

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

On December 17, 2013, [REDACTED], CBP, [REDACTED] was interviewed by DHS OIG. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] would not have been able to enter records into TECS without supervisor approval; however, prior to the initial records modification in 2010, no one had any idea that what [REDACTED] was doing was a problem. According to [REDACTED] the records modification in 2010 was not a disciplinary action or punitive in nature. CBP management just realized that [REDACTED] records were not in compliance with CBP policy, so the records were modified. [REDACTED] was disciplined after the 2012 incident because [REDACTED] had known by then that [REDACTED] was not allowed to enter terrorist-related lookouts in TECS.

[REDACTED] stated that he would not be surprised if [REDACTED] career had suffered because of the incident in 2012, but he had no direct knowledge of any specifics. According to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had done nothing wrong up to that point, but when [REDACTED] continued to enter terrorist-related data after being told not to, [REDACTED] was disobeying a direct order. Obviously, that could negatively affect [REDACTED] career. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] is very good at what [REDACTED] does, but [REDACTED] needs to be monitored to ensure [REDACTED] stays within CBP policy. (Exhibit 8)

On December 17, 2013, [REDACTED], CBP, [REDACTED], was interviewed by DHS OIG. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] meetings with [REDACTED] and described each as a "broken record" of the previous meeting. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that there is a process for creating an entry based on official information, and open-source material found on the Internet is not "official information". [REDACTED] stated that he warned the NTC that [REDACTED] reports were derived from unverified open-source material and needed to be vetted. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] reports are not properly annotated so that an intelligence analyst could independently verify the sources of [REDACTED] information. [REDACTED] also noted that [REDACTED] reports are too complex and need to be written in layman's terms. (Exhibit 18)

On January 9, 2014, [REDACTED] CBP, NTC, was interviewed by DHS OIG. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as an "asset to CBP". He stated that [REDACTED] was "extremely intelligent" and has a "ton of knowledge". [REDACTED] went on to say [REDACTED] does not know how to focus [REDACTED] information. He stated that [REDACTED] once [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said it was just a "matter of common sense" that you would not [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] described some of [REDACTED] links as "genius", but said there were also plenty of links that no one but [REDACTED] understood. While [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] at the NTC, [REDACTED] had to regulate a lot of [REDACTED] work. (Exhibit 11)

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