



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

10 February 2009

Ms. Jenny Small
Judicial Watch Inc.
501 School Street, SW Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20024

Dear Ms. Small,


I am writing to respond to your Freedom of Information Act request for all records used by General Petraeus and his staff to brief Senator Obama on 21 Jul 2008.

After a thorough review of the three responsive documents, I am fully releasing one document and partially denying some information contained in two documents in order to protect national security information. Certain portions of the documents are currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958, as amended, Section 1.4(a), military plans, weapons system, or operations. Therefore, portions of the documents are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1).

Accordingly, in my capacity as the Initial Denial Authority, by withholding this information I am partially denying your request. All fees are waived for this request. You may submit an administrative appeal within 60 calendar days of the date above to James Hogan, Chief, Defense Freedom of Information Policy Office, 1155 Defense Pentagon Washington D.C. 20301-1155.

If you have any questions regarding this FOIA request, please contact my FOIA Requester Service Center at (813) 827-1810 and refer to USCENTCOM FOIA #08-0195, when inquiring.

Sincerely,


JAY W. HOOD
Major General, U.S. Army

Enclosures:

1. MNF-I Commander's guidance
2. Optimized CODEL
3. MNF-I/USM-I Joint Campaign Plan



Judicial Watch

July 28, 2008

Because no one is above the law!

Received

JUL 28 2008

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL & FAX

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND CCI6-RDF (FOIA)
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AFB, FL 33621-5101
(Fax No.: 813- 827-1241)
(Art. No.: 7008 0150 0003 3587 1271)

USCENTCOM FOIA
Case #

08-0195

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request

Dear Sir/Madam:

Pursuant to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, Judicial Watch, Inc. hereby requests that the United States Central Command (hereafter "USCENTCOM") produce any and all agency records concerning, relating to or reflecting the following subjects:

- 1) Copies of all briefing materials, notes, presentations, PowerPoint slides, and other documents and records used by General David Petraeus and the staff of the Multi-National Force – Iraq for briefing Senator Barack Obama and his Congressional Delegation on 21 July 2008.

The time-frame for this request is 18 July 2008 to present.

For purpose of this request, the term "record" shall mean: (1) any written, printed, or typed material of any kind, including without limitation all correspondence, memoranda, notes, messages, letters, cards, telegrams, teletypes, facsimiles, papers, forms, records, telephone messages, diaries, schedules, calendars, chronological data, minutes, books, reports, charts, lists, ledgers, invoices, worksheets, receipts, returns, computer printouts, printed matter, prospectuses, statements, checks, statistics, surveys, affidavits, contracts, agreements, transcripts, magazine or newspaper articles, or press

United States Central Command**FOIA Request****July 28, 2008****Page 2 of 7**

releases; (2) any electronically, magnetically, or mechanically stored material of any kind, including without limitation all electronic mail or e-mail, meaning any electronically transmitted text or graphic communication created upon and transmitted or received by any computer or other electronic device, and all materials stored on compact disk, computer disk, diskette, hard drive, server, or tape; (3) any audio, aural, visual, or video records, recordings, or representations of any kind, including without limitation all cassette tapes, compact disks, digital video disks, microfiche, microfilm, motion pictures, pictures, photographs, or videotapes; (4) any graphic materials and data compilations from which information can be obtained; (5) any materials using other means of preserving thought or expression; and (6) any tangible things from which data or information can be obtained, processed, recorded, or transcribed. The term "record" also shall mean any drafts, alterations, amendments, changes, or modifications of or to any of the foregoing.

If you do not understand this request or any portion thereof, or if you feel you require clarification of this request or any portion thereof, please contact us immediately at 202-646-5172 or jsmall@judicialwatch.org.

If any responsive record or portion thereof is claimed to be exempt from production under FOIA, please provide sufficient identifying information with respect to each allegedly exempt record or portion thereof to allow us to assess the propriety of the claimed exemption. *Vaughn v. Rosen*, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). In addition, any reasonably segregable portion of a responsive record must be provided, after redaction of any allegedly exempt material. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).

Judicial Watch also hereby requests a waiver of both search and duplication fees pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II) and 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii).

Judicial Watch is entitled to a waiver of search fees under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II) because it is a member of the news media. Judicial Watch, Inc. regularly obtains information about the operations and activities of government through FOIA and other means, uses its editorial skills to turn this information into distinct works, and publishes and disseminates these works to the public. It intends to do likewise with the records it receives in response to this request.

As a member of the news media, Judicial Watch uses the following means, among others, to publish and disseminate its distinctive work to the public:

(1) Judicial Watch maintains an Internet site, www.JudicialWatch.org, where the public can review records obtained through FOIA and read editorial works prepared by Judicial Watch, Inc., including news releases, based on FOIA materials. This website is viewed by over 20,000 people per day on average, and on several occasions, has logged up to 1,000,000 visitors in a single day.

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(2) Judicial Watch also publishes a monthly newsletter in which it publishes its own editorial works and presents, analyzes, and explains information it obtains through FOIA. Judicial Watch, Inc.'s newsletter is sent to approximately 140,000 individuals each month. The organization also utilizes an e-mail Infonet service that sends out updates of Judicial Watch's activities over the Internet to almost 18,000 persons.

(3) Judicial Watch also periodically publishes and disseminates its own distinct works in the form of books and reports. For example:

- September 1998 – Judicial Watch, Inc. published the Interim Report on Crimes and Other Offenses Committed by President Bill Clinton Warranting His Impeachment and Removal from Elected Office. This 145-page report was accompanied by nearly 4,000 pages of supporting documentation and was crafted, in part, from the raw materials obtained by Judicial Watch through FOIA requests, among other regular means.
- August 1999 – Judicial Watch published Filegate Status Report, which is 136 pages long and is supported by nearly 1000 pages of documentation.
- March 2001 – Judicial Watch published The Judicial Watch Florida Recount, an independent, non-partisan analysis of the results of Florida's hotly contested 2000 Presidential election based upon a sampling of ballots reviewed by Judicial Watch pursuant to Florida's version of FOIA.
- February 2002 – Judicial Watch published The Judicial Watch 2002 "State of the Union" Report, Bush Administration Ethics Enforcement: "A Failure of Leadership."
- September 2002 – Judicial Watch published Fatal Neglect: The U.S. Government's Continuing Failure to Protect American Citizens from Terrorists.
- November 21, 2003 – Judicial Watch produced Analysis of GAO Testimony: US Postal Service – Clear Communication With Employees Needed Before Reopening of Brentwood Facility. (GAO-04-2057T/October23, 2003). Comptroller General of the United States David M. Walker, in a reply to Judicial Watch's Analysis of GAO Testimony, wrote on December 17, 2003, "We view Judicial Watch as an important accountability organization in Washington, D.C."
- June 29, 2005 – Judicial Watch produced a special Report US Border Patrol Survey Analysis, an analysis of documents produced under FOIA.

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<http://www.judicialwatch.org/borderpatrolreport.shtml>

- February 3, 2006 – Judicial Watch held an educational panel at the National Press Club and published a Special Report of the event, “A Discussion of Ethics in Washington.”
<http://www.judicialwatch.org/archive/2006/special-report-ethics.pdf>
- May 9, 2006 – Judicial Watch produced The Clinton RU-486 Files, a special report of the Clinton administration’s effort to put the abortion drug RU-486 on the market in the United States, based on documents obtained from the National Archives at the Clinton Presidential Library and in the course of a five year FOIA litigation battle between Judicial Watch and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). <http://judicialwatch.org/archive/2006/jw-ru486-report.pdf>
- June 15, 2006 – Judicial Watch publishes “Jesse Jackson Exposed,” a special report details the intimidation and shakedown tactics of Jackson’s so-called civil rights organization, the Rainbow Push Coalition.
<http://judicialwatch.org/archive/2006/jackson-report.pdf>
- October 30, 2006 – Judicial Watch releases a special report “*Academia Semillas del Pueblo* (Seeds of the People Academy): Training the Next Generation of Mexican Revolutionaries with American Tax Dollars.” The report includes excerpts of new documents obtained by Judicial Watch through the California Public Records Act that highlight the school’s radical agenda.
http://www.judicialwatch.org/archive/2006/SR_academia%20semillas.pdf
- November 27, 2006 – Judicial Watch publishes New Clinton White House Records Raise Disturbing Questions about Hillary Clinton and Abortion. Judicial Watch’s report includes excerpts of new documents obtained by Judicial Watch from the Clinton Presidential Library in Little Rock, Arkansas.
http://www.judicialwatch.org/archive/2006/SR_Clinton%20abortion.pdf

Judicial Watch also publishes and disseminates its distinctive work by participating in public conferences and seminars, including its own "Ethics in Government" conferences held in Pasadena, California (1999), Washington, DC (2000), and Miami, FL (2001).

Judicial Watch holds quarterly education panels at the National Press Club in Washington DC that have been televised by C-SPAN. Past panel discussions have been: “Defining ‘Judicial Activism’ in the Context of the Culture Wars,” “A Discussion of Ethics in Washington,” “The Case for Open Government,” “Conservative Perspectives on the Alito Nomination,” “The Role of Grassroots Groups in the Supreme Court

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Nominating Process," "The Foley Scandal Fallout," "New Fronts in the Immigration Battle," "How to Fight Corruption in Government," and "The Security and Prosperity Partnership – Threat or Opportunity?."

Judicial Watch also works with other media organizations to publish and disseminate distinctive work to the public, and representatives of Judicial Watch appear frequently on nationally broadcast television and radio programs. Judicial Watch has been granted press credentials at a number of national conventions and other events. Judicial Watch's Director of Investigations and Research, Christopher Farrell, is a member of Investigative Reporters and Editors, Inc.

On February 16, 2005, Judicial Watch was rated by the highly respected capitol newspaper *The Hill* as being on of the nation's top ten "watchdogs."

Consequently, Judicial Watch qualifies for a waiver of search fees as a member of the news media. See *National Security Archive v. U.S. Department of Defense*, 880 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In fact, Judicial Watch has been recognized as a member of the news media in other FOIA litigation. See *Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice*, 133 F. Supp.2d 52 (D.D.C. 2000); and, *Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of Defense*, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44003, *1 (D.D.C. June 28, 2006).

Judicial Watch also is entitled to a complete waiver of both search fees and duplication fees pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). Under this provision, records:

shall be furnished without any charge or at a charge reduced below the fees established under clause (ii) if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii).

Judicial Watch is a 501(c)(3), not-for-profit, educational organization, and, by definition, it has no commercial purpose. Judicial Watch exists to educate the public about the operations and activities of government, as well as to increase public understanding about the importance of ethics and the rule of law in government. The particular records requested herein are sought as part of Judicial Watch's ongoing efforts to document the operations and activities of the federal government and to educate the public about these operations and activities.

Courts applying the "public interest" fee waiver provision of FOIA typically take into account four factors in determining whether to grant a waiver: (1) whether the subject of the requested records concerns the operations or activities of government; (2)

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whether disclosure of the requested records is likely to contribute to an understanding of government operations or activities; (3) whether disclosure of the requested records will contribute to a "reasonably broad" audience and whether the requestor has the "ability and intention" to disseminate the information to the public; and (4) whether disclosure of the requested record will contribute "significantly" to the public understanding. See *D.C. Technical Assistance Org. v. HUD*, 85 F. Supp.2d 46, 48-49 (D.D.C. 2000); 28 C.F.R. § 16.11(k)(2)(i)-(iv). Request for "public interest" waivers are to be judged on a case-by-case basis." *Larson v. CIA*, 843 F.2d 1481, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

The requested records unquestionably regard U.S. government operations. During five years of operations in Iraq, the government has devoted considerable resources to the effort. The future activities of the U.S. government depend upon the operation in Iraq. Therefore, any briefing records that discuss this operation are inherently intertwined with current and future government activities.

Disclosure of the requested records is likely to contribute to an understanding of government operations and activities and will appeal to a "reasonably broad" audience, as the Iraq War has engrossed the American Public. American families have been directly and indirectly affected by the war. Many election experts believe opinions on the Iraq War will influence the upcoming U.S. Presidential election. These opinions will be based on a variety of information. As one of the top commanders and experts on the Iraq War, General Petraeus' briefing will be a valuable source of information for forming an opinion. In addition to an interest in expert opinion, the American public has demonstrated an interest in the upcoming Presidential election. Senator Barack Obama's overseas trip has been highly publicized with media crews accompanying him, demonstrating the depth of American interest in his trip and his activities and meetings during the trip.

Once Judicial Watch obtains the requested records, it intends to analyze them and disseminate the results of its analysis, as well as the records themselves, as a special written report. Judicial Watch will also educate the public via radio programs, Judicial Watch's website, and/or newsletter, among other outlets. It also will make the records available to other members of the media or researchers upon request. Judicial Watch has a proven ability to disseminate information obtained through FOIA to the public, as demonstrated by its long-standing and continuing public outreach efforts, including radio and television programs, website, newsletter, periodic published reports, public appearances, and other educational undertakings.

Not only is the American public greatly interested in the topic, but disclosure of the briefing material will also contribute to public understanding. As the Iraq War has been highly contentious, expert knowledge shared with a Presidential candidate will provide greater public understanding of the Iraq War and the decisions facing the future

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.
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Fax

To: Freedom of Information Act office (centcom) From: Jenny Small
 Fax: 813-827-1241 Date: 28 July 2008
 Phone: _____ Pages: 8 (including cover)

- Urgent For Review Please Comment Please Reply

Comments: If you do not receive all pages, please call 202-646-5172.



HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400

15 July 2008

Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance

- **Secure and serve the population.** The Iraqi people are the decisive “terrain.” Together with our Iraqi partners, work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate establishment of local governance, restoration of basic services, and revival of local economies.
- **Live among the people.** You can't commute to this fight. Position Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, and Patrol Bases in the neighborhoods we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents.
- **Hold areas that have been secured.** Once we clear an area, we must retain it. Develop the plan for holding an area before starting to clear it. The people need to know that we and our Iraqi partners will not abandon them. When reducing forces, gradually thin our presence rather than handing off or withdrawing completely. Ensure situational awareness even after transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces.
- **Pursue the enemy relentlessly.** Identify and pursue Al Qaeda-Iraq and other extremist elements tenaciously. Do not let them retain support areas or sanctuaries. Force the enemy to respond to us. Deny the enemy the ability to plan and conduct deliberate operations.
- **Employ all assets to isolate and defeat the terrorists and insurgents.** Counter-terrorist forces alone cannot defeat Al-Qaeda and the other extremists. Success requires a comprehensive approach that employs all forces and all means at our disposal—non-kinetic as well as kinetic. Employ Coalition and Iraqi conventional and special operations forces, Sons of Iraq, and all other available non-military multipliers in accordance with the attached “Anaconda Strategy.”
- **Generate unity of effort.** Coordinate operations and initiatives with our embassy and interagency partners, our Iraqi counterparts, local governmental leaders, and non-governmental organizations to ensure all are working to achieve a common purpose.
- **Promote reconciliation.** We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify and separate the “irreconcilables” from the “reconcilables” through thorough intelligence work, population control measures, information operations, kinetic operations, and political initiatives. We must strive to make the reconcilables part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables.
- **Defeat the network, not just the attack.** Focus to the “left” of the explosion. Employ intelligence assets to identify the network behind an attack, and go after its leaders, explosives experts, financiers, suppliers, and operators.
- **Foster Iraqi legitimacy.** Encourage Iraqi leadership and initiative; recognize that their success is our success. Partner in all that we do and support local involvement in security, governance, economic revival, and provision of basic services. Find the right balance between Coalition Forces leading and the Iraqis exercising their leadership and initiative,


and encourage the latter. Legitimacy of Iraqi actions in the eyes of the Iraqi people is essential to overall success.

- **Punch above your weight class.** Strive to be “bigger than you actually are.” Partner in operations with Iraqi units and police, and employ “Sons of Iraq,” contractors, and local Iraqis to perform routine tasks in and around Forward Operating Bases, Patrol Bases, and Joint Security Stations, thereby freeing up our troopers to focus on tasks “outside the wire.”
- **Employ money as a weapon system.** Money can be “ammunition” as the security situation improves. Use a targeting board process to ensure the greatest effect for each “round” expended and to ensure that each engagement using money contributes to the achievement of the unit’s overall objectives. Ensure contracting activities support the security effort, employing locals wherever possible. Employ a “matching fund” concept when feasible in order to ensure Iraqi involvement and commitment.
- **Fight for intelligence.** A nuanced understanding of the situation is everything. Analyze the intelligence that is gathered, share it, and fight for more. Every patrol should have tasks designed to augment understanding of the area of operations and the enemy. Operate on a “need to share” rather than a “need to know” basis. Disseminate intelligence as soon as possible to all who can benefit from it.
- **Walk.** Move mounted, work dismounted. Stop by, don’t drive by. Patrol on foot and engage the population. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass.
- **Understand the neighborhood.** Map the human terrain and study it in detail. Understand the local culture and history. Learn about the tribes, formal and informal leaders, governmental structures, religious elements, and local security forces. Understand how local systems and structures—including governance, provision of basic services, maintenance of infrastructure, and economic elements—are supposed to function and how they really function.
- **Build relationships.** Relationships are a critical component of counterinsurgency operations. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, strive to establish productive links with local leaders, tribal sheikhs, governmental officials, religious leaders, and interagency partners.
- **Look for Sustainable Solutions.** Build mechanisms by which the Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi community leaders, and local Iraqis under the control of governmental institutions can continue to secure local areas and sustain governance and economic gains in their communities as the Coalition Force presence is reduced. Figure out the Iraqi systems and help Iraqis make them work.
- **Maintain continuity and tempo through transitions.** Start to build the information you’ll provide to your successors on the day you take over. Allow those who will follow you to “virtually look over your shoulder” while they’re still at home station by giving them access to your daily updates and other items on SIPRNET. Deploy planners and intel analysts ahead of time. Encourage extra time on the ground during transition periods, and strive to maintain operational tempo and local relationships to avoid giving the enemy respite.
- **Manage expectations.** Be cautious and measured in announcing progress. Note what has been accomplished, but also acknowledge what still needs to be done. Avoid premature declarations of success. Ensure our troopers and our partners are aware of our assessments and recognize that any counterinsurgency operation has innumerable challenges, that enemies get a vote, and that progress is likely to be slow.

- **Be first with the truth.** Get accurate information of significant activities to the chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the press as soon as is possible. Beat the insurgents, extremists, and criminals to the headlines, and pre-empt rumors. Integrity is critical to this fight. Don't put lipstick on pigs. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, and then state what we've learned and how we'll respond. Hold the press (and ourselves) accountable for accuracy, characterization, and context. Avoid spin and let facts speak for themselves. Challenge enemy disinformation. Turn our enemies' bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them.
- **Fight the information war relentlessly.** Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that will be won or lost in the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and our forces has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a narrative that works and continually drive the themes home through all forms of media.
- **Live our values.** Do not hesitate to kill or capture the enemy, but stay true to the values we hold dear. Living our values distinguishes us from our enemies. There is no tougher endeavor than the one in which we are engaged. It is often brutal, physically demanding, and frustrating. All of us experience moments of anger, but we can neither give in to dark impulses nor tolerate unacceptable actions by others.
- **Exercise initiative.** In the absence of guidance or orders, determine what they should be and execute aggressively. Higher level leaders will provide a broad vision and paint "white lines on the road," but it will be up to those at tactical levels to turn "big ideas" into specific actions.
- **Empower subordinates.** Resource to enable decentralized action. Push assets and authorities down to those who most need them and can actually use them. Flatten reporting chains. Identify the level to which you would naturally plan and resource, and go one further—generally looking three levels down, vice the two levels down that is traditional in major combat operations.
- **Prepare for and exploit opportunities.** "Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity" (Seneca the Younger). Develop concepts (such as that of "reconcilables" and "irreconcilables") in anticipation of possible opportunities, and be prepared to take risk as necessary to take advantage of them.
- **Learn and adapt.** Continually assess the situation and adjust tactics, policies, and programs as required. Share good ideas. Avoid mental or physical complacency. Never forget that what works in an area today may not work there tomorrow, and that what works in one area may not work in another. Strive to ensure that our units are learning organizations. In counterinsurgency, the side that learns and adapts the fastest gains important advantages.

DAVID H. PETRAEUS
 General, United States Army
 Commanding

Anaconda Strategy vs. AQI





Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander's Guidance

COUNTERINSURGENCY

A Guide to Soldiering in Iraq

- Secure and serve the population.** The Iraqi people are the decisive "terrain." We must give them security and respect, and we must help improve their lives.
- Live among the people.** You can't commute to this fight. To help secure the people, we must live with them, together with our Iraqi partners.
- Hold areas that have been secured.** Once we clear an area, we must retain it. Develop the plan to hold an area before starting to clear it.
- Pursue the enemy and his network relentlessly.** Identify and pursue AQI and other extremist elements tenaciously. Allow no safe havens.
- Employ money as a weapons system.** Money can be as important as is ammunition. Use a targeting process to ensure effectiveness in monetary "engagements."
- Generate unity of effort.** Coordinate operations and initiatives with our partners to ensure that all are working to achieve a common purpose.
- Promote reconciliation.** We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We must identify and separate the irreconcilables from the reconcilables.
- Defeat the network, not just the attack.** Focus to the "left" of the explosion; go after the network leaders, financiers, and explosive experts.
- Foster Iraqi legitimacy.** Encourage Iraqi leadership and initiative. Recognize that their success is our success, and help them make their systems work.
- Employ all assets to defeat the enemy.** Success against Al-Qaeda and other extremists requires non-kinetic as well as kinetic efforts.
- Punch above your weight class.** Strive to be "bigger than you actually are." Partner on operations with our Iraqi counterparts. Thicken your forces with "Sons of Iraq," contractors, and local Iraqis to perform routine tasks, thereby freeing up our troopers for the important tasks "outside the wire."
- Fight for intelligence.** Analyze, share, and fight for more intelligence. Good intelligence is what enables the most effective operations and understanding.
- Walk.** Move mounted, work dismounted. Stop by, don't just drive by. Interact with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass.
- Understand the neighborhood.** Map the human terrain and study it in detail. Learn how local systems are supposed to work—and how they really work.
- Build relationships.** Relationships are a critical component of COIN operations. Build them and nurture them. Establish productive links with Iraqi leaders.
- Look for sustainable solutions.** Help identify and develop Iraqi solutions to sustain long term security and political and economic gains.
- Maintain continuity and tempo through transitions.** Start to build the information you'll provide to your successors on the day you take over.
- Manage expectations.** Be cautious and measured in announcing progress. Note what has been accomplished—and acknowledge what still needs to be done.
- Be first with the truth.** Be first with the truth to your chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the press, and don't put lipstick on pigs.
- Fight the information war aggressively.** Compete in the Iraqi marketplace of ideas. Our struggle for legitimacy will be won or lost in the perceptions of the Iraqi people.
- Live our values.** Do not hesitate to kill or capture the enemy, but stay true to the principles we hold dear, as our values distinguish us from our enemies.
- Exercise initiative.** In the absence of guidance or orders, determine what they should be and execute aggressively. Push assets to those who can best use them.
- Prepare for and exploit opportunities.** "Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity." Be ready for good fortune and make the most of it.
- Learn and adapt.** Ensure your unit is a learning organization. Continuously assess the situation and adjust tactics, policies, and programs as required. Share good ideas. In counterinsurgency, the side that learns and adapts the fastest typically has the advantage.

Security Incidents





Chart includes potential attacks (IEDs/mines found and cleared) and executed attacks.


Sources: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 19JUL08; weekly beginning 3JAN04.

Civilian Deaths



Source: SIGACTS III Coalition and Iraqi reports as of 19 JUL 08.

ISF and U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq




Includes deaths within Iraq only. U.S. deaths under investigation are classified as battle deaths.

Sources: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 19JUL08.

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
High Profile Attacks (Explosions)





Sources: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 19JUL08.

UNCLASSIFIED

Ethno-Sectarian Violence




Density plots depict incidents of ethno-sectarian deaths.




Source: CIOC Trends (CF and Iraqi reports) as of 19JUL08; weekly beginning 1 May 06.

IED Explosions Incidence




Anaconda Strategy vs. AQI



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Al Qaeda in Iraq And Sunni Insurgent Groups December 2006



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Al Qaeda in Iraq
And Sunni Insurgent Groups
July 2008

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SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI//20100724

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**Shi'a Extremist
Militia Influence
February 2008**

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SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20180724
SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20180724

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**Shi'a Extremist
Militia Influence
July 2008**

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SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20180721

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KURDISH EXPANSION IN NORTHERN IRAQ

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SECRET//REL TO USA, MCF//20180721


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Sons of Iraq (Concerned Local Citizens)

TOTAL SOI Contracted: 102,946
Enrolled in BATS: 92,401
Requesting ISF hire: 22,296

SOI Transitioned: 20,983
Iraqi Security Forces: 8,697
Non-Security Employment: 4,080
Anbar: 8,206

Average Monthly CERP for SOI: \$21M



Caches Found and Cleared






Chart shows caches and ERW for all of Iraq.

Sources: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 19JUL08; weekly beginning 3JAN04.

ISF Combat Battalion Operational Readiness Assessment

Infantry, Armor, Special Operations, National Police, and Emergency Response Unit Battalions

Over 72% or 113 of 156 Iraqi Army Combat Battalions are "in the lead" for operations



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4th of July Reenlistment Ceremony



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MNF-I/USM-I Joint Campaign Plan Mission

27 November 2007

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Portion(s) Declassified IAW:
MNF-I SCG, dtd 31 Mar 07
Declassified on: 8 Aug 08

(b)(1)1.4a

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Document approved for release
by U.S. Central Command.
See FOIA Case # 08-0195

Derived from: MNF-I SCG, 31 Mar 07
Reason: 1.4a
Declassify on 20180721

Joint Campaign Plan Near Term Goals

Near term (NLT JUL 08):

(b)(1)1.4a

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Joint Campaign Plan Intermediate Term Goals

Intermediate Term (NLT JUN 09):

(b)(1)1.4a

Operation Iraqi Freedom Campaign Endstate

A stable Iraq:

(b)(1)1.4a

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