



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

DEC 31 2015

Mr. Sean Dunagan
Judicial Watch
425 Third Street, SW
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20024

Re: Freedom of Information Act Case # F2014-22937

Dear Mr. Dunagan:

Reference is made to your December 16, 2014, Freedom of Information Act request to the Department of State regarding Adnan Gulshair el Shukrijumah. The Office of Information Programs and Services (A/GIS/IPS) has forwarded 28 documents numbered 01-28 found in the Department's central foreign policy records to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) for review and direct reply to you. We note that you agreed on December 17, 2015, to exclude the non-responsive portions of the documents from review.

We are withholding portions of documents numbered 01-05 based on the provisions of 5 USC 552 (b)(1) [E.O. 13526, as amended, sec. 1.4 (b, d)], (b)(6), b(7)(C), (b)(7)(D), and/or (b)(7)(E).


Documents numbered 06-26 have been withheld in full under one or more of the above cited exemptions. An explanation of exemptions is enclosed.

Portions of documents numbered 02-05 and 27-28 originated with other federal agencies. That information is being referred to those agencies for review. The Department will notify you of the results as soon as they become available

You have the right to appeal the Department's determination by writing, within 60 days, to the Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/GIS/IPS/PP/LA, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. The appeal letter should refer to the case number shown above, clearly identify the decision being appealed, and provide supporting arguments when possible. For further information, see the Code of Federal Regulations, 22 CFR 171.52.

If you have any questions regarding a particular aspect of this case, you should contact the Office of Information Programs and Services, Department of State, SA-2, Washington, DC 20522-8100 or you may call (202) 261-8314. In any communication, please refer to the above case number.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Jacqueline Schools". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Jacqueline Schools
Director, Office of Management Services
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
U.S. Department of State

Enclosures:

Explanation of Exemptions
Documents

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552 (FOIA):

(b) (1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;

(b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information, (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

(b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a (PA):

(b) No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains,

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding.

General Exemptions:

(j)(1) applies to CIA records and information provided by foreign governments;

(j)(2) maintained by an agency or component thereof which performs as its principal function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws, including police efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or to apprehend criminals, except records of arrest.

Specific Exemptions:

(k)(1) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal law, or which would identify a source under an express promise of confidentiality, or, prior to the effective date of this section, under an implied promise of confidentiality;

(k)(3) maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to section 3056 of Title 18;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suit ability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal contracts, or access to classified information, the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a source under an express promise of confidentiality, or, prior to the effective date of this section, under an implied promise of confidentiality;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service the disclosure of which would compromise the testing or examination process; or

(k)(7) evaluation material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a source under an express promise of confidentiality, or, prior to the effective date of this section, under an implied promise of confidentiality.

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From: svcsmartmfi
Sent: 8/12/2010 5:08:07 AM
To: SMART Core
Subject: REPORTED SIGHTING OF SUSPECT TERRORIST ADNAN G. EL SHUKRIJUMAH (U)

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MRN: 10 SEOUL 1370
Date/DTG: Aug 12, 2010 / 120856Z AUG 10
From: AMEMBASSY SEOUL
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: ASEC, PINR, PTER
Captions: TERREP, NOFORN
Pass Line: DEPARTMENT FOR DS/DSS/IP AND DS/DSS/TIA
Subject: REPORTED SIGHTING OF SUSPECT TERRORIST ADNAN G. EL SHUKRIJUMAH (U)

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 001370

~~NOFORN~~
TERREP

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/DSS/IP AND DS/DSS/TIA

E.O. 13526: DECL: 08/12/2035
TAGS: ASEC, PINR, PTER
SUBJECT: REPORTED SIGHTING OF SUSPECT TERRORIST ADNAN G. EL SHUKRIJUMAH (U)

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Classified By [redacted] Regional Security Officer, AMEMB Seoul, 1
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1. (SBU) At 1400 hrs, on Saturday, August 7, 2010, the switchboard operator from American Embassy Seoul forwarded a call from a Canadian citizen to the Deputy Regional Security Officer (DRSO). The caller, hereafter referred to as SOURCE, identified himself as a Canadian citizen with long-term residence in Pyongtech, Republic of Korea. SOURCE, stated that on Wednesday, August 4, he had visited the Canadian Embassy in Seoul to inquire about Canadian citizen services for his daughter. During the visit he had a short conversation (approximately 1-2 minutes in duration) with an unidentified (U/I) male and female couple who appeared to be Canadian citizens of Middle Eastern descent. They were waiting together for consular services in the lobby of the Canadian Embassy. Days later he saw a photograph on the Korean Yahoo main Internet page of suspected terrorist Adnan G. EL SHUKRIJUMAH and he observed a strong resemblance

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between the U/I male he met on August 4 and SHUKRIJUMAH. SOURCE stated that he was &p.e.ty sur:8 that the U/I man he met at the Canadian Embassy was SHUKRIJUMAH, commenting that the U/I male had a strong resemblance to clean-shaven images of SHUKRIJUMAH as seen on the Internet.

2. (SBU) (Note: Adnan G. El SHUKRIJUMAH is wanted by the U.S. Government in connection with terrorist threats against the U.S. and has a \$5 million DS Rewards for Justice (RFJ) offer for information leading to his capture. SOURCE did not mention anything related to the RFJ offer and did not sound inebriated or emotionally disturbed. He presented himself to be a genuinely concerned Canadian citizen who felt he should report his possible sighting of a wanted terrorist to the United States Embassy (as is directed on www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/elshukrijumah.htm. Publicly available information indicates that SHUKRIJUMAH could attempt to travel on a Canadian passport.)

3. (SBU) SOURCE stated that after viewing other pictures of SHUKRIJUMAH and reading about his physical description on the Internet he became more confident that the person he met on August 4 could likely have been SHUKRIJUMAH. SOURCE described the U/I male as being short and small framed, approx. 130-135 lbs, 5,3) 5,6 tall, 35-40 years of age, and of Middle Eastern descent. The U/I male spoke English with an accent (NFI). The U/I female was described as being much older, approximately 50-55 years of age. She carried most of the conversation and stated that she was originally from Iran, but had lived in Vancouver and Ottawa for about 10-15 years.

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11. (U) POC is SA [redacted] DRSO Seoul,
STEPHENS

Signature: STEPHENS

Classified By: [redacted], Regional Security Officer, AMEMB Seoul, 1.4 (c)(d),
Declassify on: 08/12/2035
Attachments: metadata.dat

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Action Post:
Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

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ACTION DS-00

INFO LOG-00 MFA-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 A-00 CIAE-00 INL-00
WHA-00 UTEDE-00 VC-00 OBG-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 VCE-00
DCP-00 OMB-00 PC-01 PER-00 IRM-00 TEST-00 FMP-00
ECA-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00 /001W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3357

UNCLAS PANAMA 001848

DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/CR, DS/OSAC AND
DS/DSS/IP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT (QSR): APRIL - JUNE 04

REF: 03 STATE 7339

1. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

At last, the long-awaited move of the Embassy main annex to the temporary Interim Office Building (IOB), in the area previously known as Fort Clayton, was completed. In spite of experiencing some growing pains, personnel are far more secure than at the previous temporary location for the past 20 years, which was located on a major thoroughfare downtown.

The IOB, now called The Clayton Building, refurbishment project was completed on an accelerated timeline and we are now grappling with problems related to that aggressive and demanding schedule. Customers and employees have voiced a number of complaints concerning our initial operations at the IOB. Most of them stem from long waiting periods, no protection from the elements, inadequate parking, poor flow-through and excessive security screening. Some of these complaints reflect expected breaking-in problems, while others stem from design flaws in the building renovation. Security features and facility access control plans have been mostly driven by a limited budget and the availability of salvaged hard-line doors. The previous facility featured seven separate access points which would segregate the different occupants. At the new facility, only one single door in the CAC now provides access and egress to the entire compound. It channels ALL building occupants and must accommodate employees, EFMs, contractors, vendors, visa applicants, ACS customers and visitors. Additionally, the Technical Security System (TSS) installation is substandard. Due to OBO concerns about moving out of our previous facility on time, the project was turned over without the benefit of a close inspection by the SEO. Likewise, the hard-line doors salvaged from AmConsulate Sao Paulo were extremely deteriorated and improperly installed. On the bright side,

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OBO finally agreed to allow the installation of a drop-arm crash bar at the back of the building in order to not permanently seal the compound perimeter. This will ease the access of emergency and maintenance vehicles. OBO has funded the purchase and shipment of the drop arm and Post is actively pursuing funding for its installation (Panama 1688 et al).

ESO San Jose continued its outstanding support to Embassy Panama. The Junet annex and APO facility located across the street from the Chancery are now wired into the Selec-Tone alarm system at Post One. On his own, a local developer has come forward with a proposal to build a walled housing compound that would accommodate up to [redacted] of the Embassy community. Embassy will consider this proposal from all perspectives, including security. Post also requested additional residential security 5841 funds to contract and standardize the installation, monitoring and servicing of residential alarms for single-home residences (Panama 1477). RSO completed numerous physical security surveys for proposed housing units for the Embassy, commercial spaces for the Peace Corps and APHIS, and even the International School of Panama and Balboa Academy (Panama 1365), the later two part of the Overseas School Security Phase II efforts.

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Following DS/IP/FPO direction, Post began implementing the mandatory across-the-board reduction in Local Guard Force (LGF) operations. Some of these positions were automatically eliminated by moving the main Embassy annex to the new location, while others have been more painful and we are still assessing the impact of these cuts on IOB operations. These cuts are unpopular because they exacerbate problems associated with the design flaws at the IOB as referenced above. In addition to securing the perimeter, monitoring employee access and screening visitors, LGF members had been performing additional non-security related functions such as traffic management, parking enforcement, and other visitor assistance. Post has taken steps to minimize LGF involvement in non-security activities and will accomplish the targeted reduction of ten percent by the end of the fiscal year (Panama 1289). RSO is working closely with FPO to secure additional, one-time funding to purchase and install

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(Panama 1428). RSO remains concerned due to the elimination of one LGF position and the frequent incidents of trespassing on the residence grounds (Panama 852 and 1148). With respect to other mission facilities, LGF elements and surveillance detection units continue to be extremely successful in spotting possible collection activities and criminal patterns.

RSO continued its strong commitment to advance OSAC-driven security initiatives involving the American community at large, and specifically in support of industry and commerce. Panama's OSAC Country Council was recently formally established after a lot of coaching and coordination by the

RSO staff (Panama 955). Recent world events have sparked tremendous interest in security issues among the American

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business and expatriate communities in Panama. To that end, RSO staff has met and briefed diverse U.S. Government and non-government entities and has sponsored monthly OSAC meetings. Additionally, RSO has met with local counterparts from the British, German, Italian, Polish and Spanish missions to discuss common security issues and concerns. Following the recent, peaceful, democratic general elections held in May, RSO has participated in a number of Embassy-sponsored outreach activities with transition government officials.

The office has maintained excellent relations with present host nation law enforcement officials, and has provided critical support and coordination for various events such as the general elections held in May and the DEA-led Regional Drug Enforcement Conference. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that Foreign Service National Investigators


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[redacted] Similarly, [redacted] local police assistance has been outstanding in support of U.S. security interests. The Panamanian National Police (PNP) has been extremely cooperative and has provided permanent uniformed officer presence at the Clayton annex, and proactively at the Chancery and other facilities in response to credible threats, incidents or demonstrations. The Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) has sponsored a RSO-led initiative to support the creation of a PNP Diplomatic Protection Unit. This specially trained unit will consist of uniformed police officers providing dedicated local law enforcement and security support to diplomatic missions in Panama. RSO is in the process of coordinating this training with Scotland Yard's Diplomatic Protection Group, which eagerly agreed to provide assistance to this NAS-funded effort since DS/ATA was unable to do so. We hope this exchange is fruitful and will assist them and us in achieving our mutual law enforcement and security objectives. This project will not only boost the U.S. Mission's security, but will complement Post's overall police modernization initiative (Panama 1626). RSO and NAS also collaborated in another worthy endeavor by sponsoring a DS-led document fraud detection training seminar. The team, comprised of three DS and one BICE instructors supported by RSO staff, addressed an eclectic group of seasoned investigators from different Panamanian law enforcement organizations. The seminar focused [redacted]

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[redacted] The course ended with a one-day practical "buy-bust" exercise that allowed students to apply classroom principles and use technical equipment valued in excess of \$10,000 which was subsequently donated to the PNP. This is another example of the positive effects achieved through cultivating close working relationships with host government officials (Panama 1382).


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The office has also completed a series of investigative inquiries that have resulted in the removal of three locally engaged staff. Each investigation was the result of either local law enforcement approaching RSO, or others making substantive and credible allegations of misconduct against FSN staff members. In each instance RSO has been able to document lack of candor, an inability to corroborate employee's version of events, and contradictory statements made by employees. Each investigation resulted in the employees losing their security certification and their

subsequent removal from the mission (Panama 1120). A number of Peace Corps (PC) volunteers were victims of a theft of personal funds that were being held at the PC Panama office. The funds totaling almost \$3,000 USD, along with passports and other personal documents, were kept in folders inside a file cabinet in the cashier's office. Inadequate internal controls contributed to the theft of the funds and their late discovery. A set of keys disappeared sometime in March, and the funds were discovered missing, almost by chance, in early April. The Policia Tecnica Judicial (PTJ), a local law enforcement entity, launched an official investigation into this matter.



The initial investigation was inconclusive, but clearly

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
focused on two employees:

who both failed their polygraph interview and are at the core of the inquiry. Another employee involved in the case, _____, was dismissed during the course of the investigation for unrelated causes. The case has now been transferred to the Fiscalia (prosecutor's office) and RSO continues to monitor its progress and coordinate with PC management (Panama 1082 et al). RSO is also actively involved in locating several fugitives wanted by U.S. federal and state authorities who are believed to be currently residing in Panama. RSO has been very successful in the past with finding and bringing wanted criminals to justice and will continue to aggressively pursue these investigations.

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B. MISSION-WIDE EMERGENCY ACTION DRILLS:

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OTHER THAN CHANCERY

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C. CONSTITUENT POSTS:

RSO has no constituent Post responsibility.

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D. MSG ACTIVITIES:

RSO and MSG Detachment conducted the following drills with favorable results: INTRUDER - 04/02/04; 04/06/04, BOMB - 04/28/04; 06/07/04; 06/23/04. RSO attended all regular MSG guard schools at the Chancery and MSG BEQ. MSG Inspecting Officer [redacted] conducted a semi-annual inspection from 4/5 to 4/9 with mission-capable results.

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[redacted] arrived at post on 5/22/04 and [redacted] arrived at post on 5/23/04. [redacted] departed Post TDY to Baghdad, Iraq for a period of 120 days on 6/17/04. On 6/24/04, [redacted] departed Post and [redacted] arrived TDY to act as the Detachment Commander until the incoming Detachment Commander comes aboard. [redacted] departed Post on 6/27/04.

2. THREATS AND INCIDENTS:

POST OF RECORD

A wide array of incidents during this quarter have kept this office very busy.

In one case, an unhappy AmCit retiree called the Embassy operator to complain about the lack of customer service at the Consular section and threatened to place a bomb at the facility. RSO has identified the suspected individual, who lives in the country's interior, and is working with local authorities to follow up on this incident (Panama 903).

[redacted]

[redacted]

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During routine screening of packages at the Embassy annex in Clayton, LGF detected positive results for the presence of high explosives on a package addressed to the Consul General. The CAC was evacuated and secured. Panamanian security forces immediately responded to the incident and determined that the parcel was harmless (Panama 1551).

In another case, a LGF member noticed a suspicious package in a planter on the Chancery perimeter. PNP quickly responded and after sealing the area off proceeded to neutralize the contents, which revealed abandoned personal items (Panama 959).

A number of possible surveillance incidents have been reported, and most successfully resolved. This was due to the combination of an alert surveillance detection program

driven to locate any observation attempts, and the excellent response by Panamanian authorities in challenging suspected individuals and following through the investigation to determine identities and purposes of individuals apparently photographing, filming, or watching the Embassy and surrounding areas.

An EAC meeting was convened on 06/22/04 to evaluate and discuss current threat conditions, emergency preparedness and contingency planning related to the 4th of July Independence Day Celebration Reception. The EAC concurred that there have been no credible threats that might affect Embassy plans, and thus far GOP law enforcement officials have provided excellent support for Post's security needs (Panama 1652).

CONSTITUENT POSTS:

RSO has no constituent Post responsibility.

3. DS INITIATED INVESTIGATIONS

A. DEPARTMENT GENERATED INVESTIGATIONS:

Opened (18)
Closed (30)
Pending (16)
Overdue (00)

B. POST GENERATED INVESTIGATIONS: (FSN/PSC Investigations)

Opened (17)
Closed (15)
Pending (09)
Overdue (10)

C. MISCELLANEOUS RECORD CHECKS:

Opened (72)
Closed (77)
Pending (32)
Overdue (00)

D. RECERTIFICATIONS:

Opened (00)
Closed (27)
Pending (27)
Overdue (00)

4. ACTION CABLES NOT ANSWERED BY DS:

None

5. SUMMARY OF SEPARATE REPORTS:

A. CIWG REPORT - 12/02/03

B. EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN - Panama City, Panama, submitted 01/29/04, under revision.

C. SECURITY SURVEY(S):

CHANCERY - 10/01; 10/04

IOB ANNEX - 03/04

USAID - 09/02; 09/05

PEACE CORPS - 09/02; 09/05

USDA/APHIS - 07/98; new building under construction

FBIS - 09/02; 09/05

ODC (MILGRP) - N/R

GSO WAREHOUSE - N/R; 08/02

MSG RESIDENCE - 12/01; 12/04

USDA APHIS/AIRPORT - 12/01; 12/04

ABMC CEMETERY - 04/03; 04/06

D. PROCEDURAL SECURITY SURVEY - 07/01

E. COMPREHENSIVE SPE INVENTORY - 04/26/04, Panama 949

F. RSO QUARTERLY TRAVEL REPORT - N/A

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ACTION SCT-00

INFO LOG-00 MFA-00 NF-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 A-00 CCO-CC
CG-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 CTME-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DOEZ-00
DOTE-00 WHA-00 DS-00 EB-00 E-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00
VC-00 HHS-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 INSE-00 IO-00 LAB-01
L-00 CAC-00 VCE-00 M-00 AC-00 NEA-00 DCP-00
NRC-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OCS-00 NIMA-00 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 FMPC-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00
TRSE-00 USSS-00 ASDS-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00
G-00 SAS-00 /002W

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AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMCONSUL MONTERREY PRIORITY
AMCONSUL TIJUANA PRIORITY

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TERREP

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/DSS/PII, DS/IP/WHA, DS/IP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/1/2014

TAGS: PTER, ASEC

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, A PROVEN CI TO THE USG IN THE PAST,
REPORTS OF ARAB "CELLS" WITHIN MEXICO

CLASSIFIED BY:
REASON: 1.4 (c)

ARSO, RSO, DOS.

1. (S) SUMMARY: [redacted] an individual approached the Ciudad Juarez Consulate to provide information pertaining to suspect Arab extremists who have been smuggled through Mexico to the United States/Mexico border. The confidential source (SUBJECT) stated his family member, who is a human trafficker, knows the exact whereabouts of three Arabs who are currently being hidden in Agua Prieta, Sonora, Mexico. Although not absolutely positive, one of the three is likely Adnan G. El Shukrijumah, alleged to be a Saudi Arabian terrorist cell leader thought to be in Mexico. SUBJECT also provided information on two smuggling networks, "cells", that specialize in providing logistical support for Arab individuals attempting to enter the United States.

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
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TX. END SUMMARY.

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
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
NOTE: Within
the past month, RSO CJ distributed information throughout the
states of Sonora and Chihuahua, Mexico, via newspapers regarding
El Shukrijumah at the request of the FBI Joint Terrorism Task
Force (JTTF) in El Paso.

FBI

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ORIGIN DS-00

INFO LOG-00 MFA-00 AF-00 AID-00 A-00 CIAE-00 INL-00
DNI-00 DODE-00 DOT-00 WHA-00 FERC-00 EAF-00 EB-00
EUR-00 OIG-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 FRB-00 HHS-01 H-00
TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 JUSE-00 L-00 MMP-00 NEA-00
DCP-00 ISN-00 NSCE-00 OIC-00 OIG-00 OMB-00 P-00
ISNE-00 DOHS-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00
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APPROVED BY: DS/DSS/CC: [redacted]
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2031
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY


Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY PETER HARGRAVES, OFFICE DIRECTOR, CC
REASONS: 1.4 (A) (B) (C)

1. (U) Diplomatic Security Daily, September 19, 2006
2. (U) U.S. Mission Iraq - Paragraphs 9-15
3. (U) Significant Events - Paragraphs 16-17
4. (U) Key Concerns - Paragraphs 18-30
5. (U) Trends and Analysis - Paragraphs 31-33
6. (U) Cyber Threats - Paragraphs 34-40
7. (U) UNGA 61 - Paragraphs 41-61
8. (U) Surveillance Incidents - Paragraphs 62-67
9. (U) U.S. Mission Iraq
10. (SBU) Regional Embassy Office (REO) Kirkuk

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
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el-Shukrijumah is one of the FBI's most wanted terrorists and Rewards for Justice is offering 5 million dollars for information leading to his capture. For some time, it has been rumored that Shukrijumah would attempt to enter the U.S. to conduct attacks. Most recently, on September 11, al Arabiya television quoted Hamid Mir, a Pakistani journalist who has interviewed Usama Bin Laden many times, warning that the al-Qa'ida leader is preparing new attacks in the U.S. more devastating than those that destroyed the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon exactly five years ago. Mir said his sources indicated that bin Laden had assigned Shukrijumah with executing the operations after smuggling

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TAGS: ASEC

SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY

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
Declassify on: Source marked 25X1-human, Date of source:

February 2, 2008

1. (U) Diplomatic Security Daily, January 2, 2008
2. (U) Significant Events - Paragraphs 6-11
3. (U) Key Concerns - Paragraphs 12-53
4. (U) Cyber Threats - Paragraphs 54-62
5. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents - Paragraphs 63-67
6. (U) Significant Events

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54. (U) Cyber Threats