

Alexander, et al. v. FBI, et al. CA 96-2123 and  
Grimley, et al. v. FBI, et al. CA 1:97CV1288  
(Consolidated Actions)

Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' First  
Request for Production of Documents to Def. EOP

DR# 3

Doc. Nos. 1005119 - 5199

DECLARATION OF ANTHONY MARCECA

I, Anthony Marceca, hereby declare:

1. I make this Declaration based on personal knowledge, of my own volition, and-not because of any inducement, promise or threat of any kind.

2. In mid-August 1993, I was detailed from my position as an investigator with the United States Army Criminal Investigative Division to the White House Office of Personnel Security, where I remained until mid-February 1994. At that time I had, and to this day I have, a Top Secret security clearance.

3. One of my assignments at the Office of Personnel Security was to pick up and continue the project of recreating personnel security files on employees and officials from the prior Administration who continued in their positions with the Clinton Administration, as well as others who continued to have a legitimate need for access to the White House complex. It was my understanding that all personnel security files from the prior Administration were sent to the archives during the transition between Administrations. This project was known as the Update Project.

4. Just prior to beginning my duties with the Office of Personnel Security, I was briefed by a long-time employee of the Office who was retiring. She showed me the procedure to follow in performing the Update Project, which consisted of creating a new file folder for "holdover" personnel and others who continued to need access to the White House complex, and ordering a copy of each individual's "Previous Report" (i.e., the individual's prior

~

background investigation) from the FBI to be placed in his or her file. The employee who was retiring showed me the various lists of names for which personnel security files needed to be recreated. I understood that these computerized lists came from the United States Secret Service.

5. It was my understanding that every person on the lists from which I was working was properly included on the lists because they had a legitimate need for access to the White House complex. I was not told, and I had no reason to believe, that some of the persons on the lists no longer should have been included on the Secret Service's White House access list. By illustration, I recall seeing several former Bush Administration officials, such as [REDACTED], in the White House complex during my detail at the Office of Personnel Security. If I saw [REDACTED] name on the access list, therefore, it would not have struck me as odd.

6. It was not part of my job to determine who should or should not have been on the Secret Service's White House access lists. I was not asked to make any judgments, and I did not make any judgments, as to who should or should not be on those lists.

7. The procedure I employed for the Update Project was as follows. I took a name from the access list, and determined whether the Office of Personnel Security had an existing file on the individual. If there was not a file on the individual in the Office vault, I would prepare a file folder and type a request on a pre-printed, xeroxed form, addressed to the "FBI, Liaison,"

asking for a copy of the individual's Previous Report. I also typed on the form the reason for the request to the FBI, e.g., "ACCESS (S)." I sent the form requesting a Previous Report to the FBI without showing it to anyone else in the Office of Personnel Security. When the Previous Report came into the office, I pulled the file I had created for the individual and reviewed the report to determine the date for the individual's next periodic reinvestigation, and to determine whether there was any information in the individual's Previous Report that could raise a question as to the individual's suitability to have access to the White House complex. In particular, I looked for inconsistencies between the information obtained by the FBI in its background investigation and the information voluntarily provided by the individual in his or her application for federal employment (SF-86). If the information I reviewed did not appear inconsistent, I delivered the file to the investigative assistant in the Office to initiate the process for the issuance of a pass and for filing in the Office vault.

8. As part of my consistent practice for the Update Project, I did not deliver the files or FBI Previous Reports to the head of the Office of Personnel Security, Craig Livingstone. I only delivered files that I created in the course of the Update Project for Mr. Livingstone's review if I discovered what I believed to be inconsistencies in an individual's paperwork.

9. As best I recall, there were only three files that I reviewed in the course of the Update Project that I delivered for

Mr. Livingstone's review. To the best of my recollection, none of these files were of former high-ranking Bush or Reagan Administration officials, such as [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] My recollection is that one of the individuals involved worked for the General Services Administration, one worked for the telephone company, and one was a grounds keeper.

10. I was not asked to, and I did not seek to, obtain a Previous Report on any person for any reason other than to create a current personnel security file for an individual whom I believed was properly included on the White House access list. When I obtained copies of Previous Reports, I processed each one in accordance with the procedure I describe above, and did not single out any person for special scrutiny or treat any person differently, because of who he or she may have been.

<sup>24.</sup>  
I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. (28 U.S.C. § 1746(2))

EXECUTED ON JUNE 9, 1996.

  
ANTHONY MARJECA