Skip to content

Judicial Watch • Bates 001003 001010 Redacted

Bates 001003 001010 Redacted

Bates 001003 001010 Redacted

Page 1: Bates 001003 001010 Redacted

Category:General

Number of Pages:8

Date Created:April 14, 2012

Date Uploaded to the Library:February 20, 2014

Tags:001010, 001003, Bates, redacted


File Scanned for Malware

Donate now to keep these documents public!

  • demand_answers

See Generated Text   ˅

Autogenerated text from PDF

UNCLASSIFIED Atta known Pentagon before 9/11 
John Crewdson and Andrew Zajac, Chicago Tribune, September 2005 
WASHINGTON --Four years after the nation's deadliest terror attack, evidence accumulating that super-secret Pentagon intelligence unit identified the organizer the Sept. hijackings, Mohamed Atta, Qaeda operative months before entered the U.S. 
The many investigations Sept. 11, 2001, have turned half-dozen instances which government agencies possessed information that might have led investigators some part the terrorist plot, although most cases not time stop it. 
But none those leads likely would have taken them directly Atta, the Egyptian architecture student who moved the U.S. from Germany take flying lessons and later served Qaeda's 
U.S. field commander for the attacks. 
Had the been alerted what the Pentagon purportedly knew early 2000, Atta's name could have been put list that would have tagged him someone watched the moment 
stepped off plane Newark, N.J., June that year. 
Physical and electronic surveillance Atta, who lived openly Florida for more than year, and who acquired driver's license and even pilot's license his true name, might well have 
made possible for the II expose the Sept. plot before the fact. 
Atta presumed have been the controls American Airlines Flight when struck the north tower the World Trade Center Sept. 11, 2001. 
The Eli has reviewed the voluminous records its extensive Sept. investigation and can find mention Atta before Sept. 11, senior  official said. the Pentagon knew about Atta 2000 and failed tell the the official said, "It could problem." 
Anthony Shaffer, civilian Pentqgon employee, says was asked the summer 2000 
Navy captain, Scott Phillpott, arrange meeting between the and representatives the 
Pentagon intelligence program, code-named Able/Danger. 
But said the meeting was canceled after Pentagon lawyers concluded that information suspected Qaeda operatives with ties the U.S. might violate Pentagon prohibitions retaining information "U.S. persons," term that includes U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens. 
Information unearthed The Washington-based agent who was Shaffer's liaison has recalled, interviews with her superiors, that Shaffer told her his group had unearthed important information suspected Qaeda operatives with links the U.S., but without mentioning Atta's name. 
When Shaffer, who also lieutenant colonel the Army Reserve, asked whom the that 
001003 
information should communicated, the agent gave him the name and phone number official ftil headquarters, according the senior 11 official. 
Shaffer explained telephone interview that although Able/Danger never had knowledge Atta's whereabouts, had linked him and several other Qaeda suspects Egyptian terrorist, Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, who had been linked the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and later was convicted for conspiring attack the U.S. Atta arrived the U.S. some seven years after that bombing. But Shaffer and his attorney, Mark Zaid, emphasize that Able/Danger never knew where Atta was, only that was connected Abdel-Rahman and Qaeda. 
"Not say they were physically here, but the data led bel.ieve there was some activity related the original World Trade Center bombing that these guys were somehow affiliated with," Shaffer 
said. 
Asked Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), chairman the Senate Judiciary Committee, hearing last week whether Atta, who lived for months Florida under temporary student visa, was "U.S. person," senior Pentagon official answered, "No, was not." 
The official, William Dugan, was asked why the Pentagon had not given the Able/Danger data the 
.i. 
'We're lot smarter now than were 1999 and 2000," replied Dugan, who testified that the 
Pentagon instead destroyed the huge volume material gathered Able/Danger, which was 
disbanded late 2000. 
Erik Kleinsmith, former Army major who worked with Able/Danger, testified the hearing that 
continued wonder whether, Able/Danger "had not been shut down, [whether] would have 
been able assist the United States some way" prevent the Sept. attacks. 
Zaid, who also represents James Smith, private contractor employed the Pentagon work AbleJDanger, said that until last summer Smith had his office wall copy chart Qaeda suspects, produced more than year before Sept. 11, that had Atta's name and photograph. 
"He showed anybody who came by-'Look what had,"' Zaid testified. "And would just 
shake his head, 'What if, what if, what .... 
Specter sharply criticized the Pentagon for refusing allow Shaffer, Phillpott, Smith and others who recall seeing the chart appear and answer the committee's questions. 
"It looks could obstruction the committee's activities," the senator said. 
Specter added that was especially "dismayed and frustrated" the committee's inability hear from Shaffer and Phil!pott, whom.he described "two brave military officers [who} have risked their careers come forward and tell America the truth." 
Pentagon permit testimony Following the hearing, Specter announced that the Pentagon had 
agreed allow Shaffer, Phillpott and three other witnesses testify public next month, though 
Specter aide said Tuesday that the Pentagon now insisted the hearings closed. 
The Defense Department .initiated its own investigation Able/Danger's activities several weeks 
ago. After more than interviews with Pentagon personnel, investigators reported that two 
individuals addition Shaffer, Phillpott and Smith recalled seeing the Atta chart before Sept. 11. 
Kleinsmith, who longer affiliated with the Pentagon, testified that was ordered Defense Department lawyer comply with Pentagon regulations destroying the Able!Danger data. 
001004 

information should communicated, the agent headquarters, ar---..1:--.... fho coriinr 
Shaffer explained whereabouts, had lin Omar Abde lRahman, convicted for conspirin bombing. But Shaffer< Atta was, only that he 
"Not say they were the original World 
. 
said. 
Asked Sen. Arlen  week whether Atta, person," senior Pen 
The official, William 
"We're lot smarter now 
Pentagon Instead destroy 
disbanded late 2000. 
Erik Kleinsmith, former 
continued wonder whe' 
been able assist the 
Zaid, who also represent; Able/Danger, said tha 
Qaeda suspects, produc1 
"He showed anybod 
shake his head, 'What 
Specter sharply criticizer 
recall seeing the chart 
him the name and phone number official 
official. 
var had knowledge Atta's Egyptian terrorist, Sheik .hter bombing and later was seven years after that 
 Danger never knew where was some activity related affiliated with," Shaffer 
)Committee, hearing last student visa, was "U.S. the Able/Danger data the 

"It looks could obstruction tne commmioa i:o .......... 

Specter added that was from Shaffer and Phillpott, careers come forward 
Pentagon permit testimo 
agreed allow Shaffer, Specter aide said Tuesday 
The Defense Department ago. After more than intr individuals addition 
Kleinsmith, who longE 
Department lawyer com1 
001005 testified that the 
:banger, which was the hearing that 
ether] would have 
rattacks. the Pentagon work 
opy chart h's name and photograph. 
id. "And would just 
bott, Smith and others who 
..e senator said. 
ittee's inability hear 
/[who] have risked their 
 the Pentagon had next month, though 
'1osed. 
ities several weeks )ported that two chart before Sept. 11. 
 ordered Defense ble/Danger data. 

b(5) 

said did not remember seeing Atta's name photo the materials destroyed, but that believed Shaffer, Phillpott and the three other employees "implicitly when they say they do.ft 

Shaffer said that before Sept. neither nor anyone else associated with Able/Danger attached any special significance Atta, any the other Qaeda suspects the intelligence effort had unearthed. 

Nor would they have had reason to. early 2000, when Shaffer said first saw Able/Danger charts identifying suspected Qaeda members with links the U.S., Atta and two other Sept. hijack pilots, Marwan al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah, were living and studying Hamburg, Germany. was the one that carried the charts down Tampa, Capt. Phillpott," then Able/Danger's operations officer, Shaffer said. 

Able/Danger was experiment new kind warfare, known "information warfare" "information dominance." One the program's missions was see whether Qaeda cells around the world could identified sifting huge quantities publicly available data, relatively new technique called "data mining." 
The data miners used complex software programs, with names like Spire, Parentage and Starlight, that mimic the thought patterns the human brain while parsing countless bits information from every available source find relationships and patterns that otherwise would invisible. 
Over its 18-month lifetime, Able/Danger gathered immense amount data, the equivalent, Specter said, one-quarter the contents the Library Congress. 
Although data mining can powerful technique, there danger that false connections wi!l made along the lines "six degrees separation," the popular theory that any two people Earth can linked through their relationships more than six other people. 
Data points matched The Atta-Al Qaeda connection, Shaffer said, was made Smith, who then worked for Pentagon contractor named Orion Scientific. Atta's photo, Shaffer said, was obtained Smith from someone California who had connections foreign source" who monitored radical mosques Europe. 

"J. Smith took eight data points that were common the original World Trade Center bombers 1993," with whom Abdel-Rahman had been associated, Shaffer said. "From those eight data points, matched the profile." 
Atta, whose full name was Mohammed El-Amir Awad Sayid Atta, called himself Mohamed el-Amir while living Germany, and thus would not have been readily identifiable "Mohamed Atta." switched the surname Atta prepared move the U.S., according German police documents. Senate aide said Specter was negotiating with the Defense Department over the conditions under which Shaffer and the other Pentagon witnesses would permitted appear before tl}e Judiciary Committee and answer the senators' questions. think the Department Defense owes the American people answer about what went here," Specter declared. 

Clues pieced together years following attacks Post-Sept. investigations have revealed instances that seem, hindsight, have been chances 
001006 

Shaffer said that before Sept. neither nor anyone else associated with Able/Danger attached any special significance Atta, any the other Qaeda suspects the intelligence effort had 
 
unearthed. 

Nor would they have had reason to. early 2000, when Shaffer said first saw Able/Danger charts identifying suspected Qaeda mem
bers with links the U.S., Atta and two other Sept. hijack pilots, Marwan 1-Shi:>nhi .,.n..i 71,,,,A ,gin Hamb'urg, Germany. illpott," then Able/Danger's "Information warfare" 
Over its 18-mon! Specter said, 
Although data made along the can linked thraug11 me1r re1auonsnrps rici more than six other people. 
Data points matched The Atta-Al Qaeda connection, Shaffer said, was made Smith, who then worked for Pentagon contractor named Orion Scientific. Atta's photo, Shaffer said, was obtained Smith from someone California who had connections foreign source" Who monitored radical mosques Europe. 
'1J.D. Smith took eight data points that were common the original World Trade Center bombers 1993," with whom Abdel-Rahman had been associated, Shaffer said. "From those eight data points, matched the profile." 
Atta, whose full name was Mohammed El-Amir Awad Sayid Atta, called himself Mohamed el-Amir while living Germany, and thus would not have been readily Identifiable "Mohamed Atta." switched the surname At'a prepared move the U.S., according German police documents. Senate aide said Specter was negotiating with the Defense Department over the conditions under which Shaffer and the other Pentagon witnesses would permitted appear
before the Judiciary Committee and answer the senators questions. think the Department Defense owes the American people answer about what went here," 
Specter declared. 

Clues pieced together years following attacks 
Post-Sept. investigations have revealed instances that seem, hindsight, have been chances 
001007 

for the thwart the attacks. MAY 1998 
HIJACK WARNING --In September 2005 was revealed that the independent commission that investigated the Sept. attacks found that the Federal Aviation Administration had been warned early 1998 that Qaeda "might try hijack commercial jet and slam into U.S. landmark." The FAA viewed this possibility "unlikely" and "last resort," the report said. JAN.15, 2000 
il4ANO1:11--Investigations into Sept. paid much attention the ll's failure tell the that one the Sept. hijackers. Khalid al-Mihdhar, had apparently moved the U.S., where was taking flying lessons with another hijacker, Nawaf al-Hazml, San Diego. JAN. 31, 2000 
DUBAI ARREST One the most promising leads came from Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, 

where January 2000 authorities detained Sept. hijack pilot Ziad Jarrah was returning 
Hamburg from twomonth sojourn with Mohamed Atta and fellow hijacker Marwan al-Shehhi 
Osama bin Laden's Afghan training camps. was during those two months that bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed decided that Atta and his friends were the ideal candidates conduct the operation, according the Sept. commission report. Jarrah was questioned the Dubai airport police, knew the general outlines the plot, 
though the date and targets would not decided for more than year. 
According senior UAE official who spoke the condition that not identified, while Jarrah 
was custody the Dubai police informed the American Embassy that young Lebanese student 
had been detained his way back Europe from Afghanistan. The embassy contact, the official 
said, asked that Jarrah arrested. 
When the Dubai police explained they had grounds for arrest, the embassy contact replied 
that the police should let Jarrah go. 
Jarrah flew from Dubai Amsterdam and then Hamburg, where reconnected with Atta,
Shehhi and Ramzi Binalshibh. 
U.S. officials dispute the UAE official's account, saying they never learned the Jarrah airport stop until Sept. 18, 2001. JULY 2001 
THE "PHOENIX MEMO" What has become known "the Phoenix memo" was written July 2001 111 agent that city who took notice the number Middle Eastern students enrolling Arizona flight schools and wondered whether some them might terrorists. 
The agent suggested the j compile visa information foreigners applying flight schools, 
although such effort would have missed the Sept. hijackers, who had graduated from flight 
school months before. AUG.15, 2001 

001008 

for the 1. thwart the attacks. 
 MAY 1998 
HIJACK WARNING-In September 2005 was revealed that the independent commission that investigated the Sept. attacks found that the Federal Aviation Administration had been warned early 1998 that Qaeda "might try hijack commercial jet and slam into U.S. landmark." The FAA viewed this possibility "unlikely" and nlast resort," the report said. JAN. 15, 2000 
THE AND Im Investigations into Sept. paid much attention the @l's failure tell the that one the Sept. hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar, had apparently moved the U.S., where was taking flying lessons with another hijacker, Nawaf al-Hazmi, San Diego. 
DUBAI ARREST  One the most promising leads came from Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, where Januar liad Jarrah was returning

hijacker Marwan al..Shehhi was during th< Mohammed decided that Atta and his friends were ording the Sept. commission report. Jarrah was general outlines the plot, though the date 
According not identified, while Jarrah was custody that young Lebanese student had been detail 1The embassy contact, the official said, asked tha' 
When the Dub