Skip to content

Judicial Watch • Senate Intelligence Benghazi Report

Senate Intelligence Benghazi Report

Senate Intelligence Benghazi Report

Page 1: Senate Intelligence Benghazi Report

Category:General

Number of Pages:85

Date Created:January 15, 2014

Date Uploaded to the Library:January 17, 2014

Tags:Benghazi, State Department, FBI, EPA, ICE, CIA


File Scanned for Malware

Donate now to keep these documents public!

  • demand_answers

See Generated Text   ˅

Autogenerated text from PDF

U.S. S.We Se1eet 

TELLIGE 
REVIEW the 
TERRORIST ATTACKS U.S. FACILITIES BENGHAZI, LIBYA, SEPTEMBER 11-12, 2012 

together with 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS 
January 15, 2014 
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INTELLIGENCE 
United States Senate 13th Congress 

SSC/ Review the Terrorist Attacks U.S. Facilities Benghazi, 

Libya, September 11-12, 2012 

Department Defense (DoD) and Department State (State State Department). important acknowledge the outset that diplomacy and intelligence collection are inherently risky, and that all risk cannot eliminated. Diplomatic and intelligence personnel work high-risk locations all over the world collect information 
necessary prevent future attacks against the United States and our allies. Between 1998 (the year the terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassies Kenya and Tanzania) and 2012, 273 significant attacks were carried out against
U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel.
The need place personnel high-risk locations carries significant vulnerabilities for the United States. The Committee intends for this report help increase security and reduce the risks our personnel serving overseas and better explain what happened before, during, and after the attacks. 
II. THE COMMITTEE'S REVIEW2 U.S. Department State, Bureau Diplomatic Security, Significant Attacks Against U.S. Diplomatic Facilities 
and Personnel, 1998-2012, revised July 2013. This report also states page "This information not all
inclusive compilation; rather, reasonably comprehensive listing significant attacks." The Committee notes that the IC, State, and DoD provided the Committee with hundreds key documents 
throughout this review, although sometimes with significant amount ofresistance, especially from State. This lack cooperation unnecessarily hampered the Committee's review. 

including the following hearings, briefings, and meetings (which included interviews U.S. personnel the ground during the attacks): 
 	
Three Committee oversight hearings with witnesses from the Office the Director National Intelligence (ODNI), National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI), State, and DoD; 

 	
Two Committee briefings with David Petraeus--one while was CIA Director and one after his resignation; 

 
Three Committee briefings with Robert Litt, ODNI General Counsel, 

 	
Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief Mission (DCM) Tripoli during the attacks;3 	
Mark Thompson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism the State Department; 	Eric Nordstrom, former Regional Security Officer (RSO) Libya; and 	
the former CIA Chief Base Benghazi who was the Annex the night the attacks; and 

 least other staff briefings and meetings, including interviews 
U.S. Government security personnel the ground Benghazi the night the attacks. Mr. Hicks met with Committee staff, without Senators, follow-up session. See SSCI Transcript, Staff Interview Gregory Hicks, June 19, 2003. 

Documents and Video Reviewed: The Committee reviewed: thousands intelligence reports and internal documents (including e-mails, cables, etc.) which were provided the IC, the State Department, and DoD; (2) written responses Committee questions for the record; (3) numerous open-source materials; and (4) surveillance videos related the attacks. 

The sequence events Benghazi the night September 11, 2012, and 
can seen the surveillance video recovered from the Mission facility.5 The attackers moved unimpeded throughout the compound, entering and exiting buildings wi_ll. 
After entering the Mission facility, the attackers used diesel fuel set fire the barracks/guard house the Libyan tlt February Brigade militia, which served security force provided the host nation for the Mission compound, and then proceeded towards the main buildings the compound.6 Diplomatic (DS) agent working the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) the Mission SSCI Transcript, Hearing the Attacks Benghazi, November 15, 2012, 24. James Clapper, Director National Intelligence, Joint Statement for the Record, SSC/ Hearing the Attacks Benghazi, November 15, 2012, lbid. also 

There were five agents the Mission compound that night. Two had traveled from Tripoli with U.S. Ambassador Libya Christopher Stevens (who was staying the Mission compound Benghazi), and three others were assigned the Mission facility. addition the five agents duty, there were three armed members the Libyan 1t11 February Brigade militia, three Libyan National Police officers, and five unarmed members local security team contracted through British company, Blue Mountain Group, who were guarding the Mission facility that night. addition, six armed CIA security personnel (plus interpreter) operating out the nearby Annex were able respond quickly after receiving word the attack. 
After the agent the Tactical Operations Center the Temporary 
Mission Facility alerted the Annex security team that TMF wa,s under attack .m., the Chief Base called the 
force provide assistance," according September 19, 2012, cable that provided the joint CIA Station/Base report the events surrounding the September 11-12 attacks.9 
Two armored vehicles were prepared the security team could respond from the Annex. Approximately 20-25 minutes after the first call came into the Annex that the Temporary Mission Facility was under attack, security team left the Annex for the Mission compound. footage taken from the Annex' security cameras, the security team can observed departing the CIA Annex 10:03 p.m. Benghazi time. During the period between approximately 9:40 p.m. and 10:03 
p.m. Benghazi time, the Chief Base and security team members attempted secure assistance and heavy weapons (such .50 caliber truck-mounted machine guns) from the 17th February Brigade and other militias that had been assisting the United States. Then, the team drove the Mission facility and made their way NCTC and FBI, The 11-12 September Attacks Facilities Benghazi, November 13, 2012, 
"Fw: Subject: Eyes Only -Tripoli Station and Benghazi Base 
1 Classified Report the Department State Accountability Review Board (ARB), December 18, 2012, 27. 

onto the Mission compound the face enemy fire, arriving the vicinity the
compound approximately 10: p.m. Benghazi time. The Committee explored claims that there was "stand down" order given the security team the Annex. Although some members the security team expressed frustration that they were
unable respond more quickly the Mission compound, the Committee found evidence intentional delay obstruction the Chief Base any other
party.
Meanwhile, agent secured Ambassador Stevens and State Department Information Management Officer Sean Smith the "safe area" the main building the Mission facility (Building C). The attackers used diesel fuel set the main building ablaze and thick smoke rapidly filled the entire structure. According testimony the Director the NCTC, the agent began leading the Ambassador and 
Mr. Smith toward the emergency escape window escape the smoke. Nearing unconsciousness himself, the agent opened the emergency escape window and crawled out. then realized had become separated from the Ambassador and Sean Smith the smoke, reentered and searched the
building multiple times.The agent, suffering from severe smoke inhalation, 
climbed ladder the roof where radioed the other agents for assistance
and attempted unsuccessfully ventilate the building breaking skylight. 
Other agents went retrieve their M-4 carbine assault rifles from Building when the attack began. When they attempted return the main building (Building help protect the Ambassador, they encountered armed attackers and decided return Building take cover rather than open fire. 
They eventually regrouped, made their way nearby armored vehicle, and then drove over assist the agent the roof Building searching for the SSCI Transcript, Hearing the Attacks Benghazi, November 15, 2012, pp. 27-29. NCTC and FBI, the 11-12 September Attacks Facilities Benghazi, November 13, 2012, Unclassified Report ofthe ARB, December 18, 2012, 22. 

Ambassador and 
Mr. Smith. After numerous attempts, they found Mr. Smith, who The agents did not fire single shot that night during the attack the Temporary Mission Facility, according testimony before the
Comm1ttee. 

State and CIA personnel re-entered the burning compound numerous times attempt locate Ambassador Stevens, but avail. Under the impression that the Ambassador "had already been taken from that compound and that he'd been kidnapped," the leader the Annex security team decided that U.S. personnel needed evacuate the Annex for their safety. special agents agreed with the decision evacuate. 

Together, CIA and security personnel made final search for the Ambassador before leaving for the Annex two separate armored vehicles. One vehicle encountered heavy fire ran roadblock several blocks east the Mission compound. Both vehicles were eventually able make their way the Annex, which was approximately two kilometers away. approximately :30 
p.m.Benghazi time, all U.S. personnel, except for the missing Ambassador, had departed the Mission compound.26 Mr. Smith's remains were also taken the Annex. 

Annex was known some Benghazi American facility. approximately :56 p.m. Benghazi time, sporadic arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) were fired the Annex.28 Over the next hour, the Annex took sporadic small arms fire and RPG rounds, the security team returned fire, and the attackers dispersed.29 likely U.S. personnel injured possibly killed some the attackers during the exchange fire. "[T]hey probably took casualties. I'm 
quite sure they took casualties," according the Chief ofBase.30 
2_2 DoD, Time/ine Department Defense Actions September 11-12, 2012, April 2013, 
SSCI Transcript, Member and Staff Interview former Chief Base, December 20, 2012, SSCI Transcript, Hearing the Attacks Benghazi, November 15, 2012, 35. HOGR Transcript, Hearing the Security Failures Benghazi, October 10, 2012, 32; NCTC and FBI, The 11-12 September Attacks US. Facilities Benghazi, November 13, 2012, pp. 4-5. SSCI Transcript, Hearing the Attacks Benghazi, November 15, 2012, 35. NCTC and FBI, The 11-12 September Attacks Facilities Benghazi, November 13, 20I2, SSCI Transcript, Member and Staff Interview former Chief Base, December 20, 2012, 60. NCTC and FBI, The 11-12 September Attacks Facilities Benghazi, November 13, 2012, E-mail from CIA OCA staff Staff Director, HPSCI, al., "Background Points used Nov," November 2012, SSCI Transcript, Member and Staff Interview former Chief Base, December 20, 2012, 61. approximately a.m. Benghazi time, seven-man reinforcement team 
Ambassador and trying obtain information the security situation the Benghazi Medical Center where was said be. individual the hospital made calls from the Ambassador's cell phone numbers stored the phone, including some numbers Tripoli and one the Os. After exchange calls between the individual possession Stevens' phone and some the Americans, the Americans became concerned that the caller could luring U.S. personnel into ambush the hospital and conc;luded was too risky the hospital. 
After more than three hours negotiations and communications with 
took direct mortar fire they engaged the enemy from the roof the Annex.36 The mortar fire also seriously injured one other security officer and one 
specil NCTC and FBI, The 11-12 September Attacks Facilities Benghazi, November 13, 2012, E-mail from CIA OCA staff Staff Director, HPSCI, al., "Background Points used Nov," November 
2012, SSCI Transcript, Benghazi Follow with Staff, May 22, 2013, 34. E-mail from CIA OCA staff Staff Director, HPSCI, al., "Background Points used Nov," November 
2012, SSCI Transcript, Benghazi Follow with Staff, May 22, 2013, 34. NCTC and FBI, The 11-12 September Attacks Facilities Benghazi, November 13, 2012, demonstrating lethal capability and sophistication that changed the dynamic the ground that night. According testimony the Chief Base, was only after this third wave attacks, when the mortars hit, t}lat decided was 
39necessary evacuate the personnel from the Annex. 
Less than hour later, heavily-armed Libyan militia unit arrived help evacuate the Annex all U.S. personnel the airport. The Ambassador's body, which had been secured local Libyan coordinating with the State Department, was also transported from the Benghazi Medical Center the airport. approximately 10:00 a.m. Benghazi time, all U.S. personnel and the bodies the 

40fou.r dead Americans departed from Benghazi Tripoli.
tV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Western facilities and personnel Libya. For example: 
 June 12, 2012, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) produced report entitled, "Libya: Terrorists Now Targeting U.S. and Western Interests." The report noted recent attacks against the U.S. Mission compound Benghazi, SSCI Transcript, Member and Staff Interview former Chief Base, December 20, 2012, 42. E-mail from CIA OCA staff Staff Director, HPSCI, al., "Background Points used Nov," November 
2012, SSCI Transcript, Member and Staff Interview former Chief Base, December 20, 2012, 42, which the 
Chief Base said: "Until the mortar attack, were pretty comfortable that could stave off any type ground 
assault the Annex." 

the growing ties between al-Qa'ida (AQ) regional nodes and Libya-based terrorist, a_ncj expect more anti-U.S. terrorist attacks eastern Libya due the terrorists' greater presence there Thfa wiff indude terrorists conducting more ambush and IED
.... 
_f9Yisg  gevice] attacks well more threats against 
,,41 
 June 18, 2012, the Pentagon's Joint Staff produced slide its daily intelligence report entitled, "(U) Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorist Safe Haven Libya." the slide, the Joint Staff assessed: support will increase Libyan terrorist capability the permissive post-revolution security environment. Attacks will also increase mm1ber and lethality terrorists connect with associates Libya. Areas eastern Libya will likely become safe haven the end 
2012 

 July 2012, CIA produced report entitled, "Libya: Al-Qa'ida Establishing Sanctuary." the report, CIA stated: "Al-Qa'ida-affiliated groups and associates are exploiting the permissive security environment Libya enhance their capabilities and expand their operational reach. This year, Muhammad Jamal's Egypt-based network, al-Qa'ida the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al-Qa'ida the Lands the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have conducted training, built communication networks, and DIA, "Libya: Terrorists Now Targeting U.S. and Western Interests," Defense Intelligence Report, June 12, 2012. Joint Staff, "Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorist Safe Haven Libya," J-2 Intelligence Update, June 18, 2012. Q'i.u!lu was released from Guantanamo OLA," "Defense Intelligence 
Digest, July 2012. 

facilitated extremist travel across North Africa from their safe haven parts eastern Libya."45 
 August 19, 2012, the Pentagon's Joint Staff produced slide its daily intelligence report entitled, "(U) Libya: Terrorists Increase Strength During Next Six Months." the slide, the Joint Staff stated: "There are near-term prospects for reversal the trend towards terrorist safe haven Libya, and areas eastern Libya will likely become broader safe haven the end 2012. The conditions Libya will allow terrorists increase attacks against Western and Libyan interests the country, well attempt attacks the region and possibly Europe the next six months."46 

 September 2012, AFRICOM produced Theater Analysis Report entitled, "(U) Libya: Extremism Lib Past, Present, and Future." The report contained map showing how" are actively exploiting the open operating environment Libya.'' (The map located Appendix this report). The report also noted: "Disarray Libyl:;l's security services, and likely focus authorities pursuit Qadhafi loyalists likely allowing jihadists Libya freedom recruit, train, and facilitate the movement fighters and weapons. The threat Western and 

U.S. interests and individuals remains high, particularly northeast
Libya."47 

 tember 2012, DIA produced QTI 'that stated: 

FINDING #2: The State Department shogl have increased its security posture more significantly Benghazi based the deteriorating security the and threat attckS CIA, "Libya: Al-Qa'ida Establishing Sanctuary," WIRe, July 2012. Joint Staff, "Libya: Terrorists Increase Strength During Next Six Months," J-2 Intelligence Update, August 19, 
2012. United States Africa Command, "Libya: Extremism Libya Past, Present, and Future," United States Africa 
Command Theater Anal sis ort, tember 2012. 

48 DIA,' 	,"Defense Intelligence Digest, September 2012. and 
information the security situation and terrorism issues. The read book was also supplied the Embassy's RS0.50 the Accountability Review Board found, there were least security incidents involving the Temporary Mission Facility, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and third-country nationals and diplol)J.ats the 
13enghazi area the months leading the September 11, 2012, attacks.51 The SSCI Transc;ript, Member and Staff Interview Gregory Hicks and Mark Thompson, June 12, 2013, 39. SSCI Tnmscript, Benghazi Follow with Staff. May 22, 2013, 36. The security incidents detailed the unclassified report the ARB pages 15-16 are follows: 	March 18, 2012-Armed robbery occurs the British School Benghazi. 
 	
March 22, 2012-Members militia searching for suspect fire their weapons near the U.S. Mission and attempt enter. 

 	
April 2012-A British armored diplomatic vehicle attacked after driving into local protest; the vehicle was damaged but occupants uninjured. 

 	April 2012-A gelatina bomb "fish bomb" (traditional homemade explosive device used for fishing) thrown over the Temporary Mission Facility's north wall. 

 	
April 10, 2012-An IED (gelatina dynamite stick) thrown the motorcade the United Nations (UN) Special Envoy Libya Benghazi. 

 	
April 26, 2012-The principal officer the U.S. Mission evacuated from the International Medical University (IMU) after fistfight escalated gunfire between Tripoli-based trade delegation security 
personnel and IMU security. 

 	
April 27, 2012-Two South African nationals Libya part ofa U.S.-funded weapons abatement, unexploded ordnance removal, and demining project are detained gunpoint militia, questioned, and released. 

 	
May 22, 2012-Benghazi-based International Committee the Red Cross (ICRC) building struck RPGs. 

 	
May 28, 2012-A previously unknown organization, Omar Abdurrahrnan group, claims responsibility for t_he

ICRC attack and issues threat against the United States social media sites. 
 	
June 2012-IED attack the Temporary Mission Facility; the IED detonates with injuries but blows large hole the compound's exterior wall. Omar Abdurrahman group makes unsubstantiated claim 
responsibility. 
 	June 2012----=-Two hand grenades target parked United Kingdom (UK) diplomatic vehicle Sabha (800 south Benghazi). 

 	
June 11, 2012-While Benghazi, the British Ambassador's convoy attacked with RPG and possible AK-47s; two security officers are injured. The closes its mission Benghazi the following day. 

535455 	April 2012-A small IBO was thrown over the wall the Temporary Mission Facility. 
 	April 10, 2012-An explosive device was thrown convoy Benghazi carrying the head the mission Libya. 

 	
May 22, 2012-The ICRC building Benghazi was attacked with RPGs. The Omar Abdul Rahman Brigade56 claimed responsibility for the attack, according press, social media, and other intelligence. 

 	
June 2012-An IED exploded near the main gate the Mission 
facility Benghazi, creating 9x12 foot hole the exterior wall. The 

according press reporting and web forum. 

 	
June 2012-Two hand grenades were placed under two parked 
diplomatic vehicles Sabha (800 south Benghazi). 

 	June 11, 2012-Unknown assailants using two RPGs and small-arms attacked three-vehicle convoy Benghazi carrying the British Ambassador. 

 	
June 12, 2012-An RPG attack occurs the ICRC compound Misrata (400 west Benghazi). 

 	
June 18, 2012-Protestors storm the Tunisian consulate Benghazi. 

 July 29, 2012-An IED found grounds the Tibesti Hotel Benghazi. 

 	
July 30, 2012-A Sudanese consul Benghazi carjacked and his driver beaten. 

 	
July 31, 2012-Seven Iranian-citizen ICRC workers are abducted Benghazi. 

 	
Augusts, 2012-ICRC Misrata office attacked with RPGs; ICRC withdraws its representatives from Misrata and Benghazi. 

 	
August 2012-A Spanish-American dual national NGO worker abducted from the Islamic Cultural Center Benghazi and released the same day. 

 	
August 20, 2012-A small bomb thrown Egyptian diplomat's vehicle parked outside the CIA, "Libya: Stn1ggling Create Effective Domestic Security System," WIRe, August 29, 2012. CIA, "Libya: Attack British Diplomatic Convoy Underscores Risks Western Interests," WIRe, June 11, 2012. CIA, "Libya: Recent Attacks Highlight Persistent Threats Eastern Libya," WIRe; August 2012. DIA, "Libya: Terrorists Now Targeting U.S. and Western Interests," Defense Intelligence Report, June 12, 2012. unknown group fighting under the name Omar Abdul Rahman, who commonly referred the "Blind Sheikh." The Omar Abdul Rahman Brigade also referred the Omar Abdurrahrnan group this report. 

 
June 12, 2012-The ICRC building Misratah57 was attacked either RPG bomb. 

vehicle, armored convoy left Damah (250 east Benghazi). 

 
July 29, 2012-A number ofIEDs are found and defused atthe Tibesti Hotel Benghazi. The Tibesti Hotel frequented foreign diplomats 

and businessmen and was previously used Ambassador Stevens base operations. 

 	
August 2012-The former regime military intelligence building Benghazi was bombed. 

Misratah. ICRC facilities Misratah and Benghazi were attacked fout times between May and August, usually with RPGs. 

 	
Al,lgust 2012-Unknown assailants attacked the ICRC building 

 	
August 2012-Two U.S. military personnel diplomatic vehicles were forced off the road and attacked near Tripoli. the months prior the attack, Ambassador Stevens and other State Department officials Libya outlined concerns via cables State Department headquarters about the security the Mission compound Benghazi and made The spells the city "Misratah," but the ARB's report spells "Misrata." The has since updated this infonnation and now assesses that the ICRC facilities Misratah and Benghazi were attacked five times between May and August, and two occasions, the perpetrators used RPGs.  State TRIPOLI 37, June 2012. SSCI Memorandum for the Record, "Staff Briefing with Under Secretary State for Management Patrick Kennedy and Assistant Secretary State for Diplomatic Security Eric Boswell," December 2012. 

 July 2012, Stevens sent cable State Department headquarters requesting minimum "Temporary Duty" (TDY) U.S. security personnel for Libya, which said could made agents, DoD Site Security Team (SST) personnel, or_some combination the two.61 These TDY security personnel were needed meet the requested security posture Tripoli and Benghazi. The State Department never fulfilled this request and, according Eric Nordstrom, State Department headquarters never responded the request with cable.62 August 16, 2012, cable State headquarters, Stevens raised additional concerns about the deteriorating security situation Benghazi following Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting held August 15, 2012, Benghazi. The EAC interagency group convened periodically U.S. embassies and other facilities response emergencies security matters. this case, the head State Department officer Benghazi, caJled the Principal Officer, convened the meeting "to evaluate Post's tripwires light the deteriorating security situation Benghazi." The cable summarizing this EAC included the following points: 
(1) The Principal Officer "remarked that the security situation 

Benghazi was 'trending negatively"' and "that this daily pattern 
violence would the 'new normal' for the foreseeable future, 
particularly given the minimal capabilities organizations such 
the Supreme Security Council and local police." 
(2) CIA officer "briefed the EAC the location approxjmtely ten Islamist militias and training camps within Benghazi." 

(3) 
The Principal Officer and CIA officer "expressed concerns with the lack host nation security support the U.S. Mission [facility]." 
State TRIPOLI 690, July 2012. 
SSCI Transcript, Member and Sta.ff Interview Eric Nordstrom, June 27, 2013, pp. and 60. State TRIPOLI 55, August 16, 2012. 

ionship with the 
actions taken the brigade's subsidiary members." 
(5) The Regional Security Officer "expressed concerns with the ability defend Post the event coordinated attack due limited manpower, security measures, weapons.capabilities, host nation support, and the overall size the compound." 
Despite the clearly deteriorating security stuation Benghazi and requests for additional security resources, few significant improvements were made the State Department the security posture the Temporary Mission Facility. Although the Mission facility met the minimum personnel requirements for 
Diplomatic Security agents accepted the U.S. Embassy Tripoli the time the August EAC meeting (specifically, the three Diplomatic Security agents were assigned guard the Mission compound), the Committee found evidence that significant actions were taken the State Department between August IS, 2012, and September 11, 2012, increase security the Mission facility response the concerns raised that meeting.65 
According the report the ARB, "there appeared Very real confuion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered make decisions based both policy and security concerns" the State Department's Bureau Diplomatic Security, Bureau Near Eastern Affairs, the U.S. Embassy Tripoli, 
 

agencies and countries, found that "potential root cause for the confusion, lack clear lines authority, and communication the headquarters level" was that "some senior Foreign Service officers and agents who met with the Panel identified the Under Secretary for Management (M) the senior security official the Department responsible for final decision making regarding critical security requirements," even though this role was "not identified Congress the Diplomatic Security Act 1986."67 
Additionally, the uncertain future the Mission facility, due its one-year expiration December 2012, contributed lack continuity for security staff and constrained decision-makers Washington regarding the allocation security enhancements that facility.68 The Temporary Mission Facility continued understaffed and under-resourced, situation best summarized Jurte 2012 document from the Principal Officer Benghazi, commenting that "[i]f there real mission, fund and find the staff."69 The State Department did implement some physical security improvements 2012, such heightening the perimeter wall, installing concrete Jersey barriers, mounting safety grills the safe area windows, and other minor improvements. However, the classified version the ARB report found, the Mission compound "included weak and very extended perimeter, incomplete interior fence, mantraps and unhardened entry gates and doors. Benghazi was also severely under-resourced with regard weapons, ammunition, [non-lethal deterrents] and fire safety equipment, including escape masks."70 contrast, the CIA, response the same deteriorating security situation and threat reporting, consistently upgraded its security posture over the same time period. Specifically, the attack the British Ambassador's convoy rocket-propelled grenade June 11, 2012, led CIA security audit the Annex. result, CIA quickly implemented additional security measures due the threat continued attacks against Western personnel Benghazi. These security upgrades included the following: U.S. Department State, Report the Independent Panel Best Practices, August 29, 2013, August 28, 2012, memo entitled, "Regional Security Officer Turnover" from the outgoing RSO stated: "U.S. 
Mission Benghazi has uncertain future; Post scheduled close December 2012. Various alternatives are 
being proposed,. including colocating with the Annex. The RSO should aware that requests for expensive 
security upgrades may difficult obtain headquarters hesitant allocate money post that may 
closing few months." Classified Report the ARB, December 18, 2012, Appendix Email from -"Response from Charlene," February 13, 2012, (the document attached this email series bullet points). 
7 Classified Report the ARB, December 2012, CIA BENGHAZI 14986, June 12, 2012, pp. and comparison, the ARB found, the Mission facility had received additional surveillance cameras, but they remained uninstalled because the State Department had not yet sent out the technicc:}l team necessary install them. addition, according the ARB, the camera monitor the local guard force booth next the main gate was inoperable the day the attacks due needed repair technical team. 
There was also significant difference security staffing between the two facilities. September 2012, there were three Diplomatic Security agents assigned the Imporary Mission Facility, while there were nine security officers out total individuals the CIA Annex.74 the night the attack, there were five f>S agents present the Mission compound, two whom came from Tripoli with the Ambassador. sum, the Mission facility had much weaker security posture than the Annex, with significant disparity the quality 
 
 
and quantity equipment and security upgrades. 
The lack security e.nhancements contributed the security breakdown Temporary Mission Facility the night the attacks. Although the cable following the August Emergency Action Committee stated that requests "for additional physical security upgrades and staffing needs" would submitted separately the Embassy tripoli,76 the Committee has not seen any evidence that those requests were passed the Embassy, including the Ambassador, State Department headquarters before the September attacks Benghazi. SSCI Trscript, Member and Staff Interview former Chief Base, December 20, 2012, 47. Unclassified Report the ARB, December 18, 201_2, 35. The CIA ersoil,nel ijeiighazi ih_clu.cled SS