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Judicial Watch • Reply Brief of Appellants – Phillips, et. al v. Board of Trustees Montgomery College

Reply Brief of Appellants – Phillips, et. al v. Board of Trustees Montgomery College

Reply Brief of Appellants – Phillips, et. al v. Board of Trustees Montgomery College

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THE
COURT APPEALS MARYLAND
September Term 2012
DockctN0,
MICHAEL LEE PHILIPS, al.,
Plaintiffs and Appcllants,
vs.
BOARD TRUSTEES
MONTGOMERY COLLEGE,
Defendant and Appcllee, Appeal from the Circuit Court
OfMontg0mcry County, udgc Marielsa /. Bemard
REPLY BRIEF APPELLANTS
Paul Orfancdes (Bar. No. 9112190026)
Judicial Watch, Inc 
425 Third Street, SW. Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20024
Tel: (202) 646-5 I72
Fax: (202) 646-5
p0rfanedes@iudicialwalchnrg
Cumzse/for Plaintiffs Michael Lee Philips, Pzztricia Fenalzj and1)av[rl Drake
TABLE CONTENTS
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... The Board Miseonstrues the Well-Established, Common Law Doctrine
That Allows Taxpayers Challenge the Illegal and Ultra Vires
Acts ofPublic cials..
II. The Board Incorrectly Asserts That There Difference Between
Maryland Common Law Taxpayer Claims and Claims Arising
Under Statute ........................................................................................................ ..4
III. The Board Refuses Analyze the Claim Plaintiffs Have Actually
Asserted and Continues Misapply Federal Law ................................................. I46
IV. The Board Continues Ignore 150 Years ofMary1and Precedent ........................ ..9 The Board Distorts the Only Relevant Case Chose Not Ignore .................... ..1l
VI. Plaintiffs Complaint Amply Alleges the Elements Claim for
Inj unctive Relief. ...................................................................................................
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................
CERTIFICATE COMPLIANCE ...............................................................................
CERTIFICATE SERVICE
 
.18
TABLE CASES
_CLeS P_3 
Alexander Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) .................................................................... ..8
Baltimore Gill, Md. 375 (1869) ........................................................................... ..2,
Boltnolt Mayor ofBaltzmore, 356 Md. 226 (1999) .....................................................
Bey Moorish Temple, 362 Md. 339 (2001) ...14
Davis Passmcm, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) ........................................................................... ..8
Day Sebelius, 376 Supp. 1022 (D. Kan. 2005),
a]jd, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007) .................................................................... ..8
Frothingham Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) ......................................................... ..8
Pace State, 195 Md. App. (2008) ............................................................................. ..5
Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture Stale Rtls. Comm
388 Md. 500 (2005) ............................................................................................... ..2
120 Fayette St., LLLP Mayor ofBaltimore,
2012 Md. LEXIS 255 (April 27, 2012) ........................................................... ..10, 12,
Statutes, Rules, and Regulations U.S.C. 1621 ........................................................................................................ ..6, 7,13 U.S.C. l621(d) ............................................................................................................. ..7
Md. Code Ann., Educ. 16-310 ............................................................................ ..9, 13,
Md, Code Ann., Slate Fin. Proc. SA-326(h) ............................................................
COMAR 13B.07.02.03 ............................................................................................. ..9,
INTRODUCTION
Appellants Michael Lee Philips, Patricia Fenati, and David Drake Plaintiffs)
have brought valid Maryland taxpayer claims that seek enjoin illegal and ultra vires
tuition policy enacted Appellee Board Trustees Montgomery College the
Board that clearly violates both state and federal law. Rather than addressing the
substantial merit Plaintiffs taxpayer claims, the Board raises straw man arguments
about claims that the Board wishes Plaintiffs had made, not the claims Plaintiffs actually
made. None ofthe Board straw-man arguments are well founded. For the reasons set
forth Plaintiffs opening brief and for the reasons set forth below, the decision the
Circuit Court must reversed and this matter must remanded for further proceedings,
ARGUMENT The Board Misconstrues the Well-Established, Common Law Doctrine
That Allows Taxpayers Challenge the Illegal and Ultra Vires Acts
Public Officials.
Struggling avoid the obvious conclusion that the Circuit Court ruling
odds with over 150 years Maryland precedent, the Board creates the false narrative
that Plaintiffs have asserted claims under the Maryland Code and the .S. Code that
require private rights action} sustain this false narrative, the Board repeatedly
The Board also claims factual matter that the challenged policy does not result taxpayer loss. Brief Appellee 12-13, n,7. The Board references the opinion
its paid expert, who made the counterintuitive claim that, not charging full, out-of-
state rates oftuition students who are not eligible for reduced, in-state in~county
rates, Montgomery College actually saves taxpayers money, Id. However, because
reviewing motion dismiss court must assume all well pleaded facts and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom light most favorable the pleader, this Court should
.1.
describes the common law right oftaxpayers challenge the illegal and ultra vires acts public officials taxpayer standing, the Maryland common law taxpayer
doctrine that dates back least early 1869 merely standing issue and not
about the right taxpayers challenge government misconduct that may cause
pecuniary harm. The Board repeatedly uses the words taxpayer standing order
imply that the Maryland common taxpayer doctrine merely expands the class persons
who may assert preexisting state and federal causes action. The Board wrong.
Rather than doctrine that merely expands the pool potential plaintiffs who
may assert preexisting state federal cause action Maryland court, taxpayer
lawsuit, shown extensively Plaintiffs opening brief, different kind claim
altogether. Its purpose allow any taxpayer enjoin illegal ultra vires government
actions that may harm the public sc. The landmark case ofBa1timare Gill, Md.
375 (1869), makes the purpose ofthe doctrine perfectly clear: this State the Courts have always maintained with jealous vigilance the
restraints and limitations imposed law upon the exercise power
municipal and other corporations; and have not hesitated exercise their
rightful jurisdiction for the purpose restraining them within the limits
their lawful authority, and ofproteeting the citizen from the consequence
their unauthorized illegal acts.
Id. 395. The taxpayer doctrine thus clearly envisions vigilant court protecting the
rights ofcitizcns not only those circumstances which legislature has specifically
crafted private right action, but whenever public officials violate the law act
without authority way that causes pecuniary harm taxpayers.
therefore disregard Dcfcndant dubious claims taxpayer gains not issue. Reic/as
Ford Rd. Join! Venture State Rds. Comm rz, 388 Md. 500, 509 (2005).
.2.
Maryland common law therefore allows Maryland taxpayers seek protection
from the courts from the illegal ultra vires acts public officials even when
separate, private right action exists under speci statute. Plaintiffs need not show
that the legislature intended particular cause action because the nature the doctrine provide recourse the courts that not otherwise available when public officials
act unlawfully without authorization. Indeed, the legislature had created private
rights action that enable taxpayers sue enjoin illegal ultra vires acts public
officials, then the doctrine would not necessary. keeping with this broad, protective purpose, the taxpayer doctrine does provide
standing large class litigants. All taxpayers, not merely those who suffer
particularized harm from public officials illegal ultra vires acts, are empowered
bring suit the illegal ul/ra vlres acts are reasonably likely cause pecuniary harm.
But this does not mean the doctrine merely standing doctrine, the Board
mischaracterizes it. Not only does the Board exclusively refer Maryland
longstanding line taxpayer doctrine cases using the phrase taxpayer standing
order create the misiinpression that these cases are merely about standing and not
about enjoining illegal and ultra vires acts public officials, but the Board also inserts
the word standing into Plaintiffs argument create the misirripression that Plaiiitiffs
view the doctrine merely matter standing. For instance, the Board states:
Second, Appellants attempt obfuscate the fundamental difference
between standing and private right ofaetion. Speci cally, Appellants
assert that taxpayer standing sufficient maintain their claims because
allegedly the illegal and ullra vlres nature the public official act
that the focus taxpayer lstanding] claim not the source substance
.3. the underlying provision law that makes the public offieial acts
illegal ultra vires. 
Brief Appellee 10, quoting Brief Appellants 10. Nowhere the cited
paragraph did Plaintiffs use the word standing. Brief Appellant 10. Because
Defendants cannot prevail the taxpayer doctrine properly construed, the Board tries change the meaning what the Plaintiffs wrote their brief. Plaintiffs not use the
term standing their brief because, effect, the taxpayer doctrine both loosens
traditional standing requirements and provides taxpayers with common law right
action, the extent one even necessary. Properly analyzed, the Maryland common
law tmrpayer doctrine not only gives taxpayers standing sue, but also authorizes
precisely the type claims Plaintiffs have asserted.
II. The Board Incorrectly Asserts That There Difference Between
Maryland Common Law Taxpayer Claims and Claims Arising
Under Statute.
The Board also incorrectly asserts that the difference between taxpayer seeking enjoin the illegal ultra vires act public official that may cause harm the
public tisc and individual seeing enforce private right arising under federal
state law distinction without difference. Brief Appcllee The Board
assertion ignores the very real differences the purposes behind lawsuit brought
plaintiffs taxpayer capacity and lawsuit brought plaintiffs private capacity, well the scope the remedies available each type action. Taxpayers suing enjoin
the unlawful unauthorized acts ofpublie officials are not seeking enforce private
rights; they are seeking place check government. Accordingly, taxpayers are
.4.
limited declaratory and injunctive relief only relief that stops the public ofticia1
illegal ultra vires action. Taxpayer plaintiffs are not able collect monetary damages,
either for themselves for the public treasury. The enormous number plaintiffs who court seeking damages would say that such distinction distinction With
substantial difference.
The cases cited the Board none which were taxpayer cases highlight
these important differences. For example, Pace State, 195 Md. App. (2008),
which, like all the cases cited the Board, was not taxpayer case, the plaintiff,
student Maryland school who suffered from peanut allergies, alleged that the school
violated its duty under federal law serving her peanut butter sandwich. What she
sought was not prevent all Maryland schools from continuing provide peanut butter
sandwiches, but compensatory damages for her injuries. The court dismissed the
student damages claim, nding private right action under the statute issue. Id. 33. The difference important. Maryland law affords taxpayers the right challenge
illegal unauthorized acts public cials that are likely cause pecuniary harm
regardless the source the underlying law. Seeking enforce the underlying law
directly, and, particular, order obtain damages, requires private right action.
The the the Board logic illustrated proposing more analogous
situation, where federal law forbade schools from serving lunch students, but
Maryland school continued serve school lunches taxpayers expense. student like
the plaintiff Pace, who had been injured one ofthese lunches, may not have claim
against the school for damages under the federal law, but Maryland taxpayer could sue
.5. enjoin the sehool illegal and ultra vires lunch program under the common law
taxpayer doctrine. immaterial whether Congress speeilieally provided for private
right action for taxpayers. What material that the substantive federal law makes
the school lunch program unlawful and ultra vires. The Maryland common law
provides Maryland taxpayers with the right challenge unlawful and unauthorized
expenditures ofpublic money and, consequently, with the right challenge the illegal
and unauthorized lunch program. The absence legislatively created, private right
action does not prevent the courts Maryland from protecting the rule law and
imposing check Maryland public officials through taxpayer actions such
Plaintiffs lawsuit, although course any Maryland judgment such suits would not
apply federal officials public officials other than those Maryland.
111. The Board Refuses Analyze the Claim Plaintiffs Have Actually
Asserted and Continues Misapply Federal Law.
The Board cannot and does not argue that its tuition policy complies with federal
law. quite plainly does not. The Board simply thumbcd its nose federal law when
decided make unlawfully present aliens eligible for reduced, in-county tuition even
though the Maryland General Assembly had not enacted law affirmatively providing for
such eligibility. See generally USC, l62l. The Board response Plaintiffs 
assertion that the policy violates the federal statute is, effectively, that there nothing
that Plaintiff the courts can about it. arguing, the Board miseonstrues Plaintiffs challenge the policy under U.S.C. 1621 attempt bring private cause action under federal law. such thing. The statute issue, U.S.C. 1621, makes unlawfully present aliens
ineligible for certain state local public benefits. took away any authority the Board
might have had provide tuition bene unlawfully present aliens unless such
bene are speci cally and affinnatively authorized state law. -S-C4 1621(d).
Because federal law supreme, the Board was required abide and respect the
limitation its authority provided the federal statute. Instead, the Board chose
ignore the statute. Plaintiffs taxpayer action does not seek enforce any private rights
they might possess under the statute. Rather, seeks enforce Plaintiffs rights
Maryland taxpayers enjoin the Board ultra vires adoption its unlawful tuition
policy. The rights Plaintiffs invoke are Maryland common law rights; federal law,
least for purposes Count Plaintiffs Complaint for lnjunctive and Declaratory
Relief, only what makes the Board policy illegal and ultra vires.
Without hint irony, the Board argues that, because federal law supreme,
federal standards and federal precedent govern Plaintiffs claim that the Board policy
illegal and ultra vires under federal law. More specifically, the Board insists that state
court must apply substantive federal law determine who the class litigants that
Congress intended able enforce federal statute. BriefefAppellee 15. The
Board refuses acknowledge otherwise respond the argument that Plaintiffs are not
asserting rights under federal law, but instead are asserting their rights Maryland
taxpayers. 1fPlaintiffs had sought bring claim directly under Section 1621, then
.7.
federal standards and federal precedent would apply threshold issues such who
entitled bring claim. Plaintiffs are not bringing claim directly under Section 1621,
however. Plaintiffs are bringing common law taxpayer claim.
Consequently, the standards and precedents set federal case law such Alexander Sandoval, 532 US. 275 (2001), Davis Passrnan, 442 US. 228 (1979), orDay
Sebelius, 376 Supp. 1022, (D. Kan. 2005); aff 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007)
not apply taxpayer action under Maryland common law. Federal standards and
federal precedent regarding who entitled assert claim and other threshold issues are
particularly unhelpful analyzing state common law taxpayer actions. Federal courts
obviously are subject different rules and procedures. They are courts limited
jurisdiction, defined Article lll the U.S. Constitution. Federal courts also
generally not recognize taxpayer lawsuits being wit.l1in their limited jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Frothlnglmm Mellon, 262 US. 447 (1923). contrast, Maryland courts
not operate under these same limitations and quite obviously recognize taxpayer
lawsuits. See, eg., Baltimore Gill, Md. 395. Therefore, federal standards and
federal precedent governing threshold issues federal lawsuits asserting federal claims
have applicability Maryland taxpayer lawsuits that seeks enforce Maryland
taxpayers rights Maryland courts. the Board seeks demonstrate that the Maryland common law taxpayer doctrine
does not authorize Plaintiffs taxpayer claim, then the Board must examine Maryland
taxpayer cases, least Maryland cases. did not so. lnstead, the Board attempts confuse the issue citing plethora federal cases that have bearing
.3.
Maryland taxpayer actions filed Maryland courts. The Board does asserting that
because one the sources law that its tuition policy allegedly violates federal law,
Plaintiffs claim must analyzed were federal claim. Plaintiffs are making
Maryland common law claim, however taxpayer claim and they are properly using
Maryland common law and Maryland courts S04 irrelevant whether the
underlying law that makes the public cial actions illegal ul/ra virex state
federal statute, ordinance, regulation, other source law. What relevant that the
public official action alleged illegal ultra vires under seine applicable statute,
ordinance, regulation, other source law.
IV. The Board Continues Ignore 150 Years Maryland Precedent.
Unable rebut Plaintiffs clear demonstration that they have amply stated
taxpayer claim alleging that the Board tuition policy illegal and ultra Vires under Md.
Code Ann. Educ. 163 and COM/R l3B.07.02.03, the Board chooses avoid the
issue. Although the existence taxpayer actions broad right too well established ignore, the Board makes the illogical claim that the issue this case narrow and
heretofore undecided one: whether Appellants can enforce provision ofthe Maryland
Education Code even though the Maryland Legislature entrusted its enforcement
Ml-ll7.C. Brief of/ppellee 33. The Board appears argue that the Court should
carve out special exception for taxpayer challenges involving higher education, but
provides neither any basis precedent nor any principled reason for doing so.
The right Maryland taxpayers enjoin illegal ultra vi/es actions ofpublie
officials that may cause hann the public tisc not narrow limited right.
.9.
broad right. Boimolt Mayor (2/ Baltimore, 356 Md. 226, 234 (1999) (noting that
Maryland has gone rather far sustaining taxpayer challenges alleged illegal and
ultra i/[res actions public officials The Board argument akin asserting
free speech case that, although the right criticize the government protected right,
the right criticize particular local assemhly recently enacted measure has never
been speci cally protected and thus not protected speech. broad right necessarily
protects particular applications invocations that right even where the particular
application invocation has not been expressly rmed.
Nor does the Board explain why entrusting agency carry out the law should
create exception taxpayers right challenge illegal ultra vires acts. The very
reason the Maryland Courts have recognized this common law right provide
taxpayers with the ability ensure that the public officials tasked with carrying out the
law not break it, For more than 150 years, Maryland law has provided remedy
taxpayers seeking curb abuses power public officials who commit illegal
unauthoriaed acts. The important purpose behind such actions would substantially
undermined narrowing taxpayer claims the way the Board suggests, leaving
taxpayers with protection against the illegal ultra vircs acts ofpublie officials when
agencies charged with protecting the public fail act. [20 Lafayette St., LLP
Mayor 0fBa/timore, 2012 Md. l.EXlS 255, *82 (Md. April 27, 2012) (Bell, C..l.,
dissenting) (noting that taxpayer actions are authorized even when another public
official, such Attorney General, empowered bring the lawsuit, but fails, for
whatever reason, so.
-10.
The Board offers even more illogical argument explain why Maryland
court has ever required the existence ofa separate, private right action order for
taxpayer state valid Maryland taxpayer claim. The Board asserts that
most critically, none the defendants the decisions that Appellants cite
(other than 120 West ayerte Street) asserted that the taxpayer-plaintiffs
lacked the necessary private rights action enforce the statute
issue. Rather, the cases Appellants cite merely recognized taxpayer
standing and allowed the ease proceed with respect the claim issue,
but the private right action issue presented here was simply not
addressed.
Brief Appellee 30. The Board argument shows that can principled way distinguish the numerous cases cited Plaintiffs. result, simply discounts all these great many cases, implying that either Maryland courts would have ruled
differently over the past 150 years other defendants taxpayer actions had brought
the issue that Maryland courts did rule differently, they just didn say so. More
realistically, defendants thought argue that taxpayer actions require rights creating
language because such argument obviously odds with the entire purpose
behind taxpayer actions. rights creating language were required, taxpayer actions
would ever available those who needed them. Since the Maryland courts have long
recognized taxpayer actions, Maryland law obviously intends for taxpayers have such
rights without having depend legislature create private rights action. The Board Distorts the Only Relevant Case Chose Not Ignore.
The Board true goal appears overturn taxpayer actions
altogether. Although the Board insists that /ppellants assertion that the Board
seeking overturn more than 150 years Maryland precedent woetiilly misguided 
-11.
(Brief ofAppellee 33), the Board fails identify single case which plaintiff,
order state valid taxpayer action, was required demonstrate that the underlying
statute, ordinance, regulation, other source law that rendered the public official
actions illegal ultra vires contained private right action affording individual
remedy the plaintiff. The one case the Board highlights, 120 West Fayette Street, LLP,
did not involve statute, ordinance, regulation, other source law, but instead
involved agreement. also was not even clear that the plaintiff had sought invoke
taxpayer rights. While the Board accuses Plaintiffs ignoring the majority opinion,
the Board that misreads the majority and disregards the dissent direct refutation the
Board argument about private right action, issue 120 Fayette St, LLLP was Memorandum ofAgreement entered
into the City Baltimore and the Maryland Historical Trust the Trust concerning
the redevelopment parcel land downtown Baltimore. The plaintiff, business
entity and neighboring landowner that was not party the agreement, brought suit
asking the court interpret the Memorandum Agreement light the facts ofthis
case and declare letter conditionally approving the proposed redevelopment plan ultra vires, imtzo. 2012 Md. LEXIS 255 **l2-13. does not appear that the
plaintiffs complaint even invoked the right Maryland taxpayers enjoin illegal
ultra vires acts ofpublic officials. Rather, the plaintiff appeared invoke the rights adjacent landowner and only sought invoke taxpayer rights after the fact. Id. l5. Regardless, the Court found that the plaintiff could not invoke taxpayer rights
because had not alleged that any laws were broken: The complaint consider the
_]2_
present appeal does not allege violation City law the City Charter. Id. **23.
Instead, the Court found that the plaintiff had alleged violation the agreement
between the City and the Trust. Id. **2l-28. result, the Court rejected any
taxpayer claim. Id.
Moreover, the Court also found was likely that the plaintiff had not alleged
violation law, but instead alleged breach ofthc agreement between the City and the
Tnist, because the applicable statute contained provision expressly prohibiting any
 private cause action under State law for non-compliance. Id. 2425, n.13,
citing Md. Code. Ann., State Fin. Proe. 5A-326(h). While the Court did not rule that
this particular provision would have prevented the plaintiff from invoking taxpayer rights the plaintiff had alleged that the conditional approval the redevelopment plan
violated the statute, the provision provoked the discussion the dissent regarding private
rights action general, which Plaintiffs had referenced their opening brief.
noted Plaintiffs their opening brief, Chief Judge Bell, writing dissent and joined two ofhis colleagues, stated unequivocal terms, The lack private cause
action contained the statute did not negate taxpayer standing. I20 Fayetle SL,
LLLP, 2012 Md. LEXIS 255 *80. Thus, I20 VV. Fayet1eSl., LLLP directly refutes the
Board claims that private right action necessary state valid taxpayer claim.
Regardless, unlike the plaintiff 120 Fayette S1,, LLLP, Plaintiffs not claim
that the Board tuition policy violates some agreement which Plaintiffs are not
party. Rather, Plaintiffs have identified three provisions oflaw that plainly render the
Board tuition policy illegal and ultra vires U.S.C. 1021, Md. Code Ann., Educ.
.13.
 16-319, and COMAR l3B.07.02.03 and the Board has not identi any statutory
prohibitions, either these three provisions elsewhere, that prevent Plaintiffs from
invoking their longstanding right Maryland taxpayers challenge the Board tuition
policy for being illegal and ultra vires under these provisions. Plaintiffs have plainly
stated Maryland common law taxpayer claim.
VI. Plaintiffs Complaint Amply Alleges the Elements Claim for
Injunctive Relief.
Finally, the Board also wrong argue that Plaintiffs have failed allege the
requisite elements claim for injunetive relief. order state claim for injunctive
relief, plaintiff must allege that will sustain irreparable injury result the alleged
wrongful eonduct. Bey Moorish Sci. Temple, 362 Md. 339, 355 (2001). ordinarily
understood, injury irreparable, within the law injunctions, where such
character that fair and reasonable redress may not had court law, that
refuse the injunction would denial ofjustiee. Id.
Plaintiffs Complaint clearly contains sufficient allegations irreparable injury. states: result Defendant B0ard Violation ofMaryland law, taxpayers
Montgomery County and the State ofMaryland, including Plaintiffs, are suffering
pecuniary injury and will continue suffer sueh injury unless and tuitil Defendant
Board policy enjoined Plaintiffs have adequate remedy law. 24.
Plaiiititfs Complaint also states: proximate result ofDefendant l3oar(l violation federal law, taxpayers Montgomery County and the State Maryland, including
Plaintiffs, are suffering pecuniary injury and will continue suffer such injury unless
.14.
and until Defendant Board policy enjoined Plaintiffs have adequate remedy
law. 25. inconceivable, under the facts alleged Plaintiffs Complaint, that any form available relief, other than injunetive relief, would ever remedy the Board illegal and
ultra vires tuition policy. Plaintiffs have alleged that the Board policy notjust
reasonably likely cause pecuniary harm, but has actually caused such harm because
Montgomery College has failed and failing charge out of~state rates tuition
students who are not eligible for lower, in-state eounty rates. l9-23. Obviously,
Plaintiffs cannot back and compel these students pay the higher rate Nor can
Montgomery College, taxpayer-funded institution, reimburse the public fise for these
losses because the funds for any reimbursement are public monies. The losses resulting
From the Board policy cannot recovered; they can only stopped from continuing
into the future. Plaintiffs have amply pled that the public suffering irreparable
injury result the Board illegal and ultra vires tuition policy.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reverse the
trial euurt opinion dismissing the complaint and remand the trial court for further
proceedings.
Dated: June 26, 2012
.16.
Respectfully submitted,
JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.
/72W? ~:; /Q5 aulJ. edes
Md. Bar No. 9112190026
Julie Axelrod
(Not Member the Maryland Bax)
Suite 800
425 Third Street, SW.
Washington, 20024
Tel: (202) 646-5172
Fax: (202) 6466199
Alto/ rieysfar Plaiiiti/fs and Appellants 
CERTIFICATE COMPLIANCE certify that this bricfcomplies with all requirements ofMarylar1d Rule 8-112,
503 and S-504 The brief has been prepared 13~point, proportionally spaced Times
New Roman font with 2.0 spacing between lines, pursuant Rule 8-ll2(c).
 
.17.
CERTIFICATE SERVICE hereby certify that this 26th day June, 2012, caused two true and correct
copies the foregoing REPLY BRIEF APPELLANTS served, via rsvclass
US? mail, postage prepaid, the following:
Michael IIays
Dow Lohnes PLLC
1200 New Hampshire Avcnuc, N.W.
Suitt: 800
Washingtoii, 20036-6802
Clyde II. Sorrcll
General Counsel
Montgomery College
900 Hungerforcl Drive, Room 355
Rockville, 20850 
Paul nodes
.13.