

Working Draft - CIA Watergate History

1. The attached paper is an unfinished draft "history" of the so-called Watergate affair, as it affected CIA. The history was compiled during the latter part of 1973 and 1974. Undertaken as an internal CIA review of the matter, it is still incomplete and remains a working paper. In this form it has not been edited, checked for accuracy, nor reviewed for approval of the views and analyses that it contains, other than that given in the course of its preparation in the Office of the Inspector General.

2. The attached version of the paper--classified SECRET--was typed from the working draft prepared by John C. Richards, who died in December 1974. That draft contained extensive amendments on its face in the form of Mr. Richards' handwritten revisions, as well as attached notations for later insertion. The attached draft was typed in order to provide a clean copy to Mr. William Schwarzer, a member of the Staff of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States.

3. It had been planned, prior to John Richards' death, to review certain incidents and developments that are not treated in detail in the working draft. This has not been undertaken, and at present the eventual completion of the work had not yet been scheduled.

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WATERGATE HISTORY

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## WATERGATE

Background

1. It is difficult to recapture the atmosphere in which the Agency provided certain limited materials and assistance to persons who later became involved in the Watergate and Ellsberg affairs and related issues. Any real understanding of the Agency's role must start with consideration of a problem with which government officials were preoccupied at the time.

2., In 1970 and 1971 the United States Government, at both policy and working levels, had considerable concern over the problem of security and leaks of classified information to the press and thence to opposition intelligence services worldwide. Some times the revelations were on matters of marginal significance, but on occasion they were on subjects of importance. The reporting in 1971, in accurate detail, of the US position and its tactics in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) had considerable impact in official Washington. The publication of the Pentagon Papers served further to dramatize what seemed to be a deteriorating situation.

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3. The seriousness with which the U.S. Government viewed the leak and publication of the Pentagon Papers was shared by this Agency. A damage assessment report was made on 8 July 1971 by the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, George A. Carver, Jr., which examined the problem from both a parochial and government wide point of view. It cited the following areas of actual or potential damage.

"As regards the Agency, certain proprietary relations are identified in the study, e.g., Eastern Construction Operation Brotherhood, the Fort McKinley Training Center. So too are the mission and functions of the Okinawa Support Base and former Agency control and use of CAT. These identifications could cause various kinds of problems or embarrassment in the Philippines, Japan, Indonesia, etc.

"Several Agency officers were identified by name, position and/or activity. There were repeated references to Agency engagement in covert paramilitary operations. There were extensive quotations from and discussions of a wide range of Agency publications covering more than two decades."

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4. Further, the study concludes that:

"More than specific potential damage attributable to single passages in the study, the collective totality of Agency material in the Pentagon Papers would tell any sophisticated or professional outsider a very great deal about how the Agency goes about doing its business (e.g., its procedures, the numbering systems, format, and prose style employed for different types of documents or communications, etc.). This would constitute a major windfall for any hostile intelligence service and greatly facilitate future denigration operations, including the preparation of fabricated documents, forgeries or other types of tailored disinformation.

"There were broader damage considerations which affected the entire intelligence community and the highest levels of the U.S. Government. Many if not most of the documents incorporated one way or another in the Pentagon Papers study involved communications intelligence of some form or to some extent. A sophisticated review of the study would tell professional intelligence officers of many foreign countries (certainly the Soviet Union and Communist

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China) a great deal about the overall level of U.S. COMINT capabilities and much about certain specific U.S. Communications intelligence activities. One particular volume of the study, by itself, would clearly compromise an extremely sensitive and politically delicate collection activity.

"Apart from the intelligence field per se, the study also compromised several politically sensitive activities, including those of other governments undertaken only after explicit U.S. assurances that their roles therein would be kept secret."

5. Finally, the assessment report concludes:

"That the leak of the study raises the whole range of issues associated with the right -- or even ability -- of the U.S. Government to conduct private business privately. It also raises a range of basic issues concerning the right or ability of officials in any administration to engage in frank debates or discussions associated with their official responsibilities without having their views and actions subject to hostile out-of-context criticism at some later date and in some changed and later climate but within a time span whereby some retrospective review can

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adversely affect such officials' public or private careers without their having any effective means of seeking recourse or redress. In short, the leak of the Pentagon Papers raised the basic issue of the U.S. Government's right or ability to have or protect secrets of any nature.

"It was feared by the administration that there was a very real possibility that the leak of the Pentagon Papers might prove to be only an opening salvo in a campaign of selective major leaks by persons opposed to the war and the administration and that once the interest in the Pentagon study began to wane, new sets of classified documents of more recent vintage might begin to be surfaced in public print."

6. It is against this backdrop that the Administration's concern and efforts against Ellsberg must be viewed. Not only did they feel that an example must be made of Ellsberg to forestall future leaks, but also they felt that if he were in touch with the Soviets, as had been rumored, it was of vital importance to identify his contacts. The concern was legitimate, the means to achieve their ends was, to say the least, questionable.

7. As early as mid-1970 a White House Assistant, Tom Charles Huston, spearheaded an attempt to organize an intelligence plan in

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the government that had material overtones of domestic security. This plan survived only a few days, apparently foundering on the objections of the Director of the FBI, who already was estranged from CIA and subsequently withdrew from a number of areas of effective participation in efforts of the administration to take additional action in the security field.


8. Faced with the problem of an FBI whose Director was reluctant to use covert means of obtaining information, a CIA whose charter prohibited domestic operations and a Secret Service not well equipped for clandestine activities, the Administration moved to set up its own Special Investigations Unit. On 16 July 1971, at the San Clemente White House, President Nixon placed Egil Krogh in charge of the Unit which subsequently came to be known as "The Plumbers". Krogh officially took charge of this Unit at the White House on 24 July 1971. His reporting channel was through John Ehrlichman but he also had the authority to go directly to the President when he deemed it necessary. Working for him initially were David Young and G. Gordon Liddy who were already deeply involved in investigative work involving Daniel Ellsberg.

9. By mid-1971 a number of programs involving the Agency and the DCI began to mature. On 23 April 1971 the Director reported to the President on steps taken to tighten security vis-a-vis the press.

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On 4 June 1971, in an appropriately classified paper addressed to certain senior government officials, the DCI restated their responsibility to tighten security. On 30 June 1971 a paper was addressed to the heads of all departments and agencies on security. In August the Agency submitted a detailed study to the President on leaks to the press during the Nixon administration, which led to a request for similar studies on preceding administrations. Leaks continued, the reporting by Jack Anderson in December 1971 of the minutes of the WASAG minutes on the India-Pakistan situation being an example, and efforts continued to pinpoint the sources.



10. It is not the intent of this paper to delineate between paranoia and responsible concern for security, but it is felt that there is a difference. And regardless of whether some personages involved in what has come to be known as "Watergate" claimed national security as the cause for what they did, the fact remains that security was an issue that concerned responsible officials at the time. Without judging the right or wrong the Agency's limited actions, the above summary of the problems of the time does provide a relevant back drop for judging why some things happened as they did.

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11. We are not in a position to relate with certainty what happened within the various groups working in the White House staff, or what overlaps there were between security considerations and other interests. The parties to those activities have been screened off from the Agency, and questions that might have been asked, for the Agency's enlightenment, may never have been asked; if asked, many of the answers are unknown to the Agency. The Agency has not had access to the information collected by the various investigative authorities, although the transcripts of some proceedings have been available publicly, and summary reports--with highly selective, and sometimes inaccurate data--have been reviewed. Some things do seem clear. Howard Hunt was employed by the White House for work on security matters; he has testified that his discussions prior to employment were concerned with the Ellsberg case, and his security responsibilities were emphasized by Ehrlichman in his telephone call on 7 July 1971 to General Cushman, soliciting support for a security matter. How things got on another track thereafter is a different story, one apparently not of interest to the investigators, so far as publicized information reveals. Some of the story is suggested by Hunt's testimony, making it seem that his initiatives caused the first diversion, namely to interview a man who was reported to

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have information on the Kennedy family. However, the details of what came out of it are complex, and much of it is still unknown to the Agency.

## COMMENT:

While much is unknown and may never be known, it is possible to put together an interpretation of what happened, how and why.

It appears from existing records and testimony that Hunt was originally hired by Colson to help in what the press has come to characterize as the "dirty tricks" department. Colson was aware of Hunt's writing ability and the fact that he had been active in the writing of propaganda for covert action projects. A telephone conversation between Colson and Hunt, taped by the former at the time of the conversation on 1 July 1971, and given wide publication in conjunction with Colson's testimony seems quite clearly to indicate that Hunt's initial assignment was to do a job on Ellsberg, "to try him publicly", to discredit him in the eyes of the American public. His interview with Conein and DeMott were also along the lines of the "dirty tricks" department as was his fabrication of State Department cables.

The "Plumbers Group", Krogh, Young and Liddy operating out of Room 16 in the Executive Office Building were concerned about and charged with the responsibility for doing something to halt security leaks in the government. They were concerned with Ellsberg before Hunt appeared on the scene and had already pulled together a great deal of information on him. When

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Hunt was assigned the job of character assassination on Ellsberg he found that the material he needed was being held in the files at Room 16. Ellsberg was a fairly constant topic of conversation in that room and, given Hunt's assignment and proclivities, it was inevitable that he would be drawn into the discussion and planning. Hunt says, in his testimony before the Grand Jury on 2 May 1973, consideration was given by the "Plumbers" to involving the FBI or Secret Service with the task of securing more information. Hunt testified that Liddy claimed that the FBI no longer had the expertise to handle such an operation and that "the White House did not have sufficient confidence in the Secret Service in order to entrust them with a task of this sort."

Hunt goes on to say, "There came a time shortly thereafter when it was suggested that perhaps the unit, which had been popularly described as 'the plumbers' in the press but which was never so called during my incumbency, might be able to undertake such an operation on its own. To that end, Mr. Liddy and I were authorized to fly out to the west coast, Los Angeles...."

In his testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee on 24 September 1973 Hunt in answer to the question how he happened to join the "Plumbers" unit when he had been hired to work for Colson, gave the following reply, "Through a process resembling osmosis almost, I had discovered early in my reading of the overt materials relating to the publication of the Pentagon Papers, my researches into Dr. Ellsberg's background, that considerably more documentation would

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be necessary for my purposes. I so advised and informed Mr. Colson, and he told me that these materials, that is to say, classified materials bearing on my researches, were to be found in Room 16, and I should check with Mr. Liddy for that purpose. I found that the holdings that were in Room 16 were quite extensive and I began as a matter of course and custom, to go there every day to acquaint myself with additional information as it flowed into Room 16 from the various government agencies that were making contributions. So it was that I spent less and less time in Office 338, which had been assigned me by Mr. Colson, and a great deal more time in Room 16, which became known as the plumbers unit, the special investigation unit."

Thus it is that early on there was a marriage of the "dirty tricks" section with the special investigations unit. It could be reasoned that the latter group, with a legitimate concern and charter from the President, began to concern itself with domestic political activities and to move from a staff function to a covert action operations unit with Hunt admittedly, on some occasions, leading the way and suggesting the action.

12. Experience has demonstrated that seemingly minor aspects of events can be given a public significance that would ordinarily never have occurred to less imaginative persons than those involved in publicizing the affair and responsible for unraveling its complexities. As a result, while this report was being prepared we have had to enlarge sections initially passed over briefly, simply because some

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minor fact or incident was given a significance that would not ordinarily be attributed to it by the average citizen. Similar omissions probably still exist, just as there has been some selection in preparing this summary, with some items being omitted simply because they did not appear as significant. Nevertheless, because of the attention that has been given details, the final summary has proven much longer than had been planned initially.

13. This history of CIA's connection to the "Watergate Affair" begins in retrospect with the retirement of two Agency staff employees, Mr. E. Howard Hunt in April 1970, and Mr. James McCord in August 1970.

14. Hunt, whose Agency career was spent in the Directorate for Plans, worked through the External Employment Affairs Branch (EEAB) of the Agency -- known familiarly as "Out placement" -- to locate outside employment. He also took advantage of his friendship with senior Agency officials, including Director Helms, to canvass private job opportunities. Director Helms signed at least one letter of recommendation for Hunt, to Kennecott Copper Corporation and is alleged to have signed and sent one to the Robert R. Mullen Company, a public relations firm that had cooperated with CIA for several years by supplying non-official cover for Agency employees (a fact known to Mr. Hunt.) Attempts have been made by the Agency

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without success, to verify the existence of this second letter. Mr. Mullen thinks he turned it over to the special prosecutors, who have been unable to produce it in response to repeated Agency requests. On 25 September 1973 the Special Prosecution Staff advised Warner that an exhaustive search of its files had failed to produce the Helms' letter of recommendation of Howard Hunt, which Mullen alleged had been furnished his company. In testimony given before the Senate Select Committee on 5 February 1974 Mullen admitted that there may never had been a letter of recommendation to Mullen Company on Hunt but a copy of a letter to another company (Kennecott Copper) which Hunt showed to Mullen.

15. The combination of EEAB's and Central Cover Staff's favorable relations with the Robert R. Mullen Company, Director Helms' reported letter of recommendation to the President of the Company, Mr. Robert Mullen, who had known and worked with Hunt in Paris in 1948 and 1949 where both were employees of the Economic Cooperation Administration as well as Hunt's own background and qualifications (over the years he had worked as a news reporter and had authored several mystery/detective stories under various pseudonyms) were persuasive enough that Hunt was employed by the Mullen Company, on 1 May 1970.

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16. In early July of 1971 Hunt was hired by the White House as a consultant and as a result was put on consultant status by the Mullen Company. Testimony of White House personnel and White House records cited by them indicate that Mr. Hunt was introduced by Charles Colson, then Counsel to the President to John Ehrlichman on 7 July 1971. The same day, 7 July 1971, CIA records show that Mr. Ehrlichman called the DDCI, General Robert Cushman, to advise that Hunt had been employed by the White House as a security consultant, would soon be calling on the General, and asked that he be given a hand.

17. Mr. James McCord retired in August of 1970 after spending 20 years in various positions in the Agency's Office of Security. After retirement he set up his own private investigative organization known as McCord Associates as well as a subsidiary organization known as the Institute for Protection and Safety Studies, Inc. In early 1972, McCord was named Security Coordinator for the National Committee for the Re-election of President Nixon (CRP). This was his title and position when he and four others were arrested on 17 June 1972 after having been discovered breaking into the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate apartment complex in Washington, D. C. The other four men Barker, Martinez,

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Gonzales and Sturgis were Cuban exiles, of whom the first three had been contract agents of CIA in its operations against Cuba at the time of the Bay of Pigs. Sturgis had never been employed by CIA in any capacity. One, Martinez, was still on a \$100.00 monthly retainer as an informant on the Cuban exile community in the Miami area. Somewhat later two more men were taken into custody--E. Howard Hunt, White House consultant, and G. Gordon Liddy, who left his White House "plumber" job in late December of 1971 to become an employee of CRP. The past association with CIA of five of the seven men led to speculation concerning CIA involvement in what became known as the Watergate affair. CIA, confident that it had no involvement in the matter, and unaware of the ramifications that would develop later, proceeded in relatively routine cooperation with the investigating authorities, providing background material on the individuals on whom it had information, and summarizing its more recent known contacts with Hunt (which the Agency did not initially associate with the Watergate affair).

18. The role of the Agency in this matter should be considered in two aspects. The first aspect is the actual but limited involvement of the Agency by the White House staff through its requests for Agency support and assistance in presumably legitimate (albeit unusual) activities purporting to be in the national interest. The Agency

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cooperated, though reluctantly, in producing psychological profiles on Daniel Ellsberg, of Pentagon Papers fame. It also cooperated in giving materials and assistance to Hunt up to the point that it appeared the requested support exceeded the stated purpose. (This phase of Agency involvement is covered in Sections II and III of this report.) The second aspect is the apparent attempt by members of the White House staff to involve the Agency in suppression of the FBI investigation of an aspect of the Watergate affair, and in what appeared to be an attempt to involve the Agency in a cover-up. The Agency's top officials refused and rebuffed attempts to implicate CIA.

19. When the five men were arrested at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters on 17 June 1972, the FBI found certain identification documents in possession of two of them which were suspected as having been prepared by CIA. The ensuing inquiries not only established that this was so, but that they had been issued to E. Howard Hunt. This is the first indication that the Agency had of how some of the material issued to Hunt, at White House request, was being used. Even this took some time since initially the Office of Security, which was handling the matter, was unaware of the issuance to Hunt of the Hamilton alias documents from another Agency component.

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## COMMENT:

It was not until it was disclosed in the media in May 1973, that the Office of Security first learned of the fact that Mr. Hunt had been issued the Warren Alias.

With regard to the Hamilton alias, that name was first mentioned as Martin Hamilton in a telephone call from the Metropolitan Police Department to the Security Duty Office on 17 June 1972; it subsequently appeared in the press in that version. Security reviewed Mr. Hunt's Office of Security file on 19 June 1972. The file contained reference to issuance of the operational alias "Edward V. Hamilton" to Mr. Hunt in September 1960, and the fact that he had used the alias "Edward J. Hamilton" in 1968, when writing the original manuscript for his book, Give Us This Day. Of itself, the name "Hamilton" did not appear significant because its use in earlier press coverage had not come to the attention of the officer reviewing Mr. Hunt's file.

A memorandum prepared by the Security Office for the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 19 June 1972 concerning Mr. Hunt's background did not include reference to the Hamilton alias, although a blind memorandum prepared for Mr. William E. Colby on the same date did mention the manuscript and the Hamilton alias.

On 26 June 1972, Mr. Arnold L. Parham, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, inquired as to whether Mr. Hunt had ever used an alias. Mr. Hunt's Office of Security file was again reviewed on that date, and on 27 June 1972 Mr. Parham was furnished a memorandum concerning Mr. Hunt's use of the Edward V. Hamilton and Edward J. Hamilton aliases.

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The Bureau on 28 July 1972 and the Department of Justice on 24 October 1972 were furnished details on the materials supplied Hunt, and the circumstances under which they were given, plus the fact that a disguise and documentation were also furnished to a then unknown second individual, later identified as G. Gordon Liddy. The Agency also furnished trace information, summaries of Agency relationships where they existed, and biographic material on the five arrested on 17 June and later on Hunt and Liddy. (Section IV, Agency Cooperation sets forth details on this period.)

20. The checking of Agency files and records which ensued as a result of the requests for information from the FBI and Justice Department failed to surface any information about the Agency's assistance to the White House and Hunt on the Ellsberg Profiles. This was due to a number of reasons: the White House request for assistance had not been handled in normal, operational channels; written records, when and where they existed, were tightly controlled and restricted; and, the Agency personnel, including the Director, involved at this stage of the investigation had no knowledge of Hunt's role in the Profiles, or of the fact that there had been a break-in of the Office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. That activity simply was not associated, at that time, with Watergate. The detailed account

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of the Agency's role in the preparation of the Ellsberg Profiles is set forth in Section III of this report.

21. Public attention was again focused on the Agency on 27 April 1973 when Judge W. Matthew Byrne, Jr., the presiding judge in the Ellsberg trial underway at that time in Los Angeles, made public government information that Hunt and Liddy had broken into the office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist. This information had been supplied Judge Byrne by the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Mr. Henry E. Petersen, who in turned received it from Mr. Earl J. Silbert, Principal Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. The information came from pre-Grand Jury interrogation of Hunt by Department of Justice attorneys. The Agency had no advance notice of this information or that it was being furnished to Judge Byrne.

22. At this point it became apparent in the Agency that the earlier support given Hunt and an unnamed associate (documentation, disguise, camera, and the film developed by the Agency for Hunt on 27 August 1971) had broader significance than was known at the time.

23. Hunt testified before the Grand Jury on 2 May 1973. On 4 May the Agency's Legal Counsel was allowed, by the Assistant Attorney General, to review Hunt's testimony which set forth his role in the White House request for a psychological profile on

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Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and stated that two such profiles had been prepared. The Assistant Attorney General requested copies of the profiles. They were delivered to him, the 9 August 1971 profile on 7 May, and copies of both the 9 August and 9 November 1971 profiles on 8 May. Mr. Petersen sent copies of both to Judge Byrne who reportedly gave Ellsberg's attorneys the first profile, dated 9 August 1971. This is the one that was published by the press on 2 August 1973; it has been speculated that it was given to the press by the defense, perhaps by Ellsberg himself.

24. The leaking of Hunt's Grand Jury testimony, with the attendant publicity focused on the Agency, resulted in requests from CIA Congressional Committees and subcommittees for an explanation by CIA of exactly what its role had been in the Watergate and Ellsberg affair. To satisfy these Congressional demands and answer their questions, there was an unprecedented parade of past and present top Agency officials to Capitol Hill. In addition to the then Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. James R. Schlesinger, and Deputy Director, General Vernon E. Walters, there were appearances by former DCI Helms, former DDCI, General Robert Cushman; the then Executive Secretary of the CIA Management Committee, Mr. William E. Colby; General Counsel Lawrence Houston; Legislative Counsel John Maury; the Director of Medical

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Services, Dr. Tietjen; the Chief of the Psychiatric Staff of Medical Services, [REDACTED] Director of Security, Mr. Howard J. Osborn; Chief of the Security Research Staff of the Office of Security, Mr. Paul Gaynor; and the Assistant Legislative Counsel Mr. George Cary.

25. Although the appearances and testimonies of the CIA officers were held in Executive Sessions of these Congressional Committees, very full accounts of their testimony were reported daily by press, radio, and television (it should be noted that the majority of this was with Agency consent, as both the Agency and its Congressional Committees wanted the CIA story in the public domain). By and large the Congress accepted CIA's denial of any actual involvement in Watergate, of any knowledge of, or complicity in, the break-in and burglary of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, and, its explanation of the Agency's role in supplying the Ellsberg profiles. There was some criticism of the Agency for naivete and loose management controls, but the focus of attention had shifted from the Agency itself to attempts by members of the White House staff to involve the CIA in what became known as the Watergate cover-up.

26. The public record is so replete with the cover-up phase of the Watergate story, and is so current, that this paper will not

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attempt to document this record in any detail. Suffice it to say that the principal Agency officials concerned, i. e., Helms, Walters, Schlesinger and Colby, resisted and rebuffed attempts by members of the White House staff to implicate CIA in suppressing aspects of the Watergate investigation and related issues.

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## Section II

Reconstructed Chronology of Agency Support  
to the White House in Connection with  
Request by E. Howard Hunt in 19718 July 1971

The DDCI (General Robert E. Cushman) noted at the DCI morning meeting that John Ehrlichman, Domestic Advisor to the President, had phoned on 7 July 1971 to announce that E. Howard Hunt had been appointed a security consultant for the White House. In a later amplification of this call Cushman said Ehrlichman told him Hunt would be calling on him soon and asked the Agency to lend him a hand.

COMMENT: This minute of the 8 July 1971 meeting was not rediscovered until May 1973 when DCI Schlesinger ordered a complete search of all files and records for information bearing on Watergate and individuals concerned in it. The fact of the call became an issue in General Cushman's memos of 8 and 10 January 1973 when he tried to recall who in the White House had called him, and it was only in May 1973 that he was able to state definitively in his affidavit that the initial call was made by John Ehrlichman.

16 July 1971

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E. Howard Hunt wrote to [REDACTED] an Agency staff secretary-stenographer assigned to the [REDACTED] advising

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her that she might receive TDY orders to return to Washington and that it was at his request. She was advised by him to let it come as a complete surprise and not to mention his name or the fact he was working in the White House.

## COMMENT:

[redacted] had never worked for Hunt, but got to know him when he was chief of covert activities for Europe Division and she was a secretary [redacted]. Mr. Hunt frequently visited with the chief [redacted] and he and [redacted] struck up a friendship which continued, through correspondence, after she was assigned PCS [redacted].

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With the Watergate break-in and Hunt's arrest, the fact of his asking for an Agency secretary (her name was revealed to FBI and Justice) and the fear that she might be publicly identified [redacted]

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[redacted] was brought home to wait out the trials and hearings. She has turned over copies of all her correspondence from Hunt to the Office of the Inspector General and has been debriefed on her knowledge and relationship with Hunt.

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22 July 1971

Karl Wagner, Executive Assistant of the DDCI, General Cushman, in response to a telephonic inquiry from E. Howard Hunt, arranged a meeting between Cushman and Hunt at the General's office at the CIA headquarters building at Langley for this date.

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**COMMENT:** Normal procedure for a visitor to CIA headquarters calls for the visitor to check in at a receptionist's desk where a visitor's slip is filled out under visitors badge issued. This allows for a record to be kept that will show the visitors time and place of entry and departure, who he came to visit and the location of the office. However, this system can be by-passed when the visitor is calling on the DCI or DDCI he is or maybe escorted up to their offices via the Directors elevator and no record is made of biographic data, date, entry, departure, etc. This latter procedure must have been the one followed for Hunt's 22 July 1971 visit to Cushman since a subsequent thorough check of visitors logs for this date did not reveal a Hunt visit.

At Hunt's request for privacy General Cushman asked Mr. Wagner to leave the room. (For that reason Cushman later testified, he activated his recorder, without telling Hunt, and taped the conversation.)

**COMMENT:** With the recovery of the original tape and subsequent re-discovery of the original transcript it was clear that the recorder was activated before Hunt came into the office and before Wagner was asked to leave the room. This fact resulted in some sharp questioning of General Cushman when he testified before the Senate Select Committee in March of 1974. At this late date the General said he could no longer recall why he taped the conversation since his original reason (activated when Wagner was asked to leave) no longer seemed valid.

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After an initial exchange of pleasantries Hunt stated that he had been charged with a highly sensitive mission by the White House to visit and elicit information from an individual whose ideology was uncertain and for that purpose "they asked me to come over here, "to get two things: flash alias documentation (non-backstopped) and some degree of physical disguise "for a one-time operation -- in and out. " Hunt asked that the fact of his support be closely held, that his identity not be revealed to Technical Services Division (TSD) people and that he be met in a safehouse. He stated he would be traveling either Saturday or Sunday (24-25 July 1971) and therefore the next afternoon (Friday, 23 July 1971) would be fine for him. Cushman agreed to set it up and have Hunt notified at his White House number. Hunt expressed appreciation then "John Ehrlichman said that you were the--" Cushman replied, "Yeah, he called me, sure."

Hunt then specified what he needed: flash documentation in alias using the first name of Edward for any state drivers license and some pocket litter in the same name, and a physical disguise so the interviewee could not identify him later.

It was left between them that Hunt would be called and given an address and time. Some small talk ensued during which Cushman asked Hunt to say Hello to John Ehrlichman for him which Hunt promised to do. They then talked about Pentagon Papers, China,

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Ehrlichman's role in White House, etc. Hunt says "What Ehrlichman is doing this morning is no business of Kissinger's or the Vice President (so this is great). Because (of) somebody at the top we've got to watch these things." (Comment: The clear implication here is of Ehrlichman's domestic responsibilities for the President.)

COMMENT: This recording was transcribed and filed. Upon General Cushman's departure from CIA, his files were cleared out by his secretary, Miss Barbara Pindar and EA/DDCI Karl Wagner, the transcript being removed by the latter and stored in an unmarked file in his safe.

After 19 June 1972 when Hunt's name came up in connection with the Watergate break-in, Wagner was unable to locate the original transcript of the Cushman-Hunt meeting of 22 July 1971. At the time of General Cushman's departure from the Agency in December of 1971, Miss Pindar and Karl Wagner had gone through all his files and records, including room and telephone transcripts, destroying some, sending others to archives and in a few cases retaining items which they felt had continuing relevance. This original transcript was saved by Wagner and stored in his safe, however, his original search failed to reveal it. Miss Pindar recalled that she kept a card file on General Cushman's visitors, checked the file and found the date of the Hunt visit and the fact that a tape had been made of the meeting. She called the Security office technicians and discovered the tape was in the files. The tape was delivered to her and Miss Pindar produced a new transcript from the tape during the week of 19-27 June 1972. This transcript was filled with gaps and missing pieces due to Miss Pindar's inability to distinguish all the conversations.

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In May 1973, Wagner in making another thorough search of all files for any other material bearing on Watergate located the original transcript in the bottom drawer of his safe among unrelated miscellaneous files and papers. A copy of this was given to the Cox group on 7 August 1973.

22 July 1971

General Cushman briefed Wagner on the Hunt visit, what Hunt had requested and what Cushman had agreed to. Cushman said he had given Hunt Wagner's number and Wagner should arrange with TSD the carrying out of Hunt's request.

Later in the day Hunt called Wagner and repeated his request for aid earlier asked of Cushman "in obtaining a physical disguise and 'pocket litter' documentation in alias to assist him in connection with an extremely sensitive project, which he could not further discuss, and which had been approved by Mr. Ehrlichman." Wagner was asked by Hunt not to identify him to other personnel or to indicate it was a sensitive matter requested by the White House. Wagner did protect Hunt's identity until near the end of the activity but did indicate to a few individuals that the request came from the White House.

COMMENT: With the advantage of hindsight, given the dramatic publicity accorded the materials provided, it should be noted that limited disguise and "pocket litter" of the type provided -- flash alias documentation --

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serves only limited purposes. In this instance they seemed to serve the described need, of concealing a person's identity in a one-time meeting. They do not in any way facilitate the commission of an illegal entry, nor do they protect a person from identification if apprehended in the commission of an illegal act, whatever sense of false security they may provide.

Wagner contacted Mr. Richard Krueger, Acting Chief of Technical Services Division, and instructed him to make arrangements for furnishing a physical disguise and alias documentation to an individual who did not want his identity known to TSD officers. Wagner indicated the matter was extremely sensitive and was being done for the White House. He further specified that all support in this matter be handled by TSD. Since the TSD officer would have to meet the individual (Hunt) before creating a disguise, Wagner obtained a safehouse address and key from the Office of Logistics and arranged for a meeting there the following day between Hunt (under the alias of Mr. Edward) and the TSD officer.

Before talking to Krueger, Wagner stated he cleared his request for TSD assistance with either the EA/ADDP Paul Breitweiser or with the EA/DDP, Sam Halpern. Halpern and Krueger confirm that Wagner did talk to Sam Halpern, advising him generally of the project and its sensitivity, that he planned to call on TSD for assistance and wondered if his request should be cleared through the DDP, Mr. Thomas Karamessines

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Since the DDP was not immediately available, and the project had the approval of the DDCI, Mr. Halpern told Wagner to go ahead with TSD and that he would subsequently advise the DDP, which he did. Krueger later called Halpern to report the requirement levied on TSD by O/DDCI and Halpern reported he had already talked to Wagner and okayed TSD support.

Krueger then got his team together, first calling the Chief of the Authentication Branch [REDACTED] (who had no further part) who selected TSD officers Stephen Greenwood, [REDACTED]. It was 1700 by then and, unable to contact Hunt -- known to TSD as "Edward" -- it was settled that Greenwood would take action the following day.

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23 July 1971

Greenwood went to the office of the DDCI and picked up the keys to the safehouse from Karl Wagner. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Greenwood went to the address where he waited until "Edward" appeared. He "programmed" him for disguise, phoning his description to [REDACTED] who turned the information over to [REDACTED] to prepare alias documentation, under the name of Edward J. Warren (a [REDACTED])


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These  
were not backstopped, being for "flash" identification purposes only.

"Edward" left. [REDACTED] delivered the cards in his absence, not meeting "Edward" (Hunt). Hunt returned and in addition to the documentation was given a brown or dark wig, spectacles, and a speech alteration device.

Greenwood also gave Edward his Agency telephone number. On Saturday morning, 24 July 1971, Greenwood briefed Krueger on support given "Edward."

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COMMENT: From this point on Greenwood gets confused in his dates. Due to the sensitivity of the project, very few records were made or kept and Greenwood found himself some two years later trying to recall exact dates. (He did make some notes in October of 1971) which were pretty accurate. Unfortunately he did not have them when he made out his affidavit. Greenwood's rough notes and chronologies were turned over to Leo J. Dunn on 5 December 1972. Dunn had been detached from the Office of Security to work for Colby in preparing answers and collecting information to reply to Justice department questions. It was for this purpose that he interviewed Greenwood and Gephart, collected such notes and materials as they had and incorporated them into what later became the Colby files. In most instances from here on we have relied on the MR's of

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Karl Wagner (written usually the same day an event occurred), of [REDACTED] MR's where he documents the dates he prepared alias documentation, the original notes of Krueger and Greenwood, MR's of Dick Krueger where they existed, and of Hunt's Grand Jury testimony. Where available we have also used evidence revealed by prosecution lawyers in Hunt's Grand Jury hearing. Based on these sources we feel the following chronology is accurate and squares with facts that are known.

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26 July 1971

Hunt wrote [REDACTED] advising that he had as yet received no definite answer from his principals but hoped to very soon.

30 July 1971

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Note from Hunt to [REDACTED] advising still no decision on her coming back TDY to work for him in the White House.

18 August 1971

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Despite Hunt's correspondence to [REDACTED] his first actual request to the Agency on the subject was a telephone call to Wagner this date, requesting specifically that [REDACTED] be returned TDY from her PCS assignment [REDACTED] and assigned to work for him in the White House. Hunt said that John Ehrlichman had suggested that he call General Cushman. Wagner discussed it with General Cushman and the request for [REDACTED] was denied. Wagner offered to try and find someone else but this was not acceptable to Hunt.

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COMMENT: Although this request was made on 18 August and refused the same day it was not until 23 August 1971 that Wagner wrote a memo for the record on the above incident noting that one request had been denied, but might be reopened with Gen. Cushman. By yellow buckslip DDCI Cushman routed the memo to DCI Helms with a note, "FYI and guidance on how to handle." The DCI on the same day, 23 August 1971, routed it back to the DDCI with note, "If Hunt renews the request, (i.e., for [REDACTED]) please let me know and I'll speak to Ehrlichman at once." This exchange clearly is confined to the secretarial problem since at this point in time Hunt's requests for other aid had not escalated to the point where they raised Agency concern.

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Greenwood probably met Hunt on this date, with [REDACTED] in company.

20 August 1971

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[REDACTED] met with Hunt.

Hunt wrote [REDACTED] saying that his request for her services had been denied by the Agency.

(b)(3) CIAAct

25 August 1971

Greenwood met with Hunt and an associate, with others also joining.

COMMENT: There is some confusion over just what did happen on these dates (18-25 August), and in what sequence. And there was possibly one other meeting, between 20 and 25 August. The accounts of the parties

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based on incomplete records and fuzzed with the passage of time, leave a good deal of uncertainty that will remain unclarified. The broad outline of what transpired remains essentially clear, but if disputes were to arise over just who did what, with what authority, and when, it is doubtful that any disagreements could be resolved on the basis of certain fact. Greenwood, in his affidavit, states his recollection that he met Hunt "about a week later," after the initial 23 July 1971 meeting, which would have been about 31 July. If there was such a meeting it is highly unlikely that it had anything to do with the events treated here.

The earliest documented date during this period is a report on use of a speech alteration device, dated 18 August 1971, filled out (probably) by Greenwood. The information had to be based on at least a debriefing of Hunt and suggests the likely approximate -- and perhaps actual -- date for their meeting.

Greenwood's notes on 5 December 1972, based on his recollection at that time, and his affidavit on 9 May 1973, clearly indicate a meeting prior to the one on 20 August. He received a telephone call from Hunt requesting an adjustment in his disguise spectacles. Hunt also asked to see someone with whom he could discuss his requirements for a recorder, and that he wanted some backstopped business cards. Greenwood evidently reported this to Krueger, who alerted [REDACTED] to accompany Greenwood to the next meeting. Krueger probably also approved the request for non-backstopped cards, as they were at his office when Greenwood stopped there to pick up

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[redacted] on the way to the meeting. They were properly subject to being considered by Krueger without clearance with Wagner as part of the original requirement for false documentation.

At this meeting (which was most likely on or about 18 August, the date of the report on the speech device) Greenwood was asked by Hunt for a second speech alteration device, for a backstopped telephone number and address in New York, and for disguise and documentation for an associate. Krueger states the New York address and backstopped phone request were not raised with him until 26 August 1971. He goes on to say, however, that Greenwood was a good young officer who would staff out such a request as this before raising it and that in his view Greenwood's memos to [redacted] on this issue was an attempt by Greenwood to get all the data needed to enable his superiors to make a decision.

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[redacted] who can recall none of the dates, but who recalls some sequences in the developments, discussed with Hunt his requirements for a recorder, recommending a Uher Stero-recorder as meeting Hunt's stated needs. Hunt also wanted some means whereby he could avoid advertising that he was carrying a recorder, and asked that all this equipment be obtained for him. (TSD bought the recorder on the open market, along with studio lavalier-type microphones, and provided a used portable typewriter case, padded with styro-foam. The case did not meet TSD's standards as a "concealment device," constituting instead something anyone could provide if so inclined).

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Krueger's notes record that [redacted] met with Hunt on 20 August and delivered the recorder, and the TSD safehouse logs show [redacted] signing for a safehouse for that date. The safehouse record does not show if Greenwood was also present -- he may or may not have been. Krueger's notes, recording the delivery by [redacted] state that the business cards also were delivered this date, which would have been by Greenwood if done (although other evidence suggests that this was at an earlier -- probably the 18 August -- meeting).

Krueger's notes show that on 20 August he phoned Wagner to report the requests for the business cards and the recorder. The cards probably had been delivered already, and Krueger was only reporting the request, to which he was probably adding the recorder prior to its delivery. Wagner understood that both requests were outstanding and approved them as consistent with the original authorization.

Krueger's reconstructed notes of December 1972 also state that the 20 August meeting was the occasion of the request for the backstopped telephone and address in New York and for documentation and disguise for an associate. But the 8 May 1973 affidavit by Krueger states that the request for the backstopped telephone and address, and the question of Hunt's associate, came after the 20 August meeting, and before the 25 August meeting.

It remains speculative, perhaps never to be verified, but the following scenario is offered as to what happened:

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18 August. Greenwood and [redacted] met Hunt, Greenwood delivering the business cards that Hunt had requested by telephone, and adjusting his disguise spectacles.

[redacted] got the recorder requirements.

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20 August. Krueger phoned Wagner reporting the request for the business cards (which had been delivered) and for the recorder, both of which Wagner approved. [redacted] met with Hunt, delivering the recorder.

23/24 August. Greenwood met Hunt to deliver the new speech device, at which time Hunt raised the question of his associate being given disguise and documentation, and requested the backstopped address and telephone. Greenwood reported to Krueger, who instructed him to proceed with the preparation of documentation and disguise for the new man, but to accede to no demands while Krueger checked for authorization.

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25 August. Having received what he read as a preliminary approval, and not having heard further from Krueger or being able to contact him at that time, Greenwood met Hunt and provided the materials for Hunt's associate. At the same time, as part of a new request for concealed camera he cleared the request with [redacted] and arranged for the camera to be delivered by [redacted] instructed "Leonard" in its use. "Edward" and "Leonard" talked about going to the airport with "Leonard" stating he had to first stop by the Pentagon.

26 August 1971

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Krueger after the fact called and advised Wagner that disguise and documentation in the name of "George F. Leonard" had been issued to a second man (later identified as G. Gordon Liddy). He also had been

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issued a Tessina camera (which was concealed in a tobacco pouch) and given training in its use. Krueger also reported Hunt as stating that he needed the camera in connection with a "new assignment". Wagner told Krueger he would report the substance of his call promptly to General Cushman and obtain guidance. He also noted in his MR for this date that these actions had been taken without prior notification or approval from the DDCI's office.

Wagner wrote a Memorandum for the Record (MR) of his conversation with Krueger and held it for General Cushman who would not be in the office until the following day.

Krueger, as a result of his discussions with Wagner, jotted down instructions for Greenwood to be passed on to Hunt at the next Hunt/Greenwood meeting. These orders were: (1) There would be a delay in further support until Greenwood's supervisors received further authorization on requests for a) photographic support, b) backstopped documents, c) audio equipment, (although none had been requested to date); (2) Backstopping of any kind must be approved through the Director's Office; (3) The camera loan was a one time affair; (4) Assistance to "Edward" in terms of notional alias documentation, servicing or maintaining his disguise and tape recorder would continue; (5) The documents of "Edward's" associate were to be returned; (6) Greenwood was not to be pressed as he was without authorization, and (7) If further authorization was received further support would follow.

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Greenwood received a telephone call from "Edward" asking to be met at 0630 the following morning at Dulles airport to pick up exposed film. Greenwood notified Krueger of the call and also alerted [REDACTED] to the need for processing the film.

27 August 1971

Greenwood met "Edward" and his associate "Leonard" at Dulles airport. "Edward" returned the camera, stating that it was not suitable for his needs. He gave Greenwood a roll of exposed film and asked that it be developed immediately and that the prints and negatives be delivered to him later that day. The pictures, when developed, seemed routine surveillance scenes, parking lot, office buildings, etc. Greenwood made xerox copies of the pictures and delivered them to Krueger before going to meet "Edward" at the safehouse. Krueger gave Greenwood the set of instructions to go over with Edward. Greenwood proceeded to the safehouse, turned over the negatives and pictures and started to list the conditions for further support. Edward, who appeared to be in a hurry, interrupted Greenwood about half way through to state he thought he had the Agency's full support and that he would straighten out the matter.

COMMENT: Since Edward did stop Greenwood before he had stated the conditions it is likely Edward was not aware aid was to be stopped nor is it clear when he was so advised by Ehrlichman since, as will be seen, he again called for aid 4 days later.

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Wagner attached a buckslip memorandum for General Cushman, dated 27 August 1971, to his M/R of 26 August 1971. The buckslip note read as follows: "Attached is the report on Howard Hunt's latest requests for TSD support. I see two problems: 1) Hunt has brought a stranger into the picture who is now privy to TSD's role in this affair. The White House should have cleared this with us and we must be told who the fellow is. He could embarrass us later. 2) Hunt's use of unique clandestine equipment in domestic activity of an uncertain nature also has potential for trouble. The Agency could suffer if its clandestine gear were discovered to be used in domestic secret operations. I will instruct TSD to clear all of Hunt's requests with this office. Also, I think it would be desirable to obtain Ehrlichman's assurance that Hunt's latest caper is OK. Even then, this does not relieve the Agency from its vulnerability if associated with domestic clandestine operations against Americans." At the opening of business on 27 August 1971, Wagner gave his M/R of 26 August 1971 with its covering buckslip to General Cushman. These led General Cushman to telephone Ehrlichman, which he recorded as follows on the buckslip below Wagner's note "called 11:00 on 27 August 1971. J. E. indicated he would call a halt to this." signed with the initial C.

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Krueger called Wagner to relate further Hunt requests (presumably made on 27 August 1971 to Greenwood) for fully backstopped documentation, including a driver's license and car rental credentials in alias which Krueger turned down. Hunt had also asked for a backstopped New York telephone answering service which Krueger told Wagner were beyond his Division's capability. Wagner verified that these requests were not to be honored and that all future Hunt requests were to be referred to General Cushman's office. Wagner immediately reported to General Cushman his latest conversation with Krueger and was advised of the results of the Cushman/Ehrlichman call. Wagner at once called Krueger and instructed him that CIA was to furnish no additional help to Hunt, that TSD should not accept any more requests from Hunt, and that Hunt should be asked to return the sensitive materials from TSD.

Krueger received a call from General Cushman who had received and read Wagner's memorandum. At this time Cushman advised Krueger that "Edward" was a former employee, E. Howard Hunt, and that he had immediately stopped all relationships with Mr. Hunt.

30 August 1971

The telephone conversation between Wagner and Krueger took place on Friday, 27 August 1971. It was not until the following Monday, 30 August 1971, that Wagner wrote an M/R in which he included his

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instructions that TSD was not to meet any more Hunt requests. General Cushman upon receipt of the M/R on Monday, 30 August 1971, routed it to DCI Helms with the following notation on a buckslip: "I called John Ehrlichman Friday and explained why we could not meet these requests. I indicated Hunt was becoming a pain in the neck. John said he would restrain Hunt." The note was signed with General Cushman's initial "C". Directly below Cushman's note was the word, "Good" signed with Director Helms' initial "RH".

COMMENT: Because these memoranda for the Record by Karl Wagner played such an important role in reconstructing events, they are attached with their covering buckslip as ANNEX I.

COMMENT: As noted earlier, people's recollections of these events and dates were fuzzy and at variance with one another. When the actual date of the Hunt/Liddy trip to and from California became a critical question in the minds of the prosecutors, a thorough search and review of all records was initiated. These included safehouse logs, affidavits, Hunt's Grand Jury testimony, prosecution evidence, Krueger and Greenwood original notes, etc. As a result it was possible to fix the dates of the Hunt/Liddy trip departure as 25 August 1971, and the return as 27 August 1971. In August 1973, Greenwood's and Krueger's affidavits of May 1973 were corrected to reflect these dates.

Also extremely useful and extensively used were Wagner's M/R's and affidavit covering this period because in nearly every instance the M/R was written promptly after

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events occurred, thus giving exact dates that requests were made or actions were taken. They also recount the positive response made in the O/DCI as developments were made known.

For this same sequence of events, i. e., 25-26-27 August, the Krueger/ Greenwood affidavits of May 1973 give the dates of 22 August 1971 for turning over documentation, disguises and camera to Hunt and Liddy, 23 August 1971 for Hunt's call to have Greenwood meet him at Dulles Airport and 24 August 1971 as the day the film was picked up, developed and returned. These dates are incorrect.

31 August 1971

Greenwood received a telephone call at his home from Hunt in which Hunt renewed his request for backstopped credit cards. Greenwood turned down this request.

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End of DDCI and TSD role with  
E. Howard Hunt

In General Cushman's mind his call to John Ehrlichman about Hunt, the latter's agreement to restrain Hunt and Karl Wagner's call to TSD re no further aid removed the Agency from this whole affair. In point of fact it did remove TSD and General Cushman, but unknown to them, Hunt almost simultaneously, was involved with another part of the Agency and this contact continued through 12 November 1971.

It should also be noted that the record does not fully support the view that the Agency finally did cut Hunt off cleanly. Richard Krueger, Deputy Chief of Technical Services Division (now the Office of Technical Service) did react perceptively and positively, raising a question twice about how far things seemed to be going. Krueger first raised the question of supplying Hunt with a recorder and alias business cards with Karl Wagner, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on 20 August 1971. Wagner felt at that point that the request was consistent with his understanding of the original mission and instructed TSD to proceed. When Krueger again questioned Wagner re Hunt's requests on 26 August 1971, and this was after TSD had supplied the camera and documentation for the second man, Wagner acted promptly


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and decisively in a memo to General Cushman which recommended caution and questioned further assistance.

TSD did not tell Hunt he would receive no further support, but that he would not be given the backstopping he requested without further authorization. Nor was Hunt turned down flatly in his request for a secretary; he would not accept a substitute for the one he specifically requested. Hunt did not seem to view the limits placed on his support as the end, as he contacted the case officer, Steven Greenwood, again at the end of August, and later felt free to approach

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 further requests. (These and other Agency contacts by Hunt are covered in Section IV of this report.) Whatever the intent, the result was to achieve a stand down and did end the operational support of General Cushman and TSD. Despite the reservations about Hunt expressed to John Ehrlichman by General Cushman on 27 August 1971, the White House staff apparently took no action to modify their on-going program or to restrain Hunt and the other Plumbers in their pressure on the Agency to produce the Ellsberg profiles.

COMMENT: It should be noted that at this time there was no indication that anything illegal was contemplated or had occurred, so there was no particular reason for the Agency to not attempt to cooperate in a request from the White House until it began to appear that there might be some domestic activity involved.

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It was and had long been customary for the Agency and other government agencies to provide employees on special detail to the White House, and Hunt's secretarial request was viewed in this context. In this instance, however, while the Agency was willing to provide a secretary of its choosing, it would not interfere with an assignment to an overseas post, where removal of an employee might be disruptive.

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## Section III

Chronology of Agency Support to the White House in Preparing  
A Personality Profile on Daniel EllsbergForeword

Central to an understanding of the Agency's continuing support to Hunt and the White House on the Ellsberg profiles after the stand-down ordered by General Cushman is the fact that in this case the Agency's right hand did not know what its left hand was doing and vice versa. The doctors in the Office of Medical Services who were involved in preparing the profiles and meeting with Howard Hunt were never aware of Hunt's contacts with Cushman and TSD, nor were Cushman and TSD aware of the Doctors' contacts. Indeed, with the possible exception of the then Deputy Director for Support, John Coffey, and the Doctors, no one, not even Director Helms, was aware of Hunt's participation in the profiles matter.

Exactly how, when and by whom the decision was made to use the Agency's resources to produce a profile on Daniel Ellsberg is not clear. We do know from the records that on 11 December 1970, Mr. Thomas Huston of the White House Staff called on Dr. Tietjen, the Agency Director of Medical Services, to discuss personality studies

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and production procedures and how similar applications could be applied to domestic problems, particularly as related to dissidents.

Mr. David Young, on Ehrlichman's White House Staff, formerly served as an aide to Dr. Henry Kissinger and in that capacity would be familiar with the Agency's capability to turn out profiles on foreign leaders. It was Mr. Young who made the request for the study.

Finally, in E. Howard Hunt's testimony before the Grand Jury he relates the following account: (In response to Prosecutor Glanzer's question as to whether Hunt had any knowledge of attempts to obtain information about Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatric profile).

HUNT: Well, some months subsequent to that (he is speaking now from a time in mid-September), it occurred to me that the CIA might be helpful in providing such a psychiatric profile.

QUESTION: So what did you do?

ANSWER: How did I arrange that? I asked -- I suggested to David Young -- I said, "after all, we had a whole psychiatric unit set up at the Central Intelligence Agency to provide in effect second-hand profiles of persons of interest to the U.S. Government. This is an activity that has been going on for many years."

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"I happened to know the Chief of the Unit, Dr.

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[REDACTED] I mentioned his name to Mr. Young,  
and Mr. Young I believe, was instrumental in bringing  
[REDACTED] to our offices in Room 16."

So whether the idea for contacting and tasking CIA to produce a  
profile on Ellsberg originated with Huston, Young or Hunt cannot be  
definitively stated, the request was levied and resulted in the following  
chronology of events.

COMMENT: The idea did probably originate  
with Young since it started in mid-July  
and at that time was not Hunt's task. As  
Hunt states in his own testimony, he  
began to associate more and more with  
Krogh, Young and Liddy and became in-  
volved in their activities, he may very  
well have introduced [REDACTED] name to  
the group resulting in [REDACTED] meeting  
at EOB on 12 August 1971.

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Mid-July 1971

Mr. David Young, former assistant to Dr. Henry Kissinger  
on the National Security Council Staff, was appointed in early July  
1971 as assistant to the President's Advisor on Domestic Affairs,  
Mr. John Ehrlichman. About mid-July he telephoned the CIA  
Director of Security, Mr. Howard Osborn to request that a psychiatric  
profile be done on Daniel Ellsberg. Osborn had been designated by

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DCI Helms as Young's point of contact on security matters. Young said he had seen an Agency study done on Castro while he, Young, was working for Dr. Kissinger and he wanted one similar to that done on Ellsberg. Osborn said such a request would require DCI approval since the subject was a U.S. citizen. Osborn was reluctant to forward such a request but Young insisted and said he would have Ehrlichman call Director Helms. At this point Osborn agreed to raise the matter with the DCI.

COMMENT: Director Helms in his testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee on 2 August 1973 stated that he personally called Mr. Young, remonstrated with him and stressed his reluctance to do the study. He said Mr. Young pleaded with him, pointed out it was regarded as of highest priority by Mr. Ehrlichman and Dr. Kissinger and that CIA was the only agency with such a capability. Young also discussed Ellsberg's role in stealing and publishing the Pentagon Papers. He cited the National Security Act of 1947 and the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence methods and sources from unauthorized disclosure (such as those of Ellsberg). In short, Mr. Helms testified that he was persuaded, reluctantly, to agree to have the Agency produce the study.

29 July 1971

Dr. John Tietjen, in a Memorandum for the Record on 29 July 1971 indicates he met with Mr. Osborn who relayed to him Mr.

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Young's request for a psychiatric profile (or personality study) on Mr. Daniel Ellsberg. Osborn advised Tietjen, the CIA Director of Medical Services, that this request had been discussed with Director Helms who had reluctantly agreed to have the study prepared. Dr. Tietjen accepted the requirement to prepare the study but pointed out that information available on which to prepare such a profile was very sparse. (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct Dr. Tietjen passed the requirement to [REDACTED] Chief of the Psychiatric Staff who, in turn discussed it with his Deputy, [REDACTED] and another staff member, Dr. Post. Dr. Post was reluctant to undertake such a study and cited his reservations about the propriety of conducting such an assessment of a U.S. citizen. [REDACTED] indicated he shared these reservations and concerns, but cited approval by the Director and his [REDACTED] understanding that the White House was concerned about the security problems caused by Ellsberg's revelations and hoped, by an understanding of his psychology and motivations, to be able more effectively to deal with this type of threat to national security. (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct Dr. Post was asked by [REDACTED] to prepare an indirect personality assessment on the basis of the open literature available

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which consisted of biographic profiles and stories in national news magazines and newspapers.

5 August 1971

Dr. Post forwarded to Dr. Tietjen the brief summary he had prepared on Ellsberg. Dr. Tietjen routed the paper to [REDACTED] Deputy Chief of Medical Services, with the request that [REDACTED] review it and discuss it with him.

6 August 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

Drs. Tietjen and [REDACTED] reviewed the paper, concluding that certain modifications were needed.

COMMENT: Some time between 5 and 9 August 1971 OMS received some State Department and FBI reports forwarded to them from the Office of Security, which had presumably received them from Young.

(b)(3) CIAAct

9 August 1971

A meeting was held between Drs. Tietjen, [REDACTED] and Post to discuss changes and modifications needed. (Presumably at this time the material from State and FBI files mentioned above had been incorporated in the paper.) The study was redone and the final draft was cleared with DD/S John Coffey and Osborn.

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~~SECRET~~10 August 1971

Dr. Tietjen handcarried to Mr. Osborn an "indirect assessment" of Daniel Ellsberg dated 9 August 1971. Mr. Osborn cleared the paper with Director Helms, attached a transmittal note to David Young which stated, "I know that you appreciate that however this is used, the Agency should not become involved."

11 August 1971

Osborn had the paper, along with the transmittal note, delivered to David Young by a special Security Office courier.

In a telephone conversation between Osborn and Young, the latter requested that Dr. Post come to a meeting the following day in Room 16 of the Executive Office Building. Osborn called Tietjen to relay this request. Post being out of town, Tietjen nominated [REDACTED] to attend.

12 August 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

[REDACTED] met with David Young in Room 16 at the Executive Office Building. [REDACTED] and Young were joined by G. Gordon Liddy, [REDACTED] understood the name to be Linney, but later identified him as Liddy.) Young told Dr. [REDACTED] that the study had the highest priority and had been requested by Mr. Ehrlichman and Dr. Kissinger. He also stated that the President had been informed of the study.

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Young said the profile would be only one facet of a multi-faceted approach and that however the report was finally used, great care would be taken to avoid its being attributed to the Agency. Young inquired about the data [REDACTED] needed to provide a study similar to that done on "Fidel Castro." (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

At this point the group was joined by E. Howard Hunt. [REDACTED] and Hunt had known one another prior to Hunt's retirement when he was an Agency employee. Hunt talked about "trying Ellsberg in public" and about discrediting him. [REDACTED] was asked to define the type of material needed for the study and was told that more was available. Other information offered by Hunt and Liddy included the fact that Ellsberg had been under psychiatric analysis, that his former wife could be interviewed, and was willing to testify. This information also included the name of Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. Fielding of California. The importance of the activity was again stressed. Hunt was designated as the person responsible for getting additional information on Ellsberg sent to [REDACTED]

(b)(3) CIAAct

COMMENT: It would appear at this point that Young had not yet seen the study Osborn had delivered to EOB on 11 August since it was never referred to in this hour long meeting. Osborn also reports, after the 11 August 1971 delivery, that it was "a few days later" that Young called expressing dissatisfaction with

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the initial study. However, on 24 July 1973 when Ehrlichman was testifying before the Watergate Committee the following exchange takes place between Counsel Samuel Dash and John Ehrlichman.

Dash: (Referring to a memorandum) "The memorandum is dated August the 11th, 1971, and it's a memorandum to you from Bud Krogh and David Young. "Subject: Pentagon Papers Project, Status report as of August 11th, 1971." I think the relevant portion is in paragraph two, rather than the progress report of one, and let me just read paragraph two.

(b)(3) CIAAct

"We have received the CIA preliminary study, copy attached at TAB A, which I must say I am very disappointed in and consider very superficial. We will meet tomorrow with the head psychiatrist, [REDACTED] to impress upon him the detail and depth that we expect. We will also make available to him here some of the other information we have received from the FBI on Ellsberg."

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

Why no dissatisfaction over the initial profile was expressed to [REDACTED] at the 12 August 1971 meeting is unexplained. Howard Osborn stated in his affidavit that a few days after Young's receipt of the study, Young called Osborn and expressed dissatisfaction with the paper. Osborn remonstrated about the scarcity of adequate information to which Young replied more would be furnished and sent Osborn what appeared to be material from State Department and FBI files. Osborn forwarded the material to the Office of Medical Services.

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Hunt remained behind with [REDACTED] after the others had left the meeting. He asked [REDACTED] not to mention to anyone at the Agency that he was present and participated in the meeting. When

[REDACTED] arrived back at the Agency he called Hunt to advise that it was not feasible for him to avoid mentioning his presence at the meeting. Hunt regretted that this was necessary stating he had "adequate contact with General Cushman and was on good terms with the Director." [REDACTED] discussed the entire meeting with Drs.

[REDACTED] Tietjen and [REDACTED]

(b)(3) CIAAct

COMMENT: The Washington Star-News of 7 September 1973 revealed that then White House aide Charles Colson taped a telephone conversation held with E. Howard Hunt on 1 July 1971 in which the two talked of "trying Ellsberg in the newspapers" and publicly discrediting him, the same line Hunt was pushing with [REDACTED] at the 12 August meeting. Colson also verified that Hunt was interviewed by Ehrlichman on 7 July, the same day General Cushman said his call came from Ehrlichman advising him that Hunt was now working for the White House and asking CIA to lend him a hand.

[REDACTED] subsequently advised he did not mention Hunt's presence at the conference to Howard Osborn. He may have mentioned it to Mr. Coffey but if so, Coffey did not so advise Director Helms.

Helms said in his August 2, 1973, testimony before the

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Watergate Committee that he had not learned of this fact until May of 1973. It is thus apparent that the fact of Hunt's dual involvement with the Agency, i.e., with Cushman and TSD and with OMS was not known by any one officer in the Agency.

COMMENT: Newspaper accounts, Hunt's Grand Jury testimony, Colson's and Ehrlichman's testimony and the Krogh-Young memo of 11 August 1971 to Ehrlichman make it possible to construct a hypothetical scenario for the Hunt/Liddy Agency contacts and requests. Hunt's initial assignment (as variously reported) was to either interview Col. Lou Conein about Vietnam or Clifford DeMott about the Kennedy Chappaquidick incident, or perhaps both. The undertaking to interview someone is consistent with his initial requests to CIA for disguise, alias documentation and a recorder. His testimony indicates he did use this equipment in early August 1971 for the DeMott interview. Coincident with this, as related by Hunt in his Grand Jury testimony, are the discussions in Room 16 of the EOB between Young, Krogh, Liddy and Hunt about Ellsberg, his psychiatric files, how to get at them, and the use of the CIA psychiatric unit. This led to the request for the CIA profiles, the rejection of the first CIA paper, and the need to develop more information. Krogh and Young at this point wrote the 11 August 1971 memo to Ehrlichman mentioned above in which they said, "In this connection, we would recommend that a covert operation be undertaken to examine all of the medical files still held by Ellsberg's psychoanalyst covering the two-year period in which he was undergoing analysis." The

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memo was initialed in the approval line by Ehrlichman with the initial "E" and a note that said, "if done under your assurance that it is not traceable." With this approval Hunt and Liddy were assigned a new mission which called for a preliminary reconnaissance of the site to be entered. At this point Hunt needed a camera and Liddy needed alias documentation; both were requested by Hunt of CIA and supplied on 25 August. Hunt even told his CIA contact (Greenwood) that he had a new assignment. These requests are also what led Krueger, Wagner and Cushman to call a halt to further support from the Office of the DDCI and TSD.

13 August 1971

[REDACTED] reported the receipt of additional material on Ellsberg which, he thought came from Howard Hunt in the White House but which may well have been the material forwarded through Osborn. According to [REDACTED] it was xeroxed copies of FBI and State Department documents. The additional information on Ellsberg indicated that:

- a) He had revealed "quasi-secret" material while still in the service when he was applying for a Ph. D. fellowship.
- b) He had volunteered for Vietnamese service for the State Department while under the stress of obtaining a divorce from his first wife.

(b)(3) CIAAct

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c) He had sought psychoanalytic treatment between the fall of 1968 and 1970 with a psychoanalyst (reputable) in California.

d) He may have been involved in leaking information about a South Vietnamese in 1970 while he was actually in psychoanalytic treatment. (b)(3) CIAAct

This material was discussed between Tietjen and [REDACTED] and because of their continuing concerns over the ethical and political considerations involved they decided to discuss their problems with the Deputy Director for Support, John Coffey.

20 August 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

Drs. Tietjen and [REDACTED] met with John Coffey to discuss the White House request for the Ellsberg profile and the pressure associated with the request. [REDACTED] stated "the problems associated with developing the study and our continuing reservations were discussed in detail." [REDACTED] felt that Coffey was in agreement with the Doctors. It was agreed that the DDS would not inform the DCI of these developments until [REDACTED] met again with Young and advised him that the additional material was of no real help. It was also agreed that there would be the greatest reluctance to undertake any interview of the former Mrs. Ellsberg.

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~~SECRET~~23 August 1971

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[redacted] called David Young at the White House. Young was advised that the additional material had been received and considered and that [redacted] would be available to discuss the data further. Young stated that Hunt was not immediately available but that he would have Hunt call.

(b)(3) CIAAct

COMMENT: The initiator of this activity, Mr. Young, seems at this point to have turned it over to Hunt, but this is more likely a delaying action since the California trip had been approved and the decision probably had already been taken to burgle Fielding's office in the hope of making more material available. In fact, at this point Hunt might have been meeting with Greenwood and requesting the camera and Liddy's disguise and documentation.

26 August 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct

In his affidavit of 25 May 1973, Mr. Coffey stated that he was advised by Dr. Tietjen [redacted] had seen Mr. Young and Mr. Hunt.

(b)(3) CIAAct

COMMENT: This is not confirmed in the affidavits of either [redacted] or Tietjen. It may be that Tietjen called Coffey to say [redacted] had tried to see them or it may be that Coffey may have taken this from notes in his calendar that recorded a communication on the subject of trying to arrange a meeting and that he interpreted it to mean that the meeting had occurred.

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~~SECRET~~30 September 1971

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[redacted] reported that on this date there was an internal yellow memorandum advising him of a telephone call from David Young at the White House. The message stated that Mr. Hunt suggested a meeting on Wednesday, 27 October at 11:00 a.m.

Osborn's affidavit states that sometime in September he arranged to put [redacted] in direct contact with Mr. Young. He also stated he understood the DDS had been brought into the matter.

(b)(3) CIAAct

COMMENT: Hunt being away, Young called Osborn to get [redacted] telephone number and then called that number and left his message.

12 October 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] received additional material which he believed came from Hunt in the White House. It also contained a note which asked when the paper would be forthcoming. [redacted] and Tietjen decided to again raise the matter with Coffey.

(b)(3) CIAAct

15 October 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct

Drs. Tietjen and [redacted] met with Coffey, advised him of the receipt of the additional material and the note from Hunt asking when the paper could be expected. They said the new material added very little to what they already had. Coffey was also briefed on the call from Young on 30 September. It was agreed in this

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meeting that [REDACTED] should try again to see Young and explain the continuing problems and deficiencies in trying to satisfy the requirement.

COMMENT: Osborn's affidavit reports he received a call from Coffey, but does not give a date. He says he told Coffey of the Director's stipulation that he wanted to approve personally all material forwarded to the White House on this matter. That call may have been made after the meeting of 15 October.

(b)(3) CIAAct

27 October 1971

[REDACTED] met with Young, Hunt and Liddy. They pressed him to produce the study within a week and specified the paper was to bear no signature, no watermark and no subject's name. Interest was expressed in Ellsberg's sexual proclivities and in obtaining information which could be used to defame or manipulate him. Young also made it known that he had talked earlier with the DCI (see foregoing comment on DCI Helm's testimony before Senate Watergate Committee) and Young insinuated to [REDACTED] that the Agency was to provide anything on Young's request. [REDACTED] was told to write the report.

(b)(3) CIAAct

28 October 1971

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[REDACTED] met with DDS Coffey (Dr. Tietjen was on leave). Coffey was briefed on the results of [REDACTED] 27 October meeting with Young, Hunt and Liddy (see above). Coffey had no guidance

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from the DCI on the matter and suggested that [REDACTED] continue working on the paper.

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Mr. Coffey, at a luncheon meeting with Director Helms, briefed Helms on the continuing pressure on [REDACTED] from Mr. Young. Coffey told him that [REDACTED] had been requested by him to go ahead and prepare a second paper subject to review and possible discussion with Mr. Helms.

(b)(3) CIAAct

COMMENT: Coffey's affidavit says "From other records [Ed. note: not cited] it would appear that shortly thereafter [Ed. note: no date] I passed to Dr. Tietjen the DCI's views and his desire that after the paper was completed I should make an appointment for [REDACTED] and me to see him (Mr. Helms).

(b)(3) CIAAct

1 November 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct

[REDACTED] affidavit shows this as the date of a phone call from David Young in the White House requesting the report the following day. Young was told by [REDACTED] that the report was presently in the hands of his supervisors for their evaluation.

3 November 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

Mr. Liddy sent [REDACTED] further information on Ellsberg.

7 November 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct

This date is not mentioned in Tietjen's, [REDACTED] affidavit but it is surmised that it may be the date [REDACTED] turned the paper over to Tietjen. [REDACTED] affidavit states, "In early

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November 1971 I reviewed the final paper prepared by [REDACTED]. It is believed this review would have been done before the paper was turned over to DDS Coffey on 8 November.

8 November 1971

Dr. Tietjen's affidavit sets forth the following: "The earlier paper and the second profile were forwarded to the Deputy Director for Support, together with a note of transmittal, dated 8 November 1971. Our note expressed our concern and the view that the Director should have the opportunity to review the material and offer comment."

In the records there is a document which must be the transmittal note referred to. It is captioned, "Note for: Deputy Director for Support," and is dated 8 November 1971. It reads as follows:

"Jack:

As per our discussions this morning, we feel that the Director should have the opportunity to review the attached material. We have re-thought our concerns and they can be subsumed under one major concern; i. e., entering into matters beyond the Agency's purview. Perhaps the Director would judge this point to be of sufficient importance as to offer comments.

In any event, since there has been a specific request for this material, OMS stands ready to deliver this material

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to Mr. David Young at the Executive Office Building whenever agreeable. Included with the current material, is a copy of the original report sent to Mr. Young. It is for reference purposes only, and I would appreciate its return when convenient."

(b)(3) CIAAct

The note is signed "John" over the typed name and title of Dr. Tietjen. Below the signature and at the left of the paper is typed "attachment".

Paragraph 6 of Mr. Coffey's affidavit of 25 May 1973 gives the following account, "On 8 November 1971 I met again with Drs. Tietjen and [REDACTED] who reported that Mr. Young was pressing for the paper. Evidently they had the study and we discussed getting it to Mr., Helms. By informal memorandum dated 9 November 1971, I forwarded to Mr. Helms both the studies which had been prepared, with comments and suggestions as to handling. From notes I have reconstructed what I believe subsequently happened. The Director telephoned me to say he had read the papers and that the expanded study should be delivered. He was returning the papers to me to accomplish this. He had also decided to send a letter to Mr. Young which he asked that I draft. Mr. Helms changed my draft and sent the revised letter to Mr. Young. Meanwhile I passed the papers returned by Mr. Helms to Dr. Tietjen, asking that [REDACTED] deliver

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the second study to Mr. Young but only after we knew that Mr. Helms' letter to Mr. Young had been signed and was enroute. I do not recall when I received word that the letter had been sent but I believe it was 9 November....."

9 November 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct Coffey forwarded the old and new profiles on Ellsberg to Helms on 9 November 1971, attached to a short memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence. In his memo Coffey reminded the Director of their previous discussion of this case. He reviewed the continued concern of Drs. Tietjen and [REDACTED]. He stated "their worries did not at this time involve professional ethics or credibility. Instead, they are concerned lest the Agency's involvement in the development of this information should become known and particularly that it might come to light during any legal proceeding." He expressed his view that the Doctors would feel more comfortable "if Mr. Young could be reminded that the Agency's connection with this matter must never surface." Coffey suggested either a separate note from the DCI or a phone call to Young from Howard Osborn. Parenthetically he noted that Osborn had not seen the second profile.

COMMENT: Coffey's note does not seem to accurately reflect the OMS concern over the Agency's purview.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

DCI Helms' note to Mr. Young is dated 9 November 1971. It says: "I have seen the two papers which [redacted] prepared for you. We are, of course, glad to be of assistance. I do wish to underline the point that our involvement in this matter should not be revealed in any context, formal or informal. I am sure that you appreciate our concern. Signed Richard Helms."

(b)(3) CIAAct

Dr. Tietjen stated in his affidavit of 9 May 1973, paragraph 5, that, "On 9 November (1971) I was advised by a telephone call from Mr. Coffey that the material had been reviewed and that we should proceed to set up a meeting with the White House recipients to deliver the second profile. I conveyed this message to [redacted] who proceeded to set up the meeting which I believe was held on the 12th of November at the White House. During the interim period we received back from Mr. Coffey's office the two profiles, along with my original transmittal note, Mr. Coffey's original transmittal note to the Director and a xerox copy of a letter from the Director to Mr. David Young, dated 9 November 1971 in regard (to) the matter."

9 November 1971

David Young again called [redacted] about the status of the paper.

[redacted] advised that the materials should be forthcoming from his

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(b)(3) CIAAct

supervisors shortly and that he would inform Young immediately upon receipt.

12 November 1971

[REDACTED] affidavit states that "on 12 November 1971 the material was delivered by me to the White House and to Mr. Liddy, Mr. Young and Mr. Hunt."

17 November 1971

Dr. Tietjen advised DDS Coffey that [REDACTED] had delivered the study to Mr. Young.

(b)(3) CIAAct

18 November 1971

DDS Coffey told Director Helms that [REDACTED] had delivered the study to Mr. Young.

(b)(3) CIAAct

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~~SECRET~~Epilogue to the Ellsberg Profiles

The adverse publicity for the Agency that resulted when the burglary of Dr. Fielding's office surfaced in April 1973 confirm that the anxiety and concern over this matter, by the Doctors and other Agency officials, was well founded.

Here again, as in the Cushman/TSD/Hunt matter, the Doctors and other officials reacted properly and raised the appropriate concerns. The final decision was, and had to be, made by Director Helms. One might speculate as to whether his decision would have been different had he known that E. Howard Hunt was involved in the Ellsberg profiles matter. In any event in his August 1973 testimony before the Erwin Committee when asked about Mr. Young's request for the profiles, Ambassador Helms made the following reply, "Yes, I have genuine regrets about being pressured into that. On Monday morning there are a lot of football games that if played again might have been played differently, and, you know, I'm not proud of that one."

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## Section IV

Additional Agency Support Furnished E. Howard Hunt  
During and Subsequent to the Cushman/TSD Ellsberg  
Profiles Activity (mid-July - 18 November 1971)

Hunt's solicitation of support from General Cushman and TSD was overt and approved. The same could not be said for his role with the Office of Medical Services which he tried to conceal. Coincident with these activities he was also contacting former Agency colleagues for other information.

(b)(3) CIAAct

Early Summer 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] secretary to [redacted] the DCI representative to the Secretary of Defense, has reported that Mr.

(b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] asked her to determine some Agency extension numbers (she thought they were in TSD) and to convey the information to Howard Hunt. [redacted] questioned this action but [redacted] felt it was no

problem as Hunt had merely misplaced the numbers and asked [redacted]

for assistance.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

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COMMENT: It is very possible that the incident occurred during the time Hunt was working with TSD, and one may speculate that he had merely misplaced his contact instructions and sought assistance in re-establishing them.

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~~SECRET~~14-15 October 1971

Hunt called Thomas Karamessines, then the DDP, for lunch on the 15th. Karamessines, who was aware of the initial Hunt contacts with General Cushman and TSD personnel asked Sidney Gottlieb, then Chief of TSD to bring him up to date on the present status of the Hunt/Agency relationship. Mr. Karamessines' calendar shows that he met with Mr. Gottlieb in the DDP office at 1700 hours on 14 October. The calendar further shows that Karamessines was scheduled to meet Hunt for lunch at the City Tavern, downtown Washington, on 15 October 1971.

## COMMENT:

In the initial chronology that was prepared on the Hunt/TSD/Cushman contacts the notes of TSD employee Steven Greenwood indicated that he briefed General Cushman on 14 October 1971 preparatory to the General's lunch with Hunt the following day, i.e., 15 October 1971. There was no knowledge or record of such a luncheon in the office of General Cushman. In an attempt to clarify the record Mr. Colby, present DCI, called General Cushman to see if he might recall having been briefed and having lunched with Hunt on those dates. General Cushman had no such recollection. In September of this year (1973) in a meeting with DC/OTS (formerly TSD), Richard Krueger, over some discrepancies in dates, the subject of the Cushman/Hunt luncheon was raised. At this point Krueger indicated Greenwood's notes were wrong. The briefing was requested by Mr. Gottlieb to bring the then DDP, Mr. Karamessines, up to date on Hunt's Agency contacts. General Cushman had never been involved.

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When queried about the 14 October 1971 briefing and the 15 October 1971 lunch, Karamessines did recall the meeting. It had been initiated at Hunt's request and Karamessines who had been vaguely aware of the TSD support of Hunt asked to be brought up to date in case Hunt requested anything.

The purpose of the meeting actually involved a cover problem with the Mullen Company and neither Hunt nor Karamessines mentioned Hunt's prior contacts with TSD.

(b)(3) CIAAct

October 1971

(b)(3) CIAAct

Hunt asked [redacted] at that time Chief of Europe Division, about the possibility of obtaining some information about a leak of documents in the French Government. [redacted] referred Hunt to John Caswell, Executive Officer of Europe Division, who on [redacted] instructions, provided Hunt with unclassified material concerning a 1954 case of leakage of government documents in France. (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

8 December 1971

Mr. E. Howard Hunt contacted [redacted] of East Asia Division, [redacted] a close personal friend, and asked her to have Agency files checked on a Costa Rican citizen,

[redacted] Hunt asked [redacted] to contact

[redacted] a Western Hemisphere Division employee, with

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whom Hunt had formerly worked, for the traces. Mr. Broe, C/WH and [REDACTED] DC/WH, agreed to service the trace request but put it back in proper channels, i.e., through [REDACTED] the Agency senior liaison officer representative with the National Security Council, located in the White House.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

November-December 1971 or January 1972

[REDACTED] Chief of Station at a sensitive overseas post) recalled in June 1973 that when he was with the National Security Council Staff he received a request from E. Howard Hunt for name traces on Latin Americans. He said he sent these forward with caveats and questions, but cannot recall the final results. His memory, which fixes the time as the last two months of 1971 or January 1972, may be only an embellishment of the 8 December 1971 name trace [REDACTED]. However, the possibility of more than one name trace cannot be dismissed completely.

Other post-retirement contacts by Hunt with Agency personnel

In addition to the foregoing Agency contacts by Hunt there were a number of others which seemingly have no relation to the Ellsberg profiles or the Watergate affair. However, since Watergate and all its ramifications continues to unfold, these contacts are being listed and attached, as Tab A, to this study.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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## Section V

Post-retirement Use of the External Employment Assistance  
Branch by E. Howard Hunt and James McCord

The External Employment Assistance Branch (EEAB) of the Retirement Affairs Division (RAD) was set up by the Agency to help CIA retirees locate employment opportunities outside the Agency. Retired employees file resumes with this office where they are made available to employers who may be seeking particular job skills, or, in some cases, (Hunt is an example) EEAB personnel may contact companies with whom they have established good relationships on the retiree's behalf.

When Mr. McCord retired from the Agency in August of 1970 he set up his own private Security organization known as McCord Associates. He also organized a subsidiary corporation, Institute for Protection and Safety Studies, Inc. Having spent 20 years with the Agency it was natural that McCord would be interested in hiring other retirees having qualifications he was looking for just as it was natural for EEAB to refer properly qualified retirees to McCord Associates and its subsidiary. The bulk of those referred, or in whom McCord was interested, came from the Agency's Office of

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Security. Although none of the retirees so referred are known at this writing to have been involved in the Watergate Affair, they are listed at Tab B. A few were employed, most were not. He also approached two individuals still employed with CIA, who declined his offer.

On at least three more occasions Mr. Hunt took advantage of his knowledge of EEAB practices and personnel to try and locate retirees with specific skills. In at least two of these instances it is known there was no Watergate activity connection, in the case of a third there might have been. In any event all these contacts are being described and attached to this study at Tab C.

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## Section VI

Agency Cooperation

At 0219 hours on 17 June 1972 five men were arrested inside Democratic National Headquarters in the Watergate apartment complex, initially they all used aliases with the police, thus initial name checks requested of the Agency by the Secret Service and others revealed no traces in Agency records. Director Helms testified that he first learned of the burglary and arrest through either press or media coverage. It was not until about 10:00 P.M. 17 June that the Director of Security, Howard Osborn, called the Director and gave him the true names of the five arrested individuals. He also told the DCI that one of the men, James McCord, had in his possession a check from E. Howard Hunt.

17 June 1972 was a Saturday. On the following Monday, 19 June at his daily Executive morning staff meeting, the Director issued his instructions on how the Agency would handle questions on the Watergate burglary and the burglars.

19 June 1972 Excerpt from the DCI morning staff meeting:

"The Director noted the 17 June arrest of James W. McCord and four others who were apprehended at the Democratic National

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Committee headquarters at the Watergate. With the Director of Security present to provide biographic details, the Director specified that responses to any inquiry with respect to McCord or Howard Hunt, who may be implicated, are to be limited to a statement that they are former employees who retired in August and April 1970, respectively. The Director asked that any inquiry from other elements of the government be referred to the Director of Security, who was designated the focal point. Inquiries from the press are to be referred to Mr. Unumb who may say that McCord worked in the Office of Security. The Director noted that we have no responsibility with respect to an investigation except to be responsive to the FBI's request for name traces. It was noted that Howard Hunt may have done some work since retirement in connection with the preparation of supporting material for some awards. The Executive Director was asked to review this topic and report to the Director."

COMMENT: This procedure was followed up to approximately 30 June 1972. A list of FBI requests and Office of Security responses is appended as Tab D and will not be listed here. Treated in this paper will be only those dates and items that varied from the routine.

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Mr. William O. Cregar, an FBI officer accredited to CIA, was called by Office of Security employee, Mr. Leo J. Dunn. Such a call would normally have gone to the regular FBI/CIA liaison man, Mr. Arnold L. Parham. As Parham was unavailable, at the request of the Director of Security, Dunn contacted Mr. Cregar just before noon to get a reading on their investigation of the "McCord incident." Cregar subsequently advised Dunn that Parham had passed on this request to his supervisor, Mr. Arthur Roehrl, but the word had come down from L. Patrick Gray, Acting Director of the FBI, that the FBI was not to disseminate any information about the case in oral or written form.

**COMMENT:**

We now know from testimonies and transcripts of White House tape recordings that this attitude on the part of Gray was based on several factors, involvement of former CIA personnel, his deputies advice to him that they thought CIA was involved, and Charles Colson's attempts to divert FBI suspicions away from the White House and onto the CIA.

22 June 1972

L. Patrick Gray, Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation called DCI Helms. He said, "I told him of our thinking that we may be poking into a CIA operation and asked if he could confirm or deny this. He said he had been meeting every day with

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his men, that they knew the people, that they could not figure it out but that there was no CIA involvement."

23 June 1972 Summary of General Walters memorandum of 28 June 1972 (#1)

Helms and Walters met at White House with Ehrlichman and Haldeman. Haldeman said FBI investigation leading to "a lot of important people." He asked what connection CIA had. Helms said none.

Haldeman is quoted in the memorandum as saying it was "the President's wish" that Walters call on FBI Acting Director Gray and suggest that the arrest of five suspects was sufficient and that it was not advantageous to push the inquiry, "especially in Mexico, etc."

Helms said he had talked to Gray the previous day and told him (1) the Agency was not behind the matter, (2) none of the suspects was working for the Agency, and (3) none had worked for the Agency in the past two years. He told Gray none of the FBI's investigations was touching any covert projects of the Agency.

Haldeman stated Walters could tell Gray he had talked to the White House and suggest the investigation not be pushed further. Gray would be receptive, as he was seeking guidance.

Helms repeated that the Agency was unconnected with the matter. Walters then agreed to talk with Gray "as directed." Ehrlichman then implied Walters should do this soon and Walters said he would try to do so today, i.e., 23 June 1972.

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COMMENT: On 18 May 1973, General Walters wrote a covering note for the series of memoranda covering his meetings with John Dean and L. Patrick Gray. His note makes quite clear that the memoranda were never intended to be a full or verbatim account of the meetings they covered but were notes to refresh his memory. The covering note and complete memoranda (not excerpts) are attached to this study as Tab F.

18 May 1973 memo

When Walters showed the 28 June 1972 memo to Helms, the DCI said that specific reference was not made to the President, it being only implicit. Walters agreed.

23 June 1972 Summary of General Walters memorandum of  
28 June 1972 (#2)

Walters met with Gray at the FBI. He said he had come after talking to the "White House," without mentioning names. Stating his (Walters) familiarity with the Gray-Helms discussion the previous day, he said that while the Watergate investigations had not touched any Agency projects its continuation might. They noted the working agreement between CIA and FBI on such matters. Gray said his problem was how to "low key" the matter. There was a matter of a check of \$89,000 on a Mexican bank, and asked if the name Dahlberg meant anything. Walters did not know the name. Gray

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noted the awkwardness of the issue arising in election year. Walters said if investigations were pushed "south of the border" it could trespass on CIA covert projects. In view of the arrests Walters said it would be better to taper off the matter.

Gray said he would have to talk to John Dean.

(At this point in the working draft there was a note indicating the desirability of incorporating verbatim the transcripts of the 23 June 1973 Nixon-Haldeman conversations. The material follows here.)

to  
This message is to make available to you material from transcripts of conversations between President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman occurring on 23 June 1973. The transcripts, released by the President late on 5 August, were published on 6 August in the Washington Post, from which these excerpts were taken. The transcripts, reportedly, are being turned over to the House Judiciary Committee, and the tapes are being turned over to Judge Sirica. The excerpts in this message are those portions of the conversations that relate to Ambassador Helms, General Walters and CIA. We believe the material is self explanatory, except for gaps in the conversations, and we have made no interpretations.

H. Now, on the investigation, you know the Democratic break-in thing, we're back in the problem area because the FBI is not under control, because Gray doesn't exactly know how to control it and they have--their investigation is now leading into some productive areas--because they've been able to trace the money--not through the money itself-but through the bank sources--the banker. And, and it goes in some directions we don't want it to go. Ah, also there have been some things--like an informant came in off the street to the FBI in Miami who was a photographer or has a friend who is a

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photographer who developed some films through this guy Barker and the films had pictures of Democratic National Committee letterhead documents and things. So it's things like that that are filtering in. Mitchell came up with yesterday, and John Dean analyzed very carefully last night and concludes, concurs now with Mitchell's recommendation that the only way to solve this, and we're set up beautifully to do it, ah, in that and that--the only network that paid any attention to it last night was NBC--they did a massive story on the Cuban thing.

P. That's right.

H. That the way to handle this now is for us to have Walters call Pat Gray and just say, "Stay to hell out of this--this is ah, business here we don't want you to go any further on it." That's not an unusual development, and ah, that would take care of it.

P. What about Pat Gray--you mean Pat Gray doesn't want to?

H. Pat does want to. He doesn't know how to, and he doesn't have, he doesn't have any basis for doing it. Given this, he will then have the basis. He'll call Mark Felt in, and the two of them--and Mark Felt wants to cooperate because he's ambitious--

P. Yeah.

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H. He'll call him in and say, "We've got the signal from across the river to put the hold on this." And that will fit rather well because the FBI agents who are working the case, at this point, feel that's what it is.

P. This is CIA? They've traced the money? Who'd they trace it to?

H. Well they've traced it to a name, but they haven't gotten to the guy yet.

P. Would it be somebody here?

H. Ken Dahlberg.

P. Who the hell is Ken Dahlberg?

H. He gave \$25,000 in Minnesota and, ah, the check went directly to this guy Barker.

P. It isn't from the committee though, from Stans?

H. Yeah. It is. It's directly traceable and there's some more through some Texas people that went to the Mexican bank which can also be traced to the Mexican bank--they'll get their names today.

H. --And (pause)

P. Well, I mean, there's no way--I'm just thinking if they don't cooperate, what do they say? That they were approached by the Cubans. That's what Dahlberg has to say, the Texans too, that they--

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H. Well, if they will. But then we're relying on more and more people all the time. That's the problem and they'll stop if we could take this other route.

P. All right.

H. And you seem to think the thing to do is get them to stop?

P. Right, fine.

H. They say the only way to do that is from White House instructions. And it's got to be to Helms and to--ah, what's his name.. ....? Walters.

P. Walters.

H. And the proposal would be that Ehrlichman and I call them in, and say, ah--

P. All right, fine. How do you call him in--I mean you just-- well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things.

H. That's what Ehrlichman says.

P. Of course, this Hunt, that will uncover a lot of things. You open that scab there's a hell of a lot of things and we just feel that it would be very detrimental to have this thing go any further. This involves these Cubans, Hunt, and a lot of hanky-panky that we have nothing to do with ourselves. Well what the hell, did Mitchell know about this?

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H. I think so. I don't think he knew the details, but I think he knew.

P. He didn't know how it was going to be handled though--with Dahlberg and the Texans and so forth? Well who was the asshole that did? Is it Liddy? Is that the fellow? He must be a little nuts!

H. He is.

P. I mean he just isn't well screwed on is he? Is that the problem?

H. No, but he was under pressure, apparently, to get more information, and as he got more pressure, he pushed the people harder to move harder--

P. Pressure from Mitchell?

H. Apparently.

P. Oh, Mitchell. Mitchell was at the point (unintelligible).

H. Yeah.

P. All right, fine, I understand it all. We won't second-guess Mitchell and the rest. Thank God it wasn't Colson.

H. The FBI interviewed Colson yesterday. They determined that would be a good thing to do. To have him take an interrogation, which he did, and that--the FBI guys working the case concluded that there were one or two possibilities--one, that this was a White House--they don't think that there is anything at the election committee--

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they think it was either a White House operation and they had some obscure reasons for it--nonpolitical, or it was a--Cuban and the CIA. And after their interrogation of Colson yesterday, they concluded it was not the White House, but are now convinced it is a CIA thing, so the CIA turnoff would--

P. Well, not sure of their analysis, I'm not going to get that involved. I'm (unintelligible).

H. No, sir, we don't want you to.

P. You call them in.

H. Good deal.

P. Play it tough. That's the way they play it and that's the way we are going to play it.

H. O.K.

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P. When you get in--when you get in (unintelligible people, say, "Look the problem is that this will open the whole, the whole Bay of Pigs thing, and the President just feels that ah, without going into the details--don't don't lie to them to the extent to say there is no involvement, but just say this is a comedy of errors, without getting into it, the President believes that it is going to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing up again. And, ah, because these

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people are plugging for (unintelligible) and that they should call the FBI in and (unintelligible) don't go any further into this case period! (inaudible) our cause--

H. Get more done for our cause by the opposition than by us.

P. Well, can you get it done?

H. I think so.

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1:04 to 1:13 p.m.

P. O.K., just postpone (scratching noises) (unintelligible)

Just say (unintelligible) very bad to have this fellow Hunt, ah, he knows too damned much, if he was involved--you happen to know that? If it gets out that this is all involved, the Cuba thing it would be a fiasco. It would make the CIA look bad, it's going to make Hunt look bad, and it is likely to blow the whole Bay of Pigs thing which we think would be very unfortunate--both for CIA, and for the country, at this time, and for American foreign policy. Just tell him to lay off. Don't you?

H. Yep. That's the basis to do it on. Just leave it at that.

P. I don't know if he'll get any ideas for doing it because our concern political (unintelligible), Helms is not one to (unintelligible)-- I would just say, lookit, because of the Hunt involvement, whole cover basically this

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H. Yep. Good move.

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2:20 to 2:45 p.m.

H. No problem.

P. (Unintelligible)

H. Well, it was kind of interest. Walters made the point and I didn't mention Hunt, I just said that the thing was leading into directions that were going to create potential problems because they were exploring leads that led back into areas that would be harmful to the CIA and harmful to the government (unintelligible) didn't have anything to do (unintelligible).

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H. (unintelligible) I think Helms did to (unintelligible) said, I've had no-

P. God (unintelligible).

H. Gray called and said, yesterday, and said that he thought--

P. Who did? Gray?

H. Gray called Helms and said I think we've run right into the middle of a CIA covert operation.

P. Gray said that?

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H. Yeah. And (unintelligible) said nothing we've done at this point and ah (unintelligible) says well it sure looks to me like it is (unintelligible) and ah, that was the end of that conversation (unintelligible) the problem is it tracks back to the Bay of Pigs and it tracks back to some other the leads run out to people who had no involvement in this, except by contracts and connection, but it gets to areas that are liable to be raised? The whole problem (unintelligible) Hunt. So at that point he kind of got the picture. He said, he said we'll be very happy to be helpful (unintelligible) handle anything you want. I would like to know the reason for being helpful, and I made it clear to him he wasn't going to get explicit (unintelligible) generality, and he said fine. and Walters (unintelligible). Walters is going to make a call to Gray. That's the way we put it and that's the way it was left.

P. How does that work though, how they've got to (unintelligible) somebody from the Miami bank.

H. (unintelligible). The point John makes--the Bureau is going on this because they don't know what they are uncovering (unintelligible) continue to pursue it. They don't need to because they already have their case as far as the charges against these men (unintelligible) and ah, as they pursue (unintelligible) exactly, but we didn't in any way say we (unintelligible). One thing Helms did raise. He said,

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Gray--he asked Gray why they thought they had run into a CIA thing and Gray said because of the characters involved and the amount of money involved, a lot of dough. (unintelligible) and ah, (unintelligible).

P. (Unintelligible).

H. Well, I think they will.

P. If it runs (unintelligible) what the hell who knows (unintelligible) contributed CIA.

H. Ya, it's money CIA gets money (unintelligible) I mean their money moves in a lot of different ways, too.

H. (Unintelligible).

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H. The Democratic nominee, we're going to have to brief him.

P. Yes sir. Brief him (unintelligible). We don't (unintelligible).

H. Oh no. Tell him what we want him to know. I don't think you ought to brief him.

P. Me? Oh, hell no!

H. (unintelligible) you would have been if Johnson called you in--

P. Johnson was out of office.

H. That's the point--he was

P. Eisenhower, Eisenhower did not brief Kennedy.



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H. And wouldn't be proper anyway (unintelligible) because you're too (unintelligible).

P. (unintelligible) same thing that Eisenhower did. Course Eisenhower (unintelligible).

Phone rings

P. Ya, Ah, I'll call him tomorrow.

H. (Unintelligible) sure, that you want to

P. No. I just simply think that we provide for (unintelligible) from the appropriate authorities (unintelligible) of course not, and I don't think we ought to let Kissinger brief--I'd just have Helms (unintelligible) (unidentifiable)

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26 June 1972 Summary of General Walters Memorandum of  
28 June

Dean phoned Walters saying he wished to discuss the matter discussed with Haldeman and Ehrlichman on 23 June. Walters checked with Ehrlichman who said he could talk freely with Dean.

Walters met Dean at his office. Dean reviewed the investigation, one theory being that CIA was involved. Walters said he was sure the Agency was not involved. Dean asked if he was sure, and said he believed that Barker had been involved in a break-in of the Chilean Embassy.

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Dean said the suspects were "wobbling," to which Walters replied they could not implicate the Agency. Dean asked if the Agency could arrange bail for the suspects and for their salaries.

COMMENT: In his affidavit of 12 May 1973 General Walters corrected his recollection of the meeting in which Dean raised the question of whether the Agency could arrange bail for the suspects and for their salaries. This subject was raised in his second meeting with Dean, that of 27 June 1973 and not during the 26 June 1973 first meeting.

Walters pointed out the limitations of his authority. He said the Agency should remain apolitical, and that if it did not, it would leak out with stronger repercussions.

Excerpts from General Walters memorandum of 18 May 1973

Walters states that he told Dean on 26 June that if he did as Dean asked "Those who were not touched by the matter would be so."

27 June 1972 Summary of General Walters memorandum of 29 June 1972 (#1)

Walters met Dean in EOB. He reported a conversation with Helms to the effect if CIA did as Dean wished he would have to clear with the CIA Oversight Committees in both the House and Senate.

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Walters emphasized that following Dean's proposed course would enlarge the problem.

27 June 1972

L. Patrick Gray telephone Director Helms. In his testimony Gray described the conversation as follows: "I asked him to tell me specifically if the CIA had any interest in Mr. Ogarrio that would prevent us from interviewing him.....Director Helms told me that he would have to check to determine whether the CIA had any interest in Mr. Ogarrio and would call me later. . . . Director Helms called me back later that afternoon, told me that CIA had no interest in Ogarrio."

28 June 1972 Excerpts from General Walters memorandum of 29 June 1972(#2)

Walters met Dean at EOB. Dean said the DCI's meeting with Gray was cancelled and Ehrlichman had suggested Gray deal with Walters instead. Dean said the problem was how to stop the investigation (FBI) beyond the five suspects.

Leads led to a Mexican named Guena and to Dahlberg, the latter refusing to answer any questions.

Walters said as DDCI he had no independent authority and the idea that he could act independently was a delusion. In response to Dean's request for suggestions, Walters observed that the affair

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already had a strong Cuban flavor. Given Cuban proclivities for conspiratorial activity it might be plausible to attribute as a motive their interest in knowing what both parties felt towards Castro. Dean said this might be the best tack, but it might cost a half million dollars.

Agreeing that CIA involvement was unacceptable, Dean said Gray's cancellation of his appointment with Helms might be reversed the next few hours.

COMMENT:

There have been inconsistencies in the recollections of Patrick Gray, John Dean, and General Walters as to their conversations during this period. The exchanges have been subjected to various interpretations, including one to the effect that the White House staff was seriously concerned that sensitive CIA operations might be compromised. Another interpretation, and not necessarily exclusive of others, is that first an effort was made to have the Agency suppress the FBI's investigation in Mexico, and then to involve the Agency in support of the "Watergate Five"; if this is correct view, the record is clear that the attempt did not succeed.

There has been considerable dramatic reporting of the differing recollections of the parties engaged in the conversations during this period. We do not intend to make a detailed analysis of this, but there are certain aspects of the relationships of the parties that should be kept in mind, both at the time that the talks were under way and

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in retrospect, in the light of what did not happen. General Walters clearly went to see Patrick Gray under instructions from Haldeman. Patrick Gray says he does not recall General Walters making this point, in any form. Yet, Gray could not have missed this completely, as at the very moment that Helms and Walters were meeting with Haldeman/Ehrlichman on 23 June 1971, Dean in the White House as Counsel to the President was phoning Gray (according to Gray's own testimony) to advise him that Walters would be calling on him as in fact he did later that day.

And during the exchanges with Gray and Dean, that followed, General Walters was in a most unenviable position. He was new to his job as DDCI, and there was a great deal of detailed knowledge that he did not then have, about how the Agency functioned. He did know that Helms had stated unequivocally that CIA was not involved in Watergate and had nothing to fear from the proposed FBI investigation in Mexico. He also felt that his independent authority was limited, as he stated repeatedly to Dean. Yet he was under pressure from high levels in the government (the White House) to take action that he not only opposed but that he kept saying he had no authority to take. As the pressures continued unabated, he had to threaten resignation to be understood by those with whom he talked.

Viewed in this context, some of the rhetorical questions raised in the press and elsewhere have reasonable answers. And, as Ambassador Helms said, when new questions were being raised again in November 1973, the entire matter should be viewed in terms

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of the record. The fact is that CIA did not yield to the pressures generated from other places to either suppress the proposed investigation in Mexico or to participate in any aspect of attempts to suppress full investigation or prosecution of the guilty parties.

27-28 June 1972

Mr. Arnold L. Parham, the FBI liaison man with the Agency, contacted Office of Security employee, Leo J. Dunn. Parham expressed an interest in interviewing Mr. Karl Wagner, Executive Assistant to the DDCI. This request was discussed by Dunn and the Director of Security. The Director of Security then discussed the request with the Director of Central Intelligence and with Wagner. The request for the interview was withdrawn by Parham several days later. A request was also received at this same time from Parham to interview Agency employee John F. Caswell, and Mr. Parham did conduct that interview.

COMMENT: Dunn originally thought this date was 30 June now believes the actual request for these interviews may have been made on 27 or 28 June. This appears to be so since the DCI wrote a memo, dated 28 June 1972, to the DDCI in which he said, among other things, "Acting Director Gray of the FBI phoned me this morning to cancel our meeting scheduled for 2:30 this afternoon. He indicated that he would not be able to get together until next week. I informed him that I would be away but that

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you would be available with Shackley and [REDACTED] for any such meeting. I did, however, use the opportunity of this call to make two points to Acting Director Gray: (1) that I would appreciate his calling off interviews with Karl Wagner and John Caswell (this he agreed to do); and (2) that Kenneth Harry Dahlberg was no agent of CIA and that we had no ties to him." Given the lack of any other reported source from which the Director could have learned of the FBI desire to interview Wagner and Caswell, the date must be 27-28 June.

Mr. Helms' memorandum went on to state in the closing sentence, "In addition, we still adhere to the request that they (FBI) confine themselves to the personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion and that they desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may well, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

This particular memorandum became an issue on 29 October 1973 when former Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that he had recently come into possession of a memorandum written by a "major witness" that was "at odds" with testimony by that witness and others involved in the Watergate scandal.

The truth of the matter is that this particular memorandum had been in the hands of the Special Prosecutor's staff (as well as in the hands of the Senate Watergate Committee and all four CIA Congressional Oversight Committees) for some four months. It specifically

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had been drawn to the attention of the Special Prosecutor's staff by Acting General Counsel John Warner on 7 August 1973 and had been referred to by DCI Colby in his confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July 1973.

The Special Prosecutor's staff is continuing to press on this issue as are Senator Symington and Representative Nedzi. A series of communications on this matter have taken place between members of the Congress, the Agency, the Special Prosecutor's office, and Ambassador Helms. A copy of the original memorandum and Ambassador Helms' explanation of why it was written are attached to this study as Tab E.

Ambassador Helms written explanation was not accepted as satisfactory by the Special Prosecutor and he asked that Ambassador Helms return to the U.S. on 26 November 1973 for another appearance before the Grand Jury.

On this incident, paragraphs 15 and 16 of Karl Wagner's affidavit of 18 May 1973, as follows, are pertinent:

"15. With the closing off of Agency contacts with Mr. Hunt [Comment: he is referring here to the Cushman-Ehrlichman exchange of 27 August 1971] I discarded my handwritten notes covering my talks with Mr. Hunt and Mr. Krueger. I filed my memorandum to General Cushman, however. In June 1972, when Mr. Howard Hunt's name turned up in connection with the Watergate affair, I retrieved these memoranda and

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went to see Director Helms to remind him of the contacts with Mr. Hunt a year earlier. I left these memoranda with Mr. Helms.

"16. Shortly thereafter the CIA Director of Security, Mr. Howard Osborn, informed me that a representative of the FBI wanted to talk to me because my name had been found in a telephone list in Mr. Howard Hunt's office. I informed Director Helms of this fact and he said that he would take up the matter with the Department of Justice. He said that if an FBI officer contacted me directly, I should say that since my contacts with Mr. Hunt had been in an official capacity, all inquiries should be referred to Director Helms. I heard nothing more from the FBI."

In his testimony on 8 March 1974, Ambassador Helms made the following statement:

Because for the first time in my memory there were definite leaks out of the Alexandria office of the FBI after the Watergate break-in, and it struck me that there was no need to get people from the Agency who were on active duty involved with the agents at the field office. So I wanted to make it clear that if anyone wanted to talk to either of these gentlemen then it should be somebody from Mr. Gray's office to talk to them. In other words, I wanted it at a level where it wasn't going to leak.  
(pg. 107)

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Additional information bearing on this point is the fact that the FBI did recover Hunt's notebook from his White House safe and Hunt's own testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee that the notebook contained the names and phone numbers of his contacts and former colleagues in CIA. (This incident served to alert the Office of Security to the fact that Wagner was somehow involved in something concerning Hunt.)

5 July 1972

A memorandum of DDCI Walters records a telephone call from Acting Director of the FBI, L. Patrick Gray. Gray advised Walters that unless he received something in writing from him to the effect that the FBI investigations were endangering national security the FBI would have to go ahead with their investigation of Dahlberg and Daguerre (Ogarrio). Gray had talked to John Dean. Walters told Gray he would have him an answer by 1000 hours on 6 July.

COMMENT: Up to this point Gray had only oral assurances that CIA had no interest in the two men. It was proper for him to ask for something in writing if he was to stop the investigation. It is clear from the next entry that he already had the message and knew what the answer would be, having already told Dean (according to his own statements to Walters), that he was going ahead with the investigation.

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6 July 1972 The following is a summary from the DDCI's memorandum of 6 July 1972

Walters met with Gray at 1005 on 6 July. Walters turned over to Gray a memorandum covering the entire relationship between the Watergate suspects and the Agency, including information on Dahlberg and Ogarrio, of which he was then aware. Walters said he could not tell Gray to cease future investigations on the grounds of compromise of national security and even less could he write anything to that effect. Gray said he understood, and that he had told Haldeman and Ehrlichman the investigation could not be suppressed. He reported leaks within the FBI.

Walters then gave Gray a detailed account of the 23 June 1972 meeting at the White House between Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Helms and Walters and what Haldeman directed Walters to tell Gray. Gray thanked Walters and repeated that the FBI investigation could not be suppressed. He had so advised Kleindienst, Ehrlichman and Haldeman.

7 July 1972

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Parham inquired of Dunn about the telephone number [REDACTED] and the name [REDACTED] (sic). Dunn said he would check it out. It was determined that the number in question was that of [REDACTED] Technical Services Division. Parham called again at 1555 hours, expressing further interest, and saying he would have to check through

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his own channels if a reply were not soon forthcoming. The matter was brought to the attention of Karl Wagner, and then coordinated with General Vernon A. Walters and Mr. William E. Colby. Instructions were received in the Office of Security to tell Parham, if necessary, that senior officials from the Agency were attempting to contact Mr. Gray. (Gray was on a field trip and was not expected to return until 12 July 1972.) (b)(3) CIAAct

COMMENT: It is fairly certain [redacted] name also came from Hunt's notebook. It is known from [redacted] affidavit that he gave Hunt his phone number.

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From this point forward everything having to do with the Cushman/Wagner/TSD dealings with Hunt were handled from the 7th floor.

12 July 1972 Summary of M/R of DDCI Walters dated 13 July 1972

Walters met Gray in Gray's office at 1415 on 12 July. Walters said one additional item concerning Howard Hunt had been discovered since their meeting of 6 July. He gave Gray a memorandum concerning the assistance given to Hunt by the Agency which terminated in August 1971 when Hunt's demands escalated to an inappropriate level. The assistance was given at White House request with the Agency's understanding that it was for the purpose of tracking down security leaks in the government.

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Gray thanked Walters for the memo. He expressed his view that the Watergate affair would lead quite high politically. He told Walters of a call he had received from the President. He told the President that he had talked to Walters and that both Walters and Gray felt the President should get rid of the people involved in the cover-up, no matter how high. Gray said he had also told this to Dean. In response to Gray's question as to whether the President had spoken to Walters, Walters said he had on another matter but had not raised this issue.

Both men agreed that they would resign if necessary to maintain the integrity of their respective agencies.

COMMENT: Later, in a different context, when testifying before the Senate Select Committee, General Walters stated that he had not spoken to the President since he was sworn in as DDCI.

28 July 1972

DDCI Walters' M/R advises that he called on Acting Director of the FBI at 1100 hours this date. His visit was to clarify information previously given to the FBI re [REDACTED] Walters identified [REDACTED] and said he had been in contact with Hunt in August 1971. [REDACTED] had supplied Hunt with a Uher recorder pursuant to Hunt's request. The recorder was a commercial type, not a CIA issue or clandestine device.

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Walters also told Gray that CIA had issued alias documents and disguises to Hunt and an associate. Further Hunt was issued a clandestine camera, which he returned. One roll of film was developed for him of which the Agency retained copies. Gray was again advised that the Agency had stopped its assistance to Hunt in August 1971 when his demands had escalated. CIA also intended to terminate the [REDACTED] number which [REDACTED] had given Hunt in August 1971.

Gray thanked Walters for the above information. He said he was still under a lot of pressure but had not given in to it. Gray said the whole affair was largely a money matter, that "some heavy Texas Money had given Barker checks to convert into cash. Over-zealousness as to money and judgment was clearly visible."

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7 August 1972

In response to a request from an attorney in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice re Agency's views on granting of immunity to [REDACTED] they were advised on 8 August 1972 that, despite his past Agency connections the Agency had no objections and would be glad to furnish traces and background information.

5 October 1972

Department of Justice asked on the case of the Watergate Seven whether the Agency had subjected them or their premises to any form

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of electronic surveillance. The Agency gave a negative reply to this query on 17 October 1972.

11 October 1972

Deputy General Counsel John Warner met with Principal Assistant United States Attorney, Earl Silbert, and Assistant United States Attorneys Seymour Glanzer and Donald E. Campbell at Silbert's request. The U.S. Attorneys advised that they thought it highly likely CIA would be injected into the Watergate affair by the defendants. Silbert raised the question of the Agency providing a witness for rebuttal purposes. Warner indicated he would get word of their desires to the DCI but that the Director might wish to talk to Mr. Kleindienst personally. Warner would let them know.

The Attorneys raised a series of questions concerning Howard Hunt, the Cubans and James McCord. These included questions on documentation, the recorder, the camera, contacts with past and present Agency employees, the Mullen Company, etc.

18 October 1972

The DCI wrote a memorandum to the Attorney General on the Watergate incident. The memorandum was undated and unsigned. The original was handcarried to the Acting Director of the FBI on 18 October 1972 by the DCI.

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The DCI's memo detailed the meeting between Deputy General Counsel Warner (not so identified in the memo) and U.S. Attorneys Silbert, Glanzer and Campbell and the fact that they had asked a series of questions concerning the principals in the Watergate indictment. The memorandum assured the Attorney General of complete CIA cooperation, but stressed the necessity of careful handling of its material. As he later stated, there was no CIA involvement whatsoever in the incident at the Watergate.

Copies of all memoranda previously given to the FBI on the individuals mentioned in the indictment were attached to the Helms' memorandum, as were answers to the questions raised by the U.S. Attorneys. In the memorandum the DCI again stressed the sensitivity of some of the material, asked that it be restricted to the smallest possible number and requested that CIA be consulted with respect to any use the Department of Justice may believe it essential to make of the documentation supplied.

19 October 1972

In an unsigned Memorandum for the Record the DCI set forth the details of his 18 October 1972 meeting with Acting FBI Director Gray.

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Helms informed Gray of the approaches made by the U.S. Attorneys office in the District of Columbia and of his proposed course of action. He showed Gray all the material he proposed to pass to the Attorney General and Gray read it all. Gray said he had no problems with it. Helms said he hoped to restrict to the Attorney General himself the material passed to Gray alone, i. e., material previously furnished Gray as well as answers to U.S. Attorneys questions. Gray had no objection to this proposed course of action.

The material previously provided to Gray by DDCI Walters had been seen only by Gray and his assistant Mark Felt. Some of this material, including FBI reports of interviews, Gray thought might have been passed to Justice as part of normal practice.

In response to Helms' question as to information the Attorney General had on the Watergate case Gray replied that he thought the Attorney General was not well informed on the case, and further, did not want to be. Gray said he had had two or three long conversations on the case with the Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen.

COMMENT: It is not clear why the DCI did not sign the memoranda of the 18th and 19th of October, or why he did not date the first one. He apparently wanted Gray to be aware of the Justice Department involvement. It appears he also wanted to ascertain the extent of FBI knowledge on material supplied by the Agency and to emphasize its sensitivity.

24 October 1972

DCI Helms and General Counsel Houston met with Attorney General Kleindienst to discuss CIA's responses to inquiries from

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the U.S. Attorney's office for information concerning the Agency's relationships with people involved in the Watergate case. The DCI said the Agency had no involvement in the case, CIA would stand up to any such charge and supply witnesses to prove it, if necessary. Kleindienst volunteered that he did not believe that sensitive information should be given to the U.S. Attorney's office until there was a clear need for it. He ran through the answers provided by the Agency to the questions raised by Mr. Silbert, but did not review the rest of the material. Kleindienst called in Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen who also said that information that was sensitive should not go forward until there was a clear need for it at the time of the trial. Petersen and Houston went over the Director's memo and all the attachments in detail. Petersen had only a couple of questions which Houston answered.

Petersen said he would call Silbert and tell him he had the information Silbert had requested, and that he had gone through it, but that it would not be forwarded unless and until there was a clear need for it at the time of trial. Petersen felt that whoever handled the trial could familiarize himself with the materials in a couple of hours. He also told Mr. Houston he would keep him posted on any developments.

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~~SECRET~~8 November 1972

General Counsel Houston in a note to DCI Helms advised that he had talked to Henry Petersen in connection with Patrick Gray's request.

COMMENT: It is assumed that L. Patrick Gray's request was for permission from the Agency to allow Gray to show Silbert information furnished to Gray and the FBI by CIA.

Petersen at first agreed he could ask Mr. Silbert to postpone his request for access to the information on the Agency's relationships with the Watergate people, or he could invite Silbert to read the information in his, Petersen's, office, or he could arrange for Warner to go talk to Silbert alone without any papers to try to satisfy Silbert as to what the situation would be in the event Hunt tried to involve the Agency at the time of the trial. Petersen explained that Silbert has every right to know what he may be faced with at the time of trial and not be caught by surprise.

9 November 1972

Acting General Counsel John Warner advised Petersen that the Director would very much like Petersen to request Silbert to withdraw his request to the FBI for interview of Agency people regarding the Watergate case.

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The interviewing was being done by the Alexandria field office of the FBI and the Director was aware of the leaks coming from this office. It is assumed that he felt that not only the identity of the CIA people might be revealed but also anything they said.

The Director saw no objection at an appropriate time, of having Silbert meet with Petersen in Petersen's office to review with Petersen the specific information concerned. Petersen said he saw no problem in handling the matter this way.

27 November 1972

Executive Director-Comptroller W. E. Colby and Deputy General Counsel John S. Warner met with Henry E. Petersen and Earl J. Silbert in order for the latter two to address additional questions to the Agency. Petersen and Silbert stated that there was no interest on the part of the government in using any of the information relating to the Agency in its case in chief, but that they wished to know all the facts wherein CIA might be involved in order to avoid surprise moves by the defense.

Among the questions posed to Messrs. Colby and Warner were: who in the White House requested CIA assistance for Hunt; when was such aid stopped, why and by whom; was the White House advised of cessation of assistance; who was notified and by whom. They further

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indicated that they might wish to question certain of the people involved in giving assistance to Hunt and Liddy and asked whether CIA had dealings with Liddy on other matters. A number of other questions relating to Hunt, McCord, Wagner and Caswell were asked to which Mr. Colby said answers would be supplied.

The meeting ended with Mr. Colby pointing out that while the Agency wanted to cooperate in every way it was felt by CIA that the sensitivity of the matter required that it be done at the Petersen and Silbert level and not at the normal FBI investigative level. Petersen and Silbert appeared to understand the Agency's position in this regard.

COMMENT: The sensitivity referred to by Mr. Colby is believed to consist of two things; (1) that John Ehrlichman was the White House figure involved, and (2) the knowledge of leaks at the normal FBI investigative level. The two points are related in that the surfacing of Ehrlichman's name at lower Bureau levels might very well have been leaked to the press causing more problems for both the Agency and the White House.

30 November 1972

Principal Assistant U.S. Attorney Earl Silbert telephoned Deputy General Counsel John Warner to pose additional questions relating to Hunt's alias documentation and on the Agency's relationship, if any,

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with [REDACTED] Mr. Silbert also inquired as to when he might expect to receive the answers to these questions and the ones asked of Colby on 27 November.

13 December 1972

Warner addressed but did not send a memorandum to Petersen on 13 December 1972, to which were attached answers to the questions raised by Petersen and Silbert. Warner stressed again that this was background information only and not to be used in the government's case in chief.

13 December 1972

Mr. Colby, at the DCI's request, met with former DDCI General Robert E. Cushman to brief him on the questions being asked of the Agency by the Justice Department and FBI about the Agency's relationships with Hunt and others. Colby and Cushman reviewed the General's role in the provisioning of Hunt, when it started, who in the White House requested CIA aid, and who was notified there when aid was cut off. Mr. Colby stressed the point that the Agency was not involved in any way in the Watergate affair and that it was being completely cooperative with Justice and the FBI.

15 December 1972

Director Helms and Mr. Colby met at the White House with John Ehrlichman and John Dean. The purpose of the meeting was to

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summarize CIA's dealings with the FBI and the Department of Justice with respect to Howard Hunt. This Colby did, including in his briefing the fact that he had had to identify Ehrlichman to Silbert as the individual in the White House who requested CIA aid for Hunt.

COMMENT: In his Memorandum for the Record of this meeting, Mr. Colby used the following phrase about his and Warner's meeting with Petersen and Silbert when the latter focused in on the reference to a "duly authorized extra-Agency request;" "Colby said he had danced around the room several times for ten minutes to try to avoid becoming specific on this, finally naming the White House, and was then pinned by Silbert with a demand for the name, at which point the name of the individual was given." This particular sentence came back to haunt Mr. Colby when he was questioned by some of the Congressional Committees to whom this particular Memorandum for the Record was supplied.

Ehrlichman did not remember making the call in early July, to which Helms and Colby replied they were relying on General Cushman's memory on that particular call. The specific help given to Hunt was discussed. Ehrlichman said he would check the phone calls with his schedule but that he thought at that point Hunt was working for Colson on tracing document leaks. Dean reviewed the material which had been prepared on 13 December for passage to Petersen and Silbert. It was agreed that these materials would be held up. Ehrlichman asked Colby to have General Cushman call him so they could discuss the

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details of the alleged phone calls. Colby contacted Cushman who promised to call Ehrlichman.

COMMENT: Colby in his confirmation hearings stated that the initiative for this meeting came from the White House.

20 December 1972

In a telephone conversation between Colby and John Dean the former stated the Agency was being pushed by the people on the other end of the relationship, i. e., Justice Department. Dean replied that you (the Agency) will have to give them "the minimal bit they need but on the understanding that it is to be closely held by Petersen."

There was some discussion about the possibility of the prosecution's using the material provided by CIA in Court. Colby's view, if that situation arose, was that the Agency would go to the Attorney General.

21 December 1972

Warner met with Petersen and Silbert and delivered to them the package of materials that had been assembled for the December 13 memorandum. Warner answered a few questions having to do with the Hunt/Cushman meeting. He said that if it appeared an Agency witness would be needed in the direct case Petersen or Silbert should advise as soon as possible since the Director would want to discuss

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the matter with the Attorney General. Both Petersen and Silbert stated they did not feel an Agency witness would be needed in the direct case. Warner told Silbert, in reply to the latter's question, that he had not known that the Agency had copies of the pictures developed for Hunt, but later found they did have them. Copies were delivered to Silbert on 3 January 1973.

COMMENT: Mr. Warner's memorandum of 13 December was redated to 21 December and the information which had been held up at White House request was finally delivered to Petersen and Silbert on that date, roughly a month after it was requested.

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~~SECRET~~10 January 1973

General Cushman, in a memorandum to John Ehrlichman, sets forth his contacts with E. Howard Hunt. In this memorandum General Cushman says, "I cannot recollect at this late date who placed the call, but it was someone with whom I was acquainted, as opposed to a stranger." General Cushman details the aid given to Hunt and the cessation of aid by his telephone call on 27 August 1971 to John Ehrlichman.

COMMENT: This was in fact the second version of the memorandum. The first version said that Cushman had received a call from either Ehrlichman, Colson or Dean. Upon Ehrlichman's and Dean's protests about being named in the General's memorandum he retrieved the first version and produced the second, cited above, which named no one. After the discovery of the minutes of the DCI morning meeting of 8 July 1971 on May 8, 1973, specifying that the call had come from John Ehrlichman on 7 July 1971, the first version (which had not been kept) was reconstructed from the secretarial notes taken at the time.

9 February 1973

Director James R. Schlesinger received a phone call from John Dean in the White House requesting that CIA retrieve the materials it had supplied to the Department of Justice. Dean suggested a card be left at Justice noting that the package had been returned to the Agency as being no longer pertinent. Dean also alluded to a newspaper article that named

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Sturgis as the individual responsible for burglarizing the Chilean Embassy.

The DCI discussed this call with Colby and it was agreed that Colby would discuss the question of the package relating to the Watergate investigation with General Walters and a decision would be made with regard to the appropriate action.

21 February 1973

DDCI Walters, at DCI Schlesinger's request, went to see John Dean at the White House to explain to him that the Agency would not request the Justice Department to return CIA materials supplied to them in connection with the Watergate investigation. General Walters told him again that there was no Agency involvement in this case and that any attempts to involve the Agency in it could only be harmful to the United States.

COMMENT: General Walters did not record this incident until the DCI requested that he do so in early May, when the Agency was trying to produce what it could on everything having to do with Watergate and the principal figures involved therein.

30 March 1973

Legislative Counsel John M. Maury, at Colby's request, gave a briefing to Congressman Lucien Nedzi on the Cushman/Hunt contacts and the material furnished Hunt by the Agency. Maury did not

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reveal the identity of the individual in the White House who made the call to request Agency assistance for Hunt; however, he did state that Agency aid was stopped when Hunt's requests got out of line.

Congressman Nedzi seemed to be upset only by the fact that Agency personnel couldn't recall who made the call from the White House.

4 May 1973

General Counsel Lawrence Houston and Deputy General Counsel John Warner met with Department of Justice Attorneys Henry E. Petersen and Kevin T. Maroney at Maroney's request. The purpose of the meeting was to enable Houston and Warner to read a portion of Howard Hunt's testimony before the Grand Jury, which was being made available by Judge Byrne, later in the day, to the defense in the Daniel Ellsberg case. Petersen and Maroney pointed out that undoubtedly the testimony would be made public during the course of the day. They therefore felt that a substantial portion of the material supplied by the Agency to the Justice Department on 18 October 1972 and 21 December 1972 would also have to be furnished to Judge Byrne, including xerox copies of the film which had been developed for Hunt by the Agency.

Hunt's testimony gave fairly accurate details of the support he received from CIA, also describing the burglary of the office of Dr. Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

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COMMENT: It should be noted that the pictures clearly identifying Dr. Fielding's office and parking place had been in Petersen's possession since 3 Jan 1973. Petersen's office became aware of the burglary in early April as a result of pre-Grand Jury hearing interrogation of Hunt. Consistent with the practice of the prosecution staff the Agency was not advised of this and had no knowledge of it until the last moment.

Houston and Warner returned to the Agency, where they reviewed the CIA material supplied Justice on 18 Oct and 21 Dec. Material relevant to the Ellsberg case was to be declassified and retyped with no classification for delivery to Justice first thing on Monday, 7 May 1973. The DCI was briefed on these developments by Houston and Warner and agreed there was no choice but to declassify the requested material.

COMMENT: This was the first official notice the Agency had of Hunt's involvement in the Ellsberg matter and of the fact that items issued to him by the Agency had been used at the time of the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office. However, other circumstances connected with the trial and its attendant publicity had already started action by knowledgeable people in the Agency which flushed up to the surface the Agency's role in the preparation of the Ellsberg Profiles.

The 9 May 1973 affidavit of Dr.

[REDACTED] relates how this came about:  
"On 30 April 1973, after reading in the press about the alleged burglary of the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. Tietjen and I

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discussed the matter. On the same day [REDACTED] discussed this press report with me. On 1 May 1973, Dr. Tietjen and I discussed the matter again and a decision was made to review the material held by Dr. Tietjen with [REDACTED]. Because Dr. Tietjen was out of town on official business for most of the day on 1 May 1973, this review was not accomplished until 2 May 1973. At the conclusion of that meeting it was decided that a meeting should be held with Mr. Osborn, Director of Security, and then with Mr. Brownman, Deputy Director for Management and Services. Dr. Tietjen scheduled a meeting with Mr. Osborn for early morning of 3 May 1973. (Dr. Tietjen in arranging the meeting told Mr. Osborn the subject matter was the Ellsberg profiles and that he felt the Agency's role in the matter should be brought to the DCI's attention. Mr. Osborn agreed and meeting was scheduled for 0915.) This meeting was cancelled by Dr. Tietjen who later in the day advised me that he had been asked to meet with Mr. Brownman on the Ellsberg Case." On the morning of 3 May 1973 Dr. Tietjen had an early meeting with Mr. Brownman on some administrative problem. Mr. Brownman told Dr. Tietjen that late on the previous evening, i.e., 2 May 1973, DCI Schlesinger had received a telephone call from an unidentified (to Mr. Brownman) source who alerted him to some CIA role in the Ellsberg affair. DCI Schlesinger had appointed Mr. Brownman to investigate the matter. In the course of the questioning, Dr. Tietjen advised Mr. Brownman of his scheduled 0915 meeting with Mr. Osborn. Mr. Brownman asked Dr. Tietjen to cancel this meeting and that he, Brownman, would meet with Osborn. Dr. Tietjen did cancel the meeting. Mr. Brownman did meet with Osborn and by the end of the day was able

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to give DCI Schlesinger a fairly clear picture of the Agency's involvement in the Ellsberg case.

Subsequent investigation disclosed that DCI Schlesinger's source for the above information was Rob Roy Ratliff, the Agency's National Security Council officer whose office was located in the Executive Office Building. His memorandum on just how this all came about has since been published in the Judiciary volumes and the New York Times although his name, and the names of other Agency personnel was deleted.

Warner's memorandum of 4 May 1973 states; "the testimony gives reasonably accurate details of Hunt's securing support from CIA and describes the burglary of the office of Dr. Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist." Houston and Warner had been advised of the existence of the profiles on 4 May by DCI Schlesinger (who had been briefed by Brownman) just prior to their meeting with Petersen and Maroney, but had no details, and were not in a position to appreciate what they read in Hunt's testimony. Warner's statement in his memorandum, therefore, applies principally to knowledge of the Cushman/Hunt/TSD contacts and not to the Profiles.

It should be further noted that the Profiles were prepared during Aug-Nov 1971 when Helms was DCI and General Cushman DDCI. Neither Dr. Schlesinger nor General Walters had any knowledge of the matter. Former DD/S John Coffey states very clearly in his affidavit that he never connected Hunt with the profiles, he associated them only with David Young. The Director of Security, Howard Osborn

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states he never knew that Hunt was involved (neither, for that matter did DCI Helms or DDCI Cushman). The members of the Medical Staff who were aware of this aspect had no knowledge whatever of Hunt's contacts with General Cushman and Technical Services Division. This type of compartmentation is not at all unusual in the Agency regardless of how difficult it may be for outsiders to understand it.

7 May 1973

Deputy General Counsel John Warner delivered to Petersen and Maroney the package of now declassified documents that had been selected and agreed to in the meeting on 4 May 1973. Justice also still had classified copies of the documents. Mr. Petersen reflected that possibly none of the papers would have to be put into court but could be exhibited, if necessary, to the Judge in camera. Warner stated that while this would be helpful, Justice could, if necessary, use all the documents furnished them during this meeting.

Mr. Warner also delivered a copy of the indirect assessment of Ellsberg dated 9 August 1971. He advised Mr. Petersen that under the circumstances the Director did not wish to have Agency staff employee George Carver testify in the Ellsberg Case. Warner asked Petersen to determine if the FBI had interrogated General Cushman, that this was important as the DCI was scheduled to appear

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before the McClelland Committee on Wednesday and the question of Ehrlichman's undocumented call to General Cushman was an important point. Mr. Petersen promised to advise.

COMMENT: The note of 8 July 1971 from the Director's Daily Staff meeting in which General Cushman reported the call from John Ehrlichman in the White House re aid to new consultant E. Howard Hunt was resurrected on 7 May 1973. This enabled General Cushman to testify positively as to where and by whom he was called.

8 May 1973

General Counsel Houston transmitted to Kevin T. Maroney, under a covering letter, three envelopes of material. One contained the two indirect assessments of Ellsberg prepared by the Agency medical staff. A second envelope contained State Department and FBI material on Ellsberg, both overt and classified. The last envelope contained newspaper, magazine and television material. (b)(3) CIAAct

Houston advised that, although [REDACTED] was identified as one who participated, the profiles were a group staff effort and further that there was no direct clinical evaluation of Ellsberg. Houston asked that the material be protected and restricted since the Agency staff doctors felt that there might be a question of medical ethics involved.

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DCI Schlesinger transmitted to Attorney General designate Elliot Richardson a copy of W. E. Colby's Memorandum for the Record of 18 December 1972 re: Meeting at the White House on 15 December 1972. DCI Schlesinger suggested that at some appropriate time the Attorney General might want to conduct a review of Agency materials to assure the completeness of information already transmitted to the Justice Department.

10 May 1973

Colby wrote to Petersen explaining that the language, contained in a memorandum dated 28 July 1972 and given that day to the Acting Director of the FBI, was that of Colby. The memorandum had to do with the roll of film developed for E. Howard Hunt and suggested that the pictures (of which the Agency had xerox copies) might be of Rand Corporation facilities. Colby advised that the speculative identification of the building as Rand Corporation was his.

COMMENT: That speculation is indicative of the Agency's understanding that the White House activity concerning national security leaks, and Ellsberg involvement, could have focused on Rand property and activities.

14 May 1973

DCI Schlesinger directed the Inspector General and his staff to assume responsibility for pulling together all Agency material on

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Watergate and individuals connected with it. In the course of their duties the IG and his Deputy checked with Howard Osborn to see if he had any additional information. At this point Osborn recalled the existence of seven letters, which were presumed to be from James McCord that were in a special file in his safe.

15 May 1973

Copies of the letters were turned over to the IG who included them in a report on Watergate which he was doing for the DCI.

18 May 1973

DDCI General Walters wrote a covering note for the series of memoranda he did on his various meetings with Dean and others in which he stated that the memos were never intended to be a full or verbatim account but were notes to refresh his memory if he should need it.

21 May 1973

The IG report containing the McCord letters was delivered to Mr. Colby, the Executive Secretary of the CIA Management Committee.

COMMENT: These letters have not been inserted in their chronological order in this study since they came in at different times; all ended up in one place, and all were discovered together. The story of the letters is as follows:

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The first letter, dated 30 July 1972, was sent to DCI Helms' office. It was signed only with the initial "J" and, following prescribed routine for anonymous letters, was forwarded to the Director of Security, Howard Osborn. Osborn thought he recognized the initial and guessed that the writer might be James McCord. He discussed the letter with DCI Helms who called General Counsel Lawrence Houston into the meeting. After some discussion it was decided that Osborn would hold the letter in a secure file in his office and not turn it over to the FBI as he had initially suggested. The letter appeared to warn the Agency that certain persons were trying to involve CIA in the Watergate affair. There was also a note indicating that from time to time the writer, not until later known for certain to be McCord, would continue to send along information that might be of interest.

Additional letters were, in fact, sent to Paul Gaynor, Chief of the Security Research Staff of the Office of Security, and Mr. McCord's supervisor for many years, on the following dates: 22 December 1972, 27 December 1972, 29 December 1972, 4 January 1973, and 6 January 1973. On each occasion, Gaynor turned over the letters to Osborn who held them in the same file with the first letter. About mid-January of 1973 Osborn, aware

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that Helms would soon be leaving the Agency, took the folder of letters to Helms and asked for guidance as to what he should do with them. DCI Helms reviewed the file, directed Osborn to check with General Counsel Houston, and if the latter had no objection Osborn was to continue secure retention of the letters. Osborn proceeded as directed and, Houston having no objection, returned the letters to his safe.

At this point the existence of the letters was completely forgotten by Houston and Osborn until mid-May when the Inspector General's Office began its investigation (at DCI Schlesinger's direction) to see if there was any further contact or information re Watergate and the arrested suspects. The Agency promptly notified the appropriate Congressional Committees and the Justice Department of the existence of the letters. Considerable significance was, at one point, attached to the letters and the Agency's failure to report them earlier.

COMMENT: With the advantage of hindsight, the significance of the letters was that they alleged as facts some things that were McCord's deductions and opinions, some of which will remain speculative. The Agency had no reason to suppress the letters, as they tended -- if anything -- to defend the Agency. The failure to report them earlier can simply be attributed to the relatively minor significance attributed to them and the

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resulting loss of their existence  
from the memories of extremely  
busy men.

23 May 1973

A memorandum for all employees was issued by Colby emphasizing that each employee is directed to report to the Director any knowledge he or she has of the Watergate affair and related matters, or person connected with it, or any other illegal activity in which they believe the Agency was involved in any way. There was also a list of individuals given and employees were asked to report any and all contacts with them including not only the Watergate affair, but any investigative work on the Pentagon Papers/Ellsberg case and any contacts relating to the Executive Branch and White House efforts to locate and stem leaks of classified information to the press starting as early as 1970.

Assistant General Counsel John K. Greaney wrote an explanatory note for the files in which he explained that the material requested of CIA by Henry E. Petersen on 27 November 1972 was held up by order of John Dean of the White House until he finally agreed to its release on 21 December 1972.

General Counsel Houston wrote a short note to the Special Counsel to the President, Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt to which he attached

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
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a memorandum of 22 May 1973 setting forth how the McCord letters were brought to light and why this had not happened before. Houston also advised that Silbert had been notified of the file of McCord letters on 17 May 1973.

24 May 1973

Inspector General William Broe, Director of Security Howard Osborn and Paul Gaynor, Chief of the Security Research Staff testified before the House Committee on Armed Services about the McCord letters, when they were received, what was done with them and why, when they were resurrected, etc.

COMMENT:



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31 May 1973

The Legislative Counsel held discussions with Senators Symington and Jackson and General Counsel James Woolsey of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the handling of Watergate material developed by the Committee. Senator Symington was in favor of a quick release of all this material but was persuaded by

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Senator Jackson, General Counsel Woolsey and the CIA Legislative Counsel to hold up for a while. The CIA Legislative Counsel cautioned the Senators on the sensitivity of some of the material, particularly that of the Ehrlichman phone call to General Cushman and General Cushman's meeting with Hunt.

Later on in a separate meeting between Counsel Woolsey and the CIA Counsel, Woolsey indicated the full Committee would probably want to see the full text of the minutes of the Director's "Executive morning meeting" of 8 July 1971. He was advised the Agency would be very reluctant to release the full minutes but that perhaps it might be possible to arrange for Woolsey to read all the minutes so he could certify to the Committee that none of the other items were relevant to the question at issue. Woolsey felt this might be acceptable to the Chairman.

The CIA Legislative Counsel learned later in the day that the 23 June 1972 meeting of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Helms and Walters had been at the direction of the President.

1 June 1973

The Office of Legislative Counsel delivered two volumes of CIA documentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Appropriations Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee.

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Much of the material contained in the two volumes was actually made available contemporaneously when Agency witnesses appeared before these CIA Committees. The later assembling of such and other documentation (in volumes) served a number of interests including accountability and accessibility.


14 June 1973

Copies of Volumes I and II of the Office of Legislative Counsel's "Master File" were delivered to George Frampton of the Special Prosecutors office. The sensitivity and classification of the documents was stressed. Frampton assured the staff would respect all classifications.

20 June 1973

Erwin Committee via Senate Appropriations Committee was supplied Vols. I and II.

13 July 1973

The following named CIA personnel were made available for interview by the Watergate Special Prosecution Force: Stephen C. Greenwood  John F. Caswell, Karl Wagner and Howard Osborn.

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19 July 1973

Copies of Volume III of the Office of Legislative Counsel's "Master File" were delivered to the Senate and House Armed Services

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Committees. The Sensitive Supplement to Volume III was reviewed by but not left with the House Committee.

23 July 1973

The Senate Appropriations Committee and the Erwin Committee were given a copy of Volume III of the OLC "Master File". The sensitive supplement was reviewed by but not left with the Senate Appropriations Committee. The sensitive supplement was reviewed by but not left with the Erwin Committee on 1 August 1973.

25 July 1973

Acting General Counsel John Warner met with William Merrill, Watergate Special Prosecution Staff to discuss various aspects of the Watergate matter. He also delivered to him Volume III of the "Master File" and reviewed with him the sensitive supplement to Volume III. Prosecutor Heymann was called in and he also reviewed the sensitive supplement. Warner advised them that there were additional documents relating to Tom Huston which could be made available later.

Warner answered a number of questions regarding the transcript of the Cushman/Hunt meeting, the McCord letters and the exact date of the Helms, Osborn, Ehrlichman, Krogh, Young meeting. He was asked to attempt to confirm the exact date on which Young requested Osborn for the profile on Ellsberg.

and Heymann advised that they would want to interview Ambassador Helms sometime in the next week.

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Arrangements were made between John Warner and Phillip Heymann of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force staff for Ambassador Helms to be interviewed by Heymann on Tuesday,

31 July.

31 July 1973

Ambassador Helms was interviewed by several members of the Watergate Special Prosecution Staff in a session that lasted several hours. It was concentrated on the Watergate break-in and relations with the White House during the morning and on the Ellsberg Profiles in the afternoon session. More information on several subjects was requested which the Agency undertook to provide.

2 August 1973

Ambassador Helms testified before the Senate Select Committee on Watergate.

3 August 1973

DDCI General Walters testified before the Senate Select Committee on Watergate.

8 August 1973

Counsel Warner met with Prosecutor Merrill and gave him copies of the questions and answers that had been posed at Mr. Colby's

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confirmation hearing by Senators Symington, Nunn, Proxmire and Kennedy. He also delivered a copy of the original transcript of the Hunt/Cushman 22 July 1971 meeting to which was attached a memorandum by Karl Wagner, dated 23 July 1973 explaining the history of the transcript.

Warner further explained that queries on Ogarrio and Dahlberg were made to the Agency on the same day at two levels, one the working level of the FBI with the Office of Security and the other by Acting Director Gray to DCI Helms. The internal memorandum to the Director furnishing the results of these traces were attached to Mr. Helm's memorandum to the Deputy Director and dated 28 June 1972. Warner goes on to say "This last memorandum with the attachments is in the volume documentation provided by the Agency at Volume III, Tab 8."

COMMENT: This volume, with this memorandum was delivered to the Special Prosecutors Staff on 25 July 1973. This is the memorandum former Special Prosecutor Cox says he discovered in October of 1973. Cox's statement made before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Monday, 29 October 1973 is reported as follows in the 30 October 1973 Baltimore News American: "Cox said he had obtained a memo written by a 'major witness' that was 'at odds' with testimony by that witness and others involved in the Watergate scandal. Although Cox did not name the witness, it was soon learned that it was Helms, now U.S. Ambassador to Iran."

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Merrill raised the question of availability for Grand Jury testimony of [REDACTED], Howard Osborn, Stephen Greenwood and General Walters. Warner would check and advise.

Further questions were raised about the date on which the films were developed by CIA for Hunt and whether Hunt's wife ever worked for CIA. Mr. Warner checked and later advised Merrill the date for film development was 24 August as set forth in Greenwood's affidavit.

COMMENT: As explained in Section II of this paper the 24 August date was incorrect and Warner later corrected this inaccuracy.

13 August 1973

John Warner responded to a 26 July 1973 letter from Deputy Special Prosecutor Henry Ruth which asked a series of questions about several individuals and whether they had ever been employed by or associated with CIA. There were also several questions about International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT), Mullen Company and whether CIA was aware of any intelligence or undercover activities performed by Howard Hunt and/or Gordon Liddy for ITT.

23 August 1973

Warner arranged with Merrill of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force for General Walters to appear before the Grand Jury on 28 August 1973.

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Warner further advised Merrill that an exhaustive search of Agency records had been made with the result that there was no evidence that Mrs. Hunt had ever worked for CIA in staff, contract or any other capacity.

5 September 1973

Warner met with Merrill and Bakes of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force to discuss the question of when the film was developed by CIA for Howard Hunt. He left with them the following material; 1) undated draft of a portion of the Inspector General's Watergate History; 2) October 1971 and December 1972 logs prepared by Stephen C. Greenwood; 3) additional copies of Karl Wagner's memoranda of 26 and 30 August 1971.

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Merrill accepted the evidence that the film was developed on 27 August 1971 but wished to interview Richard Krueger and [REDACTED] prior to their appearance before the Grand Jury on 6 September 1973.

Warner answered or promised to obtain answers for additional questions on the film and prints. Merrill also wanted Stephen Greenwood back for testimony before the Grand Jury on 11 September 1973 so that he could correct his previous testimony on the date the film was developed.

Neither Bakes nor Merrill had yet been able to locate the Helms' letter of recommendation to the Mullen Company regarding employment

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of Howard Hunt. (Mullen had advised he thought he had given it to the Prosecution Staff.) They said they would once more attempt to locate it.

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6 September 1973

Warner accompanied [REDACTED] and Richard Krueger to Merrill's office. Merrill stated he would also like to interview Leo Dunn. (This later proved unnecessary since Merrill received the information he wanted in a memorandum).

[REDACTED] and Krueger appeared before the Grand Jury at 2:00 p.m.

11 September 1973 (b)(3) CIAAct

Warner accompanied Stephen Greenwood to the office of the Special Prosecutor for a meeting with Merrill and Bakes to discuss Greenwood's reappearance before the Grand Jury to correct his earlier testimony as to the date he picked up and developed the film for Howard Hunt. During the meeting it developed that Greenwood had a telephone number given to him by Hunt during the July-August 1971 period by which he could reach Hunt. A copy of the note on which the number was listed was given to the Prosecutor's staff.

12 September 1973

Stephen Greenwood appeared before the Grand Jury at 0930 a.m.

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~~SECRET~~25 September 1973

Merrill of the Watergate Special Prosecution Staff advised Warner that an exhaustive search of the staff's records had failed to produce the Helms' letter of recommendation of Howard Hunt to the Robert Mullen Company.

12 October 1973

Warner met with Akerman and Goldman of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force Staff to discuss CIA documentation relating to Martinez. They asked to see a copy of COS/Miami's Rybat report on Martinez. Warner said he would review it to determine whether it could be made available. He gave a similar answer to their request for a copy of a Martinez's roundup of his discussions with Hunt and Arttime done on 5 April 1972. Warner explained why such a request was difficult for the Agency - the breaching of trust of an agent. Warner stated that under no circumstances would the Agency give up all records relating to the Agency's relationship with Martinez and/or Barker and would resist to the utmost compliance with a subpoena.

16 October 1973 (b)(3) CIAAct

 of the Office of General Counsel handcarried a document entitled "Sensitive Information provided by CIA orally (Supplement to Vol. III of 'Documentation Provided by CIA') Compiled 19 July 1973" to the Office of the Watergate Special Prosecutor's Task

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Force. It was reviewed by George Frampton and Richard Ben-Veniste with the latter making brief notes. They showed special interest in the hand written memorandum of Martin J. Lukoskie. [REDACTED] returned the document to Headquarters.

17 October 1973

(b)(3) CIAAct

Warner accompanied Mrs. Elizabeth Dunlevy, retired Agency employee who was for many years the secretary of former Director Helms, for an interview by members of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. Prior to the Dunlevy interview Warner met with Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox and one of his assistants, Richard Ben-Veniste. Concern was expressed by Cox on 3 items: 1) the 28 June 1972 memorandum by DCI Helms to the DDCI, General Walters; 2) the hand written memorandum by Martin J. Lukoskie recording his discussions with Robert Foster Bennett of Mullen and Company and; 3) the McCord letters. Cox felt all these matters should have been brought to the attention of the Justice Department on a current basis. Cox and his staff believed that the last sentence in paragraph two of the 28 June 1972 Helms memorandum conflicted with the thrust of Mr. Helm's testimony, including his interview with the Cox staff, although Cox agreed that the memorandum should have been raised with Helms during the interview.

Cox asked Warner to again query Colby as to whether any

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information was being withheld. He also asked about a rumor that Howard Hunt had travelled to Spain in June 1972 on an official passport.

COMMENT: This question caused the Agency to go back again and check its records and appropriate personnel. This reinvestigation disclosed the existence of records showing that Hunt had been issued an alias birth certificate which could have been used to obtain an official passport. A check of passport records disclosed that this did not happen. The records covering this particular episode are attached at Tab G.

Cox went on to state that his staff would want to interview Mr. Helms again, either by requesting his return or sending some of Cox's staff to Iran. He also indicated they might want to interview Shackley and [REDACTED] Warner was asked for any information the Agency had on whether Dahlberg was ever engaged in any way in electronic surveillance equipment.

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Mr. Neal, a member of the Prosecutor's staff, expressed the view that Robert F. Bennett of Mullen and Company had lied by not acknowledging any Agency connection. He asked whether Bennett had been so instructed by the Agency. Warner stated that to his knowledge this was not the case but he would check and advise.

Mrs. Dunlevy was questioned as to her recollection of the 28 June 1972 memorandum from DCI Helms to DDCI Walters. She remembered typing it but nothing further although she did describe how such a

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memorandum would normally be handled. She further recalled that sometime between early February and before 29 June 1973, she came across a carbon copy of the memorandum and turned it over to Mr. Colby. She could contribute no information about how the original came to light. Warner explained he had received the original from the Inspector General where it was maintained in a so-called "Colby File" which he also explained to them.

17 October 1973

Warner met with Bakes and Merrill as a follow-up to his meeting with Ackermann and Goldman to further discuss the problems of presenting complete records in open court.

25 October 1973

Warner met with Ben-Veniste, Frampton, Volner, Goldman and Reint of the Watergate Special Prosecutor Force. He advised them that after discussions with Mr. Colby he could state that the Agency was withholding nothing. This was true of the Helms 28 June 1972 memorandum, the handwritten memorandum by Lukoskie dated 11 July 1972 and the McCord letters.

COMMENT: The date of the Lukoskie hand written memorandum is 10 July 1972.

Warner advised also that E. Howard Hunt did not travel to Spain for the Agency in June 1972. Ben-Veniste asked Warner to check

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whether Hunt had an official passport and whether it would have been picked up when he left the Agency.

The Agency did not have any information as to whether Dahlberg was engaged in any way with electronic surveillance equipment.

Ben-Veniste asked for documentation surrounding Dahlberg's assisting the Peruvian with a hearing aid in 1961. Warner agreed to check.

Warner confirmed the Agency had given no instructions to Robert Bennett as to how he should answer queries but that the Agency had currently advised Bennett he could respond freely to any queries from the Cox Staff.

Warner gave them the dates on which Volumes I, II and III were furnished to the various Congressional Committees and their own staff.

He also explained how and by whom the volumes had been put together.

In further discussion of the Helms 28 June 1972 memorandum he speculated on what might have happened, i. e., discussions between Walters and Helms negated the need for the memorandum which was then put in the Director's safe until it was turned over to Colby in October 1972 and held by him until May 1973 when it was turned over to the Inspector General.

As to Ambassador Helm's returning, Warner indicated the circumstances today in that area were such as to make this very

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difficult. Warner attempted to explain the time and circumstances in connection with the McCord letters, the Lukoskie memorandum and the Helms memorandum of 28 June 1972. Warner felt he made little headway in allaying the staffs concerns.

29 October 1973

Senator Fulbright addressed a series of questions to DCI Colby, and through him to Ambassador Helms, concerning Sturgis and Martinez and their past relationship with CIA. He cited what he described as discrepancies in Mr. Helms' testimony and asked that they be cleared up.

30 October 1973

Legislative Counsel Maury called Congressman Nedzi about press comment stemming from former Special Prosecutor Cox's remarks about alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of an important but unidentified witness. Maury advised that the remarks were about a Helms' memorandum to DDCI Walters dated 28 June 1972. Maury gave the background and an explanation of the memorandum and advised Nedzi it had been given to his Committee on 19 July 1973. In reply to a Nedzi question, Maury advised against making the memorandum available to the Press. Nedzi saw nothing wrong in the memo.

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~~SECRET~~5 November 1973

DCI Colby, by letter to Senator Symington and Representative Nedzi, forwarded copies of Ambassador Helm's explanation of his 28 June 1972 memorandum to General Walters.

COMMENT: The memorandum and Helm's reply have been previously referred to and are attached to this paper at Tab E.

Colby also covered areas of his own knowledge on this matter wherein Helm's had made the Agency non-involvement in Watergate clear to the FBI. He supported Helms position that the evidence on the record refutes any interpretation that the 28 June memorandum constituted an order to General Walters to stifle the FBI's investigation of the Watergate break-in.

6 November 1973

DCI Colby sent a memorandum to Senator Symington similar to the letter cited above but giving a more detailed explanation of the 28 June 1972 Helms memorandum. He also reminded the Senator that most of this material had been covered in his (Colby's) confirmation hearings.

8 November 1973

Senator Howard Baker in a letter to DCI Colby cited an article in the November issue of Harpers Magazine by Andrew St. George

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entitled "How the Cold War Came Home" which discusses the CIA.

Baker asked for the Agency's assessment of the accuracy of the material covered in the last chapter headed "Supplanting the CIA."

Baker also asked for the answers to a series of question prompted by the article. These questions centered around how CIA first learned of the break-in, who advised them, who advised Osborn, where, when and by whom were the Director and Deputy Director informed.

Further questions concerned the Watergate and Fielding break-ins as to whether CIA had any reports or information on any domestic intelligence operation connected with the "Watergate Seven"? Had Martinez in any manner advised, hinted or suggested to anyone in CIA or the Government re any clandestine activities against domestic targets and additional questions along these same lines.

13 November 1973

By letter Warner forwarded to Merrill in the office of the Special Prosecutor a copy of DCI Colby's 6 November 1973 memorandum to Senator Symington referred to above.

15 November 1973

Assistant General Counsel Greaney forwarded to Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski a letter from Ambassador Helms requesting a personal appointment upon his return from Iran to testify again before

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the Grand Jury. In his letter Ambassador Helms makes the statement that the 28 June 1972 Helms' memorandum had been in the hands of Mr. Cox from the time he took over as Special Prosecutor.

COMMENT: This statement was inaccurate. Cox was appointed on 18 May 1973. The memorandum which was contained in OLC Volume III was turned over to the Special Prosecutor's office on 24 July 1973. This error was subsequently corrected by Counsel Greaney in a letter to Special Prosecutor Jaworski dated 24 November 1973.

15 November 1973

Merrill contacted Greaney and asked to interview Jake Esterline re Martinez and James Angleton re his knowledge of the Room 16 operation on 19 November 1973. Greaney agreed to check and advise Merrill on the availability of the individuals.

16 November 1973

DCI Colby replied to Senator Baker's letter of 8 November. He gave the Agency's assessment of the accuracy of the last chapter headed "Supplanting the CIA" of an article by Andrew St. George carried in the November issue of Harpers Magazine entitled "The Cold War Comes Home". Director Colby also supplied answers to the seven questions that had been posed by Senator Baker.

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~~SECRET~~16 November 1973

Director Colby appeared before on executive session of the Senate Armed Services Hearing on St. George's allegations.

COMMENT: The documentation backup for Mr. Colby for this hearing is so extensive and voluminous that it is not being included in this study but will be on file in the Inspector General's office. The table of contents sheets and the explanatory routing sheet of both volumes is attached to this study as Tab H so that the reader may be aware of the topics covered.

17 November 1973

DCI Colby replied to Senator Fulbright's letter of 29 October 1973. This reply contained the requested information, as available to the Agency, on Frank Sturgis and Eugenio Martinez.

19 November 1973

Warner and Greaney met with Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski and staff members Ruth and Ben-Veniste. They assured Jaworski that the Agency's position at the direction of DCI Colby was to cooperate fully with the Special Prosecutor. Arrangements were made for Ambassador Helms to meet with Jaworski on 26 November and appear before the Grand Jury on 27 November. Warner gave Jaworski a copy of Colby's letter to Congressman Nedzi dated 5 November 1973 which included Ambassador Helm's response re his 28 June 1972 memorandum to General Walters.

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Warner and Greaney had a further meeting with Ben-Veniste, Volner and Reint to discuss specific requests from the Prosecutor's office which were outstanding. Ben-Veniste was given a copy of the SECRET memorandum of Agency contacts with the Dahlberg Company. Warner advised on the status of Hunt's official and diplomatic passports (both expired) and of our issuance to Hunt of an alias birth certificate and explained that Agency records do not reflect the date of issuance.

Warner and Greaney agreed to prepare sanitized versions of the 10 July 1972 Lukoskie handwritten memorandum of his meeting with Bennett and the 10 July 1972 typewritten contact report prepared by Lukoskie of his meeting with Bennett. Greaney would attach a cover letter to these sanitized versions outlining the ground rules under which this material could be used.

19 November 1973

Jacob D. Esterline, accompanied by John Greaney, appeared for interview by the staff of the Special Prosecutor. Esterline answered a number of questions having to do with Eugenio Martinez. He also identified the last two Agency case officers who had handled Martinez,

[REDACTED] Greaney advised that both men

had been questioned and all their records and files reviewed and there

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was no information re Howard Hunt. Mr. Esterline's present job and its sensitivity was explained to the staff who promised to protect his identity if he should be needed to testify before the Grand Jury.

The next person to be interviewed by Merrill was James Angleton. He was asked if he had ever dealt with Howard Hunt at Room 16 of the Executive Office Building (EOB). Angleton replied that he did not know Hunt and had never been in Room 16 of the EOB. Angleton asked Merrill who had given the Prosecutor's office his name to which Merrill replied it had been mentioned by a witness before the Grand Jury and therefore could not be disclosed. Angleton stated that there had been many leaks to the media regarding the business of the Grand Juries and, given CIA's responsibilities in counterintelligence, the Agency contended that the identity of their source should be revealed since he was guilty of falsification. Angleton then asked if the source was newspaperman Seymour Hersh, who, Angleton stated, seemed to be intent on destroying confidence in the Intelligence Community and, in particular, the CIA. Further, according to Angleton, Hersh was alleged to have concluded a deal to write such a book with a \$75,000.00 advance from Random House. In preparation Hersh is seeking out ex-employees, disgruntled and otherwise, to uncover and publish details of highly classified intelligence operations. Merrill admitted to some

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relations with Hersh but reiterated their inability to disclose the identity of the source who had raised the questions regarding Angleton and Room 16.

Merrill asked Angleton's views on a report that a copy of the Pentagon Papers had been delivered to the Russian Embassy, as to whether the Soviet Intelligence Service had acquired the Pentagon Papers and whether this was a matter of national security. Angleton asked whether their questioning reflected conversations with the FBI. Merrill acknowledged that they did and that the FBI indicated that the sensitive source involved was continuing to furnish valuable and high-level intelligence. Merrill asked Angleton's evaluation of this contention. Angleton responded that this was a question to be resolved between the Special Prosecutor and the FBI. Angleton then gave a rather detailed account of the Soviet and Bloc disinformation effort, through their Departments of Disinformation, to isolate the United States and change the balance of military power in favor of the Bloc. Angleton also gave an explanation of the Soviet methods of recruiting foreigners as agents and their use of leaks, i. e., Jack Anderson.

With reference to Andrew St. George and his article in Harpers magazine, Angleton gave a brief resume of St. George's background noting that he not only lied about the Agency but was given broad, if

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not favorable coverage in the media. Regarding prior CIA knowledge of Watergate, Angleton said that he had known Mr. Helms for many years on a professional basis and knew that St. George's charges were fabrications. Angleton said that shortly after the Watergate arrests, he had conferred with Mr. Helms and that it was clearly evident that Mr. Helms had no prior knowledge but that Mr. Helms did surmise that the media, the Soviets and some politicians would attempt to exploit the affair in order to harm the Agency.

Angleton posed the hypothetical question as to whether the American taxpayer did not have a cause of action or class action against those who destroyed the confidentiality of classified matters relating to the national security. The President has the undisputed right by law to conduct foreign policy and other activities pertinent to the national security. These functions require a large drain on the tax dollar. It would seem, therefore, that the public's vested interest in secrecy is extinguished harmfully by the actions of St. George, Anderson and Hersh.

Merrill expressed his gratitude to Angleton for information regarding the Soviet Disinformation Program.

26 November 1973

The material referred to in the last paragraph above was supplied to Ben-Veniste by Greaney at the meeting this date between Ambassador

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Helms and Greaney with Special Prosecutor Jaworski and members of his staff.

Ambassador Helms answered questions pertaining to his 28 June 1972 memorandum, the Lukoskie handwritten memorandum and the McCord letters, seemingly to the satisfaction of the questioners.

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## Epilogue

The 26 November 1973 entry concerning Ambassador Helms meeting with Special Prosecutor Jaworski brings this study to a close. This is not to say that the Watergate affair is ended; or that the Agency will not continue to be questioned by the media, by the Special Prosecutor's office and by the Congress. However, the Agency's pattern of cooperation and responsiveness has been set and will undoubtedly continue.

It is believed, however, that there remain no significant unknown facts concerning the Agency's connection with the whole range of events that have become known popularly as "Watergate." If there are aspects of the matter that have not been developed, we doubt that they would add significantly to an understanding of what did and did not happen. If some such information is developed, the significance is more likely to lie in the interpretations placed on it than in the facts themselves.

Much has been said, and rightly so, about the performance of top echelon Agency officials in repulsing attempts to involve or implicate the Agency in Watergate and its subsequent cover-up. It is appropriate here to also draw attention to the performance of

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the lower and middle level echelons during this trying period. We found in every instance that these employees acted properly and promptly in bringing to the attention of the upper levels their fears and concerns when they felt the Agency was being drawn into activities beyond its charter. We would cite particularly OTS employee Richard Krueger, OMS Doctors Tietjen [REDACTED] and the Executive Assistant to the DDCI, Karl Wagner. (b)(3) CIAAct

While it is true that some discrepancies exist between the testimonies of Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Gray, Dean, Helms and General Walters, once it became clear what was developing the Agency refused to cloud the investigation of Watergate by asserting a non-existing conflict with CIA operational activities. The Agency was in no way involved in the Watergate break-in, although several individuals who were, had formerly been employed by or associated with the Agency. Likewise all subsequent attempts by Dean and others to involve the Agency with the individuals involved in the break-in were rejected, in no uncertain terms, by Helms, Walters, Schlesinger and Colby.

It has been said by some that the Agency was perhaps too prone to accept and act on requests of White House officials presumably speaking for the President. This is certainly not the case when it was

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clear that any such request would involve a violation of its charter. This was attested to by John Ehrlichman in his testimony when he cited an instance in 1969 when General Cushman instantly vetoed a White House request from Ehrlichman clearly reflecting the personal interest of the President. This was a request to involve CIA in the surveillance of the President's brother, Donald Nixon, which would have been a clear violation of the Agency's charter. The request was promptly rejected by Cushman. General Walters refused repeatedly to involve or implicate the Agency in acts which were in violation of its charter. The Agency representatives thought they were dealing with responsible officials. As former Director Helms said in his congressional testimony, "It is only lately that it has become a crime to try to assist the President." When the subterfuge used to procure Agency help or materials became apparent, such aid was quickly shut off.

We have tried in this report to pull together all the information existing in Agency records on the Ellsberg Profiles, the provisioning of Hunt, Agency cooperation, etc., and to put the pieces together in a coherent, chronological report. There is speculation in some places but it is informed speculation based on an overview derived from reviewing and following closely the unfolding developments of the all inclusive story now known as "Watergate."

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