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Sturgeon v Bratton Appelleebrief 01022011

Sturgeon v Bratton Appelleebrief 01022011

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CASE NO. B209913 THE COURT APPEAL THE STATE 
CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
DIVISION THREE 

HAROLD STURGEON, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
WILLIAM BRATTON, al., 
Defendants and Respondents, 
and 
BREAK THE CYCLE, al., 
Interveners and Appellants. APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT THE 
CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY LOS ANGELES 
CASE NO. 351646 
THE HONORABLE ROLF TREU 

APPELLEES ANSWER BRIEF 
Sterling Norris (SBN 040993) 
JUDICIAL WATCH, INC. 
2540 Huntington Drive, Suite 201 
San Marino, 91108-2601 
Tel:  (626) 287-4540 
Fax:  (626)237-2003 

Counsel for Plaintiff and Appellee 

CERTIFICATE INTERESTED 
ENTITIES PERSONS 

Counsel hereby discloses, pursuant Cal. Rule Court 8.208, 
that the following entities persons may have interest this 
case: Plaintiff-Appellee Harold Sturgeon Defendant William Bratton (in his official capacity Chief Police the Los Angeles Police Department) Defendant John Mack (in his official capacity member 
the Board Police Commissioners) Defendant Shelly Freeman (in her official capacity member the Board Police Commissioners) Defendant Alan Skobin (in his official capacity member the Board Police Commissioners) Defendant Andrea Sheridan Ordin (in her official capacity member the Board Police Commissioners) Defendant Anthony Pacheco (in his official capacity 
member the Board Police Commissioners) Defendant/Intervener-Appellant Break the Cycle Defendant/Intervener-Appellant Los Jornaleros Defendant/Intervener-Appellant Comite Jornaleros Defendant/Intervener-Appellant Instituto Educacion 
Popular del Sur California 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees Attorneys for Defendants Attorneys for Defendants/Interveners-Appellees 

TABLE CONTENTS 	INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT THE CASE 
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND ........................... 

III. 	ARGUMENT ....................................... 	Standard Review.............................. 	Interveners Waived Any Claim for Fees ............. 	Interveners Are Not Eligible for Award Fees ........................................ Award Fees Barred the Doctrine Equitable Estoppel ............................ Award Fees Would Violate Sturgeons Constitutional Rights ............................ 	Interveners Are Not Entitled Award Fees Because They Cannot Satisfy the Requirements Section 1021.5 	
Interveners Have Not Enforced Any Cognizable Right .......................... 	
Interveners Have Not Conferred Any Significant Benefit the General Public Large Class Persons Private Enforcement Was Necessary ................................ 	Interveners Fee Request Not Reasonable .......... 

IV. 	CONCLUSION ...................................... 

TABLE AUTHORITIES 

Federal Cases Page 
Chapman Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979) .................................. 
DeJong Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) .................................. 
Evans Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) .................................. 
Martinez-Medina Holder, 616 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2010) .......................... 
Muehler Mena, 544 U.S. (2005) ................................... 
Plyler Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) .................................. 
Wakefield Mathews, 852 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1988) ........................... 
State Cases 
American Civil Liberties Union Board Education, Cal.2d 167 (1961) ................................. 
Armendariz Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., Cal.4th (2000) .................................. 
Arntz Buildlers Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 4th 1195 (2004) .......................... 

Azteca Const., Inc. ADR Consulting, Inc., 
121 Cal. App. 4th 1156 (2004) .......................... Blair Pitchess, Cal.3d 258 (1971) ......................... Blumenthal Superior Court, 
103 Cal. App. 317 (1980) ........................... Boskowitz Thompson, 144 Cal. 724 (1904).................... Bouvia County Los Angeles, 
195 Cal. App. 1075 (1987) .......................... City Long Beach Bozek, Cal.3d 527 (1982) ................................. City Santa Monica Stewart, 
126 Cal. App. 4th (2005) ........................... Committee Defend Reprod. Rights Free Pregnancy Ctr., 
229 Cal. App. 633 (1991) ........................... Connerly State Personnel Bd., Cal.4th 1169 (2006) ................................ Conservatorship Whitley, Cal.4th 1026 (2010) ................................ Covina Governing Bd., Cal. App. 314 (1997)............................. Davey Southern Pacific Co., 116 Cal. 325 (1897) .............. Edgerton State Pers. Bd., Cal. App. 4th 1350 (2000) ........................... 

Folsum Butte County Assn Govts, Cal.3d 668 (1982) ................................. Horn County Ventura, Cal.3d 605 (1979) ................ Hospital Council Cal. Superior Ct., Cal. App. 331 (1973)............................. Marriage Flaherty, Cal.3d 637 (1982) ................ Lentz McMahon, Cal.3d 393 (1989)....................... Meyer Spring Spectrum, L.P., 
445 Cal.4th 634 (2009) ................................ 

People rel. Cooper Mitchell Brothers 
Santa Ana Theater, 165 Cal. App. 378 (1985) ........... Riverwatch County San Diego, 
175 Cal. App. 4th 768 (2009) Rubin Green, Cal.4th 1187 (1993) ......................... Sturgeon Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1407 (2009) .............. Vasquez State California, Cal.4th 243 (2008) ................................. Walmart Real Estate Bus. Trust City Council, 
132 Cal. App. 4th 614 (2005) ........................... Washburn City Berkeley, 
195 Cal. App. 578 (1987) .......................... 

Wolfgram Wells Fargo Bank, Cal. App. 4th (1997) ............................ 
Woodland Hills Residents Assn. City Council, Cal.3d 917 (1979) ................................. 
Young Redman, Cal. App. 827 (1976) .................. 

Federal Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const., amend. I..................................... 

State Constitutional Provisions 
Cal. Const., art.  3..................................... 

Federal Statutes and Regulations U.S.C.  1101(a)(15)(S) ................................... U.S.C.   1101(a)(15)(T) .................................. U.S.C.  1101(a)(15)(U)................................... U.S.C.  1373 ........................................... U.S.C.  1644 ........................................... C.F.R.  245.23.......................................... C.F.R.  245.24.......................................... 

State Statutes Page 
Civ. Code  1717(a) ....................................... 
Civ. Code  1780(e) ....................................... 
Civ. Code  3513 .......................................... 
Code Civ. Proc.  128.5(a) .................................. 
Code Civ. Proc.  526a ..................................... 
Code Civ. Proc.  1021.5 ............................. passim 
Penal Code  834b......................................... INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT THE CASE. September 20, 2006, open court, counsel for Interveners voluntarily and unambiguously relinquished any claim for award attorneys fees from Harold Sturgeon, taxpayer and resident the City Los Angeles who, the exercise his constitutional rights, had initiated lawsuit against the Chief Police and the Board Police Commissioners the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).  Interveners were seeking join Sturgeons lawsuit the side the LAPD, but the trial court had not yet ruled their motion intervene.  Sturgeon objected the intervention, asserting, among other concerns, that Interveners presence the lawsuit and, particular, claim for award attorneys fees their proposed Complaint Intervention, would enlarge the issues litigated. response, Interveners ACLU counsel represented the Court that her clients would withdraw the claim: 
[By Counsel for Interveners]  Your Honor, the attorneys fees the one issue that plaintiffs (sic) object enlarging the issue this case, said, far the substantive issue, were not enlarging any  the fees are the contentious issue, wed willing waive fees this case. 
Reporters Transcript Proceedings, September 20, 2006 (RT), 
13.1   After Interveners withdrew the claim from their proposed Complaint Intervention, the Court overruled Sturgeons other various objections and allowed Interveners join the litigation defendants. 
Despite their representations Sturgeon and the trial court that they would not seek award fees, Interveners did just that nearly three years later, after this Court affirmed judgment entered favor the LAPD.  The trial court denied Interveners motion, however, finding that they had waived any claim seek award fees and also finding that, because Interveners had joined Sturgeons lawsuit behalf public entity defendants that were not eligible for award fees under section 1021.5 the Code Civil Procedure (section 1021.5), Interveners stood the shoes the public entity defendants and therefore were not eligible for award either.  
Indeed, any other ruling would have been erroneous, not only had Sturgeon relied Interveners representation that they order filed April 16, 2010, the Court granted Sturgeons motion augment the record appeal with this transcript.  
would not seek award fees, but awarding fees entities that 
voluntarily join lawsuits behalf  public entity defendants would turn section 1021.5 its head.  Prospective plaintiffs contemplating litigation against public entity defendants would not risk filing suit out fear that they could required pay potentially enormous awards attorneys fees unknown and unforeseen persons entities that might seek intervene behalf the government. Holding otherwise would create substantial disincentive for persons contemplating public interest litigation and would have tremendous chilling effect public interest lawsuits. would make public interest litigation infeasible.  
For these and the other compelling reasons set forth below, the trial courts denial Interveners fee motion should affirmed. the unlikely event that the Court does not affirm the denial, this matter must remanded the trial court for consideration whether Interveners can satisfy the various elements required for award attorneys fees under section 1021.5, and, so, for determination the amount any award.  Sturgeon respectfully 
submits, however, that such remand necessary, the trial 
courts ruling should affirmed its entirety. 

II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 
Sturgeon initiated this action against the LAPD May 2006.  Clerks Transcript (CT) 000007. August 16, 2006, the LAPD answered Sturgeons complaint after the trial court denied motion dismiss.  Id. 000006. August 22, 2006, Interveners filed motion intervene and proposed complaint intervention. Id. 000009-65.  The prayer for relief the proposed Complaint Intervention stated: 
WHEREFORE, Defendant-Interveners pray for judgment follows: 	
For dismissal Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice; 	
For attorneys fees; 	
For costs suit; and For any such relief the Court deems just. Id. 000103. September 20, 2006, the trial court granted the motion intervene, not matter right, but matter permission, after Interveners disavowed the claim their prayer for 
relief requesting award attorneys fees.  Id. 000097-98; and 18. June 25, 2008, the trial court granted summary judgment the LAPDs favor.  Id. 000234-43. final judgment was entered July 2008.  Id. 000003.  Sturgeon appealed, but the trial courts ruling was affirmed this Court June 17, 2009.  Sturgeon 
Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1407 (2009).  Approximately two months later, August 14, 2009, Interveners attempted file motion this Court, not the trial court seeking award attorneys fees pursuant Code Civ. Proc. section 1021.5.  Sturgeon 
Bratton, Case No. B209913, Order (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2009). The Court denied Interveners motion for filing.  Id. November 2009, Interveners filed their motion the trial court. 000244-566.  The trial court issued tentative ruling denying Interveners fee motion January 2010.  Id. 001187
92. its tentative ruling, which subsequently became the final ruling, the trial court found that Interveners had waived any claim for award attorneys fees more than three years earlier and that Interveners were not eligible for award any event because they had intervened behalf public entity defendants that were not eligible for award under section 1021.5.  Id. 001190-92.  The trial court expressly declined rule the other factual and legal issues raised Interveners motion, including whether Interveners could satisfy the requirements section 1021.5 what reasonable award might have been.  Id. 001192 (In light this ruling, the Court declines rule the issues presented the parties.). Interveners did not seek challenge the trial courts tentative ruling. Id. 001187.  This appeal followed.  Id. 001193-95.  
III. ARGUMENT. Standard Review. 
The standard review for decision granting denying motion for award attorneys fees abuse discretion. Conservatorship Whitley, Cal.4th 1206, 1213 (2010). However, novo review such trial court order warranted where the determination whether the criteria for award attorney fees and costs this context have been satisfied amounts statutory construction and question law. Id. (quoting, Connerly State Personnel Bd., Cal.4th 1169, 1175 (2006)). Interveners Waived Any Claim for Fees. 
Interveners principal argument that, when their counsel stated September 20, 2006 open court that, if the fees are the contentious issue, wed willing waive fees this case, her words were effect.  According Interveners, section 3513 the Civil Code (section 3513) precludes them from waiving their statutory right attorneys fees.  Opening Brief Appellants/ Interveners (Op. Brf.) 
Section 3513 states, its entirety:  Anyone may waive the advantage law intended solely for his benefit. But law established for public reason cannot contravened private agreement.  Civ. Code  3513.  Interveners argue that this means that party may waive statutory right where its public benefit merely incidental its primary purpose, but waiver unenforceable where would seriously compromise any public purpose the statute was intended serve.  Op. Brf. (citing Azteca Const., Inc. ADR Consulting, Inc., 121 Cal. App. 4th 1156, 1166 (2004)). 
There are multiple errors Interveners argument.  First and foremost, the time the September 20, 2006 hearing, Interveners 
had statutory right attorneys fees waive.  Section 1021.5 
applies successful parties certain types litigation, and Interveners were not yet parties Sturgeons lawsuit, much less successful parties.  They were complete outsiders.  Before Interveners could have statutory right attorneys fees, the following had occur:  (1) the trial court would have grant their motion intervene; (2) they would have prevail the merits the underlying action; (3) they would have demonstrate the trial court that they satisfied the stringent requirements section 1021.5; and (4) they would have submit competent evidence demonstrating the amount time spent the matter and reasonable hourly compensation for each  attorney.2   What Interveners waived the September 20, 2006 hearing was not any statutory right attorneys fees.  Rather, they waived any claim seeking award attorneys fees the future. claim seeking award fees some indefinite point time the future obviously materially different Sturgeon demonstrated the lower court and the trial court found, because Interveners aligned themselves with public entity defendants, they could never possess right seek award fees under Code Civ. Proc. section 1021.5. 
from fully vested, present right fees.  According Interveners 
own argument, section 3513 prohibits the waiver statutory rights, not mere claims possible, future rights. 
Nor Interveners cite any authority which court has ever applied Civ. Code section 3513 strike down express waiver statutory right attorneys fees, much less the waiver claim for future award attorneys fees. claim for possible, future award attorneys fees bears resemblance any the unqualified, fully vested rights which section 3513 generally has been applied.  See generally Arntz Buildlers Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 4th 1195, 1206-07 (2004) (collecting cases).  Interveners completely fail demonstrate that section 3513 prohibits prospective litigants which all Interveners were before the trial court granted their motion intervene from waiving any claim seek award attorneys fees the future. addition, while the purpose section 1021.5 may encourage the enforcement important public policies persons entities acting private attorney generals (see Conservatorship Whitley, Cal.4th 1217-18), the primary and the most direct and 
obvious beneficiaries the provision are the successful litigants 
themselves.  Section 1021.5 rewards successful litigants providing them with award attorneys fees.  When compared the direct and obvious benefit that the statute provides successful litigants, any public benefit merely incidental.  Section 3513 does not apply. 
Nor would seriously compromise any public purpose litigant especially prospective litigant seeking intervene ongoing litigation voluntarily chooses waive claim seek future award attorneys fees. Folsum Butte County Assn Govts, Cal.3d 668, 678-79 (1982), the Supreme Court California impliedly held that awards attorneys fees under section 1021.5 could waived part settlement agreement stipulated judgment.  See also Washburn City Berkeley, 195 Cal. App. 578, 583 (1987).  Surely, the choice forego claim seeking award fees will not undermine the enforcement any important public policy. will not discourage other actual prospective litigants from prosecuting participating public interest litigation.  Nor will cause other actual prospective litigants forego the possibility seeking future awards attorneys fees. will not affect the public any meaningful way, much less seriously compromise public purpose. fact, Interveners completely fail address, much less demonstrate, how giving effect express, unambiguous, and voluntary waiver claim seek future award attorneys fees would compromise any public purpose otherwise harm the general public.  Presumably, prospective litigant who waives any claim seek award attorneys fees lawsuit makes calculation that the rewards for prosecuting participating the lawsuit are sufficient without the added benefit potential award attorneys fees.  Interveners obviously made such calculation the September 20, 2006 hearing.  They appear have decided that waiving any claim seek future award attorneys fees from Sturgeon might help convince the trial court allow them participate Sturgeons lawsuit.  Intervenors present case which litigant prospective litigant made express waiver claim attorneys fees (or any other type waiver, for that matter), obtained benefit from that waiver, then attempted renege the waiver, citing section 3513.  Interveners made their choice and they should held it. They certainly not identify any reason why their choice 
would seriously compromise any public purpose behind section 1021.5. 
Moreover, nothing Code Civ. Proc. section 1021.5 indicates that the Legislature intended limit the discretion prospective actual litigants determine for themselves whether seek awards attorneys fees.  The Legislature clearly could have mandated awards attorneys fees forbid waivers attorneys fees under section 1021.5, intended.  The Legislature has done other contexts.  See Civ. Code  1717(a) and 1780(e). did not section 1021.5. litigant prosecutes public interest lawsuit successfully but does not file motion for attorneys fees, the public policy behind section 1021.5 does not compel the successful litigant accept award attorneys fees.  The decision not seek award attorneys fees not materially different from the voluntary waiver any claim seeking award attorneys fees, yet Interveners not argue that they would compelled accept fee award they had not moved for one.  Interveners assertion that not giving effect its unambiguous, voluntary waiver any claim 
seeking award attorneys fees  would seriously compromise 
public purpose does not withstand scrutiny.3 
Finally, Interveners argument also fails because there simply was agreement, private otherwise, which Interveners waived any claim seek award attorneys fees Sturgeons lawsuit.  Section 3513 expressly prohibits certain types waivers private agreement, and Sturgeon never agreed, expressly impliedly, that, Interveners waived any claim seeking award attorneys fees, then would not object their intervention this lawsuit.  Reporters Transcript Proceedings (Tr.),  September 20, 2006, 14-17.4   Sturgeon continued object any proposed intervention.  Id. this regard, Interveners reliance Covina Governing Bd., Cal. App. 314, 322-23 (1997) misplaced. Covina, Federal courts have problem upholding waivers claims for attorneys fees under U.S.C.  1988, analogous federal statute.  Wakefield Mathews, 852 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Evans Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986). order entered April 16, 2010, this Court granted Sturgeons Motion Augment the Record Appeal include copy this transcript. 
teacher employed community college full-time temporary 
employee for single school year sought compel the college rehire him for succeeding school year even though provision the Education Code prohibited the college from rehiring him anything other than probationary employee.  The college had admitted that the teacher was well qualified and would acceptable temporary employee, but for the legal provision prohibiting his re-employment anything other than probationary employee. Covina, Cal. App. 317 n.3. open court, the teacher purported waive his right re-employed probationary employee.  The Court declined give effect the purported waiver, citing separate provision the Education Code that expressly prohibited any contract agreement, express implied, made employee waive the benefits this chapter .  Id. 322. 
The Court Covina also referenced section 3153 (id. 32223), but simply not possible draw any meaningful conclusions from Covina about its application section 3513, the decision fails distinguish between Education Code provision and section 3513. addition, there appeared least implied agreement rehire the teacher the Court accepted the waiver. contrast, 
there was not even hint implied agreement this case, Sturgeon continued object Interveners participation this lawsuit even after they  waived any claim seeking award attorneys fees. 14-17.  For this and other reasons,  Covina inapposite.   Interveners unambiguous and voluntary waiver any claim seeking award attorneys fees must upheld. 	Interveners Are Not Eligible for 
Award Fees.

 Even Interveners had not waived any claim for award attorneys fees, they are not eligible for award any event. has long been established that, when person entity permitted intervene pending lawsuit, the intervener regarded plaintiff defendant and is limited the same procedure and remedies such original party, either for the purpose defeating the action resisting the claim the plaintiff. Boskowitz Thompson, 144 Cal. 724, 729 (1904) (emphasis added). More recently has been held that: 
when party qualifies and enters action 
intervener, vested with all the same procedural 
rights and remedies the original parties, including the 
right seek attorneys fees under section 1021.5 
public interest lawsuit equal terms with the original 
parties. City Santa Monica Stewart, 126 Cal. App. 4th 43, (2005) (emphasis added). 
Interveners sought and obtained permission enter this action behalf the LAPD, which undeniably public entity.5   Section 1021.5 expressly exempts public entities from recovering awards attorneys fees against private parties:  With respect actions involving public entities, this section applies allowances against, but not favor of, public entities .  Code Civ. Proc.  1021.5. Because the LAPD could not recover attorneys fees from Sturgeon under section 1021.5 and Interveners are limited the same procedures and remedies available the LAPD, (Boskowitz, 144 Cal. 729), Interveners cannot recover fees from Sturgeon under section 1021.5 either. clear, Sturgeon named individual officials the LAPD defendants, albeit their official capacities only. makes difference the outcome, however.   People ex. rel. Cooper Mitchell Brothers Santa Ana Theater, 165 Cal. App. 378, 386 (1985) (city attorney acting his official capacity deemed public entity for purposes section 1021.5). 
Notably, Interveners not cite single case which person entity intervened lawsuit behalf governmental defendant and was awarded attorneys fees from private party plaintiff pursuant section 1021.5.  Nor has Sturgeon been able identify such case.  Interveners themselves characterize the circumstances their request undoubtedly rare.  Op. Brf. They are more than rare; they are unprecedented. 
Interveners try ignore the obvious limitations Interveners set forth Boskowitz and City Santa Monica making the completely disingenuous claim that award attorneys fees not remedy. course is.  See, e.g., Meyer Spring Spectrum, L.P., Cal.4th 634, 644 (2009) (referring the critical attorney fee remedy lawsuits under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act); Armendariz Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., Cal.4th 83, 103 (2000) (referring punitive damages and attorney fees remedies); Rubin Green, Cal.4th 1187, 1199 (1993) (noting that potential remedies include the recovery attorneys fees).  Interveners even included award attorneys fees among 
the various remedies they requested their prayer for relief. 
000103. Interveners themselves acknowledge an Intervener takes suit finds it and cannot change the position the parties.  Op. Brf. (quoting, Hosp. Council Cal Superior Ct., Cal. App. 331, 336 (1973)). seeking award attorneys fees from Sturgeon under section 1021.5 even though the LAPD could not recover attorneys fees from Sturgeon under this same provision, Interveners are exceeding the procedures and remedies available the party with which they voluntarily aligned themselves. They are seeking change the position the parties.  They are ignoring the requirement that they take Sturgeons lawsuit they found it. 
Moreover, allowing Interveners who voluntarily join lawsuits behalf public entity defendants seek awards attorneys fees against private party plaintiffs would turn section 1021.5 its head. set forth above, the purpose section 1021.5 encourage the private enforcement important public policies.  Conservatorship Whitley, Cal.4th 1217-18.  Prospective plaintiffs contemplating 
litigation against the government would not dare risk filing suit out 
fear that they could required satisfy the attorneys fees 
unknown and unforeseen persons entities that might seek 
intervene the governments behalf.  The mere possibility 
award would create substantial disincentive for bringing suit against 
the government and would have enormous chilling effect public 
interest lawsuits. would make public interest litigation infeasible 
and defeat the purpose section 1021.5. Id. Award Fees Barred the 
Doctrine Equitable Estoppel. 

The doctrine equitable estoppel also bars Interveners 
motion for award attorneys fees.  Equitable estoppel stands for 
the general proposition that if representation made another also would particularly anomalous the context taxpayer lawsuits such this one, brought under Code Civil Procedure Section 526a. well-established that the primary purpose section 526a enable large body the citizenry challenge governmental action which would otherwise unchallenged the courts because the standing requirement. Blair Pitchess, Cal.3d 258, 267-68 (1971).  Rather than encouraging taxpayers challenge allegedly unlawful expenditures public resources, requiring taxpayers pay the attorneys fees private parties who intervene would discourage such suits and undermine the purpose section 526a. 
who deals upon the faith it, the former must make the 
representation good knew was bound know false. Lentz McMahon, Cal.3d 393, 398-99 (1989).  Generally, speaking, four elements must present  (1) the party estopped must apprised the facts; (2) must intend that his conduct shall acted upon, must act that the party asserting the estoppel had right believe was intended; (3) the other party must ignorant the true state facts; and (4) must rely upon the conduct his injury  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
When Interveners voluntarily made unambiguous and unqualified representation open court September 20, 2006 that they would not seek award attorneys fees from Sturgeon, had every right believe Interveners were being truthful.  That representation has been proven false.  Interveners either had intention abide their representation Sturgeon and the Court when they made September 2006, they acted with complete disregard for their prior representation when they filed their motion for attorneys fees three years later.  However, facts case law identified Interveners should have put Sturgeon notice that Interveners representation was false.  Sturgeon was entirely correct take Interveners their word. addition, Sturgeon clearly relied Interveners false representation continuing press his claims against the LAPD. 000672-673.  Had Sturgeon known September 2006 that, after this Court affirmed the trial courts judgment favor the LAPD, Interveners would seek tax Sturgeon with enormous award attorneys fees the same attorneys fees Interveners disclaimed the September 20, 2006 hearing, Sturgeon may well have chosen different path.  Id. 000673. certainly would have appealed the order granting Interveners motion intervene.  Id. require Sturgeon pay attorneys fees Interveners after reasonably relied Interveners unambiguous and unqualified waiver any claim seeking award attorneys fees would extraordinarily prejudicial Sturgeon.  Id.  Justice and right require Interveners motion denied.  Lentz, Cal.3d 399. Award Fees Would Violate 
Sturgeons Constitutional Rights. award attorneys fees also would violate Sturgeons constitutional rights.  The Supreme Court California has recognized that the act filing suit against governmental entity represents exercise the right petition and thus invokes constitutional protection. City Long Beach Bozek, Cal.3d 527, 534 (1982).  The right petition, like the right free speech, of the essence persons] guaranteed personal liberty.  Id. 536 (quoting, DeJong Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 366 (1937). accorded a paramount and preferred place our democratic system. Id. 532 (quoting, American Civil Liberties Union Board Education, Cal.2d 167, 178 (1961)).  Like the right free speech, should scrupulously protected. Id. 536; see also Wolfgram Wells Fargo Bank, Cal. App. 4th 43, (1997) ([A]ny impairment the right petition, including any penalty after the fact, must narrowly drawn.).  Moreover, [f]ree access the courts important and valuable aspect effective system jurisprudence, and party possessing colorable claim must 
allowed assert without fear suffering penalty more severe 
than that typically imposed defeated parties. Young Redman, Cal. App. 827, 838 (1976). 
Sturgeon sued the LAPD.  Sturgeon did not sue Interveners any other private party.  The bringing suits against the government absolutely privileged.  City Long Beach, Cal.3d 539.  The only possible penalty Sturgeon could have faced result filing suit against the government was the possibility award fees and costs was determined that his lawsuit had not been brought good faith. Id. 537; Code Civ. Proc. 128.5(a). change this calculation because Interveners were allowed join Sturgeons lawsuit defendants, not even matter right but matter permission (RT 18), would impermissibly impinge Sturgeons right petition under both the U.S. Constitution and the California Constitution.  U.S. Const., amend. Cal. Const., art.  
There has never been any claim, much less finding, that Sturgeons lawsuit was not brought good faith. also would have substantial chilling effect other 
plaintiffs contemplating future lawsuits against the government. Bozek, Cal.3d 535.  Rather than the certainty knowing that the only possible penalty she might face for bringing lawsuit against the government was award fees and costs the lawsuit was determined not good faith, plaintiff bringing suit against the government would face the possibility that complete strangers might thrust themselves into the suit the side the government, then seek award attorneys fees from the plaintiff. The uncertainty possibly enormous award fees Interveners claim have expended more than $350,000 worth attorney time defending Sturgeons lawsuit against the LAPD would likely chill all but the most intrepid plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Marriage Flaherty, Cal.3d 637, 650 (1982) (noting the special care that must taken, the context defining whether appeal frivolous, to avoid serious chilling effect the assertions litigants rights appeal).  This chilling effect even greater here, where Interveners expressly disavowed any claim for attorneys fees 
when they joined this lawsuit, then attempted renege their 
disavowal after several years litigation.  
Awarding Interveners attorneys fees also would violate Sturgeons due process rights.  Due process principles require reasonable notice and opportunity heard before governmental deprivation significant property interest. Horn County  Ventura, Cal.3d 605, 612 (1979).  Interveners are invoking state law and state process deprive Sturgeon significant property interest; they seek compel him pay substantial award attorneys fees despite the fact that, early this litigation and open court, they expressly disavowed any claim for award attorneys fees.  Sturgeon then proceeded litigate this case based upon Interveners representation that they would not seek award. Simply put, Sturgeon had reason suspect that attorneys fees could awarded against him.  Fundamental fairness and the integrity the judicial system, well the most basic principles due process, preclude any award attorneys fees against Sturgeon under the circumstances presented here. Marriage Flaherty, supra (overturning fine imposed attorney for filing frivolous appeal where the attorney had notice the possibility fine); Blumenthal Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 317, 320 (1980) (vacating sanctions award against attorney where attorney had notice that sanctions were being sought against him personally). 	Interveners Are Not Entitled 
Award Fees Because They Cannot 
Satisfy the Requirements Section 
1021.5. 

Interveners argue that the trial court erred denying [their] motion because they satisfy the requirements Section 1021.5.  Op. Brf. 15.  The trial court never reached the issue whether Interveners could satisfy the requirements section 1021.5, however. 001192 (In light this ruling, the Court declines rule the issues presented the parties.).  Interveners entire argument this regard misleading best.    
Nonetheless, section 1021.5 represents one several exceptions the general rule that each party must bear its own attorneys fees.  Bouvia County Los Angeles, 195 Cal. App. 1075, 1082 (1987).  The provision codifies courts traditional equitable discretion regarding awards attorneys fees, and courts 
retain considerable discretion within the statutes parameters. 
Vasquez State California, Cal.4th 243, 250 (2008). court may award attorneys fees under section 1021.5 only the statutes requirements are satisfied.  Id.  Thus, court may award attorneys fees a successful party only the action has resulted the enforcement important right affecting the public interest.  Id. (quoting, Code Civ. Proc. 1021.5).  Three additional elements also must satisfied:  (a) significant benefit, whether pecuniary nonpecuniary, has been conferred the general public large class persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden private enforcement, enforcement one public entity against another public entity, are such make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not the interest justice paid out the recovery, any. Id. court must realistically assess the litigation and determine, from practical perspective, whether not the action served vindicate important right justify attorney fee award under private attorney general theory. Id. (quoting, 
This third element does not apply here. 
Woodland Hills Residents Assn. City Council, Cal.3d 917, 938 
(1979) (Woodland Hills)). 
The trial court, not this Court, clearly the best position make any findings regarding the applicability section 1021.5. Consequently, the unlikely event this Court determines necessary reach the issue the applicability section 1021.5, the best practice would remand this matter the trial court for consideration this issue.  Because Interveners have attempted demonstrate that they satisfy the stringent requirements section 1021.5, however, Sturgeon compelled respond.   
Obviously, Interveners did not initiate this action, but instead voluntarily joined the side the LAPD even though the LAPD was well-represented the City Attorneys office.  Thus, the typical justification for award attorneys fees provide incentive for privately initiated actions that enforce important rights for large numbers persons simply not present here. 	Interveners Have Not Enforced Any Cognizable Right. 
Interveners fail demonstrate that they have enforced any cognizable right, much less important right affecting the public interest. initial matter, the trial court rejected Interveners request allowed join this lawsuit matter right. 
18. allowed permissive intervention not because Interveners claimed protecting any particular right, but because found [t]he case before the Court significant interest many diverse individuals and organizations. 000234.  The trial court declared that wanted the legal positions the widest possible cross-section the community [to] presented. Id. 000234-35.  Having interest matter clearly not the same having legal right.  Likewise, having legal position matter clearly different from having legal right.  While Interveners may have been interested Special Order and may have taken legal position this particular police policy, section 1021.5 implicated only when important rights are enforced. 
Sturgeons lawsuit challenged policy choice the LAPD and 
various practices implementing that policy.  The pertinent provision the policy, often referred Special Order 40, states, Officers shall not initiate police action where the objective discover the alien status person. 000239.  The outcome Sturgeons lawsuit was that Special Order survived facial challenge.  Only the text the policy, not the practices implementing the policy, was determined not conflict with two federal statutes, U.S.C.  1373 and 1644, and one California statute, Penal Code  834b.  The trial court did not reach the question whether the LAPDs practices under Special Order 40, which Sturgeon also had challenged, were consistent conflict with federal state law. 000234-43. Thus, whatever right Interveners may claim have enforced, their alleged success was limited the fact the trial court did not consider any the far more significant practices the LAPD that implement its generic, not cryptic, written policy.    
Moreover, Interveners claim have enforced important right illusory. not even clear what right Interveners claim have enforced. the section their brief purportedly addressing this inquiry, Interveners reference federal preemption, fundamental principles our federal system government, and the concurrent sovereignty the states subject only the limitations imposed the Supremacy Clause.  Op. Brf. 18. Federal preemption, principles federalism, and state sovereignty are not rights, however.  They are structural principles underlying the federal system government the United States.  Id. Interveners cite authority supporting the proposition that there right federal preemption, principles federalism, state sovereignty.  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held otherwise. Chapman Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 600, 613 (1979) (holding that the Supremacy Clause not right-securing clause, but clause requiring federal law prevail when there conflict with law based state power).   
Elsewhere, Interveners make reference the existing right immigrants free victimization because their immigration status and make contact with police officers without fear detection and deportation.  Op. Brf.  Interveners make effort identify the source this allegedly existing right. not even 
clear Interveners are referring one alleged right two separate, 
alleged rights.  Interveners generalized reference right free victimization because immigration status too broad even analyze meaningful legal right.  Because Interveners not even attempt identify this alleged right any meaningful way, they have not demonstrated how could qualify important right affecting the public interest for purposes award attorneys fee under section 1021.5. 
Similarly, Interveners not identify any constitutional, statutory, other source law recognizing the alleged right aliens who are not lawfully present the United States avoid detection deportation.  Enforcement this non-existent right cannot support award attorneys fees. 
Nor can Interveners claim have enforced any equal protection rights. its face, Special Order does not establish differentiate between classes persons. does not allow officers initiate police actions where the objective discover the alien status some classifications persons, but not others. does not 
differentiate between aliens and non-aliens. expressly applies all 
persons.  Equal protection not even implicated. the extent that Interveners might claim have enforced the equal protection rights aliens who are not lawfully present the United States, has long been established that such persons are not suspect class.  Plyler Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).  Since aliens who are not lawfully present the United States are not suspect class, they not enjoy any special equal protection rights arising from their illegal status.  
Nor can Interveners claim have enforced any alleged right persons not asked about their immigration status.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that local police officers have the discretion inquire about persons immigration status without independent, reasonable suspicion.  Muehler Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005); see also Martinez-Medina Holder, 616 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2010). any event, Sturgeon never contended that officers could stop persons randomly the street and inquire about their immigration status solely because their appearance language. 
See, e.g., 000208.  Sturgeon maintained that such conduct 
would likely violate the LAPDs prohibition racial profiling.  Id.  
Because Interveners have not demonstrated that their voluntary involvement this lawsuit resulted the enforcement any congnizable legal right, they are not entitled award attorneys fees under section 1021.5. 	Interveners Have Not Conferred Any 
Significant Benefit the General Public Large Class Persons. 

Since Interveners have not demonstrated that they have enforced any cognizable right intervening Sturgeons lawsuit, not necessary consider whether the enforcement such right affected the public interest whether Interveners conferred significant benefit the general public large class persons. Regardless, clear that Interveners have not affected conferred any lasting benefit, significant otherwise, the general public anyone else because Special Order not mandated any law. merely policy choice.  The LAPD could change its policy tomorrow were inclined. 
Interveners claims have affected the public interest and 
conferred substantial benefit large number people Los Angeles and beyond not withstand scrutiny.  Op. Brf. 19-21. Interveners make generalized claim having benefitted public safety Los Angeles.  Id.  They hypothesize that Special Order builds trust and encourages members the immigrant community come forward report crimes and provide information the police.9 Id.  Without any evidentiary support, they speculate, shamefully, that, Sturgeon had been successful, immigrants who are victims witnesses would deterred from contacting the police out fear detection and deportation.  Id. course, lawful immigrants have reason fear detection deportation they contact the police report crime come forward with information about criminal activity. only unlawful immigrants other aliens not present the United States legally who may have reason fear detection deportation.  Interveners thus conferred benefit 
Interveners provide surveys statistical evidence demonstrating that members the immigrant community are more likely come forward because Special Order 40.  Nor they provide any other evidence, anecdotal otherwise, demonstrating that this the case. 
lawful immigrants.  With respect unlawful immigrants and other persons not legally present the United States, Interveners not even acknowledge, much less try refute, the obviously compelling public interest the enforcement federal immigration laws and the obvious public benefits that result from respecting the rule law. Woodland Hills, Cal.3d 917, 939 (the public always has significant interest seeking that legal strictures are properly enforced and, thus, real sense, the public always derives benefit when illegal private public conduct rectified). 
Interveners argument completely ignores various visa programs created the federal government, such the and visa programs, that assist unlawfully present aliens who are victims witnesses crimes.  See, e.g., U.S.C.  1101(a)(15)(S), (T), and (U). some circumstances, both unlawfully present aliens who qualify for these programs and their family members are able adjust their status that lawful permanent residents. C.F.R.  245.23 and 245.24. 
Nonetheless, like the alleged right that Interveners claim have enforced, Interveners assertion that they have conferred 
substantial benefit large number people Los Angeles, 
apparently allowing illegal aliens remain undetected and undiscovered, illusion.  Both the LAPD and Interveners argued the trial court that should analyze Special Order its face and not consider any the unwritten practices which the LAPD had implemented its policy.  When attempting recover award attorneys fees, however, Interveners try ignore the actual language Special Order 40.  Again, Special Order states pertinent part, Officers shall not initiate police action where the objective discover the alien status person.10 000239. The trial court ruled that Special Order neither mentions nor refers communications between police officers and federal immigration officials regarding the immigration status individual and does not prohibit restrict such communication. 000241 and 000242.  Thus, Special Order does not limit the ability officer contact federal immigration officials inquire about any persons immigration status report suspected illegal alien. 
Sturgeon did not challenge the portion Special Order that prohibits officers from arresting booking persons for the crime illegal entry. 000623. 
victim witness approaches the LAPD report crime provide 
information about crime and officer suspects learns that the victim witness unlawfully present alien, its face Special Order does not prohibit restrict that officer from contacting federal immigration officials inquire about the victims witness immigration status report his her unlawful status. 
Nor does Special Order its face prevent officer from asking person about his her immigration status. their summary judgment motion, Defendants asserted that officers have the discretion inquire about any persons immigration status long the inquiry undertaken part criminal investigation. 000681. support this assertion, Defendants cited the deposition Deputy Chief Sergio Diaz, who testified: 
Heres the one instance under which you should not inquire. this your only your only reason for making this contact, for initiating action discover the alien status individual, dont it. youre doing anything anything else thats legitimate  and dont even that far. stop there.  Dont this. if, during the course investigation And, again, the possibilities are endless But if, during the course investigation, you feel the need appropriately ask about persons immigration status, you can that. 
Id.  Special Order only prohibits police action whether the sole 
objective ascertain immigration status.  Id. affirming the trial courts grant summary judgment, this Court found that all the LAPD witnesses agreed that [Special Order 40] prohibits 
initiating investigation into individual solely determine that persons immigration status. Sturgeon, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1415 (emphasis original).  Thus, according this Court and the LAPD, Special Order does not prohibit restrict officer from asking victim, witness, any other person about his her immigration status long the inquiry part criminal investigation. sum, according this Court, the trial court, and the LAPD, its face Special Order does not actually what Interveners claim does. does not prevent officers from contacting federal immigration officials obtain information about persons immigration status report person who suspected known alien unlawfully present the United States.  Nor does prevent officers from asking victims, witnesses, any other persons about their immigration status long part criminal investigation.  The notion that, because Special Order 40, illegal 
alien who contacts the police report crime provide information 
about criminal activity will not have his her status asked about, discovered, reported federal immigration officials simply false.  The substantial benefit Interveners claim have conferred a large number people Los Angeles false illusion.11 
Nor can Interveners claim have conferred substantial benefit persons beyond the City Los Angeles reason the alleged precedential value the Courts ruling.  Again, the trial courts ruling was limited analysis Special Order its face.  While certainly the case that other cities may have policies like Special Order 40, Interveners have presented evidence demonstrating that other cities have adopted policies that, their face, are identical Special Order 40. likely that there are wide range such policies and that each has its own unique language. way example, the City San Francisco has very specific policy, does the City Chicago. 001169-1174. 
Nor can Interveners claim that, without Special Order 40, officers could stop persons based their appearance language and inquire about their immigration status.  Such conduct would prohibited the LAPDs prohibition racial profiling. 000208.  
Obviously, such policies would have analyzed based their unique language.  Any precedential effect limited, exists all. Private Enforcement Was Necessary. 
Interveners cannot demonstrate that the necessity and financial burden private enforcement this case makes award attorneys fees appropriate.  Code Civ. Proc.  1021.5.  Interveners claim that they advanced significant theories adopted the trial court and affirmed the Court Appeal, which were not advanced the governmental entity.  Op. Brf. 21.  Interveners claim demonstrably false.  
First, Interveners claim that the LAPD, in its briefing and oral argument, made mention facial versus as-applied challenges, let along ma[d]e any attempt defend the trial courts reliance application this distinction. Id.  Interveners assertion that only they argued the facial versus as-applied distinction belied the trial courts ruling, which found that all parties have well and diligently briefed the pertinent issues for the Courts consideration and noted that: 
Defendants and Interveners bring their motions the same grounds, wit: 	Plaintiffs attack Special Order facial, opposed applied challenge. 	Plaintiff cannot show that Special Order conflicts with federal state law. 000237; see also id. 000210-21.  Nor can Intervenors claim that they single-handedly defended this distinction appeal.  Not only did this Court obviously have the trial courts ruling before when considered Sturgeons appeal, but the LAPDs brief appeal expressly argued that Special Order policy, which how referred the text face the policy, did not violate conflict with federal law.12 001146-51.  The LAPDs arguments appeal regarding Special Order policy were largely indistinguishable from Intervenors arguments appeal regarding facial challenge the policy. Interveners make the same erroneous argument about 
Interveners and the LAPDs respective appellate argument concerning Penal Code  834b.  Op. Brf. 22-23.  Again, the LAPD also not known whether and what extent Intervenors and the LAPD may have coordinated their filings.  
actively and ably defended this Courts ruling with respect Penal 
Code  834b. 001162-65. this regard, Walmart Real Estate Bus. Trust City Council, 132 Cal. App. 4th 614 (2005) (Walmart), case cited Interveners, counsels against award attorneys fees here. issue Walmart was whether two private parties named real parties interest mandamus action against municipality could recover attorneys fees from the petitioner.13   The trial court denied the real parties interests motion for fees and, reviewing the denial, the Court Appeal asked, Did the private party advance significant factual legal theories adopted the court, thereby providing material non minimis contribution its judgment, which were nonduplicative those advanced the governmental entity?  Id. 623 (quoting, Committee Defend Reprod. Rights Free Pregnancy Ctr., 229 Cal. App. 633, 642-43 (1991)). 
Unlike this case, which Sturgeon named only public officials, their official capacities, defendants and Interveners voluntarily joined this suit the side the defendants, the petitioner Walmart had sued the private parties real parties interest. 
The answer that question clearly No. contrast this 
case, the municipality Walmart had not opposed the relief sought the petitioner.  Walmart, 132 Cal. App. 4th 618. fact, the municipality did not present any arguments the trial court all; simply asked the trial court for guidance.  Id. contrast, the real parties interest Walmart had opposed the issuance writ and challenged the merits the petitioners arguments.  Id. 622. the Court noted, public enforcement was not being effectively pursued. Id. 624 (emphasis added).  Unlike the municipality Walmart, the LAPD actively and ably defended its policy the trial court, then effectively defended the trial courts ruling before this Court filing comprehensive, 38-page appellate brief and appearing and arguing oral argument. 001117-68. 
Second, because the petitioner Walmart did not appeal, there was question about the necessity defending the trial courts ruling the appellate court.  Here, Interveners contend that was necessary for them defend the trial courts ruling appeal because, they claim, the LAPD allegedly made mention facial versus as-applied challenges, let alone ma[d]e any attempt defend 
this Courts reliance application this distinction.  Op. Brf. 
21. Not only this misreading Defendants appellate brief (see 001146-54), but also incorrect matter law. the LAPD succinctly argued this Court, [I]t the Trial Courts substantive ruling, not judicial reasoning argument, that the subject review. Id. 001146 (citing, Davey Southern Pacific Co., 116 Cal. 325, 330 (1897)).  Because was the trial courts decision grant summary judgment favor the LAPD that was appeal, not the reasoning behind that decision, Interveners cannot satisfy section 1021.5 claiming their participation the appeal was necessary defend the Courts reasoning.  Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, Interveners filed their appellate brief March 17, 2008, one day before the LAPD filed its appellate brief March 18, 2008.  Compare 001061-116 with 001117-67. Interveners cannot claim that their participation the appeal was necessary because they did not even wait see what arguments the LAPD might make appeal.  Interveners participation was not necessary within the meaning section 1021.5 either for purposes the underlying action the appeal because the LAPD actively and ably participated both the underlying action and the appeal.  Rather, Interveners efforts were largely duplicative the LAPDs work.  Consequently, Interveners are not entitled award attorneys fees for this, additional reason. 
Moreover, Interveners failed demonstrate that the cost [their] legal victory transcends [their] personal interest the subject the suit. Edgerton State Pers. Bd., Cal. App. 4th 1350, 1362 (2000).  This burden lies with Interveners.  Riverwatch County San Diego, 175 Cal. App. 4th 768, 777 (2009). try satisfy this burden, Interveners claimed the disproporationality requirement has been met because they allegedly had pecuniary interest the outcome the case.  Op. Brf. 24.   
First, irrelevant how much time Interveners attorneys claim have spent this matter the trial court level.  Interveners only ask for attorneys fees for their alleged work the appeal.  Id. Therefore, the  relevant question whether the attorneys fees allegedly incurred appeal are proportionally more than the value Interveners alleged interests the outcome.  While Interveners seek award approximately $75,000, substantial portion this 
figure for time allegedly spent preparing Interveners motion for 
fees.  Sturgeon submits that time spent preparing motion for fees should not considered any proportionality analysis because does not reflect the cost the legal victory, but instead reflects the cost the fee motion.  Woodland Hills, Cal.3d 941.    
Second, Interveners claim that they had pecuniary interest the outcome this litigation directly contradicts prior statements Interveners made the trial court. seeking intervene this action, Interveners represented that Break the Cycle will forced divert resources away from its mission, that Los Jornaleros members would not engage activity publicly indicating their ability for day work, and that Comite Jornaleros members would not engage activity publicly indicating their availability for day work. 000016-17. all three instances, Interveners sought intervention protect their pecuniary interests, specifically, monetary resources and income.  
Similarly, Instituto Educacion Popular del Sur California (IDEPSCA) represented that [t]he City would have terminate its contracts with IDEPSCA because managing the job centers and 
organizing the street corners would cease effective.  This would 
cause significant economic harm IDEPSCA:  the City contracts make about two-thirds IDEPSCAs budget. 000039. also was represented that the undocumented day laborers who are members Los Jornaleros, would unable look for work they now and that [i]t would difficult, not impossible, for them make themselves known potential employers they could not gather freely public places. 000032-33.  
Likewise, Break the Cycle represented that would forced divert resources away from our mission.  Significant time and effort would diverted. 000030.  While Sturgeon does not concede that any these claims are well-founded they would have resulted the Court had enjoined the expenditure taxpayer funds Special Order 40, Interveners own prior statements contradict their claims that they had financial interest the outcome this litigation.  Consequently, Interveners have not satisfied their burden demonstrating that the attorneys fees they allegedly incurred appeal transcended the potential monetary losses terminated 
contracts, lost wages, and diverted resources they claimed they would 
suffer result adverse ruling this litigation. sum, Interveners fail show that was necessary for them participate the appeal this matter that the financial burden they allegedly incurred participating the appeal outweighed their own financial interests.  Consequently, Interveners fail satisfy this necessary element any fee recovery well. Interveners Fee Request Not Reasonable. 
Although Interveners ask this Court find that they satisfy the requirements for award attorneys fees under section 1021.5, they not ask the Court assess award.  Their brief completely silent about what should happen the unlikely event that this Court reverses the ruling the trial court.  Because, again, the trial court did not reach any issue beyond Intervenors waiver any claim seeking award attorneys fees and their lack eligibility for any such award because they had aligned themselves with public-entity defendants, this matter must remanded the trial court any further proceedings are necessary. the extent the Court might see fit determine the amount any award issue that 
Interveners did not brief this Court Sturgeon respectfully refers 
the Court the compelling arguments submitted the trial court this regard. 000686-88.   

IV. CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons set forth above, Sturgeon requests that the ruling the trial court affirmed its entirety. the unlikely event that the ruling the trial court reversed, this matter must remanded the trial court for consideration all remaining issues. 
Dated:  January 10, 2011  Respectfully submitted,  
JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.  
By:_____________________  
Sterling Norris  
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee Counsel:  
Paul Orfanedes  
James Peterson  
JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.  
Suite 800  
425 Third Street, S.W.  
Washington,  20024  
Tel: (202) 646-5172  
Fax: (202) 646-5199  

CERTIFICATION WORD COUNT (Cal. Rules Court, Rule 8.204(c)(1)) certify that pursuant Rule 8.204(c)(1), the attached brief proportionally spaced, has typeface points more and contains  ____words 
Dated:  January 10, 2011 _________________________ 
Sterling Norris 

CERTIFICATE SERVICE 

DISTRICT COLUMBIA, CITY WASHINGTON employed the City Washington, District Columbia. over the age and not party the within action. business address 425 Third Street, S.W., Suite 800, Washington,  20024. January 10, 2011, served the foregoing document: 

APPELLEES ANSWER BRIEF the interested parties this action placing true and correct copy thereof sealed envelope addressed follows: 

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST deposited the sealed envelope, with postage thereupon fully prepaid, into United States Postal Service mailbox Washington, the same day this declaration was executed. aware that the postage cancellation date more than day later than the date this proof service, service may deemed invalid. declare under penalty perjury the laws the State California that the foregoing true and correct and that this declaration was executed January 10, 2011 Washington, D.C. 
DAVID ROTHSTEIN 

SERVICE LIST 
Sturgeon Bratton, al., Case No. 351646 
Counsel for Defendants William Bratton, John Mack, Shelley Freeman, Alan Skobin, Andrea Ordin, and Anthony Pacheco: 
Carmen Trutanich, City Attorney 
City Hall East, 7th Floor 
200 North Main Street 
Los Angeles,  90012 
Tel: (213) 978-8100 

Counsel for Interveners/Appellants Break the Cycle, Los Jornaleros, Comite Jornaleros, and Instituto Educacion Popular del Sur California: 
Hector Villagra, Esq. Belinda Escobosa Helzer, Esq. ACLU FOUNDATION SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 2140 Chapman Avenue, Suite 209 Orange,  92868 Tel: (714) 450-3962 
Trial Court Judge: 
The Hon. Ralph Treu 
c/o Clerk the Court 
Superior Court the State California, County
  Los Angeles 
111 Hill Street 
Los Angeles,  90012-3117 
Supreme Court California: 
Clerk (Four Copies) Supreme Court the State California 350 McAllister Street San Francisco,  94102



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