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The Road Boston: Counterterrorism Challenges and Lessons from the Marathon Bombings 
House Homeland Security Committee Report 
U.S. House Representatives 
Committee Homeland Security 
Rep. Michael McCaul, Chairman 

March 2014 
Prepared the Majority Staff the Committee Homeland Security 

(U) THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING: 
(U) INYESTIGA11VE REPORT THE ST.AFF THE COMMIITEE HOMELAND SECURITY 

(U)L 11'"TRODUCTION 

(U)II. 
EXECUrIYE SUlllARY 

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 

Terror i11 the Caucasus 

Tiie Tsamaev Famiv 

201I FBI Assessmem Tamerlan Tsamaev 

Tamerlan Tsamaev's Travel Russia 

Earv 'JiVamings 

(U)I THE BOSTON MARATHON BOJIBL'"G 

April 15, 2013 

The Ma11hu11t 

Subsequent Deve/opmems Co11nectio11 with this Case 

OVERSIGHT 

(U)VI. 
fu"'DIXGS AND R.ECOl.1ME1'"'DA TIONS 

Federal Cooperation with Local Law E11force111e11t 

Reco111111e11dotio11 
Greater Slzari11g wit/I Local Law Enforcement
Reconmumdation -Revise Agreements TFOs 

TECS Lookouts and Response  
Recommendation 3-Secondary Examinations  
Recommendation Improving TECS Alert Notifications and  
Records  
Nomination for TIDEITSDB and the Second TECS Alert  
Recommendation 5-Reviewing TIDEITSDB Nominations  
Addressing Long-Term Challenges  
Recommendation -Encouraging Cooperation and Assistance  
from the Community  
Recommendation 7-Ending the "Case Closed" Mentality  
(U) APPENDIX -Correspondence between the Committee and the Executive  
Branch 
INTRODUCTION 
(U) 
For over decade, the United States House Representatives' Committee Homeland Security (the Committee) has worked oversee and strengthen the nation's counterterrorism programs and policies. Established along with the Department Homeland Security response the terrorist attacks September 11, 200 the Committee has responsibility continually examine our homeland security effort -identifying weaknesses and providing solutions address these shortfalls. 

(U) 
The Committee's mandate was reemphasized April 15, 2013, when two improvised explosive devices detonated near the finish line the Boston Marathon. Krystle Campbell, Martin Richard, and Lingzi died the attack. Well over two hundred others were injured. The bombs were built with pressure cookers and were packed with shrapnel inflict maximum damage, fashion reportedly popular with militants Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many lost limbs suffered other critical injuries, but the true extent the damage will never fully recorded. Yet the Nation and the world looked -before the smoke had cleared and before they knew was safe -the citizens Boston, their police officers and firemen, members the National Guard, Federal agents, and other spectators, runners, and first responders, rushed forward help, decisively and honorably. 

(U) the wake this tragedy, Americans drew inspiration from the example those heroes. During the hunt for those responsible, Boston once again demonstrated our country's true strength the world, and proved the futility horrific violence intended intimidate Americans. 

(U) the Nation looks forward, would mistake not reflect how those responsible were able carry out their assault order prevent similar attacks the years come. The Committee has obligation conduct such investigation and, since this attack, has worked toward that end. 

(U) 
The Committee has written multiple letters Federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI), the Department Homeland Security (DHS), well the Office the Director National Intelligence (ODNI), and held several hearings gather evidence. Committee staff have held multiple briefings with Federal and local officials both Boston and Washington, and travelled the Russian Federation meet with American officials stationed Moscow and representatives fi-om the Russian government. Unfortunately, while eager carry out this effort, the Committee initially encountered significant resistance and delays. Yet recent months, the Committee has received increased cooperation from agencies the Executive Branch that had previously limited their assistance. The Committee hopes that this more productive relationship can continue not only relation this investigation but into all areas the Committee's jurisdiction. 

(U) conduct our investigation, the Committee repeatedly requested documents and briefings discuss the specifics Tamerlan Tsarnaev's history, the extent which Federal agencies knew about the threat posed, and what actions they took, did not take, response. While some Federal agencies responded the Committee's questions, for several months the FBI largely denied ignored the Committee's requests for assistance. one letter the Committee, FBI representatives asserted that the Committee's requests amounted "nonoversight activities" -implying that the FBI was therefore not required comply. 

(U) 
Despite these challenges, the Committee persisted working obtain the required documentation and information. Throughout this effort, the Committee has appreciated the challenges facing the FBI and all other agencies conducting their investigation into the bombing, and bringing those responsible justice. The Committee has always applauded the men and women the FBI, along with all other Federal law enforcement and intelligence officials, and will always endeavor assist them their mission. 

(U) 
Yet, just Federal investigators have duty carry out their investigation with speed and integrity, the Committee obliged carry out its own investigation -without delay and without leaving any question unanswered -because not, and cannot, know when where the next attack will occur. 

(U) 
Being compelled our duty move forward strengthening our national security, the Committee has decided release report that includes findings based the evidence available present and provide recommendations for further action. The Committee shall consider this appropriate documentation our effort the American people and will endeavor ensure that the recommendations contained herein are enacted improve the security the United States Homeland. 

(U) will also continue pursue additional information and documentation, and explore all appropriate avenues for fulfilling our mission. this report will detail, there were opportunities which greater sharing information might have altered the course events. Such failures must not allowed persist, and the Committee will continue work toward strengthening our nation's Homeland Security. 

(U) 
This report was compiled Committee staff using both classified and unclassified materials, including open source reporting. many instances, this report utilizes media reporting, part address issues raised news media outlets and part because initial information about the events was not provided relevant agencies. draft version this document was sent Federal agencies for review. December 16, 2013, representatives from the Executive Branch met with Committee staff discuss this report's classification level and provide comments the Committee's findings and recommendations. such, certain portions this text have been redacted preserve the integrity the sensitive and classified evidence provided the Committee throughout this investigation. Furthermore, these representatives provided greater insight into steps their agencies have taken address the issues concern detailed below. Much this information reflected this report. 

3ECRE'f'//FGI 

(U) The Committee thankful all those who assisted providing evidence and compiling this report, including the Commonwealth Massachusetts and Boston-area local law enforcement agencies, outside experts, Federal officials, and others. The powerful example the brave first responders Boston working save lives continues echo all those who are working learn from this tragedy. The United States Congress and the American people are appreciative that effort. 
Sincerely, 
MICHAEL McCAUL 
Chairman 
Committee Homeland Security 
PETER KlNG WILLIAM KEA TING 
Chairman 
Subommirtee Counterterrorism and 
Intelligence 
CANDICE MILLER 
Chairman 
Subcommittee Border and Maritime Security 
PATRICK MEEHAN 
Chairman 
Subommittee Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies 
JEFF DUNCAN Chairman 
Subcommittee Oversight, Management and Efficiency 
SUSAN BROOKS Chairman 
Subcommittee Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications 
RICHARD HUDSON Chairman 
Subcommittee Transportation Security 

II. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
(U) 
This report examines much Tamerlan Tsarnaev's personal history and his interaction with Federal agencies, including his radicalization, the 2011 threat assessment carried out the FBI, and his travel Russia early 2012. Additionally, the Committee explores missed opportunities that potentially could have prevented this attack. 

(U) 
The Committee has developed seven preliminary recommendations strengthen our Federal counterterrorism efforts. These recommendations are intended combat systemic weaknesses the Committee has identified during the course its investigation, including: 

 	
Insufficient cooperation and information sharing between Federal agencies and local law enforcement; 

 	
Limited communication between Federal agencies; 

 	
Inadequate resources for necessary screening outbound travelers interest; and 

 	
Failure amend inaccurate incomplete records held various agencies. 

(U) 
Many the Committee's recommendations, along with recommendation strengthen Congressional oversight homeland security, echo recommendations included the 9/11 Commission Report released July 26, 2004, and are also found other examinations terrorist attacks, such the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee's review the Fort Hood shooting. This once again demonstrates that nearly ten years after the release the findings the 9/11 Commission, have yet fully address these challenges. 

(U) The Committee recommends greater information sharing with local law enforcement, and expanded access the FBl's classified Guardian system State and local fusion centers. particular, the Committee notes that Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) around the country must allow for greater sharing with local police departments and other agencies that sponsor personnel work the task forces. The Committee also recommends that the Memoranda Understanding between the FBI and other agencies that prevent the sharing information outside JTTFs without FBI approval amended foster greater sharing. 
(U/Additionally, based classified briefings provided the Committee, 
the Committee will continue its review efforts Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

(U) Acknowledging that local law enforcement officials have indicated they may not have done anything differently had they known about the FBI 2011 assessment Tamerlan Tsamaev, the course this investigation the Committee has been provided evidence demonstrate that information sharing remains problem non the less. 

The Committee also will work ensure that CBP resources necessary secure omeland. Uncertainty continues surround the question which Federal 

agencies and investigators knew Tamerlan Tsamaev's travel Russia. The Committee 
recommends uiring detailed records relating the sharing -records that all riate officials can reliabl informed 
ese agencies proactive commuwcate 
wit one ano e-co 1ct ieir records, each would have had more thorough 
picture the threat Tamerlan Tsarnaev posed, and could have presented the opportunity review his case after his return from Dagestan, Russia. Therefore, the Committee recommends establishing additional requirements ensure that Federal agencies with information relating nominations for watch lists proactively communicate with the nominating agencies ensure all records are full and accurate. CBP has taken some steps make these enhancements that will examined greater detail below. 
(U) addition specific policy changes such those outlined above, the report also identifies broader weaknesses stemming from issues such public awareness terrorist threats and government-wide accountability. address these, the Committee recommends improving upon programs designed educate the public about terrorist threats and their role assisting authorities identifying and mitigating potential dangers. 
(U) Finally, the Committee recommends that investigators, analysts, intelligence and law enforcement professionals, and all those charged with guarding the nation's security, continuolly find new ways proactively improve our homeland security. Though difficult 
implement, these last two recommendations are perhaps the most important, and the most likely prevent terrorist attacks the future. difficult build and evaluate public service and information campaigns, but often, the public that first notice indicators individual's radicalization, plans commit terrorist attack, other signs danger. perhaps even more difficult build self-critical bureaucracy, and improve the efficacy examinations into terror attacks. However, recognizing the limitations Federal agencies mitigating terrorist threats the first step improving our efforts. 
(U) The Committee hopes these recommendations strengthen the hand Federal, State and local law enforcement, well the Intelligence Community, combating terrorist threats. Though will never realistic expect can eradicate the threat posed terrorist networks and the danger homegrown extremists, the United States should always endeavor improve our security and these recommendations are step that direction. 

Ill. 
(U) BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
(U) Terror the Caucasus 
(U) Russia's North Caucasus region has been volatile for decades, violent Islamist 
groups Chech nya, Dagesta, and other neihborig republics have engaged ruthless and
bloody war against the Russian Federation. -Varying assessments suggest that beyond their 
attacks against the Russian state, these terrorist networks have the potential cooperate 
3Qaeda's global jihad.The current Emir Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri was reportedly arrested Dagestan 1996, and has also called for the Caucasus ajihadist safe haven. AlZawahiri noted 2001, 
(U) The liberation the Caucasus would constitute hotbed jihad (or fundamentalism the United States describes it) and that region would become the shelter thousands Muslim mujahideen from various parts the Islamic world, particularly Arab parts. This poses direct threat the United States, represented the growing support for the 
jihadist movement everywhere the Islamic world. 
(U) Chechen fighters have also reportedly fought alongside Qaeda and Taliban forces Afghanistan.5 addition, some estimate that many 850 Chechen fighters belong the Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar group lslamist fighters Syria allied with Qaeda's Islamic State Iraq and the Levant. According one expert, the Caucasus Emirate (also known the lmirate Kavkas IK), the leading violent Islamist extremist group that region, (U) Jim Nichol, "Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests," the Congressional 
Research Service, September 13, 2013. (U) The FBI noted interagency briefing Committee staff December 16, 2013 that after the fall the 
Soviet Union, "There were two factions the Chechen resistance movement -Chechen nationalists and ihadists 
but for both factions the focus was entirely Chechen independence." (U) Lorenzo Yidino, "How Chechnya became Breeding Ground for Terror," Middle East Quarterly, September (U) Mairbek Yathagaev, "Influence Chechen Leader North Caucasian Fighters Syria Grows," James/own Foundation. August 2013. (Available at: 
cache= tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D=4I 255tx ttnews%5BbackPid%5D= 381cHash=?9f5982933f249d5I3ffdOfd9e3e30853.UI XYYLH D-U1) 

has increasingly developed ties with Qaeda. May 26, 2011, the United States Defartment State added the Caucasus Emirate the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list, and the United Nations lists them among entities associated with Qaeda, noting that they are active Afghanistan and Pakistan, well Russia. 
(U) has not been determined whether the Boston Marathon bombing that took place April 15, 2013 tied directly the Caucasus Emirate the ongoing terrorist activity Dagestan, Chechnya, and across the North Caucasus. However, reasonable assume that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was least inspired their activity and ideology, and driven take part the vision global jihad which they share with Qaeda. During Tamerlan Tsarnaev's time Dagestan, which will explored greater detail below, would have seen Russia's fight against these groups first-hand, and (though Federal investigators have not found proof these meetings) possibly had the opportunity meet with rebel fighters from that region, which may have helped fuel his radicalization. Secretary State John Kerry noted Brussels shortly after the bombing, "[Tamerlan] learned something where went and came back with willingness kill people." 1 Clearly, understanding the context the situation the Caucasus sheds some light Tamerlan Tsamaev's drive carry out this attack. 

(U) The Tsarnaev Family 

(U) 
The Tsarnaev family ethnic Chechen, though Tamerlan Tsarnaev was born 1986 Kyrgyzstan, where his parents lived the time. While there, Tamerlan Tsarnaev's father, Anzor Tsarnaev, worked for the government Kyrgyzstan, and 1993 had second son, Dzhokhar Tsamaev. After losing his job the Kyrgyz Republic 200 Anzor Tsarnaev and his family returned Dagestan semi-autonomous Russian republic bordering Chechnya. 

(U) 2002, Anzor Tsarnaev applied for asylum the United States after previously being granted tourist visa. The Tsarnaev parents and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev arrived first, leaving (U) Gordon Hahn, "Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right," The Center for Strategic and International Studies, August (U) 1267 Committee, "Al-Qaida Sanctions List," the United Nations. October 2013. (U) Tracy Jan, Globe Staff, "Secretary State John Kerry Says Tamerlan Tsarnaev Returned from Russia 'with (U) Glenn Kessler, "Rand Paul's misguided question how the Tsarnaev brothers arrived the United States,"
Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his sisters uncle's care for another year. Subsequently, 2003,
Tamerlan Tsamaev and his sisters joined their family the United States. 2006, Tamerlan Tsarnaev was granted Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) status. this time, had taken boxing, and the fall 2006 attended Bunker Hill Community College part-time. left the school 2008. 
(U) 2007, Tamerlan Tsarnaev began dating Katherine Russell. According some media reporting, friends Katherine Russell claim that time went took increasingly extremist view Islam, and allege that became violent toward her. During break their relationship, Tamerlan Tsarnaev was arrested charges domestic abuse for
slapping different woman, Nadine Ascencao. 2009, won the New England Golden Gloves heavyweight title, and lost the first round the national tournament Salt Lake City. The next year, though qualified for the national tournament, was not allowed compete due chane the competition's rules. Tamerlan Tsarnaev married Katherine Russell June 21, 2010. His daughter, Zahira, was born October 
(U) For his part, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev attended high school the Cambridge Rindge and 
Latin 	School Cambridge, Massachusetts where wrestled competitively and eventually19
became co-captain the wrestling team.In 2011, graduated and received $2,500 
scholarship from the City Cambridge for college, which used attend the University
Massachusetts Dartmouth.His grades were poor, but nearly all public accounts was well-liked and social, and was known drink and smoke marijuana with friends. also reportedly maintained close relationship with his older brother. September 11, 2012, 
21Dzhokhar became naturalized U.S. citizen. (U) CNN Staff, supra note 11. (U) important note that despite conflicting early reports, the Tsamaev family received asylum from Kyrgyzstan, and not Russia. (U) CNN Staff, supra note 11. (U) Philip Caulfield, "Tamerlan Tsamaev abused Katherine Russell with taunts 'slut' and 'prostitute' during courtship: roommates," New York Daily News, April 23, 2013. (Available at: 

roommates-article-I. (U) Chris Krik and Heather Brady, "From Boxing Champion Bombing Suspect," Slale. April 25, 2013. (Available at: (U) Jack Gillum, Katie Zezima and Michelle Smith, "Talented Rhode Island artisit married bombing suspect Tamerlan Tsarnaev," the Associaled Press, April 22, 2013. (Available at: 
mass ive.com/news/index/ssf/20 13/04/katherine-russel tamerlan-tsa.htm (U) Chris Krik and Heather Brady, supra note 17. (U) Ibid. 
21(U) Ibid. 

(U) 
The Tsarnaev family struggled with money during their time the United States. Anzor Tsarnaev worked auto mechanic. Tamerlan Tsarnaev's mother, Zubeidat Tsarnaeva, worked multiple jobs over the years help make ends meet, including time cosmetologist and in-home care taker. June 2012 she was allegedly caught shoplifting from store Natick, Massachusetts. Zubeidat and Anzor Tsarnaev are reportedly separated, though both returned Russia before the Boston Marathon bombing. 

(U) 2011 Assessment o/Tamerlan Tsarnaev 

(U) 2011, the FBI received letter from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) regarding Tamerlan Tsarnaev.26 the letter, the Russian government expressed concern that had become radicalized and that might return Russia and join extremist groups there.27 While lacking compelling derogatory information exactly why posed threat, the letter contained detailed biographic information Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his mother, including physical addresses, marital status, online social media profiles, and discussed his history boxer. The letter also noted that had previously hoped travel the Palestinian territories wage jihad, but decided not because did not speak Arabic. The letter requested that the FBI notify the Russian government Tamerlan Tsarnaev attempted travel Russia, which may indicate they were concerned about possible ties militants the Caucasus. 

(U) response this letter, the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) Boston initiated assessment determine Tamerlan Tsarnaev did indeed pose terrorist threat. Such threat assessments are outlined the Attorney General Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, (U) Alan Cullison, Paul Sonne, and Jennifer Levitz, "Life America Unraveled for Brothers," the Wall Street Journal. April 20, 2013. (Available at: (U) Alan Cullison, Paul Sonne, and Jennifer Levitz, supra note 22. (U) Kathy Lally, "Russian FSB Describes its Tsamaev Letter FBI," Washington Post, May 31, 2013. 

along with preliminary investigations and investigations. Each these respective categories investigative activity increases scope, with assessments being the least intrusive. the course their inquiry, the Boston JTTF checked U.S. government databases and other information look for such things derogatory telephone communications, possible use online sites associated with the promotion radical activity. associations with other persons interest, travel history and plans, and education history. links terrorism were uncovered these records checks and investigation Tamerlan Tsamaev's background. The investigators then interviewed his parents and Tamerlan Tsamaev himself. The FBI did not find any evidence terrorist activity, and this information was provided the Russian government the summer 
2011.28 

FBI Case Agent the Boston JTIF had the Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) Officer assigned his team enter TECS record order provide29
notification Tamerlan Tsarnaev's international travel.TECS owned and managed CBP and its principal law enforcement and anti-terrorism database. TECS established overarching law enforcement information collection, analysis, and sharing environment TECS contains Depaitment Homeland Security (OHS) immigration data, well information from other government, criminal and terrorism databases, including information from the Terrorist Screening Database (frequently referred "the watchlist" TSDB). TECS also provides the (U) '2011 Request for Infonnation Tamedan Tsamaev from Foreign Government." FBI National Press Office. (U) Previously knovm the Treasury Enforcement Communications System. this program now officially referred TECS. (U)Tamerlan Tsamaevs TECS Records Supplied the Committee 

listing.33 Therefore, they would not have seen this explicit request. 
(U) After the FBI's assessment Tamerlan Tsamaev found links terrorism, the Boston JTTF officially closed their assessment June 24, 2011. the summer 2011, the FBI notified the Russian government that they had reviewed Tamerlan Tsarnaev and identified links terrorism.35 The FBI also requested that the Russian government provide "more specific additional information" that would indicate why Tamerlan Tsamaev posed threat. Federal officials have stated that the Russian government did not reply. 
(U) Tamerlan Tsamaev's Travel Russia 

Tsarnaev traveled Russia January 2012. and returned the investigators are still working piece together details his visit, but 
FBI officials stationed the U.S. Embassy Moscow info1med the Committee that before Anzor Tsamaev arrived Russia May 2012, Tamerlan Tsamaev spent time with other family Makhachkala. There are conflicting media repo11s regarding the amount time they spent together and the possibility that they may have travelled other areas during the visit -either (U)Tamerlan Tsarnaev's TECS Records Supplied the Committee (U) U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 'CBP Outbound Screening Briefing Follow Questions." provided the Committee December 23. 2013. (U) The Committee will elaborate steps CBP taking address this issue below. 
34(U) DHS Briefin{ls Committee Staff. June 2013. (U) FBINational Press Office, supra note 28. (U) Ibid. (U) delegation Committee staff traveled the region. and spoke with U.S. officials the embassies Moscow and Tbilisi. Committee staff were briefed FBI officials advance anticipated third and final rowid investigative interviews relating the FBI's criminal investigation into the Boston Marathon bombing. 

other parts Dagestan into Chechnya. While the facts presently known about Tamerlan Tsarnaev's travel not indicate that this attack has connections external terror network, they raise significant questions. For example, possible that Tamerlan Tsarnaev's travel provided him with opportunity make contact with militants the region. Tamerlan 
39Tsarnaev also reportedly prayed the al-Nadira mosque during his time Makhachkala.
Writing for The Wall Street Journal, Alan Cullison alleges that the mosque's founder,40
Nadirshakh Khachilaev, also aided Ayman Zawahiri, "during 1997 trip Dagestan."Furthermore, some media accounts report that while Dagestan, Tamerlan Tsarnaev made contact with Mahmoud Mansour Nidal, known insurgent the region, and perhaps others.41 
(U) Mahmoud Nidal was reportedly recruiter for Islamist insurgents Dagestan and some media reporting suggests and Tamerlan Tsarnaev could have met several times 2012.42 Though the run from Russian authorities during much ofTamerlan Tsarnaev's time Dagestan, former Russian investigator familiar with Mahmoud Nidal noted that would 
43probably not have been afraid emerge from hiding and that the two could have met.Mahmoud Nidal was killed raid Russian forces May 19, 2012. 
(U) January 2014 Chairman McCaul and Representative William Keating traveled Russia and met with investigative journalists who had spent time Makhachkala, Dagestan, looking into Tamerlan Tsarnaev's time there. These sources reported that had attempted join the Chechen fighters, and met with Mahmoud Nida!. These sources further allege that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was rejected these groups, part because his conspicuously Western 
style. 
(U/owever, according briefings provided Committee staff officials the U.S. Embassy Moscow, official investigators have uncovered evidence such relationship between Mahmoud Nidal and Tamerlan Tsarnaev. Furthermore, investigators have (U) Miriam Elder, "Tamerlan Tsarnaev Dagestan: the unanswered questions," The Guardian, April 22, 2013. (U) Alan Cullison, "Dagestan lslamists Were Uneasy About Boston Bombing Suspect," Wall Street Journal, May 2013. (Available at: (U) Jake Tapper, Jessica Metzger, Sherisse Pham, "Russian sources tell congressman Boston suspect met with two 
Chechen extremists," the Lead with Jake Tapper, CNN, May 2013. (Available at: (U) Simon Shuster, Dead Militant Dagestan: Did This Slain Jihadi Meet Tamerlan Tsarnaev," TIME, May (U) Ibid. 

determined Tamerlan Tsarnaev likely did not attempt "go into the forest" euphemism for joining Chechen rebel groups. 
(U) 	According least one Russian media report, Tamerlan Tsarnaev has also been
linked Canadian extremist William Plotnikov during his time the North Caucasus.Writing for the Russian paper Novaya Gazzetta, journalist Irina Gordienko alleges that Russian authorities were first alerted Tamerlan Tsarnaev after finding evidence "frequent contacts"
between the two William Plotnikov's computer.Though born Russia, William Plotnikov
grew Canada and, like Tamerlan Tsarnaev, took competitive boxing.He converted
Islam 2009 and left Canada join rebels Dagestan less than year later.William Plotnikov died during shootout with Russian security services July 
14, 2012. 
officials Moscow indicated that electronic communication between 
collected 
officials also reported that investigators have determined unlikely 

the two met face-to-face while Tamerlan Tsarnaev was Dagestan. 
(U) Early Warnings 
(U) While the many specific details Tamerlan Tsarnaev's radicalization remain somewhat vague, some known details begin paint picture. YouTube account under his name showed that viewed multiple Russian-language videos Islam and even compiled playlists jihadi videos. This account was created only few weeks after Tamerlan Tsarnaev's return the U.S., possibly indicating some degree radicalization had taken place while was Russia. One 13-minute video entitled "The Emergence Prophecy: The Black Flags Khorasan" details jihadi prophecy that the end the world, holy army will rise out region historically associated with Afghanistan, and sweep across the Middle East 
49Jerusalem. 
(U) 	One playlist also included video, since deleted, entitled "Rabbanikaly Amir Abu
Dujana -Appeal the Militias."That name reportedly the alias the Dagestani terrorist (U) Ibid. (U) Simon Shuster, "The Boston-Bomber Trail: Fresh Clues Rural Dagestan," TIME, April 29, 2013. 

(U) Ibid. (U) Video available at:
Gadzhimurad Dolgatov, who was killed December 2012.Dolgatov was based out Kizilyurt, town miles away from Makhachkala, the capital Dagestan, where Tamerlan Tsarnaev stayed during his trip early 2.52 There evidence that Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Dolgatov met, however appears Tamerlan Tsarnaev was intrigued the jihadist rebels the Caucasus and perhaps inspired their general ideology. 
(U) Tsarnaev family members allege that man known "Misha" further shaped Tamerlan Tsarnaev's views, although investigators have dismissed that Misha played role this attack. man claiming Misha, whose full name Mikhail Allakhverdov, insists that 
53while knew Tamerlan Tsarnaev 2009, was not influential his radicalization.
(U) public statement, the Islamic Society Boston (ISB) Cultural Center reported
that Tamerlan Tsarnaev attended prayers this mosque from time time. multiple occasions, engaged shouting matches with preachers the mosque, and was asked leave. These disputes allegedly arose from Tamerlan accusing the preacher being "non-believer" and "hypocrite" who was "contaminating people's minds," for encouraging worshippers celebrate American holidays. Unfortunately, this information was not shared with the authorities, and therefore did not contribute what Federal investigators knew about Tamerlan Tsarnaev until made public after the bombing. 
(U) this point, the Committee shall refrain from commenting Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's potential radicalization out sensitivity the ongoing court proceedings relating his involvement the Boston Marathon bombing. 

IV. 
(U) THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING 
(U) April 15, 2013 

(U) Monday, April 15, 2013, roughly 2:50 p.m., two explosions occurred near the finish line the Boston Marathon. Within moments, first responders, including local law enforcement, Federal agents and emergency medical technicians (EMTs), well volunteer medical personnel scene were securing the area and tending those injured the blast. Though initial casualty estimates varied, the attack resulted three deaths and approximately 260 injuries. Initial reports suggested possible additional explosives, particular the John Kennedy Presidential Library, but those reports were ultimately deemed inaccurate. Following the blasts, unit from the Massachusetts Army National Guard posted near the marathon route provide security for the race immediately began "removing debris and providing medical assistance."57 According one report, over 400 Guardsmen on-duty the marathon responded the bombing and stayed duty throughout the day assist law enforcement. Over 1,500 Guardsmen were activated response the incident the first hours following the blasts. One group guardsmen helped set Joint Incident Site Communications Caability ISCC), allowing the emergency responders site access computers and telephones. 

(U) 
Shortly after the attack, the Boston Police Department (BPD) detained Saudi national who was reportedly behaving suspiciously near the site the explosions. This individual was questioned for nearly five hours and voluntarily allowed BPD officers, well FBI and Bureau Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) agents search his (U) James Nye, and David McCormack, '"Misha' Speaks Out: Friend Accused Radicalizing Boston Bomber (U) Ibid. (U) Brian Naylor, "Boston Response Praised, But Intelligence-Sharing Questioned," National Public Radio, April (U) "Around the Army: Mass. National Guard supports Boston Police Force," Bayonet Saber, April 16, 2013. 

59(U) Cynthia Simison, "Massachusetts National Guard Gen. Scott Rice says upwards 1,500 troops duty support Boston wake marathon bombings," The Republican. April 16, 2013. (Available at: (U) Susan Ruth, "First Responders, National Guard Boston Marathon," the Washington Times, April 25, 2013. (Available at: http://communities.washingtontimes.com /neighborhood/political-potpurri/20 3/apr/25/firstresponders-national-guard-save-lives-boston-/#ixzz2RUyEWRnX) 

apartment. Although his actions and the resulting questioning led speculation regarding his involvement, the Saudi national was later confirmed BPD not suspect.61 
(U) Immediately following the explosion the FBI, Massachusetts State Police (MSP), local police, and began investigating the attack. 4:50 p.m., the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued ground stop for Boston Logan International Airport, and restricted the airspace over the site the explosion. Concurrently, investigators examined video and photographs the marathon route from before, during, and after the bombing. 
(U) The Manhunt 
(U) Days into the investigation, Federal investigators identified video 
evidence the suspects they believed responsible, and eventually turned the public effort pinpoint the identities the unknown individuals. 5:10 p.m. Thursday, April 18, 2013, investigators released pictures the two suspects, later identified the Tsamaev brothers. This touched off day-long manhunt and Boston-area citizens were later asked remain their homes throughout the following day. The FBl's Special Agent Charge (SAC), Richard Deslauriers, warned the public that the suspects were considered "to armed and extremely dangerous."66 Around 0:30 p.m. April I8, Massachusetts Institute Technology (MIT) campus police officer Sean Collier was found with multiple gunshot wounds and pronounced dead Massachusetts General Hospital. Investigators believe that the Tsarnaev brothers killed Officer Collier order steal his gun. 
(U) O'Ryan Johnson, Laurel Sweet, "Roommate: Cops searched home Saudi student injured shrapnel," (U) David Abel, Travis Anderson, Martin Finucane, "Three killed, including 8-year old boy, explosions Boston Marathon Finish Line; President Obama vows bring perpetrators justice," the Boston Globe, April 16, (U) J.M. Hirsch, "Boston Bombing Overview: The Unfolding 5-Day Manhunt For Suspects," Huffington Post, April 21, 2013. (Available at: http://www.huffington post.com/20 3/04/2 l/boston-bombingtimeline_n_3127079 html) 
(U) Ibid. (U) "The Hunt for the Boston Bombing Suspects," the New York Times, April 19, 2013. (Available at: 
19/us/boston-marathon-manhunt.html? r=O) 

(U) 
Shortly afterwards, man reported police that had been carjacked gunpoint two males.68 According some media accounts, using the stolen-vehicle's built-in GPS system, law enforcement personnel were able catch the suspects Watertown, suburb Boston.69 Officers the Watertown Police Department (WPD) approached the vehicle unaware that the suspects the car theft were also the bombers. The suspects exchanged gunfire with police and threw improvised explosives, including pipe bombs and pressure cooker bombs, from their vehicle. Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA) Officer Richard Donohue was critically wounded after being shot. Though shot several times during the gunfight, Tamerlan Tsarnaev charged officers and taunted them repeatedly. WPD Officers were able apprehend him after threw his gun officer after either ran out ammunition malfunctioned. 

(U) Tamerlan Tsarnaev was being apprehended his brother, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, sped the officers the carjacked vehicle. Sergeant Jeffrey Pugliese attempted pull Tamerlan Tsarnaev out the way, and later reported, grabbed Tamerlan the waist his pants. was trying pull him out the street... had prisoner; didn't want anything happen him this point. The next thing knew, the headlights were right here face, and had let ofTamerlan."72 Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's vehicle reportedly struck his brother sped off, yet the fatally wounded Tamerlan Tsarnaev still struggled resist being put into handcuffs. Some accounts suggest that Tamerlan Tsarnaev may also have been dragged short distance his brother's vehicle. After being taken Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Tamerlan Tsarnaev died approximately :35 a.m., April 19, 2013. 

(U) Dzhokhar Tsarnaev abandoned the vehicle Watertown and escaped foot. 74At 
4:30 a.m., MSP and BPD personnel held news conference which they told residents eastern Watertown remain their homes, while police officers and FBI agents began (U) Chelsea Carter and Greg Botelho, "'CAPTURED!!!' Boston Police announce Marathon bombing suspect custody," CNN. April 19, 2013. (Available at: (U) Vincent DeWitt, "EXCLUSIVE: Watertown Mass. Police describe takedown Boston Marathon Bombers," 
the New York Post, July 2013. (Available at: 
boston-marathon-bombers/) (U) Emily Davis, "'They hurled pressure cooker bomb decoy': Eyewitness Watertown shootout describes 'firefight' between suspects and police bullets penetrated his apartment" the Daily Mail, April 19, 2013. (U) Vincent DeWitt, supra note 69. (U) Ibid. (U) "The Hunt for the Boston Bombing Suspects," the New York Times, April 19, 2013. (Available at: 
19/us/boston-marathon-manhunt.html? rO) /37 

searching for Dzhokhar. 5:50 a.m., authorities expanded their request for residents shelter place Watertown, Newton, Waltham, Belmont, Cambridge, Arlington and the AllstonBrighton neighborhoods Boston. the same time, all Boston area mass transit was shut down. With Watertown and the surrounding areas lockdown, police initiated door-to-door search for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. press conference 12:30 p.m., MSP stated that they had searched over "60 percent what want cover." 
(U) 
However, around nightfall, police began scale back the manhunt. evening briefing approximately p.m., Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick announced that the shelter-in-place request had been lifted and that MBTA and other mass transit services would resume immediately. Not long after the lockdown order was lifted, Watertown resident reported finding man, covered blood, boat his backyard and called the police. When officers arrived, they attempted talk Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who was weakened gunshot wound likely received during the overnight shootout with police. The manhunt came end when BPD announced 8:45 p.m. via Twitter that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was custody, followed announcement from the Mayor Boston, Thomas Menino, 8:50 p.m.79 After being taken into custody, the Department Justice (DOJ) directed law enforcement question Dzhokhar Tsarnaev before reading him his Miranda rights, citing established exception frequently used for questioning about immediate threats public safety. 

(U) 
Several weeks after the bombing, several media outlets reported that handwritten note had been scrawled the interior the boat which Dzhokhar Tsarnaev hid April 91h, 2013. This note allegedly referred the victims the Boston Marathon bombings "collateral damage" and attemted justify the attacks saying, "When you attack one Muslim, you attack all Muslims." 

(U) 
Additionally, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev reportedly confirmed investigators during questioning that and his brother one point intended drive New York City and detonate (U) "Second Boston Marathon Bombing Suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Custody,'' PBS, April 19, 2013. 
(Available at: 
boston-on-lockdown htm 

76(U) The New York Times, supra note 74. (U) PBS, supra note 75. (U) J.M. Hirsch, supra note 65. (U) PBS, supra note 75. (U) Eric Schmitt, Michael Schmidt, and Ellen Barry, "Bombing Inquiry Turns Motive and Russia Trip,'' the New York Times. April 20, 2013. (Available at: (U) Daily Mail Reporter, '"F*** America': Boston 'bomber' scrawled 'confession' side boat revealing would not mourn 'martyr' brother because was 'in paradise"' the Daily Mail, May 16, 2013. (Available at: 

their explosives Times Square. Fortunately, their shootout with local authorities prevented this from being possible. 
(U) Subsequent Developments Connection with this Case 
(U) Wednesday May 2013, investigators announced the arrest three additional persons associated with Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. One the individuals, Robel Philipos, U.S. citizen, has been charged with lying investigators. Two others, Azamat Tazhayakov and Dias Kadyrbayev, are citizens Kazakhstan who had come the United States attend school.85 The two are accused disposing backpack and laptop belonging Dzhokhar Tsarnaev after they realized might connected the bombing, although they claim have known nothing the plot beforehand. Azamat Tazhayakov, who attended the University Massachusetts Dartmouth with Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, returned the U.S. January 20, 2013, after few weeks Kazakhstan. During that time, had been dismissed from the University and his student status had been terminated. CBP officials did not prevent him from entering the country because still held the proper documentation, and they did not check his status the Student Exchange Visitor information System (SEVIS).87 OHS officials report they first addressed this gap implementing mandatory manual SEVIS screening for all student visa holders entering the country. Now, OHS has implemented automated TECS record placement for all students and exchange visitors that have violated their status are associated with invalid SEVIS record. 

(U) 
Another individual, Jbragim Todashev, was questioned authorities multiple times for his connections with Tamerlan Tsarnaev, under suspicions the two them may have (U) Jerry Markon, Sari Horwitz, and Peter Finn, "Authorities: Tsarnaev Brothers Planned Attack New York's Times Square," the New York Times, April 25, 2013. (Available at: 

wash itics/a uthori mes
uare/20 3/04/25/5efc342c-add5-l e2-8bf6-e70cb6ae066e html (U) Pete Williams, Richard Esposito, Michael lsikoff, and Tracy Connor, Pals Boston Marathon Bombing Suspect Charged with Coverup," NBC News, May 2013. (Available at: (U) United States District Court, District Massachusetts, "United States America Dias Kadyrbayev (I) Azamat Tazhayakov (2), and Robel Kidane Phillipos (3), Defendants," Case 13-cr-I 0238-DPW (U) Scott Neuman, "Kazakh Students Indicted Boston Bombing Probe," National Public Radio, August (U) Ibid. 

committed triple homicide September 11, While being questioned, lbragim Todashev was shot and killed when reportedly attacked FBI investigators. 
(U)The bodies Brendan Mess, Erik Weissman, and Raphael Teken were discovered three different rooms Mess' apartment the morning September 12, 201 with their throats slit, and covered marijuana and cash. The three were all involved martial arts, and Tamerlan Tsarnaev once reportedly described Brendan Mess his "best friend."90 One local investigator later noted that the brutality the murders was perhaps the worst he'd seen his career, and "their throats were slashed right out Qaeda training video."91 The motives for the killings remain unclear, though the symbolism the date and the religion the victims, least two whom were Jewish, raised media speculation that the murder was ideologically driven. 
(U) Born Grozny, the capital Chechnya, lbragim Todashev came the United States 2008.93 reported have been friends with Tamerlan Tsamaev, and the two trained martial arts together. Uncertainty still surrounds public accounts the 2011 murder, yet lbragim Todashev refortedly acknowledged and Tamerlan Tsarnaev were responsible shortly before his death.9 Briefings provided the Committee Federal officials indicate that authorities not suspect was all connected the Boston Marathon bombing. The DOJ and the Office the State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court Florida are each conducting reviews the May 22, 2013 shooting Ibragim Todashev agent. the time this report was finalized, these reviews were ongoing. (U) Michael Schmitt, William Rashbaum, and Richard Oppel, Jr., "Deadly End FBI Queries Tsarnaev and Triple Killing," the New York Times, May 22, 2013. (Available at: (U) Alana Samuels, "Dead Boston Bombing Suspect Tsarnaev Tied Gruesome Triple Homicide," Los Angeles (U) Michele McPhewe, "Boston Bomb Suspect Eyed Connection 2011 Triple Murder," ABC News, April 22, (U) Michael Schmitt, William Rashbaum, and Richard Oppel, Jr., supra note 88. 
(U) OVERSIGHT 
(U) April 20, 2013, the Committee sent the first several letters the FBI, OHS, 
and the ODNI response the death Tamerlan Tsarnaev and the public announcement that and his brother were suspects the Boston Marathon bombing investigation. This letter requested "all information and records" relating Tamerlan Tsarnaev held the U.S. Government. Again, April 27, 2013, the Committee sent the same three Federal agencies detailed series questions regarding Tamerlan Tsarnaev's history, based what was appearing public media reporting about his life and interactions with the Federal Government. early May, the Committee received response from the legislative affairs representatives from FBI, OHS, and DNI indicating those agencies would not provide answers the Committee. Intent move forward this investigation, however, the Committee convened its first hearing the Boston Marathon Bombings hear from local law enforcement officials Boston and the Commonwealth Massachusetts, well other experts. 
(U) 
The Executive Branch supplied initial briefings the bombings all Members Congress, and another select representatives from the staffs various Congressional Committees. was argued, after the fact, May 2013 response the Committee that these meetings, and some brief phone conversations between the Committee and senior FBI leadership, should considered enough satisfy the Committee's inquiry. However, there remained significant gaps the information supplied, and notes these meetings were never made available for review verification. The Committee informed the FBI, OHS, and ODNI that this was insufficient via letter May 15, 2013. Representatives from FBI and OHS offered the Committee classified briefing discuss the Committee's questions. mid-June 2013 OHS provided briefings length answer the Committee's questions. The FBI declined participate, citing bureau policy that prohibits providing "sworn testimony" reference ongoing prosecutions. However, May 16, 2013 and again June 19, 2013, then-FBI Director Mueller discussed the Boston attack public testimony before the Senate. 

(U) June 12, 2013, the Committee extended formal invitation the FBI, OHS, and the NCTC (as agency within the ODNI) provide official testimony classified portion the Committee's second hearing the bombings. NCTC Director Olsen and then-OHS
Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism Cohen appeared before the Committee.The FBI again declined citing the ongoing prosecution Dzhokhar Tsamaev. June 14, 2013, the Committee notified the FBI the Chairman's decision conduct site visit Boston and (U) This letter, along with subsequent correspondence between the Committee and the FBI, OHS, and the ODNI (specifically the NCTC) are provided appendix this report. (U) Mr. Cohen now the Department's Counterterrorism Coordinator. 

requested meeting with FBI representatives from the Boston JTTF. After some deliberation, the FBI made SAC DesLauriers available for meeting with Members the Committee and local law enforcement hosted the BPD. 
(U) July 2013, the FBI wrote the Committee reiterate their refusal satisfy the Committee's inquiry. Despite the letter's assertion that briefing the Committee this issue could potentially damage the FBI's own investigation and prosecution the bombing, the Committee's requests this matter have all focused documents and information relating Tamerlan Tsarnaev, not his brother Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. died the early hours April 19, 2013, supplying the necessary records Tamerlan Tsarnaev would not damage the integrity any future prosecution. Further, this letter attempted argue that the FBI's interpretation congressional jurisdiction released them from their obligation answer the Committee's questions, and referred the Committee's investigation "non-oversight" activities. 

(U) 
However, September and October 2013, during series meetings with the Committee, FBI officials indicated willingness "reset" relations and begin cooperating with the Committee's investigation. November 2013, bi-partisan delegation Committee staff traveled meet with U.S. officials stationed the U.S. Embassies Moscow and Tbilisi. This delegation spoke with officials from DHS, FBI, and other agencies further the Committee's investigation (among other issues). Subsequently, November 21, 2013, Committee staff visited the Boston JTTF meet with investigators. These conversations with officials Boston and Moscow provided extremely useful information and valuable perspective the Committee's review. The information received has been incorporated into this report and the Committee will continue build these positive developments. 

(U) 
Rule Clause the adopted rules the House Representatives makes clear that the Committee "shall review and study continuing basis all Government activities relating homeland security .... This provides the Committee the jurisdiction carry out this investigation, and request documents and information regarding Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and does not give any Executive Branch agency license ignore this oversight effort. 

(U) 
Initial reluctance assist the Committee this investigation was unfortunate because another example problems identified the 9/11 Commission Report that have yet solved. The Commission urged "unity effort the Congress," and specifically noted that "Congress should create single, principal point oversight and review for homeland
security."This call was answered part when the Committee was established standing committee. Though there are additional oversight recommendations the 9/11 Commission Report which remain unfulfilled, the Committee takes its jurisdiction this area seriously, and will continue provide this oversight. rejection this Committee's effort reversion pre-9/11 mindset, and demonstrates concerning disinterest aiding Congress improving our homeland security. (U) "The Complete 9/11 Commission Report," National Commission Terrorist Attacks Upon 1he United States 
July 26, 2004. Page 421 

VI. 
(U) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
(U) Cooperation with Local Law Enforcement 
(U) May 2013, BPD Commissioner Edward Davis testified before the Committee that neither he, nor the wider Boston Police Department, were alerted the potential threat that Tamerlan Tsarnaev posed either before, during, after the Boston JTTF's 2011 assessment Tamerlan Tsarnaev: 
Chairman McCaul. Before the bombing were you aware that based this Russian intelligence, the FBI opened investigation into Tamer/an? 
Commissioner Davis. were not aware that. 
Chairman McCaul. Would you have liked have known that? 
Commissioner Davis. Yes 

Chairman McCaul. Before the bombing were you aware that Mr. Tamer/an travelled the Chechen region? 
Commissioner Davis. No, were not. 
Chairman McCaul. Again, would you have liked have known that? 
Commissioner Davis. Yes. 

(U) The BPD had officers assigned the Boston JTTF. However, existing agreements between the FBI and partner agencies required FBI approval before Task Force Officers (TFOs) could share information with their parent agencies. The Committee has found similar prohibitions sharing information across the country. fact, this requirement staple the Memoranda Understanding (MOUs) signed between the FBI and other Federal, State, and 
100
local entities that are assigning personnel JTTF. 
(U) Though Commissioner Davis raised these concerns, should noted that also stated the BPD may not have done anything differently based the reporting from the Russian 
101 102 
government. This provides valuable perspective, but the Committee has indicated 

100 (U) the request the FBI, the Committee notes that the overall structure the JTTF model not question. 
101 (U) Commissioner Edward Davis, supra note 99. 
102 (U) Additionally, given that Tamerlan Tsamaev resided the Boston suburb Cambridge, should noted that this falls outside BPD's official jurisdiction. 

several times this report and throughout this investigation, impossible know how wider dissemination may have impacted events. 
(U) 
Even more critical the fact that while nothing may have been done differently this case, this only one example the wider information sharing relationship. Ensuring this relationship operates effectively all times paramount. 

(U) 
This restriction runs counter the claims that JTTFs are "one-stop shopping for information regarding terrorist activities," that they "enable shared intelligence base across many agencies." 103 investigative bodies, JTTFs bring the expertise several agencies under one roof combat terror threats, but this case, and possibly others, the information they possessed may have been valuable when shared with other agencies. former Mayor New York Rudy Giuliani explained testimony before the Committee, sharing information outside the JTTF with local law enforcement about terrorist threats can help investigators: 

(U) But there's second reason why the Boston Police should have been notified. And wasn just notify the Boston Police, was ask for help. the FBI receives notification from the government Russia that man suspected terrorist, and the FBI doesn't know the man suspected terrorist not, but has investigate this, where would you immediately? Where should you immediately get information about that, but the police department where this man lives? Not just notify them, ask for their help. ask them for all the information th7 have about him, ask them put him under surveillance, ask them watch them. 

(U) 
Mayor Giuliani estimated that there are "only about 12,000 13,000 FBI agents for the entire world," and that the FBI faces diverse threat with limited resources. However, with proper training, Mayor Giuliani notes that the roughly 800,000 police officers around the country can assist the FBI protecting the United States against terrorist attacks. 105 There every indication that the 2011 assessment done Tamerlan Tsarnaev the Boston JTTF was thorough, and exhausted all options available investigators that time. However, Mayor Giuliani raises important issues about the most effective relationship between Federal investigators and local law enforcement more broadly. 

(U) Recommendation Increase Information Sharing with Local Law Enforcement
(U) examining the Boston Marathon bombing, the Committee strongly recommends finding ways increase and enhance the information sharing between Federal intelligence and 
103 (U) "Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces," the Federal Bureau Investigation. (Available 
104 (U) Hon. Rudy Giuliani, "House Homeland Security Committee Holds Hearing Assessing Attacks the U.S. from Fort Hood Boston, Panel I," Congressional Transcripts, July 10, 2013. (Available at: 

105 (U) Ibid. 

law enforcement agencies and State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies. Based official testimony provided during open hearings current and former government officials, briefings with State and local law enforcement personnel and even the recommendations representatives from Federal agencies including the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Committee has determined there extensive room for improvement made both the perception the FBl's information sharing expectations its agents and TFOs, well the actual information sharing procedures place. Moving forward, the Committee hopes that more information can shared beyond JTTFs around the country with State and local police departments relating such ongoing assessments. 
(U) 
This includes expanding access classified networks such Guardian the various State and local fusion centers. The Guardian system "serves the primary database for setting leads other Field Offices and JTTFs open new terrorism related assessments investigations," 106 and Guardian lead was initiated for Tamerlan Tsarnaev based the liaison memorandum from the Russian government. briefing provided Committee Staff, OHS Coordinator for Counterterrorism John Cohen noted that while fusion centers have access eGuardian, 107 OHS working with the FBI explore increasing the number persons Fusion Centers with access Guardian itself. 108 Concern regarding state and local access classified material was echoed several local law enforcement officials during the course the Committee's investigation, who suggested that improvements could also made the timeliness threat reporting made available fusion centers and police departments. has been argued that some fusion centers have access Guardian virtue individuals who serve both part the center and the local JTTF. Yet, this not enough ensure the fusion center has true Guardian access. 

(U) 
Additionally, expanding access the Guardian system not the only way increase information sharing between Federal and State and local partners. Ensuring leaders major city police departments across the country have the necessary clearances receive threat information, and developing policies that provide these individuals with insight into ongoing closed JTTF investigations and assessments may also effective preparing local law enforcement for emerging threats within their communities. Furthermore, testimony provided the Committee Richard Stanek, Sheriff Hennepin County, Minnesota during hearing examining the threat Westerners travelling abroad for training with Qaeda, identified areas 

106 (Li) Hon. William Webster, Douglas Winter, Adrian Steel, Jr. William Baker, Russell Bruemmer, and Kenneth Wainstein, "Final Report the William Webster Commission the Federal Bureau Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events Fort Hood, Texas, November 2009," the 

101 (Li) eGuardian unclassified threat reporting system similar but distinct from the classified Guardian network. 
108 (U) OHS Briefings Committee Staff, March 2014 

where Federal and State and local law enforcement could work more closely together.109 Sheriff Stanek noted that police departments that detailed officers the FBI for placement JTIF "would also like see the security clearances maintained JTIF task force officers, even after they rotated back their home agency." This common sense change, because will ensure institutional knowledge built local law enforcement and, the Sheriff later noted, because clearances are significant investment. 
(U) Recommendation -Revise Agreements TFOs 
(U/ Throughout our examination this attack, the Committee repeatedly learned problems associated with the MOUs signed between partnering agencies and the FBI when assigning non-FBI personnel Joint Terrorism Task Forces around the country. The Committee understands that these problems have gained more attention, the FBI convened workinggroup revisit the MOUs and other information sharing issues associated with the JTIFs. 110 July 22, 2013 email provided the Committee the FBI, Deputy Director Sean Joyce acknowledged that "some TFOs have been led believe that the provision their JTIF MOU that requires supervisory (SSA) approval before FBI information disseminated their home agency essentially prohibition information sharing."111 Deputy Director Joyce goes clarify November 26, 2013 letter the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) that, while requirement for SSA approval such sharing will remain part the MOUs "we have revised the language ... indicate that this requirement not intended dissuade the sharing information."112 
(U) the Committee's recommendation that these agreements foster more open and collaborative relationship, where more TFOs can share information with their parent agency and local fusion centers, and the Committee views these changes step toward that end. Representatives from both local and Federal law enforcement have noted that there risk providing too much information too many people. Potential leaks could damage the integrity investigations, and possibly affect sources and methods gathering threat information. course limiting the flow critical information also risks lives. 
(Uimilarly, part their response this attack, the FBI has issued guidance all members JTIFs across the country that encourages them collaborate and communicate 
109 (U) Richard Stanek, Tesimony before the U.S. House Representatives Committee Homeland Security, 3'h Congress, First Session, October 2013, "From al-Shabaab al-Nusra: How Westerners Joining Terror Groups Overseas Affect the Homeland," Statement for the Record, Page 
110 (U/According FBI officials Boston, this group consisted local law enforcement and FBI officials from across the United States. 
111 (U77F600)..Deputy Director the FBI Sean Joyce correspondence with Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Sheriff Douglas Gillespie, November 26, 2013 (provided the Committee December 16, 2013). 
112 (eputy Director the FBI Sean Joyce correspondence with Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Sheriff Douglas Gillespie, November 26, 2013 (provided the Committee December 16, 2013). 

between one another. This reminder seems targeted ensuring that there greater visibility within each task force which assessments and investigations are ongoing. Deputy Director Joyce notes his correspondence with the MCCA., "state and local chiefs should encourage their TFOs leverage their position the JTTF stay abreast any threat investigation ... even they are not directly assigned the particular investigation question."113 The Committee feels this positive change, and recommends that this effort reinforced with additional, permanent policy changes. 
(U) TECS Lookouts and Response 
(U) November 2011, Tamerlan Tsamaev purchased ticket fly Moscow from John Kennedy Airport New York.114 According DHS, January 18, 2012 -three days before his flight -the TECS system notified CBP officer assigned the Boston JTTF the scheduled trip. This was the same CBP officer who had initially placed this alert Tamerlan Tsamaev during the 2011 assessment the JTIF. Records demonstrate that this CBP officer did receive and view the alert, but official FBI and DHS accounts cannot officially verify whether the TECS alert was shared with the FBI case agent who led the 2011 assessment.115 matter policy, the FBI considers all individuals formally assigned the JTTF part the FBI and acknowledges, therefore, that the J1TF was officially aware Tamerlan Tsamaev's plans travel. 116 DHS, Tamerlan Tsarnaev's ticket was one-way 
reseivation scheduled for January 22, 2012.117 The first TECS alert Tamerlan Tsamaev was 

113 (U/eputy Director the FBI Sean Joyce correspondence with Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Sheriff Douglas Gillespie. November 26. 2013 (pro.ided the Committee December 16. 2013). 
114 (U) OHS Briefings Committee Staff. March 2014 (U) OHS Briefings Conunittee Staff. March 2014 
116 (U) OHS Briefings Committee Staff March 2014 
117 (U) OHS Briefings Committee Staff June 2013. 
118 (U) OHS Briefings Committee Staff March 2014 
119 (U) CBP Briefing Committee Staff December 2013. 120 (U) CBP Briefing Committee Staff. December 11. 2013. conduct outbound targeting and examinations for the five international terminals John Kennedy International Airport. Further details are needed conclude whether these resources were sufficient review all individuals interest travelling out JFK that day. However, this point, appears that guidance issued 1to CBP officials prioritize these reviews was key factor the decision not review the records all names The Committee has 
requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct review this process fully evaluate these issues. 
(U) There indication that CBP officials the John Kennedy International Airport reviewed the record related Tarnerlan Tsarnaev. CBP Officials indicated briefing with Committee staff that this was likely because how Tamerlan Tsarnaev's alert was coded (he was not placed the Fly list) and particularly that, without comment from the JTTF (which the CBP officials the point exit did not receive), they would not normally conduct such examination.121 Given the volume passengers travelling into and out the United States any given day, ensuring all indiviiduals concern are examined is, and always will be, challenge. Adequate resources for CBP carry out this mission are vital, and CBP officials indicated that outbound examinations are prioritized those passengers who pose the most risk. there was communication from the Boston JTTF CBP officials the point departure conduct additional screening, CBP did not feel Tamerlan Tsarnaev warranted this additional scrutiny. 
(U/However, the TECS record entered March 22, 2011 unequivocal its request for Tamerlan Tsarnaev reciive secondary screening -and this did not factor into the CBP's prioritization. CBP officials reported the Committee that there record that the CBP officials examined Tamerlan Tsarnaev's TECS record and therefore 

(U/pon his return from Rusia six months la' Tamerlan Tsarnaev's
TECS alert once agam notified the record-holder his intended travel. -Tamerlan's return was booked June 22, 2012 and departed July 17, 2012.123 Once again, neither OHS nor FBI can verify from written electronic records this information was passed from the CBP 

multiple potential opportunities advance the FBl's understanding Tamerlan Tsarnaev and the threat posed. 
121 (U) OHS Briefings Committee Staff, June 2013. 
122 (U) OHS Briefings Committee Staff, March 2014. 123 (U) OHS Briefings Committee Staff, June 2013. 
124 (U) The Committee will elaborate the value secondary screening and the additional opportunities for Tamerlan Tsarnaev screened upon his return b'elow. /37 

(U) copy the letter sent the Russian government the FBI regarding Tamerlan Tsarnaev specifically requested that the FBJ notify Russia Tamerlan decided travel. 125 The agents and TFOs the Boston JTTF assigned carry out assessment Tamerlan 2011 should have been familiar with this request. Though the Committee understands that the TECS alert was not placed response this request, the fact that Tamerlan Tsarnaev did fulfill this warning ought have warranted greater examination the FBI when returned. However, FBI Officials have stressed that knowledge Tamerlan Tsarnaev's travel, itself, would not sufficient predicate reopen the 2011 assessment expand preliminary investigation. this context, opportunities collect additional information are all the more important. 

(U) 
The FBI's 2011 assessment concluded Tamerlan Tsarnaev did not have links terrorism. months later, after his retUtrn from Russia began post extremist-themed videos, and later disrupted services his mosque. second assessment even the decision expand into preliminary investigation aft.er Tamerlan Tsarnaev's return could potentially have yielded evidence suggest that had lbeen radicalized. While impossible say with certainty that such second look would have prevented the bombings, equally impossible say with certainty could not have. 

(U) Recommendation -Secondary Examinations 
(U/s noted above, CBP prioritizes the review records for outgoing international travelers before they depart the United States TECS alert triggered. this case, because Tamerlan Tsarnaev's name was associated with active TECS alert the time left John Kennedy International Airport for Moscow, was initially placed list 
travelers interest departing the United States that day. decision was made not review the TECS files for all oif those -especially the 
absence additional communication from the JTTF. The Committee was pleased learn that the aftermath the bombing, CBP issued guidance the field mandating the review all possible matches. CBP reports they also subsequently enhanced system functionality facilitate the review requirements. Ports entry remain responsible for prioritizing their identification subjects that pose the highest level potential threat (while taking into account the scheduled departure time). This positive step, but additional concerns remain. 
(UThe Committee strongly recommends increasing the examination international travelers with such alerts their name they depart the country. Furthermore, the 
Committee recommends finding 
the examination all individuals whose status causes them selected 
This will pose challenge given the current 
fiscal environment and tightening budgets across Federal agencies, but another avenue strengthen the security the United States. working address this and other challenges faced CBP, the Committee gravely concerned continued leadership vacancies that agency 
125 (U) This copy was made available for the Committee review, but not retain, the House Representatives' Committee the Judiciary. 

and across DHS, which will slow 

the Department's continued evolution into more 
effective entity. 
(U) Recommendation -Jmproiring TECS Alert Notijicatio11s and Records 
(U) Since former Secretary Homeland Security Janet Napolitano's report that the system "pinged" when Tamerlan Tsamaev left the United States for Russia. attention has turned the TECS alert placed his name part the 2011 assessment carried out the Boston 
126
JTTF. Yet beyond record the TECS alert notifying the CBP Officer who initially placed this alert that Tamerlan Tsamaev was leaving, not clear that this information was shared with others the Boston JTTF. The Committee recommends ensuring that the FBI Case Agents each assessment where TECS alert placed individual also receives these notifications, and that each time TECS alert shared there written record detail when, how, and with whom this alert communicated. The Committee understands possible (and even likely) that this alert, and the alert that was sent upon Tamerlan Tsamaev's return were shared verbally with others the Boston JTTF, yet the absence reliable record that demonstrates this makes difficult kw:>w with certainty who was aware that Tamerlan was travelling. 
(U) CBP has informed the Committee that they have worked address this recommendation. May 2013, guidance was issued the field that all CBP officers assigned JTTFs notify the FBI Case Agent upon any international travel for subjects interest not listed the TSDB, via government email systems. addition other forms communication, the email correspondence will provide record these notifications for future reference. The Committee also recommends finding ways automate this process and reduce the possibility for human error ensuring these records are shared. 
(U) No111i11ation for TIDEITSDB and the Second TECS Alert 

126 (U) "System Pinged" When Boston Bombing Suspect Went Russia. Napolitano Says," CNS News, April 23. /37 birth were inaccurate, and result there was match through TIDE [Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment].. 130 TECS records provided the Committee, alert entered October 20, 2011 spells Tamerlan TsamaE!V's surname "Tsamayev," and lists his birthday 1987 instead 1986. Just the FBI's TECS alert was unambiguous its requests, this second TECS alert specifically requested that officials encountering Tamerlan Tsamaev ''Escort [him] CBP secondary and detain mandatory whether not the officer believes there exact match." disturbing that such detaifod lookout could missed, either because the TECS 

expanding the 2011 assessment into preliminary investigation, which investigators concluded they did not have sufficient evidence do. 133 

Government] possesses related the identities individuals known appropriately suspected have been involved activities constituting, preparation for, aid of, related terrorism (with the exception purely domestic terrorism information)."134 Agencies nominate individuals for TIDE through the NCTC, and turn these records can added additional Federal terrorist "watchlists," they meet the necessary threshold. The NCTC can then provide unclassified version these records 

Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which maintains the TSDB. 135 
128 (U) The TECS alert placed the CIA was established October 20. 2011. 129 (U) DHS Briefings Committee Staff. March 2014. 
130 (U) DRS Briefings Committee Staff, March 2014. 
131 (U) regard the failure automated systems identify these records referring the same person. CBP reports that May 2013. they fully deployed Russian-IBM regularization its Global Name Recognition (GNR) application." 
132 (U) DHS Briefings Committee Staff. March 2014. 133 (U) FBI briefing for Committee Staft February 2014. (U) 'Terrorist Screening Center: Frequently Asked Questions." the Federal Bureau Jmestigarion. 

1136 noted, Tamerlan Tsamaev's name and birth were maccurate, the NCTC informed the FBI that Tamerlan Tsamaev had been nominated for TIDE via the FBI's Foreign Terrorism Tracking Force. However, they did not ask the FBI, nor did the FBI volw1teer, add all the info1mation their records Tamerlan the TIDEffSDB record Tamerlan Tsarnaev, correct the spelling his name his date birth. 
(U/Because the two TECS alerts his name were not identical, and 

because the TSDB record for him was incomplete and inaccurate Tamerlan Tsamaev did not 
 
examination returned the United States from Russia. 137 mterest ist matena poss1 ave Olm some his
 
possession that would have revealed the threat posed. This lack communication represents failure proactively share information that could potentially save lives. Indeed 

any further scrutiny upon Tamerlan Tsarnaev's return from Russia might have prevented the bombing revealed evidence his radicalization ties terrorism. 
(U) Reco111111e11datio11 -Reviewing TSDB Nomi11atio11s 
(U) more accurate and comple1te TSDB record for Tamerlan Tsamaev might have subjected him greater scrutiny upon his return the United States. The Committee recommends that all relevant agencies c:omply with NCTC's requirements that sponsoring agencies include all identifying information their nominations. 
(U/ Similarly,
the Committee recommends changes the TSDB nomination process that would require 1hird-party agency with information individual being nominated proactively share corre'Ctions additional information. this case, the FBI was made aware Tamerlan Tsarnaev's TIDE record, and had more accurate information correct name and date birth) they did not share with the NCTC. Additionally, August 
2013, both the NCTC and CBP signed Letter Intent improve data si!it!!
 and record 

enhancement related the watchlist. Parti1cularly, 
according CBP officials 
 CBP, TSC, and NCTC are now able automatic transmit qmc SDB records."138 
(U) Addressing Long-Term Challeuges 
136 (U) DHS Briefings Committee Staff. March 2014 
(U) should noted that Tamerlan Tsamaev's record was inaccurate that the initial information was inaccurate. not because NCTC entered incomplete false record. 
138(U) DHS. NCTC. and FBI Briefing Committee Staff December 16. 2013. 

(U) The Boston Marathon bombing took place Monday April 15, 2013. Sometime around just shortly after midnight Friday, April 19, 2013, investigators began suspect that two individuals involved Cambridge, Massachusetts carjacking might responsible for the bombing that took place some hours prior. The victim, whom the Tsarnaev brothers had held hostage for period time, allegedly reported police upon his escape that Tamerlan and Dzhokhar claimed responsibility for the !bombings. 139 Still, the account Watertown Police Officers who first encountered Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev makes clear they did not suspect the two brothers had committed the attack until the Tsarnaevs exchanged gunfire with 
140
law enforcement and detonated improvised explosives the street. 
(U) 
Nonetheless, was not until Tamerlan Tsarnaev's fingerprints were scanned that the identity the attackers became known authorities. had been roughly three and half days from the blasts near the finish line the Boston Marathon, and almost nine hours since pictures the suspects were made public FBI SAC Deslauriers. that time, not one associate Tamerlan Dzhokhar Tsarnaev identified them the authorities. Members Tamerlan's mosque, the ISB, did not identify him the man they had thrown out months before for arguing with preacher. Classmates and friends Dzhokhar did not alert police that they recognized his face TV. These inactions may have cost MIT Campus Police Officer Sean Collier his life. 

(U) difficult know exactly how many closed assessments investigations from recent years the Boston JTTF had April 15, 2013. Whatever the figure, difficult credibly speculate that, the wake the bombing, each these files could have been reexamined look for potential new leads. Personnel from multiple agencies were pulled several directions; whether was exploiting evidence from the scene, reviewing witness accounts, combing through the thousands images and hours video from the Boston Marathon identify suspects. 

(U) 
The Committee believes this massive effort testament unequivocal need for positive, effective relationship between Fe:deral agencies and between Federal, State, and local authorities working investigate and mitigate terrorist threats. Some the areas which are most necessary working toward that goal are the perceptions attitudes among officials and investigators. some ways, this tied the top-down guidance provided individuals from each agency involved JTTF. the Committee's investigation, much discussion has focused around existing perceptions policy roles and responsibilities. absolutely necessary for the leaders our nation's counterterrorism efforts not allow misperceptions limit their agencies' effectiveness -and working communicate guidance their personnel paramount. The post-bombing guidance issued FBI officials intended clarify JTTF and other roles and responsibilities example the type instruction and management that must continually evaluated, improved, and communicated all counterterrorism partners. 

139 (U) Katharine Seelya, William Rashbaum, and Michael Cooper, "2"d Bombing Suspect Caught After Frenzied Hunt Paralyzes Boston," the Nei11 York Times, April 20, 2013. (Available at: 
140 (U) Vincent DeWitt. supra note 69. 

(U) Recommendation -Encouraging Cooperation and Assistance from the Comm1mity 
(U) When investigators were unable locate the identities the suspects that video evidence suggested had carried out the Boston Marathon bombing, they turned the public for help. This public appeal for information regarding the suspects, who would later tum out Tamerlan and Ozhokhar Tsarnaev, was not without risk, yet presented the hope that someone who recognized the individuals the photos would alert the authorities. Unfortunately, one stepped forward. This failure take responsibility ultimately cost lives, and the Committee recommends efforts strengthen and expand OHS' "ff You See Something, Say Something," program. Shortly before the attack Boston, the OHS Center Excellence the University Maryland (known the National Consortium for the Study Terrorism and Responses Terrorism ART), released report that demonstrated that 56% the country had never heard the "If you See Something, Say Something" campaign. Ensuring that Americans are alerting their local pol ice Federal authorities suspicious behavior other potential indicators important step preventing terrorist attacks. Certainly, such public education programs will require continued evaluation ensure they are effective. However, members local community are the individuals best placed identify potential terrorist threats. Toward that end, nationwide efforts combat radicalization, such OHS' Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy, should receive similarly increased scrutiny evaluate efficacy. 
(U) Recommendation Ending the "Case Closed" Mentality
(U) testimony before Congress, then-FBI Director Robert Mueller noted that though there were problems with communications breakdowns between Federal investigators, felt that, "even [procedures] had been fixed prior the Boston bombing, not think would have stopped it." 141 Other unnamed FBI officials were more direct noting that even the FBI had known about Tamerlan Tsarnaev's travel, would not have changed the outcome. One official quoted noting, "the FBI investigation into the individual question had been closed six months prior his departure ... since there was derogatory information, there was reason suggest that additional action was: warranted." 142 early August 2013, was reported that the FBI had concluded internal investigation into the incident and determined they could not have prevented the attack. 143 The Committee has been informed that while the FBI and other 
141 (U) Noah Bierman, "FBI Director Admits Lapse Before Marathon Bombing," The Boston Globe, June 14, 
2013. (Available at: 
142 (U) Greg Miller, "Anti-Terror Task Force Was Warned Tamerlan Tsamaev's Long Trip Russia," The 

143 (U) Michael Schmitt, "FBI Said Find Could Not Have Averted Boston Attack," The New York Times, /37 

agencies have conducted multiple reviews related this case, none has resulted formal report memorializing the relevant findings. Though joint effort the Inspectors General Gs) the Intelligence Community, Department Justice, Department Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency look into this matter was announced April 30, 2013, this effort ongoing. 
(U) The Committee therefore concerned that officials are asserting that this attack could not have been prevented, without compelling evidence confirm that the case. This perhaps the most difficult problem address, but extremely important and addressing requires delicate balance. Ensuring that our investigators and counterterrorism professionals are confident, yet appropriately critical, once again returns themes identified previous works, and particular the 9/11 Commission Report. Again, the Committee repeats the warnings the Commission and urges the men and women our intelligence and law enforcement communities and their leadership approach potential gaps with critical eye and forthright with ways address the challenges they face. /37



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