



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330417

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

17 April 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010002DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Sabir Lahmar Manfred
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Saber Mahfouz Lahmar,
Saber Mahfouth al-Ahmad, Shaykh al-Saber
- Place of Birth: Constantine, Algeria (AG)
- Date of Birth: 22 May 1969
- Citizenship: Algeria
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US4AG-010002DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 26 September 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a senior member of a Bosnia-based element of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).¹ Detainee was detained for his involvement with a GIA

¹ Analyst Note: GIA is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Priority 3 counterterrorism (CT) target. Priority 3 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats other senior policymakers and IC managers believe must receive attention from the IC that are not already identified as Priorities 1 or 2. These include terrorist/extremist groups involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to attack US persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat than Priority 2 groups, or terrorist/extremist

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cell in Bosnia which was suspected of plotting an attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia/Herzegovina (BK). Detainee has advocated hostilities against US forces and the international community in Bosnia. Detainee has links to multiple terrorist plots and criminal related activity, including a car-bombing in Mostar, BK. Detainee had intentions of traveling to Afghanistan and Iran, and is reported as doing so prior to his capture. Detainee has demonstrated a commitment to jihad, and would likely engage in anti-US activities if released. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Added documents identifying detainee's presence at an al-Qaida associated guest house in Afghanistan and attempted travels to Iran to meet with al-Qaida leadership
- Added reports stating detainee served in the el-Mujahid Brigade and has been reported as leading a group that has been training for acts of terrorism as far back as 1998
- Included corroborating reports identifying detainee's involvement in car theft and document forgery
- Added a report indicating detainee is wanted in Belgium and France for his involvement in violent activities
- Included a report which identifies detainee's pocket litter as containing the phone number formerly identified as one used to threaten the US Embassy in Sarajevo
- Added numerous documents identifying detainee as a leader who issued *fatwas* (religious orders) to disrupt US personnel while in detention at JTF-GTMO

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee attended a vocational high school where he received a degree in chemistry in 1988. Detainee attended the al-Amir Abdulqadil, aka (Emir Abd al-

groups that have demonstrated intention to attack US persons and interests and are taking action to develop or acquire WMD capability.

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Qadir), University in Constantine, AG, from 1990 until early 1992, but failed to earn a degree. In mid-1992, detainee traveled on the *umra* (minor hajj) to Saudi Arabia, returning to Algeria late in the year. Detainee then departed for Italy (IT) in an attempt to find work. Detainee eventually obtained a position as an imam at a residential mosque in Perugia, IT for four months. Upon returning to Algeria, detainee learned that he received a scholarship to attend the Islamic University in Medina, SA. In late 1992, detainee departed for Medina where he remained at the University until 1996, receiving a two-year general degree in *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence).²

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In 1996, detainee accepted a position with the Saudi High Commission for Relief (SHCR), a non-governmental organization (NGO), in Mostar.³ Detainee flew from Medina to Jeddah, SA, and then on to Turkey. From Turkey, detainee traveled to Zagreb, Croatia (HR), and then onto Sarajevo, BK. During his employment, detainee worked with the SHCR Deputy Director Fahd al-Zakari, aka (Abu Faisal), the Director of Finance Abdel Waheb al-Shoeibi, the Bosnian Operations Director Nasser Said, and Mostar Deputy Director Yousef al-Rahma.⁴

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee initially worked in Mostar, where his supervisor was Yousef al-Rahma, a Saudi national. The Mostar office closed shortly after Rahma returned to Saudi Arabia. Following a short period in Sarajevo, detainee was then transferred to Zenica, BK. From 1996 to 1997, detainee worked for the SHCR in Zenica teaching Arabic to Bosnian children. Detainee also worked at the SHCR's Markez ar-Ishad Islamic center in Sarajevo.⁵ In Zenica, detainee worked for three months with Ahmed Boujama and Mustafa Khalkhal, a Syrian employee of SHCR. Detainee then transferred to Sarajevo, where he taught Arabic for the SHCR in a government school. He also worked as the custodian of the Two Noble Sanctuaries Cultural Center, which occupied the same building as the SHCR. Detainee reported primarily to Nasser Said, but occasionally reported to Fahd al-Zakari. At that time, the Sarajevo office was the only SHCR office open in Bosnia. In 1997, detainee was arrested and convicted of assaulting a US citizen in Bosnia, and sentenced to five years in prison, of which he only served two years and three months.

² IIR 6 034 0200 02, TD-314/09118-02, SFOR-2002-10143, SFOR-2002-10139

³ Analyst Note: The SHRC is a NIPF Priority 4 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 4 TSEs have available resources and are in a position to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 4 terrorist groups.

⁴ Analyst Note: A variant of Nasser Said is Nasar al-Said. A variant of Fahd al-Zakri is Fahad el-Zakri. A variant of Abdel Waheb al-Shoeibi is Abdu Wahab el-Shuaibi.

⁵ Analyst Note: Markez ar-Irshad is assessed to be the Markaz ud-Dawaa wal-Irshad (MDI), which is listed as a NIPF Priority 1 target. Priority 1 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

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Detainee's early release in 1999 came after the SHCR intervened on his behalf. After his release, detainee returned to work for the SHCR in Sarajevo. Detainee also met, married, and divorced his second wife within nine months of arriving in Sarajevo. Masoud Susic, the father of detainee's second wife, worked at the US Embassy in Sarajevo.⁶ Detainee traveled to Fujairah, United Arab Emirates (AE), to seek work as an imam at a local mosque. Detainee was unsuccessful and returned to Bosnia one month later.⁷

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) In late October 2001, the Bosnian Federal Ministry of Interior Police (FMUP) arrested detainee and several others suspected of being involved in a terrorist plot against the US Embassy in Sarajevo.⁸ After exhausting the legal limits for detention and following the Algerian government's refusal to take custody, Bosnian authorities transferred the "Algerian Six" to US custody on 18 January 2002.⁹

b. (S) Property Held:

- Miscellaneous items, including a watch, clothing, and personal items
- Though not held by JTF-GTMO, the following items were reportedly in detainee's possession at the time of capture¹⁰:
 - Money
 - 4600 Deutsch marks¹¹
 - Algerian passport, number 0705315
 - An Albanian passport with the name Muhammad Medini
 - A Tunisian passport with the name Muhammad Fadil Ben Khem Medini
 - Algerian identification documents issued to him from the Algerian Embassy in Rome in October 2000
 - An appointment book containing Bosnian phone numbers
 - An entry permit from the United Arab Emirates
 - A bill of sale for a 1988 Mercedes Benz car
 - A bank receipt dated 12 July 2001 for 20,500 French francs with the name Ahmed Lahmar (likely detainee's brother)¹²

⁶ TD-314/09118-02, IIR 6 034 0200 02, TD-314/21465-00

⁷ TD-314/09118-02, SFOR-2002-10120, IIR 6 034 0200 02

⁸ IIR 7 130 1022 02, Paragraph 1, TD-314/39634-01

⁹ TD-314/39239-01, 010002 DIPLOMATIC 16-OCT-2001, TD-314/49994-02, AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 29-DEC-2006, Analyst Note: Detainee was arrested on 17 October 2001.

¹⁰ >TD-314/39239-01, IIR 7 130 1056 02

¹¹ Analyst Note: Based on the conversion date of 11 November 2001, 4,600 Deutsch marks was equivalent to \$2,120 US.

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- Miscellaneous documents including a marriage certificate, a diploma from the Islamic University of Medina, and scraps of paper with phone numbers written on them

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 20 January 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: Detainee's file does not indicate why he was sent to JTF-GTMO.

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's account of events is partially truthful, yet incomplete. Detainee attempts to portray himself as a scholarly man who went to the Balkans to work for various NGOs, which he has described during interviews. Detainee fails to acknowledge his extremist ties to multiple terrorist plots, his anti-US rhetoric while in Bosnia, extremist associates, and counterfeiting operations; which have all been corroborated by numerous reports. Detainee has provided deceptive and conflicting information regarding his reasons for requesting an Iranian visa in 2001 and is likely withholding information pertaining to extremist leadership throughout the Balkans and Middle East.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a member of an Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) cell involved in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee advocated hostilities against US forces and the international community in Bosnia, and is linked to multiple terrorist plots and criminal related activity. Detainee had intentions to travel to Afghanistan and Iran, and is reported as doing so prior to his capture. Detainee has demonstrated a commitment to jihad, and would likely engage in anti-US activities if released.

- (S//NF) Detainee is a member of a GIA cell in Bosnia and an assessed participant in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo.
 - (S//NF) The US Embassy reported in October of 2001 that phone number 66-775-375 called on multiple occasions threatening the Embassy. This phone number was found in detainee's possession upon capture.¹³

¹² Analyst Note: Based on the conversion date of 11 November 2001, 20,500 French francs was equivalent to \$2,810 US.

¹³ >TD-314/39170-01, USNIC SARAJEVO 20-OCT-2001

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- (S//NF) On 8 October 2001, FMUP, in cooperation with US forces in Bosnia, apprehended suspected al-Qaida facilitator Bensayah Belkacem, ISN US4AG-010001DP (AG-10001), after an investigation into threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Bosnian authorities also directed the investigation toward seven other individuals, including detainee. The individuals were suspected of involvement in the threats, which led to their subsequent apprehension.¹⁴
 - (S//NF) Over the next two weeks, detainee, along with Muhammad Nechla, ISN US4AG-010003DP (AG-10003), Mustapha Ait Idir, ISN US4AG-010004DP (AG-10004), Lakhdar Boumediene, ISN US4AG-010005DP (AG-10005), and Al-Haj Omar Boudellaa, ISN US4AG-010006DP (AG-10006), were arrested for false attestation of information and suspected involvement in the threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo.¹⁵ This group became known as the “Algerian Six.”
 - (S//NF) The two other individuals arrested were identified as Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) member Khaled al-Arbed, and Atif Munassar, aka (Abu Nasar), a suspected facilitator for the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC).¹⁶
- (S//NF) The Bosnian Federation Supreme Court stated that detainee and his companions attempted to attack the facility and the employees of the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Documents identified the arrested as an organized terrorist group, whose activities constituted an act of international terrorism. The group is suspected of conducting surveillance of the Embassy and its personnel, and coordinating with senior al-Qaida lieutenant Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Hussayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016).¹⁷ However, in 2004, Bosnian prosecutors and police formally exonerated the six Algerians after a lengthy criminal investigation.¹⁸
 - (S//NF) AG-10001 possessed the phone number of a Bosnian locksmith employed at the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Further investigation by embassy authorities revealed that the individual was detainee’s father-in-law. The employee was detained and subsequently failed a polygraph test given by US authorities.¹⁹

¹⁴ IIR 6 933 0021 02

¹⁵ IIR 6 933 0021 02

¹⁶ TD-314/11070-05, IIR 6 933 0021 02, 010001 Mantis ealin26398 21-Nov-2001; Analyst Note: The LIFG and GSPC are both listed as NIPF Priority 1 CT targets. Priority 1 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

¹⁷ TD-314/02606-02, BIH Court Doc BB-014 30-OCT-2001, DCS-G2 Special Assessment-Algerian Six 18-FEB-2004

¹⁸ Washington Post Foreign Service 21-AUG-2006

¹⁹ IIR 7 130 1022 02, Paragraph 1A

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- (S//NF) Despite early claims that they were not associated with each other, communications between the members of the group known as the “Algerian Six” demonstrated a close association amongst the group.
 - (S//NF) Detainee’s mobile phone number and his landline number are listed among AG-10001’s contacts.²⁰ AG-10001 stated that detainee, whom he met in January 2001, was his only acquaintance while in Bosnia.²¹
 - (S//NF) AG-10003 states that AG-10005 assisted detainee and AG-10001 with their respective charity work. (Analyst Note: AG-10005 claimed he first learned of detainee when he saw his name on court papers while in jail, and met him when they were later turned over to the US.)²²
 - (C//REL TO USA, SFOR) AG-10005’s phone number is also listed among AG-10001’s phone number contacts. Additionally, another phone number on the list was for “Abu Zubayda,” believed to be a reference to GZ-10016.²³
 - (S//NF) AG-10003’s phone records indicate that he maintained consistent contact with AG-10005.²⁴
 - (S//NF) FMUP investigation found that items confiscated during AG-10004’s arrest listed AG-10005’s phone number.²⁵
 - (S//NF) AG-10006’s mobile phone memory contained the phone numbers of AG-10003, AG-10004, and AG-10005.²⁶
- (S//NF) Detainee was involved in anti-US and other violent activities in Bosnia, and may have had prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US.
 - (S//NF) Detainee was known in Bosnia as being a vehemently anti-Western Islamic extremist.²⁷ As of late 2000, detainee was reported stating that attacks should be carried out against US troops in Bosnia because he believed the US was the number one enemy of Islam. Detainee and his associates reportedly supported a *fatwa* (religious decree) issued by UBL against the US.²⁸
 - (S//NF) In March 2001, after his return from the United Arab Emirates, detainee was again reported expressing a desire to blow up US soldiers because they were “enemies of God.” Detainee reportedly blamed Americans for everything wrong with Muslims in Bosnia.²⁹

²⁰ 010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001, IIR 6 933 0021 02, IIR 6 034 02

²¹ IIR 6 034 0196 02, IIR 6 034 0896 02

²² IIR 6 034 0205 02, IIR 4 201 2433 06

²³ 010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001

²⁴ TD-314/41670-01

²⁵ TD-314/39904-01

²⁶ TD-314/41367-01

²⁷ TD-314/35452-01

²⁸ TD-314/39169-00

²⁹ TD-314/13355-01

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- (S//NF) Detainee was convicted and sentenced to a five-year prison term for armed robbery of an American in Zenica in October 1997. Croatian authorities also believe he was involved in the 1997 bombings in Travnik and Mostar.³⁰
- (S//NF) Detainee was involved in a shootout with Zenica police and arrested while in a car bearing diplomatic plates believed to be assigned to Iran.³¹ (Analyst Note: Detainee served only two years and three months of his sentence. Detainee's early release in 1999 came after the SHCR intervened on his behalf.)³²
- (C//NF) Detainee was wanted in France and Belgium for his involvement in violent activities.³³
- (S//NF) Detainee is identified as serving in the el-Mujahid Brigade and has been reported as leading a group that was training for acts of terrorism.³⁴
- (S//NF) Several of detainee's associates involved with the SHCR were also connected to terrorist and criminal activities.
 - (S//NF) Detainee and Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad, who were both associated with the SHCR, were tried and convicted by the Bosnian courts.³⁵ Ali Hamad stated detainee attempted to obtain \$20,000 US to purchase counterfeit travel documents. Ali Hamad is currently serving a 12-year sentence for his involvement in a 1997 Mostar bombing and identified detainee as his recruiter to attack foreigners, including an American citizen chosen by detainee.³⁶
 - (S//NF) Detainee, Nabil al-Hila, Hamad, and Ahmad Zayid Salim al-Zuhayri, aka (Handala), ISN US9SA-000669DP (SA-669), are all listed on a Bosnian Agency for Investigation document describing extremists tied into document forgery and car theft.³⁷
 - (S//NF) Rasid al-Sudeiri and Saad Abid al-Ubeida, who were both close to detainee, visited Kosovo and Saudi Arabia several times in 2001 and 2002 as a part of their duties with the SHCR.³⁸ According to the Bosnian government, al-Sudeiri and al-Ubeida were close contacts of SA-669, who planted a car bomb in Mostar in 1997.³⁹ (Analyst Note: Detainee had involvement in the 1997 Mostar bombing.)⁴⁰

³⁰ TD-314/21465-00

³¹ TD-314/21465-00

³² TD-314-09118-02

³³ >USNIC SARAJEVO 20-OCT-2001

³⁴ >IIR 7 130 0009 02, IIR 7 100 0064 98

³⁵ TD-314/09800-04

³⁶ 000669 FM40 08-NOV-2004

³⁷ >IIR 7 130 1056 02

³⁸ TD-314/09800-04

³⁹ Analyst Note: A variant for Rasid al-Sudeiri is Rashid al-Sudairi, who reportedly provided financial support to AG-10001 for his travel to Afghanistan for jihad. For additional information see TD-314/35452-01.

⁴⁰ >IIR 7 100 0064 98, IIR 2 216 1381 01

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- (S//NF) Jawad Jabber Sadkhan, ISN US9IZ-000433DP (IZ-433), photo-identified detainee as one of the six Algerians captured in Bosnia. IZ-433 stated that, since arriving at JTF-GTMO, he heard that detainee possessed prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks and participated in the UBL council that planned the attacks.⁴¹
- (S//NF) Detainee had intentions to travel to Afghanistan and Iran in October of 2001, and is reported as doing so prior to his capture.
 - (S//NF) Detainee reportedly planned to travel to Afghanistan along with the other Algerians, at the urging of AG-10001. Detainee applied for an Iranian visa for onward travel to Afghanistan on 27 September 2001.⁴² Detainee and the others planned to travel as soon as AG-10001 arrived in Afghanistan to make receiving arrangements. Flight itinerary information for detainee showed anticipated travel from Bosnia to Syria on 18 October 2001, with probable onward travel through Iran. Detainee was arrested the day before his planned trip.⁴³
 - (S//NF) AG-10001 encouraged his Algerian associates to participate in jihad. AG-10001 applied for an Iranian visa in Sarajevo for onward travel to Afghanistan on 1 October 2001. He planned to provide travel assistance to help the other Algerians join militant elements in Afghanistan, in anticipation of the US campaign following the 11 September 2001 attacks. AG-10001 received financial support from Shaykh Nasar al-Said, the director of the SHCR, for his travel to Afghanistan.⁴⁴ (Analyst Note: SHCR was detainee's employer at the time.)
 - ◆ (S//NF) A US intelligence assessment identified AG-10001 as the primary al-Qaida facilitator in Bosnia, with ties to GZ-10016. AG-10001 possessed numerous phone numbers linking him to UBL's operational network in Afghanistan and the global Sunni extremist network.⁴⁵
 - (S//NF) Tawfiq Nasir Awadh al-Bayhani, US9SA-000893DP (SA-893) identified detainee as a part of a group who traveled to Iran and on to Afghanistan (or Iraq) geared towards reorganizing and establishing a different strategy to combat US forces.⁴⁶
 - (S//NF) Mamdouh Ibrahim Ahmed Habib, US9AS-000661DP (AS-661, transferred) identified detainee as being present at the Hamza Guesthouse in Kabul in late September of 2001.⁴⁷ (Analyst Note: Detainee's possible travels to

⁴¹ 000433 SIR 18-JAN-2003

⁴² TD-314/35452-01

⁴³ TD-314/35452-01, TD-314/39170-01; SFOR-2002-10166

⁴⁴ TD-314/35452-01, IIR 6 933 0021 02, TD-314/14059-02

⁴⁵ TD-314/14059-02, IIR 7 130 1022 02, IIR 6 933 0021 02, DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian Six 18-FEB-2004

⁴⁶ >000893 SIR 09-JUN-2007b

⁴⁷ >IIR 4 201 0851 05

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Iran and Afghanistan may have taken place between August and October of 2001 just prior to his arrest. If present, the meeting in Iran may have been the venue in which detainee learned of the 11 September 2001 attacks referenced by IZ-111, as numerous al-Qaida leadership were reported in attendance. However, detainee's presence at the aforementioned meeting is considered unlikely because reporting indicates that al-Qaida leadership didn't evacuate Pakistan for Iran until early 2002.)

- (S//NF) Detainee has links to extremists in GIA and to NGOs that supported extremist activities.
 - (S//NF) In November 2000, detainee was reportedly attempting to assume leadership of GIA in Bosnia.⁴⁸
 - (S//NF) On 18 November 2002, the Irish National Police (Garda) arrested Algerian asylum seeker Karim Abbes and searched his house. During the course of the search, the Garda seized false identification papers and a Western Union money transfer form for the payment of 800 Euros to Emina Lahmar, detainee's wife, in Sarajevo, BK. Garda had indications that Abbes was associated with GIA member Hamid Aich before Aich left Ireland in July 2001.⁴⁹
 - (S//NF) Hamid Aich was believed to have been involved in the foiled plot to attack the Los Angeles airport during the Millennium celebrations. He was an associate of Millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam, who was captured attempting to bring explosive materials into the US in December 1999.⁵⁰
 - (S//NF) Detainee reportedly became acquainted with Saleh Nidal and Lionel Dumont, both suspected terrorists associated with GIA, during their 1998 Bosnian imprisonment. Nidal and Dumont are suspected of numerous terrorist acts. Dumont is a convicted murderer and suspected French member of the GIA. He escaped from Bosnian prison on 26 May 1999 and was later captured in December of 2005, ultimately sentenced to 30 years in prison.⁵¹
 - (S//NF) Detainee reportedly provided lessons on Islam for the al-Furqan NGO.⁵² (Analyst Note: AG-10001 was identified as a former head of the al-Furqan NGO. The SHCR had used NGOs such as al-Furqan and al-Haramain to fund the Bosnian Active Islamic Youth Organization (AIO), a radical Islamic organization in Bosnia

⁴⁸ TD-314/39169-00

⁴⁹ TD-314/03253-03; Analyst Note: 800 EUROS is equivalent to \$720 US based on the conversion date of 1 November 2001.

⁵⁰ TD-314/02127-03

⁵¹ TD-314/09118-02, TD-314/21465-00, Paragraph 2; TD-314/16772-02

⁵² TD-314/13355-01; Analyst Note: Al-Furqan is a NIPF Priority 4 TSE. Priority 4 TSEs are described as having available resources and are in a position to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack U.S. persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 4 terrorist groups.

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- associated with the former mujahideen communities. Al-Furqan was noted as a branch of the AIO and taught Wahabi Islam.⁵³)
- (S//NF) Detainee denied having knowledge about the operations of, or the personnel working for, the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, aka al-Haramain NGO, in Bosnia or elsewhere. However, detainee's cell phone SIMM card had the phone number to the al-Haramain Sarajevo office. Three other numbers in his SIMM card were recovered in documents captured in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and attributed to senior SHCR officer Abdul Aziz al-Aqili, Abu Ghaith (possibly al-Qaida spokesman and religious figure Shaykh Suleiman Abu Ghaith), and another unknown individual named Karim. Detainee reportedly worked for the SHCR which coordinated with al-Haramain.⁵⁴
 - (S//NF) The Bosnian-based NGO, Pomoc, provided detainee's wife and the wives of other "Algerian Six" members with a monthly stipend throughout 2004. The Pomoc also provided a stipend to the wife of convicted terrorist Said Atmani, who was associated with Millennium plot participant Ahmed Ressay.⁵⁵
 - (S//NF) The Pomoc NGO is suspected of having ties to the AIO. Pomoc is also suspected of collecting funds for the "Algerian Six" detainees.⁵⁶
 - (S//NF) Detainee has been completely defiant while detained at JTF-GTMO and will likely pose as a significant threat to US interests if released.
 - (S//NF) Detainee has been identified by numerous JTF-GTMO detainees as a "Shaykh" who has issued verbal and written *fatwas* promoting hunger striking, non-compliance with guards, and encouraged uncooperativeness with interrogators.⁵⁷

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been sporadically compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 18 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 26 February 2008, when he was in possession of contraband. He has two Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 1 October 2007, when he threw a shaving razor at a guard. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow

⁵³ 010002 RSO Doc 01-NOV-2001, TD-314/09800-04, Paragraph 2; Analyst Note: Wahabism is a strict or fundamental form of Islam. Al-Haramain is a NIPF Priority 2 TSE. Priority 2 TSEs are described as having demonstrated sustained and active financial support for terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1B terrorist groups. AIO is a NIPF Priority 1 TSE. Priority 1 TSEs provide witting operational support to Priority 1 terrorist groups.

⁵⁴ IIR 6 034 0461 02, TD-314/52648-03, TD-314/12470-02, TD-314/35035-01, Paragraph G

⁵⁵ TD-314/50199-05, Paragraph W

⁵⁶ IIR 7 114 0256 04

⁵⁷ >000067 SIR 19-MAY-2007, 000195 SIR 10-MAY-2007, 000215 SIR 24-AUG-2005, 000493 MRF 30-OCT-2006, 000695 23-AUG-2005, 000760 SIR 17-FEB-2006, 000489 SIR 16-JUN-2006, 000568 SIR 23-AUG-2005, 000568 SIR 26-AUG-2005, 010004 SIR 14-JUN-2006, 000695 SIR 23-AUG-2005, 000760 SIR 17-FEB-2006, 001095 SIR 03-MAR-2006, 010004 SIR 03-JAN-2007, 010004 SIR 14-JUN-2004

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guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, damage to government property, assaults, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of seven Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and two so far in 2008.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 28 March 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee served as a facilitator and was reported as the head of the GIA in Bosnia. He had ties to various NGOs in Bosnia that were known to support extremist groups. Detainee had connections to members of a cell suspected of planning an attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo, where his father-in-law worked as a locksmith. Detainee was arrested for armed robbery of an American citizen and had connections with the 1997 bombing in Mostar.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: As a senior member of the GIA in Bosnia, detainee can provide information on extremists in Bosnia and possibly the Arabian Gulf region. Detainee has information on the GIA and NGO links to the SHCR, AIO, al-Furqan, MDI, and other organizations in Bosnia, and possibly similar groups in other parts of Europe. Detainee likely has information on perpetrated and planned attacks against US Government personnel and facilities in Bosnia, and information on other extremist groups operating in that region.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Terrorist attacks within Bosnia:
 - Planned attack against the US Embassy in Sarajevo
 - Individual attacks targeting US personnel
 - 1997 Mostar bombing
 - Future attack plans including those in the US or involving chemicals
- GZ-10016 and facilitators and financiers within al-Qaida's European network
- Bosnian-based terrorist organizations and affiliated NGOs including:
 - GIA
 - SHCR
 - MDI and its militant wing, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)
- Extremist leadership and meetings in Iran
- Prior knowledge of 11 September 2001
- Al-Qaida guesthouse in Kabul

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9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 24 February 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

v/r,



MARK H. BUZBY
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.