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Media Highlights -Claim Atta Was Named Debated 
Back Table Contents  
UNCLASSIFIED Claim Atta Was Named Debated 
Security Chief Denies Getting Chart Identifying Hijacker 
Dan Eggen, Washington Post, September 2005, Page A06 
National security adviser Stephen Hadley yesterday denied receiving Defense Department chart that allegedly identified lead terrorist Mohamed Atta before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, dealing blow claims Republican congressman that have caused political uproar recent weeks. 
Rep. Curt Weldon (Pa.) wrote his book, "Countdown Terror, earlier this year that provided chart Hadley produced 1999 the Pentagon's "Able Danger" program, secret effort identify terrorists using publicly available data. Weldon said the chart identified Atta connection with Brooklyn, N.Y., terrorist cell. 
That claim was the start expanding list allegations related Able Danger, that culminated Wednesday with hearing the Senate Judiciary Committee where angry lawmakers accused the Pentagon coverup for refusing allow some witnesses testify. 
But spokesman for Hadley, who has previously declined comment Weldon's claims, 
said yesterday that search National Security Council files produced such documents 
Identifying Atta and that Hadley was not given such chart Weldon. 
"Mr. Hadley does not recall any chart bearing the name photo Mohamed Atta," said the spokesman, Frederick Jones II. "NSC staff reviewed the files Mr. Hadtey well all NSC personnel" who might have received such chart. 
"That search has turned chart," said. 
Hadley does recall seeing chart used example "link analysis" --the technique used the Able Danger program -as counterterrorism tool, but not sure whether happened during Sept. 25, 2001. meeting with Weldon another session, Jones said. 
Weldon's chief staff, Russ Caso, said that "the congressman sticks his account" the 
meeting, adding 1hat was understandable Hadley may have forgotten misplaced the 
chart, given the demands his job. 
MThis case not closed," Caso said. are still aggressively trying track down charts 
and/or documents. haven't turned over every rock yet.ft 
The NSC findings echo the results earlier probes into the Able Danger claims the Sept. commission and the Defense Department, neither which found documents other evidence that Atta was identified the program. Weldon and others who have made the charges have contradicted themselves provided shifting explanations for important details the heart the case, according interviews, news reports, transcripts and hearing 
testimony. 
Investigators and counterterrorism experts also find improbable -if not impossible -that obscure Defense Department program that used open-source records could identify Atta name and photograph early 2000, when was living Germany under different name and had yet obtain U.S. visa. Investigators have discovered other charts that include 
001048 of3 1/9/2006 7:45 
Media Highlights -Claim Atta Was Named Debated 
Back Table Contents  
UNCLASSIFIED Claim Atta Was Named Debated 
Security Chief Denies Getting Chart Identifying HVacker 
Dan Eggen, Washington Post, September 2005, Page A06 
National security adviser Stephen Hadley yesterday denied receiVlng Defense Department chart that alleaedlv identified lead terrorist Mohamed Atta before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, dealing have caused political uproar recen 
Rep. Curt Weldon (Pa.; ris year that 
provided chart Had program,
 
secret effort identify the chart identified Atta connection with 
That claim was the star Danger, that culminated Wednesda) !where angry lawmakers accused thE Iwitnesses testify. 
But spokesman for H IWeldon's claims, 
 
said yesterday that such documents 
identifying Atta and tha
"Mr. Hadley does not r med Atta," said the 
spokesman, Frederick ... 1dley well all NSC personnel" who ;. 
"That search has turned chart," said. 
Hadley does recall seeing chart used example "link analysis" --the technique used the Able Danger program --as counterterrorism tool, but not sure whether happened during Sept. 25, 2001, meeting with Weldon another session, Jones said. 
Weldon's chief staff, Russ Caso, said that "the congressman sticks his account" the meeting, adding that was understandable Hadley may have forgotten misplaced the chart, given the demands his job. 
"This case not closed," Caso said. 'We are still aggressively trying track down charts 
and/or documents. haven't turned over every rock yet." 
The NSC findings echo the results earlier probes into the Able Danger claims the Sept. commission and the Defense Department, neither which found documents other evidence that Atta was identified the program. Weldon and others who have made the charges have contradicted themselves provided shifting explanations for imi:>ortant details the heart the case, according interviews, news reports, transcripts and hearing 
testimony. 
Investigators and counterterrorism experts also find improbable --if not impossible --that obscure Defense Department program that used open-source records could Identify Atta name and photograph early 2000, when was living Germany under different name and had yet obtain U.S. visa. Investigators have discovered other charts that include 
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Media Highlights-ClaimAtta WasNamedDebated 
terrorists who are similar name appearance Atta, bolstering the possibility that the entire affair based the false recollections those involved. 
Army Reserve Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, Navy Capt. Scott Philpott and three civilians affiliated 
with Able Danger have told Pentagon investigators that they recalled seeing either Atta's 
name photograph before Sept. 11, 2001 But other evidence has emerged support 
the claims. Pentagon investigators say they Interviewed about others affiliated with Able Danger, none whom recalled identification Atta other hijackers, 
Shaffer has conceded that based his recoHection the memories others, and the Pentagon says had contact with the now defunct 18-month project for total days. 
Shaffer's security clearance was formally revoked Monday for series unrelated violations, Including allegations that exaggerated his past actions obtain service 
medal, according his attorney, Mark Zaid. 
Shaffer denies the allegations and was entitled the medal, Zaid said yesterday. 
The Bush administration has fueled the controversy through its responses various allegations. For example, the Pentagon provided on-t he-record briefing about the issue reporters earlier this month, but then refused allow public testimony Philpott and others Wednesday's Senate committee hearing. The Pentagon has relented and will allow the witnesses testify second hearing Oct. the judiciary panel announced yesterday. 
Weldon has alleged that documents proving his claims may have been lost part 
 
record-destruction program motivated concerns over keeping data U.S. citizens; 
companies and legal residents. Yet large volumes Able Danger documents did survive, 
presumably including the Atta charts that Weldon and others claim have had their possession recently last year. Weldon has also said used original data from the Able: Danger project reconstruct charts thathe has presented reporters and congress. his unusual appearance before the judiciary panel Wednesday, Weldon criticized the Pentagon investigation and said Defense Department officlals were stonewalling. "My goal now ... the same was then: the full and complete truth about the run-up 9/11," Weldon said. 
Weldon controversial figure who vice chairman the House homeland security and armed services committees and known for carrying replica suitcase nuclear bomb. His book, which devoted one paragraph the claim about Atta, focused primarily   allegations Iranian Intelligence source whom the has dismissed fabricator 
The chart that Weldon said gave Hadley was one the enduring mysteries the 
controversy. Two others associated with Able Danger, Shaffer and defense contractor James Smith, also have said interviews that they had copies pre-Sept. chart that included Atta. but that they were destroyed 2004 under unclear circumstances. 
Zald, who represents both Shaffer and Smith, said Smith's copy was thrown away after was wrecked while was being removed from office wall. Shaffer has said that his copy was among papers destroyed the Defense Intelligence Agency last yearwhen his clearance was first suspended. 
While Pentagon investigators never found such chart, they did uncover two other interesting1 diagrams: One from 1999 included the name and photograph Mohammed Atef -not Atta well-known Qaeda lieutenant. Another included the photo convicted terrorist named  Eyad lsmoil, Egyptian who bears resemblance Atta -and who, unlike Atta, was part the Brooklyn cell tied the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. 
Investigators and experts say those two charts could explain how handful military officers and civilians may have come mistakenly believe they identified Atta. Atta's Florida driver's license photo from the summer of2000 has become icon the attacks, and the lead  hijacker has been the subject many dubious claims and sightings. 
(b) (3.)
001050 2of3 1/9/2006 7:45 
Media Highlights -Claim Atta Was Named Debated 
terrorists who are similar name appearance Atta, bolstering the possibility that the entire affair based the false recollections those Involved. 
Army Reserve Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, Navy Capt. Scott Philpott and three civilians affiliated 
with Able Danger hav"' tnlr! Pont::innn invAtinators that they recalled seeing either Atta's 
name photograph !merged support the claims. Pentagon affiliated with Able 
Danger, none who [s. 
Shaffer has concede1 others, and the 
Pentagon says total days. Shaffer's security cle: unrelated violations, including   obtain service 
medal, according tot 
Shaffer denies the vesterday. The Bush administra !es various 
allegations. For exan !ng about the issue 
reporters earlier this Philpott and others Wednesday's Sen, and will allow the
. 
witnesses testify unced yesterday.
 
Weldon has alleged ... .... .-.--.,,. ---------  lost part a 
record-destruction program motivated concerns over keeping data U.S. citizensi 
companies and legal residents. Yet large volumes Able Danger documents did survive, 
 
presumably inctudlna the Atta charts that Weldon and others claim have had their
 
possession rec:i      original data from the Able.  
Danger project  his unusual app Pentagon investlgr prters and Congress. 'r'eldon criticized the  stonewalling. ffMy goal  
now the san the run-up 9/11,"  
Weldon said.  
Weldon contn armed services  omeland security and ultcase nuclear bomb.  
His book, which alfegatlons  'jsed primarily lissed fabricator"  .  
The chart that controversy. Two 1ng mysteries the efense contractor James Smith, also  Sept. chart that  
included Atta, but  lrcumstances.  
Zaid, who represt......  :.... ...  thrown away after was  

wrecked while was being removed from i:in office wall. matter nas said that his copy was among papers destroyed the Defense Intelligence Agency last year when his clearance 
was first suspended. -:'. '.' ....
While Pentagon Investigators never found such chart, they did uncover two other interestingi 
 

diagrams: One from 1999 Included the name and photograph Mohammed Atef--not Atta well-known Qaeda lieutenant. Another included ihe photo convicted terrorist named Eyad lsmoil, Egyptian who bears resemblance Atta -and who, unlike Atta, was part the Brooklyn cell tied the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. 
Investigators and experts say those two charts could explain how handful military officers and civilians may have come mistakenly believe they identified Atta. Atta's Florida driver's 
license photo from the summer 2000 has become icon the attacks, and the lead 
hijacker has been the subject many dubious claims and sightings. 
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Media Highlights -Claim Atta Was Named Debated 
Gorton (R-Wash.), member the Sept. commission, wrote letter the Senate 

Judiciary Committee last week. ... Any investigator can tell you that memories, years after 
the fact, are faulty." 
 2005 The Washington Post Company 
UNCLASSlflED 

Back Table Contents  
 ' 
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Media Highlights -Excerpts from 'Inside the Ring' ... of2 Back Table Contents  
UNCLASSIFIED 
11. Excerpts from 'Inside the Ring' 
Iran's weapons, Atta's photo, Qaeda and drugs Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, September 2005, Page 
Iran's weapons 
Much public attention has been focused recent weeks Iran's continuing efforts hide its 
covert nuclear weapons program. 

The Bush administration recently highlighted another major weapons problem, accusing 
Tehran building deadly biological and chemical arms. 
The State Department's annual report "Adherence and Compliance With Arms Control, 
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" said Iran has the 
capability weaponizing deadly agents missile warheads aerial bombs. 
"The Iranian [biological weapons] program has been embedded within Iran's extensive 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries obscure its activities," stated the report, 
made public last month. "The Iranian military has used medrcal, education, and scientific 
research organizations for many aspects BW-related agent procurement, research, and 
development. Iran has also failed submit the data declarations called far the [Biological 
Weapons Convention]." 

Regarding chemical arms, the report said the U.S. government has evidence that "Iran has 
manufactured and stockpiled blister, blood, and choking chemical agents, and weaponized 
some these agents into artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs." 
'We continue believe that Iran has not acknowledged the full extent its chemical 
weapons program, that has indigenously produced several first-generation [chemical 
wea pons} agents (blood, blister, and choking agents}, and that has the capability produce 

traditional nerve agents," the report said, noting that "the size and composition any Iranian 
stockpile not known.n 
Attats photo 
Congressional investigators looking into the Special Operations Command data-mining 
activity known Able Danger are trying find woman California who first came with supposed photograph September terrorist leader Mohamed Atta months before the 
deadly suicide attacks. 
The woman worked for security contractor that obtained 1he photo Atta and other lslamis1 
militants through surveillance mosque, said Rep. Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania 
Republican who has been looking into the matter. 

"There were five cells Qaeda that were identified [by Able Danger], including the 
Brooklyn cell," Mr. Weldon told us. 
The purported photo Atta was later reproduced chart that had the names 
suspected terrorists that Mr. Weldon says gave Stephen Hadley 2001, when 
was White House deputy national security adviser. 
(b). (3) 
001053 1/9/2006 7:42 
,diaHighlights-Excerpts from 'Inside the Ring' 
Frederick Jones, NSC spokesman, said that Mr. Hadley does not recall ever seeing the 
chart with the Atta photo, but does not rule out the possibility that was given the photo 
Mr. Weldon. 

The photo was purchased from the woman Orion Scientific Systems Inc., government contractor that was involved early phase the Able Danger program. 
Orton was purchased SRA International Inc., intelligence contractor, 2004. spokesman for SRA could not reached for comment. 
The reputed linkages between Atta and lslamists Brooklyn were uncovered Able Danger analyses information related the New York-area terrorist group that carried out the 1993 bombing the World Trade Center and other Qaeda attacks plans. 
Pentagon officials say extensive investigation recent months failed tum any chart showing Atta. They say they have found Able Danger charts depicting other terrorists. Qaeda and drugs 
Top military officials have been reluctant state publicly that Qaeda reaping money from the heroin trade Iraq. Yesterday, Gen. John Abizaid, the chief Central Command, was not reticent discuss the Qaeda-drug connection. told the Senate Armed Services Committee: "They develop safe havens that are both geographic and ungoverned spaces and virtual within the Internet and within the mass-media 
world. They have front companies. They buy off politicians. They develop facilitators and smugglers. They deal with financiers that move drug money around, welt other illicit 
money." 
--Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough are Pentagon reporters. 
Copyright  2005 News World Communications, Inc. All rights reserved. 
UNCLASSIFIED Back Table Contents  
(bj (.3 

001054 20f2 1/9/2006 7:42 
,bdia Highlights -Excerpts from 'Inside the Ring' 

Frederick Jones, NSC spokesman, said that Mr. Hadley does not recall ever seeing the chart with the Atta photo, but does not rule out the possibility that was given the photo 
Mr. Weldon. The photo was purchased from the woman Orion Scientific Systems Inc., governmentI contractor that was involved early phase the Able Danger program. 
Orion was purchased SRA International Inc., intelligence contractor, 2004. spokesman for SRA could not reached for comment. 
The reputed linkages between Atta and lslamists Brooklyn were uncovered Able Danger 
analyses information related the New York-area terrorist group that carried out the 1993 
bombing the World Trade Center and other Qaeda attacks plans. 
Pentagon officials say extensive investigation recent months failed tum any chart 
showing Atta. They say they have found Able Danger charts depicting other terrorists. Qaeda and drugs 
Top military officials have been reluctant state publicly that Qaeda reaping money from the heroin trade Iraq. Yesterday, Gen. John Abi.:zaid, the chief Central Command, was not reticent discuss the Qaeda-drug connection. tofd the Senate Armed Services Committee: "They develop safe havens that are both geographic and ungoverned spaces and virtual within the Internet and within the mass-media 
world. They have front companies. They buy off politlcians. They develop facilitators and smugglers. They deal with financiers that move drug money around, well other illicit. money." 
-Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough are Pentagon reporters. 
Copyright  2005 News World Communications, Inc. All rights reserved. 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Back Table C"' '""--i--..,,.   
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001055 

2of2 11912006 7;42 

16. lfwe only had acted Michael Maloof, Washington Times, October 2005, Page 
Rep. Curt Weldon, Pennsylvanla Republican, correctly asserts the terrorist attack America September 11. 2001, could have been averted. 

The ssertion was based his efforts early 1999 create national collaborative fusion center. would data-mine vast amounts information from U.S. intelli gence and law enforcement confront such asymmetrical threats terrorism, proliferation, illegal arms trafficking, espionage, narcotics and infonnation warfare cyber-terrorism. was process that produced, among other things, the Able Danger open-source analysis 

Ifwe only had acted 
intelligence {C31), now renamed networks and information integration, especially pushed for 
creating the Joint Central Analytic Group {JCAG). C31 was concerned that money for the national collaborative center would diverted from the long-sought JCAG counterintelligence analytical center. 
Unfortunately, the JCAG, now the Defense Intelligence Agency Bolling Air Force Base, doesn't talk other analytical centers that deal with various asymmetrical threats. 
Nor the other existing Sflalytical centers dedicated collectlng information terrorism, proliferation, arms smuggling and other threats talk each another regularly. 
Following the initial DoD turndown, Ellen Preisser and this writer then data-mined unclassified information report Mr. Weldon possible Chinese front companies the United States 
seeking technology for the People's Liberatlon Army. showed how Chinese front companies the United States listed U.S. corporations were 
acquiring U.S. weapons technology from U.S. defense contractors, and improving China's military capability. Such access U.S. technology then would allow the Chinese over time 
duplicate U.S. military systems down the widget. 
Indeed, June 27, 2005 article The Washington Times reported U.S. investigators were concerned with China and its middlemen Increasingly and illegally obtaining "sensitive classified U.S. weapons technology" from U.S. companies. 
Reaction the study Chinese front companies the United States from the Army and the General Counsel's office the Office the Defense Secretary was immediate. November 1999, they ordered the study destroyed, but not before Mr. Weldon complained then Army Chief Staff Eric Shinseki. Mr. Weldon also wrote letter then-J Director Louis Freeh requesting espionage 
investigation. Mr. Freeh never responded the Weldon request. 
Then April 14. 2000, memorandum from the legal counsel the Office the Joint Chiefs Staff, Capt. Michael Lohr wrote that the concern over the LIWA initiative potentially bumped into what amounted domestic spying. 
"Preliminary review subject methodology raised the possibility that LIWA 'data mining' would potentially access both foreign intelligence (Fl) information and domestic information relating U.S. citizens (i.e. law enforcement. tax, customs, immigration, etc," Capt. Lohr 
wrote. recognize that argument can made that LIWA not 'collecting' the strict sense (i.e. they are accessing public areas the Internet and non-Fl federal government databases already lawfully collected information)," Capt. Lohr added. "This effort would, however, have the potential pull together into single database wealth privacy-protected U.S. citizen information more sweeping and exhaustive manner than was previously contemplated.'' effect, the national collaborative center experiment based the LIWA example was 
sidelined. the concept the NOAH had been 
effect September 11, 2001, events may have been different The cost for such system would have been minimal compared the heavy cost 

human life and resources the nation suffered. Michael Maloof former senior analyst the Office the fense Secretary. 
Copyright 2005 News Wor1d Communications, Inc. All rights reserved. 
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001057 
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Media Highlights Ifwe only had acted

Department. The office the assistant secretary for command, control, communications and lnteUigence (C31), now renamed networks and information integration, especially pushed for creating the Joint Central Analytic Group (JCAG). C31 was concerned that money for the national collaborative center would diverted from the long-sought JCAG counterintelligence analytical center. 
Unfortunately, the JCAG, now the Defense Intelligence Agency Bolling Air Force Base, doesn't talk other analytical centers that deal with various asymmetrical threats. 
Nor the other existing arialytical centers dedicated collecting Information terrorism, proliferation, arms smuggling and other threats talk each another regularly. 
Following the initial DoD tumdown, Ellen Preisser and this writer then data-mined unclassified information report Mr. Weldon possible Chinese front companies the United States seeking technology for the People's Liberation Army. showed how Chinese front companies the United States listed U.S. corporations were acquiring U.S. weapons technology from U.S. defense contractors, and improving China's 
military capability. Such access U.S. technology then would allow the Chinese over time duplicate U.S. military systems down the widget. 
Indeed, June 27, 2005 article The Washington Times reported U.S. investigators were 

concerned with China and its middlemen increasingly and illegally obtaining "sensitive classified U.S. weapons technology" from U.S. companies. 
Reaction the study Chinese front companies the United States from the Army and the General Counsel's office the Office the Defense Secretary was immediate. November 1999, they ordered the study destroyed, but not before Mr. Weldon complained then Army Chief Staff Eric Shinseki. 
Mr. Weldon also wrote letter then-il,ijJ Director Louis Freeh requesting espionage 

investigation. Mr. Freeh never responded the Weldon request. 
Then April 14, 2000, memorandum from the legal counsel the Office the Joint   
Chiefs Staff, Capt. Michael Lohr wrote that the concern over the LIWA initiative potentially 

bumped into what           
''Preliminary review  ,!WA 'data mining'  
would potentially    domestic information  
relating U.S. citiz  )n, etc," Capt. Lohr  
wrote. ... recognize that  the s1rict sense (i.e. emment databases 
already lawfully coll  ... Would, however, have the potential pull rprotected U.S. citizen information /ious!y contemplated." effect, the nation  example was sidelined. the concept thE events may have been different. The co5t ired the heavy cost 
. 
human life and res<  Michael Maloof former senior analyst the Office the Defense Secretary. 
Copyright 2005 News World Communications, Inc. All rights reserved. 
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Ifwe only had acted 

Back Table Contents  of2 
2nd Lawmaker Credits Secret Intelligence Program 

Back Table Contents  
UNCLASSIFIED 

13. 2nd Lawmaker Credits Secret Intelligence Program 

Douglas Jehl, New York Times, October 2005, Page A11 
WASHINGTON, Sept. second Republican member Congress has said that pP,J(ltigJy. who was then the deputy national security adviser, was given chart shortly after the Sept. attacks that showed information collected about Qaeda before the attacks secret military intelligence program called Able Danger. The account was provided Representative Dan Burton Indiana, who said interview that Sept. 25, 2001, attended meeting with Mr. Hadley the White House along with Representative Curt Weldon, Republican Pennsylvania. Mr. Weldon has said that gave Mr. Hadley such chart the meeting, but the White House had refused comment Mr. Weldon's account. 
Told about Mr. Burton's account, spokesman for Mr. Hadley, who now the national security adviser, confirmed for the first time last week that Mr. Hadley recalled seeing such chart that time period. But the spokesman, Frederick Jones, said that Mr. Hadley did not recall whether saw during meeting with Mr. Weldon, and that search National Security Council files had failed produce such chart. 

Mr; Weldon has sought call attention the Able Danger program arguing that the Clinton and Bush administrations and the Sept. commission all failed pay heed work done Able Danger, which used advanced computers sift data effort identify 
possible Qaeda members. 
Mr. Weldon, along With several military officers who participated the program, have said that identified Mohammed Atta and other future hijackers potential threats the fall 2000, but the Pentagon has said has been unable corroborate the accounts. letter Congress last week, former member the Sept. commission, Slade Gorton, defended the commission's decision not mention Able Danger its report last year. Mr. Gorton questioned Mr. Weldon's account, saying Mr. Hadley did not recall seeing the chart described Mr. Weldon. 

But the White House response, Mr. Jones said: nMr. Hadley did fact meet with Congressman Weldon Sept. 25, 2001. recalls tha1 same time period receiving briefing link analysis counterterrorism tool, and being shown chart that was example link analysis. But does not recall whether was shown that chart the 
eeting with Mr. Weldon some oiher meeting. Either way, Mr. Hadley does not recall seeing achart bearing the name photo Mohammed Atta." 
who attended might have attended such meeting, but chart was found. 

Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company 
UNCLASSIFIED 
001060 

Back Table Contents  
UNCLASSIFIED 

13. 2nd Lawmaker Credits Secret Intelligence Program 
Douglas Jehl, New York Times, October 2005, Page A11 

Sept. second Republican member Congress has said that 

who was then the deputy national security adviser, was given chart shortly 
after the Sept attacks that showed information collected about Qaeda before the attacks secret military intelligence program called Able Danger. 

old about Mr. Burtot 
security adviser, con1,  ;called seeing such chart that time peri Mr. Hadley did not recall whether saw larch National Security Council files 
The account was provided Representative Dan Burton Indiana, who said intetview that Sept. 25, 2001, attended meeting with Mr. Hadley the White House along withRepresentative Curt Weldon, Republican Pennsylvania. Mr. Weldon has said that gave Mr. Hadley such chart the meeting, but the White House had refused comment 
Mr. Weldon has sougl, rguing that the Clinton and Bush adm- pay heed work done Able Danger, identifypossible Qaeda memb 
Mr. Weldon, along With have said 
that identified Moharr the fall 
2000, but the Pentagor: letter Congress I Slade Gorton, 
defended the commissi1. ast year. Mr.
Gorton questioned Mr.
described Mr. Weldon. 

But the White House response, Mr. Jones said: "Mr. Hadley did fact meet with 
Congressman Weldon Sept. 25, 2001. recalls that same time period receiving
briefing link analysis counterterrorism tool, and being shown chart that was
xample link analysis. But does not recall whether was shown that chart the meeting with Mr. Weldon some other meeting. Either way, Mr. Hadley does not recall 

Mr. Jones said that security council staff members reviewed the files Mr. Hadley and others who attended might have attended such meeting, but chart was found. 
Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company 
UNCLASSIFIED 

001061 of2 

Media Highlights 

Next> 
UNCLASSIFlED 

15. Army project illustrates promise, shortcomings data mining 
Shane Harrrs, National Journal, GovExec.com, December 2005 the 
spring 2000, year and half before the 9/11 attacks, Erik Kleinsmith made 
decision that history may judge colossal mistake. 
Then 35-year-o!d Army major assigned little-known intelligence organization Fort Belvoir Virginia, Kleinsmith had compiled enormous cache information -most electronically stored -about the Qaeda terrorist network. described the group's presence countries around the wortd, including the United States. was great interest military planners eager strike the terrorists' weak spots. And 
may have contained the names some the 
9/11 hijackers, including the ringleader, 

Mohamed Atta. 
The intelligence data totaled 2.5 terabytes, equal about percent all printed pages held the Library Congress. Neither the JJJ:ll nor the J. had ever seen the information. And 
that spring, Kleinsmith destroyed every bit it. 

Why dld that? And how did midlevel officer minor intelligence outfit obtain that 
information the first place? Those questions lie behind the latest phase simmering 
controversy Washington: whether something could have been done prevent the terror 
attacks September 11. 

Kleinsmith worked for Army project code-named "Able Danger. This past summer, 
number former project members -none whom had worked for Klelnsmlth --came 
forward say that Able Danger had identified Atta and linked him convicted terrorist who still serving time federal prison for his role the 1993 bombing the World Trade Center. 
The Able Danger members recalled' charts showing names and pictures suspects, and 
their links each other. Rep. Curt Weldo ou1spoken Pennsylvania Republican and 
longtime supporter intelligence reform, has demanded know why the charts were never 
shared wfth agency positioned halt the attacks. also points out that the 9/11 commission failed include any mention Able Danger 
its final report, which regarded authoritative history the attacks. The Pentagon 
searched more than 80,000 documents and found chart with the name "Mohamed Atta." 
Weldon has accused the government cover-up and called for criminal investigation. 

But Able Danger, for all its intrigue, just one piece the unusual 
intelligence practices that 
Kleinsmith was engaged in, years before 9/11. the late 1990s, Kleinsmith was the chief 
intelligence for the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity, support unit assigned the 
Intelligence and Security Command. LIWA had broad authority assist the Army and all 
military commands conducting "informaUon operations," broad discipline that includes 
Information warfare, public deception combat, and intelligence analysis. 

The Army's hub this effort was the aptly named Information Dominance Center, based 
Fort Belvoir. Since the late 1990s, the IOC has been home some the most innovative, 
unconventional, and controversial minds the intelligence business. its futuristic-style 

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Media Highlights 

mining." recent afternoon coffee shop Springfield, Va., not far from the IDC, Kleinsmith 

explained how data mining works. Putting pen paper, Kleinsmith sketched clumps circles, then surrounded some with concentric, wavy perimeters, until he'd drawn crude version topographical map. data mining, explained, powerful search engine used "harvest" tens thousands Web pages that contain key words interest --"Al Qaeda" and "bin Laden," for instance. Another tool, called data visualization program, then creates three-dimensional map showing which words appear most often and how they relate. 

The features and contours the map tell analyst about the underlying information's 
significance, Klein smith said. High peaks represent words that appear frequently. Peaks close 
together signal words that share some context. The analysts can cllck peak and pull 
the Information that helped create it. 
With data mining, analysts don't just read information, they "see" it. Kleinsmith called this kind data mining "intelligence steroids," and was 
the IDC's hallmark. 
Data mining works best with large sets information, it's particularly useful for Internet 
searches. the IDC, Kleinsmith and three colleagues mapped Qaeda for Able Danger 
mining open sources and fusing their results with classified government intelligence. But addition the mass information they returned suspected terrorists, they collected thousands names U.S. citizens. 
People's names and personal information litter the Internet. Data harvesting, its very 
nature, indiscriminate and sweeping. Unavoidably, along with "Osama Bin Laden," 
often-mentioned name like "Bill Clinton" will harvested. That says lot about the power, and the limits, data mining, and why Kleinsmith destroyed what had; the military not supposed gathering information U.S. citizens. First Test 
From its earliest days, the IDC was haven for renegades who wanted use technology step outsid traditional intelllgence..gathering, which relies heavily classified sources and labor-intensive analysis. The center had high-level champions, including Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, who from 2000 2003 directed the Intelligence and Security Command, the IDC's parent. Alexander now heads the National Security Agency, which operates the most-sophisticated electronic eavedropping devices the world. 

Alexander also worked closely with James Heath, who headed the IDC late 1990s and whom former employees recall mix driven genius and mad scientist. According one such former employee the center, Heath saw the IDC "an experimentation table" which try out all kinds new tools, depending what the Army wanted the time. Analysts and technicians worked together, "speaking the same language" and building useful data-mining tools. This dynamic didn't exist other intelligence agencies, the former 
employee noted. 
The IDC earned reputation for innovation, but also stepped over the bounds traditional military intelligence. One its first outside fans was Curt Weldon. Rep. Weldon had been advocating "national collaborative center" fuse law enforcement and intelligence units, and their information, from across the government. 

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IDC covered range topics. 
Analysts tracked computer hackers who were targeting military networks, watched for potential avenues Chinese government espionage, and charted the working relationships among foreign terrorists. this, the tDC relied heavily novel technique called "data mining." recent afternoon coffee shop Springfield, Va., not far from the IOC, Kleinsmith explained how data mining works. Putting pen paper, Kleinsmith sketched clumps 
From its earliest days, 1uv was naven for renegades who wanted use technology step outside traditional intelligence-gathering, which relies heavily classified sources and labor-intensive analysis. The center had high-level champions, including Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, who from 2000 2003 directed the Intelligence and Security Command, the IDC's parent. Alexander now heads the National Security Agency, which operates the most-sophisticated electronic eavesdropping devices the world. 

Alexander also worked closely with James Heath, who headed the IDC the late 1990s and whom former employees recall mix driven genius and mad scientist. According one such former employee the center, Heath saw the IDC ''an experimentation table" which try out all kinds new tools, depending what the Army wanted the time. Analysts and technicians worked together, "speaking the same language" and building useful data-mining tools. This dynamic didn't exist other intelligence agencies, the former employee noted. 
The IDC earned reputation for innovation, but also stepped over the bounds traditional 
military intelligence. One its first outside fans was Curt Weldon. Rep. Weldon had been 
advocating "national collaborative center" fuse law enforcement and intelligence units, 
and their information, from across the government. 

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2of9 

corruption Russia, but did not know much else about him, Weldon said. 
Unsatisfied, Weldon contacted his ''friends the Information Dominance Center,'' which considered model for his own intelligence collaboration venture. The !DC "came back with eight pages about this man," who the analysts said "was very close Milosevic personally." Former IDC employees confirmed 1hat they proVided Weldon with detailed information Karie. 

The 
!alk,s with Karie bore fruit. But when Weldon returned Washington, said, the lll and! asked debrief him what knew about Karie. Weldon delivered thorough 
dossier. told them that there were four Karie brothers; that they were the owners the largest banking system the former Yugoslavia; that they employed some 60,000 people: that their bank had tried finance the sale SA-1 [missile system] from Russia Milosevic; that their bank had been involved billion German bond scam; that one the brothers had financed Milosevlc's election; that the house Milosevic lived was really their house; that, fact, the Karie brothers' wives were best friends with Milosevic's wife; and that they were the closest people this leader." 
Surprised hear such details man they barely knew of, the agents presumed Weldon got the information from the Russians. When told them 1hat the facts came from the Army's Information Dominance Center, Weldon recalls, the agents replied, "What ... the Information Dominance Center?" 
The event convinced Weldon that the