Skip to content

Get Judicial Watch Updates!


Judicial Watch • Zero Dark Thirty – Final Report 12-02-14

Zero Dark Thirty – Final Report 12-02-14

Zero Dark Thirty – Final Report 12-02-14

Page 1: Zero Dark Thirty – Final Report 12-02-14


Number of Pages:14

Date Created:December 5, 2014

Date Uploaded to the Library:December 05, 2014

Tags:Zero Dark Thirty, Bin Laden

File Scanned for Malware

Donate now to keep these documents public!

See Generated Text   ∨

Autogenerated text from PDF

tinitcd tatcs cnatc 
KRISTINE LUCIUS, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 20510-6275 KOLAN DAVIS, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director 
November 17, 2014 

Mr. John Rymer 
Inspector General 
Department Defense 
4800 Mark Center 
Alexandria, 22350 

Dear Inspector General Rymer, have concluded oversight review actions taken former Acting Inspector General (IG) and current Principal Deputy Inspector General (PDIG) Lynne Halbrooks her direct management the Release Department Defense (DOD) Information the Media, also known the Zero Dark Thirty (ZDT) report. undertook this inquiry because received reports from whistleblowers who were concerned that PDIG Halbrooks deliberately suppressed the report for two reasons: (1) protect senior officials from disciplinary action prosecution and (2) the process, further her candidacy for nomination the next DOD IG. Senior officials, including former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director and DOD Secretary Leon Panetta and Under Secretary for Intelligence (USDI) Michael Vickers, were accused allegedly making unauthorized disclosures highly classified information the Osama bin Laden raid. These alleged disclosures could have placed DOD Special Operations personnel and their families harm's way. Concurrent with the ZDT investigation, PDIG Halbrooks was being vetted for the DoD nomination. The convergence these potential conflicts-of-interest needed scrutiny. main concern was that she may have handled these conflicts ways that could compromise the integrity and independence the Inspector General's Office (OIG). address and resolve these questions, staff examined evidence and documents provided whistleblowers and official sources. addition, they interviewed number witnesses who were directly involved the management, preparation, and review the report. After in-depth evaluation the information presented, staff identified nine potential red flags trouble spots the handling the ZDT report top management the Office the Inspector General (OIG). 
These areas potential concern fall into four broad categories: Impairment 
independence and lack commitment the spirit and intent the Act; Weak leadership; Mismanagement; and Waste time and money. The major red flags are follows: Anonymous, "sitting report" email message Senator Grassley's staff, December 14, 2012; Whistleblower, interview Senator Grassley's staff, September 13, 2014. 
There are unexplained delays publishing controversial report alleged misconduct the Secretary and Under Secretary Defense; 
There may have been improper contacts with targets the ongoing investigation; 
Senior management failed promptly implement "long-standing Department 
policy" mandating the removal sensitive information from the report prior 

----That policy required that all derogatory information pertaining 
unauthorized disclosures senior officials removed from the report; 
----The removal this information essentially gutted the report and rendered 
unfit for publication; 
----Neither the requirement for nor the impact this policy was ever 
communicated the staff responsible for producing and editing the report; 
----Senior management allowed the draft report and media talking points 
prematurely circulated externally before completing the mandated edits; 

----Since the preparation the press package typically the last and final step 
the report review process before release, this misstep caused widespread turmoil 
and confusion; 

----This series missteps caused the investigative and support staff 
mistakenly believe that report was ready for issue; 

----When the report was not released promptly, whistleblowers contacted 
office report suspected cover-up and leaked the report POGO; 

 official was assigned lead the project, who lacked relevant professional experience, and then top management failed exercise due diligence over his day-to-day work and progress the report ensure that followed established protocols; 
Precious time and money was wasted producing report questionable value due, part, failure conduct effective coordination with counterparts the CIA OIG resolve jurisdictional issues before the investigation started; 
The Director Whistleblowing and Transparency was accused making false statements without proper justification credible evidence, which might have led his termination were not for your intervention; 
These areas potential concern were boiled down nine conclusions. These are laid out the attached staff report along with the underlying rationale for each one. Some corrective action, including appropriate measure accountability, appears justified. misconduct and/or mismanagement occurred the handling the ZDT report, then PDIG Halbrooks and Deputy James Ives, both whom led the ZDT review, would appear chiefly 
responsible for whatever happened. Also, staff raises legitimate point about whether the "long-standing practice" removing sensitive information from reports should applied senior officials like the Under Secretary Defense for Intelligence. This practice needs independent review and possible modification. summary, proof weak leadership, mismanagement, and lack independence are reflected the end-product: the highly-sanitized ZDT report that was finally issued June 14, 2013 six months after was finished. was second-class report that not worth the paper which was written. The ZDT project was unmitigated disaster spawned series top-level missteps and blunders. All this wasted energy produced nothing better than confusion, turmoil, dissent, and more alleged misconduct. addition, valued employee with unique and unparalleled knowledge whistleblowing and rock-solid commitment fair treatment whistleblowers would have been fired were not for your intervention. 
The Inspector General's office needs strong leadership. Those leaders must have the courage tell like and report promptly the agency head and Congress with recommendations for corrective action. This especially true when comes reporting alleged misconduct top officials, like the Secretary and Under Secretary Defense. They must find way strike fair balance between shielding alleged misconduct top officials while honoring the taxpayer's right know how senior officials are spending their money. 
When top government officials, like the Secretary and Under Secretary Defense, stand accused misconduct, there should some accountability the public. Thus far, this matter, there has been none. comparison, former Deputy Secretary Defense and CIA Director Deutch mishandled highly classified information and got hammered for doing it. lost his clearance for six years and came close prosecution. Unlike the Zero Dark Thirty leaks, that matter was dealt with effectively and aired public. Those lessons seem have been forgotten. 
The ZDT model was wasteful the taxpayers' money and harmful the perceived independence the G's office. should used educational tool teach OIG employees how not conduct sensitive investigations alleged misconduct senior officials. Rymer, your patience with and support this oversight review deeply appreciated. 
The report prepared staff attached. offered for further review and consideration. 
Your attention these matters would appreciated. 

Attachments Staff Report Sensitive information removed from the report 
Attachment taff
The ZDT report was energized the "hemonhage leaks"of highly classified information senior officials after the Osama bin Laden raid May 2011. Congressman King, Chairman the Committee Homeland Security, formally requested investigation the alleged leaks. His letter the DOD and CIA IG's dated August 2011, expressed grave concern about news report suggesting that Hollywood filmmakers were given "top-level access the most classified mission history. was seeking assessment potential damage intelligence collection and covert operations. The King letter triggered two investigations -one the CIA and the other the DOD IG. The focus this report the DOD OIG inquiry. was assigned the directorate for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments (ISP and was ultimately led Mr. James Ives and managed directly Acting and Deputy 
4Halbrooks. December 16, 2011, the DOD OIG announced that the ISPA review would begin "immediately" and would "coordinated" between the two Gs. ISP prepared report. After was declared unclassified the Pentagon Security Office November 2012, "coordination package" was developed, which included publicly-releasable version, talking points for reporters, and transmittal memos the Defense Secretarl and Chairman King.6 This package was circulated internally for "final review and clearance." The next and final step was submission PDIG Halbrooks request for release. some measures, the report was ready for issue November-December 2012.8 However, fact, was not ready. There was major foul-up. The report review process was bungled from start finish. All the derogatory information unauthorized disclosures highly classified information the senior officials, including Secretary Panetta, listed Attaclunent still had stripped from the report before could published. This Draconian measure, which gutted the report, was mandated
"long-standing Department policy" -guidance well known both Halbrooks and Ives.They should have applied the report the front-end their review July-August 2012. Both failed communicate this need the investigative tean1 and others who needed that information execute the policy and their jobs. The result was wasted time and money. There appears reasonable explanation for what happened. Draft DOD OIG report 2013-092, issued POGO 6/4/13, p.2. King letter DOD and CIA G's, August 2011. Mr. Jon Rymer was confirmed DOD September 17, 2013. DOD OIG Memo signed DIG ISPA Brannin, December 16, 201 Whistleblower, affidavit presented Senator Grassley, May 2014; 
DAIG !SPA, interview 
Deputy Ives finally began the mandated "substantive review" mid-December and
finished early January 2013.However, the report did not regain forward motion until 
after Secretary Panetta retired February 27, 2013. Halbrooks' claims she did not receive 
12until March 25, 2013.The three-month delay reaching her desk and subsequent delays until June remain substantively unexplained. Aside from few minor edits, there record significant edits between mid-December and publication June 2013.14 These facts create the perception that the review process was slowed PDIG Halbrooks and others her direction shield DOD officials from scrutiny and perhaps help her gain the nomination. These facts, when combined with her contacts with targets the investigation, raise issues about independence. Similarly, the possible misuse the policy requiring the removal misconduct allegations from reports points another facet the perceived independence issue. addition creating confusion the working-level, may have caused whistleblowers, who thought the report was ready for issue, perceive cover-up and leak what they believed final version the Project Government Oversight (POGO). About week after the report appeared the POGO web site, the G's office finally issued highly sanitized version the report and subsequently launched internal inquiry find the leaker, but none was found. 

Conclusion Lack effective coordination with the CIA wasted time and
The need for coordination was crystal clear. First, the inquiry crossed the lines jurisdiction between two major agencies. Second, the alleged misconduct the principal subject, Mr. Panetta, occurred while was CIA Director and reportedly could not investigated the DOD IG, fact relayed Senator Grassley's staff several occasions during investigation. addition, the investigation into the leaks did not begin until after had resigned his post with the CIA become Secretary Defense. Clearly, coordination was essential untangle these thorny jurisdictional issues. 
While some coordination occurred between the DOD and CIA OIGs, based contradictory statements, difficult determine how much actually took place. The August 2014, letter from the DOD stated: "Based the structure Chairman King's questions, consultation and coordination between DOD OIG and CIA OIG about which office would answer specific questions was not required and did not occur."15 That letter also states, however, that least one meeting was held between the PDIG Halbrooks and CIA Buckley August 2011. was agreed that each organization would exchange copy its initial correspondence King and that members the ISPA investigative team would interact the staff level with members CIA OIG various points exchange information related field work. Regardless how much coordination ultimately occurred, the failure the part Halbrooks anticipate the need for coordination up-front had disastrous consequences. 
Ives, interview. 
DOD ISPA Timeline. Halbrooks, interview; DOD ISPA Timeline. DOD Jon Rymer, letter Senator Grassley, August 2014. 
DOD ISPA Timeline. DOD Jon Rymer letter, August 2014. 
DOD Rymer, letter. September 18, 2012, just the DOD OIG report was being readied for classification review, final decision was made refer the Panetta allegations back the CIA OIG. According DIG ISPA Ives, who was charge the project, preliminary decision this had been made early August 3rd, 2012.17 This decision meant that all the information relative the alleged misconduct the Secretary and that his Chief Staff, Jeremy Bash, had stripped from the report. That included interview DOD OIG personnel Chief Staff Bash whose actions occurred while still employee the CIA. When that sanitization process was completed three months later, there was very little substantive value regarding leaks left the report. more positive attitude about the need for coordination the part Deputy Halbrooks might have helped avoid this wasteful exercise least ten DOD employees and also helped bring the DOD OIG's responsibilities into much sharper focus much sooner. The alleged misconduct USDI Vickers should have been the sole focus the report. Addressing the alleged misconduct Secretary Panetta and his Chief Staff Bash was the responsibility the CIA IG. This matter should have been resolved right up-front. 

Mr. James Ives, Deputy Director the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), Senior Executive Service (SES) position, was selected succeed Deputy (DIG) for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments (ISP A), Ms. Patricia Brannin, who retired June 29, 2012. Mr. Ives assumed her management responsibilities detailee the position Acting DIG ISPA July 2012. Those included leadership the ZDT investigation. Mr. Ives' previous experience included years service with DCIS Special Agent and senior manager. According Mr. Ives, after learning Ms. Brannin's pending retirement, actively 
18sought this temporary assignment with the assistance and support DIG Halbrooks.
The selection Mr. Ives for this unique assignment cause for concern. 
While his investigative experience the DCIS arena impressive and conducted himself with competence and professionalism during the interview, was not well-qualified lead leak investigation top agency official like the Secretary Under-Secretary Defense.19 Rymer pointed out during the Ives interview, the ISPA directorate has specialized mission. conducts evaluations, which are very different from criminal investigations -Mr. Ives' specialty.20 unclear how Mr. Ives could expected readily adapt the ISPA mission and lead the project with relevant ISPA experience. Nor easy comprehend how his selection over project being conducted evaluators and auditors would mutually beneficial. Ives, interview. Ives, interview. 19Ives, interview. Ives, interview. 

Further, the time Mr. Ives' selection, was the understanding the Office General Counsel (OGC) and PDIG Halbrooks, through their interpretation applicable law, that due federal law enforcement service requirements, could only remain detailee this
position for four months.ln July, the start his appointment, the ZDT investigation was ongoing and had reached critical mass. preliminary draft repoit was about ready for review. However, the likelihood oflves being able see this project through the end was not high was limited four-month detail. further complicate the selection Mr. Ives, despite the OGC's interpretation the law, Ives returned his full time duties Assistant Investigations but continued oversee this major report secondary responsibility.24 
All these shortcomings occurred under the direct supervision PDTG Halbrooks. 
The appointment Ives this project four-month detailee, through real fault 
his own, was recipe for disaster. PDIG Halbrooks should have recognized the shortcomings appointing Ives from the beginning. The four-month limitation his appointment, interpreted the DOD OIG OGC, should have been automatic disqualifier. project this importance and sensitivity demanded highly-competent, full-time manager with institutional knowledge and experience with evaluations. Above all, the project needed manager who would able see the project through successful conclusion. 

Once Mr. Ives assumed his position over ISPA, stated that his priority was get the report out before his temporary assignment ended.25 During his interview, Mr. Ives repeatedly expressed overriding desire keep the project moving forward, expedite the process, and finish before left.26 This blind desire allowed for innumerable problems surface. lost sight his primary responsibilities the repo1t writing process. failed follow established report-writing procedures and failed communicate effectively with his staff. the final analysis, this may the reason the report was ultimately leaked POGO. 
One the first meetings Mr. Ives attended the Acting DIG was August 3rd, 2012.27 
According Ives, during this meeting which PDIG Halbrooks was present, decision was
reached make referrals two senior officials involved, Secretaries Panetta and Vickers. 
Halbrooks, interview. Halbrooks, interview. Ives, interview; DOD Jon Rymer, letter Senator Grassley's, October 14, 2014. Inspector General Jon Rymer, letter Senator Charles Grassley, August 2014. 
Ives, interview. Ives, interview. Ives, interview. Ives, interview. 
Due longstanding Department policy," well policy only investigate those individuals who were within the DOD during the timeframe the allegations, was this point that Ives knew the sensitive information the report pertaining open investigations and referrals alleged misconduct senior officials would have removed before could published. However, for reasons that are not fully explained understood, waited another five months implement that policy. the staff understands it, the substantive edits consisted primarily the six pieces infmmation listed Attachment this report. All six items were declared unclassified DOD November 2012. This information appeared the report published POGO June 2013 but not the official version issued week later. The block information Attachment was the core substance the report, and culling out the report was mandated standin
policy, according Halbrooks and Ives.29 was not big job. started December
30and finished, "not much past early January." October 2012, despite having knowledge the OIG policy, Mr. Ives allowed the report outside the agency for classification review with the information about the misconduct senior officials and associated referrals still present the draft. Further, once came back, DIG Ives again allowed the report outside ISPA the OGC and Office Congressional Liaison (OCCL) for editing even though had not made his substantive edits.
Ives said did this because wanted keep the report moving along.He was later told DIG Halbrooks that the process had used, having OGC and OCCL review and suggest edits first, was reversed and that under standard protocols, should have reviewed and substantively edited before went those two offices. She added the confusion investigation suggesting that the draft was circulated OGC and OCCL without Mr. Ives' knowledge and
approval.That was inaccurate, according Mr. Ives.
Nonetheless, his actions caused much confusion because failed make timely 
"substantive" edits mandated DOD OIG's policies before authorizing the report
circulated outside ISP A.As result this misstep, the staff the DOD began working press package and talking points the report consultation with the various offices concerned with such matters. When the report was not released, whistleblowers contacted Senator Grassley' Office. They were confused and concerned about the delay. They perceived potential cover-up. The crafting talking points and circulation the report OGC and OCCL for final review are typically the last steps the repmt process before approval for release from
the PDIG.They mistakenly believed that the report was the cusp publication. Halbrooks, interview; Ives, interview. Ives, interview. Ives, interview. Ives, interview. Halbrooks, interview. Ives, interview. Ives, interview. Anonymous, email Senator Grassley staff, November 2012; Anonymous, email Senator Grassley staff, November 19, 2012; Whistleblower, affidavit. 

Ultimately, Mr. Ives failed recognize his responsibility implement the policy promptly and communicate that need effectively with his subordinates. failed explain them how the policy guidance requiring substantive review would remove the misconduct and referral information and thereby fundamentally alter the contents the report. They needed understand that requirement order accomplish the mission but never got it. Halbrooks failed effectively manage Ives attempted navigate novel process. Their combined failures communicate effectively led internal confusion and turmoil. 
Mr. Ives did not grasp how the creation those talking points and the premature circulation unedited draft constituted waste chime and money, nor did see possible cause for the whistleblower leak POG0.37 While leaking the draft probably violated DOD OIG rules, possible this could have been avoided had DIG Ives not lost sight the objective and failed follow established protocols and communicated effectively. 

Conclusion# The the created that Halbrooks
the OIG's 
While there conclusive evidence that PDIG Halbrooks deliberately suppressed the report protect either senior officials herself, evidence and interviews appear indicate the repo1t was ready for publication December 2012 early January 2013, six months before was actually published.38 
For whistleblowers, the failure the DOD publish the report promptly the December/January timeframe created confusion and some perceived abuse. One whistleblower alleged that Deputy Halbrooks repeatedly stated, "The report will not published until after
Secretary Panetta steps down."While other statements were found directly support this assertion, there evidence that appears confirm it. 
Deputy Ives, who was charge the ZDT project, didn't recall "actually doing substantive efforts much past early January.'"'0 However, following the completion his substantive edits, the report did not appear regain forward motion until after Secretary Panetta retired February 27, 2013. According PDIG Halbrooks, did not reach her desk until March 25, 2013. Further, according unofficial timelines provided the DOD IG, significant edits occurred between Ives' substantive edits, confirmed January 30th and when 
the OGC made minor edits March 201 Ives interview. 
3-interview; Ives, interview; Whistleblower, "it's getting close final" email message Senator 
Grassley's staff, December 2012. Whistleblower, affidavit, May 2014; Anonymous, email, December 14, 2012. Ives, interview. DOD !SPA Timeline, provided Senator Grassley's staff, September 2014. 
The three-month delay reaching Deputy Halbrooks' desk and subsequent delays until June remain substantively unexplained, other than with the reassuring words that "rigorous and iterative internal review process" filled the void, referenced six times the last five pages Jetter August 2014. similar description, without information back that claim, was given again letter October 14, 2014. Aside from thoroughly discussed 10word edit April 2013, involving USDI Vickers, which disputed,42 there appears have been little significant editorial activity between Mr. Ives' "substantive review," starting midDecember and publication June 2013. These facts create the perception that the report process was slowed PDIG Halbrooks and others working her direction shield DOD officials from scrutiny and perhaps bolster her chances for gaining the nomination. 

Conclusion Halbrooks' contacts with the raise

Admittedly, removing the sensitive information from the report created dilemma. essentially gutted the report. Ives' words, left "holes" the report. The official version did not even reveal that senior official had made unauthorized disclosures highly classified information. Instead, was reduced chronological listing emails and meetings that skirts the core issue, falling far short addressing and resolving Chairman King's concerns about the "hemorrhage leaks" top officials. After nearly two years hard work over ten DOD OIO personnel, ISPA was left with work product questionable value. 
Regarding the value the gutted report, PDIO Halbrooks stated during her interview: once that information was removed, the report was neither interesting nor important and just dropped off radar screen words that effect.48 While she may have been correct about the report's face-value, she was dead wrong about her responsibilities for the pending report. that point, she appears have lost sight her goal IO. This report was requested the chairman House oversight committee. She had solemn duty put back her radar screen and keep there --front and center --until was fixed and required standards and presented proudly and enthusiastically the Congress and Deputy Secretary Defense and maybe even the public and promptly. 
Even verbal level, communications about the substance the report's principal findings were essentially non-existent. meeting with Chairman King's staff, according Mr. Ives, did not even "tell them the Secretary had made unauthorized disclosures," which fits
with what Chairman King told McClatchy News.
The OIO's "longstanding practice" removing sensitive information from reports needs independent examination. question that needs answered whether this practice should applied senior officials like the Under Secretary Defense. There may cause, given such position, that they held higher standard even alleged misconduct had reported classified letter due the sensitivity the subject matter and ongoing investigation. When top government officials, like the Under Secretary Defense, stand 
accused misconduct, there should some accountability the public. Thus far, this matter, there has been none. Former Deputy Secretary Defense and CIA Director Deutch mishandled highly classified information and got hammered for doing it. lost his clearance for six years. Unlike the ZDT leaks, that matter was dealt with effectively and aired public. Halbrooks, interview. Ives, interview; Id. McClatchy Report, December 17, 2012. 
5 CIA OIG, Rep01t Improper Handling Classified Information John Deutch, February, 18, 2000 and reports CNN, February 2009, and ABC News, February 2001. 

That findings and recommendations were offered appears indicative the report's hollowness. was gutted during DIG Ives' "substantive review." contained little information importance interest, PDIG Halbrooks put it. Findings and recommendations were simply not justified necessary even possible. Producing reports this caliber waste oftime and money. 

Following careful review notes taken the Halbrooks interview June 2014, 
Senator Grassley, June 18, 2014, submitted list follow-up questions her attention. The 
response those questions dated August 2014. The answers given were largely unsatisfactory. Most answers were not substantive nature nor did they mesh with other available information. Some appeared inaccurate and misleading. Some questions were simply incomplete ignored. Others were confusing and defied understanding. preparing this report, complete list such discrepancies was compiled but only two are summarized below. responding interview question the need for coordination with the CIA IO, for example, Halbrooks stated that she was w1aware any coordination.51 Then, the response the same follow-up question the letter, she said "coordination was not required and did not occur."52 the very next sentence the letter, however, she admits that coordination did occur.53 Providing diametrically opposing answers simultaneously the same question 

Similarly, when asked for the dates and agendas for each In-Progress Review (IPR) meeting the ZDT report, she provided list seven meetings between December 2011 and 
July 2012, stating twice that "predecisional draft reports were  wed IPR meetings." 
Thjs statement appears inaccurate. According Ives and there were other IPR 
meetings where the draft report was discussed and reviewed and some these meetings were 
attended Halbrooks. the statements Ives and are accurate, then Halbrooks may have been involved reviewing the report long before the March 25, 2013 date she gave during her interview for when she "first received and saw draft for the first time." 

Deputy for ISPA, James Ives, helped clear most the confusion created PDIG Halbrooks' answers Senator Grassley's questions. Halbrooks, interview. DOD Rymer, letter (August 2014). DOD Rymer, letter (August 2014). June 21, 2013, Deputy Halbrooks directed the Office Professional Responsibility (OPR) conduct internal investigation determine who had leaked the ZDT report POGO. Interviews were conducted. total 33,269 emails were examined. the
end, investigators were unable identify the leaker.During questioning, however, Mr. Dan Meyer, the DOD OIG Director Whistleblowing and Transparency, admitted giving copy the report the two congressional committees having jurisdiction over the matter. His admission triggered swift and decisive action. Mr. Meyer was accused making false statements, which was followed attempt suspend his clearance. This action had the potential destroying his career. Fortunately, the new IG, Jon Rymer, intervened Mr. Meyer's behalf and successfully blocked those efforts because the case against Mr. Meyer did not rest solid foundation. the aftermath the OPR leak investigation, concern was expressed about the way whistleblowers were treated. During her interview, DIG Halbrooks was asked about the treatment whistleblowers during the OPR review. She attempted provide assurance that her actions were "harmless,'' even though they nearly led Mr. Meyers' followup question, she was asked explain how accusing employee making false statements and then attempting suspend that employee's security clearance clearance that was essential continued employment -could characterized harmless. She ignored the question. DOD OIG, OPR Report oflnvestigation, February 19, 2014. Halbrooks, interview; Halbrooks, interview; 

Attachment Sensitive information removed from 
"This initial review did not include interview with the Honorable Leon Panetta, Secretary Defense." (Page POGO) 
Removed prior January 16, 2013, predecisional working draft response acting DIG ISPA review. 
".. USD(I) Vickers provided the name the Special Operations Planner Mr. Boal and Ms. Bigelow." (Page POGO) 
Removed April 2013 ISPA team. PDIG Halbrooks' review the predecisional working draft presented her March 25, 2013, questioned whether the information was related the referral and ongoing investigation being conducted the DoD OIG Investigation Senior Officials. 
"June 22, 2011: ASD(PA) Wilson told communicated with the White House request guidance dealing with Mr. Boal and Ms. Bigelow." (Page POGO) 
Removed prior January 16, 2013, predecisional working draft response acting DIG ISPA review. 
June 26, 2011: ASD(PA) Wilson responded email from the White House Deputy Press Secretary requesting, "[AJ moment connect tomorrow Boal." (Page POGO) 
Removed prior January 2013, predecisional working draft response acting DIG ISPA review. 
"During this awards ceremony, Director Panetta specifically recognized the unit that 
conducted the raid and identified the ground commander name. Director Panetta also 
provided DoD information, identified Original Classification Authorities TOP SECRET/SI/ ... (Page 12, POGO) 
Removed prior January 2013, predecisional working draft response acting DIG ISPA review. 
"According the DoD PAO, the day the event, the CIA PAO contacted the DoD PAO state that efforts failed and the 'Chief Staff" directed that the Hollywood executive 
given access the event." (Page 12, POGO) That information, with the exception the reference the "Chief Staff' included the June 14, 2013, publicly released report. Reference the Chief Staff was removed prior Janua1y 16, 2013, predecisional working draft response acting DIG ISPA review. The dates shown this document when each item was removed from the report were provided fetter from the DOD OIG August 2014. The dale which item was removed dis uted. Mr. Ives claims did about November 14, 2012, when Vickers' misconduct 
eported FebruaiJ' 13, 2013, that leaving wou ave negative impact its investigation. 
least five items were removed during Ives' "substantive review" December 2012. All six items were declared 
unclassified DOD security review November 2012 and appeared the report published POGO June 
Senator Grassley' staff, September 2014; James Ives, DIG, interview Senator Grassley's staff, September 10, 
2014; DOD ISPA Timeline, provided Senator Grassley's staff, September 2014. Whistleblower, affidavit; Ives, interview; -interview; DOD ISPA Timeline. Ives, interview; -interview. Lynne Halbrooks, PDIG, interview Senator Grassley's staff, June 2014; Ives, interview.