tripp’s testimony that Livingstone boasted about his access to the White House Residence. See Tripp. Depo. at 297-303. Mari Anderson testified that Livingstone removed FBI files from OPS without making an entry in the sign out log, albeit allegedly to show them to Kennedy. See Anderson Depo. at 151. Documents maintained by Deputy White House Counsel Vince Foster, including FBI files and the infamous Rose Law Firm billing records, were likely removed from The White House Counsel’s Office at the direction of Mrs. Clinton on the night of Foster’s death. Tripp testified that she saw what she thought were both FBI files and the Rose Law Firm billing records in a safe used by Foster in Nussbaum’s office. Id. at 61-67, 71-72, 80-83, 94, 347-48, 351-52, 491-99, 545-51, 561, 672, 768-72. A Secret Service agent testified that he saw Mrs. Clinton’s Chief-of-Staff, Maggie Williams, removing documents from The White House Counsel’s suite the night of Foster’s death. See Excerpt from Investigation of Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters, Final Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters, 104th Congress, Second Session, June 17, 1996, attached as Exhibit 44 at 53-55. Tripp also testified that after Foster’s death, Tom Castleton, a White House Counsel Office worker, carried boxes from Foster’s office to The White House residence under the direction of and esc