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Council v. Gray Sullivan opinion dc budget 01967

Council v. Gray Sullivan opinion dc budget 01967

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Date Created:May 19, 2014

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Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT COLUMBIA
COUNCIL THE DISTRICT
COLUMBIA,
Plaintiff,
VINCENT GRAY, his
official capacity Mayor the District Columbia,
and
JEFFREY DeWITT, his
official capacity
Chief Financial Officer for
the District Columbia
Defendants. Civ. Action No. 14-655 (EGS)
MEMORANDUM OPINION 2012, the Local Budget Autonomy Act 2012 (hereinafter
Budget Autonomy Act D.C. Law 19-321, DCR 1724, was
enacted the Council the District Columbia (hereinafter
Council signed Mayor Vincent Gray, and ratified
voters the District Columbia (hereinafter District April 2013 referendum.
The law, upheld, would grant the
District the right spend its local tax and fee revenue
without seeking annual appropriation from Congress.
Mayor
Gray and Jeffrey DeWitt, Chief Financial Officer for the
District Columbia (hereinafter CFO both passionate
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
advocates for budget autonomy, have refused implement the
Budget Autonomy Act.
Although they wholeheartedly agree with
the Council matter policy, they not agree that the
Budget Autonomy Act valid matter law. the basis this refusal, the Council has sued the Mayor and the CFO
their official capacities.
The Council seeks declaration that
the Budget Autonomy Act valid, and injunction compelling
the Mayor and the CFO comply with the law.
The fight for budget autonomy the District not new.
The District has had measure control over its own affairs
since the enactment the Home Rule Act 1973, and has been
fighting unsuccessfully for budget autonomy ever since.
1981, Congressional Delegate Walter Fauntroy introduced the
District Columbia Budget Autonomy Act, which would,
passed, have ended the congressional appropriation requirement
for locally derived funds.
Similar bills have been introduced nearly every Congress thereafter. recently 2011 and
2012, bills were introduced the House and the Senate that
would have provided for local control the local portion
the District budget.1
These efforts have continued even after
Those bills were withdrawn the request District leaders
because they would have altered District law banning the use local funds for abortion, loosening gun control laws, and/or
prohibiting union security agreements. See Mem. Points and
Authorities the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group the U.S.
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
the Budget Autonomy Act purportedly became effective.
The
President has included budget autonomy for the District his
fiscal year 2013, 2014, and proposed 2015 budgets, and yet
another bill was introduced Congress April 10, 2014.
Despite this long history seeking budget autonomy
through Congress, the Council now argues that since the Home
Rule Act was enacted 1973, has possessed the authority
grant itself control over its own local spending.
This
argument, which the Council advances for the first time this
litigation, simply cannot withstand judicial scrutiny. more
fully set forth below, contrary the plain language
the Home Rule Act, which prohibits the Council from changing the
role the federal government the appropriation the total
budget the District. cannot reconciled with the
legislative history the Home Rule Act, during which Congress
explicitly considered, and rejected, budget autonomy for the
District.
And violates separate federal statute, the Anti-
Deficiency Act, which prohibits District employees from spending
public money unless has been appropriated Congress.
This case presents unique situation which all involved
strongly support the policy budget autonomy for the District Columbia.
Indeed, the policy arguments advanced the
House Representatives Amicus Curiae 11-13 (citations
omitted).
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
Council are extraordinarily powerful. all District residents
know, the budget procedure the Home Rule Act makes for
extremely difficult governance the District.
First, Congress
habitually fails enact budget the start the October
fiscal year; has done only three occasions the last years. the remaining years, Congress has either passed continuing resolution budget all, leading
shutdown.
Second, because the lengthy congressional
appropriations process, the District budget necessarily
outdated the time enacted Congress.
Finally, the
uncertainty the congressional appropriations process often
negatively impacts assessment the District finances bond
rating agencies.
Notwithstanding these challenges, the District
has demonstrated unprecedented track record fiscal
responsibility recent years, including seventeen balanced
budgets, sixteen years clean financial audits, and
reduction the federal portion the District budget from
over percent only one percent.
The Council makes
compelling argument that the time has come for budget autonomy. native Washingtonian, the Court deeply moved
Plaintiff argument that the people the District are
entitled the right spend their own, local funds.
Nevertheless, the Court powerless provide legal remedy
and cannot implement budget autonomy for the District.
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
Notwithstanding the sound policy preferences conscientious
District lawmakers, members Congress, and the President, the
Court must interpret and apply the law enacted.
Both
Congress and the President have expressed their support for
budget autonomy for the District, but have failed act
achieve that goal.
Congress has plenary authority over the
District, and the only entity that can provide budget
autonomy. sum, having carefully considered the parties cross
motions for summary judgment, the responses and replies thereto,
the submissions amici, the supplemental briefing requested
the Court, the applicable law, the oral argument, and the record whole, Plaintiff motion for summary judgment DENIED
and Defendants cross motion for summary judgment GRANTED.
Mayor Vincent Gray, CFO Jeffrey DeWitt, the Council the
District Columbia, its officers, agents, servants, employees,
and all persons active concert participation with them who
receive actual notice the injunction, are hereby permanently
ENJOINED from enforcing the Local Budget Autonomy Act 2012
pending further order the Court.
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
Factual and Procedural Background
Local Autonomy the District Columbia and the
Home Rule Act
The District Columbia exceptional community
established under the Constitution the seat the National
Government.
(1941).
District Columbia Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 452
The Constitution grants Congress the power exercise
exclusive Legislation all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square), may, Cession
particular States, and the Acceptance Congress, become the
Seat the Government the United States. cl. 17.
U.S. Const., Art.
Pursuant that authority, Congress
established the District Columbia 1801.
See District
Columbia Organic Charter Act, ch. 15, Stat. 103 (1801).
The
City Washington was incorporated 1802, and local
government authorized provide services was established.
Plaintiff Mem. Points and Authorities Support Motion
for Summary Judgment Remand (hereinafter Pl. MSJ
From 1802 about 1871, the local powers the District were
expanded, and there was trend toward increased selfgovernment.
Id.; see also Jason Newman Jacques DePuy,
Bringing Democracy the Nation Last Colony:
The District
Columbia Self-Government Act, AM. REV. 537, 541 (1975)
(hereinafter Newman DePuy 1871, Washington City,
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
Georgetown, and Washington County were merged create the
District Columbia, and Congress granted greater home rule
authority the District.
During that time, the Organic Act
provided for District Governor, appointed the President,
and legislature that could exercise limited power.
See
District Columbia John Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 10405 (1953).
However, this gradual increase was temporary, and
1874 Congress imposed commission system govern the
District.
Adams Clinton, Supp. 35, (D.D.C.
2000), aff 531 U.S. 941 (2000). 1878, Congress repealed
the home rule provisions the Organic Act and disbanded the
territorial government entirely; the District was henceforth governed three-person commission appointed the
President.
Id.
Under this system Government, [l]egislative
powers ceased, and the municipal government [was] confined mere administration.
Metro R.R. Co. District
Columbia, 132 U.S. (1889).
From 1878 the 1970s,
Congress exercised its plenary power through direct legislation
for the District, with very little input from District
residents.
Banner United States, 303 Supp.
(D.D.C. 2004), aff 428 F.3d 303 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
This continued until 1973, when Congress enacted the
District Columbia Self-Government and Governmental
Reorganization Act, Pub. No. 93-198, Stat. 774 (1973)
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
(codified amended D.C. Off. Code 1-201.01 seq.), now
known the Home Rule Act.
Pl. MSJ
The Home Rule
Act was compromise, granting the people the District
Columbia opportunity exercising their rights once more and
yet with adequate safeguards for the Federal interest
component.
Home Rule for the District Columbia, 1973-1974:
Background and Legislative History H.R. 9056, H.R. 9682, and
Related Bills Culminating the District Columbia SelfGovernment and Governmental Reorganization Act, 2106 (1974).
Nevertheless, with the Home Rule Act, Congress expressed the
intent relieve itself the greatest extent possible, the burden legislating upon essentially local District
matters.
D.C. Off. Code 1-201.02(a).
The grant
legislative authority the District the Home Rule Act
broad, id. 1-203.02, but Congress included several
restrictions that authority Sections 601, 602, and 603.
These included congressional authority veto District
legislation and the authority legislate for the District
any matter.
Id. 1-206.01.
The Council the District
Columbia, the main legislating body created the Act, was
prohibited from legislating nine enumerated areas,2 and
The District may not impose any tax federal state
property; lend public credit for private undertaking; enact
amend any law that concerns the functions the federal
government does not apply exclusively the District;
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
Congress retained broad authority over borrowing, spending, and
budgeting for the District.
Id. 1-206.02, 1-206.03.
Congress also retained ultimate legislative authority over the
District providing that local legislation passed the
District government becomes law only after review Congress.
Title the Home Rule Act sets forth the District
Columbia Charter, which established the means governance
the District upon ratification District voters.
Code 1-203.01.
D.C. Off.
The Charter establishes municipal
structure similar state constitution that would take
precedence over other locally-enacted legislation; provides
clear statement regarding the structure the new government;
and provides the procedure for and limitations the
District ability amend the Charter. Newman DePuy, AM. REV. 576-77.
The Charter also establishes tripartite
form government for the District comprised the Mayor, the
Council, and the judiciary, and the basic governmental
structure within which [those entities] operate.
Id. 576.
The Charter sets forth the process for the enactment
local legislation.
Most legislation becomes law after
approved majority the Council after two readings days
regulate the federal District Columbia Courts; impose
personal income tax nonresidents; permit the construction
buildings that not comply with height restrictions;
regulate the Commission Mental Health. D.C. Off. Code 1206.02(a)(1)-(a)(8).
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
apart, signed the Mayor (or approved over his her veto),
and sent Congress for passive review.
If, after days (or days for changes criminal laws), Congress does not
affirmatively disapprove the legislation, becomes law.
D.C. Off. Code 1-204.04(e); 1-206.02(c)(1).
The District budget, contrast, requires the active
review Congress.
The process for the enactment the budget set forth Section 446 the Act, which included the
District Charter.
Section 446 provides that the Mayor must
present budget, which includes both locally derived and
federal funds, the Council.
The Council must hold hearing
and adopt budget within days the transmittal from the
Mayor.
The Mayor must sign the budget, must approved
over his her veto, within days.
The Mayor then transmits
this budget, called the Budget Request Act, the President
submit Congress part the national budget.
Congress
must enact affirmative legislation appropriate expenditures the District.
D.C. Off. Code 1-204.46.
Further, the
fiscal year the District identical that the federal
government.
Section 446 also provides that [n]otwithstanding
any other provision the Mayor shall not transmit any
annual budget amendments supplements thereto, the
President the United States until the completion the
budget procedures outlined Section 446.
Id. also
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
fundamentally enshrines the role Congress the budget
process, stating that amount may obligated expended
any officer employee the District Columbia government
unless such amount has been approved Act Congress, and
then only according such Act.
Id.
The District Charter also created the General Fund the
District Columbia Section 450 the Home Rule Act.
Off. Code 1-204.50.
D.C.
This section transferred revenue
collected from local sources from the Treasury, where they were
held prior the enactment the Home Rule Act, the D.C.
General Fund.
Id.
The Act also empowered the Council
establish such additional special funds may necessary for
the efficient operation the government the District.
Id. 1995, the Home Rule Act was amended Congress create the
Office the Chief Financial Officer.
See District Columbia
Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act 1995,
Pub. No. 104-8, 109 Stat. 97, 142 (1995).
The CFO and the
Mayor are tasked with the responsibility for administering the
District finances.
Like state constitution, the Charter can amended
subject three-prong process delineated Section 303
the Home Rule Act.
D.C. Off. Code 1-203.03.
The Charter
the only part the Home Rule Act subject amendment; noncharter provisions are off-limits the local government.
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
Brief Amici Curiae Jacques DePuy, Daniel Freeman, Jason Newman and Linda Smith Support Defendants Vincent
Gray and Jeffrey DeWitt (hereinafter DePuy Amicus
The Charter amendment procedure outlined Section 303
outside the Charter, thus not subject amendment.
amend the Charter, the Council must first pass proposed
amendment.
Second, the amendment must ratified majority eligible District voters.
Finally, the Chairman the
Council must submit the amendment the Speaker the House
and the President the Senate for 35-day period passive
review.
Id. 1-203.03(a).
The amendment becomes law unless
Congress passes joint resolution disapproving the proposed
amendment within the review period. Id. 1-203.03(b).
The
Council amendment authority not absolute subject
the limitations specified sections 601, 602, and 603 [of the
Home Rule Act].
Id. 1-203.03(d).
The Local Budget Autonomy Act 2012
The Council the District passed the Local Budget
Autonomy Act 2012, which amends the District Columbia
Home Rule Act provide for local budget autonomy.
19-321.
D.C. Law
This Act purports amend Section 446 the Home Rule
Act, which sets forth the procedure for appropriation the
District budget Congress.
The amended section changes the
procedure for locally derived funds; does not alter the
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
process for the federal portion the District budget.
Compl. 50.
Pursuant the Budget Autonomy Act, the budget
process for the local portion the District budget has been
modified that similar that for most other District
legislation i.e., subject passive review Congress
after approval the Council.
Pl. MSJ Congress
does not pass joint resolution disapproving the budget
within days, becomes law.
The Budget Autonomy Act writes
the President and the Mayor out the local budget process,
providing that the local portion the annual budget shall
submitted the Chairman the Council the Speaker the
House Representatives.
Budget Autonomy Act 2(e).
The Budget Autonomy Act also alters the timeline which
the Council must pass the budget.
The Council required
adopt the budget for the District within calendar days
after receipt the budget proposal from the mayor.
Autonomy Act 2(e).
Budget
There are two readings the
proposed budget, and those readings must least days
apart.
Pl. MSJ
The Act also amends Section 441(a)
the Home Rule Act authorize the Council change the fiscal
year the District that runs from July June rather
than October September.
Budget Autonomy Act 2(d).
The Budget Autonomy Act was unanimously passed the
Council and was signed into law Mayor Gray February 15,
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
2013.
Pl. MSJ Defs. Mem. Points and Authorities
Support Their Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter Defs.
MSJ letter sent the Council prior signing
the Budget Autonomy Act, Mayor Gray stated that while fully
and passionately support[ed] the goal securing budget
autonomy for the District Columbia soon possible[,]
believed that the Budget Autonomy Act written would violate
the Home Rule Act.
Defs. MSJ, Ex. reiterated these
concerns signing statement that accompanied the Budget
Autonomy Act.
Defs. MSJ, Ex. Signing Statement. The Budget
Autonomy Act was then submitted the D.C. Board Elections
and Ethics for inclusion the April 2013 ballot and the
Council filed Notice Public Hearing the ballot language.
District Columbia Attorney General Irvin Nathan responded
the notice with letter expressing his serious reservations
about the legality the amendment and recommended that
excluded from the April 2013 ballot.
Pl. MSJ, Declaration David Zvenyach (hereinafter Zvenyach Decl. Exhibit
January 2013 Letter from Irvin Nathan, the
conclusion the public hearings and after considering the
arguments presented, the Board Elections found basis
reject the Budget Autonomy Act and included the ballot.
Pl. MSJ
The Budget Autonomy Act was ratified 83%
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
voters special election April 2013 (approximately
the District electorate 505,698 registered voters).
Answer
Defs.
Congress took action affirmatively disapprove the Budget Autonomy Act, thus became law July 25, 2013
and became effective January 2014.
See Pl. MSJ
After the Budget Autonomy Act became effective, Congressman
Ander Crenshaw (R-FL), asked the Government Accountability
Office (hereinafter the GAO opine its validity.
MSJ
Pl. January 30, 2014, the GAO returned its opinion,
concluding that provisions the Budget Autonomy Act that
attempt change the federal government role the
District budget process have legal effect.
Defs. MSJ,
Ex. January 30, 2014 GAO Opinion,
The Instant Dispute April 2014, the Attorney General issued formal
opinion advising the Mayor that should not implement the
Budget Autonomy Act and advise Executive Branch officials and
employees not absent binding judicial decision the
contrary.
Pl. MSJ, Zvenyach Decl., Ex. Opinion the
D.C. Attorney General, April 11, 2014, both the Mayor
and the CFO advised the Council separate letters that they
would decline implement the Budget Autonomy Act. 10; Compl. 52.
Specifically, the Mayor notified the
Council the steps would take:
Pl. MSJ
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
First, will direct all subordinate agency District
officials not implement take actions pursuant
the Act, which contravenes our Home Rule Charter and
other federal law. Second, will veto any
budget transmitted the Council that not
inclusive both the local and federal portions
the budget, required under the Home Rule Act.
Third, noted, achieve compliance the extent able with the Home Rule Act, will transmit the
Congress and President the full District budget
stands after the 56th day following transmission
you the budget, whether not the Council has
taken second vote.
Compl., Ex. April 11, 2014 Letter Mayor Vincent Gray,
The CFO mirrored the Mayor statements his letter the
Council, noting that would not enforce the Budget Autonomy
Act absent judicial determination its validity:
Absent such [determination], will not make
authorize any payment pursuant budget that was
approved conformance with the Act. will also
direct OCFO employees not certify contracts make
payments under this budget given the potential civil
and criminal penalties which they, individuals,
would subject under the federal Anti-Deficiency
Act.
Compl., Ex. April 11, 2014 Letter CFO Jeffrey DeWitt, response these letters announcing the Mayor and CFO
intention not enforce the Budget Autonomy Act, the Council
brought suit the Superior Court the District Columbia April 17, 2014. filed Motion for Preliminary
Injunction that same date.
the action this Court.
Defendants immediately removed
Plaintiff filed motion remand
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
the action the Superior Court, arguing that jurisdiction was
lacking this Court. preliminary status hearing April
22, 2014, with the consent the parties, the Court
consolidated the motion for preliminary injunction with
determination the merits, including jurisdictional arguments,
pursuant Federal Rule Civil Procedure 65(a)(2).
The
parties have filed motions for summary judgment, and five groups concerned individuals have filed amicus briefs aid the
Court its determination the important issues presented.
The Court ordered the parties file supplemental memoranda
respond arguments made amici support Defendants.
The Court heard oral argument the parties cross motions
May 14, 2014.
Those motions are now ripe for determination
the Court.
II.
Standard Review
Summary judgment appropriate situations where the
moving party has shown that there are genuine issues
material fact and the moving party entitled judgment
matter law.
See Fed. Civ. 56(a); Celotex Corp.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Waterhouse Dist.
Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2002). ruling
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court shall grant
summary judgment only one the moving parties entitled judgment matter law upon material facts that are not
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
genuinely disputed.
Cir. 1975).
See Rhoads McFerran, 517 F.2d 66, (2d
That factual dispute exists not sufficient
bar summary judgment, rather, the dispute must regarding
material fact.
See Fed. Civ. 56(a).
For the purposes summary judgment, [a] fact material might affect
the outcome the suit under the governing law, and dispute
about material fact genuine the evidence such that
reasonable jury could return verdict for the nonmoving
party.
Steele Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Anderson Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Moreover, the factual dispute must genuine, such that there sufficient admissible evidence for reasonable trier fact find for the non-moving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. 255.
The moving party bears the burden demonstrating the absence any genuine issues material fact.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. 323.
All parties the instant dispute concur that there are
genuine issues material fact before the Court.
Summary
judgment particularly appropriate situations where,
here, pure question law that ripe for decision before
the Court.
See Wyoming Outdoor Council Dombeck, 148 Supp. (D.D.C. 2001); see also Swan Clinton, 100 F.3d 973,
976 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
III. Discussion
This Court has Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts limited jurisdiction,
Kokkonnen Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994),
and case must remanded state court [i]f any time
before final judgment appears that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. U.S.C. 1447(c).
Section
1331 confers District Courts jurisdiction over all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, treaties the
United States, where the controversy presents federal
question. U.S.C. 1331. case only properly
federal court the basis well-pleaded complaint; may
not removed federal court the basis federal
defense, even the defense anticipated the
plaintiff complaint, and even both parties concede that the
federal defense the only question truly issue.
Caterpillar Inc. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (internal
citations omitted).
Federal courts also lack jurisdiction over claims that
pertain only the District Columbia.
[F]or the purposes [28 U.S.C. 1331], references the laws the United
States Acts Congress not include laws applicable
exclusively the District Columbia. U.S.C. 1366.
Thus, [w]hen Congress acts the local legislature for the
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
District Columbia and enacts legislation applicable only
the District Columbia and tailored meet specifically local
needs, its enactments should absent evidence contrary
congressional intent treated local law.
Roth
District Columbia Courts, 160 Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C.
2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff argues that this case should remanded the
Superior Court for the District Columbia because this Court
lacks jurisdiction over its claims, which describes
exclusively local.
Pl. MSJ 40.
Because Plaintiff contends
that the Charter applicable only the District, claims
federal question jurisdiction unavailable.
Id. 41.
Moreover, Plaintiff contends that the only bases for federal
jurisdiction presented Defendants are defenses, which further
counsels favor remand.
The Court persuaded Defendants arguments that this
case unequivocally presents federal question whether the
Council can unilaterally amend the District Charter
fundamentally alter the roles the President and Congress with
respect the locally funded portion the District budget.
This case similar Thomas Barry, 729 F.2d 1469 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), where the Circuit considered Home Rule Act
challenge raised employees the District Columbia
Department Employment Services who had been transferred from
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
the Department Labor.
The District Court dismissed their
claims the grounds that federal jurisdiction was lacking.
729 F.2d 1470. appeal, the Circuit noted that while the
Home Rule Act applied the District, did not
exclusively because [m]any the Act sections apply directly the federal not District government and was thus
hybrid statute.
Id. 1471.
The section the Home Rule Act issue was not exclusively local, according the Court,
because impacted the actual structure the Department
Labor.
Id.
Plaintiff argues that this case distinguishable from
Thomas, because its claim relief premised the local
obligations local officials, triggered the budget
process for local funds the District Charter.
43.
Pl. MSJ
However, the budget process for the District necessarily
includes federal entities, namely the President and Congress,
the latter which has active role appropriating the
District budget.
The Budget Autonomy Act thus far from the
type purely local legislation that the D.C. Circuit has found
does not confer federal jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Decatur the oral argument May 14, 2014, the Court questioned
Plaintiff regarding its argument that Thomas distinguishable
from the instant matter. While Plaintiff did not concede that
this Court has jurisdiction, did explain its position that the Court were rely [Thomas], open
question whether there jurisdiction and that would certainly one way resolve it. Transcript Hearing 10:25-11:2.
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
Liquors, Inc. District Columbia, 478 F.3d 360 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (finding that the District Court could not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over claim that all parties agreed
was local, whether the legislation was invalid because the
Council failed read twice before voting it, required the Home Rule Act); Dimond District Columbia, 792 F.2d
179, 187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that challenge the
District Fault Insurance Law the grounds that changed
the jurisdiction the District Columbia Courts and thus
violated the Home Rule Act did not fall within the traditional
federal question jurisdiction because the relevant sections
the Home Rule Act dealing with the District Columbia Courts
applied exclusively the District Columbia
Accordingly, the Court concludes that federal question
jurisdiction exists over Plaintiff claims.4
Though not dispositive, the D.C. Circuit decision Bliley Kelly, F.3d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1994), instructive. There,
several members Congress sought declaratory judgment that
would have required the Council resubmit the Assault Weapon
Manufacturing Strict Liability Act Congress for review
pursuant its authority review District legislation under
the Home Rule Act. F.3d 509-10. The District Court
dismissed the action the grounds that plaintiffs had failed state claim under U.S.C. 1983. Id. 510. The
Circuit reversed. ruling the merits, the Court considered
the D.C. Court Appeals interpretation the Home Rule Act,
under which the congressional review period for District
legislation would not suspended intervening legislation
repeal the legislation awaiting review. Id. 511. The Court
held that while must defer the D.C. Court Appeals
interpretations purely local law, was not required
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
The Local Budget Autonomy Act 2012 Unlawful
Plaintiff contends that the Budget Autonomy Act valid
exercise its authority amend the District Charter the
procedure outlined the Home Rule Act.
Defendants argue
the contrary that the Budget Autonomy Act unlawful
exercise the Council Charter amendment authority pursuant Section 303(d) the Home Rule Act, which provides that the
amending procedure [in Section 303(a)] may not used enact
any law affect any law with respect which the Council may
not enact any act, resolution, rule under the limitations
specified sections 601, 602, and 603.
203.03(d) (emphasis added).
D.C. Off. Code
Defendants contend that the Budget
Autonomy Act purported amendments Section 446 violate
Section 303(d) for three independent reasons, each which
would sufficient for the Court find that unlawful.
Defs. Reply
First, Defendants argue that the Budget
Autonomy Act violation Section 603(a) the Home Rule matters federal law. Id. The Court reasoned that
was self-evident that such deference was not warranted the
matter hand because questions regarding Congress reserved
right review District legislation before becomes law
concerns exclusively federal aspect the Act. Id.
Defendants persuasively argue, the Circuit conclusion
Bliley mandates the conclusion that the Council claim
authority change the respective roles Congress and the
President with respect the locally funded portion the
District budget likewise one federal law. Defs. Reply Support Their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
(hereinafter Defs. Reply
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
Act, which prevents the Council from amending the Charter
change the respective roles Congress, the President, and the
Office Management and Budget the enactment the
District total budget.
Second, Defendants argue that the
Budget Autonomy Act violates Section 603(e) the Home Rule Act
because its amendments Section 446 relating the locally
derived portion the District budget longer comply with
the Anti-Deficiency Act.
Finally, Defendants argue that the
Budget Autonomy Act unlawful under Section 603(a)(2) because purports amend the Anti-Deficiency Act, which federal
law that not restricted its application exclusively the District.
D.C. Off. Code 1-206.02(a)(3).
The Court again persuaded Defendants arguments.
Although the Home Rule Act grants authority the Council
amend the District Charter, that authority subject the
limitations Sections 601, 602, and 603.
Plaintiff concedes
that its ability amend the District Charter subject the
limitations those sections; however, argues that only some
portions Sections 601, 602, and 603 are limitations.
Sections 603(a) and (e), according the Council theory, are
instead rules construction that were intended guide the
interpretation the Home Rule Act enacted 1973.
This
argument contrary the plain language Section 303(d);
the legislative history Sections 601, 602, and 603; the
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
experience almost years Home Rule; and common sense.
Plaintiff also argues that Section 450 the Home Rule Act
permanent appropriation that meets the requirements the AntiDeficiency Act without requiring appropriation from Congress.
This argument likewise contrary the plain language
Sections 450 and 446 and federal appropriations law.
Because
the amendments Section 446 the Budget Autonomy Act
independently violate sections 603(a), 603(e), and 602(a)(3),
they are unlawful and must enjoined.
Section 603(a)
Defendants argue that the Budget Autonomy Act unlawful
because violates the limitations Section 303(d), which
prevent the Council from amending the District Charter
conflict with Section 603(a).
Section 603(a) provides:
Nothing this act shall construed making any
change existing law, regulation, basic procedure
and practice relating the respective roles the
Congress, the President, the federal Office
Management and Budget, and the Comptroller General
the United States the preparation, review,
submission, examination, authorization, and
appropriation the total budget the District
Columbia government.
D.C. Off. Code 1-206.03(a) (emphasis added).
Section 303(d)
unequivocally refers Section 603 limitation[] the
Council amendment authority and does not specify that only
certain provisions that section are treated
limitations.
Defendants therefore argue that Section 303(d) can
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
only read treat the entirety Section 603
limitation.
Defs. MSJ 15.
Statutory construction must begin with the language
employed Congress and the assumption that the ordinary
meaning that language accurately expresses the legislative
purposes.
Park Fly, Inc. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469
U.S. 189, 194 (1985).
Here, the text both Sections 303(d)
and 603(a) clear Section 603(a) intended
limitation the Council amendment authority.
The word
limitation generally defined mean something that
controls how much something possible allowed the
act controlling the size extent something:
limiting something.
the act
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/limitation (last
visited May 18, 2014); see also Limitation, CONCISE OXFORD AM.
DICTIONARY 516 (2006 Ed.) limiting rule circumstance;
restriction
The text also clear that Section 603(a) does
not make distinction between the locally and federally funded
portions the District budget, but instead refers the
total budget the District, which comprised both
components.
Accordingly, the most logical reading the
phrase limitations specified sections 601, 602, and 603
303(d) that treats the sections whole
limitations the Council authority, not just the extent
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
that they explicitly state they are limitations. 15-16 (emphasis original).
Defs. MSJ
And the most logical reading Section 603(a) that prevents changes the role
Congress and the President with respect six areas related
the District budget preparation, review, submission,
examination, authorization, and appropriation.
Where, here, the statutory text clear, there
need for the Court resort legislative history.
See, e.g.,
Ratzlaf United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994); Barnhill Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401 (1992).
However, the legislative
history the Home Rule Act confirms the plain meaning
Section 603(a) and demonstrates the flaw Plaintiff
interpretation the statute.
See Hessey District
Columbia Bd. Elections and Ethics, 601 A.2d n.6 (1991)
(en banc) The legislative history the Self-Government Act
makes clear that the Self-Government Act left place the preexisting Congressional appropriations process for the District
government.
Though the Senate had passed several home rule
bills the years leading the enactment the Home Rule
Act, the House did not seriously consider such legislation until
1973.
DePuy Amicus
The initial bill drafted the House
District Columbia Committee (hereinafter Committee Bill
included budget autonomy for the District; however, the
Committee Bill faced considerable resistance, especially from
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
Congressmen the Subcommittee District Columbia
Appropriations the House Appropriations Committee, who were
intimately involved District affairs generally and the budget
process particular.
Id. 7-8.
After became clear that
there was very little chance that the Committee Bill would pass,
Congressman Charles Diggs, Chairman the House Committee
the District Columbia, took the unusual step abandoning
the original Committee Bill and offering comprehensive
substitute.
Id. 8-9.
Diggs Compromise.
This substitute was referred the Congressman Diggs explained Dear
Colleague letter:
The Committee substitute contains six important
changes which were made after numerous conversations
and sessions with Members Congress and other
interested parties. These changes clarify the intent [the bill] and accommodate major reservations
expressed since the bill was reported out.
Letter from Charles Diggs, al. Members the House
Representatives (reprinted 119 Cong. Rec. 33353 (Oct.
1973)).
The main concession the Committee Substitute Bill was
the first change listed the letter: Budgetary process.
Return the Existing Line Item Congressional Appropriation
Role.
Id. was understood home rule supporters
Congress that this concession was necessary condition for the
passage any bill.
DePuy Amicus 9-10; see also id., Ex.
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
(Docket No. 28-1), Jack Kneece, Ford Insists Hill Run D.C.
Budget, WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS, Oct. 16, 1973, B-2 (quoting the
Vice President-designate saying that [i]n view, this
particular provision the bill non-negotiable the HouseSenate Conference id., Ex. (Docket No. 28-1), Jack Kneece,
Diggs Ready Deal Home Rule Bill, WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS, Oct.
1973, B-1 (noting that Congressman Diggs was prepared
continue detailed congressional oversight and control over the
D.C. budget means reaching accommodation with home
rule foes id., Ex. (Docket No. 28-1), Editorial, Home Rule Last, WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS Oct. 11, 1973, A-18 (describing the
process required get powerful Congressmen the District
Appropriations subcommittee sign off the Committee
Substitute Bill and stating that the high price was ultimate
congressional control over the city budget id., Ex.
(Docket No. 28-1), Editorial, Home Rule:
One More Step Go!,
WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS, Dec. 1973, G-1 (explaining the changes
made the Diggs Compromise, and stating that the Committee
Substitute Bill falls far short what home rule
advocates had sought but struck balance between the
conflicting desires Congress give District residents
meaningful further measure control over their own affairs
while the same time retaining strong measures
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
congressional oversight ).5 Congressman Thomas Rees explained
during the floor debate the bill, the budget process the
Committee Substitute Bill would not change the existing budget
process for the District:
Really the relationship, this legislation
passed, will the same relationship that Congress
now has with the District Columbia budget, that
money can spent the District Columbia.
This was the major compromise that have
change all budgetary control when are
discussing who will run the budget the District
Columbia.
119 Cong. Rec. 33390 (Oct. 1973).
The Committee Substitute Bill was eventually approved
the House after extensive debate.
DePuy Amicus 10.
addition the reservation active congressional authority
over the District budget, the Committee Substitute Bill also
added Sections 603 (a) and (e).
These sections are entitled
Budget Process; limitations borrowing and spending and,
critically, appear portion the Home Rule Act that cannot amended Charter Amendment.
Id. 11-12.
The introductory language Section 603(a) mirrors the
language Section 602(b), which also begins with [n]othing
The Court may take judicial notice newspaper articles that
explain the prevailing views congressional retention
budget authority and the importance the Diggs Compromise
the ultimate passage the Home Rule Act. See Wash. Post
Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that the
court could take judicial notice newspaper articles
publicizing criminal prosecution deciding whether plea
agreement should sealed).
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
this Act shall construed
206.02(b).
D.C. Off. Code
Section 602(b) provides that [n]othing this Act
shall construed vesting the District government any
greater authority over the National Zoo, the National Guard
the District, the Washington Aqueduct, the National Capital
Planning Commission, any federal agency.
Id.
While there legislative history for Section 603(a), there legislative
history explaining Section 602(b) the original Committee
Bill, which remained largely unchanged between the Committee
Bill, the Committee Substitute Bill (implementing the Diggs
Compromise), and the Home Rule Act enacted.
The legislative
history that section, therefore, particularly instructive,
especially appears clear that, when Congress realized
October 1973 that needed language implementing the Diggs
Compromise provisions budgeting, used 603 the
Committee Substitute familiar language borrowed from 602
the Committee Bill.
DePuy Amicus 13.
The legislative history Section 602 makes clear that
Congress intended for the entire section, not just the
enumerated limitations Section 602(a), serve
prohibition Council action.
(Sept. 11, 1973).
See H.R. REP. NO. 93-482 36-37 describing the specific areas listed
Section 602(a) which the Council could not legislate, the
Report notes that [t]his section lists specific prohibitions
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
against the District Council legislative authority, which
include prohibitions against [the listed activities].
36-37 (emphasis added).
602(b) follows:
Id.
The Report further describes Section
Subsection (b) prohibits the Council from
exceeding its present authority over the National Zoological
Park, the District National Guard, the Washington Aqueduct, the
National Capital Planning Commission, any other Federal
agency.
Id. (emphasis added).
Congress used the word
prohibition describe both sections despite the fact that
Section 602(b) begins with the phrase [n]othing this Act
shall construed as, and the legislative history leaves
doubt that the limitations the section are intended
prospective.
Thus, the identical language Section 603(a)
must also read prospective prohibition the Council
authority. well-known canon statutory construction
that the same phrase appearing several places statutory
text generally read the same way each time appears.
Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. 143.
The legislative history the Home
Rule Act provides basis for the Court depart from this
well-established canon statutory construction.
Despite the very clear language Section 603(a) and the
legislative history that reinforces that clear language, the
Council nonetheless argues that Section 603(a) rule
construction, not substantive limitation.
Plaintiff contends
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
that Section 603(a) explains only how the Home Rule Act was construed 1973 and does not prohibit the amendments
Section 446 made the Budget Autonomy Act.
Pl. MSJ 30-
31; Pl. Consolidated Reply Mem. Support Pl. Motion for
Summary Judgment Remand and Mem. Opposition Defs.
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter Pl. Reply
26.
According Plaintiff, because Congress was explicit
elsewhere the Act when delineating areas which the Council
could not legislate, could not have intended for Section
603(a) impose limitations the Council ability amend
the budget process outlined Section 446, which located
the amendable Charter.
Pl. MSJ 31.
This the only
reasonable reading the text, according Plaintiff, because
the overall purpose the Home Rule Act was provide
expansive legislative power coupled with broad Charter
amendment power.
Pl. Reply 23.
Plaintiff devotes significant portion its Reply
discussion the legislative history the amendment
provisions the Home Rule Act. See Pl. Reply 11-18.
Plaintiff explains that the Senate and House versions the
Home Rule Act contained very different amendment provisions
the Senate version provided for limited amendment authority,
while the amendment authority the House version was much
broader. Id. 12. The House version eventually made into
the final bill. Id. 13. Ultimately, this discussion
irrelevant. Nor directly relevant that Congress later
amended the Home Rule Act relax the requirements for amending
the Charter from active review both houses Congress
passive review after the Supreme Court decision INS
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), which invalidated the legislative
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
The Council argument, put simply, not persuasive.
Plaintiff own counsel, David Zvenyach, has referred
Section 603(a) limitation, stating during testimony before
the Committee the Whole November 2012, that the
limitations [in Section 303(d)], the most difficult hurdle
Section 603(a).
Docket No. 38-1, November 2012 Testimony David Zvenyach, Public Hearing Bill 19-993, (emphasis
added). noted that there were two possible interpretations Section 603(a): could read bright-line prohibition the
ability the Council affect the budget process. could read declaration that Congress
maintains ultimate authority with respect the
budget, and that the Home Rule Act originally
approved meant leave the budget process intact. view, the latter reading preferable and
consistent with both the plain language and the
overall purposes the Home Rule Act.
Id. (emphasis original).
While the Council reading
Section 603(a) may indeed preferable from policy
perspective, inconsistent with the plain language the
statute, the rules statutory construction, and the
legislative history the Home Rule Act.
Section 603(a)
veto. See Pl. Reply 16. Even assuming, arguendo, that the
Council has broad authority amend the District Charter, the
only issue for the Court whether the Charter amendment
procedures allow the changes that the Council has made with
respect the local portion the District budget.
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
limitation that prohibits the very change the Budget Autonomy
Act purports make.7
Section 603(e)
Defendants also argue that the Budget Autonomy Act violates
Section 603(e) the Home Rule Act and thus contravenes the
limitations its Charter amendment authority Section
303(d).
Section 603(e) provides that [n]othing this Act
shall construed affecting the applicability the
District government the provisions the AntiDeficiency Act.
D.C. Off. Code 1-206.03(e).
The Anti-
Deficiency Act precludes [a]n officer employee the
District Columbia government from spending public monies
unless Congress makes the amount available appropriation fund for the expenditure obligation. U.S.C. the oral argument May 14, 2014, Plaintiff argued that
Congress silence and failure pass joint resolution
disapproving the Budget Autonomy Act could signify tacit
approval the changes the Budget Autonomy Act makes Section
446 the Home Rule Act. However, congressional inaction does
not make law immune judicial review. See, e.g., Brown
Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994)(noting that the context
congressional approval administrative regulations,
congressional silence lacks persuasive significance,
particularly where administrative regulations are inconsistent
with the controlling statute (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Plaintiff points dicta the Supreme
Court denial stay Jackson D.C. Bd. Elections and
Ethics, 559 U.S. 1301 (2010), evidence contrary
position. However, Jackson the Court stated that while
congressional inaction counseled favor denying stay,
those considerations are course not determinative the
legal issues. Id. 1302-03.
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
1341(a). enacted, Section 446 the Home Rule Act mandates
the procedure which the District could comply with the AntiDeficiency Act prohibiting the obligation and expenditure
funds unless the spending has been approved Act
Congress.
D.C. Off. Code 1-204.46.
For the reasons set forth Section III.B.1 supra, Section
603(e) also prospective limitation the Council
authority amend the District Charter pursuant Section
303(d).
Like Section 603(a), Section 603(e) not included
the District Charter and cannot amended.
Though the Budget
Autonomy Act only explicitly amends Section 446, also
effectively amends Section 603(e) reading compliance with the
Anti-Deficiency Act, which was previously included Section
446, out the Home Rule Act entirely.
Defendants argue that the Budget Autonomy Act can only
valid the Court accepts Plaintiff argument that Section 450 the Home Rule Act, which establishes the D.C. General Fund, appropriation that satisfies the requirements the AntiDeficiency Act.
Defendants urge the Court not accept that
interpretation because contrary both the plain meaning Section 450 and federal appropriations law.
Defendants
contend that Section 450 does nothing more than move funds from
the Treasury the D.C. General Fund subject requirements
Sections 446 and 603(e) that those funds appropriated and
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
comply with the Anti-Deficiency Act.
Thus, Defendants argue
that the Budget Autonomy Act unlawful.
All public funds are subject the appropriations process.
See Am. Fed. Gov Empls., AFL-CIO, Local 1647 Fed. Labor
Relations Auth., 388 F.3d 405, 409 (3d Cir. 2004) (hereinafter
AFGE appropriation has been made only [i]f the statute
contains specific direction pay and designation the
funds used. Office General Counsel, United States
General Accounting Office, Principles Federal Appropriations
Law (3d ed. 2004) (hereinafter Principles Appropriations
Law 2-16.8
While there are magic words signify that appropriation has been made, the statutory text must clear
that funds are being appropriated.
Indeed, [a] law may
construed make appropriation only the law
specifically states that appropriation made.
1301(d). U.S.C.
Accordingly, appropriation cannot inferred.
See
Principles Appropriations Law 2-16.
The parties disagree the level deference that should given GAO opinions. The Court regards the GAO
expert, one whose opinions will prudently consider, but
that has obligation defer to. Delta Data Systems
Corp. Webster, 744 F.2d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Even
though GAO opinions are not binding, the Court will give
special weight [those] opinions due [the GAO
accumulated experience and expertise the field government
appropriations. Nevada Dep Energy, 400 F.3d
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
Congress can make exemptions the appropriations
requirement through various means.
See AFGE, 388 F.3d 409.
Congress can establish revolving fund, which replenished moneys from the public [and] constitutes on-going
appropriation which does not have renewed each year.
United Biscuit Co. Wirtz, 359 F.2d 206, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(internal citations omitted).
Examples such funds are
stock fund the Treasury fund military commissary
purchases, id., and the Postal Service Fund, which establishes
revolving fund the Treasury that shall available the
Postal Service without fiscal-year limitation carry out the
purposes, functions, and powers [of the Postal Service],
U.S.C. 2003(a).
Congress may also create permanent
appropriation, which one that always available for
specified purposes and does not require repeated action
Congress authorize its use.
Principles Appropriations
Law 2-14.
Moreover, Congress may create nonappropriated fund
instrumentality (hereinafter NAFI through which makes the
decision not finance federal entity with appropriations.
See AFGE, 388 F.3d 409. NAFI instead funded primarily
from [its] own activities, services, and product sales.
Id.
(quoting Cosme Nieves Deshler, 786 F.2d 445, 446 (1st Cir.
1986).
The fact that organization receives money from its
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
own activities not sufficient for designation NAFI;
long under the authorizing legislation Congress could
appropriate funds necessary, appropriations are still
required.
Id. 409-10 (quoting Enfant Plaza Props., Inc.
United States, 668 F.2d 1211, 1212 (Ct. Cl. 1982)).
determining whether fund entity NAFI, the Federal
Circuit has adopted clear statement test, pursuant which
funds should treated requiring appropriation unless
there clear expression Congress the contrary.
Id. 410 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff argues that the Budget Autonomy Act lawful
because Section 450 permanent continuing appropriation
that meets the requirements the Anti-Deficiency Act.
Alternatively, the Council suggests that the creation the
D.C. General Fund took District generated revenues out the
public fisc, thereby obviating the need for appropriation.
Pl. MSJ 20. Though Congress maintained what Plaintiff
refers second-level requirement that expenditures out the D.C. General Fund affirmatively approved Congress,
that requirement was located the District Charter and,
according Plaintiff, was subject amendment.
Id. 16.
The Council offers statutory, legal, other support
for this novel theory, nor can the Court find any.
While
Section 450 gave the District authority collect and deposit
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
local revenues, did not give the District the ability
obligate expend those funds.
(emphasis original).
Defs. Supp. Mem.
Indeed, the weight authority, and
the text the statute itself,9 suggests that the creation
the D.C. General Fund did not constitute permanent
appropriation.
The location public money not dispositive this inquiry; whether public money held separate fund the Treasury removed from the Treasury entirely, that
money still subject the Anti-Deficiency Act.
Simply
removing funds from the Treasury does not satisfy the
requirements the Anti-Deficiency Act, which silent
regarding the location public money (and does not even
contain the word Treasury Defendants point out, the Council interpretation the
Home Rule Act would render internally inconsistent, the
congressionally enacted versions Sections 446 and 603(e)
specifically note that all funds for the District regardless whether they are locally federally generated are subject congressional appropriation. See D.C. Off. Code 1-204.46
and 1-206.03(e). familiar canon statutory
construction that, possible, [the court is] construe
statute give effect every clause and word. Amoco
Prod. Co. Watson, 410 F.3d 722, 733 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
Plaintiff reading Section 450 would not only make the Home
Rule Act internally inconsistent, but would also render
Sections 446 and 603(e) enacted superfluous because the
transfer District collected revenues from the Treasury the
D.C. General Fund alone constituted appropriation. There reason read the statute that way, especially when its
plain meaning and legislative history support alternative
reading that gives effect each section.
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
The D.C. General Fund also cannot considered NAFI
revolving fund that would constitute appropriation for the
purposes the Anti-Deficiency Act.
While Section 450 takes
District generated revenues out the Treasury and deposits
them into the D.C. General Fund, nothing that section (or
elsewhere the Home Rule Act) clear expression
Congress that the D.C. General Fund was not subject
appropriations.
See Enfant Plaza, 668 F.2d 1212.
Nor
there any indication the Home Rule Act that Congress could
not appropriate funds for the District necessary.
The Home Rule Act fact suggests the opposite.
See id. clear
statement that Congress intended the D.C. General Fund
appropriated.
See D.C. Off. Code 1-204.46, 1-206.03(e).
This Circuit decision Nevada Dep Energy, 400
F.3d (D.C. Cir. 2005), mandates the conclusion that Section
450 does not constitute appropriation.
The Court considered
whether Section 116 the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, U.S.C.
10101-10270 (hereinafter NWPA which created Nuclear
Waste Fund, was continuing appropriation.
400 F.3d 13.
The Nuclear Waste Fund was separate fund the Treasury
created finance the development nuclear waste repository
and was funded with payments regulated entities.
Id. 11.
After Yucca Mountain Nevada was selected the location
the repository, the NWPA was amended provide financial
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
assistance the state Nevada out the Nuclear Waste Fund.
Id. (citing U.S.C. 10136(c)(1)).
Nevada interpreted the
statute providing continuing appropriation, relying
language the statute that the Secretary shall make grants
the State Nevada, id. (citing U.S.C. 10136(c)),
and provision specifying that such grants shall made out amounts held the Waste Fund, id. (citing U.S.C.
10136(c)(5).
Like the Council here, the State argued that the
mandatory phrase shall make grants amount[ed] specific
direction pay, one that the GAO would treat
appropriation.
Id. 13.
The Court held that the Nuclear
Waste Fund did not constitute continuing appropriation because
another section the statute made expenditures from the Waste
Fund, including grants, subject appropriations.
Id. making this determination, the Court explained that had
found authority suggest that statute creating funding
source and ordering payment subject appropriations amounts continuing appropriation.
Id. 14; see also id. [N]either Nevada nor have identified any authority
suggesting that continuing appropriation exists when Congress
creates special fund but makes spending from subject
appropriations.
The Council argues that Nevada inapposite because
involved special fund the Treasury the United States and
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
because the case did not arise under the Anti-Deficiency Act.
Pl. Reply n.3.
However, Plaintiff attempts
distinguish Nevada fail.
The Circuit held that permanent
appropriation not statutorily created when another provision the same statute makes funds subject appropriations.
location the fund irrelevant.
The
The D.C. General Fund, like
the fund issue Nevada, has not been permanently
appropriated because another section the Home Rule Act,
Section 446, requires that the Fund appropriated. is,
therefore, still subject the requirements the AntiDeficiency Act.
Such reading Sections 450 and 446 also
comports with the broader principle that one should not lightly
presume that Congress meant surrender its control over public
expenditures authorizing entity outside the
appropriations process.
AFGE, 388 F.3d 410.
The Budget
Autonomy Act, which removes the provisions Section 446 that
provide for compliance with the Anti-Deficiency Act, thus runs
afoul the limitations Section 603(e) and the AntiDeficiency Act.
Section 602(a)(3)
Defendants argue that the Budget Autonomy Act invalid
for the additional reason that violates Section 602(a)(3)
the Home Rule Act, which places another limitation the
Council amendment authority under Section 303(d).
Section
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
602(a)(3) provides that the Council has authority enact
any act, enact any act amend repeal any Act
Congress, which concerns the functions property the United
States which not restricted its application exclusively the District.
D.C. Off. Code 1-206.02(a)(3).
Defendants contend that the Budget Autonomy Act impermissibly
amends Act Congress that not restricted its
application exclusively the District, namely the AntiDeficiency Act.
Defs. MSJ 28-29.
Because the Budget
Autonomy Act purports change the procedure for the local
portion the District budget authorize spending without
congressional appropriation, necessarily seeks enact
amend Act Congress that not restricted exclusively
the District Columbia. its very terms, the Anti-
Deficiency Act applies the federal government and the
District.
See U.S.C. 1341.
For the reasons explained Section III.B.2 supra, the
Budget Autonomy Act does not comply with the requirements the
Anti-Deficiency Act, and the Council attempts characterize
the D.C. General Fund permanent appropriation fail.
Because the Council cannot amend the District Charter exempt
the local portion the District budget from the AntiDeficiency Act pursuant the limitations Sections 602(a)(3)
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
and 603(e), the Budget Autonomy Act unlawful its terms and exercise the Council amendment authority.10
Defendants also argue that the Budget Autonomy Act violates
the first part Section 603(a)(2) because concerns
functions the United States. Defs. Reply 6-7. According Defendants, [b]udgeting and appropriations are
unquestionably functions Congress. Defs. Reply
support their claim, Defendants cite two cases which
budgeting and appropriations are referred dicta
functions the government. See, e.g. Gross Winter, 876
F.2d 165, 171 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining that the
context determining whether official has immunity from
Section 1983 suit, budget decisions are traditional legislative
functions Hessey D.C. Bd. Elections Ethics, 601 A.2d (D.C. 1991) (en banc) (referring generally
appropriations function the legislature). Because the
Budget Autonomy Act purports change the role the President
and Congress with respect the locally funded portion the
District budget, Defendants assert that exactly the type change federal function, i.e., change how
responsibilities are divided between federal and local
officials, that the limitation was intended guard against.
Defs. Reply
The Council argues that this reading Section 603(a)(2) would
gut [its] legislative authority because encompasses any
District law with non-ministerial federal effect. Pl.
Reply 21. Plaintiff contends would prevented from
cutting taxes amending the criminal code, and that even the
Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter Amendment Act 1977
would unlawful. Id. However, Plaintiff dramatic reading Section 602(a)(3) has basis law fact. Cutting taxes
would impact the total amount District funds available for
Congress appropriate, but would not alter its function
appropriating those funds. Nor would changing the criminal code
alter the function the U.S. Attorney prosecuting crimes.
Indeed, the District Charter already provides that the Council
can amend the District substantive and procedural criminal law
subject 60-day, opposed 30-day, passive review period Congress. See D.C. Off. Code 1-206.02(c)(2);
Crawley, 978 A.2d 608, 610-11 (D.C. 2009). While such actions the Council might alter the background against which federal
officials act, neither would change federal officials
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
IV.
Conclusion
Although the Council the District Columbia, the
Mayor, and this Court are powerless grant the residents
the District Columbia the full budget autonomy that they have
demanded for almost forty years spend their revenue collected
from their local taxes and fees, the United States Congress and
the President the United States are without doubt
empowered so. view the foregoing, the Court concludes that the
Budget Autonomy Act unlawful.
Plaintiff Motion for Summary
Judgment hereby DENIED and Defendants Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment hereby GRANTED.11
Mayor Vincent Gray, CFO
Jeffrey DeWitt, the Council the District Columbia, its
functions, i.e., those officials roles, tasks,
responsibilities. Defs. Reply (emphasis original).
The District Columbia Court Appeals came the same
conclusion Crawley. There, the Court considered
whether the Procurement Reform Amendment Act 1998 (the
District false claims act) impermissibly transferred
prosecutorial authority from the U.S. Attorney the Office
the Attorney General. 978 A.2d 609-10. The Court considered
the legislative history the Home Rule Act and determined that
any law passed the Council concerning the jurisdiction the
U.S. Attorney was understood one that concerned the
functions the United States, and thus subject Section
602(a)(3). Id. 615. Likewise, the Budget Autonomy Act
impermissibly affects function the United States. the motions hearing May 14, 2014, the Council
represented that would not seek stay even sought
appeal. Transcript Hearing 124:20-24. the absence
any request for stay, the Court will not stay its order.
Case 1:14-cv-00655-EGS Document Filed 05/19/14 Page
officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons active
concert participation with them who receive actual notice
the injunction, are hereby permanently ENJOINED from enforcing
the Local Budget Autonomy Act 2012 pending further order
this Court. appropriate order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion. ORDERED.
Signed:
EMMET SULLIVAN
United States District Judge
May 19, 2014