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
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
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Political Parties  
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7.




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--(SBU) This past April, Der Spiegel reported on how Russia has built a relationship with the Alternative For Germany (AfD) party, including close ties between the AfD and United Russia youth wings, and perhaps provided direct funding to the party. This reporting discussed how Russia has paid to bring AfD youth leaders (and youth leaders from the Freedom Party of Austria [FPO] and France's National Front) to conferences in Crimea and Donbas, where they stoutly defended Russian policy.



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Pro-Kremlin NGOs and Think Tanks  
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8 [redacted] 1.4(B)  
[redacted] 1.4(D)  
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--(SBU) The "Russia Eurasia Institute" in Tbilisi organizes protests, publicizes studies critical of NATO, and agitates against EU integration. The Caucasus Research Network, funded directly by the Russian government, moves these products through the region. The Gorchakov Foundation, established by the Russian MFA, funds youth camps and projects to promote networking among pro-Russian youth and advances the Moscow narrative on current events: Russia's foreign aid agency, Rossotrudnichestvo, is responsible for promoting Russian culture, but many of its grants go to "human rights" groups that observe elections, "defend" ethnic Russians overseas, and publish selective human rights reports.

--(SBU) In the United States, an organization known as the "Human Rights Accountability Global Initiative," is working to erode support for the Magnitsky Act (which imposes sanctions on persons responsible for the death of Sergey Magnitsky and other gross human rights violations). The organization screened an anti-Magnitsky film at Washington's Newseum in June. Circumstantial evidence suggests the organization's funding is connected to individuals who benefited from the tax fraud that Magnitsky uncovered in 2008.

-- [redacted] 1.4(B)  
[redacted] 1.4(D)  
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--(SBU) Pro-Kremlin think tanks also provide an opportunity for the Kremlin to influence unsuspecting audiences. In 2016, Deutsche Welle discussed the Berlin launch of the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute (DOC); part of the World Public Forum. The DOC's founder and financier is Vladimir Yakunin, a longtime Putin associate and former head of Russian Railways who was sanctioned by the United States after Russia's attempted annexation of Crimea. Though the DOC denies any connection to the Kremlin, its funding is not transparent and

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several Russian businessmen who are close to Putin are rumored to be contributors. The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS), headed by a former senior Russian intelligence official, has been vocal in arguing against Sweden and Finland joining NATO. RISS has representatives in Finland, France, and Poland, and also partners with a local institute in Serbia.

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Acquiring Interest in Strategic Economic/Information Assets  
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9. [Redacted]

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Intimidation of U.S. Diplomats  
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
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
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**Successful Pushback**  
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11. (SBU) While every country targeted is unique and Russian covert campaigns vary widely, there are examples of host-country push-back that cast a spotlight on Moscow's actions while raising the cost to Russia's security services. Some examples follow:



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
--(SBU) Estonia has adopted a "zero tolerance" approach to illegal activities by Russian intelligence operatives. Estonia does not downplay the capture and deportation of Russian illegals; nor does it quietly trade them back to Russia. Instead, Estonia prosecutes such individuals to the maximum extent of the law, and Estonian authorities discussed this approach openly with Foreign Affairs magazine in June 2014. Every year Kapo, the Estonian domestic intelligence service, puts out a public review of major cases, publicly naming organizations and individuals that are suspected of working with the Russians.

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
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 Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE  
 E.O.: 13526  
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, NATO, RU, SE  
 Captions: SENSITIVE  
 Reference: A) 15 STOCKHOLM 238  
 B) 16 HELSINKI 93  
 C) 15 STOCKHOLM 191

Pass Line: AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF  
 AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PASS TO AMCONSUL HAMBURG  
 AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG  
 AMEMBASSY PARIS PASS TO AMCONSUL STRASBOURG  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK  
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Subject: Swedish Leaders Respond to Russian FM Lavrov Threat



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Russian FM Threatens Military Response to Potential Swedish NATO Membership

2. (U) Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov threatened a military response against Sweden should it join NATO during an April 29 interview with the Swedish daily *Dagens Nyheter*. "Like every state, Sweden is entitled to independently decide the forms for how it wants to arrange its security, starting from its national interests. If Sweden decides to join NATO, we do not believe for that matter the Swedes will attack us. But since the Swedish military infrastructure in that situation will be subordinate to NATO's high command, naturally we will take necessary technical-military measures at our northern borders, since on the other side there is a military

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political bloc that regards Russia as a threat and attempts in every way to hold her back," Lavrov stated. When asked what concrete measures he was referring to, Lavrov replied that "That is not my job. It is a matter for our military forces, the defense ministry, and the Russian general staff. When they see what kind of potential there is on the other side of the border – directly at our border or a bit further from the border – then they will know what the capacity is and what can be expected of it if NATO suddenly decides to stop us in a 'hot' manner." In addition to threatening Sweden about prospective NATO membership, Lavrov also blamed Sweden for the frozen relations between the two countries and criticized the EU and the United States on a number of points – to include Ukraine, Syria, NATO expansion, and the "general licentiousness" of Western culture.

#### Swedish Government and Opposition Leaders Condemn Statements

3. (U) Swedish government and opposition leaders quickly condemned Lavrov's statements and affirmed Sweden's sovereignty over its security policy. Prime Minister Stefan Löfven called Lavrov's threats "very unnecessary and uncalled for. We in Sweden make our own decisions about our defense and security policy. No other country decides those matters for us. We handle them ourselves. We demand respect for this, just like we respect other countries' decisions about their security and defense policies." Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist similarly affirmed Sweden's autonomy after calling Lavrov's statements "unacceptable and unjustifiable." "We make our own decisions. That is of no concern to others. We are in charge when it comes to values, issues to weigh, and how we assess developments in our region and in other parts of the world. Our sovereignty and independence shall not be governed by what others say in ways like this." Foreign Minister Margot Wallström stated in a tweet that "Sweden's security policy is set by Sweden, no one else." The center-right opposition parties also condemned Lavrov's statements, the largest of which, the Moderate Party, called on the MFA to summon the Russian ambassador in response.

4. (SBU) Notably, the government also emphasized Sweden's non-alignment, whereas some opposition politicians used Lavrov's statements as an argument for Swedish NATO membership. Prime Minister Löfven asserted in his response that "it is well-known where we stand. Sweden has been non-aligned for a long time and it has served us well. We have pointed this out to the world many times, and Moscow knows that." Foreign Minister Wallström ended her tweet about Sweden's security policy by stating that "military nonalignment serves us well, and remains in place." Conversely, Center Party Leader Annie Lööf argued that "Russia's actions underline the need for cooperation on security policy. Sweden needs to join NATO in coordination with Finland and with broad parliamentary support. We should build security with others." Christian Democratic MEP Lars Adaktusson asserted that "Lavrov spells it out. This clearly shows why Sweden should join NATO." Liberal Party foreign policy spokesperson, Birgitta Ohlsson, tweeted a picture of the Lavrov interview with the caption "NATO membership now."

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#### Russian Intelligence Operatives Attempt to Influence Debate on NATO HNSA

6. (SBU) Russia made headlines once again on April 30 when the Swedish security service, SÄPO, publicly confirmed that Russian intelligence operatives have attempted to influence the domestic debate on Sweden's ratification of the NATO HNSA. There has been a lively debate in Sweden on the HNSA over the past year, including at a number of conferences and seminars, SÄPO's Chief Analyst, Wilhelm Unge, told *Dagens Nyheter* on April 30 that the agency had documented a number of Russian activities directed at the HNSA: "A person we can tie to Russian intelligence participated in at least one such conference," where he had "actively argued against the agreement." *Dagens Nyheter* also quoted a Swedish government source, who said, "This is a Russian strategy. They do not openly raise Russia's arguments against the agreement. They instead use arguments that


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can appeal to some Swedes, including arguments about a Nordic nuclear-free zone, non-alignment, and Sweden as an independent voice in the world." (Note: The HNSA was signed by the previous administration in September 2014 and will be voted on by parliament on May 25. The agreement is supported by six of eight political parties controlling 80 percent of parliamentary seats, and post expects it to pass. End note.)

Comment

7. 

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MRN: 16 ROME 197  
Date/DTG: May 02, 2016 / 021504Z MAY 16  
From: AMEMBASSY ROME  
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE  
E.O.: 13526  
TAGS: PREL, ETRD, EINV, KSAN, PROP, RU, IT  
Captions: SENSITIVE  
Reference: A) MILAN 46  
B) FLORENCE 38  
Subject: SUBJECT: Italy: Russia Expands Representation (and Influence?)

1. [Redacted]

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2. [Redacted]

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3. (SBU) [Redacted]

B5

[Redacted] Italy's bilateral trade in goods with Russia fell from €30.9 billion in 2013 to €21.3 billion in 2015. Italian exports to Russia fell by approximately one-third in this period, from €10.8 billion in 2013 to €7.1 billion in 2015. The drop in exports occurred across all sectors, including non-sanctioned agricultural products such as olive oil and wine, as well as non-sanctioned sectors such as furniture. The Department's Office of the Chief Economist estimated the effect on Italian exports due solely to sanctions (both US/EU and Russian counter-sanctions) to be 0.2 percent of its global exports, but individual businesses have suffered and provide fodder for those who argue that sanctions should be removed.

4. (SBU) The Italy-Russia Chamber of Commerce and the Italian Embassy in Moscow, together with a host of Italian ministries and business groups, released a guide in March that highlights sanctions-free investment opportunities in Russia for Italian companies. As an example, the guide cites Russian overtures to sanctions-affected cheese producers in Turin to move their production to Russian regions that produce high-quality milk, citing Russian advantages in the costs of material and labor. These efforts track with those of business strategists in Consulate Milan's district who are publicly advising Italian companies to invest in manufacturing plants in Russia to lower import duties and benefit from an expanded market through Russia's membership in the Euro-Asian Customs Union.

**Russia Continues to Make Propaganda and Commercial Inroads in Sicily, Despite Sanctions**

5. [Redacted]

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6. [Redacted]

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8.

[Redacted]

**Russia Targets the Industrial North**

9. (SBU) Russia has continued to expand its representational footprint in Italy's industry-rich north, as well. The Russian Federation established in September 2015 an Honorary Consulate in the Chamber of Commerce of Udine, Friuli-Venezia Giulia (a region led by the PD). This is in addition to Honorary Consulates in Venice, Verona, and Bolzano, and active Consulates General in Milan and Genoa. The fourth meeting and workshop on Italian-Russian industrial, economic and commercial partnerships was held in Milan February 12, with Russia's CG in Milan, Aleksander Nurizade, and Italy's Ambassador to Russia, Cesare Maria Ragalini.

[Redacted]

B5

10. (SBU) Russia seems to be encouraging region-to-region investment. A business delegation from Veneto will visit the Chelyabinsk and Tyumen Oblasts in June 2016. Both conservative and left-leaning Italian regional governments are exchanging visits with Russian counterparts: Lombardy and Novosibirsk have been partner regions since July 2015; a delegation from Lombardy, led by regional Deputy President Fabrizio Sala (Forza Italia, or FI), visited Novosibirsk (Jan 18-20), and a delegation from Liguria led by its regional president

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Giovanni Toti (FI), visited Moscow and Ryazan (March 2-6, 2016). In addition, center-left administered Northern Italian regions, like Piedmont and Friuli Venezia Giulia, host Russian delegations on a regular basis. Turin hosted a delegation from Moscow on urban planning in March 2016, and in October 2015 Friuli hosted a Russian delegation during an EXPO parallel program. Trentino Alto Adige, in particular Alto Adige/Sudtirool, targeted Russia in its 2015-16 tourism plan. Additionally, Italian MEPs from Forza Italia, led by MEP Elisabetta Gardini (elected in the North East Constituency in 2014, and currently running as the center-right candidate for Mayor in Bolzano) visited Russia in December 2015.

11. (SBU) In central Italy, Russia appears to be following the same playbook, recently opening an Honorary Consulate inside the Italian portion of the Rimini airport in Emilia-Romagna. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Russians, even post-sanctions, are the largest tourist presence in the area (Ref B). The Tuscany region recently approved a memorandum of understanding with the Rostoy oblast in Russia aimed at fostering economic and cultural ties, an apparent response to the decrease of Tuscan exports to Russia post-sanctions. According to Unioncamere, the federation of Chambers of Commerce, exports from Tuscany to Russia decreased by 11 percent during the first six months of 2015, while the decrease was close to 15 percent during 2014.

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12. [REDACTED]

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


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MRN: 16 PRAGUE 237  
 Date/DTG: Oct 13, 2016 / 131342Z OCT 16  
 From: AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
 Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE  
 E.O.: 13526  
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PROP, PINR, CZ  
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 Reference: A) 16 PRAGUE 83  
 B) 16 PRAGUE 193  
 Pass Line: EUR/CE FOR LARRY KORB  
 EUR/PD/ICE FOR EDWARD FINDLAY  
 AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF  
 AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PASS TO AMCONSUL HAMBURG  
 AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG  
 AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PASS TO AMEMBASSY MINSK  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG  
 AMEMBASSY PARIS PASS TO AMCONSUL STRASBOURG  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG  
 Subject: Czech Government Establishes Center to Counter Threats

1.   


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The PM's Initiative

2. (SBU) Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka ordered a national security audit following the Paris and Brussels attacks to assess the Czech Republic's ability to mitigate real internal and external security threats. As part of this audit, experts

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from the Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs, as well as partners from academia and the think-tank community, identified 11 separate areas constituting internal security threats. Some of these areas may be interconnected:

1. Terrorism
2. Extremism
3. Security Aspects of Migration
4. Organized Crime
5. Energy and Industrial Security
6. Currency and Financial Stability
7. Cyber Security
8. Influence of Foreign Powers
9. Human Threats (referring to so-called insider threats)
10. Environmental Threats
11. Hybrid Threats (propaganda and disinformation)

3. (SBU) [Redacted]

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The National Security Audit, as such, provides a legal framework that establishes the authorities and capabilities within the Czech Government to respond to threats. The MoI has created working groups to study each threat. Each working group brings together experts from the various government ministries, the Czech Intelligence services, think-tanks and academia. The working groups have met on a regular basis over the past few months. In connection to academia, for example, academics from Prague-based Charles University, Brno-based Masaryk University and Israeli academics from the University of Haifa are also providing expertise to the audit.

**Recommendations to Action Plans**

4. (SBU) The working groups on the eleven threat areas regularly update the National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister on progress. According to Chovanec, a final text with general conclusions will be presented to the National Security Council and likely approved by the Government by the end of this year. Chovanec added that the documents would become publically available (after Government approval), but noted that the action plans will have classified chapters not accessible to the public.

**Center for Terrorism and Hybrid Threats**

5. [Redacted]

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6. (SBU) [Redacted] also spoke to the challenge the Center will face in producing factual products that steer clear of politics. She admitted that disinformation is inherently politically motivated, complicating the task of the MoI Threat Center in responding to it. [Redacted] explained that there will be close cooperation with other EU partners, in

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particular the EU External Action Service (EEAS) STRATCOM East. [redacted] also welcomed closer cooperation with U.S. agencies and hoped that there will be opportunities in the near future to expand U.S.-Czech cooperation on countering the disinformation threat, particularly by sharing best practices and mitigation strategies.

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7. [redacted]

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MRN: 16 PRAGUE 83  
Date/DTG: Apr 14, 2016 / 141438Z APR 16  
From: AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE  
E.O.: 13526  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, SOCI, EUN, RU, CZ  
Captions: SENSITIVE  
Pass Line: EUR/CE FOR LAWRENCE KORB  
Subject: Czech Republic: Russian Disinformation on the Cheap

1. (SBU) Summary. Embassy interlocutors across Czech civil society, academia and government largely agree that the impact of Russian disinformation is moderate, but has been growing, especially in the wake of the migration debate. We have seen a significant increase in the number of on-line media servers that tout an alternative take on local and international developments than the mainstream media. In the Czech Republic, these online media servers are almost exclusively run by Czechs who can often be described as pro-Russian. And while many informed Czech observers believe the influence of Russian disinformation is overstated, they also contend that Russia actively seeks to exacerbate fissures within Czech society tapping into dissatisfaction within some segments of Czech society over the socioeconomic return on the EU experiment. End Summary.

2. (SBU) In April 2015, the Open Source Center produced a report (see ref) on the prevalence of Russian disinformation in the Czech Republic following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. This is the first of two cables analyzing the impact of Russian disinformation in the Czech Republic. A subsequent cable will focus on the role of the Russian Embassy in the Czech Republic. We use the term "disinformation" to describe Russian efforts to undermine the unity and resolve of the transatlantic alliance by sowing doubt among Europeans about EU institutions, EU policy, US policy and the NATO alliance.

#### Fertile Soil for Illiberal Views?

3. (SBU) Few regard the Czech Republic as a priority target for Russian disinformation, considering how the violent squashing of the 1968 "Prague Spring" reform movement by Soviet and Warsaw-pact countries was seared in the collective memory of Czechs. The reality, according to [redacted] is somewhat different. [redacted] notes that in what he calls "the regions" (those areas outside the Czech Republic's largest cities such as Prague, Brno and Plzen) a sense of nostalgia for the Communist period from 1948 to 1989 as a more economically predictable and socially "just" time is deeply rooted amongst pensioners and, to a less degree, younger people who have little to no recollection of the communist period. These villages and small towns are where Europe's largest unreformed Communist party, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), draws most of its

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support. (Note. Currently the KSCM is the third largest party in the Czech parliament with 33 seats out of 200. End note).

4. (U) The economic shock reforms of the government of Vaclav Klaus in the early 1990s hit some in the areas outside the capital very hard. Numerous factory workers, particularly in massive State Owned Enterprises (SOE), mining and heavy industry, lost their jobs and social benefits were cut. Some of these areas, such as Ostrava, and Northern Bohemia—on the border with former East Germany—have yet to recover. Jobs in the new economy often requiring advanced education and IT skills are predominantly concentrated in Prague and a few larger cities, while most of the rest of the rural Czech Republic and old industrial North is largely overlooked. The differences between Prague and these smaller towns and villages have only been exacerbated since the Velvet Revolution of 1989. In towns in Northern Bohemia or Silesia region on the border with Poland, for example, there is a sense that people have “lost out”.

5. (U) Journalists argue that the Czech media, overwhelmingly located in its “golden cage” in Prague, like to celebrate positive aspects of pro-European and pro-free market policies, but that populations in areas outside of Prague, Plzeň or Brno often feel those gains were won at their expense. Those areas that lost out during the economic reforms of the last 25 years are where President Zeman found the bulk of his political support during his 2013 Presidential campaign, and where Zeman’s populist rhetoric appears to resonate the most.

#### Zeman Taps into Cynicism for Own Political Ends, Playing to Common Russian Themes

6. (SBU) [REDACTED] President Milos Zeman is now by far the most popular politician in the Czech Republic, with approval ratings hovering around 60 percent. Elected in 2013, he is the first popularly elected President in Czech history (previous Presidents were elected through Parliament). When he ran for President, he largely campaigned on a platform that appealed to anxious voters who disagreed with the Prague intelligentsia and were more concerned about their economic standing and had fewer compunctions about looking east. He effectively routed his opponent in the elections by alluding to former Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg’s aristocratic – read German/Austrian, heritage -- and invoking the “betrayal” of the Czechs’ Sudeten German population during WW II and the hollow threat of their returning to the Czech Republic to reclaim their land. Many in the media and in academia believe that Moscow directly funded Zeman’s campaign.

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7. (SBU) [REDACTED]

B5

8. (SBU) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] crediting Zeman’s political acumen and ability to tune in to the concerns of the common Czech about the future. In light of the vast changes occurring around them [REDACTED]

B5

[REDACTED] their most common explanation was that Zeman values loyalty. Most academics and civil society experts however suspect that the Russians exert substantial influence on Zeman through those advisors, who include, for example, Martin Nejedly the Czech Representative for Russian Oil Company Lukoil and Vratislav Mynar, the Head of the Presidential Office whom the Czech internal security service refuses to clear due to his substantial Russian ties.

9. (SBU) Some Prague journalists lament that much of Czech media, which they describe as largely a “Prague media” plays right into Zeman’s hands even as they attempt to criticize him. Like populists elsewhere in Europe, Zeman is very skilled

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at homing in on the concerns of the common Czech. Whether it is the fear of Islam, the faceless EU bureaucrats who issues the latest "diktat" (decree) without the consent of the Czech people. (Note: Read refugee quotas which the EU adopted over Czech objections. End Note), or the elitism of the Prague intelligentsia who have little trust in the cognitive faculties of the common Czechs, Zeman knows how to address the common Czech's concerns and uncertainty. Thanks to his popularity, especially outside of Prague, Zeman often dominates the public debate, limiting the political maneuver space for other politicians, including Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka. And the more the Prague media attack and criticize Zeman, the more he seems to be able to exploit his role as the selfless defender of the common man who stands up to the Prague "kavarna". The Prague elite and intelligentsia, called the "kavarna" (coffee house) society by its detractors, has historically been viewed with suspicion by the common man in the "hospoda" (pub).

[Redacted]

B5

10. (SBU) Comment.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Skepticism about the European Union, the liberal democratic economic model and the Czech Republic's geopolitical orientation is more tied to domestic conditions and historical Czech developments.

B5

[Redacted]

Signature:

Kashkett

[Redacted Signature]

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RELEASE IN PART 1.4(B),B1,1.4(D),1.4(C)



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Sensitive



MRN: 16 PODGORICA 67  
 Date/DTG: Oct 18, 2016 / 181224Z OCT 16  
 From: AMEMBASSY PODGORICA  
 Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE  
 E.O.: 13526  
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ME  
 Reference: 16 PODGORICA 63  
 Pass Line: AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF  
 AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PASS TO AMCONSUL HAMBURG  
 AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG  
 AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PASS TO AMEMBASSY MINSK  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG  
 AMEMBASSY PARIS PASS TO AMCONSUL STRASBOURG  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

Subject: Montenegro: Elections Smooth, but Attempted Outside Influence Evident

1. [Redacted]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

Elections Billed as Russia versus the West

2. [Redacted]

Twenty Serbs Attempt Attack on Parliament – Opposition Calls It a Coup

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3 [Redacted]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

4 [Redacted]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

**Cyber Attacks Lead to Shutdown of Viber and What's App**

5. (U) On election day, countless citizens, including Embassy staff, received spam text messages from several countries, including Great Britain and China. The text messages alleged that the DPS was conducting fraudulent activities on the polling day, such as paying for votes. The Montenegrin Agency for Electronic Telecommunications and Postal Services (EKIP) temporarily suspended the Viber and WhatsApp applications for about 90 minutes to halt the "bombardment" of spam text messages. ~~As a result of the suspension~~, the suspension was unprecedented; but he justified the decision given the need to counter the effects of the spam messages. The CSO Human Rights Action claimed that the Agency's decision to suspend the Viber and WhatsApp applications was illegal and contrary to the Montenegrin constitution and freedom of the press. Viber has agreed to cooperate with CSO CDT to clarify and establish standard procedures and protocols should such an incident recur.

6. (U) At the same time, many portals experienced massive cyber denial of service attacks, including CdM.me; a main news portal, CDT, a key CSO monitoring the elections, and the DPS website itself. CdM reported that the attacks came from groups in France, Italy, Finland, Russia and the United States. Hackers made multiple attempts to enter the administrative part of CdM's website, disabling infrastructure, and bringing down servers, according to a press release by the Ministry of Informational Society and Telecommunications. In response, the national CIRT team took measures in coordination with state institutions to prevent the attacks so that Montenegrin portals remained available to citizens on election day.

**Russian News Agency Issues False Reports to Undermine Voter Confidence**

7. [Redacted]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

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[Redacted]

Comment

8. [Redacted]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

Signature:

UYEHARA

[Redacted]

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Sensitive

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DOS-SFRC-20161216-076

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RELEASE IN PART  
1.4(B), B1, 1.4(G), 1.4(D), B6



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Sensitive



MRN: 16 PODGORICA 63  
 Date/DTG: Sep 28, 2016 / 281016Z SEP 16  
 From: AMEMBASSY PODGORICA  
 Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*  
 E.O.: 13526  
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ME  
 Captions: SENSITIVE  
 Pass Line: AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF  
 AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PASS TO AMCONSUL HAMBURG  
 AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG  
 AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PASS TO AMEMBASSY MINSK  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG  
 AMEMBASSY PARIS PASS TO AMCONSUL STRASBOURG  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

Subject: Russia Fills DFs Pockets to Influence Parliamentary Elections

1.

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

Millions from Russia Flood DF's Campaign Coffers


2.

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DOS-SFRC-20161216-070

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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


1.4(B)

Money Buys Top-Notch Campaign Firm

1.4(D)

B1



DF Goes Hi Tech With New Campaign Firm and Loads of Money

4. (SBU) ██████████ explained to the Charge that the DF is not only using Russian funding for its campaign advertisements and strategy, but it bussed in supporters, who were paid 20 euros and an iPad, to attend its first rally. ██████████ informed Pol/E Chief that DF's activists are paid between 200-400 euros per month for their activities (Embassy Note: The average salary in Montenegro is approximately 400 euro/month. End Note.) Each activist will also receive an iPad, which will be connected to a central network – a network that is continually expanding.

5. (SBU) In addition to arming its supporters with high tech gadgets, DF has utilized sophisticated computer know-how, an activity that goes well beyond DF's capabilities even six months ago. ██████████ elaborating on media reports, informed the Ambassador that DF was able to send 60,000 text messages via the Slovenian telecom provider T2 during DPS' campaign kick-off in Cetinje that read, "One more deceit of Milo [Djukanovic] is making its way from the destroyed Cetinje. Us or Him. Signed the DF." He also highlighted that two days prior, T2 has sent empty text messages to many people in what he describes as "obviously a probe." In addition, DF photo shopped photographs of a DPS campaign rally, altering t-shirt logos to match DF's slogans. For example, ██████████ referred to Dnevne Novine's front page picture of a DPS rally in Cetinje in which DF changed one participant's jacket logo from "Quelle" to "MI III On [Us or Him]." Embassy interlocutors are confident that all these activities could only be made possible through exorbitant funding from Russia.

Avalanche of Advertising an Expensive Venture

6. (SBU) The most visible confirmation that DF is sitting on large amounts of newly found income is its extensive print and online advertising campaign. ██████████ noted that DF had purchased 700,000 euros in advertising space in the anti-government daily Vijesti. ██████████ relayed to the Ambassador that DF's first installment to Vijesti totaled 500,000 euros. However, ██████████ informed the embassy's PAO that the advertising contract with DF was worth 250,000 to 300,000 euros and openly scoffed at the 700,000 euro figure. He also stated that DF spent the most with Vijesti in the last three elections cycles because of its interest in Vijesti's readership/viewership. Regardless of whether the print ads cost 250,000 or 700,000 euros, this is an exceptionally high amount of money for just one medium of advertising and does not include the cost to print and post the numerous billboards throughout the country. All Embassies have noticed the large ratio of DF billboards compared to the other parties, including DPS.

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7. (SBU) In addition to Vijesti, the [REDACTED] informed PAO that DF had approached and offered Dan 150,000 euros to run advertising and to place photos, have input in headlines, and similar editorial input. [REDACTED] noted that this amount was more than twice their total income from political party ads during the last election. Despite this strong economic incentive, the editorial management rejected the offer, with several of the editors threatening to leave if it was accepted. While Vijesti is placing DF's advertising, it categorically denied that it would ever take money to influence its editorial policy:

8. (SBU) DF has not just focused on print media, but has also run a variety of controversial videos on television (which have since been removed for insulting content), YouTube, and other social media sites. These videos are professionally crafted and focus on anti-Djukanovic messages that link him to corruption and theft.

But, Does Money Talk?

9. [REDACTED]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
1.4(G)  
B1

Comment

10. [REDACTED]

Signature:

UYEHARA

[REDACTED]

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1.4(B), B1, 1.4(D), B6~~CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN~~  
Sensitive

MRN: 16 MOSCOW 813  
 Date/DTG: Aug 17, 2016 / 171452Z AUG 16  
 From: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
 Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE  
 E.O.: 13526  
 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, KCOR, RU, UA  
 Captions: NOFORN, SENSITIVE  
 Reference: A) 16 MOSCOW 795  
 B) 15 MOSCOW 845  
 C) 15 MOSCOW 177  
 D) 16 MOSCOW 1026  
 E) 16 MOSCOW 381

Pass Line: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

Subject: Russia: Security Services Reshuffle Fuels Widespread Speculation, Keeps Analysts Guessing

1. (SBU) Summary: The high profile resignation on July 26 of Andrey Belyaninov, Head of the Federal Customs Service (FCS) and his replacement by presidential envoy Vladimir Bulavin marked the latest in a series of security services shakeups that challenge conventional explanation. Belyaninov, a former Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and close Putin associate, resigned after a widely publicized raid on his home. This now familiar pattern of public shaming and resignation highlights the increasing vulnerability of close associates of the president once thought to be untouchable. While some analysts point to an institutional conflict between competing security services, others believe Russia's shrinking economic pie necessitates greater efficiency and less greed among the ruling class. All agree, however, that the behind-the-scenes corruption investigations and personnel shifts should not be chalked up to a government reform effort. The August 12 (scandal-free) dismissal of Sergey Ivanov, Head of the Presidential Administration and longtime Putin advisor, added further intrigue, but Ivanov's departure while abrupt, is likely not part of the shakeups which are seen as a means of keeping potential adversaries guessing and off guard. The difference now appears to be the increasing likelihood of Putin's cronies bearing the brunt. Whether by design or happenstance, analysts expect continued changes, with potentially deleterious effects on the governance of Russia. End Summary.

#### High Profile Resignation Raises Eyebrows; Sends Message to Elites?

2. (SBU) On July 26, Premier Dmitry Medvedev accepted the resignation of Federal Customs Head Belyaninov following a highly publicized FSB and Investigative Committee (SK) search of his home turned up approximately \$925,000 in cash (rubles, dollars, and euros) as well as expensive jewelry, artwork, and other valuables. Belyaninov's replacement by Presidential Envoy to the Northwestern Federal District and former KGB official Vladimir Bulavin created a cascading wave

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of position swaps among regional and federal officials (Ref A). As a close associate of Putin dating back to their KGB days in East Germany, many considered Belyaninov to be untouchable – apparently even Belyaninov thought that. Another theory speculated that the FCS head had failed to generate and divert adequate revenue needed for the upcoming election period. Belyaninov’s association with Dmitriy Mikhailchenko, a St. Petersburg businessman arrested in a contraband alcohol import scheme and implicated in other criminal activity, constituted yet a third theory. [redacted]

B6

[redacted] noted Belyaninov had been warned by Putin to curb his corruption seven or eight years ago but did not adequately respond. This assertion lends credence to the most likely scenario: that he was targeted precisely because of his arrogance and personal sense of invulnerability. (Note: The press reported that Belyaninov lived in a 200 million ruble [\$3.1 million] mansion. End note). The pattern of investigation from publicized search to public disgrace to resignation among top officials is becoming increasingly common.

3. [redacted]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

**In Lean Times Loyalty Is No Longer Enough (or a License to Thrive); Who's Next?**

4. [redacted]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

5. [redacted]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

6. [redacted]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

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**Healthy Competition Benefits the Boss, Keeps Authorities in Check**

10. (SBU) Political Analyst [REDACTED] described a symbiotic structure in which the system would persist as long as absolute power rested solely in the hands of the president. She likened a complete lack of unity in the Kremlin to an informal system of checks and balances. Noting the genuine struggle over dwindling resources, she pointed to a generational shift in which younger officers were seeking their piece of the now shrinking pie. Entrenched elites are more vulnerable now because the value of "personal loyalty to the president" has diminished since all functionaries demonstrated equal loyalty. She described the Kremlin as a "collection of bureaucratic clans of various degrees of closeness to the center, all trying to guess exactly what's on the boss' mind and act accordingly. The struggle was over administrative and financial resources and the clans amounted to interest groups." The boundaries of these groups, she said, did not correspond with institutions. She compared the situation of competing security services vying for scarcer resources and living in constant fear of one another to a "parody of the system of checks and public control" of a democracy, which she contended, was preferable to "all-powerful siloviki who feared nothing."

11. [REDACTED]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

**The President's Chief of Staff Replaced by 44 Year-Old Former Diplomat**

12. [REDACTED]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

**Comment**

13. [REDACTED]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

Signature: TRACY

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[REDACTED]

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MRN: 15 HELSINKI 374  
Date/DTG: Jun 26, 2015 / 261653Z JUN 15  
From: AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE  
E.O.: 13526  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS, UP, EN, FI  
Captions: SENSITIVE  
Reference: 09 HELSINKI 408  
Subject: Finland's Diverse Russian Minority: A Skeptical Audience for Moscow

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Finland's estimated 70,000 Russian speakers are an ethnically and politically diverse group that enjoys access to Finnish education, media, and citizenship, but struggles with informal barriers to employment and acceptance. Up to half of Finnish Russian speakers are not ethnically Russian, but Finnish, Ingrian, or others from the former Soviet Union. The group is divided in their attitudes toward Russia and the Ukraine crisis and is politically inactive, suggesting most would be relatively unsusceptible to Russian propaganda. Russia's actions prompt suspicion among many native Finns, however, which could slow the minority's integration. END SUMMARY.

#### A Diverse and Growing Minority

2. (SBU) Russians are Finland's largest immigrant group. In 2014, 70,000 Russian speakers lived in this country of 5.5 million, up from approximately 50,000 in 2008. About 30,000 people hold Russian citizenship, including the 20,500 people who held dual Russian and Finnish citizenship in 2013. Finnish authorities granted about 3,100 residence permits to Russian citizens in 2014, roughly evenly divided among students, family reunification, and workers or returning former residents. Finland's four consulates in Russia issued about one million visas for temporary travel in 2014. Applications for residence permits and temporary visas declined in 2014, probably because of the worsening economic situation in Russia.

3. (SBU) The diverse nature of the minority makes this count imprecise. Many listed as Russian speakers come from (and identify with) Estonia or elsewhere in the former Soviet area, and many people who speak other languages at home may not be counted if Russian is not recorded as their primary language. Furthermore, up to half of Finnish Russian speakers are not ethnically Russian, but are ethnically Finnish, Ingrian (ethnically Finnish individuals from the St. Petersburg region), or others who lived in the former Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Finnish government encouraged Ingrians and others to settle in Finland but did not closely track the large wave of people, many of whom are Russian-speaking, who came under this program. The Finnish Association of Russian-Speaker Organizations (FARO) estimates that the total number of Russian speakers could

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be as high as 100,000 because of these "hidden" compatriots.

4. (SBU) Finnish statistics suggest that at least half of the Russian speakers living in Finland are couples or families with children; there are 10,000 Russian-speaking couples, and another nearly 10,000 Russian speakers are married to Finns (mostly women married to Finnish men), and 4,000 are single parents. About 40 percent of Russian speakers live in the capital area, and the remainder lives mainly in smaller towns in the southeast near the Russian border. Most adult Russian speakers were born outside of Finland and arrived after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the second generation, who arrived as children or were born in Finland since the 1990s, is only now reaching adulthood.

#### Challenges to Integration

5. (SBU) Immigration is a relatively new phenomenon in Finland, which until 1990 granted residence permits to only a handful of foreigners. Immigrants of all stripes have struggled to find their place in Finland's tight-knit and tight-lipped society, according to our contacts. Russians are at a disadvantage because of Finland's history of conflict with its larger neighbor, and polls show that they are among the least-liked group of immigrants after Arabs and Somalis. Studies and our contacts report that Finns do not differentiate among ethnically Russian or Ingrian Russian speakers, and that individuals who identified themselves as Finns before arriving in country begin to identify more as Russians after moving to Finland because they are treated like Russians by native Finns.

6. (SBU) In a survey of Russian speakers conducted in December 2014, one-third said they had been treated negatively because of their language affiliation. Among Russian speakers age 18-34, 44 percent said they had been harassed. The Ombudsman for Minorities receives reports of Finnish students bullying Russian-speaking students, and many anecdotally report that they avoid speaking Russian in public so as not to attract negative attention.

#### Unemployment High

7. (SBU) Although many Russian immigrants speak Finnish and have received schooling in Finland or arrive in the country with a good education, unemployment among Russian speakers is 32 percent, higher than the national rate of 10 percent, but well below the estimated nearly 60 percent unemployment rate in the Somali community. A 2012 study showed that identical job applications were twice as likely to result in interviews when they bore a Finnish name compared to when the putative applicant had a Russian name. Russian speakers also report being paid less than their native Finnish colleagues, and being reprimanded for speaking Russian in a personal capacity while on the job, according to a study by the Ministry of Labor. While many people commute from Estonia via a short ferry ride to work in Finland, contacts at the Finnish Institute of Migration point out that few Russians commute for work across the eastern border.

8. (SBU) At the same time, some companies have used Russian speakers' skills to pave the way to increased business in Russia. For example, Skaala, a family-owned high-end window manufacturer, told post its Finland-based Russian-speaking employees played a key role in training new employees and dealing with Russian officials when the firm opened a factory near St. Petersburg recently.

#### Russian Speakers Remain Fragmented and Politically Inactive

9. (SBU) With the growing number of Russian immigrants, the level of organization among Russian immigrants appears to be increasing, albeit from a low level. FARO, one of the largest representatives of Russian groups in Finland, serves as an umbrella organization for the many Russian-language sport, charitable, and cultural activities. Post's FARO contact explained that these clubs not only provide extracurricular activities for Russian-speaking children, but also provide employment or volunteer activity and social connections for many adults who otherwise would be isolated and unoccupied in Finland. This network and the large number of speakers provide a wide range of activities but also allow some to remain in a Russian-language bubble.

10. (SBU) Despite their numbers, Russian speakers remain politically divided and inactive, with the lowest

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voting rates among all immigrant groups, according to FARO. This helps explain why there has been little effort to tap Russian speakers' political potential. Two second-generation Russians were unsuccessful candidates in the parliamentary elections for the National Conservative and Green Parties. Given the generally negative image of Russians (and immigrants) in Finland, however, candidates also need to appeal to the Finnish public, making them more likely to play down their Russian ties.

11. (SBU) Embassy contacts, press, and surveys indicate that Russian speakers are divided about how to view the Kremlin's recent actions in Ukraine. In December, two-thirds of Russian speakers surveyed said that the Ukraine crisis had worsened relations between Finland and Russia, while 19 percent said they were unchanged. Press reports suggest that the Ukraine crisis has caused more divisions within Russian speaking circles than between them and ordinary Finns.

#### Ukraine Crisis Prompts Increased Scrutiny

12. (SBU) Russian speakers' growing numbers and the Ukraine crisis have made this minority more visible and spurred initiatives to better integrate them into Finnish society and mitigate potential security risks. In May 2013, Finnish state-owned television YLE began a daily Russian-language news broadcast to improve the fragmented media market offering news sources with a Finnish perspective to this minority. YLE reports viewership of about 200-300,000 for its five-minute broadcast, which is also visible in Russia. In December, 40 percent of Russian speakers polled said they considered Finnish-produced news more reliable than Russian sources; however 13 percent preferred Russian news and 47 percent would not express a preference.

13. (SBU) Our contacts at [REDACTED] an umbrella organization for all immigrants, say that local and national governments have begun seeking immigrant groups' viewpoints when developing policies that affect them. The nonpolitical FARO has expanded its work to include working groups on topics such as employment, legal issues, and promoting this minority's involvement in social issues. However, the organization cannot judge how well it represents the Finnish Russian minority because the group is divided by ethnicity, length of residence, and other factors and [REDACTED] contacts note that the Russians are the least active immigrant group they represent.

14. (SBU) The Ukraine crisis raised questions among Finns about Russia's ability to influence the large number of Russians with dual citizenship. A new Russian law, which entered into force in August 2014, and requires dual citizens to register with Russian authorities, sparked debate among Finnish officials and netizens. Both Finland's Ministry of Interior and a ministerial working group have investigated the status of dual citizens and its effects on national security. The working group concluded in early June that the appointment of dual citizens to official positions had no effect on national security, but recommended that the legislation be amended to require civil servants' loyalties be investigated for conflicts of interest whether expressed as citizenship or not. Prime Minister Sipilä and Foreign Minister Soini told Finnish press in April 2015, that the matter should be investigated further, suggesting that the government could still opt to update the legislation.

15. (SBU) Similarly, Russia's decision in January 2015, to forbid foreign ownership of land in border areas reignited the recurring debate about the advisability of allowing non-EU citizens to own land in Finland. Since at least 2009, parliamentarians have introduced citizen initiatives and legislation that would bar such ownership, driven by security concerns and worries that Russian land purchases drive up real estate costs and price ordinary Finns out of the market. Despite an overall decline in Russian land purchases since 2014, because of the ruble's weakness, Defense Minister Jussi Niinistö noted earlier this year that Russian purchases of land near military bases in southeastern Finland raised questions about the bases' security. The Parliament failed to pass the latest proposed law in late 2014, but it could be revived if sensitive land purchases continue.

#### Comment: No Fertile Ground for Russian Propaganda

16. (SBU) Despite cultural obstacles to full integration, Finland's Russian minority enjoys some of the most accommodating integration laws in Europe, according to MIPEX, a comparative index of integration policies. Moreover, members of the group moved to Finland voluntarily, and are therefore perhaps less likely to feel Moscow's pull than involuntary expatriates in the Baltic States. Their diverse backgrounds, including up to half

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that do not identify as Russians, coupled with a generally high level of education and family and ethnic ties to Finland makes this group relatively unsusceptible to Russian propaganda or manipulation. Although negative attitudes toward Russia pose a challenge to integration, polls show that young people in Finland have more interaction with an international population and are more likely to view immigrants positively, so that the second generation of Russian speakers may have better chances of integrating. Reported differences of opinion about Russian actions in Ukraine, however, suggest some remain sympathetic to Moscow's worldview.

Signature: ORECK

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The signature area is heavily redacted with black boxes. There are three distinct redacted blocks: a small one on the left, a large one in the center, and a long one at the bottom.

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SBU

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RELEASE IN PART 1.4(B),B1,1.4(D)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Sensitive



MRN: 16 ANKARA 799  
 Date/DTG: Nov 02 2016 / 020910Z NOV 16  
 From: AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
 Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE  
 E.O.: 13526  
 TAGS: PREL, TR, RU, KPAO  
 Captions: SENSITIVE  
 Reference: A) 16 STATE 53225  
 B) 16 ANKARA 775  
 C) 16 ANKARA 767  
 D) 16 ANKARA 659

Pass Line: AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF  
 AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PASS TO AMCONSUL HAMBURG  
 AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG  
 AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PASS TO AMEMBASSY MINSK  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG  
 AMEMBASSY PARIS PASS TO AMCONSUL STRASBOURG  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

Subject: Russia Advancing Anti U.S. Narratives in Turkish Press and Social Media

1. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

2. (SBU) In the months since the July 15 coup attempt, Russian political figures have begun to appear regularly in the Turkish press in interviews accusing the United States of having supported the coup attempt, or alleging that the Gulenist movement (in Turkey known as the "Fethullah Terrorist Organization", or FETO) is actually run by the CIA. In an October interview with *Aydinlik* newspaper Kremlin ally and key Russia propagandist Alexander Dugin said "this coup attempt was about the U.S. waging a war against the Erdogan regime - this has become clear when Fethullah Gulen's extradition was ... rejected" These comments received

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


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front-page attention across the pro-government press and social media space.


3. (SBU) Similarly, Russian officials in Turkey have taken advantage of media exposure to reinforce and continue to promote Russian misinformation campaigns started elsewhere. For example, in a public appearance in late September, Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov repeated an earlier and discredited claim that the "drones" responsible for an airstrike against an aid convoy in northern Syria "took off from Incirlik airbase". The ambassador's claims were quickly picked up by a number of pro-government dailies, such as *Aksam*, which reported the statement as evidence of the "Incirlik trace" for the strike. Karlov's claims echoed through Turkish social media as well, prompting Post to issue a rebuttal.

4.



1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

5.



1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

6.



1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

7.



1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

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