IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CARA LESLIE ALEXANDER, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Civil Action Nos.

) 96-2123/97-1288 (RCL)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF )

INVESTIGATION, et al., )

) CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

)

JOHN MICHAEL GRIMLEY, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF )

INVESTIGATION, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

PLAINTIFFS’ PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiffs respectfully submit the attached Proposed Findings of Fact concerning the evidentiary hearing on obstruction, perjury, and threats concerning non-produced e-mail of the Clinton-Gore White House.

A. The Automated Records Management System Was Created By Daniel Barry and John Podesta to Help Records Manage Clinton-Gore White House E-Mail.

B. Court Allows Discovery In Filegate, And Clinton-Gore White House Obstruction Begins.

C. Clinton-Gore White House Obstructs E-mail Discovery with False Barry Testimony About Reliability of ARMS System.

D. Daniel Barry -- The Key Man in Clinton-Gore White House E-Mail Searches and Coverup.

E. Barry Discovers Mail2 Problem in Midst of Lewinsky Crisis.

F. Barry, Clinton-Gore Administration Lawyers Prepare and Submit False Testimony.

G. Court Unknowingly Relied on False Clinton-Gore White House Testimony In Planning E-mail Discovery.

H. Mail2 Problem “Rediscovered” In May/June 1998.

I. To Keep the E-mail Hidden from the Court, the Office of Independent Counsel, and Congress, Clinton-Gore White House Officials Threatened Northrop Grumman Contractors.

J. Clinton-Gore White House Threats Obstructed Court’s Processes and Testimony of Witnesses.

K. As a Result of the Threats and Fraudulent Secrecy Requirements Imposed on Some Who Knew about the Mail2 Problem, E-mail Evidence Was Lost Forever.

L. Daniel Barry and Clinton-Gore Justice Department Lawyers Present False Deposition Testimony to This Court.

M. Top Clinton-Gore White House and Justice Department Officials Knew of Mail2 But Did Nothing to Correct the Problem or Alert the Court and Other Proper Authorities.

N. Failures of Memory, Contradictory Testimony By Clinton-Gore White House Lawyers Belie Claims of Good Faith Concerning E-mail Scandal.

O. The Fact That Lower Level Clinton-Gore White House Employees and Contractors Knew of Mail2’s Continuing Impact on Document Production, Shows Top Officials and Lawyers Knew As Well.

P. Plaintiffs Repeatedly Put Clinton-Gore White House and Department of Justice on Notice Concerning Mail2.

Q. Northrop Grumman Officials and Their Counsel Were Notified of the Threats, Obstruction of Justice, And Worked With The Clinton-Gore White House To Coverup These Ongoing Crimes

R. Despite Warnings from Plaintiffs and Others about Mail2, Clinton-Gore White House Continued to Present False Testimony and Withhold Information from the Court, Congress, and the Office of Independent Counsel.

S. Despite Being on Notice, Barry, Clinton-Gore White House, and Justice Department Continue to Obstruct Justice and Commit Perjury By Filing An Additional False Declaration With This Court.

T. Clinton-Gore White House Lied To Court About Hillary Clinton’s E-mail.

U. Whistleblowers Expose Clinton-Gore White House’s Obstruction of Justice, False Testimony.

V. Obstruction of Justice Continues.

A. The Automated Records Management System Was Created By Daniel Barry and John Podesta to Help Records Manage Clinton-Gore White House E-Mail.

1. Daniel “Tony” Barry (hereinafter “Barry”) was hired by the Office of Administration (hereinafter “OA”) as a computer specialist in the Information and Systems Technology Division (hereinafter “IS&T” or “IS&T Division”). See E-mail Hearing Testimony of Daniel Barry (hereinafter “Barry Testimony”), August 3, 2000 Tr. at 24, 32-33.

2. In 1993, Barry reviewed the ruling and agreements in Armstrong v. EOP, requiring the Executive Office of the President (hereinafter “Clinton-Gore White House” or “EOP”) to put an electronic records management system in place. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 33-34.

3. John Podesta, who is now White House Chief of Staff, helped design and implement the ARMS system and was heavily involved in negotiating the settlement of the Armstrong litigation. See E-mail Hearing Testimony of John Podesta Testimony (hereinafter “Podesta Testimony”), October 10, 2000 Tr. at 11-16. See also E-mail Hearing Testimony of Jason Baron (hereinafter “Baron Testimony”) August 31, 2000 Tr. at 33-34.

4. Podesta recommended the filing of false court declarations with a federal court in the Armstrong litigation. See Hearing Exhibit (hereinafter “H. Ex.”) 86, Declaration of Jane Weaver at ¶5.

5. John Podesta had been active in the management of the Armstrong litigation and formulating guidelines for storing electronic records pursuant to the Presidential Records Act. He worked with Jason Baron, Esquire in the Justice Department who was handling the Armstrong case. See Podesta Testimony, October 10, 2000 Tr. at 11-13.

6. Podesta participated in the coordination of efforts to develop a more sophisticated system for the archival of e-mail. These efforts resulted in the development of the ARMS system. See Podesta Testimony, October 10, 2000 Tr. at 13.

7. This system was designed to receive and archive electronic messages and was required by both the Presidential Records Act and the Federal Records Act. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 45-46.

8. In the middle of 1993, after reviewing information on the legal ruling in Armstrong v. EOP, Barry wrote a functional requirements document for what became the Clinton-Gore White House’s Automated Records Management System (hereinafter “ARMS” or “ARMS system”), which he presented to OA Counsel for review. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 33, 48-49.

9. After receiving approval for the concept, Barry began development of ARMS. ARMS began operation in July, 1994. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 34.

10. Barry conceived, designed, developed, wrote, implemented and tested ARMS, and currently manages ARMS. By his own admission, he is the most expert person to talk to about ARMS. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr.

11. ARMS stores three types of records: electronic mail (hereinafter “e-mail”), calendars and pagers. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 42.

12. At the time that ARMS became operational, the Clinton-Gore White House was using the All-in-One e-mail system. In 1997 the Clinton-Gore White House converted from the All-in-One e-mail system to the Lotus Notes e-mail system. At the same time, a separate software program, known as the Notes ARMS Interface was developed which allowed Lotus Notes e-mails to be communicated to and stored on ARMS. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 43.

B. Court Allows Discovery In Filegate, And White House Obstruction Begins.

13. In its Memorandum Opinion and Order of June 12, 1997, this Court deferred ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification until Plaintiffs had had an opportunity to take discovery. See Memorandum Opinion, June 12, 1997, at 1.

14. In order to investigate Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality, numerosity, typicality of claims, and adequacy of representation, this Court allowed discovery as to Plaintiffs’ Privacy Act claims (Id. at 7-8, 14-15), the substitution of the United States for defendants Nussbaum, Livingstone, and Marceca (Id. at 18), and the definition of classes and subclasses for certification which was to include how files were improperly acquired by the Clinton-Gore White House Id. at 19-21.

15. On August 12, 1997, this Court granted Plaintiffs an initial six months in which to complete all discovery relating to class certification and scope of employment issues. See Memorandum Opinion, August 12, 1997, at 1.

16. The Court also provided for “an additional period of discovery” after resolution of the class certification and substitution issues. Id. at 2.

17. Plaintiffs filed their First Request for Production of Documents on October 9, 1997.

18. On November 10, 1997, the Clinton-Gore White House produced documents in response to this First Request for Production.

19. Among the documents the Clinton-Gore White House purportedly searched to respond to the First Request for Production were documents produced to the Office of Independent Counsel for its Filegate investigation. These documents included Clinton-Gore White House e-mail produced by Daniel “Tony” Barry (hereinafter referred to as “Barry”). See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 36-39; see also March 4, 1999 Declaration of Sally Paxton at ¶3, attached as Exhibit B to Motion by Executive Office of the President For a Protective Order, H. Ex. 19.

20. During a status conference on December 19, 1997, the Court sharply rebuked the Clinton-Gore White House for attempting to engage it what it described as “rolling production” of documents by which it purported to produce documents to Plaintiffs as they located them. See Transcript of December 19, 1997 Status Call at 6-9.

C. Clinton-Gore White House Obstructs E-mail Discovery with False Barry Testimony About Reliability of ARMS System.

21. At a January 13, 1998 status conference, Clinton-Gore Justice Department lawyer James Gilligan represented that e-mail after July 1994 was being records managed properly. See January 13, 1998 Transcript at 55.

22. On January 16, 1998, Plaintiffs served a Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition on the Clinton-Gore White House concerning “the system of files maintained and other things...including electronic mail...” Notice of Rule 30 (b)(6) Deposition at 1.

23. Searching e-mails related to persons who were involved in or had made allegations regarding the many scandals of the Clinton-Gore White House was a routine task frequently assigned to Daniel Barry by White House Counsel. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 31, 81, 111, 112, 116.

24. The ARMS system was used to perform these searches. See Barry Declaration of July 9, 2000 (H. Ex. 42).

25. Barry testified that “everybody” at the Clinton-Gore White House knew ARMS was not capturing e-mail properly. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Transcript at 150.

26. In addition to the Mail2 and Letter D “problems” (described below) which were kept from this Court, numerous other material failures by ARMS to records manage e-mail were also kept hidden from it. Exhibit 64 from the evidentiary hearing shows the massive scope of the ARMS system failures. In this exhibit, which contains over five-hundred pages and is labeled “Barry E-mails Documenting Problems with the Notes/ARMS interface Back to 1996,” e-mail specialist Daniel Barry documents exhaustively several persistent problems with the ARMS system. See generally H. Ex. 64.

27. Barry documented these problems in hundreds of e-mails to his superiors and colleagues (including OA Counsel). See, e.g., H. Ex. 64 at E-2355-2366, E-2422-2423, and E‑2441.

28. Barry knew, at least as early as February 27, 1996, that the “interface” which allowed ARMS to records manage e-mail “was not robust enough for a production environment. It is going to need redesign to make it so.” See H. Ex. 64 at E-2123.

29. Barry acknowledged on September 13, 2000 the loss of 3,000 e-mails from the Clinton-Gore White House computer systems. See H. Ex. 64 at E-2197.

30. In 1997, there was a loss of 10,000 e-mails from the Clinton-Gore White House computer systems. See H. Ex. 64 at E-2234, E-2301; see also H. Ex. 9-17.

31. Barry still cannot account for these missing e-mails. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 55.

32. The Court did not become aware and was never advised by the Clinton-Gore White House of these 10,000 lost e-mail until the subject evidentiary hearing. Id. at 55-56.

33. Barry and the Clinton-Gore White House had knowledge that ARMS, as early as August 28, 1997, failed to properly place e-mail in proper agency “buckets.” See, e.g., H. Ex. 64 at E-2152-2155, E-2162, E-2200, E-2402-03, and E-2410-2411; see also H. Ex. 9-21; E-mail Hearing Testimony of Kathleen Gallant (hereinafter “Gallant Testimony”), August 1, 2000 Tr. at 154-57.

34. ARMS failed to capture material information such as whether a particular document was read or unread by an e-mail recipient and any users to whom an e-mail was “blind carbon copied.” The Clinton-Gore White House even knew that ARMS failed to capture the text of certain e-mail messages. See H. Ex. 64-E-2152-2155, 9-35, Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Hearing Transcript at 27-29.

35. ARMS also failed to records manage the Office of the Vice President’s e-mail. See H. Ex. 64 at E-2134.

36. Plaintiffs had never excluded the Office of the Vice President’s e-mail from any document request. (It was not until June 5, 2000, that the Court ruled that Plaintiffs could not have access to Vice Presidential e-mail which related to Filegate. See June 5, 2000 Memorandum Opinion at 35-36. In response to the Court-ordered search of the non-records managed e-mail, the Clinton-Gore White House produced one e-mail which showed that staff in the Vice President’s office received information about the Filegate scandal.)

37. The President’s Assistant for Management and Administration, Mark Lindsay, admitted that generally the entire Clinton-Gore White House computer system (which would necessarily include ARMS) was a nightmare. See E-mail Hearing Testimony of Mark Lindsay (hereinafter “Lindsay Testimony”), August 23, 2000 Tr. at 152-153.

38. In 1997, Howard “Chip” Sparks, a computer specialist at the Clinton-Gore White House, complained to his colleague Barry and many others in OA about the failure of ARMS to capture e-mails – and the resulting negative impact on searching for document requests. See E-mail Hearing Testimony of Howard Sparks (hereinafter “Sparks Testimony”), August 16, 2000 Tr. at 71-78.

39. Barry acknowledged that he had a conversation with Sparks about the fact that ARMS did not contain certain e-mail information that it should have. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 26-29.

40. Barry acknowledged to the Court that ARMS does not contain certain e-mail information that it should have. Id.

41. Barry acknowledged that he did not tell the Court that ARMS did not contain certain e-mail information that it should have. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 29.

42. Based on the volume of the evidence, it is inconceivable that Clinton-Gore White House Counsel and their Department of Justice lawyers in this case were not informed about and did not have know of the substantial problems with ARMS, particularly since they consulted with Barry and others for lengthy periods. See infra.

D. Daniel Barry -- The Key Man in Clinton-Gore White House E-Mail Searches and Coverup.

43. Barry conducted searches for all of Harold Ickes’ schedules at the request of Dimitri Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President; concerning Karl Racine and Bruce Overton at the request of Mike Imbroscio; concerning Bayonne Nevis at the request of Michelle Peterson (hereinafter referred to as “Peterson”); concerning Monica Lewinsky at the request of Peterson for Robert Bennett; concerning the Lippo Group, James Riady, and James Woods; concerning United States Congressman Bob Barr at the request of Peterson; and concerning Dennis Sculimbrene at the request of Dimitri Nionakis. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 31, 81, 111, 112, 116; H. Ex.40-2878, 40-2879, 40-2899, 40-2907, 40-2911, 40-2912, 40-3050, 40-3055, and 40-3111.

44. Barry was even contacted regarding searches pertaining to the Alexander case in December, 1997 by Sally Paxton, Special Associate Counsel in the Clinton-Gore White House Counsel’s Office and Kate Anderson of the OA Counsel’s Office because “[w]hen there was a search for document requests in lawsuits or Congress or Independent Counsel, [Daniel Barry was] the person people went to with regard to [ARMS and] e-mail [archived on ARMS].” See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 36-39; H. Ex.40-2869.

45. Barry also met with Sally Paxton and James Gilligan regarding e-mail searches on ARMS for this Alexander case in December 1997. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 39-40; H. Ex.40-2872.

E. Barry Discovers Mail2 Problem in Midst of Lewinsky Crisis.

46. In January of 1998, shortly after the Monica Lewinsky scandal broke, Barry was contacted by Mike Imbroscio, an attorney in the Clinton-Gore White House Counsel’s Office. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 56-58.

47. The Clinton-Gore White House knew that if the Lewinsky scandal were true, with its underlying allegations of Bill Clinton’s affair with an intern, perjury, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice were true, it could be the end of the Clinton presidency.

48. Imbroscio instructed Barry to search the e-mail accounts of Betty Currie, Nancy Heinrich, and others from between December, 1995 and January 20, 1998 to and from Lewinsky within the Clinton-Gore White House. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 56-58.

49. Barry’s search for the e-mails to and from Lewinsky was quite time consuming and was a high priority assignment. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 49-50; H. Ex. 40-2880, 40-2883, 40-2879, and 40-2888.

50. Barry spent several long days working nights and weekends on this task. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 49-50; H. Ex. 40-2880, 40-2883, 40-2879, and 40-2888.

51. Barry kept Imbroscio and Peterson informed of his progress, which was considerable. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 49.

52. Barry found over 5,000 e-mails and nine boxes of responsive documents. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 53; H. Ex. 40-2881.

53. In the course of his search, Barry discovered the Mail2 problem in January of 1998. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 56-58; H. Ex. 9-49.

54. In January of 1998, Barry discovered that incoming e-mails from Lewinsky to Ashley Raines, a Clinton-Gore White House e-mail user, had not been captured by ARMS, whereas the reply e-mails from Raines to Lewinsky had been captured by ARMS. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 42-46; H. Ex. 9-49.

55. Working with Northrop-Grumman contractor John Spriggs (hereinafter referred to as “Spriggs”), Barry was able to confirm that the incoming e-mails had made their way into the Clinton-Gore White House system, as they had made it to and through the firewall and into the Mail2 server, but were not captured by and stored on ARMS. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 42-46; H. Ex. 9-49.

56. Barry documented his findings in a memorandum prepared by him on or about January 30, 1998. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 42, 43-44, 46; H. Ex. 9-49.

57. Barry reported the problem to his Clinton-Gore White House supervisor Jim Wright and gave him a copy of his report of this event. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 73-74.

58. The problem with the non-archiving of incoming e-mail which Barry and Spriggs found in January of 1998 eventually came to be known as the Mail2 problem or Project X. See Barry Testimony, August 21, 2000 Tr. at 54; H. Ex. 40-2882.

59. By January of 1998, it was known by Barry and others within the Clinton-Gore White House that there was a serious problem which caused incoming e-mail not to be captured by and stored on ARMS and, therefore, not to be produced in response to document requests from various sources. See Barry Testimony, August 18, 2000 Tr. at 21-22, 64, 122-123, 171.

F. Barry, Clinton-Gore Administration Lawyers Prepare and Submit False Testimony.

60. Shortly after discovering the Mail2 problem, Barry had discussions with Sally Paxton, an attorney in the Clinton-Gore White House Counsel’s Office, Department of Justice attorneys James Gilligan and Julia Fayngold-Covey during the preparation of a March 4, 1998 declaration submitted in this case. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 122-124.

61. These conversations were “related to searches, how searches are performed, how long they take, what kind of searches we can do in ARMS, all related to ARMS.” See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 125.

62. Following these discussions, an initial draft of what became Barry’s Declaration of March 4, 1998 was prepared by the attorneys Fayngold-Covey, Gilligan, and Paxton. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 125; H. Ex. 46.

63. Given the intense public interest in and the high-stakes concerning the Lewinsky scandal, the legal ramifications of e-mail in the scandal, and the concurrent issue of possible testimony by Barry on topic of EOP e-mail, an evidentiary inference can be drawn that Barry discussed the Mail2 and other ARMS problems with Paxton, Gilligan, Fayngold-Covey in the course of the preparation of the March 4, 2000 declaration.

64. Barry did not tell them what to put in the Declaration; instead, the attorneys “decided that themselves” without telling Barry the reasons Plaintiffs “had requested a 30(b)(6) representative witness[.]” See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 132-133.

65. Paragraph 11 of the March 4, 1998 Declaration, which states “[s]ince July 14, 1991, e-mail within EOP has been archived weekly in an on-line format that is susceptible to being word-searched in the manner described below,” was written by the Clinton-Gore White House and Department of Justice lawyers, not Barry. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 144, March 4, 1998 Declaration of Daniel A. Barry at ¶11.

66. Barry spent thirty (30) to forty (40) hours preparing this Declaration, with the assistance of Clinton-Gore Justice Department counsel James Gilligan and Julia Fayngold Covey, and Clinton-Gore White House Counsel Sally Paxton. See June 11, 1998 Deposition of Daniel A. Barry at 8; see also Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Transcript at 122-24.

67. Barry was told “that the idea was that if I gave these written declarations that I wouldn’t have to give a deposition.” Id. at 122.

68. The initial draft of this Declaration was prepared in the White House Counsel’s Office (without input from Barry) and then faxed by Paxton to Lindsay on February 11, 1998 with a note on the cover sheet that she would see Lindsay at 1:00 p.m. This draft was then transmitted to Barry who made handwritten notes and changes. See H. Ex. 46; Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 132 - 136; August 22, 2000 Tr. at 32 - 35

69. What became paragraph 11 in the final version of the Declaration was paragraph 6 in the first draft. Compare H. Ex. 46, ¶6 to E-mail H. Ex. 18, ¶11.

70. In the initial draft, this paragraph stated “Since July 14, 1994, EOP email has been stored on computer tapes in a format that is susceptible to a word search” (emphasis added). In the margin next to this language, Barry added the words “on line and on tape” to clarify that the e-mail was not just on the tapes but on ARMS as well. See H. Ex. 46 at 4, Barry Testimony, August 22, 2000 Tr. at 35.

71. By adding “on line and on tape,” Barry was indicating that both ARMS and the back-up tapes had to be searched to cover all post-July 1994 e-mail.

72. However, since Barry had designed ARMS to archive all EOP e-mail as required by the Armstrong decision and the Presidential and Federal Records Act, he knew that the reference to “on line” by itself would have been sufficient unless ARMS was not archiving all e-mail due to an error such as Lewinsky/Mail2 problem he found in January, 1998 and the numerous other problems ARMS had archiving e-mail. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 33 - 34, 45 - 46; H. Ex. 9-49, H. Ex. 64.

73. While the first draft of Barry’s March 4, 1998 referred to “computer tapes” and Barry’s corrections added “on line and,” the word “tapes” has been deleted from every subsequent draft and the final version of this Declaration. See H. Exs. 18, 49, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75.

74. Barry was working closely with Lindsay and attorneys in the White House Counsel’s office and the Department of Justice in drafting and revising this declaration. See H. Exs. 46 (Lindsay and Paxton), 49 (Paxton), 67 (Gilligan), 69 (Shapiro), and 70, 71, 73, 74, and 75 (Giles).

75. The interaction between Barry and these attorneys was extensive and detailed. See, e.g., H. Ex. 46 (extensive handwritten changes by Barry) and H. Ex. 49 at 2 - 3 (February 24, 1998 e-mail from Barry to Paxton with detailed, 2 page discussion of various changes).

76. Barry did discuss paragraph 11 of his March 4, 1998 with Clinton-Gore White House and Justice Department attorneys Lindsay, Paxton, Gilligan, Shapiro, and Giles. See H. Exs. 46 (Lindsay and Paxton), 49 (Paxton), 67 (Gilligan), 69 (Shapiro), and 70, 71, 73, 74, and 75 (Giles).

77. Before signing the Declaration of March 4, 1998, Barry reviewed it thoroughly. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 120.

78. When Barry signed the March 4, 1998, Barry knew that some inbound e-mail messages and many other e-mails inside the Clinton-Gore White House were not in ARMS. See Barry Testimony, August 3, 2000 Tr. at 145, H. Ex. 9-49, H. Ex. 64.

79. Paragraph 11 of Barry’s March 4, 1998 Declaration is false. The Clinton-Gore White House and its legal counsel knew it was and is false. Lindsay Testimony, August 223, 2000 Tr. at 166 - 168.

80. Barry also knows this language in Paragraph 11 of his March 4, 1998 Declaration, also used in Paragraph 4 of Barry’s July 9, 1999 declaration, is false. Barry says he was pressured Paxton to sign this false document.. Heissner Testimony, August 15, 2000 Tr. at 101 - 102; see also H. Ex. 39-1 051639-40, 051646; Paragraph 4 of Barry’s July 9, 1999 Affidavit, H. Ex. 42

81. The Clinton-Gore White House filed its Motion by Executive Office of the President for a Protective Order Quashing Plaintiffs’ Notice of Deposition and Request for Documents Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) & (b)(5) on March 4, 1998 (hereinafter “Motion for 30(b)(6) Protective Order”). See H. Ex. 19.

82. Daniel Barry’s March 4, 1998 Declaration, and the Declaration of Sally Paxton, an attorney in the Clinton-Gore White House Counsel’s Office, were attached to the Motion for 30(b)(6) Protective Order (as Exhibits D and B respectively) to support the Clinton-Gore White House’s argument that its search in response to the First Request for Production of Documents was complete, covering all potential sources and producing all potentially relevant documents, and that an oral deposition should not proceed. Id. at 8-11.

83. The Clinton-Gore White House Motion for 30(b)(6) Protective Order stated that “[t]he declarations [from Paxton, Laura Crabtree, the Desktop Systems Branch Chief of the IS&T Division, and Barry which were attached to the Motion] also render unnecessary plaintiffs’ broad discovery requests regarding e-mail and computer files.” See H. Ex. 19 at 11.

84. By this statement, the Clinton-Gore White House and its counsel were representing that all information relevant to the method and completeness of the e-mail searches that had been or were to be performed in this case was contained in the attached Declarations, including Tony Barry’s Declaration of March 4, 1998. Obviously, they were worried that an oral deposition would reveal the Mail2 and other e-mail problems.

85. On March 18, 1998, Plaintiffs filed their Opposition to the Clinton-Gore White House’s Motion for 30(b)(6) Protective Order (hereinafter “Oppositon”).

86. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the Clinton-Gore White House’s Motion for 30(b)(6) Protective Order stated that the purpose of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition was “to find out how personnel at the Clinton White House communicate, exchange information and store communications and information” and “to confirm that the Clinton White House’s e-mail, computer files and electronically-stored information were readily accessible.” See Id. at 2, 3.

87. A copy of this Opposition was faxed from Sally Paxton in the White House Counsel’s Office to Tony Barry on March 23, 1998. See H. Ex. 48.

88. Tony Barry then faxed the Opposition to Mark Lindsay with a note that stated “Please review. I will need guidance.” See H. Ex. 48.

89. Tony Barry confirmed in his Declaration of March 30, 1998 that he had “reviewed the Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Executive Office of the President’s Motion for Protective Order....” See H. Ex. 44 at 1.

90. Paragraph 1 of this Declaration states that “I previously provided a declaration in this case” and paragraphs 3 and 5 refer to “[m]y previous declaration” indicating the Barry March 4, 1998 Declaration. See H. Ex. 44 at ¶¶ 1, 3, 5.

91. Barry March 30, 1998 Declaration fails to correct the fals