Plaintiff, by undersigned counsel, hereby respectfully submits this motion for in camera review by the Court of the federal grand jury proceedings regarding Nolanda Hill. As grounds therefor, Plaintiff states as follows:

Understandably, Ms. Hill feared retaliation against her and her family if she informed the Court of her knowledge regarding these unlawful activities. Still, she felt compelled to come forward and reveal what she knew. Having nowhere to turn for protection, she appealed to this Court for help and guidance, stating in her affidavit:

I would like to come forward and tell this court everything I know about the failure to produce documents to Judicial Watch and this court. I am concerned, however, that if I do so, the Clinton Administration, and more particularly its Justice Department, will try to retaliate against me. As a result, I look to this court for guidance on how I can come forward and tell all I know in the interest of justice.

Because of a fear for my personal and my family’s well-being and safety, I ask that this affidavit be kept under seal and that a mechanism be set up by the court for me to come forward to tell all I know. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.

The Court acknowledged the seriousness of this matter, and ordered that Ms. Hill’s affidavit initially be kept under seal. See Mem. Op. at 25. It also directly addressed Ms. Hill and her counsel at the evidentiary hearing on March 23, 1998, expressing its concern as follows:

I appreciate very much, Ms. Hill, your coming forward, and I understand the difficult circumstances under which you appeared here today. I did want to say, in light of your having that paragraph in your original declaration about your concern about coming forward and your looking to the Court for guidance, that I took that very seriously and that’s why I immediately contacted Mr. Charles on your behalf, to make sure that he could protect your interests in these proceedings.

* * *

And I will look to Mr. Charles to continue to protect your interests. I assure you, if you have any problems because of your testimony here, if you contact Mr. Charles, this Court stands ready and available to give any assistance that’s necessary if you have any difficulties because of your testimony here today.

Within weeks of filing her affidavit with this Court, Ms. Hill’s worst fears were realized. On March 13, 1998, she was indicted on fraud and tax evasion charges by the Clinton Justice Department. The indictment came just one week before she was scheduled to testify fully before this

Court in an evidentiary hearing. As a result, on March 18, 1998, she notified the Court that she would not appear for the scheduled evidentiary hearing. She stated that "[a] court appearance at this point in time would subject [me] to cross-examination by the Government that is presently prosecuting [me]." If compelled to appear, she indicated that she would "invoke her Fifth Amendment rights."

The timing of these events is neither accidental nor coincidental. Ms. Hill’s indictment was likely an effort to retaliate against her and deter her from giving any further damaging testimony at the March 23, 1998 hearing. By causing her to invoke her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, the Clinton Administration likely sought to prevent her from divulging information she had gained from many years of close contact with Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown. Indeed, after the indictment, Ms. Hill’s counsel filed a bench brief with this Court stating that:

The indictment is sweeping, and the charges against Ms. Hill are of the type that are inherently undefined.

* * *

Under these circumstances [indictment of Ms. Hill by the Clinton Justice Department], a responsive answer to any relevant question asked of Ms. Hill in an evidentiary hearing in the above-captioned matter poses a real danger of self-incrimination. Ms.

Hill consequently intends to invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to decline to answer such questions in the hearing scheduled for Monday, March 23, 1998.

* * *

Ms. Hill cannot testify in this proceeding as to any aspect of her purported relationship with Mr. Brown without incriminating herself. Nor can she answer any question involving the statement she allegedly signed on January 17, 1998, since that statement purports to describe that relationship.

* * *

Indeed, we can hardly foresee any answer relevant to his case – a case that directly involves Mr. Brown and his actions while Secretary of Commerce, during the years covered by the indictment – that would not have the "tendency to incriminate" Ms. Hill.

Judicial Watch received information that before her indictment, Ms. Hill had not been properly notified that she was under investigation. This is highly unusual. Furthermore, at her arraignment, the Clinton Justice Department admitted they had not had time to prepare an inventory of the evidence against her — a further indication that the charges were hurriedly prepared. Moreover, after her indictment, Ms. Hill did in fact testify at the March 23, 1998 evidentiary hearing before this Court. Following that hearing, on April 15, 1998, the Clinton Justice Department re-indicted her, and re-arraigned her, purportedly because of typographical errors in the original indictment. Most likely, this re-indictment and re-arraignment was another warning by the Clinton Administration to this material witness.

In the case of Ms. Hill, however, we confront a threat to liberty. She is a witness who presented devastating evidence of illegal conduct by the Clinton Administration, implicating both the President and Mrs. Clinton. For her, it is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to avoid or overcome the Clinton Administration’s efforts to silence her. There simply is no doubt that the Administration has the means (and perhaps even the proclivity) to take this kind of retaliatory action. It should not be permitted to punish her for providing truthful testimony, or to intimidate her from preventing further truthful testimony in this case.

The extremely suspicious timing of Ms. Hill’s indictment and re-indictment — with her forced transportation back to Washington, D.C. from her home in Texas — is only part of the questionable incidents surrounding this matter. Plaintiff has been advised by Ms. Hill’s counsel, Stephan Charles, Esq., that there may have been other irregularities, errors, and/or defects in the grand jury proceedings, as well as threats and/or intimidation directed against Ms. Hill’s family.

Plaintiff submits that this information, along with the other concerns expressed by Ms. Hill’s counsel, raises serious questions about the propriety of the grand jury proceedings, and requests the assistance of and intervention by this Court, as previously offered during the March 23, 1998 hearing. Such intervention is particularly important given the facts of this case and Ms. Hill’s damaging testimony regarding high government officials in the Clinton Administration. Plaintiff believes such intervention is indeed appropriate:

[T]he government may not exercise its authority to prosecute a defendant when simply and purposely done in order to punish a defendant in retaliation for his exercise of his rights rather than to further a legitimate law enforcement interest. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974); United States v. Walker, 514 F. Supp. 294, 311-13, 316-23 (E.D. La. 1981). The due process clause establishes this limitation on the government’s charging authority as part of the principle forbidding the government from imposing punishment upon innocent conduct. United States v. Walker, supra, 514 F. Supp. at 316-19.

United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 248 (5^th Cir. 1982).

These circumstances present at least the appearance of a retaliatory motivation and possibly even harassment of Ms. Hill — a key, critical witness in this extraordinary case. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court review, in camera, the transcript of the grand jury proceedings, as well as any

other pertinent administrative documentation, to determine whether this matter should be included in the on-going proceedings before this Court.

Respectfully submitted,

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.

______________________________

Larry Klayman, Esq.

DC Bar No. 334581

501 School Street, S.W., Suite 725

Washington, D.C. 20024

202-646-5172

Attorneys for Plaintiff

LOCAL RULE 108(m) CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

On January 21, 1999, I contacted Marina U. Braswell, Esq., counsel for Defendant United States Department of Commerce, by telephone, to inquire whether her client would consent to the relief requested herein. Counsel advised me that her client would not consent to the requested relief.

______________________________

Deborah E. Berliner, Esq.