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US District Court NC Prelim Injunction Denied

US District Court NC Prelim Injunction Denied

Page 1: US District Court NC Prelim Injunction Denied

Category:Election Integrity

Number of Pages:125

Date Created:September 25, 2014

Date Uploaded to the Library:September 25, 2014

Tags:North Carolina, election integrity project, Voter ID, DOJ

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  Plaintiffs,  1:13CV658 
Official capacity Governor 
North Carolina, KIM WESTBROOK 
STRACH, her official capacity Executive Director the 
North Carolina State Board 
Elections, RHONDA AMOROSO, her official capacity 
Secretary the North Carolina 
State Board Elections, JOSHUA MALCOLM, his official 
Capacity member the North 
Carolina State Board Elections, 
PAUL FOLEY, his official 
Capacity member the North 
Carolina State Board Elections 
and MAJA KRICKER, her official 
capacity member the North 
Carolina State Board Elections, 
  Plaintiff-Intervenors,  1:13CV660 
JOSHUA HOWARD, his official 
capacity member the State 
Board Elections; RHONDA 
AMOROSO, her official capacity member the State Board 
his official capacity member the State Board Elections; 
PAUL FOLEY, his official 
capacity member the State 
Board Elections; MAJA KRICKER, her official capacity 
member the State Board 
Elections; and PATRICK 
MCCRORY, his official capacity the Governor the State 
North Carolina, 
  Plaintiff,  1:13CV861 
Executive Director the North 
Carolina State Board Elections, 
THOMAS SCHROEDER, District Judge. these related cases, Plaintiffs seek preliminary injunction pursuant Federal Rule Civil Procedure barring Defendants from implementing various provisions North Carolina Session Law 2013-381 (SL 2013-381), omnibus election-reform law.1  (Docs. case 1:13CV861; Docs. 108 110 case 1:13CV658; Docs. 112 114 case 1:13CV660.)2  Defendants move for judgment the pleadings pursuant Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(c).  (Doc. 94.) trial the merits currently scheduled for July 2015.  (Doc. 4.) Throughout the proceedings the parties have referred the challenged law House Bill 589, its original designation the North Carolina General Assembly.  Because duly-enacted law passed both chambers the General Assembly and signed the Governor, the court will refer the final product Session Law 2013-381.   Prior passage, the bill will referred 589. Because the duplicative nature the filings these three cases, for the remainder this Memorandum Opinion the court will refer only the record case 1:13CV861 except where necessary distinguish the cases. 
Plaintiffs include the United States America (the 
United States) case 1:13CV861, the North Carolina State Conference the NAACP and several organizations and individual plaintiffs (the NAACP Plaintiffs) case 1:13CV658, and the League Women Voters North Carolina along with several organizations and individuals (the League Plaintiffs) case 1:13CV660.  Additionally, the court allowed group young voters and others (the Intervenors) intervene case 1:13CV660.  (Doc. case 1:13CV660.)  Considered together, Plaintiffs raise claims under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments the United States Constitution well Section the Voting Rights Act 1965 (VRA), U.S.C.  1973.  (Doc. case 1:13CV861; Doc. case 1:13CV658; Docs. case 1:13CV660.)  The United States also moves for the appointment federal observers monitor future elections North Carolina pursuant Section 3(a) the VRA, U.S.C.  1973a(a).  (Doc. 75-77.)  Finally, Plaintiffs move exclude and strike the testimony three Defendants expert witnesses.  (Docs. 146, 148, 150.) 
Defendants are the State North Carolina, Governor Patrick McCrory, the State Board Elections (SBOE), and several State officials acting their official capacities.  They contend that Plaintiffs have not stated any claims for which relief can granted under either the Constitution the 
VRA and, any event, have not established entitlement preliminary relief.  (Docs. 94, 126.)     
The court held four-day evidentiary hearing and argument beginning July 2014.  The record extensive.  Throughout the proceedings, there was much debate over the policy merits 2013-381 election law and the popularity and desirability various voting mechanisms affects. important note that, while these have evoked strongly-held views, this not the forum for resolving that aspect the parties dispute; such considerations are matters for legislative bodies address.  The jurisdiction this court limited addressing the legal challenges raised based the evidence presented the court. 
After careful consideration, the court concludes that Defendants motion for judgment the pleadings should denied its entirety.  Plaintiffs complaints state plausible claims upon which relief can granted and should permitted proceed the litigation.  However, preliminary injunction extraordinary remedy granted this circuit only upon clear showing entitlement.  After thorough review the record, the court finds that two challenged provisions 2013-381, Plaintiffs have not made clear showing they are likely succeed the merits the underlying legal claims. the remaining provisions, the court finds that 
even assuming Plaintiffs are likely succeed the merits, they have not demonstrated they are likely suffer irreparable harm necessary prerequisite for preliminary relief before trial the absence injunction.  Consequently, the motions for preliminary injunction and the United States request for federal observers will denied.  This resolution renders the motions exclude expert testimony moot. BACKGROUND Legislative History  

The North Carolina General Assembly began consideration voter identification (voter ID) requirement March 2013. March 12, the House Committee Elections, chaired Republican Representative David Lewis, held public hearings voter ID.  (See J.A. 2388-92.)3  Over citizens from wide variety organizations spoke before the committee.  (Id.)  The next day, the committee met and considered the testimony five individuals representing wide variety organizations, including the Brennan Center for Justice and the Heritage Foundation.  (See J.A. 2393-2416.)  One the speakers was Allison Riggs, counsel record for the League Plaintiffs case 1:13CV660, who appeared behalf the Southern Coalition Citations J.A. refer the joint appendix submitted Plaintiffs along with their briefs support the motions for preliminary injunction.  (Docs. through 111 Doc. 154, along with their attachments.) 
for Social Justice.  (J.A. 2394.) April the committee heard from Ion Sancho, the Supervisor Elections for Leon County, Florida, who testified about Floridas experience when reduced early-voting days advance the 2012 general election.  (J.A. 2418, 2420-23.) 
The initial version 589 was introduced the House Representatives April  (J.A. 2101-12.)  The bill dealt almost exclusively with the implementation voter requirement beginning 2016 portions titled the Voter Information Verification Act.4  (J.A. 2101-06, 2112.) April passed first reading and was referred the Committee Elections.5  (J.A. 2354.)  The committee subsequently held another public hearing April 10, whereupon over citizens from across the political spectrum had the opportunity speak.  (J.A. 2424-28.) further debated the bill and added amendments meeting held April 17.  (J.A. 2432-43.)  The bill was also referred the Committees Finance and Appropriations.  (J.A. 2354, 2444-45.) The remainder dealt with the procedure for obtaining and voting mail-in absentee ballots.  (J.A. 2106-11.) House Rule 41(a) states: Every bill shall receive three readings the House prior its passage.  The first reading and reference standing committee House bill shall occur the next legislative day following its introduction.  H.R. 54, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), available Bills/House/PDF/H54v3.pdf. 589 advanced, amended, from the various House committees, and was debated the House floor April 24, 2013.  (J.A. 2354, 2446-51.)  After three amendments were adopted and six others rejected, the bill passed second reading roll-call vote 80-36.6  (J.A. 2354, 2450.)  The bill subsequently passed third reading immediately, vote 81-36, and was passed the House.  (J.A. 2450-51.)  Five House Democrats joined all present Republicans voting for the final voter bill (J.A. 2366, 2573, 2581, 2592), but none the black members the House supported (J.A. 2655).  Representative Rick Glazier, who strongly opposed the bill, testified the preliminary injunction hearing this case that felt that for large bill, 589 received this point the best process possible the House, one characterized excellent.  (Doc. 165 56-57.) House Rule 41(b) states: No bill shall read more than once the same day without the concurrence two-thirds the members present and voting .  H.R. 54. 589 was received the North Carolina Senate the next day, passed first reading, and was assigned the Senate Rules Committee.  (J.A. 2354.)  The committee took immediate action the bill.   The parties not dispute that the Senate believed this stage that 589 would have submitted the United States Department Justice (DOJ) for pre-
clearance under Section the VRA, U.S.C.  1973c(a), because many North Carolina counties were covered jurisdictions under that Section.  However, that time the United States Supreme Court was considering challenge the DOJs ability enforce Section June 25, the Supreme Court issued its decision Shelby County Holder, 133 Ct. 2612 (2013), declaring the formula used determine the Section covered jurisdictions, U.S.C.  1973b(b), unconstitutional.  The next day, Senator Thomas Apodaca, Republican Chairman the Rules Committee, publicly stated, So, now can with the full bill.  (J.A. 1831.)  The contents the full bill were not disclosed the time. meeting the Rules Committee was subsequently scheduled for July 23.  (See J.A. 2452.) 
The night before the Rules Committee meeting, the new bill, now pages length, was posted for the members the Rules Committee website.7  (J.A. 183-84 (declaration Sen. Josh Stein); Doc. 164 111-12 (testimony Sen. Dan Blue); J.A. 2129-85.) addition the voter provisions,8 589 now version 589 appears have been distributed members the Rules Committee who were present July 18, 2013.  (Doc. 134-4 3.) not clear whether this version differed from that posted the website July 22. The voter provisions contained significant changes.  For example, the list acceptable identifications longer included those issued state university community college.  (Compare J.A. 2102-03 
(original bill filed the House April 2013), with J.A. 2130 (version approved the Senate Rules Committee July 23, 2013).) Early voting term used describe in-person absentee voting designated locations before Election Day. Apart from the voter provisions, which were new, the bill largely purported repeal, amend, update existing law.  Other amendments included: (1) making illegal compensate persons collecting voter registrations based the number forms submitted (Part 14); (2) reducing the number signatures required become candidate party primary (Part 22); (3) deleting obsolete provisions about the 2000 census (Part 27) (4) changing the order candidates appearing the ballot (Part 31); (5) eliminating straight-ticket voting (Part 32); (6) moving the date the North Carolina presidential primary earlier the year (Part 35); (7) eliminating taxpayer funding for appellate judicial elections (Part 38); (8) allowing funeral homes 
included many additional provisions, including the following that are being challenged this litigation: (1) the reduction the period for so-called early voting9 from ten days; (2) the elimination same-day registration (SDR), which permitted voters register and then vote the same time during the early-voting period; (3) the prohibition the counting provisional ballots cast outside voters correct voting precinct Election Day (out-of-precinct ballots); (4) the expansion allowable poll observers and voter challenges; (5) the elimination the discretion county boards election (CBOEs) keep the polls open additional hour Election Day extraordinary circumstances; and (6) the elimination pre-registration 16- and 17-year-olds who will not the next general election.10  The bill proposed that the voter requirement 
participate canceling voter registrations deceased persons (Part 39); and (9) requiring provisional ballots marked such for later identification (Part 52).  The bill also proposed mandating that several matters referred for further study, including requiring the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee examine whether maintain the States current runoff system party primaries.  (Part 28.) There indication the two-minute time allotment was deviation from normal rules.    
into effect 2016 but implemented through soft rollout, whereby voters would advised the polls 2014 and 2015 the laws requirement that they will need qualifying picture vote beginning 2016. the committee meeting July 23, Senator Apodaca allowed members the public attendance speak for two minutes.11  (See Doc. 134-4 45-60.)  Speakers included the League Plaintiffs counsel, Riggs, well Jamie Phillips, who represented the North Carolina State Conference the NAACP.  (Id. 45-47, 57-58.)  Although the majority comments addressed the voter requirement, citizens also spoke opposition the other challenged provisions, including the elimination SDR and pre-registration and reduction early voting.  Several opponents characterized the bill effort voter suppression.  (See, e.g., id. (Riggs: voter suppression its very worst); id. (Phillips: The fewer young people and minorities who vote, the better seems your minds. get it. one being fooled.).)  After 
debate, the bill passed the committee and proceeded the floor for second reading.  (Id. 80.)   
The following afternoon, July 24, 589 was introduced the floor the full Senate.  (Id. 84.)  During several hours debate after the bills second reading, Democratic Senators introduced and discussed several proposed amendments.  Most significantly, Senator Josh Stein introduced amendment require the CBOEs offer the same number aggregate hours early voting were offered the last comparable election (whether presidential off-year).  (Id. 125-26.)  This could accomplished, proposed, CBOEs offering more hours present sites, opening more sites.  (Id. 130-31.)  Senator Stein argued that the amendment would reduce, but not eliminate, the impact the reduction early-voting days would have all voters, including African-Americans.  (Id. 111.)  Senator Robert Rucho, the Republican sponsor 589, asked the Senate support Senator Steins amendment (id. 126), and passed vote (id. 131).  The Senators also exchanged argument many the other challenged provisions, including voter ID, SDR, pre-registration, and the increase allowable poll observers, well several provisions not issue here (including the elimination straight-ticket voting and reduction various campaign-finance restrictions).  (See generally id. 148-223.) the close 
debate July 24, Senator Apodaca objected third reading, effectively mandating that the debate the bill carried over into the next day.  (Id. 224.) July 25, the Senate began its session with the third reading amended 589.  (Id. 229.)  Senator Rucho then offered bipartisan amendment, which passed clarified the aggregate-hours amendment and permitted county obtain waiver from the aggregate-hours requirement upon unanimous approval both the CBOE and the SBOE.  (Id. 232-33, 236, 241.)  Proponents and opponents the bill debated both its provisions and the merits various amendments over the next four hours, and the Senate accepted amendment dealing with electioneering from Senator Dan Blue (Democrat).  (Id. 307-08.)  Several Senators characterized the bill voter suppression minorities.  (E.g., id. 251-60 (Sen. Stein), 282-93 (Sen. Blue), 293-99 (Sen. Robinson).) the close debate fourteen amendments had been considered, and the Senate voted favor 589 along party lines, sending the bill back the House for concurrence, amended.  (Id. 325.)  Senator Martin Nesbitt (Democrat), although opposing the bill strongly, noted that weve had good and thorough debate this bill over two days.  (Id. 315.)   
With the end the legislative session approaching, the House received the Senates version 589 that night.  (J.A. 2355.) the beginning two-hour floor session starting 7:45 p.m., Representative Henry Michaux, Jr. (Democrat) moved that the House form Committee the Whole12 consider the bill.  (J.A. 2507-08.)  Representative Tim Moore opposed the motion the grounds that it simply waste time because such committee is the same the full House, which the bill was properly before the moment.  (J.A. 2509.)  The motion failed vote 69.  (J.A. 2510.) Committee the Whole legislative device where the whole membership legislative house sits committee and operates under informal rules.  Websters Third New International Dictionary 458 (1986).  
Two amendments offered opponents (Sen. Blues amendment the date for electioneering; Sen. Ruchos and Steins amendment altering several items, including the types that can presented for voting, and requiring the same number hours early voting) were adopted 109  (J.A. 2511-15.)   The provisions the new full bill were then reviewed.  (J.A. 2516-31.)  Each member the House Democratic caucus present  including four the five members who voted for the House version April  were granted time speak opposition the bill.  (J.A. 2571-73, 2580-81, 2581-83, 2592-93; Doc. 165 64-65 (testimony Rep. Glazier).)  Among other things, opponents characterized the measure variously voter suppression, partisan, and disproportionately affecting 
African-Americans, young voters, and the elderly.  (E.g., J.A. 2561 ([O]ur anger tonight palpable.  Passage this bill political call arms.); 2563 (the most pointedly, obviously politically partisan bill Ive ever seen); 2568 (voter suppression). the Republican side, only Representative Lewis, the bills primary House sponsor, spoke support the amended bill.  (J.A. 2620-24.) pointed out, among other things, that the bill does not bar Sunday voting, does not reduce overall hours early voting, provides for free photo ID, and, his opinion, strengthens the requirements for absentee voting.  (Id.)  Subsequently, the House voted  again along party lines  concur the Senates version 589 10:39 p.m.  (J.A. 2369.)   
The bill was ratified the next day and presented Governor McCrory July 29.  (J.A. 2355.)  The governor signed 2013-381 into law August 12, 2013.  (Id.) Procedural History 

Almost immediately after 2013-381 became law, two the instant cases were filed this court.  The NAACP Plaintiffs filed complaint challenging the voter requirement, elimination SDR, reduction early-voting days, prohibition counting out-of-precinct provisional ballots, and the expansion poll observers and ballot challengers under Section the VRA and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  (Doc. case 1:13CV658  56-80, 82-119.) amended complaint, the NAACP Plaintiffs also challenge the elimination pre-registration.  (Doc.  112, 130-32 case 1:13CV658.)  The League Plaintiffs initiated their case the same day, challenging the elimination SDR, prohibition counting out-of-precinct ballots, elimination the discretion CBOEs extend poll hours one hour Election Day extraordinary circumstances, and the reduction early-voting days pursuant both Section and the Fourteenth Amendment.  (Doc. case 1:13CV660 (prayer for relief).) September 30, 2013, the United States filed its complaint challenging the early voting, SDR, out-of-precinct voting, and voter provisions 2013-381 under Section 2.13  (Doc. case 1:13CV861.)  The Magistrate Judge consolidated the three cases for the purposes scheduling and discovery December 13, 2013.  (Doc. 30.) The various complaints refer times Hispanics addition African-Americans and young voters, but the motions for preliminary injunction not mention Hispanic voters.  This Memorandum Opinion therefore addresses only the claims with respect black and young voters. January 27, 2014, the court permitted group young voters and others intervene plaintiffs case 1:13CV660 pursuant Federal Rule Civil Procedure 24(b).  (Doc. case 1:13CV660.)  Intervenors complaint contends that the elimination pre-registration, reduction early voting, 
repeal SDR, prohibition counting out-of-precinct ballots, elimination CBOE discretion keep the polls open extra hour Election Day, and implementation voter requirement violate the Fourteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.  (Doc. case 1:13CV660.)   
Pursuant the scheduling order (Doc. 91), Plaintiffs filed motions for preliminary injunction May 19, 2014.14  Combined, Plaintiffs seek preliminarily enjoin 2013-381s provisions regarding poll observers, challenges, and hours; its    elimination SDR, out-of-precinct provisional voting, and pre-registration; its cutback early voting; and its soft rollout the voter requirement.  The United States seeks preliminarily enjoin only the early voting, SDR, and out-of-precinct voting sections the law.  (Doc. 97.) the same day, Defendants filed their motion for judgment the pleadings, contending that Plaintiffs have failed state viable legal claims.  (Docs. 95.)  The parties responded the various motions June (Docs. 126, 129, 135), and replies were filed June (Docs. 152, 153, 155). The parties have also been engaged various discovery disputes, some which have yet resolved.  Most significantly, Plaintiffs are currently seeking various legislative communications that Defendants and the legislators maintain are privileged.  (See Doc. 93.)  This court has affirmed the Magistrate Judges rejection Defendants contention that the legislative privilege absolute and returned the matter the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings, which are ongoing.   
Plaintiffs also moved exclude three Defendants experts.  (Docs. 146, 148, 150.)     
During four-day evidentiary hearing the pending motions beginning July 2014, Plaintiffs presented nine live lay witnesses, two live expert witnesses, and one witness video deposition, while Defendants rested the record, which contains many more depositions and extensive expert reports.  The court then allowed full day legal argument, including argument counsel representing Judicial Watch, Inc., Allied Educational Foundation, and Christina Gallegos-Merrill, whom the court permitted appear amici curiae.  (Doc. 136.)  Post-hearing, the court allowed the parties file hundreds pages deposition designations well supplemental briefing the issue standing and exclusion Defendants experts, bringing the total paper record these cases over 11,000 pages.   The motions are now ripe for decision. 
Ordinarily, the court would address dismissal motion before turning motions based the evidence.  However, because the court has determined that Plaintiffs have stated claims their pleadings and the legal claims must also analyzed the context the evidence presented the injunction motions, makes sense address the motions for preliminary relief first before addressing Defendants Rule 12(c) motion.  Before reaching these topics, though, there 
threshold issue Intervenors standing challenge 2013-381s elimination pre-registration, which the court now turns. 

Intervenors are the only party challenging the repeal pre-registration for 16- and 17-year-olds Twenty-Sixth Amendment grounds.15  Because none them under the age 18, their standing assert that claim not readily apparent.  Although Defendants did not raise the question and party addressed the original briefing, standing jurisdictional prerequisite, and the court has independent obligation ensure it.  Fed. Civ. 12(h)(3); Goldsmith Mayor City Council Baltimore, 845 F.2d 61, (4th Cir. 1988). the preliminary injunction hearing, the court directed Intervenors brief their standing challenge the elimination pre-registration.16  Intervenors did (Doc. 159), and Defendants have responded (Doc. 168). The NAACP Plaintiffs challenge the elimination pre-registration made under the Fourteenth Amendment and Section claiming injury young minority voters, not young voters generally.  (Doc.  case 1:13CV658.) Intervenors standing challenge the reduction early-voting days, the elimination SDR, and the elimination out-of-precinct voting not dispute because they have alleged that they are personally and directly injured those provisions. establish standing, party must demonstrate three elements: (1) injury fact, (2) causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) likelihood that the injury would redressed favorable decision.  Lujan Defenders Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  Plaintiffs sufficiently allege causal connection and likelihood redressability; issue whether Intervenors have suffered actual imminent injury from the elimination pre-registration, creating particularized injury fact.  Id. 560. 
First, Intervenors contend that some them are will imminently injured because they can longer register voters through the pre-registration program following its repeal.  (Doc. 159 3.)  Defendants dispute that harm interest registering voters can create legally cognizable injury and further assert that such harm not present here because pre-registration  not registration  issue.  (Doc. 168 4.) 
Preventing individual from registering others vote has been recognized legally sufficient injury for the purpose standing. Coalition for Sensible and Humane Solutions Wamser, 771 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1985), association dedicated helping minority and low-income citizens register vote sued the Board Election Commissioners St. Louis for refusing allow their qualified volunteers serve deputy registration officials.  The Eighth Circuit held that the association had standing sue 
behalf its members because the Board Election Commissioners injured individual association members by preventing them from registering new voters.  Id. 399.17 contrast, People Organized for Welfare and Employment Rights (P.O.W.E.R.) Thompson, 727 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1984), association dedicated increasing political power the poor and unemployed sued compel the State allow city registrars conduct voter-registration drives the waiting rooms State social services offices.  The Seventh Circuit found that the association lacked standing: Wamser specifically addressed the associations standing sue the basis injury its individual members, see Friends the Earth, Inc. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (to have standing, association must prove that its members would have had standing sue their own right), rather than organizational injury, see Havens Realty Corp. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (an action adverse organizations interests that causes drain its resources legally cognizable injury).  Thus, Wamser applicable Intervenors claim, which only involves individuals  not association organization. 
P.O.W.E.R. bringing this suit alleged only that its goal improving the lot the poor and the unemployed required for its fulfillment that the state make easier for them register.  This might persuasive basis for standing P.O.W.E.R. had been trying advance its goal registering new voters itself.  Anyone who prevented from doing that would have injured it, just the defendants this case would have injured they had prevented from going into waiting rooms and urging the people waiting there register.  But P.O.W.E.R. was never forbidden that, and never sought the actual registering voters. 
Id. 170 (emphasis original) (citations omitted).  Read 
together, Wamser and P.O.W.E.R. indicate that individual association would not have standing compel Defendants allow third party conduct voter-registration drives but suffers cognizable injury they prevent the litigant him- herself from registering voters.  
Here, Intervenors allege and produced evidence that they pre-registered young voters the past and would continue doing had 2013-381 not eliminated that program.  (Doc.  case 1:13CV660; Doc. 159-3  5-6.)  Although Defendants attempt draw distinction between registration and pre-registration, they fail explain why any difference matters.  Rather, pre-registration appears the functional equivalent registration, except that 16- and 17-year-olds applications wait hopper processed the State upon eligibility.  (Doc. 167 184.)  Furthermore, harm interest registering voters not the only civic harm courts have recognized sufficient for standing.  See Lerman Bd. Elections City N.Y., 232 F.3d 135, 141-43 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding harm individuals interest witnessing petition signatures legally cognizable).  Based the current allegations and evidence, Intervenors have sufficiently alleged standing challenge the elimination pre-registration because they allege that 2013-381 directly injures their interest registering 16- and 17-year-olds. 
Ordinarily, the standing inquiry would end here.  However, Intervenors have moved preliminarily enjoin the elimination pre-registration, and whether they can demonstrate irreparable harm justify injunction depends part the scope the harm they properly assert.  So, the court must consider Intervenors alternative bases for standing the extent they rely other claims harm. 
Intervenors contend that they will have expend greater effort and resources register young, 18-and-older voters because they were not pre-registered 16- 17-year-olds.  (Doc. 159 4-5.)  Defendants dispute this factual matter, arguing that there greater effort required register 18-year-old than 16-year-old.  (Doc. 168 6-7.)  However, there may reasons why registering 16- and 17-year-olds more effective and less expensive than registering 18-year-olds, and this stage the litigation the court bound accept Intervenors reasonable factual allegations true.  Therefore, the extent that Intervenors assert takes greater effort register young voters who otherwise would have been pre-registered, they have alleged direct, legally cognizable injury.  However, the extent they seek ground their injury loss resources, relying authority applicable organizational plaintiffs and without any allegations 
evidence financial harm (Doc. 159 4-5), that argument fails. 
Intervenors also contend that they will have expend greater effort and resources get out the vote because 2013-381 discourages young voters from voting.  (Id. 5-6.)  Intervenors are not political party any other kind organization, however.  Intervenors, individuals, not have direct, particularized interest the outcome election like that the Democratic Party, see Crawford Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007), affd 553 U.S. 181 (2008), association candidates challenging incumbents, see Common Cause Bolger, 512 Supp. 26, (D.D.C. 1980).  They have budget from which resources must now diverted deal with the effects 2013-381.  Even assuming the truth all Intervenors factual allegations and evidence, therefore, they not have standing this ground. 
Next Intervenors assert that 2013-381 harms their interest living State that does not discriminate against young voters.  (Doc. 159 6-7.)  Under such theory, any one North Carolinas approximately 6.5 million registered voters would have standing challenge the elimination pre-registration.  That injury not sufficiently particularized confer standing, and Intervenors argument and authority not indicate otherwise.  Cf. Shaw Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993) 
(discussing the merits the Fourteenth Amendment claim, not standing).  Intervenors attempt ground standing their support particular Democratic candidate similarly fails.  (Doc. 159 7-9.) 
Finally, Intervenors contend that they are not require[d] have standing independent from the original [P]laintiffs.  (Id. 9.)  While that may true claims that other Plaintiffs actually assert, here, other Plaintiff has challenged the elimination pre-registration all young voters.  The circuits appear split whether the jurisdictional rule requiring party have standing bring claim can dispensed with entirely for Intervenors injecting new claims into the litigation.  Cf. Shaw Hunt, 154 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 1998) (permissive Intervenors not required have standing where they adopted plaintiffs complaint and asserted new claim); S.E.C. U.S. Realty Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 460 (1940) (intervenor had a sufficient interest the maintenance its statutory authority and the performance its public duties entitle through intervention prevent [bankruptcy] reorganizations); King Christie, 981 Supp. 296, 307 (D.N.J. 2013) (noting circuit split the question whether intervenor must have standing).  Intervenors cite Fourth Circuit case addressing the issue, nor has the court found one.  Because Intervenors fail allege any different 
harm should its position correct, the court need not decide this issue this stage; and, light the lack Fourth Circuit precedent, the court declines so.   
For these reasons, therefore, the court finds that Intervenors have alleged sufficient harm their interest registering 16- and 17-year-olds provide standing this stage, but have not properly asserted any broader harm than that.18 course, whether 2013-381 actually causes injury Intervenors remains demonstrated trial. 
III. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTIONS Preliminary Injunction Standard and General Principles 

Issuance preliminary injunction an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise very far-reaching power, which applied only the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.  Centro Tepeyac Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991)); Winter Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 22, (2008).  This true even when the asserted injury violation the Constitution the VRA.  See, e.g., Centro Tepeyac, 722 F.3d 187 (First Amendment claim); Perry-Bey City Norfolk, 679 Supp. 655, 662 (E.D. Va. 2010) (VRA claim). demonstrate entitlement preliminary relief, Plaintiffs must make clear showing that (1) they are likely succeed the merits their claims; (2) they are likely suffer irreparable harm injunction does not issue; (3) the balance the equities tips their favor; and (4) injunction the public interest.  Winter, 555 U.S 20, 22; Dewhurst Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011).  All four requirements must satisfied order for relief granted.  Real Truth About Obama, Inc. Federal Election Commn, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated other grounds 559 U.S. 1089 (2010). not enough that plaintiff show grave serious question for litigation; must make clear demonstration will likely succeed the merits.  Id. 346-47. 
The denial constitutional right, such the right vote, constitutes irreparable harm.  Ross Meese, 818 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1987); United States Berks Cnty., 250 Supp. 525, 540 (E.D. Pa. 2003).  Because trial the merits scheduled these cases for July 2015, Plaintiffs and Intervenors must therefore make clear showing that they will irreparably harmed connection with the November 2014 general election  the only scheduled election between now and the trial date.   
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right 
vote fundamental and preservative all other rights our republic.  See Reynolds Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 56162 (1964) (citing Yick Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).  The Constitutions Elections Clause reserves the States the general power regulate [t]he Times, Places and Manner holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, subject laws passed Congress.  U.S. Const. art.  cl.    Common sense, well constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play active role structuring elections; as practical matter, there must substantial regulation elections they are fair and honest and some sort order, rather than chaos, accompany the democratic processes.  Burdick Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Storer Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).  The States power regulate elections subject limits imposed the Constitution, including the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, and federal law.   
Here, Plaintiffs challenge several provisions 2013-381, individually and cumulatively.  The statute contains severability provision that would allow the court enjoin portions without striking wholesale.19  Thus, the court will 2013-381 provides:  [i]f any provision [SL 2013-381] its application held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions applications [the law] that can given effect without the invalid provisions application, and this end the 
provisions [SL 2013-381] are severable.  2013 N.C. Sess. Law 381,  60.1.   
examine the challenged provisions with this mind. SDR 2007, the General Assembly passed legislation permitting SDR early-voting sites, which the governor signed into law effective October 2007.  The law provided that an individual who qualified register vote may register person and then vote [an early-voting] site the persons county residence during the period for [early] voting provided under [Section] 163-227.2.  2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 253,  (codified N.C. Gen. Stat.  163-82.6A(a) (2008)).  The law required prospective voter complete voter-registration form and produce document prove his her current name and address.  Id. (codified N.C. Gen. Stat.  163-82.6A(b) (2008)). the person elected vote immediately, she could vote retrievable absentee ballot provided [Section] 163-227.2 immediately after registering.  Id. (codified N.C. Gen. Stat.  163-82.6A(c) (2008)).  Within two business days, both the CBOE and SBOE were required verify the voters drivers license social security number, update the database, proceed verify the voters proper address, and count the vote unless was determined that the voter was not qualified vote.  Id. (codified N.C. Gen. Stat.  163-82.6A(d) (2008)). 2013-381 repealed the SDR provisions.  Now, eligible vote any primary general election, voter must comply with preexisting law that requires that the registration postmarked least days before Election Day or, delivered person via fax scanned document, received the CBOE time established the board.  N.C. Gen. Stat.  163-82.6(c)(1)-(2).   
All Plaintiffs, including Intervenors, move preliminarily enjoin 2013-381s elimination SDR for the November 2014 election.  Plaintiffs rely four distinct legal theories: (1) racially discriminatory results under Section the VRA; (2) racially discriminatory intent under Section and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; (3) undue burden the right vote all voters under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) unlawful denial abridgment the right vote account age under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.  Each basis will addressed turn. Section results 

Section the original VRA provided that [n]o voting qualification prerequisite voting, standard, practice, procedure shall imposed applied any State political subdivision deny abridge the right any citizen the United States vote account race color. U.S.C.  1973 (1976). City Mobile Bolden, 
446 U.S. (1980), the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs were required show discriminatory intent order prevail Section claim. response Bolden, Congress amended the VRA clarify that Section plaintiffs need only show that particular voting practice results denial abridgement the right any citizen the United States vote account race color. U.S.C.  1973(a); see Thornburg Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, (1986) (Congress substantially revised  make clear that violation could proved showing discriminatory effect alone and establish the relevant legal standard the results test, applied this Court White Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and other federal courts before.)  Consequently, Section violation may proven either showing discriminatory results discriminatory intent.  See, e.g., Garza Cnty. Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1990); Brown Detzner, 895 Supp. 1236, 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2012); United States Charleston Cnty., 316 Supp. 268, 272 n.3 (D.S.C. 2003).  Section 2(b) now provides: violation subsection (a) this section established if, based the totality circumstances, shown that the political processes leading nomination election the State political subdivision are not equally open participation members class citizens protected subsection (a) this section that its members have less opportunity than other members the electorate participate the political process and elect representatives their choice. The extent which members protected class have been elected office the State political subdivision one circumstance which may considered: Provided, That nothing this section establishes right have members protected class elected numbers equal their proportion the population. U.S.C.  1973(b).   
The essence  claim that certain electoral law, practice, structure interacts with social and historical conditions cause inequality the opportunities enjoyed black and white voters elect their preferred representatives.  Gingles, 478 U.S. 47.  The Gingles Court noted that the Senate Judiciary Committees majority Report that accompanied the amendment provided several factors that may probative establishing Section violation: the extent any history official discrimination the state political subdivision that touched the right the members the minority group register, vote, otherwise participate the democratic process; the extent which voting the elections the state political subdivision racially polarized; the extent which the state political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, other voting practices procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; there candidate slating process, whether the members the minority group have been denied access that process; the extent which members the minority group the state political subdivision bear the effects discrimination such areas education, employment and health, which hinder their ability participate effectively the political process; whether political campaigns have been characterized overt subtle racial appeals; the extent which members the minority group have been elected public office the jurisdiction. 
Additional factors that some cases have had probative value part plaintiffs evidence establish violation are:  
whether there significant lack responsiveness the part elected officials the particularized needs the members the minority group. 
whether the policy underlying the state political subdivisions use such voting qualification, prerequisite voting, standard, practice procedure tenuous. 
Id. 36-37 (quoting Rep. No. 97417, pp. 28-29, 97th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1982)). other courts have noted, these factors were clearly designed with redistricting and other vote-dilution cases mind.  See Brown, 895 Supp. 1245 n.13; Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push Allain, 674 Supp. 1245, 1263 (N.D. Miss. 1987), affd sub nom Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push, Inc. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Daniel Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, S.C. Rev. 689, 709 (2006) (The legislative history the 1982 amendments, however, provides little guidance how Section should apply practices 
resulting the disproportionate denial minority votes.). contrast, claims challenging voting procedures that disproportionately affect minority voters are referred vote-denial cases.  See, e.g., Brown, 895 Supp. 1244-45 (Vote denial occurs when state employs standard, practice, procedure that results the denial the right vote account race. (quoting Johnson Governor State Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1227 n.26 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted))).   
Vote-denial claims under Section have thus far been relatively rare, perhaps due part the fact that since 1965, many jurisdictions including many North Carolina counties were under federal control and barred from enacting any new voting procedure without first obtaining pre-clearance under Section the VRA from the DOJ the United States District Court for the District Columbia. U.S.C.  1973c(a).  Under Section the covered jurisdiction was required show that the new provision would not lead retrogression the position racial minorities with respect their effective exercise the electoral franchise.  Reno Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 478 (1997) (quoting Beer United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).  The Supreme Courts 2013 decision Shelby County, declaring the formula used determine the covered jurisdictions under Section unconstitutional, relieved several States, counties, and townships the burden submitting their voting changes federal authorities pre-cleared.20 result, very few appellate cases have considered vote-denial claims under Section 2.21  See, e.g., Irby Va. State Bd. Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that black voters could not establish Virginias choice appoint, rather than elect, school board members violated Section because there was evidence the admitted disparity between black and white school Since Shelby County, least one other State has had its newly-enacted voting law challenged under Section  See Veasey Perry, Supp. Civ. No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 3002413 (S.D. Tex. July 2014) (denying Texas motion dismiss Section and other claims challenging its voter law). This excludes cases challenging felon-disenfranchisement provisions.  While these are technically vote-denial claims, the courts appeal have analyzed them differently because the Fourteenth Amendments specific sanction such laws and the long history disenfranchisement felons many States.  See, e.g., Simmons Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2009) (When look the terms the original VRA whole, the context, and recognized sources congressional intent, clear the original  the VRA 1965 was not meant create cause action against state which disenfranchises its incarcerated felons.); Hayden Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 328 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (applying clear-statement rule because the history felon-disenfranchisement provisions and concluding that Congress unquestionably did not manifest unmistakably clear intent include felon disenfranchisement laws under the VRA); Johnson, 405 F.3d 1230 (Here, the plaintiffs interpretation [that Section covers felon-disenfranchisement provisions] creates serious constitutional question interpreting the Voting Rights Act conflict with the text the Fourteenth Amendment.); but see Wesley Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding Tennessees felon-disenfranchisement law, but classifying the challenge vote-dilution claim); Farrakhan Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003), rehg denied 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that vote-denial claims challenging felon-disenfranchisement laws are cognizable under Section and remanding the district court conduct analysis).  
board members had been caused the appointive system); Ortiz City Philadelphia, F.3d 306, 312-14 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that State statute removing voters who did not vote the last two federal elections from the registration rolls did not violate Section because its disparate impact minorities was not caused the statute, but rather because [individual voters] not vote, and not take the opportunity voting the next election requesting reinstatement); Smith Salt River Project Agric. Improvement Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that special utility districts decision limit the right vote the district property owners was not Section violation because, even though the requirement disproportionately affected minorities, there was causal connection between the decision and discriminatory result).  
These cases indicate that a bare statistical showing disproportionate impact racial minority does not satisfy the  results inquiry.22  Smith, 109 F.3d 595 (emphasis original).  However, few cases attempt set out the proper The Sixth Circuits decision Stewart Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated moot 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc), not the contrary.  There, the court merely clarified that Section plaintiffs are not required show actual denial the right vote but could prevail based showing discriminatory effect.  Id. 878. did not hold that bare showing that law would have disparate impact minority group would sufficient under Section  
test vote-denial cases.  Two recent district court cases provide some guidance. Brown, the Middle District Florida denied the plaintiffs motion preliminarily enjoin Florida law that reduced the number days early voting from between and days eight days, leaving each county discretion offer between and hours early voting (after had been required under the old law).  895 Supp. 1239.  After considering evidence that Floridas largest counties (as well the States five covered counties under Section would offer the maximum number hours early voting,23 the district court found that the plaintiffs claim was not likely succeed the merits.  The court stated the Section inquiry whether, based objective analysis the totality the circumstances, the application the [statute] will act exclude African American voters from meaningful access the polls, account race.  Id. 124950 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Despite accepting the findings experts that the changes would disproportionately impact black voters, see The United States District Court for the District Columbia, sitting three-judge court, had previously refused pre-clear the same law under Section the ground that could retrogressive the five covered counties chose offer fewer than the maximum number hours early voting permitted the statute.  See Florida United States, 885 Supp. 299 (D.D.C. 2012).  After the five covered counties committed using the maximum number hours, the Attorney General pre-cleared the changes.  Brown, 895 Supp. 124142. 
id. 1251, the court found that [b]ecause [the new statute] allows early voting during non-working hours, well voting during the weekend, including one Sunday, voting times which are important African American voters, well [get-out-the-vote] efforts, the Court cannot find that [it] denies equal access the polls.  Id. 1255. doing so, the court emphasized that was not comparing the old law the new one, because that retrogression standard applies only Section proceeding.24 The court underscored the important role the distinction between the Section standard and the Section retrogression standard and their different burdens proof played the case.  Id. 1251 (citing Reno, 528 U.S. 324). Frank Walker, Supp. __, 2014 1775432 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 29, 2014), the court permanently enjoined enforcement Wisconsins voter law.  Drawing from Gingles  although declining apply the Gingles factors, which the court viewed applicable only the vote-dilution context  the court held that Section plaintiffs must show that the disproportionate impact results from the interaction the voting practice with the effects past present discrimination and not merely product chance.  Id. *31.  After concluding that black voters disproportionately lacked IDs, the court found that the requirement interacted with historical conditions discrimination housing, 
employment, and other areas cause additional barrier placed the path black voters.  Id. *32-33.   Thus, the voter provision violated Section 2.25 July 31, 2014, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued contrary ruling, finding the Wisconsin photo law constitutional under Wisconsin law.  Milwaukee Branch NAACP Walker, N.W.2d 2014 3744073 (Wis. July 31, 2014).  The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not address Section however. Plaintiffs here concede that the applicable inquiry whether the current system under 2013-381 results inequality opportunity white and black citizens exercise the franchise.  (Doc. 164 26-27.) Plaintiffs presented the following unchallenged statistics: (1) 2011-12, 34% black North Carolinians live below the federal poverty level, compared 13% whites (J.A. 1104); (2) the fourth quarter 2012, unemployment rates North Carolina were 17.3% for blacks and 6.7% for whites (id.); (3) 15.7% black North Carolinians over age lack high school degree, compared 10.1% whites (J.A. 1151); (4) 27% poor black North Carolinians not have access vehicle, compared 8.8% poor 
The Brown courts formulation accurately captures the Section results inquiry: whether the current electoral law interacts with historical discrimination and social conditions cause black voters have unequal access the polls.26  Plaintiffs contend that North Carolinas lack SDR interacts with its history official discrimination and present conditions cause discriminatory result.  Plaintiffs expert testimony demonstrates that black citizens North Carolina currently lag behind whites several key socioeconomic indicators, including education, employment, income, access transportation, and residential stability.27  They also presented 
whites (J.A. 1155); and (5) 75.1% whites North Carolina live owned homes compared 49.8% blacks (J.A. 1158). 2012, 13.4% black voters who voted early used SDR, compared 7.2% white voters; the 2010 midterm, the figures were 10.2% and 5.4%, respectively; and 2008, 13.1% and 8.9%.  (J.A. 629.) For example, Plaintiff Rosanell Eaton, now years old, testified impressively how approximately age (in the 1940s) she was required recite the Preamble the Constitution from memory order register vote.  (Doc. 165 39-40.) 
unrebutted testimony that black North Carolinians have used SDR higher rate than whites the three federal elections during which SDR was offered.28   
North Carolina also has unfortunate history official discrimination voting and other areas that dates back the Nations founding.  See, e.g., Gingles Edmisten, 590 Supp. 345, 359-61 (E.D.N.C. 1984), affd part and revd part Thornburg Gingles, 478 U.S. (1986); (see also J.A. 1036-92 (report Dr. Lorraine Minnite).).  This experience affects the perceptions and realities black North Carolinians this day.29  Simply put, light the historical struggle for African-Americans voting rights, North Carolinians have reason wary changes voting laws.   
Plaintiffs historical evidence these cases focuses largely racial discrimination that occurred between quarter century over century ago.  However, the Supreme Court recently stated, history did not end 1965.  Shelby 
Cnty., 133 Ct. 2628. the period between the enactment the VRA and 2013, voting tests were abolished, disparities voter registration and turnout due race were erased, and African-Americans attained political office record numbers.  Id.  The record reflects such progress North Carolina, too.  Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Barry Burden, indicates that black North Carolinians have reached parity with whites turnout for presidential elections.  (J.A. 1100.)  And Dr. Charles Stewart III concludes that [t]he registration rate African-Americans has surged North Carolina since 2000, the point that the registration rate African Americans now exceeds that whites, development characterizes significant.30  (J.A. 800.)  Plaintiffs experts attribute these increases the candidacy President Barack Obama well North Carolinas election law changes since 2000.  (See J.A. 1100 (report Dr. Burden); 1193 (report Dr. Morgan Kousser).)31 addition, Dr. Burden notes, blacks North put this advance perspective, 2012 black registration reached 95.3% and white registration 87.8%.  (J.A. 806.)  This compares the Gingles courts finding that 1982 the black registration rate was 52.7% and the white registration rate was 66.7%.  Gingles, 590 Supp. 360. 2000, the black registration rate was 81.1% and the white registration rate was 90.2%, and 2006, 82.3% voting-age blacks were registered opposed 87.4% whites.  (J.A. 807.)  The largest increases black turnout occurred 2008 and 2012, with turnout the intervening off-year elections falling nearly half relative presidential years.  (J.A. 1197.) 
Carolina have been elected political office levels that now approach[] parity with their prevalence the electorate.32  (J.A. 1107.) examining the totality the circumstances, therefore, the court views all evidence context, giving due weight, but also being careful acknowledge that [p]ast discrimination cannot, the manner original sin, condemn governmental action that not itself unlawful.  Bolden, 446 U.S. 74. course, the VRA expressly provides that there right proportional representation. U.S.C.  1973(b). 
Plaintiffs rely Operation Push.  There, the plaintiffs challenged Mississippis system maintaining, for some municipalities, system dual registration that required person register two different locations eligible vote municipal elections well county, state, and federal elections.  674 Supp. 1249-50. was admitted that the practice was initially enacted 1890 part plan disenfranchise black voters, but the court did not address whether was being maintained for discriminatory purpose the 1980s.  Id. 1251-52.  The district court nevertheless enjoined the requirement after searching examination what considered the relevant Gingles factors: (1) history discrimination, (2) socioeconomic results discrimination, (3) the extent that black citizens 
have been elected public office, (4) lack responsiveness among elected officials the black community, and (5) the tenuousness the States interest.  Id. 1263-68.   
The present cases are distinguishable important respects, however.  The Mississippi system had led large disparity registration between black and white voters, and the court found that the valid registration rate for whites remained approximately percentage points above that for blacks.  Id. 1254.  Thus, the discriminatory results the lingering dual-registration system were clear  fewer black than white Mississippians were able register vote over long period, magnifying the effect the system.  Also, the dual-registration system had been effect varying degrees for almost 100 years, propagating its effects even further, and the court found that the challenged statutes did not advance relate rationally any substantial legitimate governmental interest.  Id. 1260-61. fact, the time the decision Mississippi was the only State maintaining such dual-registration scheme.  Id. 1252.  Finally, Operation Push was decided 1987, not long after Mississippi had engaged official disenfranchisement black would-be voters.  Here, voting-age blacks North Carolina maintain higher current registration rate than whites, black registration rates continued make significant increases the seven years 
before the adoption SDR (J.A. 804, Table (noting increase black registered voters from 988,134 1,116,818 the period from 2000 2006)), and SDR existed for only three federal election cycles (six years) before was repealed 2013-381.33  Moreover, noted above, according Dr. Burden, some the recent increase black registration since 2008 attributable the candidacy the first black major-party presidential candidate.  (J.A. 1100.)     
Additionally, the high registration rate black North Carolinians  95.3%, some 7.5 percentage points above that whites  suggests strongly that black voters will not have unequal access the polls.  Plaintiffs point Dr. Stewarts conclusion that 2013-381 would have affected the 2012 African-American registrants had then been effect.  (J.A. 789.)  From this, Plaintiffs predict that without SDR, North Carolina will experience similar reduction black registrants.  But this prediction appears ignore important considerations. 
Particularly, Plaintiffs have not shown that African-American voters 2012 lacked  more importantly, that they currently lack equal opportunity easily register vote otherwise.  For example, under current law, every State resident can register vote mail.  See N.C. Gen. Stat.  163-82.6(a) (The county board elections shall accept any form described [N.C. Gen. Stat. ] 163-82.3 the applicant submits the form mail, facsimile transmission, transmission scanned document, person.).  Thus, those with transportation, economic, other challenges need not physically appear register.  Cf. Operation Push, 674 Supp. 1250-52 (describing Mississippi law that initially prevented all registration outside the office the county registrar).  Certain State agencies are also required offer voter registration services.  Such agencies include departments social services and public health, disability services agencies (vocational rehabilitation offices, departments services for the blind, for the deaf, and for mental health), the North Carolina Employment Security Commission, and, under certain circumstances, the North Carolina Division Motor Vehicles (DMV), pursuant N.C. Gen. Stat.  163-82.19 163-82.20.  (Doc. 126-1  10.) response questioning the hearing, Plaintiff demonstrated how these various other options failed provide equal opportunity any black voter who otherwise wished use SDR.  (See, e.g., Doc. 167 135-40 (acknowledging that these other avenues mean that many people who are lower socioeconomic status have opportunity register vote elsewhere). addition, State law permits any individual, group, organization such the get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts conducted some Plaintiffs 
conduct voter registration drive, without any special training, pursuant SBOE-published guidelines and with materials the SBOE and CBOEs provide.  (Doc. 126-1  11.)  Finally, under 2013-381, voter who has moved within the county can still update his her registration during early voting (i.e., after the 25-day registration cut-off).  N.C. Gen. Stat.  163-82.6A(e).  That voters preferred use SDR over these methods does not mean that without SDR voters lack equal opportunity. 
Furthermore, because Section does not incorporate retrogression standard, the logical conclusion Plaintiffs argument would have rendered North Carolina violation the VRA before adoption SDR simply for not having adopted it.  Yet, neither the United States nor the private Plaintiffs have ever taken the position that jurisdiction was violation Section simply for failing offer SDR.  Indeed, [e]xtending Section that far could have dramatic and far-reaching effects, Irby, 889 F.2d 1358, placing the laws least other states which not offer SDR jeopardy being violation Section 2.34  The district court Brown recognized See Ala. Code.  17-3-50 (14-day registration deadline); Alaska Stat. Ann.  15.07.070(c)-(d) (30 days); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.  16-120 (30 days); Ark. Code Ann.  7-5-201(a) (30 days); Del. Code tit.  2036 (24 days); Fla. Stat.  97.055(1)(a) (29 days); Ga. Code Ann.  21-2-224(a) (29 days); Haw. Rev. Stat.  11-24(a) (30 days); Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-50 (three days, with some variation among 
counties, except for limited SDR the fall 2014); Ind. Code.  3-7-13-11, 3-7-33-3, 3-7-33-4 (29 days); Kan. Stat. Ann.  25-2311(3)-(7) (21 days); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.  116.045(1)-(2) (28 days); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.  18:135(1) (30 days); Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law  3-302(a) (21 days); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 51,  (20 days); Mich. Comp. Laws  168.497(1) (30 days); Mo. Rev. Stat.  115.135 (27 days); Neb. Rev. Stat.  32-311.01(d), 32-302 (11 days delivered person the applicant, days otherwise); Nev. Rev. Stat.  293.560(1) (21 days); N.J. Stat. Ann.  19:31-6, 31-7 (21 days); N.M. Stat. Ann.  1-4-8(A) (28 days); N.Y. Elec. Law  5-210(3), 5-211(11)-(12), 5-212(6)-(7) (25 days); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.  3503.19(A) (30 days); Okla. Stat. tit.  4-110.1(A) (24 days); Or. Rev. Stat.  247.012(3)(b) (21 days); Pa. Cons. Stat.  1326(b) (30 days); R.I. Gen. Laws  17.9.1-3(a) (30 days); S.C. Code Ann.  7-5-150 (30 days); S.D. Codified Laws  12-4-5 (15 days); Tenn. Code Ann.  2-2-109(a) (30 days); Tex. Elec. Code Ann.  13.143(a) (30 days); Utah Code Ann.  20A-2-102.5(2) (30 days); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.  2144(a) (six days); Va. Code Ann.  24.2-416 (22 days); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.  29A.08.140(1) (eight days person, days otherwise); Va. Code  3-2-6(a) (21 days). 
this inherent difficulty Plaintiffs argument the context the early-voting reduction, where the court stated: 
Consider the fact that many states not engage any form early voting.  Following Plaintiffs theory its next logical step, would seem that state with higher percentage registered AfricanAmerican voters than Florida did not implement early voting program Section violation would occur because AfricanAmerican voters that state would have less opportunity vote than voters Florida. would also follow that Section violation could occur Florida state with lower percentage AfricanAmerican voters employed early voting system that lasts three weeks instead the two week system currently used Florida.  This simply cannot the standard for establishing Section violation. 
Brown, 895 Supp. 1254 (quoting Jacksonville Coal. for Voter Protection Hood, 351 Supp. 1326, 1335-36 (M.D. Fla. 2004)).  Rather, the court clarified, must consider whether the State Florida, having decided allow early 
voting, has adopted early voting procedures that provide equal access the polls for all voters Florida.  Id. 1254-55 (emphasis original).  Similarly here, the court not concerned with whether the elimination SDR will worsen the position minority voters comparison the preexisting voting standard, practice, procedure, id. 1251 (internal quotation marks omitted)  Section inquiry, but whether North Carolinas existing voting scheme (without SDR) interacts with past discrimination and present conditions cause discriminatory result.     
Moreover, the National Voter Registration Act 1993 (NVRA), Congress explicitly sanctioned States power set registration cut-off days before election. U.S.C.  1973gg-6(a)(1).35 this statute was passed years after the amendment Section difficult conclude that Congress intended that States adoption registration cut-off before Election Day would constitute violation Section  See United States Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, (1940) (concluding that all acts pari materia are taken together, they were one law, and thus that [t]he later act can therefore regarded legislative interpretation fact, North Carolina has granted voters another five days, setting its cut-off days before Election Day.  N.C. Gen. Stat.  163-82.6(c)(1)-(2). 
the earlier act the sense that aids ascertaining the meaning the words used their contemporary setting (internal citations omitted)); cf. Johnson, 405 F.3d 1230 (concluding that Section did not prohibit enforcement felon-disenfranchisement provisions part because such laws are explicitly sanctioned the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants stated policy underlying elimination SDR tenuous, noting that supporters expressed concern for providing integrity the voting process ensure that votes be protected and not negated fraud.  (J.A. 2516-17.) sure, free-standing claim electoral integrity does not operate all-purpose justification flexible enough embrace any burden.  McLaughlin N.C. Bd. Elections, F.3d 1215, 1228 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Republican Party Ark. Faulkner Cnty., F.3d 1289, 1299 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  But here there more the legislative record.  During the Senate Rules Committee debate the challenged SDR provision, Senator Rucho contended:  
Theres way and theres simple way validate.  What were trying give the Board Elections opportunity their job correctly, validate those individuals and sure that the election above board.  
(Doc. 134-4 45.)  Later, during the second reading, added: also allows time for  verify voters 
information repealing same day registration and which will ensure accuracy.  Its been challenge for the Board Elections able identify and validate everyone that has come there the basis one-day registration  
(Id. 87.)  Defendants have presented evidence support this interest.   
Plaintiffs witness, Gary Bartlett (SBOE Executive Director from 1993 2013), acknowledged the hearing that under SDR, CBOEs sometimes lacked sufficient time verify registrants under State law.36  (Doc. 165 166.) consequence, over thousand ballots were counted recent elections voters who were not (or could not be) properly verified.37  (Doc. 165 148-66; J.A. 3267, 3269-72.)  George Gilbert, former director When voter registered using SDR during early voting, she was required present proper identification under the Help America Vote Act 2002 (HAVA), U.S.C.  15301-15545 (HAVA ID), proving residence within the State.  After receiving the registration, the CBOE sent out verification card via the United States Postal Service intended determine the voter fact lived the address presented the early-voting location.  (Doc. 164 183.) the voters card was twice returned undeliverable, the CBOE canceled the voters ballot.  (Id. 202.)  However, the CBOEs allow days for each card returned undeliverable, and the second card has not yet been returned before the canvass (which occurs seven days after the election non-presidential years and ten days after presidential years), the voters vote counted even though the voter has not yet been properly verified through the States procedure.  (Id. 205-07.) For example, the 2012 general election, SBOE records show that approximately 1,288 ballots were counted despite being cast voters who did not complete the verification process.  (J.A. 3271.) the May 2012 primary, 205 ballots were counted without ever being verified (J.A. 3269), and the 2010 general election, 153 such ballots were counted (J.A. 3267). the Guilford County Board Elections, acknowledged that voter who registered before the close books days before Election Day will have more time pass the verification procedure than voter who registered and voted during early voting.  (Doc. 165 16.)  These concerns were not new; they had been identified Director Bartlett 2009 report the General Assembly, following the implementation SDR.  (J.A. 1528-36.)  Specifically, the report noted: county boards found that there was not enough time between the end [early] voting (and SDRs) and the canvass date ensure that verification mailings completed the mail verification process.  (J.A. 1533.) addition, because the volume voters, CBOEs had difficulty simultaneously conducting registrations and early voting such that it was not possible process the number voter registration applications received during one-stop voting within the two-day statutory window.  (Id.)  Also, [d]ue volume issues, [CBOEs] experienced minor [sic] DMV validations, especially during the last few days [early] voting.38  (Id.) Opponents the bill were apparently unaware this report.  (See, e.g., Doc. 134-4 220 (Same day registration, dont know single problem weve had with that .).) 
The State has interest closing the voter rolls reasonable time before Election Day. Marston Lewis, 410 
U.S. 679, 681 (1973), the Supreme Court held that it clear that the State has demonstrated that [a] 50-day voter registration cutoff (for election state and local officials) necessary permit preparation accurate voter lists. passing the NVRAs authorization 1993 for States have 30-day cut-off for registration, Congress specifically noted its purposes included to establish procedures that will increase the number eligible citizens register vote, to protect the integrity the electoral process, and to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained. U.S.C.  1973gg(b)(1), (3) (4); see also Lucas Cnty. Democratic Party Blackwell, 341 Supp. 861, 865 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (noting that State law closing registration books days before Election Day serves and promotes orderly administration elections and enables election officials verify information, including the drivers license and social security numbers persons who have registered, thereby avoiding fraud). 
Plaintiffs argue that SDR actually more reliable than traditional registration because CBOEs are less likely deny voters who registered during early voting than those who registered before the 25-day cutoff.  But their own witness, Director Bartlett, demonstrated, this argument ignores the fact that with SDR over thousand voters have had their votes 
counted without being properly verified the CBOEs.  Current SBOE Director, Kim Strach, testified that this concern was recently validated when improper and unverified votes cast result SDR tainted the outcome municipal election the town Pembroke November 2013 and caused the SBOE issue order conduct entirely new election.  (Doc. 126-1  28; Doc. 161-9 48.)   
Plaintiffs argument, therefore, fails rebut Defendants point. sufficient for the State voice concern that SDR burdened CBOEs and left inadequate time for elections officials properly verify voters before the canvass and that unverified votes were counted result. fact, the State has more than interest allowing time for verification  has duty ensure that unverified voters not have their votes counted election.  Thus, the extent this Gingles factor applies here, the court finds that the States asserted justification for the repeal SDR not tenuous.  Plaintiffs further contention that these unverified voters nevertheless represent low level possible fraud view the nearly half million people who use SDR does not somehow render the States interest tenuous.  Cf. Florida, 885 Supp. 355-56.  Whether other  arguably better policy solutions exist address the problem for elected officials, not the courts, decide.   
 For all these reasons and considering the complete record, the court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown likelihood success the merits their claim that current North Carolina law (without SDR) interacts with current conditions and historical discrimination result inequality opportunity for African-Americans exercise their right vote violation Section the VRA.  The motion for preliminary injunction this basis will denied.39 Plaintiffs contention that these cases are analogous cases like Spirit Lake Tribe Benson County, No. 2:10-cv-095, 2010 4226614 (D.N.D. Oct. 21, 2010), not persuasive. Spirit Lake Tribe, the district court preliminarily enjoined under Section countys decision close seven eight precincts, including those closest Native American reservation.  Id. *1.  There, was apparent that the lack polling places, combined with social and historical conditions, caused the Native American population have less opportunity vote Election Day than the white population.  Id. *3-4.  Here, because the numerous other methods for registration and the already high African-American registration rate, has not been shown that lack SDR will likely cause similar issues.  See also, e.g., Common Cause Christian Leadership Conference Jones, 213 Supp. 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (denying defendants motion for judgment the pleadings where plaintiffs alleged punch-card voting used only minority areas had discriminatory result); Berks Cnty., 250 Supp. 538-40 (granting preliminary injunction under Section where county failed provide bilingual poll workers and election officials made discriminatory remarks about Hispanics and did not allow them use their choice poll assisters). Racially discriminatory intent under Section and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 

The showing intent required prove violation Section the same that required establish violation the Fifteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause.  See Charleston Cnty., 316 Supp. 272 
n.3 (citing Garza, 918 F.2d 766); cf. Reno, 520 U.S. 481 (Since 1980, plaintiff bringing constitutional vote dilution challenge, whether under the Fourteenth Fifteenth Amendment, has been required establish that the State political subdivision acted with discriminatory purpose.).  The analysis follow, therefore, applies the Section claim well Plaintiffs claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Village Arlington Heights Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1976), the Supreme Court held that discriminatory intent established where plaintiff proves that racial discrimination was motivating factor the governing bodys decision.  See also Reno, 520 U.S. 488; Brown, 895 Supp. 124546.  Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was motivating factor demands sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence intent may available.  Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 266.  The Court instructed that whether the impact the action bears more heavily one race than another an important starting point.  Id. (quoting Washington Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).  Next, the court should consider [t]he historical background the decision particularly reveals series official actions taken for invidious purposes.  Id. 267.  The specific sequence events 
leading the challenged decision also may shed some light the decisionmakers purposes.  Id.  This includes departures from the normal legislative procedure well substantive departures, particularly the factors usually considered important the decisionmaker strongly favor decision contrary the one reached.  Id.  Also relevant are [t]he legislative administrative history especially where there are contemporary statements members the decisionmaking body, minutes its meetings, reports.  Id. 268.  The Supreme Court did not purport establish conclusive list factors Arlington Heights, and other factors, particularly the nature and weight the State interest involved, may specifically relevant claim discriminatory intent.  See, e.g., Florida, 885 Supp. 348, 355; Terrazas Clements, 581 Supp. 1329, 1347 (N.D. Tex. 1984). Impact decision the first factor and discussed above, the enactment 2013-381s elimination SDR will bear more heavily African-Americans than whites because the former disproportionately took advantage SDR. Brown, however, the disparate impact softened the fact that elimination SDR will not likely result inequality opportunity vote for black citizens.  Cf. Brown, 895 Supp. 1246 
(Because the evidence before the Court does not demonstrate that the changes will deny minorities equal access the polls, the otherwise disproportionate effect the amendments does not weigh heavily favor finding discriminatory purpose.).  Moreover, noted, Dr. Stewart predicts that elimination SDR would have affected just black voters (and 1.5% whites) 2012, and predicts would have affected only 1.4% black voters (and white voters) 2010.40  (J.A. 789-91.)  Further, noted above, North Carolina provides several other ways register (including amending registration) that, least this record, have not been shown practically unavailable African-American residents.  Thus, the disproportionate impact 2013-381s elimination SDR supports finding discriminatory intent, but only moderately so. Although SDR was used disproportionately black voters, bears noting that its elimination affects vastly more whites than blacks.  During its existence, SDR was used 360,536 whites compared 243,396 blacks federal elections.  (J.A. 629.) Historical background decision for the historical background the decision, Plaintiffs contend that was not lost the members the General Assembly that, prior 2013-381, North Carolinas decade State action liberalizing election laws had succeeded dramatically increasing overall voter turnout North 
Carolina, and had increased African-American voter participation particular.  (Doc. 98-1 61.)  Plaintiffs argue that race data was offered opponents 589 during debate the bill (id.) and that the marked upward trend black voter registration and turnout was well-known and widely discussed local media sources and public hearings the House Elections Committee, well documented SBOE data (Doc. 65). 
There evidence that its initiation  before any indication how would used any minority group SDR was partisan issue insofar was passed Democratically-controlled General Assembly near-party line vote and was signed into law Democratic governor.  (J.A. 1209 (report Dr. Kousser), 2643-44.)  When Republicans gained control the legislature and the governorship 2013, they moved repeal SDR.  During debate 589, while asserting its disproportionate impact blacks, some opponents the bill nevertheless attributed the supporters motivation partisanship.  (See, e.g., J.A. 2563 (statement Representative Hall that the bill was the most pointedly, obviously politically partisan bill [he had] ever seen); 1109 (report Dr. Burden, noting that [a]ll evidence indicates that 2013-381 was enacted primarily for political gain .).) sure, partisan motive does not preclude excuse the existence racial motivation.  While [r]arely can said that legislature administrative body operating under broad mandate made decision motivated solely single concern, racial discrimination not just another competing consideration.  Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 265.  Protecting incumbency and safeguarding the voting rights minorities are purposes often war with each other, and racial animus this context need not based any dislike, mistrust, hatred bigotry.  Garza, 918 F.2d 778 (Kozinski, J., concurring part and dissenting part).  But the fact that bill reverses prior practice does not itself constitute impermissible intent.  This especially true not only where evidence suggests that the reversal was the result partisan split, but more importantly where new political majority espouses legitimate reason change the law.  Here, previously detailed, see supra Part III.B.1., the reasons the proponents offered for the elimination SDR were identified some length the SBOEs 2009 report the General Assembly. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the sponsors 589 sought data from the SBOE the potential racial impact some its provisions, but the evidence sparse SDR.  Plaintiffs note that March 2013, the various House sponsors 589 sent email the SBOE asking for cross matching the 
registered voters [North Carolina] with the [DMV] determine list voters who have neither [North Carolina] Drivers License nor [North Carolina] Identification Card.  (J.A. 1713.)  This evidence seems relate only the voter provisions then under consideration.  The legislators additionally stated that they would need have that subset broken down into different categories within each county all possible demographics that [the SBOE] typically captures (party affiliation, ethnicity, age, gender, etc.).  (Id.)  The SBOE sent the data large spreadsheet the next day.  (J.A. 1714-81.) March 28, Representative Lewis sent ten-page letter Director Bartlett containing nearly 100 numbered inquiries regarding the SBOEs January 2013 conclusion that 612,955 registered voters lacked qualifying photo ID.  (J.A. 3128-37.)  One the inquiries mentioned race, asking the SBOE provide the age and racial breakdown for voters who not have drivers license number listed.  (J.A. 3131.) April 11, Director Bartlett sent 19-page response with attached spreadsheet that included the requested race data.  (J.A. 3148-66.)  That same day, the Speakers general counsel emailed the SBOE, asking for additional race data regarding people who requested absentee ballots 2012 (J.A. 3234), which was provided (J.A. 3235-46). SDR, Kim Strach emailed some data Representative Lewis, one the bills House sponsors, July 25, the day the House concurrence vote.  (J.A. 3265.)  This data included the verification rates for SDR the 2010 and 2012 elections and information about the type IDs presented same-day registrants.  (J.A. 3267-84.) also included spreadsheets that contain race data for individual same-day registrants and whether those registrants were verified.  (J.A. 3278, 3280.)  This was the same data that Defendants relied upon during the preliminary injunction hearing demonstrate that SDR resulted the counting over thousand ballots voters who were never properly verified.  Thus, SDR, there little evidence from which infer that the General Assemblys course action was based research the racial effect implications its repeal.      
Plaintiffs also argue that the General Assembly proceeded pass the bill even after opponents cited the disproportional use SDR black North Carolinians.  Plaintiffs rely declaration from Senator Stein stating that during Senate debate emphasized that 2012 nearly 100,000 people registered with SDR, and that 34% were minority.  (J.A. 190.)  The Senate transcript reveals that Senator Stein mentioned the first figure but not the minority participation; however, did refer 2013-381 several times disproportionately affect[ing] 
minorities.41  (See Doc. 134-4 253-55, 259.) argued that the States registration cut-off was instituted historically minimize African-American participation and that eliminating SDR, you all are going back the sorry old history that should not embrace.42  (Id. 255.) Although Senator Stein attached document his declaration containing statistics regarding African-American use SDR the 2012 general election (J.A. 198), there indication the legislative record that this was shared with Senate members during the debate.  The record refers elsewhere only three charts  all related early voting that Senator Stein shared during debate.  (J.A. 198-200.) Whatever the original purpose registration cut-off, the Supreme Court, noted, recognized 1973 that the States have interest closing voter rolls reasonable time before Election Day.  Marston, 410 U.S. 681. 
While Plaintiffs rely heavily these facts establish improper intent, the United States also argues that the court should infer improper intent from the General Assemblys failure solicit expert opinions about the impact the changes.  (Doc. 166 219.)  Cf. Brown, 895 Supp. 1248 (noting plaintiffs urging infer intent from the Florida legislatures failure conduct any study analysis the effect the changes prior amending the statute).  When the court asked during the hearing would have been better worse not have asked for any race data, the United States responded that [i]t would just additional factor consider.  (Id. 219-20.)  Consequently, Plaintiffs effort simultaneously rely the presence and absence race information presents challenge.   
Discriminatory purpose implies more than intent volition intent awareness consequences.  Personnel Admr Mass. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).  It implies that the decisionmaker selected reaffirmed particular course action least part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon identifiable group.  Id. infer from the opponents objections that the General Assembly passed the bill because the objections difficult this record.  This especially true where some the contemporaneous legislative criticism eschewed any improper intent.  (See, e.g., Doc. 134-4 204 (statement Sen. Bryant clarifying that was not trying accuse Republicans being racist, but only stating that the bill would have racial impact regardless its purpose).43 sum, evidence that legislators knew may have known that SDR was used disproportionately African-Americans the State contrasted evidence that SDR was used overwhelmingly whites and that was causing significant number unverified voters ballots counted.  The historical the extent Plaintiffs point evidence race data 589 generally, relevant that during the Senate debate, proponents the bill emphasized that African-American turnout increased Georgia after the State passed voter law.  (Doc. 134-4 158-59.) 
background the decision, therefore, presents conflicting picture. Sequence events leading decision  

The next factor [t]he specific sequence events leading the challenged decision, including whether the decision was [d]eparture[] from the normal procedural sequence factors usually considered important would strongly favor contrary decision.  Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 267.  Plaintiffs describe the procedure used the passage 2013-381 irregular, highly expedited, and unorthodox.  (Doc. 98-1 62.)  Particularly, they note that (1) the original version 589 that left the House Representatives April concerned only voter ID; (2) the Senate took action 589 until after the Supreme Courts decision Shelby County; (3) Senator Apodaca announced the day after Shelby County the intent with the full bill without disclosing the contents that bill; (4) the new provisions were inserted into 589 process known gut-and-amend, and the expanded bill was not posted online until the night before the Senate Rules Committee meeting; (5) after the bill passed the Senate, the House received that same night and concurred the changes without referring the bill Committee the Whole any other committee; (6) the proponents the bill, only Representative Lewis spoke favor during the House session, while every Democratic opponent spoke against it; and (7) the bill represented what Plaintiffs characterize reversal course from the previous decade North Carolina legislation election laws.  Defendants contend that 589 complied with all General Assembly rules and procedures and that several other bills have followed similar procedural paths, particularly the controversial 2003 redistricting legislation passed the then Democratically-controlled legislature. reading the complete legislative record reveals that, although the procedural path the bill left room for criticism opponents, any inference impermissible intent marginal. Plaintiffs must concede, the General Assembly complied with all its rules during the passage 2013-381.  (See Doc. 164 28-29 (statement United States counsel).) one raised point order.  Moreover, testimony established that the process known gut-and-amend used transform the voter bill into the omnibus bill that became 2013-381 not uncommon the General Assembly.  (Id. 133 (testimony Senator Dan Blue, opponent the bill, acknowledging that gut-and-amend happens quite bit and too often the General Assembly).)  Such process occurs because the General Assembly must meet cut-off date  known the cross-over date which piece legislation must approved one 
House lest die for the remainder the session.  (Id. 131-33.)  Plaintiffs legislator-witnesses admitted that not uncommon for bill return its originating house with significant material not originally part the bill.  (Id. 133; Doc. 165 85-88 (testimony Rep. Glazier).) this regard, Plaintiffs real contention seems that the process for 589 was unusual for bill having the significance they contend did and the majoritys failure give deference existing political relationships with those the other side the aisle.  (See Doc. 165 (testimony Rep. Glazier: I was shocked it, not by, some respects, some the provisions, but the and, again, comments the floor that night made clear the process), ([t]he process this bill got was nothing more than what give golf cart bill); J.A. 179  (declaration Sen. Stein describing the Senate proceedings irregular for bill this magnitude).) 
The fact that the Senate acted after Shelby County favors Plaintiffs, but does not bear the full significance that they attribute it.  That decision greatly altered the burden proof calculus for legislative body considering changes voting laws. would not have been unreasonable for the North Carolina Senate conclude that passing the full bill before Shelby County was simply not worth the administrative and 
financial cost seeking permission from the United States.  Proponents were aware that  opponents sharply reminded them during debate  they were still obliged comply with Section and the Constitution.  (Doc. 134-4 153, 192.) 
Plaintiffs contention that only one legislator spoke favor the bill inaccurate.  While true that only Representative Lewis spoke the House before the vote concur the Senates changes, several Republican Senators spoke favor the bill both during the Rules Committee meeting and during the two floor sessions.  (See generally Doc. 134-4.)  Additionally, the initial bill was debated over several committee sessions and floor session March and April 2013.  (See generally J.A. 2388-2451.) not necessarily nefarious that Republican the House other than Representative Lewis rose speak favor the bill when was late the evening, the caucus knew had the votes pass the bill, and the end the legislative session was approaching.44 Indeed, opponent the bill candidly testified the hearing that had been the lawyer for the Republicans, would have similarly advised the strategy avoid further discussion.  (Doc. 165 70.) 
Plaintiffs further rely the fact that the House voted concur the Senates changes without forming Committee the Whole referring the bill another committee.  The 
record establishes that forming Committee the Whole quite rare. noted, Representative Moore stated that [i]t would pointless so, because the Committee the Whole would the entire House sitting Committee and then later simply sitting the House.  (J.A. 2507-08.)  Defendants also adduced evidence during the hearing that previous Democratically-controlled majorities the General Assembly returned politically-sensitive bills for concurrence extensive changes without referring the substitute bill committee.45 Representative Glazier testified that the 2003 redistricting legislation, affecting all voters the State, returned the House following significant changes the Senate.  The Democratically-controlled House voted concur the Senates changes without additional committee hearings.  (Doc. 165 83-86.) also testified that controversial bills regarding Sharia law and regulatory reform were also returned the House motion concur.  (Id. 87-89.) 
The Senate debated the bill over two separate sessions and Rules Committee meeting, debated over dozen amendments and added several (including two Democrats), and each opponent was given the floor and sufficient time speak and explain his her objections.  The Senate also granted time adjourn between debate allow members caucus and consider further amendments.  (Doc. 134-4 123-25.) the end the Senate debate, Senator Nesbitt  strong opponent the bill  stated [w]eve had good and thorough debate this bill over two 
days, and I think weve reviewed the