Mr. Sean Dunagan  
Judicial Watch, Inc.  
425 Third Street, S.W., Suite 800  
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Mr. Dunagan:

This is the Department of Defense Freedom of Information Division, Office of Litigation Support partial response to your March 6, 2014, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records regarding briefings, production of records and/or communications between Department of Defense (DoD) officials and certain members of Congress “on matters related to the activities of any agency or department of the U.S. government at the Special Mission Compound and/or the classified annex in Benghazi, Libya.”

The appropriate DoD components located and reviewed the enclosed 99 pages and determined that certain information is exempt from release and recommend a partial denial pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1), in accordance with Executive Order 13526, as amended, Sections 1.4(c), intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology and (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources; (b)(3) as it relates to 10 U.S.C. § 424 protecting organizational and personnel information for the Defense Intelligence Agency and 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) which protects intelligence sources and methods; and (b)(6) personal information affecting an individual’s privacy.

Appellate rights are moot as your request is currently in litigation.

Sincerely,

Paul J. Jacobsmeyer  
Chief

Enclosures:  
As Stated
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY); SYRIA (SYR).

SUBJECT: (S/NI) FORMER-LIBYA MILITARY WEAPONS
Shipped to Syria via the Port of Benghazi, Libya

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 1 May 2012 - 1 Sep 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 18 Sep 2012.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET/NOFORN.

TEXT: 1. (S/NI) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Weapons from the former Libya military stockpiles were shipped from the port of Benghazi, Libya to
the Port of Banias and the Port of Borj Islam, Syria. The weapons shipped during late-August 2012 were Sniper rifles, RPG's, and 125mm and 155mm howitzers missiles.

2. (S//NF) During the immediate aftermath of, and following the uncertainty caused by, the downfall of the (Gaddafi) regime in October 2011 and up until early September of 2012, weapons from the former Libya military stockpiles located in Benghazi, Libya were shipped from the port of Benghazi, Libya to the ports of Banias and the Port of Borj Islam, Syria. The Syrian ports were chosen due to the small amount of cargo traffic transiting these two ports. The ships used to transport the weapons were medium-sized and able to hold 10 or less shipping containers of cargo. (NFI)

3. (S//NF) The weapons shipped from Libya to Syria during late-August 2012 were Sniper rifles, RPG's, and 125mm and 155mm howitzers missiles. The numbers for each weapon were estimated to be: 500 Sniper rifles, 100 RPG launchers with 300 total rounds, and approximately 400 howitzers missiles [200 ea - 125mm and 200ea - 155mm].
RUFJFJFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUZEFJAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPNGB/NGIC CHARLOTTESVILLE VA

RUEKJCS/SECDF WASHINGTON DC
RUETICCC/USCYBERCOM FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RHMFJFISS/USCYBERCOM FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUCQSAB/USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL

 **** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ****

DATE OF PUBLICATION: 051851Z OCT 12.
COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBERIA (LBR); LIBYA (LBY); EGYPT (EGY).

SUBJECT: Source Reactions to Consulate Attack in Libya.

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 13 Sep 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 13 Sep 2012.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET/NOFORN.

TEXT: 1. (U//FOOU) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. On 13 September 2012, the Liberian newspaper, The National Chronicle, ran a front page story covering the recent attacks on the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya and carrying the headline "Prophet Muhammad Gangsters Killed US Ambassador." On 17 September 2012, the same paper published a follow up article on its front page with a headline that read, "Chronicle Editor Receives Death Threat from Individual Muslims" and listed the phone numbers from which the death threats originated. On 18 September 2012 the National Chronicle published an apology to the Muslim community in Liberia for the headline in their 13 September edition that called the men that attacked the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, "Muhammad Gangsters."

2. (U//FOOU) On 13 September 2012, the Liberian newspaper, The National Chronicle, ran a front page story covering the recent attacks on the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya and carrying the headline "Prophet Muhammad Gangsters Killed US Ambassador." The actual article in the body of the paper discussed the events of the attack on the US Consulate in the Libyan city of Benghazi without any references to the men who attacked the consulate being "Muhammad Gangsters" and the tone of the article was much less inflammatory than the headline. The article discussed the specifics of the attack to include the death of US Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens and both President Obama's and Libyan Deputy Prime Minister Mustafa Abu Shagur's public condemnation of the attack. The short article also discussed the security situation in Libya and the continuing instability. The article noted the now infamous movie that sparked
the attack as well as the subsequent demonstration at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo Egypt.

3. (U//FOUO) On 17 September 2012, the same paper, The National Chronicle, published a follow up article on its front page with a headline that read, "Chronicle Editor Receives Death Threat from Individual Muslims." The article detailed that Chronicle Editor, Edward ((Mortee)), received threatening phone calls from Lonestar Cellular numbers 0886476806, 0888100184, 0886325884, 0886683277, 0880809039, 0886315439, 0886477015, 0886519515, 0886651169, 0886343205, 0886589851, 0886416793 (Field Comment: To dial these Liberian cell numbers from a US phone, drop the first 0 and add the country code 231). The editor received death threats via these phone numbers from Friday 14 September to Saturday evening 15 September. The article also discussed a press release issued on 14 September by a group calling themselves the Coalition of Islamic Youth Organizations in Liberia that condemned the headline and called for the management of the Chronicle to retract the title immediately. The press release was signed by Abdullah A. ((Nuah)) acting Secretary General and approved by Amadu S. ((Sheriff)), acting President.

4. (U//FOUO) On 18 September 2012 the National Chronicle published an apology to the Muslim community in Liberia for the headline in their 13 September edition that called the men that attacked the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, "Muhammad Gangsters." After a brief personal apology from the publisher of the National Chronicle, Philipbert ((Browne)), the article went on to condemn the death threats phoned in following the publication of the article on 13 September by those claiming to be members of the Muslim community. The article then quoted several verses of Christian scripture to demonstrate the author's faith and cite scripture based examples of Christian tenets of non-violence against ones neighbors. See ENCL 1 for copies of the articles and headlines.
********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********

BODY

DATE OF PUBLICATION: 011924Z OCT 12.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).

SUBJECT: (U) LEADERSHIP DYNAMIC WITHIN Derna, Libya
DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 26 Sep 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 26 Sep 2012.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET/NOFORN.

TEXT: 1. (S//NF) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. According to their beliefs, the Jihadists should have an Emir who should be the highest power within
their state and would have the right to give Fatwa. It is important to understand that the title Ansar Al-Sharia does not only refer to the Katiba of Ansar Al-Sharia, because all the Jihadist groups within Derna consider Ansar Al-Sharia ideology represents all of them.

2. (S/NF) According to their beliefs, the Jihadists should have an Emir who should be the highest power within their state and would have the right to give Fatwa, as well as having a forensic or a legislator (Moshare'e) who gives the Fatwa to their life management methods (how they should conduct their lives) as well as deciding on decisions to issue a declaration of Jihad (Holy War). The last part is the Military command of the Emirate which is usually divided to different groups and segments according to goals and priorities.

3. (S/NF) It is important to understand that the title Ansar Al-Sharia does not only refer to the Katiba of Ansar Al-Sharia, because all the Jihadist groups within Derna consider Ansar Al-Sharia ideology represents all of them, but the fact that Ansar Al-Sharia was selected by Sofian Al-GOMMA's group first which made others look for other names to distinguish themselves apart from one another. More importantly, the fact that Jihadists believe that AQ command including Osama Bin ((LADEN)) wanted to change Al-Qaeda title to Ansar Al-Sharia. Therefore, almost all Jihadist groups in Derna with the exception of ((AI-HASSADI's)) group are the Ansar Sharia.

4. (S/NF) The Emir. It is still unclear in Derna as who is the current Emir of the Islamist group and this is mainly due to security reasons as well as a potential struggle of power within the main key players and their different views of how to implement their ideology on the ground. The most likely to be the current Emir of the Jihadists in Derna is Abdul Kareem (JIBRIL); a charismatic highly educated person who comes from a very well renowned family in Derna as well as having considerable expertise and knowledge of religious legislation of the Mujahideen (Tashri'c).

-Clearly, Aboyahya ((ALLIBY)) would have been their Emir if he was still alive due to his high status within the Jihadist sector as well as being the DeFacto AQ worldwide leader for more than 3 years and he was trying to get to Derna solely for this purpose.

-Sofian (AI-GOMMA) is unlikely to be the Emir due to the superiority of Abdul Kareem (JIBRIL) with regards to his education in Islamic legislation and charismatic personality. However, Sofian AI-GOMMA is still widely respected within the Jihadists and especially among the young who idolize him due to the fact he was Bin LADEN's driver.

5. (S/NF) Legislator. The Jihadist in Derna is currently taking their Fatwa's mainly from Abdul Kareem JIBRIL. Nonetheless, Fatwa's are also being taken from other Jihadists legislators around the world such as late ALLIBY in Afghan and others in Pakistan, Saudi and Egypt.

6. (S/NF) Military. The military wing of the Jihadist in Derna is
still not unified under one leadership and this is mainly because of struggle of power being played out, which is alluded to above. Differences in their priorities, how they implement these priorities, the variations in the way they should be done with the assets they have and time available, are all key facts to lack of unification.

- Abdulbaset (AZUZ), Abosalam Martyrs Katiba. After Al-GHAITHY was appointed as Deputy MOD for Border Guard affairs in Nov 2011 he had to resign from the command of Al-Noor Katiba of Derna and his Deputy Naser (EI-EKER) took charge of the command. After that Abdulbaset AZUZ was appointed as deputy head of Al-Noor Katiba to fill-up the void place. After Al-Noor Katiba and Abosalam Martyrs Katiba were dissolved a few months ago and their members were integrated into SSC and after the former Head of Abosalam Martyrs Katiba and former Head of Derna SSC, Fathi (Ajeeb), left Derna for tribal issues, Abdulbaset AZUZ became the real mover and shifter of the militant Jihadists in the mountains. Most of the Jihadists in the mountains are from Abosalam Martyrs Katiba along with a small number from Ansar Al-Sharia Katiba. Both work for and receive orders from AZUZ. Therefore, AZUZ became the military commander of the Jihadists and one of reasons is that he is from one of the most famous families in Derna and he is also known of his courageous "reckless" decision making abilities. AZUZ has also established a secret militia under the title Saraya Al-Aseer Omar ABDULRAHMAN to perform Jihadist "AQ" activities according to the request of AQ command back in Pakistan/Afghanistan and under the legislation of Abdulkareem JIBRIL. This group committed the Red-Cross attack in Benghazi, the U.S. Consulate assault in Benghazi just after the assassination of ALLIBY, the attack on the British Ambassador in Benghazi and the 11 September 2012 assault on the U.S. Consulate.

-Naser EL-EKER. EI-EKER's group is responsible for protecting and securing the western part of the city but more importantly EI-EKER's group is being assigned assassination tasks within the city which targeted a number of anti-Islamists, former regime elements, and others who according to Fatwa the Jihadists consider as infidels. Therefore, all the assassinations that happened in Derna since the beginning of the revolution are being executed by this group, 72 attacks as of September 2012.

-Abdulhakeem (AL-HASSADI). AL-HASSADI was the emir of the Jihadist group in Derna for several years during the Gadhafi regime. A very popular charismatic leader, after the revolution he managed to gather hundreds of young people around him and established an armed militia under no recognized title, based in the eastern and south eastern forests of Derna. HASSADI believes they should concentrate on building a proper force in Derna to be able to establish a good base from which Islamist can start to seek the bigger goal of establishing the Islamic Khalifah and this is where other Jihadists conflict with him as they believe that they should work on a wider scale than that and fight the infidels everywhere and immediately. HASSADI's group goes with the legislation (Fatwa's) that he issues himself and not according to JIBRIL.
THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE

DATE OF PUBLICATION: 031352Z OCT 12.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).

SUBJECT: (U) MISRATA-BANI WALID TENSIONS HIGH AS Deadline Approaches

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 2 Oct 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 2 Oct 2012.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Tensions remain high in Misrata-Bani Walid as open fighting is expected within the next few days. Women and children are evacuating Bani Walid in anticipation of conflict.

2. Last week, Misratan authorities pressured the Libyan government and security forces to issue and enforce a deadline to the city of Bani Walid to turn over those responsible for the torture and death of Shaaban and to release prisoners in their possession. The deadline is due to expire in the coming days. While negotiations continue, fighters from both sides are preparing for the outbreak of violence.

3. Misratan authorities have warned Bani Walid townspeople to evacuate their women and children because if the conditions set by the government are not met, they have stated they will attack the city. A large all-black flag is currently being flown in Misrata as a symbol of the city's mourning of the death of Shaaban. Misratan authorities are putting a lot of pressure on Libyan officials to enforce the deadline that has been established. A Misratan television station is airing programming reminiscent of what it ran during the revolution, essentially beating the drumbeat of war.

4. As of 02 October 2012, militias from Misrata passed through the town of Zliten with heavy weapons moving in the direction of Bani Walid. Their plan is to link up with elements of the 28 Brigade outside of Bani Walid and form a perimeter around the town. This encirclement will allow the militias to be ready to attack Bani Walid once the deadline is reached and the decision is made to use force to enforce the decision. Elements of the Souq al Jumaal militia in Tripoli would also be involved in any action against Bani Walid. They have previously helped the 28 Brigade and approximately six months ago had members killed in conflicts in Bani Walid.

5. Bani Walid is preparing for an attack. They have said their women and children will not leave the city. Their reaction to the death of Shaaban is that "Libyans die every day". They have reached out to tribal connections in Sebha and Bengahzi telling them to be prepared to take action in their location in the event the Libyan government attacks Bani Walid. They have not called for people to come to Bani Walid to help in its defense rather to attack government facilities in their towns in order to cause problems for the government in those locations as well as Bani Walid.

6. Bani Walid is receiving support from Niger and Mali. There are former regime elements which have established offices in Sebha and Bani Walid to help coordinate this assistance. The offices are named Libya Movement (in Arabic Haraka Libya). The main pro-Gaddafi personalities residing outside the country who are supporting Bani Walid and the Libya Movement offices are Saadi al
((Gaddafi)) and Brigadier General Massoud Abdel ((Hafid)) a relative of the former Libyan leader and the former commander of the Libyan southern military region.

7. Over the past week, tribal leaders throughout Libya have reached out to Bani Walid and leaders of the Warfalla tribe to convince them to hand over those wanted in order to avoid conflict. To date there has been no progress in these negotiations. A possible outcome in the near term is the tribal leaders are able to get an extension of the government deadline in order to defuse the situation and continue discussions.
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET//NOFORN.

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CONTROLS
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SECTION 1 OF 2

SERIAL: (U) 10 USC § 424

/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *******/

BODY
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 041232Z OCT 12.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY); EGYPT (EGY); AL-QA IDA
AND SUNNI AFFILIATES (GU).

SUBJECT: (U) OVERVIEW OF SECURITY IN LIBYA FROM
19-24 September 2012

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 19 Sep 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 25 Sep 2012.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Security incident reporting from across Libya for the period of 19-24 September 2012.

2. In Boraq from 19-24 September 2012, clashes were reported between government troops, SSC from Misrata, and locals. By 24 September 2012 armed militias took control of the local radio station, the security headquarters, and reportedly hoisted the former regime's flags in the town. Clashes in Boraq left 17 KIA and 20 injured from the SSC while casualties from the al-Magharha tribe were unknown.

3. In Tripoli on 24 September 2012, an attack was reported from the Minister of Health in front of the Carinthia Hotel. No casualties were reported. The attackers were injured ex-revolutionaries, led by former staff from the Committee for the Care of the Injured.

4. In Benghazi on 24 September 2012. A demonstration was reported from Midan Ashajara. The demonstrators asked for the dismissal of the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and Military Chief of Staff. No injuries were reported. A demonstration was reported in front of Tibesty hotel. The protestors were asking the new prime minister and the GNC to find a solution to their case since they are still to be absorbed by the National Security. "Save Benghazi" organization organized a massive rally in Benghazi in solidarity with the victims who fell in Benghazi on Friday, 21 September 2012.

5. In Marj on 25 September 2012, clashes among the National Army servicemen resulted in several wounded, when one of them dropped out a fish bomb in the local hospital's courtyard.

6. In Benghazi on 25 September 2012, weapons from Rafallah al-Sahati base, including MANPADS (man-portable air-defense systems), seven truck-mounted AAGs (anti-aircraft guns), 3,000 AKs assault rifles, and about a million rounds were reported missing after an attack on the base on conducted on 21 September. Reports suggest that the weapons are for sale now.

7. In Tocra on 25 September 2012, National Police demonstrated in front of the police station. 235 police officers claimed they were being ignored by the state.

8. In Waddan on 25 September 2012, the main office of the Mothers and Children's Association in Waddan was reported to have been broken into. Computers, TVs and other equipment were stolen and documentation was burned.

9. In Tripoli on 25 September 2012, clashes were reported between ex-revolutionaries and the National Army. The GNC members were evacuated from the building where the members of
Congress were meeting. The revolutionaries were demonstrating against the lack of will and support from the government towards the SSC during their operations in the South.

10. (S/03)10 USC § 424 In Benghazi on 26 September 2012, 118 Egyptians were deported from Libya for possession of fake visas. The Egypt Airways Flight arrived to Benghazi with 207 passengers, but only 89 were in possession of real Libyan visas.

11. (S/03)10 USC § 424 In Brega on 26 September 2012, there was a report of an unexploded ordnance detonation while military EOD teams were working to demine the area. The head of Brega military council, Abdullah (Naji), complained about the lack of resources and the absence of government support for de-miners. Four personnel were injured.

12. (S/03)10 USC § 424 In Holms on 26 September 2012, local militias blocked the coastal road for five hours and demanded immediate actions from the government towards those responsible for the death of Omran ((Shaban)) and to release other prisoners held in Bani Walid. Omran Shaban was reported to have shot Mummar ((Gaddafi)) in 2011.

13. (S/03)10 USC § 424 In Benghazi on 27 September 2012, an IED attack on the Security Directorate in the 2 Hawari district caused damage to the building. No casualties.

14. (S/03)10 USC § 424 In Sabha on 27 September 2012, armed carjacks of an SUV resulted in one civilian injured.

15. (S/03)10 USC § 424 In Sabha on 27 September 2012, clashes among SSC servicemen resulted in two SSC and one civilian injured.

16. (S/03)10 USC § 424 In Kufra on 27 September 2012, SSC arrested a criminal group of Chadians involved in human traffic from Chad to Murzuq and Sabha. A large number of fake identification cards, passports, and resident cards were seized.

17. (S/03)10 USC § 424 In Tripoli on 27 September 2012, SAF/clash between criminal group and SSC patrol in Janzour area resulted in two criminals injured, several arrested.

18. (S/03)10 USC § 424 In Tripoli on 28 September 2012, approximately 200 people demonstrated in support of the government to disband the illegal militias occurred at Algiers and Martyr Square. Two demonstrators were arrested.

19. (S/03)10 USC § 424 In Benghazi on 28 September 2012, RPG and SAF (HMG) attack on El Sabri police station by unidentified perpetrators was resolved by the Libyan Military Mobile Forces. The reason for the clash was believed to have followed an attempt to release one particular prisoner by the unidentified group. No causalities but two police cars burned.

20. (S/03)10 USC § 424 In Benghazi on 29 September 2012, an attack
on the El Hadayek police station was later resolved by the Mobile Forces. One KIA.


22. In Tripoli on 29 September 2012, a quantity of weapons were handed over at the Martyr’s Square by some militias members. Included in the handover were two Main Battle Tanks, 14.5mm and 12.5mm machine guns, a number of assault rifles and ammunition, including mortar and artillery shells.

23. In Misrata on 29 September 2012, a truck loaded with illegal immigrants from Africa was seized by the officials from the SSC. All immigrants and smugglers were arrested.

24. In Benghazi on 29 September 2012, weapons were turn-in at the Tahrir Square by members of the militias. Weapons included RPGs, a number of rifles and ammunition including HGs and artillery shells.

25. In Sabratha on 30 September 2012, a prison break resulted in 163 illegal immigrants escaping from one of the SSC detention facilities. The authorities including the SSC and National Army are involved in search operation.

26. In Kufra on 30 September 2012, a group of Satanists, led by a Sudanese national, were arrested. The gang was accused of being a destabilizing factor in the city. A number of books, amulets and items related to black magic were seized.

27. Other Security Related Information. reported that the border with Libya is under complete control, especially over border crossings, to prevent movement of any of the al-Qaeda elements from Libya to Egypt. He also stressed that in the last months Egyptian troops seized more than 1000 weapons, more than 2 million rounds of ammunition, more than 15 tons of drugs, and nearly 50 million Tramadol pills.
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---DISSEMINATION---

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#0318

14-L-0552/DIA/ 180
SERIAL: (U)(C)(3) 10 USC § 424

/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *******/

BODY
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 121613Z OCT 12.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
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COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY); AL-QA'IDA AND SUNNI AFFILIATES (GU).

SUBJECT: (U) [redacted] /LIBYA'S SHIFT IN THREAT FOCUS

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 10 Oct 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 10 Oct 2012.

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WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET/NOFORN.
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the Libyan shift in threat focus to Islamist groups in the east. The General paints a bleak picture of Libyan capabilities to combat the Islamist growth and influence in eastern Libya.

4. Size of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya. It is estimated that Sufian bin-Gumu has approximately 250-400 fighters and poses a significant threat to the military in the eastern region. Ansar al-Sharia now has upwards of 2000 fighters in Libya and is growing. BG Aguella stated that in six months there may be too many Islamists to reverse the trend.

8. Bani Walid. The militias that have surrounded Bani Walid are being driven and motivated by Islamist elements.

Additionally, the residents of Bani Walid are surviving members of the Battalions.
supported and trained under Gaddafi. Many of the residents are competent and hardened fighters. The militia forces will suffer heavy losses if they attempt to raid the city. The militia, currently collapsing on Bani Walid, are capable of taking the city.

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TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

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RHMFISS/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUZFMXI/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB II

RUEPWD/C/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

RUEKICS/Joint Staff Washington DC
RHEHAA/National Security Council Washington DC

RUEKICS/SecDef Washington DC/
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SECTION 1 OF 2
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SERIAL: (U)

****** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ******

BODY
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 211345Z SEP 12.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
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COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).
SUBJECT: (U) BENGAZI DEMONSTRATION FOR PEACE ON 21
September 2012

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 19 Sep 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 19 Sep 2012.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. A demonstration planned for 21 September 2012 in Benghazi is calling for action against militias and extremist groups. The demonstration could spark additional violence if Ansar Al Sharia reacts to the demonstration.

A Benghazi March to "Save Benghazi" is planned for Friday, September 21 2012. The march is a large anti-militias demonstration in Benghazi for the improvement of Libyan national police and military units. Stated objectives for the protest are:

- The September 11 attack on the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi.
- Militia control of the city.
- Proliferation of weapons.
- The general security environment.

Demonstration. The demonstration is scheduled to start at 1700 local at the Tibesti Hotel in Benghazi and then proceed towards Kish Square and arrive there at 1800 so that the demonstrators can conduct the evening prayer at the mosque. The demonstration is sponsored by the Save Benghazi Group. The demonstrators are calling for the General National Congress to immediately pass laws criminalizing the formation of militias and to regulate the carrying of arms; to rid all buildings and factories belonging to the nation from occupation by armed groups; to strengthen the role of the police and the military and to offer them all necessary support.
The intent is to get the militias to disband and those who want to join the security forces, either the army or police, should do so as individuals and not as entire katibas.

6. (S) Targeting Ansar Al Sharia. The demonstration is directly targeting Ansar Al Sharia partially as a result of its suspected involvement in the death of U.S. Ambassador to Libya. The Kish Square, where the demonstration is scheduled to end, is close to the Fadil Bu Amr Katiba base. Fadil Katiba was a former regime Special Forces base which, after the revolution, was taken over by elements of Ansar Al Sharia. Since the events of last week, Ansar Al Sharia is reported to have abandoned this location; however, this was only one of six camps used in and around Benghazi. Another location is a hospital in Benghazi and it is believed Ansar Al Sharia still occupies the facility and is storing weapons there.
RUCQSAB/USSO COM MACDILL AFB FL
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SERIAL: (U) 10 USC § 424
BODY
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 261343Z SEP 12.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).

SUBJECT: (U) BENGHAZI UPDATES

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 23 Sep 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 23 Sep 2012.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET/NOFORN.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Extremist in Benghazi area relocate assets and weapons prior to anti-militia/extremist protests on 21-22 September 2012.

In Benghazi the extremist militias and those suspected of being tied to the attack on the U.S. Consulate Benghazi, 11 September 2012, had all previously moved their weapons from their primary bases and gone to ground. Consequently, they left their facilities to the protesters but didn't leave their weapons. The top militia commanders know where the key people have gone and where the weapons are stored.

The Libyan Shield, the 17 February, and Katiba Shuhaada Zawiya have all been officially recognized by the government as a part of the national military force.

The Chief of Staff, MG Yusef (Mangush), called up the Shuhaada Zawiya katiba, which was located in Sirte, to Benghazi as events developed during the night of 21-22 September 2012. Mangush was worried ((Ghaddafi)) loyalists would exploit the chaos in Benghazi and further stabilize the situation.
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY

DATE OF PUBLICATION: 261650Z SEP 12.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).

SUBJECT: (U) FOLLOW UP ON SAVE BENGHAZI GROUP Demonstration

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 23 Sep 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 23 Sep 2012.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET/NOFORN.

TEXT: 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Pro-government demonstrators turn violent against extremists and militia's in the
Benghazi area from 21-22 September. Ansar Al Sharia elements abandoned their bases and protesters assumed control. Government and military officials made multiple appearances on television attempting to discourage the protesters from resulting to violence and clashing with the militias.

2. On 21 September 2012, at approximately 1900 local time Libya, citizens of Benghazi who had participated in the peaceful demonstration earlier in day the returned to Kish Square in Benghazi and took over the Ansar al Sharia Brigade compound located in the vicinity of the square. The compound is a former regime compound referred to as Bu Fadil which Ansar al Sharia occupied after the revolution. Protesters where armed and clashed with elements of Ansar al Sharia resulted in fourteen wounded. After light initial resistance, elements of Ansar Al Sharia withdrew from the compound allowing the protesters to occupy the base. Open source reports indicate four prisoners were found inside the compound.

3. Over the course of the night of 21 September and into the early morning hours of 22 September similar events occurred at two other Ansar al Sharia locations, one at the Jalal hospital and one near the Man Made Water Project in Hawar valley. At both locations, Ansar Al Sharia elements abandoned their bases and protesters assumed control. All Ansar Al Sharia elements in Benghazi have left the city and have retreated to Derna. At the former Ansar al Sharia sites in Benghazi, Libyan Armed Forces Military Police have secured the facilities apparently replacing the protesters.

4. Protesters also moved against other Benghazi militia camps to include the Rafal al Shahati Brigade and possibly 17 February Brigades. One of the main goals of the demonstration (turned aggressive protest) is the dissolution of all militias and brigades and either their incorporation into a national police or army as individuals or their complete disbanding.

5. Government and military officials made multiple appearances on television attempting to discourage the protesters from resulting to violence and clashing with the militias. The Libyan Armed Forces Chief of Staff, MG Yusef ((Mangush)) appeared on national television stating militias such as the Rafala Al Shahati Brigade, the 17 February Brigade and Libyan Shield Brigades were part of the Libyan military and as such should not be attacked. He also warned people of the possibility of fifth columnists infiltrating the demonstrations with a view of creating further chaos and instability. President al ((Magarif)) and Prime Minister elect ((Abu Shagur)) also made pleas on television for people to refrain from violence and return to their homes.
SERIAL: (U) \((3)(3) 10 \text{ USC } 8424\)

/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *******/

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DATE OF PUBLICATION: 271510Z SEP 12.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).

SUBJECT: (U) \((3)(3) 10 \text{ USC } 8424\) DESPITE MUFIT'S CALL FOR CANCELLATION,
Demonstration in Tripoli on 28 September Likely

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 27 Sep 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 27 Sep 2012.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Demonstrations scheduled for 28 September 2012 could turn violent as former regime elements attempt to gain a foothold and nefarious groups intertwine.

2. On 26 September 2012, the Mufti of Libya appeared on al Watania Libyan national television forbidding people to protest in a demonstration on 28 September 2012. Demonstration are planned to call for the dissolution of all militias and for national police and military to fill the security vacuum. Despite and possibly because of the Mufti’s appeal, there is a strong likelihood a demonstration will take place on Friday afternoon.

3. The intent of the demonstration is to replicate the demonstration that occurred in Benghazi on 21 September 2012 however, it will likely differ in tone and feel than the demonstration in Benghazi. It is unlikely women and children will participate in the event as they did in Benghazi. There will be a decidedly more aggressive feel to the demonstration from the outset. There is a greater potential for violence for two main reasons.

-First, the militias in Tripoli are not as disciplined as those in Benghazi. A number of militias in Tripoli were formed after the revolution and consist of thugs and criminal elements. This is one of the reasons, the general populace is tired of them and wants them to disband.

-A second factor influencing volatility is a greater potential for the protest to be influenced by various groups. In Benghazi, at least during the early demonstration, demonstrators were typical Benghazi citizens with no other agenda than to increase their collective security and force the government to step up and do something, Tripoli does not have the same homogeneous feel. There is concern that former regime elements, rival militias and even government elements could try and exploit the event to settle old scores, gain the upper hand, or just create unrest for the sake of instability.

4. Government Facilities Not Necessarily Safe. In Benghazi, the primary targets of the protestors were militia camps and bases. In Tripoli, recent frustration with the government’s lack of action and missteps manifested themselves as clashes between civilians and the government. On 26 September, violence took place outside of the National General Congress. Reports are mixed as to whether this had to do with SSC personnel recently injured in the south or other compliments. Government officials were criticized as being agents of America.

5. The Libyan Mufti is not well respected by Libyans. He receives a salary of nine thousand dinars (roughly eight
thousand USD) a month from the government and is consequently seen as a puppet. His comments last night on al Wattania added to this perception. He further degraded his credibility with the general Libyan populace over the past months by issuing a fatwa against voting for Mahmoud Jabril which he subsequently rescinded by announcing the start of Ramadan well after the normal time, putting pressure on Libyans to scramble in preparation.
/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

DATE OF PUBLICATION: 281601Z SEP 12.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).

SUBJECT: (U) GOVERNMENT SSC FORCES CLASH WITH former regime elements in As Shaati 20-21 September 2012

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 17 Sep 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 22 Sep 2012.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. During a clash between Government of Libya SSC forces and former regime elements in As Shaati 20-21 September 2012, one civilian was killed.

2. In early to mid September 2012, members of the As Shaati Tribe took control of a local radio station and began playing national music from when (Gaddafi) was in power. Initially, government Supreme Security Council (SSC) forces wanted to forcibly regain control of the station, however, local tribal leaders intervened and convinced those who occupied the station to return to their homes.

3. On 20 September, SSC forces sought to arrest the perpetrators who took over the station. In the course of doing this, clashes broke out between the SSC and members of the As Shaati tribe, resulting in the accidental death of an As Shaati woman. After the incident the SSC returned to its base but were subsequently attacked.

4. After the second clash, the SSC in As Shaati pulled out of the city all together and called for reinforcements from Tripoli. SSC elements from Tripoli, to include members of Souq el Jumat, deployed to As Shaati. En route, the convoy was attacked while passing through the town of As Shuwaarif. Three vehicles and an unknown of number personnel were taken prisoner.

5. When the relief convoy linked up with other SSC elements outside of As Shaati it was late in the evening of 20 September 2012. The SSC opted to wait until the next morning before attempting to reenter As Shaati. The following morning as the SSC moved into the Braq As Shaati neighborhood of As Shaati it was ambushed and resulted in fourteen dead and thirty two injured. Of those killed, four were from Souq at Jumaa in Tripoli, five were from Ghot Shaal (located in vicinity of Gargwish); and five were from Arajan which is a city located near Zintan.

6. After the ambush, the SSC managed to disengage and withdraw to Sebha where the injured were medevaced to Tripoli.

7. Located approximately 60 kilometers north of Sebha, Libya, As-Shaati is the tribal home of the former Minister of Interior Abdallah ((Senussi)). As Shaati consists of three separate neighborhoods or towns: Ghira, which is Abdallah Senussi's former town; Al Gourda as Shaati; and Braq as Shaati which is where the clashes and death of the female occurred.

8. In addition to three separate neighborhoods, four tribes are represented within As Shaati. These are the Al Maghaira (this is the main tribe and is located in the Braq as
Shaati); AlHasawna (located in Al Gourda as Shaati); Awlaad Bu Saif; and Hukman. The latter two tribes are smaller and less influential. The al Magairha tribe also have a significant presence in Sebha, and As Shuwaarif located between Tripoli and As Shaati.
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SERIAL: (U)

/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *******/
BODY
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 31155Z AUG 12.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
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COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).

SUBJECT: (U//FOD) RECENT EXPLOSIONS POSSIBLY
Linked to Libyan Supreme Security Council

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 30 Aug 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 30 Aug 2012.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET/NOFORN.
1. (C/NA) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Perceptions that the Libyan Supreme Security Council is involved in conducting bombings in order to gain support.

2. (C/NA) The Libyan Supreme Security Council (SSC) has played a role in orchestrating recent bombings and attempted bombings in Tripoli and Benghazi. The SSC has planned attacks in such a way to minimize damage and deaths to the general populace. After each attack, the SSC has quickly identified former Gaddafi regime loyalists as being the perpetrators and sought to arrest them. This simultaneously shows to the Libyan people the need for and effectiveness of the SSC.

3. (C/NA) The recent attempted bombing of the Teblisti Hotel in Benghazi exemplifies the SSC's techniques. The SSC emplaced the bomb in the hotel only later to be the ones to discover and defuse the situation and the bomb. In the process of locating the bomb at the hotel, the SSC stated it employed a specialized bomb locating van which they used to find the explosive and prevent it from detonating.

4. (C/NA) The SSC were also connected to the bombings on 18 August 2012 in Tripoli. A foreign reporter who happened to be in close vicinity of one explosion site and responded immediately, interviewed one of the SSC first responders. Minutes after the attack, the SSC member commented on the incident with what appeared to be a prepared statement claiming the bombing was clearly part of a pro-Gaddafi conspiracy but that there would not be more attacks after today because the pro-Gaddafi forces didn't possess the ability to conduct larger attacks.
THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE 
**BODY**

DATE OF PUBLICATION: 261420Z SEP 12.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).

SUBJECT: (U) LIBYAN CHIEF OF 
Staff Views on Attack on US Facility in Benghazi, Libya 
DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 23 Sep 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 23 Sep 2012.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

**WARNING:** (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET/NOFORN.

**TEXT:** 1. (S) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. The Libyan Chief of Staff characterized the attack on the U.S. Consulate Benghazi during condolence remarks.
2. In an expression of his condolences for the death of the U.S. Ambassador to Libya and the attack on the consulate, Chief of Staff Major General ((Mangush)) said he hoped the incident would not be a black stain in the Libyan-U.S. relationship. He also confirmed the Libyan authority will exert a tremendous effort to bring the perpetrators to justice.

3. In answering who he believed conducted the attack against the facility, MG Mangush drew a distinct separation between the two attacks that occurred on the evening of 11-12 September 2012. He stated the initial attack on the U.S. Consulate first started with a protest related to the "innocence of Muslims" film. According to Mangush, there was a peaceful demonstration which some elements exploited to attack the U.S. consulate. Mangush identified three groups that were involved in the attack from initial information.

- The first was extremists who were small in number.
- The second group was a criminal element.
- The third group was former regime agitators who he referred to as fifth columnists.

4. Mangush characterized the second attack at 0400 local Libya time on 12 September 2012, as distinctly different from the first incident. The group that executed the second attack were well trained experts. The attackers used stand off weapons, hit the U.S. facility hard for a limited amount of time and then quickly disappeared.

5. Mangush explained the investigation has learned a lot of information and a lead investigator has been appointed. He emphasized the perpetrators of the attacks were enemies of the U.S. and the Government of Libya.
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ENVELOPE
(b)(3) 10 USC § 424

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(b)(3) 10 USC § 424, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)

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(b)(3) 10 USC § 424, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)

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RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUZDFBI/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEMISS/HQ USOSSCOM MACDILL AFB FL
(b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
(b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)

RUGIAAA/NGA NAVY YARD WASHINGTON DC
(b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SESTATE WASHINGTON DC
(b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)

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(b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)

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SECTION 1 OF 3

SERIAL: (U) (b)(3) 10 USC § 424

/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *******/

14-L-0552/DIA/ 287

(b)(3) 10 USC § 424
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IRQ).

(b)(3):10 USC § 424

(b)(1) Sec. 1. 4 (c),(b)(3):10 USC § 424

DOI: (U) 20120730.


(b)(1) Sec. 1. 4 (c),(b)(1) Sec. 1. 4 (d)

14-L-0552/DIA/ 288
THE GENERAL SITUATION:

A. INTERNALLY, EVENTS ARE TAKING A CLEAR SECTARIAN DIRECTION.

B. THE SALAFIST, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AND AQI ARE THE MAJOR FORCES DRIVING THE INSURGENCY IN SYRIA.

C. THE WEST, GULF COUNTRIES, AND TURKEY SUPPORT THE OPPOSITION; WHILE RUSSIA, CHINA, AND IRAN SUPPORT THE REGIME.

E. THE REGIME'S PRIORITY IS TO CONCENTRATE ITS PRESENCE IN AREAS ALONG THE COAST (TARTUS, AND LATAKIA); HOWEVER, IT HAS NOT ABANDONED HOMS BECAUSE IT CONTROLS THE MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES IN SYRIA. THE REGIME DECREASED ITS CONCENTRATION IN AREAS ADJACENT TO THE IRAQI BORDERS (AL HASAKA AND DER ZOR).

3. (C) AL QAEDA - IRAQ (AQI):

A. AQI IS FAMILIAR WITH SYRIA. AQI TRAINED IN SYRIA AND THEN INFILTRATED INTO IRAQ.

B. AQI SUPPORTED THE SYRIAN OPPOSITION FROM THE BEGINNING, BOTH IDEOLOGICALLY AND THROUGH THE MEDIA. AQI DECLARED ITS OPPOSITION OF ASSAD'S GOVERNMENT BECAUSE IT CONSIDERED IT A SECTARIAN REGIME TARGETING SUNNIS.

C. AQI CONDUCTED A NUMBER OF OPERATIONS IN SEVERAL SYRIAN CITIES UNDER THE NAME OF JAISH AL NUSRA (VICTORIOUS ARMY), ONE OF ITS AFFILIATES.

D. AQI, THROUGH THE SPOKESMAN OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ (ISI), ABU MUHAMMAD AL ADNANI, DECLARED THE SYRIAN REGIME AS THE SPEARHEAD OF WHAT HE IS NAMING JIBHA AL RUWAFDIH (FOREFRONT OF THE SHIITES) BECAUSE OF ITS (THE SYRIAN REGIME) DECLARATION OF WAR ON THE SUNNIS. ADDITIONALLY, HE IS CALLING ON THE SUNNIS IN IRAQ, ESPECIALLY THE TRIBES IN THE BORDER REGIONS (BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA), TO WAGE WAR AGAINST THE SYRIAN REGIME, REGARDING SYRIA AS AN INFIDEL REGIME FOR ITS SUPPORT TO THE INFIDEL PARTY HEZBOLLAH, AND OTHER REGIMES HE
CONSIDERS DISSENTERS LIKE IRAN AND IRAQ.

E. AQI CONSIDERS THE SUNNI ISSUE IN IRAQ TO BE FATEFULLY CONNECTED TO THE SUNNI ARABS AND MUSLIMS.

4. (C) THE BORDERS:

A. THE BORDERS BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ STRETCH APPROXIMATELY 600KM WITH COMPLEX TERRAIN CONSISTING OF A VAST DESERT, MOUNTAIN RANGES (SINJAR MOUNTAINS), JOINT RIVERS (FLOWING ON BOTH SIDES), AND AGRICULTURAL LANDS.

B. IRAQ DIRECTLY NEIGHBORS THE SYRIAN PROVINCES OF HASAKA AND DER ZOR, AS WELL AS (SYRIAN) CITIES ADJACENT TO THE IRAQI BORDER.

C. THE LAND ON BOTH SIDES BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA IS A VAST DESERT PUNCTUATED BY VALLEYS, AND IT LACKS TRANSPORTATION ROUTES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL HIGHWAY AND SOME MAJOR CITIES.

5. (C) THE POPULATION LIVING ON THE BORDER:

A. THE POPULATION LIVING ON THE BORDER HAS A SOCIAL-TRIBAL STYLE, WHICH IS BOUND BY STRONG TRIBAL AND FAMILIAL MARITAL TIES.

B. THEIR SECTARIAN AFFILIATION UNITES THE TWO SIDES WHEN EVENTS HAPPEN IN THE REGION.

C. AQI HAD MAJOR POCKETS AND BASES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER TO FACILITATE THE FLOW OF MATERIEL AND RECRUITS.

D. THERE WAS A REGRESSION OF AQI IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES OF IRAQ DURING THE YEARS OF 2009 AND 2010; HOWEVER, AFTER THE RISE OF THE INSURGENCY IN SYRIA, THE RELIGIOUS AND TRIBAL POWERS IN THE REGIONS BEGAN TO SYMPATHIZE WITH THE SECTARIAN UPRISING. THIS (SYMPATHY) APPEARED IN FRIDAY PRAYER SERMONS, WHICH CALLED FOR VOLUNTEERS TO SUPPORT THE SUNNIS IN SYRIA.

6. (C) THE SITUATION ON THE IRAQI AND SYRIAN BORDER:

A. THREE BORDER BDES ARE SUFFICIENT TO CONTROL THE BORDERS DURING PEACE TIME FOR OBSERVATION DUTIES AND TO PREVENT SMUGGLING AND INFILTRATION.

C. IN PREVIOUS YEARS A MAJORITY OF AQI FIGHTERS ENTERED IRAQ PRIMARILY VIA THE SYRIAN BORDER.

7. (C) THE FUTURE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CRISIS:

A. THE REGIME WILL SURVIVE AND HAVE CONTROL OVER SYRIAN TERRITORY.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT EVENTS INTO PROXY WAR: WITH SUPPORT
FROM RUSSIA, CHINA, AND IRAN, THE REGIME IS CONTROLLING THE AREAS OF
INFLUENCE ALONG COASTAL TERRITORIES (TARTUS AND LATAKIA), AND IS
FIERCELY DEFENDING HOMS, WHICH IS CONSIDERED THE PRIMARY
TRANSPORTATION ROUTE IN SYRIA. ON THE OTHER HAND, OPPOSITION FORCES
ARE TRYING TO CONTROL THE EASTERN AREAS (HASAKA AND DER ZOR),
ADJACENT TO THE WESTERN IRAQI PROVINCES (MOSUL AND ANBAR), IN
ADDITION TO NEIGHBORING TURKISH BORDERS. WESTERN COUNTRIES, THE GULF
STATES AND TURKEY ARE SUPPORTING THESE EFFORTS. THIS HYPOTHESIS IS
MOST LIKELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DATA FROM RECENT EVENTS, WHICH
WILL HELP PREPARE SAFE HAVENS UNDER INTERNATIONAL SHELTERING, SIMILAR
TO WHAT TRANSPERED IN LIBYA WHEN BENGHAZI WAS CHOSEN AS THE COMMAND
CENTER OF THE TEMPORARY GOVERNMENT.

8. (c) THE EFFECTS ON IRAQ:

A. SYRIAN REGIME BORDER FORCES
RETREATED FROM THE BORDER AND THE OPPOSITION FORCES (SYRIAN FREE
ARMY) TOOK OVER THE POSTS AND RAISED THEIR FLAG. THE IRAQI BORDER
GUARD FORCES ARE FACING A BORDER WITH SYRIA THAT IS NOT GUARDED BY
OFFICIAL ELEMENTS WHICH PRESENTS A DANGEROUS AND SERIOUS THREAT.

B. THE OPPOSITION FORCES WILL TRY TO USE THE IRAQI TERRITORY AS A
SAFE HAVEN FOR ITS FORCES TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SYMPATHY OF THE
IRAQI BORDER POPULATION, MEANWHILE TRYING TO RECRUIT FIGHTERS AND
TRAIN THEM ON THE IRAQI SIDE, IN ADDITION TO HARBORING REFUGEES
(SYRIA).

C. IF THE SITUATION UNRAVELS THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING
A DECLARED OR UNDECLARED SALAFIST PRINCIPALITY IN EASTERN SYRIA
(HASAKA AND DER ZOR), AND THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT THE SUPPORTING POWERS
TO THE OPPOSITION WANT, IN ORDER TO ISOLATE THE SYRIAN REGIME, WHICH
IS CONSIDERED THE STRATEGIC DEPTH OF THE SHIA EXPANSION (IRAQ AND
IRAN).

D. THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION HAS DIRE CONSEQUENCES ON THE
IRAQI SITUATION AND ARE AS FOLLOWS:

--1. THIS CREATES THE IDEAL ATMOSPHERE FOR AQI TO RETURN TO ITS OLD
POCKETS IN MOSUL AND RAMADI, AND WILL PROVIDE A RENEWED MOMENTUM
UNDER THE PRESUMPTION OF UNIFYING THE JIHAD AMONG SUNNI IRAQ AND
SYRIA, AND THE REST OF THE SUNNIS IN THE ARAB WORLD AGAINST WHAT IT
CONSIDERS ONE ENEMY, THE DISSIDENTS. ISI COULD ALSO DECLARE AN
ISLAMIC STATE THROUGH ITS UNION WITH OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN
IRAQ AND SYRIA, WHICH WILL CREATE GRAVE DANGER IN REGARDS TO UNIFYING
IRAQ AND THE PROTECTION OF ITS TERRITORY.

14-L-0552/DIA/ 291
3. THE RENEWING FACILITATION OF TERRORIST ELEMENTS FROM ALL OVER THE ARAB WORLD ENTERING INTO IRAQI ARENA.
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SERIAL: (U) [b](3): 10 USC § 424

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY: (U) LIBYA (LBY); LEBANON (LBN).

SUBJ: [b](3): 10 USC § 424 SUSPICIOUS SHIP ACTIVITY OFF THE EASTERN
Libyan Coast
(9).

DOI: (U) 20120517.
SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

TEXT: 1. (S//) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. On or about 17 May 2012, a suspicious ship was detected off the shoreline of the village of Gara in eastern Libya.

2. (S//) On or about 17 May 2012, Libyan officers operating from Gamal Abd al Naser airbase, near Tobruk, identified suspicious ship activity off the eastern Libyan coast. The officers were using computer based nautical IFF, upon which they observed a ship which had previously traveled from Turkey to Benghazi to off-load cement.

3. (S//) The ship had departed Benghazi and during the night taken up a course eastward along the coast in international waters. The ship then diverted southward and approached the Libyan shore near the village of Gara, between Tobruk and Bardia. The ship halted approximately 2-3 Km from shore and remained there for over four hours. It then began moving north after turning off its IFF. Other ships had previously been observed conducting similar unusual activities near Bombe, Gabes, and Bardia. One of the other ships eventually made its way to Saida, Lebanon.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).

SUBJ: (U) LIBYA SHIELD ORGANIZATION (S).

DOI: (U) 20120525.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. This report describes the Dira Libya (Libya Shield) organization, a grouping of regional Libyan militia councils which have declared their loyalty to Libyan Military Chief of Staff Major General Yusif ((Mangush)).

As of 25 May 2012, the Dira Libya (Libya Shield) organization is a grouping of Libyan militia councils which have subordinated themselves to the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Military, Major General Yusif ((Mangush)).

The organization is divided into four sectors: West, Central, East, and South. Dira Libya West is headed by Abd al Hamid Abu ((Daballa)), a Zintani. His deputy is Abd al Aziz Abu ((Shanuga)), who is from Zuwarah. Dira Libya West is composed of 18 military councils and approximately 3,000 fighters. This organization deployed forces in support of the TNC peacekeeping efforts during tribal clashes along the Tunisian border near Ras Jadir. As a subset of this organization, there are five companies of militia in Zuwarah and Jmail. These forces are primarily a local protection force for the cities; however they send members to participate in Dira Libya operations.

Dira Libya Central is headed by Colonel Ahmed ((Musa)), who is from Misrata. This element is composed of nine military councils which include representatives from the cities of Khoms, Zliten, Tarhuna, Bani Walid, and Misrata. The sub-aligned force in Tarhuna is commanded by Colonel ((al-Habshi)), who leads the Katiba al-Awfia militia. Katiba al-Awfia maintains a camp just outside of the city and is very well equipped with tanks and artillery. It was Colonel al-Habshi who halted the advance of Misratan militia forces on Bani Walid a few weeks ago. He claimed to have done so because he had not received a call from MG Mangush to coordinate this move, and therefore deduced that the Misratans were not authorized to enter Bani Walid.

Dira Libya East is primarily made up of militias from the Coalition of Libyan Revolutionaries, including representatives from Bayda, Derna, and Benghazi.

Dira Libya South has only been recently formed but its organization is not clear.
RUCQSAB/USSOCOM
RHMFISS/USSTRATCOM
MACDILL AFB FL
OFFUTT AFB NE
(b)(3): 10 USC § 424; (b)(3): 50 USC § 3024(i)

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CONTROLS
SECRET/NOFORN
SECTION 1 OF 2
QQQQ

SERIAL: (U) (b)(3): 10 USC § 424

/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *******/

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
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COUNTRY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).

IPSP: (U) TERR; FMCC; IFC1137.

SUBJ: (b)(3): 10 USC § 424 ORGANIZATION, MISSIONS, AND LOCATIONS OF Libyan Special Forces Battalions (9)

DOI: (U) 20120701.

14-L-0552/DIA/ 307
SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

TEXT: 1. (S) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Report describes the current organization, missions, and locations of the six army Special Forces Battalions in the Libyan Armed Forces.

2. (S/NI) There are currently six army Special Forces Battalions in the Libyan Armed Forces:

A. (S) The 17th Battalion is a battalion created after the revolution. This unit is based in Salahadin near Tripoli International Airport. It provided approximately ninety of the 180 candidates for the 1st Special Operations Forces Company (SOFC), most of whom only had served with the military since the revolution. 37 of the 48 1st SOFC personnel come from the 17th Battalion. The 17th Battalion Sergeant Major ((Abdul Aziz)), who assists with the coordination for basic logistics requirements for the First SOFC commanded by MAJ Ahmed ((Zuwai)).

B. (S) The 22nd Battalion, formerly identified as the 19th Battalion prior to the Libyan revolution. This unit was redesignated as the 22nd Battalion in May 2012 due to the number "nineteen" being associated with ((Qadhafi)). This unit moved to the Al Mayah Camp in April 2012. It provided approximately forty of the 180 candidates for the 1st SOFC. The unit has a functioning Battalion Headquarters element and approximately 250 soldiers who report weekly to the camp. It provides basic logistics coordination and support for the 1st SOFC and deploys elements for short tours to Ghadamis. The 22nd Battalion is commanded by MAJ Khalid ((Cenvo)).

C. (S) The 23rd Battalion is based at Mitiga Airbase. This unit provided approximately fifty of the 180 candidates for the 1st SOFC. Unit is commanded by LTC Ahmad ((Joha)).

D. (S) The 11th Battalion is based near Benghazi. It deploys elements for short tours to al Kufra and Sebha. NFI.

E. (S) The 21st Battalion is based in Benghazi at the Abu Atou Camp. It deploys elements for short tours to al Kufra and Sebha. Unit is commanded by LTC Icriiss ((Yunis)).

F. (S) The 36th Battalion is also based in Benghazi at the Abu Atou Camp. It deploys elements for short tours to al Kufra and Sebha. Unit is commanded by LTC Abu Agil ((Muhammad)).

3. (S/NI) The Libyan SOF Training Center is located in Benghazi. This base is commanded by COI. Omran ((Juma)). The SOF Training Commander is COI. Essa ((Nassoud)) who oversees the Libya SOF Command and Airborne courses, both conducted at this SOF Training Center in Benghazi.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).

SUBJ: JULY 2012 ATTACK ON THE RED CROSS BENGHAZI (U/FOUO)

DOI: (U) 20120723.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

TEXT: 1. (S//REL) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Attack and harassment of the International Committee Red Cross in Benghazi,
2. At approximately 0300 hours on 12 July 2012, two vehicles slowed in front of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) offices located vicinity and fired 10-20 rifle rounds at the building. The rounds struck the front of the building and broke a window on the second floor, there were no injuries. Security cameras were able to determine two vehicles were involved, one being a white sedan. (b)(1) Sec. 1.4 (c)

3. At the time of the attack, ICRC staff called the local authorities, Supreme Security Council/Police (SSC), who responded within approximately 10 minutes. (b)(1) Sec. 1.4 (c)

4. A letter was left at the front entrance to their office. The letter was a warning letter that instructed the ICRC Benghazi to take down their flag (Red Cross Flag) and leave the country. The letter was signed by the group that claimed responsibility for the initial RPG attack in May 2012, the group associated with the Blind Sheik.

5. Individuals were described as wearing Islamic dress placing a box at the entrance of the ICRC office, identified lighting something connected to the box. The three individuals then departed the area. Approximately fifteen minutes later, the three individuals returned in a single vehicle and retrieved the box while placing the letter by the entrance. (b)(3) 10 USC § 424
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
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(b)(3): 10 USC § 424, (b)(3): 50 USC § 3024(i)

TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3): 10 USC § 424, (b)(3): 50 USC § 3024(i)

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RUZEHAA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE/
RHMFISS/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL/
RUZFMXI/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

(b)(3): 50 USC § 3024(i)

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RUEJIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/
RUZEHAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

(b)(3): 50 USC § 3024(i)

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC/

RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3): 50 USC § 3024(i)

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC/
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC/

(b)(3): 10 USC § 424, (b)(3): 50 USC § 3024(i)

RUEJIGE/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL/

(b)(3): 10 USC § 424

14-L-0552/DIA/ 360
RUCQSAB/USSOCOM, MACDILL AFB FL, RHMFSS/USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE

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SECTION 1 OF 2 QQQQ

SERIAL: (U) (a)(3)(10 USC § 424

/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *******/
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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COUNTRY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).

(b)(3)(10 USC § 424

DOI: (U) 20120701.

(b)(3)(10 USC § 424

(b)(1) Sec. 1. 4 (c), (b)(3)(50 USC § 3024)(

14-L-0552/DIA/ 361
SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

TEXT: 1. (S) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Report describes the current organization, missions, and locations of the six army Special Forces Battalions in the Libyan Armed Forces.

2. (S//NF) There are currently six army Special Forces Battalions in the Libyan Armed Forces:

A. (S) The 17th Battalion is a battalion created after the revolution. This unit is based in Salahadin near Tripoli International Airport. It provided approximately ninety of the 180 candidates for the 1st Special Operations Forces Company (SOFC), most of whom only had served with the military since the revolution. 37 of the 48 1st SOFC personnel come from the 17th Battalion. The 17th Battalion Sergeant Major ((Abdul Aziz)), who assists with the coordination for basic logistics requirements for the First SOFC commanded by MAJ Ahmed ((Zuwayi)).

B. (S) The 22nd Battalion, formerly identified as the 19th Battalion prior to the Libyan revolution. This unit was redesignated as the 22nd Battalion in May 2012 due to the number "nineteen" being associated with ((Qadhafi)). This unit moved to the Al Mayah Camp in April 2012. It provided approximately forty of the 180 candidates for the 1st SOFC. The unit has a functioning Battalion Headquarters element and approximately 250 soldiers who report weekly to the camp. It provides basic logistics coordination and support for the 1st SOFC and deploys elements for short tours to Ghadamis. The 22nd Battalion is commanded by MAJ Khalid ((Censo)).

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F. (S) The 36th Battalion is also based in Benghazi at the Abu Atou Camp. It deploys elements for short tours to al Kufra and Sebha. Unit is commanded by LTC Abu Agil ((Muhammad)).

3. (S//NF) The Libyan SOF Training Center is located in Benghazi. This base is commanded by COL Omran ((Juma)). The SOF Training Commander is COL Essa ((Nassoud)) who oversees the Libyan SOF Command and Airborne courses, both conducted at this SOF Training Center in
RUCQSAB/USSOCOM
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MACDILL AFB FL
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SERIAL: (U) [b](b)(3)(i) USC § 424

/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ******* /
BODY
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 162032Z SEP 12.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
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COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).
SUBJECT: (S//NF [b](b)(3)(i) USC § 424) BRIGADES OF THE CAPTIVE OMAR ABDUL
Rahman Claim Responsibility for Attack on Benghazi, Libya

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 16 Sep 2012.
CUTOFF: (U) 12 Sep 2012.
SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET/NOFORN.

TEXT: 1. (S//NF) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Brigades of the Captive Omar Abdul Rahman claim ultimate responsibility for the attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. The group has training locations around Libya and subscribe to AQ ideologies.

2. (S//NF) The attack on the American consulate in Benghazi was planned and executed by The Brigades of the Captive Omar Abdul Rahman (BCOAR). BCOAR is also responsible for past attacks on the Red Cross in Benghazi and the attack on the British ambassador, they have approximately 120 members. The BCOAR are connected to Ansar al Sharia katiba, commanded by Sofian AL ((GUMMA)), they are based in Derna but have a branch in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia share the same ideology as BCOAR, but it is not thought that they were involved in the attack on the U.S. American Consulate on 11 September 2012.

3. (S//NF) The attack was planned ten or more days prior on approximately 01 September 2012. The intention was to attack the consulate and to kill as many Americans as possible to seek revenge for U.S. killing of Aboysiye ((ALALIBY)) in Pakistan and in memorial of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center buildings.

4. (S//NF) The leader of BCOAR is Abdul Baset ((AZUZ)), AZUZ was sent by ((ZAWARE)) to set up Al Qaeda (AQ) bases in Libya. It was stated that AZUZ was not a charismatic leader but rather just a violent radical. He is also a member of the Abu Slim Martyrs Katiba, run by Fati ((AGIB)).

5. (S//NF) Within the last year AZUZ established the Al-Tawheed (Oneness of God) college in Derna, the establishment of this college was authorized by the Ministry of Education with the approval of the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Education, Fathi ((AL-KA'ARY)), a member of the Muslim brother hood movement and currently one of the eight presidential candidates. Al-Tawheed College is the headquarters of BCOAR and is located next to the main Derna hospital. The majority of its members are under the age of 28 with a large number between the ages of 17-21 years of age. AZUZ has managed to establish a headquarters and training facility in Derna, they train in the mountains surrounding Derna where they have large caches of
weapons. Some of these caches are disguised by feeding troughs for livestock. They have SA-7 and SA-23/4 MANPADS as well as unidentified missiles over two meters in length. They train almost every day focusing on religious lessons and scripture including three lessons a day of jihadist ideology.

6. (S/NF) Approximately 120 men of the BCOAR train in this area and sometimes they are joined by other radical groups such as Abu Slim Martyrs Katiba, Ansar al Sharia Katiba. One of BCOAR’s main planning locations is Hamza Mosque nobody with the exception of their group is allowed to pray there, everyone in Derna is aware of this.

7. (S/NF) The most important location is Al-Sadaqa Mosque, There is a small rectangular room, approximately 12 meters by 6 meters in the vicinity of the mosque that contains a large number of written documents. The majority of their documentation is written as the group very rarely uses e-mail, these documents contain information on all of the AQ activity in Libya.