IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



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CARA LESLIE ALEXANDER, et al.,

   Plaintiffs,

   vs.

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, et al.,

   Defendants.
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)   Civil No. 96-2123/97-1288 (RCL)
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CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS





PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER TESTIMONY AND FURTHER PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM HAROLD ICKES, FOR APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL MASTER, FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AND PERJURY PROCEEDINGS, AND FOR SANCTIONS, INCLUDING ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS



Plaintiffs, by counsel, respectfully submit this Motion to Compel Further Testimony and Further Production of Documents from Harold Ickes, for Appointment of a Special Master, for Criminal Contempt and Perjury Proceedings, and for Sanctions, Including Attorneys Fees and Costs. Plaintiffs request that sanctions be imposed upon Ickes and his counsel. As grounds therefore, Plaintiffs state as follows:

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

I. INTRODUCTION.

A. Summary of Ickes' Misconduct and the Relief Sought.

Plaintiffs' counsel deposed Harold Ickes for less than six hours on May 21, 1998, wherein Ickes said he "does not remember" or "I don't recall" or similar statements of memory loss, approximately 84 times, an average of once every four minutes!(1) On other occasions his responses bordered on feigned memory loss and/or were clearly evasive, making his memory/non-responsive condition occur over one every one and a half minutes during the deposition, for a total of 264 times.

There were many reasons to obtain his testimony. The Filegate scandal became public in May/June 1996.(2) During most of the Filegate period, Ickes was Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President from late 1993 to January 20, 1997.(3) His duties were to "assist the President in whatever way he wanted."(4) Ickes "reported directly to the Chief of Staff (Thomas "Mack" McLarty and later Leon Panetta), but there were times when he "dealt directly with the President."(5) Ickes testified that as part of his job he "had a lot, a lot under [his] purview" and the FBI files matter "was but one of them, and it was an important issue."(6) Ickes further testified that when he left the White House around January 20, 1997,(7) he took "35 to 50 or so boxes"(8) of documents from the White House with him. Ickes said he boxed the documents himself and nobody checked them before he removed them.(9) In addition, Ickes has been doing "volunteer" work for the President's lawyer on the Clinton scandals,(10) which involves the Clinton Department of Defense's violation of Linda Tripp's privacy rights, a subject this Court has ruled relevant to this case.(11)

The tactics employed by Ickes at his deposition were consistent with the obstructionist strategy used by the Clinton Administration throughout this litigation and the many other scandals in which it is embroiled. In a display even more egregious than that for which George Stephanopoulos was found to have been untruthful and sanctioned by this Court,(12) Ickes failed to conduct a proper document search in response to a subpoena duces tecum. He completely failed to search one location and refused to say whether he searched another location. He also claims to have had his attorney search an estimated 50 boxes of documents he improperly removed from the White House and then he improperly asserted attorney-client privilege to prevent any meaningful examination of his attorney's search.

Ickes also committed perjury by falsely claiming memory loss in response to numerous questions regarding the FBI files, the Clinton DoD's violation of Linda Tripp's privacy, his suspicious dinner with Kenneth Bacon (the Clinton political appointee at the DoD who helped orchestrate the release of Ms. Tripp's information), and his discussions with Clinton Administration officials and Mrs. Clinton. Ickes should have been able to answer these questions because of his high-level position during the Filegate period and his work for one of the President's attorneys to conduct damage control by keeping "a very close track on" the Clinton scandals in the press and exchanging information with the press.(13)

Additionally, Ickes was improperly prevented from answering questions about a conversation he had with President Clinton about Kathleen Willey, whose privacy rights were violated when the White House released letters from her government file to the media.(14)

Ickes' conduct requires that Plaintiffs seek relief from this Court. Plaintiffs respectfully request that Ickes be ordered to produce to a special master appointed by the Court, at Ickes' expense: 1) all of the documents he removed from the White House, 2) those stored at the location he failed to search, and 3) those stored at the location about which he failed to say whether he searched, so that relevant, non-privileged documents can be produced to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also request that he, and possibly others, be ordered to give further testimony about any new document search he conducts that will allow Plaintiffs to question under oath whoever does the search. In the event that new documents are produced to Plaintiffs, Ickes should be ordered to submit to further deposition questioning about those documents.

Additionally, the Court respectfully should find that Ickes' testimony of memory loss is not believable and is untruthful and he should be ordered to submit for redeposition. The Court also should institute criminal contempt and perjury proceedings.

Additionally, Ickes also should be ordered to answer questions about his conversation with President Clinton regarding Kathleen Willey.

Finally, the Court should award Plaintiffs attorneys fees and costs for the first and second Ickes depositions, additional document review, as well as attorneys fees and costs for the preparation and filing of this motion.

B. The Clinton Administration has Engaged in a Pattern of Privacy Violations.

Ickes' improper conduct must be analyzed within the context of this case. For a detailed discussion about the history of Filegate, the Court is respectfully referred to pages 1-16 of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Further Testimony and Further Production of Documents from Kenneth Bacon, filed on August 18, 1998.

II. DISCUSSION.

A. Ickes Should be Ordered to Conduct a Reasonable Search of his Documents That Plaintiffs Can Verify Under Oath So That a Special Master Can Review All of the Documents.

Ickes' document search clearly was inadequate. He admitted that he completely failed to search two locations under his control and he delegated responsibility to his attorney for searching an estimated 50 boxes of documents he removed from the White House, who then improperly prevented Plaintiffs from learning enough details about his attorney's search to ensure it was reasonable. Ickes' failure to search for responsive documents is reminiscent of this Court's ruling that because George Stephanopoulos' "search for documents was inadequate," and Mr. Stephanopoulos' testimony was "not truthful," he had to conduct a "reasonable" search.(15)

For the first location, a residence in Salt Air, on Fire Island, New York, despite being unsure about whether he had documents from his Clinton campaign and White House work at the location, Ickes testified that he did not search there in response to Plaintiffs' subpoena(16) even though he agreed he uses the residence as "a kind of a get away place," in addition to renting it out.(17)

For the second location, Ickes testified that he lived at an apartment at 16 West 77th St., in New York City during the 1992 primary campaign that he later rented to somebody else in the summer of 1994 when he was living in Washington, D.C.(18) Ickes testified that he had some documents in that apartment from prior work experiences up to the time he rented it(19) and he put some of those documents in a storage facility in the basement of that building.(20) However, when asked whether he searched "that storage facility in response to Judicial Watch's subpoena,"(21) Ickes gave an evasive response describing what he did with documents from the 1992 campaign.(22) Asked again if he searched "the documents in the storage facility at 77th Street in New York to see if there were documents responsive to Judicial Watch's subpoena,"(23) he again evasively failed to give a simple yes or no answer and instead said: "Well, as I understand the subpoena, there would be no documents, to my knowledge, in that storage facility other than documents pertaining to the 1992 campaign, and I've already answered that."(24) Plaintiffs' counsel asked again: "But you did not search that facility."(25) Then Ickes' attorney interrupted in an apparent effort to help Ickes avoid a direct answer:

MS. SABRIN: Again, I would like the record to reflect his testimony which was that he, as you know, this is not the first subpoena Ickes has ever received from anyone. Those documents were culled in response to other subpoenas and obtained; and they are no longer in that facility. To the extent that there are documents that would fall within the ambit of this subpoena, they've been brought down a long time ago and that's what he's testified to already.

MR. KLAYMAN: You are on notice with the prior deposition not to do this, not to provide testimony. We will be moving for sanctions for this. You're on notice, continuing notice that we will be moving. This is inappropriate to provide testimony.(26)

Ickes then avoided giving a direct answer by rudely asking Plaintiffs' counsel about other court cases in which Plaintiffs' counsel has been involved:

A: Do you always threaten people this way, Mr. Klayman? You're a big threatener, I guess, uh?

Q: Are you threatening me, Ickes?

A: Huh-uh. [indicating negative] I was just asking you a question. I mean I was reading with some degree of interest your sanctions by Judge Chin that was upheld by the Second Circuit and your, for mischaracterization and racial implications, and then you got sanctioned out there in California, didn't you, before the District Central District Court of California for --

Q: Anything else you'd like to say, Ickes?

A: No, no, no. I just -

Q: Get it off your chest.

A: No, no, no. For a fellow who runs around squawking about sanctions, you ought to know a lot about them.

Q: Anything else you want to get off your chest?

A: I have nothing to get off my chest, Mr. Klayman. I just wanted to note your expertise when it comes to sanctions, having been the subject of sanctions yourself by pretty eminent courts.

Q: Well, Ickes, we will explore exactly how you learned about those later.

A: I can read.

Q: Oh, I'm sure you can. Anything else you'd like to say? Please feel free. Just tell us anything that's on your mind.

A: Go ahead, Mr. Klayman. To quote you, let's move it along.

Q: That's a very good idea.

A: Glad you agree.(27)

Soon thereafter, Ickes was asked again if he searched the storage facility and then he and his attorney responded by incorrectly claiming that the question had been asked and answered:

Q: Did you search that storage facility at 77th Street in response to Judicial Watch's subpoena?

A: Asked and answered.

Q: You're refusing to answer?

A: Asked and answered.

MS. SABRIN: He's answered. Asked and answered.

MR. KLAYMAN: Certify it.

THE WITNESS: Asked and answered. Have the court reporter read it back.

BY MR. KLAYMAN:

Q: I'm putting you on notice.

A: No, no, no.

Q: I'm putting you on notice.

A: Don't threaten me, first of all.

Q: I'm not threatening you. I'm putting you on notice.

A: I've asked the court reporter to read the record back because you're certifying my alleged non-answer of a question that was asked and answered and that you can't remember. Could you have the court reporter read it back, please.

Q: No, no. We're not going to disrupt the deposition. I know what I can remember, Ickes.

A: I want the court reporter to read it back for the record.

Q: We will conduct this deposition --

A: I have a right to that. You asked me a question. I'm asking the court reporter to read it back.

Q: You never responded to my question whether you searched.

MS. SABRIN: He did respond. It's asked and answered.

THE WITNESS: Read it back. You can't remember what you asked. That's your problem.

MR. KLAYMAN: I'll indulge you one more time, Ickes. Read it back. Direct the court reporter where it is. This will not count against our time, but yours.

(The reporter read the record as requested.)

BY MR. KLAYMAN:

Q: It's clear, Ickes, you didn't answer the question.

A: It's not clear that I didn't answer it.

Q: Why don't you just answer it now and we can move it along.

A: Go back and read the whole deposition.

Q: Why don't you just answer it again?

A: No. Let's go back and read the whole deposition.

Q: We can make it simple or we can play games. Let's try to make it simple.

A: I'm not playing games. I'm not answering questions that I've already answered, Mr. Klayman. I answered that question. It's on the record. You can go back and read it.

Q: Well, it is on the record and you didn't answer it. So we'll certify that one, too.

A: You're wrong about that.

Q: We'll certify that one, too.

A: You're incorrect about that, Mr. Klayman.(28)

Contrary to the claims by Ickes and his attorney, Ickes never gave a direct yes or no answer to the question about whether he searched that storage facility at 77th Street in response to Judicial Watch's subpoena.

Additionally, both Ickes and his attorney made contradictory statements about the existence of documents at that 77th Street storage facility. When Ickes was asked if he searched that facility,(29) his attorney, Amy Sabrin, said:

MS. SABRIN: Again, I would like the record to reflect his testimony which was that he, as you know, this is not the first subpoena Ickes has ever received from anyone. Those documents were culled in response to other subpoenas and obtained; and they are no longer in that facility. To the extent that there are documents that would fall within the ambit of this subpoena, they've been brought down a long time ago and that's what he's testified to already.(30)

Yet, Ickes testified that he has not removed any documents from that facility:

Q: From the point that you moved the file cabinets with the documents down to the storage facility to today, have you removed any documents from that facility?

A: Not to the best of my recollection.

Q: So they're all there, everything that you moved.

A: I haven't seen it in a long time. Maybe an earthquake took it away.

Q: Do you have any knowledge whether there's been an earth quake in New York City anytime in the last ten years?

A: A lot of things happen New York, you know. Water mains break.

MR. KLAYMAN: I'm providing notice, Ms. Sabrin, not to move those documents, not to alter those documents, not to do anything with those documents. We will be requesting court intervention.(31)

Thus, Plaintiffs are confronted with Ickes' refusal to say whether he searched the 77th Street storage facility in response to the subpoena and contradictory statements by Ickes and his attorney about whether any documents have been removed from that facility.

Additionally, the reasonableness of Ickes' search of documents he removed from the White House could not be verified because he delegated responsibility for that search to his attorney who then improperly prevented Plaintiffs from learning enough details about the search to insure it was reasonable. Ickes testified that when he left the White House around January 20, 1997,(32) he took "35 to 50 or so boxes" (33) of documents from the White House with him. Ickes boxed the documents himself and nobody checked them before he removed them.(34) He claims to have "subsequently . . . turned virtually every box over to Ms. Sabrin and Mr. [Robert] Bennett [his attorneys],"(35) and another attorney, "Ms. Arbab," all attorneys at Skadden Arps, one of the law firms defending the President.(36) (Ickes testified that the boxes he failed to give to his attorneys went to his house(37) and that he searched his house in response to the subpoena.(38)) When asked if he searched the documents he gave to his attorneys in response to Judicial Watch's subpoena, he answered: "No, I did not."(39) He testified: "My counsel informed me that she searched."(40) Ms. Sabrin said, "He's told you that he left it to me to search."(41) Ickes testified that the documents "were delivered to my lawyer so that they could make the judgment as to what was responsive or not."(42)

However, Plaintiffs' counsel was prevented from learning facts that would enable them to assess the reasonableness of the search. Although Ms. Sabrin said, "I am telling you for the record that we have produced any responsive, non-objectionable documents that were in those files to you today,"(43) she was not under oath and she prevented Ickes from answering the question: "Did she show you whether or not or did she tell you whether or not she found documents that are responsive to Judicial Watch's subpoena?"(44) Ms. Sabrin objected on the basis of attorney-client privilege and said, "you're not entitled to know my conversations with my client, no matter what the subject matter of them was."(45) Therefore, Plaintiffs were prevented from obtaining any testimony under oath by which they could assess the reasonableness of his attorneys' search of the documents Ickes removed from the Clinton White House.

In ordering George Stephanopoulos to conduct a reasonable search for responsive documents, this Court said: "[A]n individual served with a subpoena duces tecum has an obligation to conduct a reasonable search to ensure that non-privileged documents that are relevant or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence are produced."(46)

Ickes clearly failed to fulfill his obligation under the subpoena. Ickes admitted that neither he nor anybody on his behalf, searched for documents in response to Plaintiffs' subpoena at his Fire Island, New York residence and he failed to say whether he searched a storage facility at 16 West 77th Street, New York City. With regard to the estimated 50 boxes of documents Ickes removed from the White House and gave to his attorneys to search in response to the subpoena, Plaintiffs do not dispute his right to delegate the search function to others, including his attorneys; but he cannot delegate the responsibility. Ultimately, Ickes remains responsible for complying with the subpoena and he cannot extinguish his obligation to conduct a reasonable search by delegating the search function.

Moreover, Plaintiffs are entitled to inquire about the reasonableness of the search by obtaining testimony under oath by those who conducted it. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) states that parties "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things…" Without such testimony Plaintiffs have no way to know whether Ickes' obligation under the subpoena was fulfilled.

This is true even if the search was conducted by Ickes' attorney. Any other rule would allow Ickes unilaterally to extinguish Plaintiffs' right to testimony about the search, leaving them with no evidence upon which to assess the reasonableness of the search. Accordingly, even if otherwise protected attorney-client communications were involved, to the extent that revelation of the content of those communications is necessary for Plaintiffs to learn the scope and details of the attorney's document search, Ickes is estopped from asserting, or has waived the attorney-client privilege. Otherwise, Ickes could avoid scrutiny of his search simply be delegating the search function to his attorney, thus unilaterally extinguishing Plaintiffs' right to testimony about the search.

However, even without any waiver or estoppel, any claim of attorney-client privilege by Ickes in this regard is unfounded. The burden is on the claimant to demonstrate with reasonable certainty that the privilege applies(47) and to be a protected attorney-client communication, it must be shown "that the lawyer's communication rested in a significant and inseparable part on the client's confidential disclosure."(48) Thus, Ms. Sabrin was incorrect when she objected on the basis of attorney-client privilege and said, "you're not entitled to know my conversations with my client, no matter what the subject matter of them was."(49) Clearly, the attorney-client privilege does not protect all attorney-client communications.

Furthermore, Ms. Sabrin would not let Ickes answer the question: "Did she show you whether or not or did she tell you whether or not she found documents that are responsive to Judicial Watch's subpoena?"(50) Yet, this question did not require Ickes to reveal an attorney-client communication that would disclose any confidential fact Ickes told his attorney. All that would be revealed is whether Ickes was told by his attorney whether or not she found responsive documents. That question only required a simple yes or no answer. Ickes had not even been asked what his attorney specifically said about whether or not she had found any responsive documents. But even that communication would not be protected by the privilege because it would not reveal any confidential fact communicated by Ickes to his attorney. So there is no basis for assertion of the attorney-client privilege here.

The same is true of another question Ms. Sabrin prevented Ickes from answering on the grounds of attorney-client privilege: "Did you go through the various document requests in the subpoena with your counsel?"(51) This question did not call for the substance any attorney-client discussion.

The appointment of a special master would be appropriate here. Given Ickes' deliberate refusal to obey the subpoena and his feigned memory loss, as described below, it is clear that he cannot be trusted to do a reasonable search and produce the appropriate documents. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, the Court can appoint a special master to review "complex document production" which is "an instance of the 'unusual discovery' that has been widely recognized as constituting an exceptional condition within the ambit of Rule 53(b)."(52) Plaintiffs respectfully request that such a master be appointed, at Ickes' expense, to review all of Ickes' documents and report to the Court about what should be produced.

B. Feigned Memory Loss Can be Perjury When Proven by Circumstantial Evidence.

Ickes claimed a memory loss in response to numerous questions regarding the FBI files, the illegal release of Linda Tripp's private information by the Clinton DoD, his suspicious dinner with Kenneth Bacon and his discussions with Clinton Administration officials and Mrs. Clinton about the Clinton Administration scandals. Ickes was not telling the truth when he claimed a lack of memory in response to these questions. The questions asked for information that any person with an average memory should have been able to answer. Ickes testified that he was not under the influence of any drugs that would impair his memory and had no problem with his memory.(53) Yet, Ickes testified he "does not remember" or "I don't recall" or similar statements of memory loss, approximately 84 times in his 6-hour deposition, an average of once every four minutes!(54) On other occasions his responses bordered on feigned memory loss and/or were clearly evasive, making his memory/non-responsive condition occur over one every one and a half minutes during the deposition, for a total of 264 times.

1. Perjury Based Upon Feigned Memory Loss Can be Proven by Circumstantial Evidence.



Feigned memory loss is perjury. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld such a perjury conviction and explained how it was based upon circumstantial evidence:

Of course, in the absence of a statement by the defendant, the falsity of an "I don't recall" answer must be proven by circumstantial evidence. This does not mean that proof is impossible. As another court has stated, "The jury must infer the state of a man's mind from the things he says and does. Such an inference may come from proof of the objective falsity itself, from proof of a motive to lie, and from other facts tending to show that the defendant really knew the things he claimed not to know" or recall. United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114, 117 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932, 91 S.Ct. 2256 (1971); see American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 411, 70 S.Ct. 6745 (1950); Gebbhard v. United States, supra, 422 F.2d at 287-88.(55)

Accordingly, in another case, the Honorable Royce C. Lamberth warned a witness who claimed she did not remember her sexual-harassment complaints that she could be committing perjury.(56) Even though the events occurred more than a decade before her testimony, the fact that she had originally prepared memoranda explaining the complaints in detail and was later shown copies of those memoranda in court to refresh her recollection, all rendered her claims of not remembering simply unbelievable.(57)

There are numerous examples of circumstances that justified a finding of perjury for feigned memory loss.

In U.S. v. Becker,(58) on the trial judge's own motion the District Attorney was directed to investigate a witness' testimony as suspicious because she was a "very equivocal witness with a convenient memory."(59) She was then found guilty of perjury.

In U.S. v. Cohn(60), because a grand jury witness' claim that he could not recall a crucial letter and envelope or any of the surrounding circumstances was thought to be false, he was convicted of perjury and obstruction of justice.

In U.S. v. Alo,(61) the conviction of a witness before the Securities and Exchange and Commission for obstruction of justice was upheld, in part, because the witness "pleaded a memory lapse some 134 times in one and a half hour's testimony."(62)

In U.S. v. Alu,(63) a witness' claim that he didn't remember meeting a particular person was found to be false after testimony from that person describing the witness' visits to that person's home.

In Ex parte Hudgings,(64) a trial judge summarily found a businessman in contempt for refusing to authenticate handwriting and claiming he was unable to remember ever seeing his business partner write anything. After testimony showing the "wide field" of business activities in which the partners had cooperated together over a long period, the trial judge believed the businessman's claimed memory loss was feigned.(65)

In Matter of Sinadinos,(66) a grand jury witness' claimed lack of memory appeared too convenient because the witness exhibited a good memory on other topics. After receiving use immunity and testifying generally about his own life and gambling activities (answering "I don't remember" to some questions):

Sinadinos rebuffed most efforts to obtain information about his dealings with others in any gambling operations. In response to more than 60 questions about his professional affiliations Sinadinos repeated the words: "I've been advised by my psychiatrist that my memory is exceedingly poor due to many years of medication. For that reason I must respectfully decline to answer that question because I don't feel confident that I can recall enough to speak the truth."(67)

The court found: "The pattern of Sinadinos' invocation of anxiety about his memory casts doubt on the bona fides of the claim. He invoked the formula about the psychiatrist with suspicious selectivity when the questions led toward his associates."(68) For example, Sinadinos testified with precision about his meetings with a Mr. Mele concerning time periods far in the past and also in recent months, but was unable to recall the relevant time period in between.(69)

In Behrle v. U.S.,(70) the claimed lack of memory was unbelievable because so little time elapsed since the events about which the witness was questioned. The passage of only 3 weeks between a witness' grand jury testimony in which he remembered seeing a shooting incident and his trial testimony in which he claimed that he "remembered nothing" was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict that witness for perjury: "Direct proof that he did not remember was impossible. The circumstantial evidence that he must have remembered was, if believed, enough to overcome the presumption of innocence and to leave no reasonable doubt of guilt."(71)

The noteworthy nature of events can make it implausible that a witness would have forgotten such events. In U.S. v. Moreno Morales,(72) the jury was entitled to infer that it was highly improbable "given the enormity of the events" that incidents surrounding a terrorist shoot-out on a hillside, killing many, had been forgotten. The jury's finding that the witness had committed perjury by claiming he did not remember seeing some of the terrorists during a crucial period of time was upheld.

The trial judge in In re Bongiorno,(73) found more than 50 testimonial statements of "I don't recall" or similar statements to be implausible. Bongiorno testified before a grand jury under a grant of immunity and the court was most concerned with the witness' failure to remember meetings with an alleged conspirator even after being shown several photographs of himself frequenting a certain bar with the alleged conspirator.

Even a claim of "to the best of my recollection" can constitute perjury. In U.S. v. McMahon,(74) a defendant on trial for extortion and conspiracy was later convicted of perjury because he had testified that "to the best of my recollection" a particular co-conspirator never called him at his office during one time period and only four times in a second time period. In light of contradictory testimony from that co-conspirator supported by telephone records, the defendant's claim of "to the best of my recollection," was found to be false.

A witness' demeanor (which in this case can be observed on videotape as well as gleaned from the written testimony) can constitute persuasive evidence that memory loss is feigned. In In re Schulman,(75) the demeanor of a person who filed for bankruptcy showed that the "whole attitude of the bankrupt in the entire proceeding is that of contempt of this court and of its authority, and a deliberate determination to conceal from his creditors all the material facts within his knowledge…." The witness had merely been vague and "on very numerous occasions" testified "I don't remember" - "the stock phrase of the prevaricator." Likewise, in Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas,(76) the court stated:

Questions concerning the credibility of the witness are by their very nature questions for the trier of fact. In this case, ample reason existed for Judge Decker to discredit as feigned Trigona's claims of lack of memory or knowledge. Judge Decker had the opportunity--which this court does not--to observe the demeanor of the witness while on the stand and to thus assess his credibility."

2. Ickes' Alleged Memory Loss was Feigned.



Ickes' claims of memory loss related to Filegate events and conversations occurring while he was Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President are not credible given the nature of his duties, the importance of the conversations and the high level in the Clinton White House at which they occurred. The instances of Ickes' alleged memory loss are consistent with examples from the case law and the circumstances show that his memory loss was feigned.

(1) Ickes testified that when the FBI files matter first became public, he and White House Counsels Jane Sherburne and Jack Quinn recommended to then Chief of Staff Leon Panetta that somebody other than the White House investigate the FBI files matter.(77) Ickes testified that after his meeting with Leon Panetta he "participated" in a "few" discussions about Filegate with others at the White House,(78) but he could not recall "with any precision when, where they were, who participated in them, or what was said."(79)

Obviously, since these discussions were about the FBI files that are the subject of this lawsuit, these discussions are directly relevant to this case. The details about these discussions likely include incriminating information that has been successfully hidden by the Clinton Administration.

Ickes claimed loss of memory is not credible. He was Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President from late 1993 to January 20, 1997,(80) during which time much of Filegate occurred and was later made public in May/June 1996, after an imminent contempt of Congress vote forced the White House Counsel's office to belatedly produce subpoenaed documents that included the FBI file of Billy Dale that was improperly requested by the White House long after it fired him and the other White House Travel Office workers.(81) The Filegate matter was heavily covered by the media and both the House and Senate conducted investigations with televised hearings. It was a major White House scandal in which FBI Director Louis Freeh said that this file transfer and acquisition was an "egregious violation of privacy" and that the FBI had been "victimized" by the Clinton Administration while the FBI said the transfer and acquisition was "without justification."(82) The scandal became public in the middle of the 1996 Presidential election(83) and therefore must have been viewed by the White House as a potential obstacle to President Clinton's re-election. This was likely to interest Ickes since he was very active in the President's election campaigns(84) and "basically ran the New York State Primary for" candidate Clinton in 1992.(85) Ickes admits that he had these discussions about Filegate and the subject matter is such that anybody with a normal memory would remember who participated in these discussions and what was said. His claimed failure to remember these facts cannot be believed.

(2) When asked if he "discussed the Filegate controversy with Mrs. Clinton,"(86) Ickes replied that he "may have"(87) and "I'm not saying I didn't talk to her about it, but I have no specific recollection of talking to her about it"(88) and "I don't even have a general recollection. I couldn't give you a time, place, date."(89) When asked if he discussed with Mrs. Clinton "who recommended Craig Livingstone" for his job at the White House Office of Personnel Security, Ickes testified: "I don't think so. Craig was not somebody that I talked a lot about. I may have had passing conversation with Mrs. Clinton about him, but I for the life of me, I can't recall what it was either specifically or generally as we sit here today under oath."(90)

Mrs. Clinton is a defendant in this lawsuit, so conversations about Filegate in which she participated are directly relevant to this case. If Ickes were to tell the truth about these conversations, he might reveal incriminating information about Mrs. Clinton.

Ickes' claimed lack of memory is not credible. As described above, Filegate was a major White House scandal. Moreover, Mrs. Clinton was seriously implicated in hiring Craig Livingstone, the man at the center of the scandal, and then being deceitful about it. Mrs. Clinton said in 1996, "I did not have anything to do with his being hired, and I do not remember even meeting him until sometime in the last year."(91) However, FBI agent Dennis Sculimbrene's contemporaneous notes of a March 1993 interview with Bernard Nussbaum quote Nussbaum as saying that Livingstone "had come highly recommended to him by HILLARY CLINTON"(92) and that Mrs. Clinton "has known his mother for a longer period of time."(93) Another FBI agent, Gary Aldrich, testified that Deputy White House Counsel William Kennedy told him that "Hillary wants him [Livingstone] for that slot."(94) Gina Gibson, a White House intern who worked with Livingstone from May to July of 1994, told the House Committee that when she was being shown around the White House, she saw Mrs. Clinton say "Hello Craig" to Livingstone.(95) When asked about the charge that Mrs. Clinton was the mastermind of Filegate, Ickes testified that, "God, the newspapers were writing about it all over hell's half-acre."(96) Given the evidence of her role in hiring Craig Livingstone, the media coverage of her role and the attempt to hide that role, Ickes' claim of memory loss regarding his discussions with her are unbelievable.

(3) White House Counsel Jane Sherburne wrote a document entitled "Task List" dated December 13, 1994 and marked "JCS Privileged."(97) It described thirty-nine of the Clinton scandals, including at least one that did not become public until mid-1996: "Security/Livingstone issues."(98) Ickes testified that during that time he met with Ms. Sherburne "on a fairly regular basis."(99) Yet, when asked at his deposition if he ever saw the document before, Ickes said: "Well, as I sit here today I don't have a specific recollection of it. If it came from my files, I probably saw it."(100)

This document is directly relevant to this lawsuit. Ms. Sherburne's mention of Livingstone (a defendant in this lawsuit) approximately 18 months before Filegate was made public raises serious questions about the extent of the White House cover-up of the illegal conduct at the heart of the scandal. Any early knowledge of this document by Ickes would likely indicate his participation in the cover-up, if not the original illegal acquisition of the files.

Ickes testimony is not credible. The Sherburne Task List is monumental in scope, especially considering it was written in December 1994. Anybody with a normal memory would likely have a definite memory of whether or not they had seen this document. Even if Ickes did not see the Task List from somebody in the White House, despite his regular meetings with Ms. Sherburne, it is very likely Ickes saw the List when it was published by the Wall Street Journal on September 6, 1996.

(4) When asked if he "had conversations with Jane Sherburne about Craig Livingstone," Ickes answered, "I can't recall the specifics, Mr. Klayman, but I probably did."(101) When asked, "What did you discuss?" he stated, "I don't recall."(102)

The content of these discussions is directly relevant to this case. Livingstone was at the heart of this scandal and is a defendant in the case. Ms. Sherburne wrote about a problem with "Security/Livingstone issues" 18 months before the scandal was made public. Ms. Sherburne could have shared important information with Ickes that has yet to be made public.

Ickes' testimony is not credible. Given the enormity of the Filegate scandal, including the resulting televised Congressional hearings, its election-year timing, the prominence of Livingstone's role in Filegate, the evidence of a cover-up of Mrs. Clinton's role in hiring Livingstone, Ickes' job as Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President during the Filegate scandal and Ickes' regular meetings with Ms. Sherburne, Ickes would know for sure whether or not he discussed Livingstone with Ms. Sherburne and would not have to hedge by using the word "probably." Given these facts, Ickes likely remembers what he discussed with Ms. Sherburne about Livingstone and his "I don't recall" answer is not believable.

(5) When asked if he ever discussed "whether FBI files were taken out of Foster's office with anyone up to today," Ickes answered, "I may have."(103) Then after he was asked, "Who did you discuss it with?" Ickes answered: "I don't recall. I had thousands of conversations, Mr. Klayman, over the years, thousands, a lot of conversation."(104)

This question seeks information directly relevant to this case. Vincent Foster was Deputy White House Counsel under defendant former White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum. It is standard procedure for the White House Counsel's office to review FBI files of White House employees and others needing access to the White House.(105) Ken Starr's office has not closed its investigation into the improper removal of documents from Mr. Foster's office after his death on July 20, 1993. It is an open question whether any improperly obtained FBI files were in Mr. Foster's office. Plaintiffs need to know the chain of custody for their own FBI files and whether other FBI files were illegally acquired by the White House. The person with whom Ickes "may have" discussed the removal of FBI files from Mr. Foster's office could have significant information directly relevant to this action.

However, once again, Ickes' claimed memory loss is not credible. Given the extensive controversy over Mr. Foster's 1993 death, the unusual circumstances surrounding the removal of documents from his office and the FBI files scandal, common sense dictates that Ickes would be able to recall with much more certainty than "I may have," whether or not he discussed if FBI files were taken out of Mr. Foster's office and with whom he spoke about it.

(6) When asked if he has "ever been questioned about Filegate by independent counsel Ken Starr's office" or by the House or Senate, Ickes testified: "Not that I recall. But I will tell you, Mr. Klayman, I've been asked so many questions by so many different people in depositions and other legal proceedings that I could not testify with any degree of accuracy whether I had never been asked about it. I don't recall it."(106)

This question seeks information directly relevant to this case. Ickes may have given these investigating bodies relevant information that Plaintiffs do not have. Plaintiffs are entitled to learn that information. At a minimum, Plaintiffs are entitled to compare whatever information Ickes may have given other investigating bodies with the information Ickes provided directly to Plaintiffs. Any significant differences could reflect on Ickes credibility. Finally, if Ickes did provide information about Filegate to any such investigative bodies and that information has not been published by those bodies, Plaintiffs would not be able to learn about it other than by asking Ickes.

Ickes' answer is not credible. Given the facts of this scandal, the media coverage, the evidence linking Mrs. Clinton to the hiring of Craig Livingstone and the significance of being questioned by the OIC and the House and Senate, it is unbelievable that Ickes would not be able to definitively remember whether these bodies had questioned him about Filegate.

(7) When asked if he "talked about any aspect of the Clinton scandals" with Mrs. Clinton during his various meetings or conversations with her in the last months since January of 1998, Ickes testified he's "sure that there have [sic] been passing reference to it," but that he "can't recall" it "with any specificity" or "even recall with general specificity."(107)

The substance of Ickes' communications with Mrs. Clinton are very important, especially since Mrs. Clinton is a defendant in this case. Plaintiffs need to discover whether Mrs. Clinton was helping Ickes use the press to attack those she viewed as Clinton Administration adversaries by misusing government files, such as occurred to Ms. Tripp.

Ickes' claim of memory loss is not credible. Mrs. Clinton was questioned in the White House by Ken Starr's office around January of this year about the FBI files matter.(108) It is unlikely she failed to discuss this meeting with Ickes, as she did with Madeleine Grunwald.(109)

Moreover, press reports show Mrs. Clinton's deep involvement in managing the Clinton Administration's public relations response to the Lewinsky scandal. The Washington Post quoted Lisa Caputo, Mrs. Clinton's former press secretary, who The Post said "has been in touch with" Mrs. Clinton "in recent days," as saying that Mrs. Clinton was "in full battle mode" over the Lewinsky scandal.(110) The Post further reported that "there were discussions that she [Mrs. Clinton] would be turning to some of the veteran advisers - Carville, Harold Ickes, Michael Kantor and Harry Thomasson - who had helped the Clintons to weather earlier scandals."(111) The Post also reported that just after the scandal became public there was "an intense struggle between Clinton's lawyers and political aides" over how to respond to the charges and "[w]ith Hillary Clinton leading the way, the political side eventually won."(112) According to The Post, on January 26, 1998, a White House "strategy session with several political consultants and advisers" was held that "focused, inevitably, on the sex scandal," and "Hillary Clinton, as she has been at every point in his [President Clinton's] career, was at the center of that strategy."(113)

This would not be the first time that Mrs. Clinton has taken a major role in trying to affect press coverage of President Clinton's scandals:

At a meeting in the White House residence soon afterward, the first lady, who spoke periodically with Blumenthal, asked aides to write a report on [Post reporter Susan] Schmidt's coverage. The idea was not only to publish the report but to formally present it to [Post Executive Editor] Downie. … After the report was compiled by White House attorneys at public expense, it was killed by White House press secretary Michael McCurry and Mark Fabiani....(114)

Moreover, Ickes' claims of memory loss relating more specifically to the Lewinsky matter involving Linda Tripp, that became public in January 1998, are especially unbelievable given that it is his job to be knowledgeable about the matter so he can conduct damage control with the press. He testified that "very shortly after the first reports about Monica Lewinsky became public" he's "been doing some work with Mickey Kantor [one of the President's attorneys], but all on a voluntary basis."(115) He testified that in doing this work he "would talk to people on the outside. . . . [t]alk to a lot of press people and talk to supporters and others about this situation."(116) He testified that this work entails finding out "what stories the press are interested in" and because "the press is often not fully informed of everything that is going on," he talks to the press "to find out what stories they think are interesting, what they're working on; and also to provide information that [he] may have that the particular press person [he is] talking to may not have."(117) He testified that he has "kept a very close track on this through the public presses."(118)

Apparently, as part of this work, Ickes had several conversations with Jane Mayer, to whom the Clinton DoD illegally released Linda Tripp's private information. Curiously, his account of his conversations with Ms. Mayer shifted drastically during the deposition. Ickes testified that since the Lewinsky scandal broke, but before Ms. Mayer's New Yorker article about Linda Tripp was published, he met with Ms. Mayer in his office once or twice and had several telephone conversations with her.(119) Ickes was asked: "What did she say to you?"(120) He answered: "I don't know. I don't have the foggiest idea. Mr. Klayman, I talk to a lot of reporters and talk to a lot of people. I can no more sit here under oath today and tell you what I said to her and what she said to me than the man on the moon."(121) Later he was asked: "What did you discuss during that second possible meeting?"(122) Initially, he denied any recollection, but then admitted that they discussed Monica Lewinsky and Linda Tripp:

A: Same answer as to the first question you asked.

Q: You don't have a clue.

A: I don't recall. I talk to a lot of different people about a lot of different things. Under oath I could not say with any certainty as to what I talked to her about.

Q: General subject matter, talked to her about the Clinton Administration?

A: She was working on one of several stories. I think it - yeah. The general subject matter was the situation known as Monica Lewinsky generally, which is a pretty broad topic, as we now, at least as I refer to it.

Q: Did you discuss Linda Tripp with her?

A: I think she may have raised the name Linda Tripp. I don't think there was any - whatever discussion there was, if there was any, was short-lived because I knew nothing about Linda Tripp, other than what I've testified to.

Q: Did she ask you whether or not you had information as to whether or not Linda Tripp had ever been arrested?

A: I don't recall her asking me that. And - I don't recall her asking me that. She may have, but I don't recall it.(123)

In light of all the news coverage over Ms. Tripp's arrest record and Ms. Mayer's role in disclosing it, Ickes likely would know whether or not Ms. Mayer inquired about Ms. Tripp's arrest record.

Therefore, given Ickes' early and continuing damage control work on the Lewinsky scandal in sharing information with the press and keeping "a very close track on this through the public presses,"(124) and Mrs. Clinton's reported central role in managing the political and public relations aspects of the Administration's response, Ickes' claimed lack of recollection regarding his conversations about the scandal with Mrs. Clinton are not believable. Since news reports indicated that Mrs. Clinton had taken personal charge of the public relations campaign for the President during this time period, it is unbelievable that she did not pass along directions to a trusted colleague who also was working on exactly the same thing. For example, one would think it to be a virtual certainty that Ickes and Mrs. Clinton would have discussed Ickes' dinner communications with Kenneth Bacon(125) and that Ickes would have a good recollection of those discussions with her.

(8) When asked if he "ever discussed Linda Tripp with President Clinton," Ickes testified he had no "specific" or "general" recollection(126) and that he didn't "have any recollection."(127)

The question is directly relevant to this case. Linda Tripp is a material federal witness against President Clinton whose privacy rights were violated by a Clinton DoD political appointee, among others, when the contents of her government file was illegally disclosed to Jane Mayer of The New Yorker after the Lewinsky scandal became public. This Court ruled that the DoD's release of Ms. Tripp's private information is relevant to this lawsuit. Her FBI file was also among those obtained by the White House. The content of Ickes' conversations with the President about Ms. Tripp might reveal information about Presidential involvement in the Tripp release.

Ickes' claim of memory loss is especially unbelievable given that: 1) Ickes was working for the President, through one of the President's attorney's, Mr. Kantor, to do damage control work on the Lewinsky scandal by sharing information with the press(128) and keeping "a very close track on this through the public presses,"(129) and 2) Ms. Tripp is at the heart of a scandal that could topple President Clinton's Administration. Common sense dictates that Ickes should have been able to give a direct yes or no answer to this question, and the only believable answer would be "yes." It is inconceivable that he would not have discussed the subject matter of his job with the person for whom he was asked to do the job. Moreover, if he had such a discussion with the President, it seems inconceivable that he would not have a clear memory of it. If he did not have such a discussion with the President, he should have been able to give a direct "no" as his answer.

(9) Ickes testified he had a dinner with Kenneth Bacon and Georgetown law professor Steven Cohen within the last few months.(130) When asked what "specifically about Linda Tripp was discussed" at the dinner, Ickes testified: "I knew nothing about Linda Tripp and I think I may have asked Ken when she came over to the Pentagon. But other than that, we did not spend any time talking about her."(131)

In light of Bacon's role in illegally releasing Ms. Tripp's private information to reporter Jane Mayer(132) and Ickes' conversations with Ms. Mayer prior to that release,(133) the likely role of Ickes as a link between the White House and the Clinton DoD regarding the release needs to be explored by Plaintiffs.

Ickes' claim that he "knew nothing" about Ms. Tripp, whose tape recordings made her a central figure in the Lewinsky scandal, is not credible given press coverage of Ms. Tripp and his testimony that "very shortly" after the Lewinsky scandal became public he's been working with Michael Kantor in finding out what the press is working on, providing information to the press and keeping "a very close track on this through the public presses."(134) In the first two days following its initial story on the Lewinsky scandal The Washington Post published two stories giving much detail about Ms. Tripp, including her past testimony about the Vincent Foster death, her job as a secretary in a classified unit of the U.S. Army Intelligence Command at Fort Meade and the fact she worked at the same Pentagon department as Ms. Lewinsky, where the boss was Bacon.(135) Thus, it is highly unlikely Ickes knew "nothing" about Ms. Tripp when he had dinner with Bacon and Mr. Cohen, if he had been doing the work for Mr. Kantor he testified about.

Also, it is nearly impossible to believe that Ickes - as one responsible for keeping "a very close track on this [the Lewinsky scandal] through the public presses"(136) - would not have been intensely interested in learning more about Ms. Tripp from Bacon than simply "when she came over to the Pentagon."(137)

(10) Although he testified that since January 1998, he talked to the President and Mrs. Clinton about Mr. Starr, he testified that he "can't remember generally or specifically" what was discussed about Mr. Starr.(138)

The President and Mrs. Clinton's discussions with Ickes about Ken Starr are directly relevant to this case. In addition to the Lewinsky matter, Mr. Starr has been assigned to investigate Filegate and the Tripp release. The President and Mrs. Clinton's comments about the man assigned to investigate the subject of this lawsuit (in which Mrs. Clinton is a defendant) and a similar incident deemed relevant to this case, could contain information incriminating to the President and Mrs. Clinton.

Ickes should have been able to remember what was discussed about Mr. Starr. Mr. Starr has been the President's most visible legal adversary for several years, especially within the last several months because of the Lewinsky scandal. Mr. Starr has had many people from the White House testify before the Grand Jury investigating the Lewinsky scandal. The President's attorney, David Kendall, has hired private investigators, smeared Mr. Starr in the media and also filed formal ethics and criminal complaints against him. White House spokespersons are constantly besmirching Mr. Starr and urging him to end his investigation as the White House makes unprecedented privilege claims that have delayed Mr. Starr's investigation. Given that it is Ickes' job to keep "a very close track on this [the Lewinsky and other Clinton scandals] through the public presses,"(139) for Michael Kantor, it is unbelievable that he would not have a recollection of his conversations with the President and Mrs. Clinton about Mr. Starr.

(11) Although Ickes testified that since January 1998, he talked to Rahm Emanuel "[v]ery infrequently; probably not over three or four times,"(140) he testified he could not recall if he talked to Mr. Emanuel about Linda Tripp or Monica Lewinsky.(141) Although he testified he talked to Mr. Emanuel about Kenneth Starr, he testified he had "no idea" what he said about Mr. Starr.(142)

It is important for Plaintiffs to learn the substance of any communications Ickes had with Mr. Emanuel. Mr. Emanuel is a major White House spokesman who is frequently seen on the Sunday Morning news talk shows. If Ickes had any role in being a White House link to the Clinton DoD regarding the release of Ms. Tripp's private information, his communications with Mr. Emanuel likely could provide evidence of such a role.

Mr. Emanuel has made many public statements about the Lewinsky scandal and Mr. Starr. Ickes works for Michael Kantor in doing damage control on the Lewinsky scandal. It defies belief that Ickes could not recall whether he talked to Mr. Emanuel about the major news topic of the last five months that has each of them deeply involved with the press. This is especially true given that the scandal threatens the Clinton Presidency. Ickes' failure to recall what was said about Mr. Starr also rings untrue for the same reason.

(12) One of Ickes' most blatant examples of feigned memory loss involves Plaintiffs' subpoena. Although he received the subpoena a week and a half before his testimony,(143) Ickes claimed that service was improper and that he appeared at his deposition voluntarily.(144) Yet, when asked when he gave the subpoena to his attorney, which had to be within the week and a half prior to the deposition, he claimed he could not recall.(145)

Ickes' testimony clearly is not believable. Incredibly, Ickes testified that he could not recall a significant event that occurred only within the last week and a half before his testimony. He testified he could not even recall enough to answer by saying only "roughly speaking" or to answer whether it could have been within "weeks," although he testified he received the subpoena only one and a half weeks earlier!

(13) Although Ickes testified that he "may have" talked to various people about Joe diGenova,(146) he testified that he didn't "know" what he discussed about Mr. diGenova.(147) When asked to identify the reporter with whom he discussed Mr. diGenova, he testified: "Don't' know when, don't know where, don't know what was said."(148) When asked if he ever discussed the issue of whether or not Mr. diGenova and his wife (Victoria Toensing) could simultaneously work for CNBC and Congress, he testified: "I may have. Don't recall if I have. I haven't paid much attention to them, to tell you the truth."(149) When asked who he discussed it with, he testified: "Don't know. Don't recall."(150)

The questions about Mr. diGenova and his wife are relevant to this case because if the Clinton Administration has been collecting private information about them from government files, this would be part of the Administration's pattern and practice of violating privacy rights in order to intimidate its perceived adversaries. There is evidence that Mr. diGenova and his wife may have been targeted by the White House and its investigators for intimidation because of their expressed views about the Clinton Administration and that the White House tried to deceive the public about this intimidation.

Mr. diGenova and his wife are frequent television talk show guests regarding the Clinton scandals. They made additional news when Mr. diGenova announced on NBC's "Meet the Press" that he had information that White House allies were investigating him and his wife.(151) Further controversy erupted after the White House "flatly denied that DiGenova and Toensing were the subject of any inquiry," but then "Clinton lawyers David Kendall and Robert Bennett acknowledged that they had retained [Terry] Lenzner's investigative firm," and only denied that they have investigated "the personal lives of" Mr. diGenova and Ms. Toensing, noting the availability of "public information."(152) Again, it was Ickes' job to follow all of this and his claimed lack of memory about Mr. diGenova and his wife is not believable.

There is an additional reason Ickes should be able to recall these conversations. Mr. Ickes might be properly and legally investigated by Mr. diGenova and his wife. They work for the House Committee on Education and the Workforce investigating the Teamsters union.(153) Their investigation might involve Ickes since he faces a possible perjury investigation sparked by Teamsters memos contradicting his Senate testimony denying that the White House helped the Teamsters during a labor dispute.(154) This would certainly be good reason for Ickes to be very interested in Mr. diGenova and his wife.

(14) Although he testified that he had conversations with various people(155) in which Richard Mellon Scaife was discussed, that "[p]robably" included discussions of the Arkansas project,(156) he testified that he didn't "recall the details"(157) of those conversations and when asked what he was told about Mr. Scaife during those conversations, he testified: "I don't have the fog - I don't have any recollection with any specificity about what they said about Mr. Scaife or who said it or when they said it."(158)

The question is relevant because if the Clinton Administration has been collecting information about Mr. Scaife from government files, this would be part of the Administration's pattern and practice of violating privacy rights in order to intimidate its perceived adversaries. It is common knowledge that the White House has been vilifying Mr. Scaife for several years and has tried to portray him as one of the leaders of Mrs. Clinton's "vast right-wing conspiracy." Ickes' role as a White House damage control ally would make him very familiar with Mr. Scaife and it is unbelievable that he would have so little recollection of discussions about him.

(15) Although he testified that he "may have discussed" Stuart Taylor with various people, he testified that he didn't "remember who I talked to about it or what was said."(159)

The question is relevant because if the Clinton Administration has been collecting information about Mr. Taylor from government files, this would be part of the Administration's pattern and practice of violating privacy rights in order to intimidate its perceived adversaries. Mr. Taylor is a well-respected legal writer who wrote a major article in late 1996 that caused the dominant media to take Paula Jones' charges seriously.(160) He has appeared on numerous television talk shows discussing the Jones case and the more recent Lewinsky scandal. Ickes' job requires him to pay attention to what Stuart Taylor tells the public. Mr. Taylor has even been in the news because of his possible employment by Mr. Starr's office.(161) Ickes' failure to recall who he talked to about Stuart Taylor and what was said is not credible.

(16) Ickes' demeanor, showing his hostility to the deposition process and this Court, also provides additional circumstantial evidence that his alleged memory loss is feigned.(162) This is evident from portions of his testimony where he did not claim any memory loss, but made the deposition process as difficult as possible, displaying a general attempt to withhold information by stressing non-responsive documents and trivial information, including a particularly graphic example when he was asked about notes and correspondence on the first floor of his residence. In response, he immediately changed the subject to his daughter's artwork and paintings on the wall:

Q: Where do you store the documents in your house?

A: Well, we have books upstairs. We have various documents upstairs. There's documents on the fourth floor, the second - let's see how many floors are there. There's the basement. . . .

. . .

Q: Where are they stored?

A: In various parts.

Q: How are they stored, in boxes?

A: In various parts. Well, the wrapping paper I keep sort of on the floor in the boxes. The newspapers, I keep some in boxes, some on the floor. The old magazines, some of those I keep on the shelf. Bubble paper, does that come within the document - yeah, bubble paper we keep down there, also. But you know, it's around different parts of the basement. There are some notes there. There are some financial records there. There are some letters there. There are some books there.

Q: What documents do you keep on the first floor?

A: Roughly, the same answer. I mean there are books there. Primarily books I would say, on the first floor. There's some -

Q: But also notes and correspondence.

A: Yeah, and my daughter has some drawing paper there. She does a lot of artwork. There's some pictures on the walls. Those are documents, I think, aren't they? Yeah. There are also some videotapes on the first floor and some audiotapes on the first floor. Oh, there are some CD disks on the first floor.

Q: The third floor, what do you keep on the third floor?

A: A combination of the stuff that I've just talked to you about, with the exception of the wrapping paper. We generally keep that down, and the bubble paper, we generally keep that down in the basement.

Q: Fourth floor?

A: Fourth floor, not many documents up there, mostly - there's some wrapping paper up there, I don't want to mislead you on the wrapping paper. There's some wrapping paper up there. There are not many notes up there. There are some magazines, basically National Geographic and the like.

Q: Are you aware you're in a court proceeding, Ickes?

A: Do I look stupid?(163)

Ickes' explanation for this testimony is not credible. Ickes quoted the definition of "document" that was included in his subpoena and sarcastically claimed that he was trying to be responsive to the subpoena.(164) However, the subpoena did not request every document in Ickes' possession, custody or control, but only those documents "concerning or relating to" various specific subjects, including access to and disclosure of FBI files and communications with specific individuals and offices, etc.(165) His daughter's artwork and the family's wrapping and bubble paper is not included within any of the subjects for which the subpoena requests documents, yet Ickes chose to testify about them, thereby showing his hostility to the deposition process, further demonstrating that his alleged memory loss was feigned and showing disrespect to the Court.

3. The Court Can Issue an Order to Show Cause to Ickes Regarding Perjury.



The Court has authority to issue an order to show cause to Ickes as to why he should not be held in criminal contempt for perjury because of his feigned memory loss. As stated by Judge Learned Hand: "The power of the court to treat as a criminal contempt a persistent perjury which blocks the inquiry is settled by authority in this circuit."(166) Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) says that a "criminal contempt . . . shall be prosecuted on notice." Such notice can be given by "an order to show cause," according to the rule.

Moreover, if Ickes violates an order to testify truthfully by feigning memory loss, the Court can impose civil contempt sanctions on him pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1826(a).(167)

B. Ickes Should be Ordered to Answer Questions About Kathleen Willey.

Ickes was improperly prevented from answering questions about a conversation he had with President Clinton regarding Kathleen Willey, whose letters were released from White House files to the public.(168) Terry Good, the Director of the White House Office of Records Management, testified that his office received a request, probably from the White House Counsel's office, to look for a letter written by Ms. Willey.(169) He said there was more than one letter and they were provided to the White House Counsel's office.(170) The letters were retrievable by entering her name in a database program and searching, according to Good.(171) The release of Ms. Willey's letters was a violation of the Privacy Act. This Court has ruled that the Willey release is relevant to this case.(172)

When discussing his conversations with the President,(173) Ickes was asked, "You've talked to him about Kathleen Willey?"(174) Ickes answered, "I think we did have a very brief conversation about her at one point."(175)

Thereafter, Ickes was asked the following questions: "What did you discuss about Kathleen Willey?"(176) "Did you discuss with regard to the President the letters that Kathleen Willey had written to him?"(177) "Did you discuss with the President the release of those letters to Kathleen Willey -- from Kathleen Willey, to the public?"(178) "But you did discuss the contents of the Kathleen Willey letters with the President. Correct?"(179)

Clinton DoJ attorney Elizabeth Shapiro instructed Ickes not to answer these questions, proclaiming that the conversation was "subject to a variety of privileges"(180) and "could potentially be a Presidential communication, it could be deliberative, it could be a number of privileges."(181)

Contrary to Ms. Shapiro's instructions, Ickes' conversation with the President about Kathleen Willey is not privileged. First, a party claiming a privilege bears the burden of establishing the facts necessary to support the privilege's application in a particular situation.(182) Ms. Shapiro failed to provide any factual basis for the privileges she claimed. Second, as this Court has stated, Executive privilege requires "an express invocation of the privilege by the President…."(183) No such invocation has occurred here. Third, the deliberative process privilege "disappears altogether when there is any reason to believe government misconduct occurred"(184) and the facts of this case show that much government misconduct occurred with regard to the illegal acquisition of FBI files by the Clinton White House, the illegal release of private information from Linda Tripp's personnel file at the Clinton DoD and the violation of Kathleen Willey's privacy rights. Finally, the claim of privilege is not credible in light of Thomas McLarty's testimony about his conversation with the President about Kathleen Willey, without any claim of privilege.(185)

III. CONCLUSION.

Harold Ickes is the Clinton Administration's political hit-man. He knows the secrets and knows how to keep them, even if it means committing perjury.

Ickes' deposition tactics are part of the Clinton Administration's continued pattern of obstructing the truth. His inadequate document search and feigned memory loss about important conversations he should have remembered are consistent with the improper conduct Plaintiffs have had to battle throughout the history of this case.

Even worse than the egregious conduct of George Stephanopoulos, Ickes' document search clearly was inadequate. Ickes cannot be trusted to make a reasonable search for responsive documents. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request that Ickes be ordered to produce all of his documents from the 77th Street storage facility and the Fire Island location, and all of the documents he removed from the White House, for production to a special master appointed by the Court pursuant to FRCP 53 for review. This should be done at Ickes' expense.

Plaintiffs also request that he and possibly others, be ordered to give further testimony about any new document search he conducts that will allow Plaintiffs to question under oath whoever does the search. In the event that new documents are produced, Plaintiffs request that they be allowed to conduct further deposition questioning of Ickes about those documents.

Ickes' huge claims of memory lapse and evasive non-responses (264) are not credible. Therefore, the Court respectfully should find that Ickes' testimony of memory loss is not believable and is untruthful and he should be ordered to submit for redeposition. The Court also should institute criminal contempt and perjury proceedings to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and to punish Ickes for his blatant misconduct and deceit.

Additionally, Ickes also should be ordered to answer questions about his conversation with President Clinton regarding Kathleen Willey.

Finally, the Court should award Plaintiffs attorneys fees and costs, against Ickes and his counsel, for the first and second Ickes depositions, additional document review, as well as attorneys fees and costs for the preparation and filing of this motion.

Respectfully submitted,

________________________

Larry Klayman, Esq.

DC Bar No. 334581

________________________

Allan J. Favish, Esq.

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.

501 School Street, S.W.

Suite 725

Washington, D.C. 20024

(202) 646-5172

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

LOCAL RULE 108(m) CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

I certify that on August 21, 1998, I telephoned counsel for non-party Harold Ickes, Amy Sabrin, Esq., regarding this motion. Her secretary, Mary Carlton, told me that Ms. Sabrin was not in and that I could leave a voice mail for Ms. Sabrin. I then asked for Mr. Ickes' other attorney, Lily G. Arbab, Esq., and was told that she was not in either. I then left a voice mail message for Ms. Sabrin explaining the nature of this motion and that I was calling her under local rule 108.

On the same date, I also telephoned counsel for the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Elizabeth Shapiro, Esq. Her voice mail message instructed me to contact her colleague at the DoJ, Julia Fayngold, Esq. I told Ms. Fayngold what Plaintiffs were requesting in this motion, including an order that Mr. Ickes be compelled to answer questions about his conversation with the President regarding Kathleen Willey, which Ms. Shapiro prevented Mr. Ickes from answering. Ms. Fayngold said she opposes the motion.

____________________

Allan J. Favish, Esq.



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 21, 1998, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Compel Further Testimony and Further Production of Documents from Harold Ickes, for Appointment of a Special Master, for Criminal Contempt and Perjury Proceedings, and for Sanctions, Including Attorneys Fees and Costs, was served by first class mail, postage prepaid, on the following:



Attorneys for Defendants Federal Bureau of Investigation and Executive Office of the President:



James J. Gilligan, Esq.

Elizabeth Shapiro, Esq.

David J. Anderson, Esq.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

901 E Street, N.W., 9th Floor

Washington, DC 20004



Attorneys for Defendant Hillary Rodham Clinton:



David E. Kendall, Esq.

Marcie R. Ziegler, Esq.

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY

725 12th Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005



Attorneys for non-party Harold Ickes:



Amy R. Sabrin, Esq.

Lily G. Arbab, Esq.

SKADDEN ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, LLP

1440 New York Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005-2111



_____________________

Allan J. Favish, Esq.

1. 1 See Itemized List of Harold Ickes' Claims of Memory Loss, attached as Exhibit 1.

2. 2 See House Report at 4-8, attached as Exhibit 7 to Plaintiffs' motions to compel testimony and documents from Kenneth Bacon and the U.S. Department of Defense, both filed on August 18, 1997.

3. 3 See Transcript of Deposition of Harold Ickes (May 21, 1998) ("Ickes Depo.") at 29:8-18; 30:22 - 31:5.

4. 4 Ickes Depo. at 29:19 - 30:1.

5. 5 Ickes Depo. at 30:12-21.

6. 6 Ickes Depo. at 380:15 - 381:6.

7. 7 See Ickes Depo. at 74:2-4.

8. 8 Ickes Depo. at 77:5-9.

9. 9 See Ickes Depo. at 81:4-10.

10. 10 See Ickes Depo. at 141:12 - 144:11.

11. 11 See Alexander v. FBI, C.A. 96-2123, Memorandum and Order at 6-7 (D.D.C. April 13, 1998).

12. 12 See Alexander v. FBI, C.A. 96-2123, Memorandum and Order at 25-26 (D.D.C. May 28, 1998).

13. 13 See Ickes Depo. at 141:12 - 144:11.

14. 14 See Peter Baker, "Clinton Told Jones Team He Had No Willey Notes," The Washington Post, March 29, 1998, at A1, attached as Exhibit 2.

15. 15 Alexander v. FBI, C.A. 96-2123, Memorandum and Order at 25-26 (D.D.C. May 28, 1998).

16. 16 Ickes Depo. at 43:14 - 47:6.

17. 17 Ickes Depo. at 44:12-14.

18. 18 See Ickes Depo. at 39:22 - 41:19.

19. 19 See Ickes Depo. at 41:20 - 43:13.

20. 20 See Ickes Depo. at 50:4 - 56:6; 68:19 - 69:8.

21. 21 Ickes Depo. at 60:10-12.

22. 22 See Ickes Depo. at 60:13-21.

23. 23 Ickes Depo. at 60:22 - 61:5.

24. 24 Ickes Depo. at 61:6-10.

25. 25 Ickes Depo. at 61:11-12.

26. 26 Ickes Depo. at 61:13 - 62:7.

27. 27 Ickes Depo. at 62:8 - 63:22.

28. 28 Ickes Depo. at 64:22 - 68:6.

29. 29 See Ickes Depo. at 61:11-12.

30. 30 Ickes Depo. at 61:13 - 62:1 (emphasis added).

31. 31 Ickes Depo. at 70:2-20.

32. 32 See Ickes Depo. at 74:2-4.

33. 33 Ickes Depo. at 77:5-9.

34. 34 See Ickes Depo. at 81:4-10.

35. 35 Ickes Depo. at 82:22 - 83:3; see Ickes Depo. at 87:16-18.

36. 36 Ickes Depo. at 93:12 - 94:15.

37. 37 Ickes Depo. at 94:16 - 95:2.

38. 38 See Ickes Depo. at 102:1-8.

39. 39 Ickes Depo. at 89:2-5.

40. 40 Ickes Depo. at 89:9-10.

41. 41 Ickes Depo. at 91:16-17.

42. 42 Ickes Depo. at 95:10:15.

43. 43 Ickes Depo. at 91:21 - 92:2.

44. 44 Ickes Depo. at 89:13 - 91:1.

45. 45 Ickes Depo. at 89:17 - 91:1.

46. 46Alexander v. FBI, C.A. 96-2123, Memorandum Opinion on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, Order to Show Cause and for Sanctions Including Attorneys' Fees at 26 (D.D.C. March 28, 1998).

47. 47 See Federal Trade Commission v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 213 (D.C.Cir. 1980).

48. 48 In re Sealed Case, 757 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C.Cir. 1984).

49. 49 Ickes Depo. at 89:17 - 91:1.

50. 50 Ickes Depo. at 89:13 - 91:1.

51. 51 Ickes Depo. at 11:20 - 12:11.

52. 52 In re United States Department of Defense, 848 F.2d 232, 235-36 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

53. 53 See Ickes Depo. at 173:11 - 174:

54. 54 See Itemized List of Harold Ickes' Claims of Memory Loss, attached as Exhibit 1.

55. 55 U.S. v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274, 1284 (D.C.Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015, 96 S.Ct. 449 (1975) (Watergate conviction of President Richard Nixon's Appointments Secretary, Dwight L. Chapin).

56. 56 Tony Locy, "Judge Warns Witness in Harassment Lawsuit About Possible Perjury," The Washington Post, March 18, 1995, at B3, attached as Exhibit 3.

57. 57 Id.

58. 58 466 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).

59. 59 Id. at 888 n. 4.

60. 60 452 F.2d 881 (2nd Cir. 1971).

61. 61 439 F.2d 751 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 961, 94 S.Ct. 215 (1971).

62. 62 Id. at 753.

63. 63 246 F.2d 29, 31-32 (2nd Cir. 1957).

64. 64 249 U.S. 378, 39 S.Ct. 337 (1918).

65. 65 While accepting the trial judge's finding of feigned memory loss, the Supreme Court reversed the contempt finding because of procedural defects.

66. 66 760 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1985).

67. 67 Id. at 168.

68. 68 Id. at 172 n. 3.

69. 69 Id.

70. 70 100 F.2d 714 (D.C.App. 1938).

71. 71 Id. at 716.

72. 72 815 F.2d 725, 749-50 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 966, 108 S.Ct. 458 (1987).

73. 73 694 F.2d 917 (2nd Cir. 1982).

74. 74 938 F.2d 1501, 1510 (1st Cir. 1991).

75. 75 167 F. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1909), aff'd 177 F. 191 (2nd Cir. 1910).

76. 76 634 F.2d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1025, 101 S.Ct. 5939 (1980).

77. 77 Ickes Depo. at 359:1 - 361:2.

78. 78 Ickes Depo. at 467:2-5.

79. 79 Ickes Depo. at 467:2-10.

80. 80 See Ickes Depo. at 29:8-18; 30:22 - 31:5.

81. 81 See House Report at 4-8, attached as Exhibit 7 to Plaintiffs' motions to compel testimony and documents from Kenneth Bacon and the U.S. Department of Defense, both filed on August 18, 1997.

82. 82 Id. at 67-68.

83. 83 Id. at 4-8.

84. 84 Ickes Depo. at 31:20 - 37:12.

85. 85 Ickes Depo. at 31:20-32:8.

86. 86 Ickes Depo. at 282:3-4.

87. 87 Ickes Depo. at 282:5.

88. 88 Ickes Depo. at 282:14-16.

89. 89 Ickes Depo. at 282:19-21.

90. 90 Ickes Depo. at 355:12-21.

91. 91 House Report at 28, attached as Exhibit 7 to Plaintiffs' motions to compel testimony and documents from Kenneth Bacon and the U.S. Department of Defense, both filed on August 18, 1997.

92. 92 Id. at 27.

93. 93 Id. The House Report notes that Nussbaum denies making the statement. Id.

94. 94 Id. at 28.

95. 95 House Report at 28, attached as Exhibit 7 to Plaintiffs' motions to compel testimony and documents from Kenneth Bacon and the U.S. Department of Defense, both filed on August 18, 1997.

96. 96 Ickes Depo. at 413:22 - 414:6.

97. 97 See Ickes Depo at 301:6 - 304:8, attached to Ickes Depo. as Exhibit 7. Also attached to this motion as Exhibit 15.

98. 98 Ickes Depo at 330:14-16; attached to Ickes Depo. as Exhibit 7.

99. 99 Ickes Depo. at 331:21 - 332:3.

100. 100 Ickes Depo. at 301:13-17.

101. 101 Ickes Depo at 356:4-8.

102. 102 Ickes Depo. at 356:9-10.

103. 103 Ickes Depo. at 345:9-12 (former Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster).

104. 104 Ickes Depo. at 345:16-20.

105. 105 See House Report at 19-23, attached as Exhibit 7 to Plaintiffs' motions to compel testimony and documents from Kenneth Bacon and the U.S. Department of Defense, both filed on August 18, 1997.

106. 106 Ickes Depo. at 288:6 - 289:1.

107. 107 Ickes Depo. at 193:22 - 194:16.

108. 108 Transcript of Deposition of Madeleine Grunwald ("Grunwald Depo.") at 130:18 - 136:10.

109. 109 Id.

110. 110 Lois Romano & Kevin Merida, "Hillary Clinton in 'Full Battle Mode,'" The Washington Post, January 24, 1998, at A16, attached as Exhibit 4.

111. 111 Id. (Emphasis added).

112. 112 David Maraniss, "First Lady Launches Counterattack," The Washington Post, January 28, 1998, at A1, attached as Exhibit 5.

113. 113 Id.

114. 114 See Howard Kurtz, "First Lady Ordered 1996 Critique of Post Reporter's Coverage," The Washington Post, February 14, 1998, at A21, attached as Exhibit 6.

115. 115 Ickes Depo. at 141:12 - 142:3.

116. 116 Ickes Depo. at 142:8-16.

117. 117 Ickes Depo. at 143:15 - 144:6.

118. 118 Ickes Depo. at 144:7-11.

119. 119 See Ickes Depo. at 171:4-14, 178:10-14.

120. 120 Ickes Depo. at 173:4.

121. 121 Ickes Depo. at 173:5-10.

122. 122 Ickes Depo. at 175:7-8.

123. 123 Ickes Depo. at 175:9 - 176:15 (emphasis added).

124. 124 Ickes Depo. at 144:7-11.

125. 125 See pages 33-34, infra.

126. 126 Ickes Depo. at 185:13 - 186:2.

127. 127 Ickes Depo. at 186:20-21.

128. 128 Ickes Depo. at 141:12 - 144:6.

129. 129 Ickes Depo. at 144:7-11.

130. 130 Ickes Depo. at 179:1 - 181:13.

131. 131 Ickes Depo. at 181:18 - 182:5.

132. 132 Bacon Depo. at 195:4 - 196:12, 211:4-22, 233:6 - 234:6, 236:6-8.

133. 133 See Ickes Depo at 171-178.

134. 134 Ickes Depo. at 141:12 - 144:11. See also Bill Sammon, "Once-spurned Ickes aids Clinton in spinning sex-and-lies scandal," The Washington Times, May 27, 1998, at A1, attached as Exhibit 7.

135. 135 See Dana Priest & Rene Sanchez, "Kindred Spirits' Pentagon Bond," The Washington Post, January 22, 1998, at A1, attached as Exhibit 8; Dana Priest & Rene Sanchez, "Once-Trusted Aide at Heart of It All," The Washington Post, January 23, 1998, at A22, attached as Exhibit 9.

136. 136 Ickes Depo. at 141:12 - 144:11. See also Bill Sammon, "Once-spurned Ickes aids Clinton in spinning sex-and-lies scandal," The Washington Times, May 27, 1998, A1, attached as Exhibit 7.

137. 137 Ickes Depo. at 181:18 - 182:5.

138. 138 Ickes Depo. at 204:16 - 205:8.

139. 139 Ickes Depo. at 141:12 - 144:11. See also Bill Sammon, "Once-spurned Ickes aids Clinton in spinning sex-and-lies scandal," The Washington Times, May 27, 1998, A1, attached as Exhibit 7.

140. 140 Ickes Depo. at 202:11 - 203:5.

141. 141 Ickes Depo. at 203:19 - 204:8.

142. 142 Ickes Depo. at 204:9-15.

143. 143 Ickes Depo. at 7:8-16.

144. 144 Ickes Depo. at 6:6 - 7:6.

145. 145 Ickes Depo. at 9:15 - 10:18.

146. 146 Ickes Depo. at 214:8-13.

147. 147 Ickes Depo. at 215:19 - 216:4.

148. 148 Ickes Depo. at 216:5-7.

149. 149 Ickes Depo. at 216:21 - 217:11.

150. 150 Ickes Depo. at 217:12-13.

151. 151 See Susan Schmidt & Peter Baker, "White House Denies Private Eye Affiliation," The Washington Post, February 23, 1998, at A8, attached as Exhibit 10.

152. 152 See Howard Kurtz, "The Power Couple at Scandal's Vortex," The Washington Post, February 27, 1998, at D1, attached as Exhibit 11.

153. 153 Id.

154. 154 See Michael Grunwald, "Reno Called 'Close' to Requesting Probe of Ickes," The Washington Post, August 19, 1998, at A6, attached as Exhibit 12.

155. 155 Ickes Depo. at 206:3-17.

156. 156 Ickes Depo. at 207:7-14.

157. 157 Ickes Depo. at 207:15-17.

158. 158 Ickes Depo. at 210:1-6.

159. 159 Ickes Depo. at 212:10 - 213:17.

160. 160 See Stuart Taylor, Jr., "Her Case Against Clinton," The American Lawyer, November 1996 (http://www.courttv.com/legaldocs/government/jones/staylor.html).

161. 161 See Howard Kurtz, "Clinton Critic Weighs Starr Job Offer," The Washington Post, April 4, 1998, at C1, attached as Exhibit 13; Howard Kurtz, "Stuart Taylor's Mea Culpa," The Washington Post, April 11, 1998, at B1, attached as Exhibit 14.

162. 162 See e.g., In re Schulman, 167 F. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1909), aff'd 177 F. 191 (2nd Cir. 1910); Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 634 F.2d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1025, 101 S.Ct. 5939 (1980), discussed at page 20, supra.

163. 163 Ickes Depo. at 103:3 - 106:13.

164. 164 Ickes Depo. at 106:14 - 108:22.

165. 165 Deposition Subpoena to Harold Ickes, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Ickes Depo.

166. 166 United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); approved in In re Weiss, 703 F.2d 653, 664-667 (2d Cir. 1983).

167. 167 See Matter of Kitchen, 706 F.2d 1266, 1274-75 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Weiss, 703 F.2d 653, 660-667 (2d Cir. 1983).

168. 168 See Peter Baker, "Clinton Told Jones Team He Had No Willey Notes," Washington Post, March 29, 1998, at A1, attached as Exhibit 2.

169. 169 See Transcript of Deposition of Terry Good ("Good Depo.") at 226:2 - 230:22, 248:11 - 251:15.

170. 170 See Good Depo. at 257:18 - 258:1.

171. 171 See Good Depo. at 259:11 - 264:17.

172. 172 See Alexander v. FBI, C.A. 96-2123, Transcript of Hearing at 23 (D.D.C. June 30, 1998).

173. 173 Ickes Depo. at 156:11-14.

174. 174 Ickes Depo. at 159:14-15.

175. 175 Ickes Depo. at 159:16-17.

176. 176 Ickes Depo. at 159:18-19.

177. 177 Ickes Depo. at 161:17-19.

178. 178 Ickes Depo. at 161:22 - 162:3.

179. 179 Ickes Depo. at 168:5-7.

180. 180 Ickes Depo. at 160:3-4.

181. 181 Ickes Depo. at 160:9-12.

182. 182 See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 604 (D.D.C. 1979).

183. 183 Alexander v. FBI, C.A. 96-2123, Memorandum Opinion at 46 n. 6 (D.D.C. May 28, 1998).

184. 184 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).

185. 185 See Transcript of Deposition of Thomas McLarty ("McLarty Depo.") at 261:6 - 263:10, 266:11 - 267:3.