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Cerletti 1 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER 556164

Cerletti 1 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER 556164

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Date Created:August 29, 2017

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ROBERT PATRICK STICHT (SBN 138586)
Law Offices Robert Patrick Sticht
P.O. Box 49457
Los Angeles, 90049
Telephone:
(310) 889-1950
Facsimile:
(310) 889-1864
Email:
LORPS@verizon.net
ELECTRONICALLY
FILED
Superior Court California,
County San Francisco
08/28/2017
Clerk the Court
BY: MADONNA CARANTO
Sterling Norris (SBN 040993)
Deputy Clerk
JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.
2540 Huntington Drive, Suite 201
San Marino, 91108
Telephone:
(626) 287-4540
Facsimile:
(626) 237-2003
Email:
jw-West@judicialwatch.org
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SUPERIOR COURT THE STATE CALIFORNIA
COUNTY SAN FRANCISCO
CYNTHIA CERLETTI,
Case No.: CGC-16-556164
Plaintiff,
VICKI HENNESSY, her Official Capacity Sheriff the City and County San
Francisco.
Defendant.
PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS
DEMURRER SECOND AND THIRD
CAUSES ACTION FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Reservation No.: 07280911-04
Hearing Date:
Judge:
Time:
Place:
September 11, 201
Hon. Harold Kahn
9:30 a.m.
Dept. 302
Complaint Filed: December 27, 2016
Trial Date:
None Set
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
TABLE CONTENTS
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................
THE COURT SHOULD ASSUME SHERIFF HENNESSYS
DIRECTIVE KEEPS PLACE HER PREDECESSORS
PROHIBITION COMMUNICATING IMMIGRATION
STATUS INFORMATION ICE .......................................................................
II.
THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT .................................................................
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................
THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT SUFFICIENT
UNDER CCP 526A .............................................................................................
FEDERAL PREEMPTION ....................................................................................
Standard Review .....................................................................................
The Demurrer The Second Cause Action Based
Express Preemption Should Denied ......................................................
Sections 1373 and 1644 ...................................................................
Steinle Order .....................................................................................
The Demurrer The Third Cause Action Based
Implied Preemption Should Denied ......................................................
The Sheriffs Restrictions Are Obstacle The
Accomplishment Clear Congressional Purpose ...................
The Sheriffs Restrictions Are Impermissible Local
Classification Aliens and Regulation oflmmigration .............
III.
THE TENTH AMENDMENT NOT BAR DENYING THE
DEMURRER ........................................................................................................
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
TABLE AUTHORITIES
Cases
Arizona United States,
567 U.S. 387, 132 Ct. 2492 (2012) .............................................................................................
Ariz. Dream Act Coalition Brewer,
855 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................................................
BFP Resolution Trust Corp.,
511 U.S. 531 (1994) .........................................................................................................................
Blair Pitchess, Cal. 258, 268 (1971) ................................................................................................................
Blank Kirwan, Cal. 311,318 (1985) ..............................................................................................................
Bologna City and County San Francisco,
192 Cal. App. 4th 429 (2011) ..........................................................................................................
City ofNew York United States,
179 F.3d (2d Cir. 1999) ...............................................................................................................
Crandon United States,
494 U.S. 152 (1990) ......................................................................................................................... Canas Bica,
424 U.S. 351 (1976) .........................................................................................................................
Demore Kim,
538 U.S. 510 (2003) .........................................................................................................................
Diop ICE/Homeland Security,
656 221 (3rd Cir. 2011) ..........................................................................................................
Dowhal SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, Cal. 4th 910 (2004) .....................................................................................................................
Garcetti Superior Court, Cal. App. 4th 1533 (1996) ..........................................................................................................
Harisiades Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580 (1962) .........................................................................................................................
Herzberg. County Plumas,
133 Cal. App. 4th (2005) ..............................................................................................................
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
Hines Davidowitz,
312 U.S. (1941) ...........................................................................................................................
Hispanic Interest Coalition Governor ofAla.,
691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................................ Farm Raised Salmon Cases, Cal. 4th 1077 (2008) ...................................................................................................................
LiMandri Judkins, Cal. App. 4th 326 (1997) ............................................................................................................
Lockheed Martin Corp. Continental Ins. Co.,
134 Cal. App. 4th 187 (2005) ..........................................................................................................
Marshall Gibson, Dunn Crutcher, Cal. App. 4th 1397 (1995) ..........................................................................................................
New York United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992) .........................................................................................................................
Pacific Legal Foundation Brown, Cal. 168 (1981) ......................................................................................................................
People Pieters, Cal. 894 (1991) ......................................................................................................................
Plyler Doe,
475 U.S. 202 (1982) .........................................................................................................................
Printz United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997) ........................................................................................................................
Quelimane Co. Stewart Title Guarantee Co., Cal. 4th (1998) .......................................................................................................................
Robinson Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337 (1997) .........................................................................................................................
Shaughnessy United States rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953) .........................................................................................................................
Steinle City and County San Francisco,
230 Supp.3d 994 (N.D. Cal. 2017) ..............................................................................................
Sturgeon Bratton,
174 Cal. App. 4th 1407 (2009) ........................................................................................................
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
iii
Taschner City Council, Cal. App. (1973) ................................................................................................................
Tobe City o,fSanta Ana, Cal. 4th 1069 (1995) .....................................................................................................................
Toll Moreno,
458 U.S. (1982) .............................................................................................................................
United States Atlantic Research Corp.,
551 U.S. 127 (2007) .........................................................................................................................
Viva! Intern. Voice for Animals Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., Cal. 4th 929 (2007) .....................................................................................................................
Wood Wilberts Sons Shingle Lumber Co.,
226 U.S. 384 (1912) .........................................................................................................................
Statutes U.S.C. 1226(c) .......................................................................................................................... U.S.C. 1226(c)(l) ....................................................................................................................... U.S.C. 1226(c)(2) ....................................................................................................................... U.S.C. 1226 ................................................................................................................................ U.S.C. 1227 ................................................................................................................................ U.S.C. 1373 ............................................................................................................................... U.S.C. 1644 ................................................................................................................................
Other Authorities Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading 831, 289 .....................................................
Blacks Law Dictionary 253 (5th ed. 1979) ....................................................................................
Exec. Order 13768, Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017) ..................................................
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act 1997, Pub. 104-208, 133,642 (1996) ...............
Opinion, Ops. Cal. Atty Gen. 270 (1992), 1992 Cal. LEXIS ........................................
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
BACKGROUND
THE COURT SHOULD ASSUME SHERIFF HENNESSYS DIRECTIVE KEEPS PLACE HER PREDECESSORS PROHIBITION COMMUNICATING
IMMIGRATION STATUS INFORMATION ICE.
Sheriff Hennessy contends that her April 11, 2016 directive does not contain any express
restriction sharing citizenship immigration status information with ICE. See Mem. PA Support Sheriff Hennessys Demurrer Second and Third Causes Action First
Amended Complaint (Defs MPA) demurrer, however, the court assumes all facts
alleged the complaint are true, along with all facts that may implied inferred from those
expressly stated. See Blank Kirwan, Cal. 311, 318 1985). The FAC alleges Sheriff
Hennessys directive keeps place her predecessors prohibition communicating citizenship immigration status information ICE. See Sheriff Hennessys Request for Judicial Notice
(Defs RFJN), Ex. (FAC) (FAC) 25. Indeed, Sheriff Hennessy concedes [t]he 2016
Directive does not mention citizenship immigration status. Defs MPA Thus, the Court
must assume true that Sheriff Hennessys directive keeps place her predecessors prohibition communicating citizenship immigration status information ICE.
II.
THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT.
Cerlettis original complaint sought enjoin Sheriff Hennessy from expending taxpayer
funds policies and/or practices that prohibit restrict SFSD personnel from sharing
immigration-related information with federal immigration officials. Compl. Sheriff
Hennessy demurred, stating five times her brief that Cerletti had not specified which policies
practices were preempted federal immigration law. See Mem. PA Support Sheriff
Hennessys Demurrer 2/17/17 Judge Richard Ulmer agreed, sustaining the demurrer
with leave amend:
Sheriff Hennessy alleges does not limit staff from providing infom1ation required
authorized state law ... and federal law. Defs MPA However, she does not assert
federal law refers Sections 1373 and 1644. Neither statute requires authorizes any
information provided ICE; they only prohibit obstacles sharing information. See also
Opinion, Ops. Cal. Atty Gen. 270 (1992), 1992 Cal. LEXIS *14, n.9 (holding that
despite similar language ordinance, [i]t the ordinances creation obstacle the
objectives Congress that impermissible ... direct conflict with federal state statute
regulation presents separate and distinct basis for the preemption local ordinance.).
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER defendant points out, plaintiff fails plead which policies and/or practices
are supposedly preempted U.S.C. 1373, 1644 stand obstacles
congressional purposes and objectives. (Cmplt. para. 43, 48.) Specificity
critical facial challenge such this, plaintiff must establish that the
particular policies and/or practices inevitably pose present total and fatal
conflict with section 1373.
Def RFJN, Ex. (internal citations omitted).
Cerletti thereafter filed first amended complaint. The FAC eliminates all generic
references the policies and/or practices that caused Judge Ulmer sustain the earlier
demurrer. her FAC, Cerletti now focuses exclusively SheriffHennessys restrictions
communications with federal immigration officials about the citizenship, immigration status, and
release criminal aliens SFSDs custody. FAC ,i,i 33, 38, 43. The FAC still claims that
Sheriff Hennessys restrictions are expressly impliedly preempted federal law. Id. Cerlettis
first and second causes action allege that restrictions information sharing are expressly
preempted two federal statutes, U.S.C. 1373 and 1644. Cerlettis third cause action
alleges that restrictions sharing release information information about the date, time, and
place certain priority criminal aliens will released from SFSD custody
preempted third federal statute, U.S.C. 1226(c), and the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA) generally. Id.
are impliedly
Sheriff Hennessy demurs the second and third causes action. Her demurrer does not
challenge whether the states valid claim for declaratory and injunctive relief; argues the
merits Cerletti preemption claims and contends that Sheriff Hennessy information-sharing
restrictions are neither expressly nor impliedly preempted matter law. Defs MPA 3-4.
ARGUMENT
THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT SUFFICIENT UNDER CCP 526A.
While Sheriff Hennessy expends lot energy making substantive arguments, the sole
issue demurrer whether the facts pleaded, true, state valid cause action. See Garcetti Superior Court, Cal. App. 4th 1533, 1547 (1996); LiMandri Judkins, Cal. App. 4th
326, 339 (1997). Whether plaintiff can prove the allegations complaint does not concern
the reviewing court. See Quelimane Co. Stewart Title Guarantee Co. Cal. 4th 26, (1998).
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER state claim under Code Civil Procedure (CCP) 526a, plaintiff must allege she has paid taxes city, county, town within the one-year period before the filing the
action and that the defendant officer agent the city, county, town and expended
public funds illegally. Id.; see also Herzberg. County ofPlumas, 133 Cal. App. 4th 23-24
(2005). The mere expending paid, public officials time performing unlawful
unauthorized acts illegal expenditure taxpayer funds that may enjoined under CCP
526a, and immaterial that the amount the expenditure small that the illegal
expenditure will permit savings tax funds. See Blair Pitchess, Cal. 258, 268 (1971
Cerletti has alleged all facts necessary state claim under CCP 526a. AC,,
and 22-31. She alleges she paid property and other taxes the City and County San Francisco
(CCSF) within the one year period before filing this action, and that Sheriff Hennessy
CCSF official and expending CCSF taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources illegally.
Id. Because Sheriff Hennessys demurrer challenges Cerlettis second and third causes action
only, the case will continue regardless the demurrers outcome. Regarding the second and
third causes action, the demurrer does not argue that facts alleged Cerletti fail state
claim for violation CCP 526a. Rather, challenges whether SheriffHennessys expenditures taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources are illegal, which merits question.
Strictly speaking, demurrer procedurally inappropriate method for disposing
complaint for declaratory relief. Lockheed Martin Corp. Continental Ins. Co., 134 Cal. App.
4th 187,221 (2005); Taschner City Council, Cal. App. 48, (1973). has been noted: brief, the object declaratory relief not necessarily beneficial judgment;
rather, determination, favorable unfavorable, that enables the plaintiff
act with safety. This theory has prevailed, and the rule now established that the
defendant cannot, demurrer, attack the merits the plaintiffs claim. The
complaint sufficient shows actual controversy; need not show that
plaintiff the right.
Id. quoting Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading 831, 289. Because Sheriff
Hennessys demurrer does not dispute whether counts two and three the FAC properly state
claims under CCP 526a, but only disputes the illegality the challenged expenditures
merits [the] controversy
the not proper demurrer and must denied.
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
II.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Sheriff Hennessy contends the Court must presume any restrictions she imposes SFSD
Standard Review
personnel sharing release information with ICE are not preempted. Defs MPA Her
contention erroneous because immigration not area States have traditionally regulated
field States have historically occupied. See Toll Moreno, 458 U.S. (1982) (authority
regulate immigration and matters concerning aliens seeking enter the U.S. vested the
Federal Government); Canas Bica, 424 U.S. 351,354 (1976). Control immigration
fundamental sovereign attribute. Shaughnessy United States rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,210
(1953). Immigration policy vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies regard the conduct foreign relations [and] the war power, and exclusively entrusted the political branches the National Government largely immune from judicial
inquiry interference. Harisiades Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1962).
The cases cited Sheriff Hennessy are not immigration cases. Defs MPA
Farm Raised Salmon Cases, Cal. 4th 1077 (2008) involved the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), U.S.C. 301 seq. and, particular, whether the FDCA
preempted plaintiffs class action alleging grocery stores sold artificially colored farmed salmon
without disclosing consumers the use color additives violation the Sherman Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Law, Health Saf. Code, 109875 seq. Viva! Intern. Voice.for
Animals Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., Cal. 929 (2007), plaintiff nonprofit
organization sued defendant retailer for engaging unlawful business practice importing
and selling athletic shoes made from kangaroo leather, and the issue was whether California Penal
Code 6300, which declares unlawful the importation for commercial purposes, sale,
possession with intent sell dead body parts specified endangered species, was preempted
the federal Endangered Species Act, U.S.C. 1531 seq. The courts both cases applied presumption against preemption because the state law each case was within the states
historic police powers. See Farm Raised Salmon Cases, Cal. 4th 1088 (consumer
protection law); Viva! Intern. Voice for Animals, Cal. 4th 938 (out-of-state wildlife law).
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
But law that regulates area traditional state concern can still effect impermissible
regulation immigration. Ariz. Dream Act Coalition Brewer, 855 F.3d 957,972 (9th Cir.
2017) (discussing five examples including two U.S. Supreme Court cases). addition, Sheriff Hennessy cites Tobe City Santa Ana, Cal. 4th 1069 (1995) for
the proposition that legislative enactments must upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly,
positively, and unmistakably appears. Defs MPA However, Tobe was not preemption
case, but rather involved facial challenge homeless persons the constitutionality local
ordinance banning camping designated public places and the proper application the
vagueness doctrine. Tobe, Cal. 4th 1107. Sheriff Hennessy cites Sturgeon Bratton, 174 Cal.
App. 4th 1407 (2009) for the proposition that local law enforcement policy entitled the
same deference accorded facially-challenged statute. Defs MPA Such deference,
however, appears only the courts discussion facial challenge the constitutionality
Los Angeles Police Department Special Order 40, not its treatment Sturgeons preemption
claim. Id. 1419-1420. Moreover, Sturgeon did not involve restrictions voluntarily sharing
inmate release information other communications with ICE, the court stated: S040 does
not address communication with ICE; addresses only the initiation police action and arrests
for illegal entry. Id. 1421. Regarding such restrictions, Sturgeon declared, [i]t cannot
seriously disputed that Congresss objective enacting section 1373 was eliminate any
restrictions the voluntary/low immigration information between state and local officials and
ICE; indeed, the express language section 1373 does just that. Id. 1423 (emphasis added).
The supremacy clause grants Congress the power preempt state law. See Arizona
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012); Dowhal SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, Cal. 4th 910, 269 (2004). There one universal preemption formula rule. See Hines
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, (1941 One recent decision states the rule follows:
Traditionally, federal law preempts state law when: (1) Congress expressly
includes preemption provision federal law; (2) states attempt regulat[e]
conduct field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined
must regulated its exclusive governance; (3) state law conflicts with
federal law, either because compliance with both federal and state regulations
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
physical impossibility state law stands obstacle the accomplishment
and execution the full purposes and objectives Congress.
Ariz. Dream Act Coalition, 855 F.3d 971 (internal citations omitted).
The Demurrer The Second Cause Action Based Express
Preemption Should Denied.
Sections 1373 and 1644.
Sections 1373 and 1644 bar restrictions voluntary communications with ICE. The bar
applies all types immigration-related information, including information concerning release
dates and times aliens custody law enforcement agencies. Both statutes are directed
their title communication between government agencies and ICE, and their content bans
prohibiting, any way restricting, the two-way flow information regarding not only
citizenship but also immigration status, broad term obviously capable embracing any
essential immigration-related communication between local officials and ICE, including
knowledge about not just the presence, but also the whereabouts, and activities removable
aliens. See e.g., Blacks Law Dictionary 253 (5th ed. 1979) (defining communication
[i]nformation given; the sharing ofknowedge one with another); id. 676 (describing
immigration [t]he coming into country foreigners for purposes permanent residence);
id. 1264 (defining status s]tanding; state condition ... [t]he legal relation individual rest the community). The First Appellate District has accorded these statutes the same
meaning. See Bologna City and County San Francisco, 192 Cal. App. 4th 429, 438 (2011)
(section 1373(a) invalidates all restrictions the voluntary exchange immigration
information .... see also Sturgeon, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1423 (Congresss objective
enacting section 1373 was eliminate any restrictions the voluntary flow immigration
information ... the express language section 1373 does just that.); Hispanic Interest Coalition Governor ofAla., 691 F.3d 1236, 1248 (11th Cir. 2012) (Sections 1373 and 1644 ... require
Alabama provide immigration-related information the federal government ... and prohibit
Alabama from restricting this transfer information.). Indeed, SFSD officials knowledge removable alien inmates release date and time classic example information about
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
individuals presence, whereabouts, and activities that Congress intended shared with ICE.
Sheriff Hennessy interpretation these statutes
and its only interpretation that
Congress sought prevent local restrictions local officials communications with ICE, but
only insofar those communications concerned individuals citizenship immigration
status. Defs MPA (emphasis deleted). She isolates these terms from the statute and
structure the federal scheme and assigns them her own restricted meaning: Information
about individuals citizenship immigration status means just that: information about the
country countries which that individual citizen (including whether that individual
citizen the United States), and about whether, and how, that individual lawfully present
within the United States. Id. From there, Sheriff Hennessy argues that communication
ICE about the date and time which the specified individual expected released [from
custody] addresses subject which Sections 1373 and 1644 are silent. Id. She then assigns
the communication even narrower meaning
and argues that such specifics are not communication about anyones citizenship immigration
status. Id. that logic, she concludes sections 1373 and 1644 not preempt her restrictions.2
for example, next Tuesday, July 15, p.m.
SheriffHennessys interpretation does not withstand scrutiny. First, her fonnulation
the tenn immigration status relies aliens presence the United States. How ICE
determine whether aliens are present the United States she sets them free without first giving
notice their release ICE? They could anywhere! Second, the fact that Sheriff Hennessy
lends restrictive meaning the term immigration status highlights its ambiguity. Third, does
not aid the inquiry suggest Congress could have added release dates and times the text.
Congress also could have used Sheriff Hennessy formulation limit the types information
intended regulate. See Robinson Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 341 (1997) (That the statute
Sheriff Hennessy contends that [i]n facial challenges such this, Cerletti bears the
burden showing that defendants alleged policies and practices pose present total and fatal
conflict with section[s] 1373 [or 1644]; mere hypothetical conflict insufficient. Defs MPA n.4 (quoting Sturgeon, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1420). Cerletti has not brought facial
challenge; her claims are based federal preemption. See and compare e.g., Dowhall, Cal.
4th 923-24 (preemption) with Pacific Legal Foundation Brown, Cal. 168, 180-81
(1981) (facial). Also, the FAC eliminates all references policies and practices.
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
could have expressly included the phrase former employees does not aid our inquiry. Congress
also could have used the phrase current employees.).
Sheriff Hennessys formulation also ignores the larger context Sections 1373 and 1644.
[W]e not construe statutes isolation, but rather read every statute with reference the
entire scheme law which part that the whole may harmonized and retain
effectiveness. People Pieters, Cal. 894, 899 (1991) citing Clean Air Constituency
State Air Resources Bd., Cal. 801,814 (1974). The plainness ambiguity statutory
language determined reference the language itself, the specific context which that
language used, and the broader context the statute whole. Robinson, 519 U.S. 341.
The object and policy Sections 1373 and 1644 are clear and undisputed: Congress has
long sought encourage full and open communication between state and local agencies and
federal immigration officials, and remove obstacles such communication. FAC 10. The
legislative history these provisions and subsequent case law confirm this clear congressional
purpose and objective. Id. (citing Arizona, 567 U.S. 411) (Consultation between federal
and state officials important feature the immigration system.). Indeed, the entire scheme the INA demonstrates clear intent promote information sharing and consultation between
state and local law enforcement agencies and federal immigration officials. Id. (citing Arizona,
567 U.S. 412) (quoting U.S.C. 1357g(10)(A)).
Significantly, sections 1373 and 1357(g)(10) were enacted the same time, see Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act 1997, Pub. 104-208, 133, 642 (1996), and the two
provisions should read consistently. See Wood Wilberts Sons Shingle Lumber Co.,
226 U.S. 384,389 (1912) (separate parts the same enactment are read not conflict and
construed such that each should have its proper application distinct from and harmonious with
that the other.). When these statutes are read together, Section 1373 ensures that external
restriction the communications between government entities will prevent state and local
officers from cooperatively assisting federal officials under Section 1357(g)(l 0). See also
Arizona, 567 U.S. 410 (cooperation under federal law includes allow[ing] federal immigration
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
officials gain access detainees held state facilities and responding requests for
information about when alien will releasedfrom their custody.) (emphasis added).
Steinle Order
Sheriff Hennessy relies Steinle City and County San Francisco, 230 Supp.3d
994 (N.D. Cal. 2017), federal district court order motion dismiss Kate Steinles familys
wrongful death lawsuit, for the proposition that Sections 1373 and 1644 not apply ICEs
requests for release information. Def This court not bound the Steinle courts
narrow reading Section that context, and Steinle distinguishable any event. The
plaintiffs did not argue the term immigration status includes release date and time infom1ation.
The court also noted there was federal preemption claim: Although [the Steinles] note the
California Attorney Generals position passing, neither the complaint nor their opposition brief
argues that the March [Mirkarimi] memorandum any portion Chapter 12H violates the
Supremacy Clause the United States Constitution. Steinle, 230 Supp.3d 1007, n.6.
The Steinle court also deviated from sound principles statutory construction avoid
having consider Section legislative history, which does not support the courts position. result, viewed the provision isolation and did not consider the broader context either
the statute whole the statutory scheme which part. The First Appellate District
examined Section 1373 and held that section 1373(a) invalidates all restrictions the voluntary
exchange immigration information. See Bologna, 192 Cal. App. 4th 438; see also Sturgeon,
174 Cal. App. 4th 1423 (Congresss objective enacting section 1373 was eliminate any
restrictions the voluntary flow immigration information ....
The Demurrer The Third Cause Action Based Implied Preemption
Should Denied. 1992 opinion, the California Attorney General held that the supremacy clause
preempts city from prohibiting its officers and employees from cooperating with federal
immigration investigations gathering disseminating information regarding immigration
status. See Opinion, Ops. Cal. Atty Gen. 270,277 (1992), 1992 Cal. LEXIS *14.
Citing Sturgeon, Sheriff Hennessy suggests examining whether local law
enforcement agencys directive violates Section 1373 and/or 1644, those statutes are applied
according their plain language. Def MPA 10. But she concedes, Sturgeon emphasized
S040 says nothing about communication with ICE, and thus does not implicate Section 1373. Id.
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
Cerletti third cause action under CCP 526a alleges Sheriff Hennessy expending
taxpayer funds and taxpayer resources illegally restricting, not prohibiting, SFSD personnel
from sharing release information about deportable criminal aliens SFSD custody. FAC 43.
Cerletti contends these restrictions are illegal because they are impliedly preempted federal
law. Id. More specifically, she claims the restrictions are obstacle the accomplishment
clear congressional purpose and constitute impermissible classification aliens and regulation immigration. Id. The former conflict preemption claim, and the latter field
preemption claim. Whether Cerletti can prove her implied preemption claims are beyond the
scope demurrer. See Quelimane Co., Cal. 4th 47; LiMandri, Cal. App. 4th 339;
Garcetti, Cal. App. 4th 1547. Because Cerletti has alleged all the facts necessary state
claim under CCP 526a, Cerlettis third cause action withstands Sheriff Hennessys demurrer.
The Sheriffs Restrictions Are Obstacle The Accomplishment Clear Congressional Purpose.
Sheriff Hennessy misconstrues, least misperceives, Cerletti implied preemption
claim. Unlike Cerletti first and second causes action, Cerletti third cause action not
based sections 1373 1644. based Congress unambiguous intent that certain
deportable criminal aliens held law enforcement agencies (LEAs) such the SFSD taken
into custody federal immigration official upon their release the LEAs. U.S.C. 1226(c).
Covered aliens include those who have committed, inter alia, aggravated felony, certain
controlled substance offenses, certain firearms offenses, two more crimes moral
turpitude. U.S.C. 1226(c)(1 Congress has mandated that these deportable criminal aliens taken into immigration custody when released LEAs without regard whether the alien
released parole, supervised release, probation and without regard whether the alien may arrested imprisoned again for the same offense. Id. Congress was concerned about
these particular criminal aliens being released into the general population that required they
Sheriff Hennessy assertion that Cerletti does not cite any section the INA
other than sections 1373 and 1644 incorrect. Paragraph the FAC cites section 1226(c) para. 14. The also cites two other sources federal laws, federal executive order
and federal regulation, and invokes the INA generally. Id. ,i,i 14-15.
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
held without bond conditional parole under all but few, very limited circumstances
determined the Attorney General. See generally U.S.C. 1226(c)(2); see also Demore
Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). even precluded judicial review covered aliens non-constitutional
challenges their detention. U.S.C. I226(e); Demore, 538 U.S. 516-17.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality section 1226(c) Demore. The
Court found Congress was justifiably concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not
detained continue engage crime and fail appear for their removal hearings large
numbers. Demore, 538 U.S. 513. According the Court, Congress adopted this provision
against backdrop wholesale failure the INS deal with the increasing rates criminal
activity aliens. Demore, 538 U.S. 518. According another court, Section 1226(c) was
intended remedy this perceived problem ensuring that aliens convicted certain crimes
would present their removal proceedings and not the loose their communities, where
they might pose danger. Diop ICE/Homeland Security, 656 F.3d 221, 231-32 (3rd Cir.
2011) (citing Demore, 538 U.S. 519 and 531 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Not only has the
constitutionality the statue been affirmed the nations highest court, but Congress purpose
and intent enacting the provision unmistakably clear. Demore, 538 U.S. 531.
Sheriff Hennessys refusal share basic information about the release deportable
criminal aliens her custody
the date, time, and place their scheduled release
plainly
frustrates Congress clear purpose enacting section 1226(c). refusing share release
information, Sheriff Hennessy allows deportable criminal aliens her custody aliens Congress
plainly intended detained upon release from the custody LEAs such SFSD
federal immigration officials grasp. Her restrictions enable aliens who have committed
aggravated felonies other crimes deemed sufficiently serious Congress warrant detaining
them and denying them bond conditional parole remain large pending removal. Not only
might such persons pose further danger the community which was one Congress main escape
The Court reiterated that, over the years, had firmly and repeatedly endorsed
the proposition that Congress may make rules aliens that would unacceptable applied citizens. Demore, 538 U.S. 522.
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
concerns
unnecessary risk themselves, the aliens, and others locating and apprehending them.
but federal immigration officials must spend additional time and resources and assume
Cerletti does not assert Sheriff Hennessy must detain deportable criminal alien any
longer than she would absent section 1226(c). The statute requires federal immigration officials,
not LEAs, detain the alien. And course, federal immigration officials must have probable
cause for determining that particular individual deportable criminal alien. The aliens
detention federal immigration authorities also must satisfy all substantive and procedural
requirements federal law. Sharing release information also does not impose any significant
undue burden Sheriff Hennessy. simple phone call email advising that deportable
criminal alien sought federal immigration official will released from County Jail
10:30 a.m. September 12, 2017 would likely suffice. SheriffHennessys restrictions
sharing release information about deportable criminal aliens stand obstacle the
accomplishment the clear goal articulated Congress when enacted section 1226(c).
The Sheriffs Restrictions Are Impermissible Local Classification Aliens and Regulation Immigration.
Sheriff Hennessys restrictions sharing release information also are impliedly
preempted the INA, which occupies the field for purposes classifying aliens and regulating
immigration. The INA creates numerous classifications aliens and gives federal immigration
officials exclusive authority determine whether alien removable. Section 1227 identifies
multiple classes deportable aliens, and section 1226 governs apprehension and detention
aliens pending decisions their removal. See U.S.C. 1226 and 1227. already
demonstrated, section 1226(c) requires certain deportable criminal aliens detained federal
immigration officials upon their release LEAs. Section 1226(a) gives the Attorney General
discretion arrest and detain other aliens pending decisions their removal. also gives the
Attorney General discretion release alien, other than criminal alien classified section
1226(c), bond conditional parole. January 2017 federal executive order also classifies
and prioritizes criminal aliens for removal. See Exec. Order 13768, Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800
(Jan. 25, 2017); FAC 15. Not content with these federal classifications, Sheriff Hennessy has
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
developed her own classifications criminal aliens different from those set forth the INA and
Executive Order 13768. FAC ,-i 27. Sheriff Hennessy classifications are similar, but not
identical, the classifications set forth CCSFs Sanctuary City law. Id. ,-i,-i 18-21 and 27.
The States enjoy power with respect the classification aliens. Plyler Doe, 475
U.S. 202,225 (1982). The power classify aliens for immigration purposes committed the
political branches the Federal Government. Id. Federal authority regulate liens derives not
from one specific federal law network laws, but from various sources, including the Federal
Governments power establish uniform rules naturalization, its power regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and its broad authority over foreign affairs. See Ariz. Dream Act Coalition,
855 F.3d 972 (citing Toll Moreno, 458 U.S. (1982)). Supreme Court precedent
explains that neither clear encroachment exclusive federal power admit aliens nor clear
conflict with specific congressional purpose required order for federal law preempt
state regulations immigrants. Id. (quoting Toll, 548 U.S. n.16)). sure, not all
state regulations touching immigration are preempted. Id. Permissible state regulations
include those that mirror federal objectives and incorporate federal immigration classifications.
Plyler, 475 U.S. 225-26. But even state law that regulates area traditional state
concern can still effect impermissible regulation immigration. Ariz. Dream Act Coalition,
855 F.3d 973.
The court Arizona Dream Act Coalition found the INA occupied the field
immigration classifications and impliedly preempted the State Arizonas independent
classification who authorized under federal law the United States. See Ariz. Dream
Act Coalition, 855 F.3d 964, 975. issue was attempt Arizona deny drivers licenses Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) recipients. Under the program, created
federal executive order, aliens brought the United States children are permitted remain for period time long they meet certain conditions. Id. Arizona rejected DACA recipients
applications for drivers licenses
proof authorized, lawful presence. Id. The court found Arizona had impermissibly created its
own immigration classifications and was regulating immigration. Id. 973. held that the area traditional state concern
concluding that they lack
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
States refusal recognize DACA recipients status necessarily embodies the States
independent judgment that recipients DACA are not authorized present the United
States. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). [B]y arranging federal classifications
the way prefers, Arizona impermissibly assumes the federal prerogative creating immigration
classifications according its own design ... despite the fact that States enjoy power with
respect the classification aliens. Id. (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. 225).
Sheriff Hennessy has done the same thing here. She classifying criminal aliens
according her own design, not the federal governments design. She has rejected the INAs
classifications deportable criminal aliens transferred the custody federal
immigration officials under section 1226(c) and replaced the INAs classifications with her own.
She also has rejected the classifications potentially removable criminal aliens set forth
sections 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1227 and Executive Order 13768 and supplanting them with her
own. And refusing provide release information, she allowing criminal aliens avoid
apprehension and detention federal immigration officials, effect setting her own priorities
for which criminal aliens should removed from the United States. Her classifications and
refusal provide release information about criminal aliens necessarily embodies the same type impermissible, independent judgment immigration the Court rejected Ariz. Dream Act
Coalition. short, Sheriff Hennessy encroaching the exclusive federal authority create
immigration classifications and impennissibly regulating immigration just like Arizona did the
DACA case. Ariz. Dream Act Coalition, 855 F.3d 971 (concluding that Arizonas policy
encroaches the exclusive federal authority create immigration classifications and
displaced the INA.). The INA has already occupied the field, however, and Sheriff
Hennessys restrictions providing release information impliedly preempted.
Finally, Sheriff Hennessys surplusage argument lacks merit. The implied preemption
arguments underlying Cerlettis third cause action are not dependent sections 1373 and
1644. Just because Congress expressly preempted restrictions communications about
citizenship and immigration status, including release information, sections 1373 and 1644 does
not mean refusing provide release information not obstacle accomplishing the clear
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER
congressional purpose behind section 1226(c). also does not mean Sheriff Hennessys
restrictions sharing release information are not impermissible local classifications
regulations immigration. Sections 1373 and 1644 are not redundant surplusage any event.
They are clarifying. Statutory language that clarifies another provision not superfluous. United
States Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 127, 138 (2007). appropriate tolerate
degree surplusage rather than adopt textually dubious construction that threatens render the
entire provision nullity. Id. Sheriff Hennessys surplusage argument has bearing
implied preemption analysis.
III.
THE TENTH AMENDMENT NOT BAR DENYING THE DEMURRER.
SheriffHennessys Tenth Amendment argument red herring. Defs MPA 12-13.
Her refusal share release information will not result unconstitutional commandeering
CCSF resources. Sections and 1644 bar restrictions the voluntary sharing
information; they not mandate sharing. least one court has rejected her Tenth Amendment
argument. See City a/New York United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31-35 (2d Cir. 1999). Also,
neither Printz United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) nor New Yorkv. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) arose the context immigration, unique federal power, and their holdings cannot
superimposed immigration case. Federal power immigration preeminent, not
plenary. The Tenth Amendment states, the powers not delegated the United States the
Constitution, nor prohibited the States, are reserved the States respectively the
people. U.S. Cons., amend. The Constitution delegates immigration power the federal
government. The Tenth Amendment does not bar finding the restrictions here illegal.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, SheriffHennessys demurrer should overruled.
Dated: August 28, 2017
Isl Robert Patrick Sticht.
ROBERT PATRICK STICHT
STERLING NORRIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Cynthia Cerletti
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS DEMURRER