EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON
FIELD OFFICE
DENA BRISCOE, )
)
Class Agent )
)
v. ) EEOC No. 100-A3-7932X
)
JOHN E. POTTER, ) Agency Case No. CC201-0022-03
POSTMASTER GENERAL, )
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, )
)
Agency. ) Date: June 24,
2004
)
CLASS
AGENT BRISCOE’S RESPONSE TO THE
EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION’S
MAY 13, 2004
ORDER TO PRODUCE INFORMATION
Class Agent, Dena Briscoe, by counsel, hereby respectfully
submits this Response to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”)
May 13, 2004 Order to
Produce Information. Class Agent Briscoe
states as follows:
INTRODUCTION
Class Agent Briscoe filed her Class Complaint to redress discrimination
based on race and national origin by the United States Postal Service (“USPS”)
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et. seq. First, Class Agent Briscoe claims that the
underlying disparity in working conditions created by the USPS between its
employees at its main postal facility in Boca Raton, Florida (“Boca Raton
facility”) and its processing
and distribution center located on Brentwood Road (“Brentwood facility”) in
Washington, D.C. in
October of 2001 was discriminatory.
Specifically, Class Agent Briscoe claims that the USPS affirmatively
notified the Boca Raton facility employees, who are predominately Caucasian, of
their exposure to anthrax and immediately took remedial measures, including
provided all such employees with medical tests and with preventative and
curative antibiotics and implemented USPS Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3
that requires, inter alia, mechanical shutdown
(including air handling equipment), isolation and evacuation of the facility
when anthrax contamination is suspected.
In contrast, the USPS actively concealed from its Brentwood
facility employees, who are predominantly not Caucasian, their exposure
to anthrax and failed to take immediate remedial measures, such as providing
all such employees with medical tests and with preventative and curative
antibiotics and implementing USPS Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3 in a
timely manner.
Second, Class Agent Briscoe claims that the USPS’ implementation
of USPS Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3 has created a disparate
impact. Specifically, the USPS timely
implemented its Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3 in its Boca
Raton facility, where the employees are predominately Caucasian,
but yet did not timely implement its Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3 in
its Brentwood facility, where the employees are not
predominately Caucasian.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. USPS
Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3 Requires That the USPS Notify its
Employees of Suspected or Known Anthrax Contamination, Provide Medical
Treatment and Effectuate the Mechanical Shutdown, Isolation and Evacuation of
the Facility.
In October 1999, the USPS issued USPS Management Instruction
EL-860-1999-3, entitled “Emergency Response to Mail Allegedly Containing
Anthrax,” which outlined the hazards of exposure to anthrax and mandated
emergency procedures regarding mail suspected of containing anthrax. USPS Manaagement
Instruction EL-860-1999-3 expressly states:
The
Postal Service is committed to providing a safe and healthful work environment
for its employees. Suspected bioterrorism threats or suspicious incidents
require prompt action by health, safety, law enforcement, and laboratory
personnel. Coordination and communication
are essential to protect first responders and employees.
Id. The USPS Management Instruction further
states, “It is management’s responsibility to minimize potential exposures
through quick isolation and evacuation until emergency response and law
enforcement can arrive and take control of the incident.” Id. Pursuant to USPS Management Instruction EL‑860‑1999‑3,
USPS officials must ensure the following:
1. All
employees, through safety talks, hazardous materials, first-responder training,
and emergency action plan training, must be instructed on initial actions to
take if there has been a suspected exposure to anthrax (or other biologically
hazardous material).
2. Emergency
action plans, crisis management plans, hazardous materials spills response
instructions, medical service standing orders, and other related standard
operation procedures must be modified to incorporate appropriate guidance. Crisis management plans must be revised to do
the following:
a. Include
appropriate actions to ensure initial coordination with the FBI and outside
responders through the Inspection Service.
b. Detail other
initial actions to isolate and contain potential contamination and deal with
potentially exposed employees.
c. Cover subsequent
actions, including proper medical treatment (using current Center for Disease
Control (CDC) guidelines), employee counseling and media liaison.
The
emergency action plan must include the telephone numbers of the initial and
secondary contacts.
Id. When anthrax exposure is suspected, USPS
officials are specifically directed by Management Instruction EL‑860‑1999‑3
to do the following:
1. Alert
employees to stay in evacuation areas and not leave postal property so that
they can receive necessary information and medical follow-up if
appropriate.
2. Invoke the emergency action plan,
including the following:
a. Effecting
mechanical shutdowns (including air handling equipment), isolation and
evacuation.
b. Notifying the Inspection Service.
c. Notify Postal Service Aviation Mail
Security Office.
d. Notify postal
and local community emergency responders, which may include the health
department, fire department, or local law enforcement.
Id.
(emphasis added).
B. The USPS
Notified the Boca Raton
Facility Employees of Their Exposure to Anthrax and Immediately Took Remedial
Measures.
On or about October 3,
2001, Bob Stevens, a photo editor for a private company called
American Media Inc. (“AMI”) located in Boca Raton,
Florida, was diagnosed with inhalation
anthrax. He died two days later. On October
7, 2001, federal officials found anthrax in Steven’s AMI
office. On October 10, 2001, Ernest Blanco, an AMI mail room
employee, tested positive for anthrax exposure.
On October 11, 2001,
federal officials found anthrax in the AMI mail room. On the very next day, the USPS implemented
its Management Instruction EL-860-1999-3 for its main postal facility in Boca
Raton, Florida that processes AMI’s mail. Specifically,
the USPS tested the Boca Raton
facility for anthrax, and, despite not receiving positive test results for
anthrax until October 15, 2001,
diligently tested all Boca Raton Postal employees, who are predominantly
Caucasian, for anthrax and immediately provided these employees preventative
and curative antibiotics.
C. The USPS Knew of the Dangers Posed By Anthrax Sent Through
The Mail.
At all relevant times, the USPS was aware that
anthrax sent through the mail could penetrate the sides of a sealed
envelope. As early as 1988, the USPS
required that bio-hazardous materials, such as anthrax, be contained in
“fail-safe packages” if they were to be sent through the U.S.
mail. These USPS regulations mandated that toxins
such as anthrax be contained in vials wrapped with waterproof tape, surrounded
by absorbent material, and sealed within two separate metal canisters. The regulations also required packages to be
labeled as containing disease-causing agents and clearly marked with a contact
telephone number at the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) in
case of leakage or damage.
D. Like
the Boca Raton
Facility, the Brentwood Facility Processed
an Anthrax-Laden Letter.
On Tuesday, October 9,
2001, anthrax‑laden letters addressed to Senator Tom Daschle
and Senator Patrick Leahy at their U.S. Senate offices in Washington,
D.C. were deposited in the U.S. Mail at Trenton,
New Jersey.
On or about Thursday, October 11, 2001, the Daschle letter was received
by and processed at the Brentwood facility using Delivery Bar Code Sorter
(“DBCS”) machine #17 and was then moved by mail transport equipment to the
Government Mail Section for delivery to the Hart Senate Office Building. Shortly after this letter was processed, DBCS
#17 was opened and a large blower using compressed air was used to blow debris
and dust from the conveyor belts and optical reading heads of the machine,
spreading anthrax throughout the Brentwood facility.
E. The
Hart Senate Office Building Was Closed and Mail Delivery from the Brentwood
Facility Was Suspended Because Capitol Police’s Field Test Confirmed That the
Daschle Letter Contained Anthrax.
The Daschle letter was delivered to the Hart
Senate Office Building
on Friday, October 12, 2001. On Monday,
October 15, 2001, the Daschle letter was opened in the Senator’s
office in the Hart Senate
Office Building
and was found to contain a suspicious, fine white powder. The Capitol Police were called and performed
a field test on the letter, which was found to contain anthrax. The ventilation system in the building was
immediately shut down, and the building was closed. Bundles of letters and packages were
quarantined, and all mail delivery was suspended. Staffers in Senator Daschle’s officer were
tested and given antibiotics. Even tours
of the Capitol were cancelled.
F. Unlike the Prudent and Responsible Safety Precautions Taken
at the Boca Raton
Facility, the USPS Actively Concealed from its Brentwood
Facility Employees Their Exposure to Anthrax And Failed to Immediately Take
Remedial Measures.
By contrast with the prudent and responsible safety precautions
taken at the Boca Raton facility,
the USPS continued to operate the Brentwood facility,
twenty‑four hours per day, seven days per week, despite the fact that the
facility had processed the anthrax-laden Daschle letter. By continuing to operate the Brentwood
facility, the USPS caused the Brentwood employees to work in unsafe conditions where they would
be exposed to the danger of anthrax contamination from the deadly anthrax that
had leaked from the envelope containing the Daschle letter. In shocking disregard for the incipient
danger of anthrax contamination at the Brentwood
facility, the USPS actively concealed from its Brentwood
facility employees, who are predominantly not Caucasian, their exposure
to anthrax and failed to take immediate remedial measures, such as providing
all such employees with medical tests and with preventative and curative
antibiotics and implementing USPS Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3.
Rather, at all relevant times, USPS officials, including USPS
Postmaster General John E. Potter and Brentwood Facility Manager Timothy C.
Haney, among other supervisors and managers, repeatedly and falsely
assured Brentwood
facility employees that the facility was safe.
USPS officials, including Postmaster General Potter and Brentwood
Facility Manager Haney, among other supervisors and managers, also repeatedly
gave intentionally false and/or misleading information to Brentwood facility
employees, falsely assuring them that they had not been exposed to the deadly
bacteria when, in fact, the USPS officials knew that the facility was likely
contaminated with anthrax from the Daschle letter. Worse yet, USPS officials, including
Brentwood Facility Manager Haney, also threatened, coerced, and intimidated the
Brentwood facility employees into not making inquiries about the Daschle
letter, the safety of the facility, or their own safety.
After the discovery of anthrax in the Daschle letter and during a
regularly scheduled “floor” meeting on Monday, October 15, 2001, Brentwood
facility Electronic Maintenance Technician (“ET”) Larry Littlejohn, whose job
responsibilities included maintaining DBCS machines (including DBCS #17 that
had processed the Daschle letter), requested that his supervisor provide a
briefing on anthrax and proper safety procedures. The supervisor not only refused to provide
the requested safety briefing, but he also threatened Littlejohn with a seven‑day
suspension and had him forcibly expelled from the building for publicly voicing
his concerns. Littlejohn subsequently
received notice that he was being suspended for seven days.
That same day, Postmaster General Potter delivered a speech in Denver,
Colorado during which he falsely declared
that the USPS mail system was safe, despite the fact that he knew the Brentwood
facility had processed the Daschle letter containing anthrax. Thomas Day, USPS Vice President of
Engineering and anthrax and security expert, attended the conference with
Postmaster General Potter and began coordinating the USPS’ response to the
Daschle letter from Denver, Colorado.
G. Tests
Confirmed That the Daschle Letter Contained Highly Potent and “Weaponized” Anthrax.
Later that same day, Monday,
October 15, 2001, the Daschle letter was sent to the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute for Infectious Disease (“USAMRIID”) at Fort
Detrick, Maryland
for further testing. USAMRIID scientist
Dr. John Ezzell tested the letter and concluded that,
in his many years of researching anthrax, he had never seen anthrax spores so
potent. Dr. Ezzell
characterized the anthrax in the Daschle letter as being “weaponized.” Indeed, the anthrax spores were so potent
that, when Dr. Ezzell opened the Daschle letter to
test it, some of its contents aerosolized instantly. Dr. Ezzell
immediately began taking antibiotics and took the extreme and painful measure
of inhaling a bleach solution to kill any anthrax spores that he may have
inhaled.
H. Unlike the Brentwood
Facility Employees, Senate Employees Were Tested and Given Antibiotics.
On Tuesday, October 16,
2001, all Senate employees were tested for anthrax exposure and
given preventative and curative antibiotics.
The results of these tests showed that at least twenty (20) Senate
staffers had been exposed to anthrax, including staffers on a floor below
Senator Daschle’s office and at least one staffer who had not been at work when
the letter was opened the previous day.
I. The USPS Was Notified That Anthrax in the Daschle Letter
Was Dangerously “Potent.”
Also on Tuesday,
October 16, 2001, Major General John Parker, U.S. Army Commanding
General at USAMRIID, stated with respect to the anthrax spores contained in the
Daschle letter: “It’s a very potent form
of anthrax that was clearly produced by someone who knew what he was
doing.” On the same day, the FBI
notified the USPS Inspection Service that laboratory tests revealed the Daschle
letter to contain a “potent” strain of anthrax.
The Inspection Service, in turn, notified Postmaster General Potter of
the potency of the anthrax spores in the Daschle letter. Thus, USPS officials, including Postmaster
General Potter and, on information and belief, Vice President Day, clearly knew
at least as early as Tuesday, October 16, 2001, that a very dangerous
condition likely existed at the Brentwood facility.
J. Despite
Knowing That the Brentwood Facility Was Likely Contaminated with Anthrax, the
USPS Failed to Implement USPS Management Instruction EL‑860‑1999‑3,
Failed to Advise Brentwood Facility Employees of the Serious Risk of Injury or
Death and Falsely Represented That the Facility Was Safe.
Nonetheless, USPS officials, including Postmaster General Potter,
failed to invoke any of the USPS emergency response procedures, including the
procedures set forth in Management Instruction EL‑860‑1999‑3
regarding suspected anthrax contamination, and failed to evacuate or otherwise
shut down the Brentwood facility. Nor
did any USPS official, including Postmaster General Potter or Vice President
Day, advise Brentwood facility employees of the
substantial danger to which they were likely being exposed.
To the contrary, on Tuesday, October 16, 2001, USPS officials,
acting, on information and belief at the direction of Postmaster General
Potter, Vice President Day, and/or other unknown USPS officials, instructed
Brentwood facility supervisors, via the USPS e‑mail system, to provide
false safety briefings to Brentwood facility employees, falsely representing to
the employees that there was no evidence that any anthrax contaminated letter
or mail had come through the facility at any time, including the letter that
was sent to Senator Daschle’s office. Ossie L. Alston, a Brentwood
facility supervisor, received a copy of this false safety briefing from Manager
of Distribution Operations (“MDO”) John Cooke with instructions to give the
false briefing to employees under his supervision. Alston refused to give the false safety
briefing, which instead was given by another supervisor. The briefing was clearly false, as the USPS
knew that the Daschle letter contained anthrax and that it, like all mail
destined for U.S. Government offices in the District of
Columbia, including mail destined for Senator
Daschle’s office, was processed at the Brentwood
facility.
K. The House of Representatives Was Shut down Because of Anthrax
Contamination from a Letter Processed at the Brentwood
Facility.
On Wednesday, October
17, 2001, Congressional leaders arranged for an
unprecedented shutdown of the U.S. House of Representatives after thirty‑one
(31) staffers tested positive for exposure to anthrax. By contrast, the Brentwood
facility continued to operate, twenty‑four hours per day, seven days per
week, despite the USPS’ knowledge of the likely potent anthrax contamination.
L. Anthrax Contamination Was Found in the Senate Mail Room That
the Daschle Letter Passed Through Even Though the Daschle Letter Was Never
Opened There.
On Wednesday, October 17, 2001, anthrax was found in a mail room
at the Dirksen Senate Office Building, through which
the Daschle letter had passed unopened before being sent on to the Hart Senate
Office Building. Based on the Dirksen Building mail room findings, USPS officials,
including, on information and belief, Postmaster General Potter and Vice
President Day, knew or should have known, at least as early as
Wednesday, October 17, 2001, that the “weaponized”
anthrax contained in the Daschle letter had likely leaked from the envelope and
contaminated the Brentwood facility, creating a serious risk of injury or death
to Brentwood facility employees, even though the Daschle letter was never
opened there.
M. The
USPS Finally Ordered the Brentwood
Facility to Be Tested for Anthrax Contamination but Failed to Invoke Emergency
Response Procedures and Failed to Advise Brentwood
Facility Employees of the Serious Risk of Injury or Death.
Indeed, these USPS officials clearly suspected, at least as
early as Wednesday, October 17,
2001, that the Brentwood facility had been
contaminated because on that date the USPS ordered that the Brentwood
facility be tested for anthrax. At no
time on that day, however, did these USPS officials invoke the procedures set
forth in Management Instruction EL‑860‑1999‑3, or otherwise
evacuate or shut down the Brentwood facility. Nor did any USPS officials advise Brentwood
facility employees of the serious risk of injury or death to which they were
likely being exposed or provide them with preventative and curative antibiotics
N. Unlike the Brentwood
Facility, All Buildings on Capitol Hill Were Closed and Quarantined.
On Thursday, October
18, 2001, all buildings on Capitol Hill were closed and
quarantined. Capitol Hill was treated as
a crime scene by the FBI. By contrast,
the Brentwood facility continued to operate, twenty‑four
hours per day, seven days per week, despite the USPS’ knowledge of the likely
potent anthrax contamination.
O. The
USPS Failed to Invoke Emergency Response Procedures and Failed to Advise Brentwood
Facility Employees of the Serious Risk of Injury or Death Despite Confirmation
Of Anthrax Contamination At The Facility.
At least as early as the morning of Thursday, October 18, 2001, USPS officials,
including Brentwood Facility Manager Haney and USPS Senior Vice President
Deborah Willhite, clearly knew the Brentwood
facility had been contaminated with anthrax.
According to notes kept by Brentwood Facility Manager Haney, on the
morning of Thursday, October 18, 2001:
I met with
Rick Edwards, representative of the Senate, Deborah Wilhite
(sic), and Terry Poole. Mr. Edwards was
upset that the senator had received an infected letter and wanted to know why
it happened and what we were going to do about it . . . When we left the
meeting, I pulled Deborah aside and let her know that the mail was leaking
and that we were affected.
(emphasis
added). On information and belief, Brentwood Facility
Manager Haney informed Postmaster General Potter, Vice President Day, and other
unknown USPS officials that anthrax had leaked out of the envelope containing
the Daschle letter processed at the Brentwood facility,
causing contamination at the Brentwood facility. Indeed, Brentwood Facility Manager Haney
stated in an interview with a USPS Equal Employment Opportunity Dispute
Resolution Specialist in this case that “[d]uring the
period before the decision was made to close the plant, he communicated and met
frequently with senior Postal Service officials to exchange information, seek
guidance, and direction.”
P. Even
Though the Daschle Letter, Which Was Mailed from New
Jersey, Was Never Opened by a New
Jersey Mail Carrier, He Contracted Anthrax.
Also on the morning of Thursday, October 18, 2001, Postmaster
General Potter and, on information and belief, Vice President Day and other
unknown USPS officials, were notified that the CDC had confirmed a New Jersey
state medical examiner’s finding on October 16, 2001 that a letter carrier in
New Jersey, where the Daschle letter had been mailed, was suffering from cutaneous anthrax.
Based on these circumstances, these USPS officials knew or should have
known that the “weaponized” anthrax contained in the
Daschle letter had likely leaked from the envelope and contaminated the
Brentwood facility, creating a serious risk of injury or death to Brentwood
facility employees, even though the Daschle letter was never opened there.
Q. Despite
Known Anthrax Contamination at the Brentwood Facility, USPS Officials Falsely
Represented That the Facility Was Safe and Discouraged Employees from Seeking
out Information or Asking Questions Regarding the Safety of the Facility.
Nonetheless, during a press conference at The White House on the
morning of Thursday, October 18, 2001,
Postmaster General Potter falsely represented that the mail was safe. At approximately 12:30 p.m. on Thursday,
October 18, 2001, Postmaster General Potter held a press conference
in an unused section of the Brentwood facility. Employees were discouraged from asking
questions at, or even attending, the press conference. Some employees were told that they could not
attend the press conference while “on the clock.” Consequently, a large number of employees
“clocked out” in order to attend the press conference. Other employees were told “not to go anywhere
near” the press conference. During the
press conference, and despite knowing from FBI and CDC reports, among other
sources, that the Brentwood facility had likely been
contaminated with “weaponized” anthrax, Postmaster
General Potter falsely represented to the employees and members of the news
media in attendance that the Brentwood facility was
safe.
R. Hazardous Materials Testing Further Confirmed Anthrax
Contamination at the Brentwood Facility
and the USPS’ Knowledge of Anthrax Contamination.
On the same day as the USPS press conference at the Brentwood
facility, the USPS contacted the Fairfax County HAZMAT Team to have them
perform quick, on‑site field tests for anthrax at the Brentwood
facility. The Fairfax County HAZMAT Team
sent over two employees in full protective gear, i.e., “moonsuits,” to take samples while the postal employees
continued their normal duties without any
protection. The Fairfax County
HAZMAT Team tested DBCS #16‑20 and the Government mail section at the
front end of the workroom floor. In the
afternoon of that same day, inspectors from URS Greiner Woodward Clyde
Engineering Consultants (“URS”), also wearing protective “moonsuits,”
began testing the facility for anthrax contamination.
Brentwood Facility Manager Haney’s notes about the results of the
URS tests further confirm that, at least as early as Thursday, October 18, 2001, he knew
the Brentwood facility was contaminated with anthrax:
URS was in
the facility at 2:30 p.m. On my way back from the meeting, I was called
by [Postmaster General] Jack Potter and Adam Walsh, (America’s
Most Wanted), the Deputy Director of the FBI, and Chief Postal Inspector
Kenneth Weaver. It was stated that they
wanted to do a live broadcast from the Brentwood
workroom floor. I contacted Corporate
Media and the broadcast was coordinated.
They all left after the broadcast (about Noon). I then met with [redacted] from URS along
with some members of my staff. We
identified the machines that we had reason to feel the mail had been run
on. At 6:15
p.m., that night, I spoke with Inspectors Weaver and Clemans to get additional information from the letter. They did not have the ID tag information at
them time (sic), but we were able to get this information from New
Jersey. By
decoding the ID tag information, we were able to identify the actual machine
the mail had been processed on. Since
URS only had 30 swabs available, we did this machine and the manual cases for
ZIP Code 20510 (The Senate). Again,
they tested hot. URS continued with
the testing, but it was not completed until 02:30
a.m. on the 19th, at which time I went home.
(emphasis
added). On information and belief, Brentwood Facility
Manager Haney informed Postmaster General Potter, Vice President Day, and other
unknown USPS officials about the results of the URS tests.
S. The USPS Waited Four Days to Identify the Machine That
Processed the Daschle Letter.
By Friday, October 19,
2001, USPS officials knew that DSBC #17 was the machine at the Brentwood
facility that had processed the Daschle letter.
T. The USPS Failed to Invoke Emergency Procedures and Kept Brentwood
Operational Despite Requesting That All Brentwood
Facility Employees Be Given Antibiotics for Anthrax Exposure.
Reflecting their recognition of the danger they created by
exposing the Brentwood workers to anthrax contamination at the facility, on
Friday, October 19, 2001, USPS officials, including, on information and belief,
Postmaster General Potter, Vice President Day, and other unknown USPS
officials, requested that the District of Columbia Department of Health place
all Brentwood employees on antibiotics for exposure to anthrax. At no time on that day, however, did any USPS
official, including the aforementioned, invoke any of the USPS emergency
procedures, including the procedures set forth in Management Instruction EL‑860‑1999‑3,
or otherwise take steps to evacuate or shut down the Brentwood
facility. Nor did any USPS official,
including the aforementioned, advise Brentwood facility employees of the
substantial danger that USPS officials created for the Brentwood employees by
requiring them to continue working at the anthrax-contaminated facility.
U. The USPS Continued to Falsely Represent That Testing Showed
No Anthrax Contamination at the Brentwood
Facility Even after Taking DBCS Machine #17 Off-line Because of Anthrax
Contamination.
Also on that same day, Postmaster General Potter falsely
represented on a USPS ‑ TV news program entitled “Keeping Our Focus” and
in an accompanying notice posted on all employee bulletin boards at the
Brentwood facility that early reports of testing at the Brentwood facility
showed no anthrax contamination. “We are
talking with employees and sharing information as quickly as it becomes
available,” Postmaster General Potter also falsely claimed. On the same day, Brentwood Facility Manager
Haney, acting, on information and belief, at the direction of Postmaster
General Potter, Vice President Day, and/or other unknown USPS officials, held
another series of “floor” meetings with Brentwood employees at which Haney
again falsely represented that the Brentwood facility was safe and that he was
doing everything he could to keep the employees safe.
Despite Haney’s false assurances, rumors began to circulate that
USPS officials knew that the Brentwood facility, and
DBCS #17 specifically, was contaminated with anthrax. As a result, at approximately 4:00 p.m. on Friday, October 19, 2001, several Brentwood
facility ETs assigned to work on DBCS #17 approached Brentwood
facility employee Alston and stated that they had heard a rumor DBCS #17 was
contaminated with anthrax. Alston told
the ETs to stay away from the machine until he could
determine if what they had heard was true.
Alston asked Supervisors Mitchell and Lewis if they had heard, or been
told, that DBCS #17 or any other machine was contaminated with anthrax. Both answered no.
At approximately 4:15 p.m.,
however, MDO Cooke told Alston that DBCS #17 was not to be used because it was
contaminated with anthrax. Thus, at some
point on Friday, October 19, 2001,
the machine that had processed the Daschle letter, DBCS #17, was taken off‑line
because it was contaminated with anthrax.
Nonetheless, Brentwood facility employees were
not informed that the Daschle letter had been processed on DBCS #17, nor were
they informed why DBCS #17 had been shut down.
Even further, no USPS official, including Postmaster General Potter,
Vice President Day and Brentwood Facility Manager Haney, invoked any of the
USPS emergency procedures, including the procedures set forth in Management
Instruction EL‑860‑1999‑3, or otherwise took steps to
evacuate or shut down the Brentwood facility or advise Brentwood facility
employees of the substantial danger that USPS officials created for the
Brentwood employees by requiring them to continue working at the
anthrax-contaminated facility.
V. Despite Knowing That the Brentwood
Facility Was Contaminated with Anthrax, the USPS Did Not Provide Brentwood
Facility Employees Protective Gear and Threatened to Use Disciplinary Action
Against Those Who Were Concerned for Their Own Safety.
MDO Cooke also told Alston that gloves and masks were available
for employees’ use, but that he should
not pass them out to employees unless they specifically asked for them, as
there were not enough gloves and masks to give to all of the employees on
duty. MDO Cooke also told Alston that,
if any employees wished to leave work because they were emotionally upset by
the anthrax contamination, he should let them go, but should take written
disciplinary action against the employees upon their return to work. MDO Cooke stated that these instructions came
from senior USPS officials, including, on information and belief, Postmaster
General Potter, Vice President Day, Brentwood Facility Manager Haney, and/or
other unknown USPS officials.
W. The USPS Ordered That DBCS Machine #17 Be Brought Back On-line
Despite Being Contaminated with Anthrax.
At approximately 11:30 p.m.,
on Friday, October 19, 2001,
Supervisor of Maintenance Operations Jimmy Tihoe
returned to work from his scheduled two days off and was told by Acting
Supervisor Tom Dickey that DBCS #17 was contaminated with anthrax. Dickey also told Tihoe
that employees were refusing to work on the machine. At that same time, Manager Chapman ordered ETs Edgar and Wright to get DBCS #17 up and running
again. ET’s Edgar and Wright protested
because they had heard rumors that DBCS #17 was contaminated with anthrax. Manager Chapman insisted that the machine was
not contaminated and ordered them to clean DBCS #17 by “blowing it out” with
compressed air and to get it on‑line immediately. Other Brentwood
employees heard managers state that they needed DBCS #17 on‑line because
another DBCS machine had broken down, and DBCS #17 was needed to meet their
processing goals. As a result, DBCS #17
was brought back on‑line notwithstanding that it was contaminated with
anthrax.
X. As They Ordered Anthrax-Contaminated DBCS # 17 Be Brought
Back On-line, USPS Officials Were Advised That Brentwood Facility Employee
Leroy Richmond Was Hospitalized with Inhalation Anthrax.
Also on Friday, October
19, 2001, Brentwood facility employee Leroy
Richmond entered the emergency room at Fairfax
Inova Hospital
and was confirmed to be suffering from inhalation anthrax. USPS officials, including, on information and
belief, Postmaster General Potter, Vice President Day, Brentwood Facility
Manager Haney, and other unknown USPS officials, were notified that Richmond
had been admitted to the hospital for possible inhalation anthrax. Indeed, in the evening of the same day, Richmond’s
wife called Brentwood Facility Manager Haney and left a message on his voice
mail stating that her husband was suffering from inhalation anthrax and that
the facility must be shut down immediately.
In addition, throughout the early morning hours of October 20, 2001, Mrs. Richmond called other Brentwood
facility supervisors to inform them that her husband was suffering from
inhalation anthrax.
Y. USPS Officials Met With the D.C. Mayor’s Office of Emergency
Response Regarding Confirmation That the Brentwood Facility Had Tested Positive
For Anthrax Contamination And That Leroy
Richmond Had Been Hospitalized With Inhalation Anthrax.
Brentwood Facility Manager Haney’s notes also show he clearly
knew that, at least as early as a 6:00 a.m. meeting with the D.C. Mayor’s
Office of Emergency Response (“OER”) on Saturday, October 20, 2001, “the
facility tested positive” and that at least one Brentwood employee was
suffering from possible inhalation anthrax exposure.
Z. USPS Officials Again Falsely Represented to Brentwood
Facility Employees That the Facility Was Safe and That No Anthrax Contamination
Had Been Found.
Nonetheless, Brentwood Facility Manager Haney, acting, on
information and belief, at the direction of Postmaster General Potter, Vice
President Day, and/or other unknown USPS officials, held another series of
“floor” meetings with Brentwood facility employees on Saturday, October 20,
2001, during which he again falsely represented to the employees that the
facility was safe and no evidence of anthrax spores had been found. Haney falsely stated, “We have made it this
far and we do not have any positive test results for anthrax.” He mentioned that one Brentwood
facility employee had been hospitalized and was being examined for potential
inhalation anthrax. Haney falsely
stated, however, that the employee’s tests had been negative so far and that
everything was okay. He then expressed
concern that the mail volume being processed in the facility was dropping, as
were processing goals. Haney then told
the employees that they needed to focus on processing the mail and meeting
their processing goals. He also falsely
promised that all news would be shared with the employees.
AA. Brentwood Facility Manager Haney Instructed Brentwood Facility
Employees to Handle Suspicious Letters and Packages, Contrary to USPS
Management Instruction EL‑860‑1999‑3, and Threatened Workers
Who Questioned His Instructions.
Brentwood Facility Manager Haney also told Brentwood
employees at least three (3) times during this same meeting that if they
encountered any suspicious pieces of mail, they should pick it up with their
hands and carry it to red bio‑hazard bags that had been placed throughout
the building. When Brentwood
facility ET David Norville, who had received training
for exposure to biological hazards while serving in the military, questioned
Haney about this instruction, Haney threatened to expel him from the
building. Haney became very belligerent
toward employees who asked specific questions about the proper procedures for
handling suspicious letters and packages.
Haney even told one employee to “shut up.”
BB. Anthrax-Laden Mail Processed at the Brentwood
Facility Also Contaminated Another Capitol
Hill Building.
Also on October 20,
2001, anthrax was found in the Ford
Office Building
where mail was processed for the U.S. House of Representatives. Mail delivered to the Ford
Office Building
initially was processed at the Brentwood facility. Based on these circumstances, the USPS knew
or should have known that the “weaponized” anthrax
contained in the Daschle letter had likely leaked from the envelope and
contaminated the Brentwood facility, creating a serious risk of injury or death
to Brentwood facility employees, even though the Daschle letter was never
opened there.
CC. Brentwood
Employee Thomas Morris Died from Inhalation Anthrax Contracted at the Brentwood
Facility.
At 4:39 a.m. on Sunday, October 21, 2001, Brentwood
employee Thomas Morris, Jr. called 911 complaining of inhalation anthrax‑like
symptoms. Morris told the 911 dispatcher
that he suspected that he had been exposed at work to an envelope containing
lethal anthrax. Morris died of
inhalation anthrax several hours later.
DD. Brentwood Facility Manager
Haney Finally Decides to Close the Brentwood
Facility and Advises Facility Employees to Seek Medical Evaluation and
Treatment.
At approximately 11:00 a.m.
on Sunday, October 21, 2001,
CDC Representative Jim Haslet told Brentwood Facility Manager Haney that the Brentwood
facility needed to be closed. After his
conversation with Haslet, Haney told all employees to gather in the cafeteria
at 12:00 p.m. for a meeting. At the meeting, Brentwood Facility Manager
Haney told the employees in attendance that a postal worker was in the hospital
with a confirmed diagnosis of anthrax and that the facility was being closed as
a “precautionary measure.” The employees
in attendance were directed to go to Judiciary Square
for medical evaluation and treatment.
EE. USPS Officials Told Some Brentwood Facility Employees to Stay
Behind and Move the Mail out of the Facility Without Protective Gear, While
Failing to Advise Those Employees That the Facility Was Contaminated with
Anthrax.
Not all employees were allowed to attend the meeting in the
cafeteria, however. Approximately eight
(8) to ten (10) employees were paged on the public address system and
instructed to report to the MDO office.
When Brentwood employee Jeffrey Butler reported
to the MDO office, he was told to take a seat in the conference room, which he
did. After the other employees arrived,
SMDO Talley entered the conference room and addressed the group of employees. Acting, on information and belief, at the
direction of Brentwood Facility Manager Haney, SMDO Talley stated that she
needed her “best workers” to help her round up all of the mail at the Brentwood
facility and move it to the loading dock/platform area so that it could be
loaded onto trucks. The employees,
including Butler, asked SMDO Talley
what was going on in the cafeteria with the other workers. SMDO Talley responded by stating that she did
not know for sure, but that she thought the facility was going to be closed as
a “precautionary measure.” She repeated
that she, personally, did not have any firm information that the building was
contaminated, but that she needed the help of her “best workers” to help get
every piece of mail in the building ready to be moved out as soon as possible. Not having any information to the contrary,
the employees, including Butler,
did as SMDO Talley directed. At no point
during the meeting were any of the employees, including Butler,
notified the facility had been contaminated with anthrax.
Butler continued to
work until 5:00 p.m., gathering mail
throughout the building and organizing it into flat trays, hampers, and other
equipment, and moving it to a platform so that it could be loaded on trucks for
shipment. At no point was Butler
issued any protective gear. After
finishing his work, Butler went to
his car in the parking lot. As Butler
drove towards the exit of the parking lot, he saw a manager handing out flyers
to the next tour of workers arriving for their shift. Butler
pulled over his car and asked the manager for a flyer. It was only upon reading the flyer that
Butler learned that the Brentwood facility was being closed due to anthrax
contamination and that all postal workers were being instructed to report to
Judiciary Square for medical evaluation and treatment. Like Butler,
none of the employees who stayed behind to close down the facility were issued
any protective gear.
FF. The
Brentwood Facility Is Finally Closed, Ten
(10) Days after the Daschle Letter Had Passed Through the Facility and the USPS
Should Have Suspected Anthrax Contamination, and at Least Four (4) Days after
the USPS Knew for Certain That the Facility Had Been Contaminated.
At approximately 7:00 p.m.
on Sunday, October 21, 2001,
the Brentwood facility was finally closed, ten (10) days
after the Daschle letter had passed through the facility and the USPS Should
Have Suspected Anthrax Contamination, and at least four (4) days after the USPS
knew for certain that the facility had been contaminated. Even after the Brentwood
facility was closed on Sunday,
October 21, 2001, truck drivers employed at the facility were
called in to transport potentially contaminated mail to other postal
facilities. The truck drivers worked
late into the night and the early morning hours of Monday, October 22, 2001 to remove potentially
contaminated mail from the Brentwood facility. Like the other employees who stayed behind to
close down the facility, none of the drivers were issued any protective
gear. Incredibly, mail that had been in
the Brentwood facility was not transported to other facilities for
decontamination, but, rather, was sent to other facilities to be processed and
delivered to homes and businesses all across the world.
GG. USPS Officials Told Mid-Level Managers at
the Brentwood Facility to Falsely Represent to Brentwood’s Floor Supervisors
and Employees That the Facility Was Not Contaminated with Anthrax.
On Monday, October 22,
2001, Brentwood facility Supervisor of
Maintenance Operations Jimmy Tihoe arrived at the Brentwood
facility parking lot and, while walking through the gate to the Brentwood
facility, spoke with Mail Processing Manager Greg Hall. Hall told Tihoe
that senior Brentwood managers, acting, on information
and belief, at the direction of Postmaster General Potter, Vice President Day,
Brentwood Facility Manager Haney, and other unknown USPS officials, had told
him and other mid‑level managers to falsely represent to the floor
supervisors and employees that the Brentwood facility
was not contaminated with anthrax.
HH. While
USPS Officials Falsely Represented That The Brentwood
Facility Was Not Contaminated, Brentwood
Employee Joseph Curseen Died Of Inhalation Anthrax
And Other Brentwood Employees Become Ill
From Exposure To Anthrax.
On the morning of Monday,
October 22, 2001, Brentwood facility
employee Joseph Curseen went to the hospital with flu‑like
symptoms, and, later that evening, died of inhalation anthrax. That same day, two (2) more Brentwood
facility employees were hospitalized and nine (9) other employees became ill
with anthrax‑like symptoms. Since
the anthrax contamination at the Brentwood facility in
October 2001, many Brentwood employees have experienced
and continue to experience anthrax‑like symptoms, in addition to substantial
emotional distress, pain, suffering, and anxiety caused by these events.
REQUESTED INFORMATION
1. Identify,
by protected racial group, the class of individuals the Class Agent seeks to
represent.
Class Agent Briscoe seeks to represent a class of Brentwood
facility employees who were employed at the facility at the time of the events
complained of herein and who are black, Asian American/Pacific Islander,
Hispanic and American Indian/Alaskan Native.
2. Specify
in what way the Agency’s actions have allegedly discriminated against the
proposed class, identifying all of the specific employment actions alleged to
be discriminatory against the proposed class and the dates on which these
actions occurred. Specify the date that
the alleged discriminatory action was taken against the Class Agent; identify
the name and position of the Agency officials who participated in that action;
and describe their role in the action.
First,
Class Agent Briscoe claims that the underlying disparity in working conditions
created by the USPS between its employees at the Boca
Raton facility, who are predominately Caucasian, and
the Brentwood facility, who are predominately not
Caucasian, in
October of 2001 was discriminatory. See
Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 418 F. Supp. 603, 606
(S.D. Ohio 1976) (School board discriminated against female physical education
teacher by providing working conditions inferior to those of male teachers
performing same services), rev’d on other
grounds, 585 F2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 932 (1979). Specifically, Class
Agent Briscoe claims that the USPS affirmatively notified the Boca Raton
facility employees of their exposure to anthrax and immediately took remedial
measures, including provided all such employees with medical tests and with
preventative and curative antibiotics, even before receiving the positive test
results for anthrax contamination in the facility, and implemented USPS
Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3 that requires, inter alia, mechanical shutdown (including air handling
equipment), isolation and evacuation of the facility when anthrax contamination
is suspected. The USPS timely initiated
these remedial measures the very next day after they discovered anthrax in the
AMI mail room because the USPS was aware that anthrax sent through the mail
could penetrate the sides of a sealed envelope as is evident by their own
regulations that require that bio-hazardous materials, such as anthrax, be
contained in “fail-safe packages” if they were to be sent through the U.S.
mail.
In contrast, the USPS actively concealed from its Brentwood
facility employees, who are predominantly not Caucasian, including Class
Agent Briscoe, their exposure to anthrax and failed to take immediate remedial
measures, such as providing all such employees with medical tests and with
preventative and curative antibiotics and implementing USPS Management
Instruction EL-860-1993-3. Like the Boca
Raton facility, the USPS had sufficient facts to suspect
that anthrax had leaked from the anthrax-laden letter processed in the Brentwood
facility based on their own regulations and the findings in the AMI mail
room. Even further, the USPS had the
following additional reasons to suspect anthrax contamination at the Brentwood
facility, which it did not have for the Boca Raton
facility:
1. On Monday, October
15, 2001, anthrax was found in the Boca Raton
facility
where
an anthrax-laden letter was processed even though the letter was never opened
there;
2. On October 17,
2001, anthrax was found in the Senate mail room that the Daschle
letter
passed through even though the letter was never opened there;
3. On the morning of October
18, 2001, the USPS was notified that the CDC
confirmed
the New Jersey state medical examiner’s finding on October 16, 2001 that a New
Jersey Postal carrier was infected with cutaneous
anthrax even though the Daschle letter, which was mailed from New Jersey, was
never opened by the New Jersey mail carrier;
4. On October 20,
2001, anthrax was found in the Ford
Office Building
where mail
that is
first processed at the Brentwood facility is processed
for the US House of Representatives; and
5. On October 16,
2001, USPS officials were advised by USAMRIID and CDC
officials
that the particular strain of anthrax in the Daschle letter was a very potent
and finely milled strain of anthrax, even more deadly than the strain of
anthrax found at the Boca Raton
facility, and a very dangerous condition likely existed at the Brentwood
facility.
Indeed, Brentwood Facility Manager Haney confirmed in his notes
that the USPS did in fact suspect anthrax contamination as early as October 18, 2001. Nevertheless, unlike their actions at the
Boca Raton facility, the USPS did not act in a prudent and timely manner to
remedy the working conditions at the Brentwood facility by notifying the
Brentwood facility employees, including Class Agent Briscoe, of their exposure
to anthrax and providing all such employees with medical tests and with
preventative and curative antibiotics and implementing USPS Management
Instruction EL-860-1993-3.
Even worse yet, by at least as early as October 18, 2001, four (4) days before the Brentwood
facility was finally closed, the USPS had actual knowledge that the Brentwood
facility was contaminated with anthrax as a result of their testing of the
facility. This finding of anthrax contamination was
confirmed when, on October 19, 2001, the USPS was notified that early tests
showed that one of its Brentwood Employees was in the hospital suffering from
possible inhalation anthrax.
Nonetheless, unlike the Boca Raton
facility, the USPS chose to keep the Brentwood facility
employees, including Class Agent Briscoe, working at the anthrax contaminated
facility by providing false and/or misleading information and/or not providing
accurate information about the safety of the Brentwood
facility. Not only did the USPS mislead,
lie and/or fail to provide the Brentwood employees, including Class Agent Briscoe,
with accurate information regarding whether the Brentwood facility was
contaminated with anthrax, but the USPS also intimidated and/or threatened the
Brentwood employees with disciplinary action, loss of employment and/or arrest
if they asked questions about the Daschle letter, the safety of the facility or
their own safety, requested safety instructions regarding the same, or asked to
be excused from work, unlike the Boca Raton facility. The USPS also failed to provide all such Brentwood
employees, including Class Agent Briscoe, with medical tests and with
preventative and curative antibiotics and to implement USPS Management
Instruction EL-860-1993-3 in a timely manner, unlike the Boca
Raton facility.
Second, Class Agent Briscoe claims that the USPS’ implementation
of USPS Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3 has created a disparate
impact. Simply put, the USPS timely
implemented its Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3 in its Boca Raton facility,
where the employees are predominately Caucasian, in October 2001 when it
affirmatively notified the Boca Raton facility employees of their exposure to
anthrax and immediately took remedial measures, including provided all such
employees with medical tests and with preventative and curative antibiotics,
tested the facility and subsequently effected the mechanical shutdown,
isolation and evacuation of the facility.
In contrast, the USPS failed to timely implement USPS Management
Instruction EL-860-1993-3 at the Brentwood facility,
where the employees are not predominately Caucasian, in October
2001. Indeed, at the Brentwood facility,
the USPS acted wholly contrary to USPS Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3 by
providing false and/or misleading information and/or not providing accurate
information about the safety of the Brentwood facility and/or how to handle
suspicious packages, intimidating and/or threatening the Brentwood employees
with disciplinary action, loss of employment and/or arrest if they asked
questions about the safety of the facility or their own safety, requested
safety instructions regarding the same, or asked to be excused from work, and
failing to provide all such Brentwood employees with medical tests and with
preventative and curative antibiotics.
The Agency officials who participated in these discriminatory
acts were as follows:
1. USPS Postmaster
General John E. Potter. At a community
meeting hosted by the USPS on decontamination of the Brentwood facility, USPS
Vice President of Engineering Day stated that decisions about the Brentwood
facility were made at the top levels of the organization, including, on
information and belief, by Postmaster General Potter. In addition, Brentwood Facility Manager Haney
stated in an interview with a USPS Equal Employment Opportunity Dispute
Resolution Specialist in this case that “[d]uring the
period before the decision was made to close the plant, he communicated and met
frequently with senior Postal Service officials to exchange information, seek
guidance, and direction,” including, on information and belief, Postmaster
General Potter. Also, as demonstrated
throughout Class Agent Briscoe’s Statement of Facts, supra, Postmaster
General Potter repeatedly and falsely assured
Brentwood facility employees that the facility was safe and that they
had not been exposed to anthrax, when, in fact, he knew or should have known
the that the facility was contaminated with anthrax from the Daschle letter.
2. USPS Vice
President of Engineering Thomas Day. At
a community meeting hosted by the USPS on decontamination of the Brentwood
facility, Vice President Day admitted that he was personally involved in
meetings about whether to shut down the Brentwood facility in response to the
anthrax contamination caused by the Daschle letter. In fact, Vice President Day stated that he
initiated the USPS’ response to the Daschle letter. In addition, Brentwood Facility Manager Haney
stated in an interview with a USPS Equal Employment Opportunity Dispute
Resolution Specialist in this case that “[d]uring the
period before the decision was made to close the plant, he communicated and met
frequently with senior Postal Service officials to exchange information, seek
guidance, and direction,” including, on information and belief, Vice President
Day.
3. Brentwood Facility Manager Timothy C.
Haney. Facility Manager Haney
admitted to a USPS Equal
Employment Opportunity Dispute Resolution Specialist in this case that he was
personally involved in the decisions regarding the Brentwood
facility. Also, as demonstrated
throughout Class Agent Briscoe’s Statement of Facts, supra, Brentwood
Facility Manager Haney repeatedly and falsely assured Brentwood facility employees that the
facility was safe and that they had not been exposed to anthrax, when, in fact,
he knew or should have known the that the facility was contaminated with
anthrax from the Daschle letter. In
addition, Brentwood Facility Manager Haney intimidated and/or threatened the
Brentwood employees with disciplinary action, loss of employment and/or arrest,
and/or instructed supervisors under his direction to do the same, if Brentwood
facility employees asked questions about the safety of the facility or their
own safety, requested safety instructions regarding the same, or asked to be
excused from work.
3. With
regard to each of the employment actions that are the subject of the Class
Agent’s complaint, specify the questions of law or fact that are common to her
individual claims and the claims of the class that she seeks to represent.
Class Agent Briscoe was at all relevant times a Brentwood
facility employee. Like the putative
class, Class Agent Briscoe was required to work in the disparate working
conditions during the month of October 2001.
In addition, like the putative class, Class Agent Briscoe was affected
by the disparate impact created when the USPS implemented USPS Management
Instruction EL-860-1993-3 at the Boca Raton
facility, but not at the Brentwood facility. As a result, there are several questions of
law or fact, the resolution of which will affect all or a significant number of
the putative class members, including Class Agent Briscoe. Among the questions of law or fact common to
the class and Class Agent Briscoe are:
1. Whether the USPS
knew or had reason to know that the Boca Raton
facility had
been
contaminated by anthrax during the October 2001 time period;
2. Whether the USPS
knew or had reason to know that the Brentwood facility
had
been
contaminated by anthrax during the October 2001 time period;
3. Whether the USPS invoked
USPS Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3 in a timely manner when they knew or
had reason to know that the Boca Raton
facility had been contaminated with anthrax during the October 2001 time
period;
4. Whether the USPS
invoked USPS Management Instruction EL-860-1993-3 in a timely manner when they
knew or had reason to know that the Brentwood facility
had been contaminated with anthrax during the October 2001 time period;
5. Whether the USPS
notified the Boca Raton facility employees of their exposure to anthrax and
immediately took remedial measures, including provided all such employees with
medical tests and with preventative and curative antibiotics in a timely manner
when they knew or had reason to know that the Boca Raton facility had been contaminated
with anthrax during the October 2001 time period;
6. Whether the USPS
notified the Brentwood facility employees of their exposure to anthrax and
immediately took remedial measures, including provided all such employees with
medical tests and with preventative and curative antibiotics in a timely manner
when they knew or had reason to know that the Brentwood facility had been
contaminated with anthrax during the October 2001 time period;
7. Whether the USPS
falsely represented to the Brentwood facility employees during the October 2001
time period that the facility had not been contaminated and/or was safe for
them to continue working;
8. Whether the USPS
provided false and/or misleading information and/or did not provide accurate
information about the safety of the Brentwood facility;
9. Whether the USPS
intimidated and/or threatened Brentwood employees with disciplinary action,
loss of employment and/or arrest if they asked questions about the safety of
the facility or their own safety, requested safety instructions regarding the
same, or asked to be excused from work;
10. Whether the
underlying disparity in working conditions created by the USPS between its Boca
Raton facility and Brentwood
facility in October of 2001 was discriminatory in violation of Title VII;
11.