UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA HON. OLIVER W. WANGER, JUDGE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

GARY L. ERMOIAN, DAVID SWANSON AND STEVEN J. JOHNSON,

Defendant.

Defendant.

Fresno, California

Tuesday, July 6, 2010

REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

KAREN HOOVEN, RMR-CRR Official Court Reporter CSR No. 5816

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     Tuesday, July 6, 2010
                                                 Fresno, California
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     2:02 p.m.
              (Proceedings were held, testimony taken of Mr.
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 4
              Larson, not transcribed herein.)
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              THE COURT: Anything further for Mr. Larson.
              MR. CULLERS: No, Your Honor.
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              MS. MONTOYA: Not for Mr. Larson.
                                                 I do have some
     comments about the declaration. And I\ --\  there are certain
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     portions of the declaration that I would ask the Court to
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     strike.
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              THE COURT: All right. Well, we are through
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     questioning Mr. Larson.
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              MR. CULLERS: Yes. He is excused.
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              MS. MONTOYA: Yes.
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              THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Larson. You may step
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     down. You are excused.
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              THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. Let me get the declaration in
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     hand. I'm going to give these exhibits to the courtroom
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     deputy.
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              MS. MONTOYA: Your Honor, I have an extra copy of Mr.
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     Larson's declaration.
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              THE COURT: I am looking for it. If you want to
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     provide me a copy, that would be helpful.
              MS. MONTOYA: Your Honor, I believe it's attached to
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1 document 459, which would be the defendant's reply. 2 THE COURT: Thank you. I've got it. 3 All right. Ms. Montoya, you may proceed. 4 MS. MONTOYA: Thank you, Your Honor. In paragraph 5 six at the end of paragraph six, where Mr. Larson states 6 starting at the bottom of page two, "Sometime the next morning 7 I was informed that Mr. Baptista did not show up." 8 I would move to strike that as whether or not Mr. 9 Baptista showed up is not within his personal knowledge and I 10 would ask that that be stricken. 11 THE COURT: Any objection? 12 MR. BALAZS: Yes. 13 MR. FALLER: Well, yes, Your Honor, actually. 14 THE COURT: Beg your pardon? 15 MR. FALLER: Well, this is a preliminary -- a 16 preliminary matter, Your Honor. And there is much in the wire 17 tap affidavit that would not be admissible evidence in a trial 18 according to the rules of evidence. There are opinions. 19 There are -- there is hearsay. 20 Now, Mr. Larson is here to answer questions in 21 regards to whether something is -- the circumstances of his 22 knowledge as to anything. But in terms of what is to be 23 admissible in a preliminary proceeding, such as this, in the 24 same way that the wiretap affidavit can be based on many 25 things other than admissible evidence, it's our contention

that this is here for the weight that the Court would give it.

And it's within the sound discretion of the Court to give each item recited by Mr. Larson the weight that it is due.

And I would also say that Mr. Larson is here if there are inquiries as his basis of knowledge for any of these facts. He can be inquired.

MS. MONTOYA: He does state that he doesn't recall who informed him of this occurrence, so I would think that -- I would ask that the Court strike that.

THE COURT: All right. Is the matter submitted.

MS. MONTOYA: Submitted.

MR. FALLER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: This proceeding is a *Franks* hearing, is measuring the accuracy, the good faith, the bona fides of the information that was provided by the Court to obtain wiretap applications.

The declaration under penalty of perjury by Mr.

Larson has been submitted in support of the motion. And assumedly in support of Mr. Ermoian. And this is a statement from Mr. Larson's memory about information he was provided and he does not recall who informed him of that occurrence.

And so even if we were to apply the rules of evidence strictly, the Court would understand that this is an explanation of Mr. Larson's then existing state of mind explaining what action he took. And therefore, it would be an

exception to the hearsay rule, if not non-hearsay, as it is explaining his conduct as he continued, at the time that he was the undersheriff, to have contact with Mr. Baptista and others concerning this report that was originated by Mr. Baptista. So the objection is overruled.

MS. MONTOYA: Your Honor, going to paragraph ten.

The government would move to strike from the second sentence starting, "Further, it is my understanding that Deputy Seymour had to pursue Baptista in order to obtain his statement," continuing through the sentence "The report, I believe, was routed to Detective Unit/Crimes Against Persons Division for followup."

It's the government's position that this is something that Mr. Larson is relaying, not based on his personal knowledge and relating to the actions of others. His whole purpose, the government can surmise, for putting forth this declaration, is to show that he had nothing to do with this investigation. And here he is offering what his understanding is as to what happened at the Sheriff's Department.

I think that information was clearly set forth not only in the T-III affidavit, but also by way of information that came to the Court in regards to reports and things of that nature during the course of this hearing.

So I would ask the Court to strike that.

MR. FALLER: Our position is the same, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Is the matter submitted?

MS. MONTOYA: Submitted.

MR. FALLER: Yes.

THE COURT: As I understand the declaration of Mr. Larson, he is, in effect, explaining what his responsibility was. And is responding to an allegation by the government investigators that somehow his handling of any contact with Baptista was out of the ordinary or not within the chain of command, or that his interaction with any officers at that time was improper to the extent that it's the government's theory that Mr. Larson was, in effect, minimizing or marginalizing the importance of this particular crime report and investigation.

And what I understand, taken in the overall, this paragraph to be referring to is based on his memory and then understanding of what had been reported to him in the ordinary course of his law enforcement duties as an undersheriff, he says that there was an interview, there was a detailed report prepared, that it was routed to the Detective Unit/Crimes Against Persons Division for followup.

It would be a detective sergeant's responsibility to review the report and, if necessary, assign a detective for the purposes of conducting further investigations. I do not know if the detective was assigned to conduct any followup investigation from that point forward.

And so what this shows is, in effect, an explanation from the perspective of Mr. Larson about how he would expect this matter to be handled in the ordinary course of Sheriff's Department's business.

And this is different from what we heard in relation to a civil matter. And any time property is taken one from the other whether there is either a claim of title, ownership or some other basis for asserting an interest in the property, that that makes it a civil matter, at least in Mr. Larson's experience.

I'm not going to comment on that because it gets into law and we don't expect, other than that is a law enforcement officer, Mr. Larson to know the law in the technical detail that it is analyzed in the courts. Rather, his duty is to make decisions as a field officer executing the law in the performance of his duties.

And so as I read this, he says the normal practice would be a report is taken, it was taken and then, based on what detective sergeant who is reading the report that's been submitted by the line deputy who took it, it would either be referred on for followup or further investigation or something else.

And Mr. Larson is saying he doesn't know what is happening, but I read this as responsive to his, if you will, defense that he didn't squash or squelch the investigation.

And I don't think that it contains any improper material because, again, this is state of mind evidence. He's relating what he understood the circumstances and conditions to be at the time he was actually in communication about the incident.

And so the credibility of this is a separate issue.

But I do believe that there is no legal rule that prevents its admissibility, so the objection is overruled.

MS. MONTOYA: Well, just for the --

THE COURT: It's not being accepted for its truth, rather for the purposes I've stated. What?

MS. MONTOYA: It's the government's position that his state of mind, since he's putting forth to the Court that he had nothing to do with this investigation, other than taking the initial report from the victim, that his state of mind, because he didn't interfere, he didn't direct, he didn't do anything with this, is pretty much irrelevant.

THE COURT: Well, I have explained and I will explain again, because you might not have heard.

 ${\sf MS.\ MONTOYA:}$ I did hear you, Your Honor. Perhaps I -- that's my thoughts on the matter.

THE COURT: The reason it's relevant is because he's being accused of, in effect, trying to dismiss this matter as one that should not have been investigated. In other words, that's the charge that's being leveled against him.

And he's explaining that -- it turns out he had two,

not just one, but he had two conversations with Baptista and at that point it's not the undersheriff who does the interview or the followup, rather it's given to crimes against persons, to a detective, a detective field officer does the interview. That's referred to a sergeant who reviews it and then the sergeant directs what the next step is.

And what Mr. Larson is saying is from his standpoint, that was the end of it. He had no further involvement. That's what this paragraph says. And so certainly he's entitled to say that and that this is what he understood and knew at the time. It either is or is not the truth, but it certainly is admissible.

MS. MONTOYA: Going on to paragraph 11, Your Honor, the government would move to strike starting at the very bottom of page 4, "Lieutenant Silva," and continuing on through the -- all but the last sentence. The sentence ending in "any dispute between Holloway and Baptista."

And again, Your Honor, it's the government's position that Mr. Larson is relaying hearsay information and since he had nothing to do with the investigation, what he's being told by another officer is not relevant and not -- certainly in this case, it's not -- it should be stricken from the declaration because it's just something that he was told by someone else regarding an investigation he was not involved in.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FALLER: Our position is the same, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is the matter submitted?

MR. FALLER: Yes.

THE COURT: This statement is first the explanation of Mr. Larson that he followed up to the extent that he wanted -- now we're up to, in the chain of command, to a lieutenant, to confirm it had been investigated thoroughly, and to provide a report to Mr. Larson, as undersheriff, of the outcome.

He states this information, which is not accepted for its truth, because it is double layer hearsay in the declaration. But rather, this was the explanation given to Mr. Larson. Mr. Larson adds, which is consistent with his testimony today, about this debt owed Baptista, making the case more or less a civil dispute, not criminal.

And that, again, is offered to explain how Mr.

Larson, as undersheriff, responded to the case. And it's not admissible for the truth, but it certainly is admissible to explain his participation or lack of it in the investigation.

And he's now explaining the basis for his decision, which he is entirely entitled to do since it is the suggestion that somehow he was responsible for this investigation and that he, in effect, called it off. So the objection is overruled.

MS. MONTOYA: Paragraph 14, Your Honor, I would move to strike that in its entirety. I think that Mr. Larson's comments on the affidavit and the information that he's reviewed in the motions pleadings and his comments on the motions pleadings probably are relevant. The Court can make the determination if they're misleading or inaccurate.

THE COURT: Well, these are, in effect, if you will, argumentative statements. But the first part of the paragraph refers to Mr. Larson's wife, who you asked about, following the documents on Pacer and informing her husband as to the contents of them. That isn't inadmissible, that's one of the sources of his knowledge.

He then states that he's read the recently published motion which refers to the wiretap authorization report authored by Agent Elias. And that it contains "misleading and outright false accounts of alleged interference by me into the investigation of the October 5th, 2004 Baptista complaint."

And that is, if you will, a conclusion of law. It doesn't say what is erroneous, what is misleading. It doesn't provide the facts. This is, in effect, an argument. And so on that basis, it is inadmissible. And I will accept it for Mr. Larson's denial of the suggestion that he did anything improper in dealing with the Baptista investigation.

To the extent that he perceived that he was being accused of that, he apparently didn't go to law enforcement to

explain that or to your office, he went to the defense and provided his, if you will, defense. And here it is.

So the Court's not accepting it for the truth, recognizing that it is an argument. But that the Court will give it the weight to which it's entitled and there has been more factual detail added that is explanatory. These are really opinions, quite frankly.

And so the Court sustains the objection in part, but I am going to accept Mr. Larson's denial of the allegations that he engaged in any kind of impropriety or misconduct in the Baptista investigation.

MS. MONTOYA: Your Honor, in regards to paragraph 16, the government asks the Court to strike or to give no weight to the statement that the reader is easily misled. I don't think that's a conclusion or an argument that Mr. Larson can properly make in his declaration.

THE COURT: Well, actually it's an inaccurate statement. Mr. Larson was personally involved, not in conducting the investigation, but he was certainly involved in the investigation. He spoke with Baptista twice.

MS. MONTOYA: Well, that's the government's position, which --

THE COURT: He agrees. He says so on the stand here.

MS. MONTOYA: But what the government is objecting to, Your Honor, is starting with the sixth line, where it

1 says, "The reader is easily misled." Again, that's argument 2 and the government would ask the Court to strike that. 3 THE COURT: It is an argument. 4 MS. MONTOYA: Or give it no weight. 5 THE COURT: The Court is not going to be misled. 6 MS. MONTOYA: Again, the same argument as to the last 7 sentence of paragraph 17, where Mr. Larson says that the 8 statement is erroneous, factually untrue and greatly 9 misleading, government would either ask that be stricken or 10 that the Court give it no weight. 11 MR. FALLER: I would just note, Your Honor, that 12 since Mr. Larson was the subject of those statements, that 13 perhaps he can give an opinion on whether they are erroneous 14 or factually untrue. 15 MS. MONTOYA: But certainly --16 THE COURT: Well, here's where we are on it. 17 "To be clear, the only time that I spoke directly 18 with Mr. Baptista, Richard Baptista, was on the early 19 morning hours of May 5, 2004. I did not speak with 20 Richard Baptista ever again." 21 We know that's not true. That was a mistake 22 apparently, maybe failed recollection. 23 "Further, as I have never met Baptista, I would not 24 be able to recognize him if I met him today." 25 That -- nothing wrong with saying that. He doesn't

1 know Mr. Baptista. Doesn't recognize him. 2 "Further, I have no knowledge and never said to 3 anyone 'the story that Baptista provided changed each time.'" 4 5 And to the Court's understanding, Mr. Larson never 6 did say in his affidavit or to anybody else that the story Mr. 7 Baptista provided changed each time. 8 MS. MONTOYA: Your Honor, I believe in the report Mr. 9 Larson admitted he authored Government Exhibit 1, he did say 10 that Mr. Baptista's story changed. 11 THE COURT: Well, the story did change. But it 12 didn't change each time. But there are only -- there were 13 only two conversations that Mr. Larson could know of his 14 personal knowledge that he had with Baptista. And then the 15 other reports were coming in from Detective Seymore or the

"Therefore, this statement proffered to the Court is erroneous, factually untrue and greatly misleading."

Well, that's an argument. And we've learned that this statement under oath isn't accurate that was made by Mr. Larson here, either because of a failure of recollection or mistake.

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sergeant.

And so the Court doesn't give any weight to the argument with the legal conclusions that it's erroneous, factually untrue and greatly misleading. There are

inaccuracies in each of the affidavits, but what we clearly understand is that there were certainly a question with regard to Mr. Baptista's reliability. Mr. Baptista had issues and, in fact, as we know now, Mr. Holloway has admitted culpability and has pled guilty to extorting Mr. Baptista over matter involving an extension of credit.

And so in the final analysis, there's no untruth or factually misleading. There was enough for probable cause to authorize a wiretap. And the defendant has now pled guilty to the Baptista crime, among others.

Next.

MS. MONTOYA: Again, in paragraph 18, as it continues on to page 9, where Mr. Larson makes the argument that the affidavit is erroneous, factually untrue, false and greatly misleading, I would ask the Court to strike the "greatly misleading" or give it no weight.

THE COURT: All right. It's an argument. I -- I have a suspicion that you never asked him. Mr. Larson, I mean, if every word in this affidavit is his. And I bet you a dollar to a doughnut that these words are not all his.

MS. MONTOYA: Well, I'm confident they're not, because if you look at -- I think it's -- I can't remember which paragraph it is, he states that, you know, he -- that this was drafted by someone else. He looked at it, made changes, reviewed it for accuracy and then signed it. So

1 he's, in effect, adopting all of the information obtained in 2 the affidavit. 3 THE COURT: Yes. 4 MS. MONTOYA: I believe it's paragraph 20. 5 THE COURT: I don't need the two lines on the top of 6 the page because they're not helpful to the Court. It's an 7 argument. So I'm not going to consider them. 8 Next. MS. MONTOYA: Your Honor, I would ask the Court to 9 10 strike paragraph 22 where Mr. Glickman is reading transcripts 11 of a bail hearing to Mr. Larson and Mr. Larson is commenting 12 on the testimony of witnesses. 13 I mean, the facts speak for themselves. Mr. Larson 14 has testified to one thing. There is contrary information and 15 the Court's is responsibility to compare and contrast and 16 determine what information will be taken into consideration. 17 MR. BALAZS: Your Honor, he's doing more than just 18 commenting on witnesses. He's -- what he's saying in 19 paragraph 23 is the information above there is untrue. 20 that he never made any type of recommendation or gave a direct 21 That's the second paragraph of 23. It's actually a order. 22 factual response to --23 THE COURT: He's, right. 24 MR. BALAZS: -- paragraph 22. So it's entirely

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appropriate.

1 THE COURT: Mr. Larson is responding specifically to 2 the Court's questions to Mr. Bunch when Mr. Bunch was asked, 3 "Did you talk to the sheriff's deputy who investigated the 4 case relative to recommending any action? Did he express to 5 you his opinion?" 6 And this is about the deputy who investigated. Mr. 7 Bunch says he believed it happened. 8 And then the Court asked, did he believe that any 9 violation of criminal law of California, or any other 10 jurisdiction had occurred? 11 "The Witness: Yes. 12 "Did he state any reason why he did not then make a 13 recommendation that the case be reviewed by a 14 prosecutor?" 15 And then Mr. Bunch said. "It was the recommendation of 16 the assistant sheriff at the time." The Court asked: "What recommendation?" 17 18 The witness says, "That the case would go no further. 19 Which was Myron Larson." 20 So then -- so there's nothing to strike there. 21 That's simply what Mr. Bunch testified to in court. 22 And so now Mr. Larson responds saying that, one, Mr. 23 Bunch testifies that Deputy Seymour told him that Mr. Larson 24 in some way stated inferred or implied communicated to Deputy 25 Seymour that the case would go no further. And Mr. Larson

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simply says, "I never made any type of recommendation or gave a direct order as to the direction or the outcome of the Baptista investigation."

So there's nothing wrong with that. That's stating what he did or didn't do. And it's a direct response to what Mr. Bunch says in his testimony in this hearing.

The next sentence is "It is my understanding and belief, as related to me by Lieutenant Jim Silva, that Deputy Seymore did not believe that Richard Baptista was honest and truthful." He believed, meaning that was Lieutenant Silva, "that Deputy Seymore believed Baptista to be a drug addict and/or an alcoholic and that Deputy Seymore did not believe that a crime had been committed by Robert Holloway. I cannot believe, and find it preposterous and incredulous, and would be shocked and amazed, that it would be true that Deputy Seymore told Investigator Kirk Bunch that I recommended, or had influenced, or gave a direct order, as to the course or outcome of the Baptista investigation, and/or that I somehow caused the Baptista investigation to go no further." So it's the witness simply repeating. And those are

that's all there is to it.

MS. MONTOYA: But it's almost him rendering an opinion for the Court by way of his declaration as to what Deputy Seymore believed when, in fact, he never spoke to Deputy Seymore and that information came through Lieutenant Silva. So I just think it's improper and should be stricken or given no weight whatsoever.

THE COURT: Well, there are two things that have happened that we now know. One of them is that in this investigation, there was a -- if you will, I'm going to call it local policy that crimes against property, where there are ownership issues or debt issues, can never be crimes against persons. And I guess I'll have to now express my opinion --

MS. MONTOYA: Well, and also --

THE COURT: Even for a law enforcement officer, that's an unbelievable statement. It's as simple as that.

And I could give you 100 examples, but I'm sure you don't have time and this isn't law school. Anymore.

MS. MONTOYA: But I -- and I agree with the comment of the Court.

THE COURT: And so what Mr. Larson is entitled to do, however, is he's entitled to, in effect, defend himself. And candidly, it's the author who deserves the blame here.

Instead of, you know, being Sergeant Joe Friday and just giving us the facts, we got to have all this argumentative

righteous indignation type of language that is categorically of no assistance to the Court, it's just more words to read, quite frankly, and you know how that goes.

So I am not giving weight to the arguments and improper opinions. I am giving weight to Mr. Larson's denials and I've listened carefully to his testimony. And I am weighing that in the balance.

The second thing that's happened -- that's the first. The second thing that's happened is that we know the Baptista incident was a crime. We know there was extortion. And we know he was in fear. And that his property was taken by force and fear.

And Mr. Holloway has accepted criminal liability and full responsibility, at least in terms of being convicted of a felony, for it. And then we'll hear what he does when we get to sentencing, about the further acceptance of responsibility for the criminal conduct.

And so what the Court's response to this is that I think it -- if you want to know what the Court's interpretation of it is, it shows that Mr. Larson was not as, if you will, involved, nor did he have the level of understanding of what was going on in the Baptista case, because, candidly, he asked that it be investigated and he followed up to see that there was an investigation conducted.

And that's about what it provides for the Court by

way of explanation. And based on what Mr. Bunch was saying, could Agent Elias have believed that this was something that would justify a wiretap, the answer is categorically yes. And a wiretap was authorized.

MS. MONTOYA: I don't have any other portions that I would be seeking the Court to strike. So those are my comments on as far as striking portions of the declaration.

THE COURT: Thank you. Those are my rulings.

All right. Did you want to present some other comment concerning the testimony?

MS. MONTOYA: Well, the testimony, in addition to the call that the government played and the report that was prepared by Mr. Larson, shows that his declaration is inaccurate and he also sought to paint Mr. Holloway as not a very close friend. That he was someone he considered an acquaintance. And by virtue of that telephone conversation, I think it shows that he and Mr. Holloway were, in fact, closer than he wants the Court to believe.

And he took issue with the fact that he was described as a long-time acquaintance of Mr. Holloway in the affidavit. And I think that based on everything the Court has heard, that that is not an inaccurate statement such as the Court can describe malicious intent to the affiant regarding that statement.

Additionally, perhaps we're quibbling over a term,

but for someone to take a statement from someone, that's a personal involvement. And while Mr. Larson seeks to distance himself from the investigation, he called a victim of a crime the minute that he received the information from a parole officer.

And then made steps to contact Mr. Baptista and personally talk to him, which, again, the law enforcement officer in the affidavit stating it's somewhat unusual for this to be personally investigated by a person in Mr. Larson's position. And the Court can draw its own conclusions from that statement.

But it remains that there was personal contact with this investigation, not only by way of Mr. Larson following up with Lieutenant Silva and such, but also by personally calling the victim and taking a statement from the victim. And then apparently recontacting the victim later that day.

During the course of the telephone conversation that Mr. -- that Mr. Larson had with Mr. Holloway, I think it becomes clear Mr. Larson's bias towards this investigation and also law enforcement involved in the investigation, specifically Mr. -- Investigator Bunch and Investigator Jacobson, by way of his comments.

And also he stated that he did not discuss law enforcement matters with Mr. Holloway and that's clearly not true, because not only did he discuss the -- what he believed

and stated to be a criminal grand jury investigation with Mr. Holloway involving his wife, but also he went on to discuss what is obstruction by Mr. Holloway by trying to thwart law enforcement who is trying to contact the mechanic, Danny Dugranrut, in order to take into custody property that he would have with him, meaning his Hells Angels vest and things of that nature. And Mr. Larson is clearly discussing that portion of the investigation with Mr. Holloway.

So as a whole, the government's position is that Mr. Larson is biased. That there is certain items that are within -- or certain statements that are within the affidavit that are, in fact, true, that Mr. Larson seeks to show are not true. And as a whole, there is nothing that can be said was put into the affidavit either with knowledge of falsity or with willful disregard.

And, again, finally, we would ask the Court to deny the motion to suppress the wire based on everything that the Court has heard, not only in today's hearing, but over the course of many months by way of witnesses and declarations and things of that nature.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. Montoya.

Mr. Balazs.

MR. BALAZS: Your Honor, I think overall Mr. Larson was very credible. And the gist of the paragraph that was complained of in the *Franks* reply is false. And it mentions a

number of different things. And it kind of builds up to the conclusion that Larson closed the case without arresting anyone or submitting the case to the Stanislaus County DA for the filing of any charges.

And it kind of suggests that it's the whole theme of the affidavit that Mr. Holloway had these connections in law enforcement and that he used them improperly to close investigations or to impair the investigations.

And I think if you -- Mr. Larson's testimony was the exact opposite. He did take two phone calls with Mr. Baptista the first day. But after that, the investigation was conducted by other people in the office. He had no say in how the determination was made as to the investigation. He asked that it be investigated fully. And the decision was based on evidentiary issues and credibility problems with Mr. Baptista.

And the way the affidavit is written in that it states that Mr. Larson had several -- spoke to Baptista several times about the incident. That's not true. When it says that -- it uses the words that Mr. Baptista -- I mean, Mr. Larson was involved in a routine investigation and that it's uncommon, not standard operating procedure, where he really wasn't involved in the routine investigation. He took the first two phone calls, had two phone calls with Mr. Baptista on the initial day, eight hours apart, and then referred it to someone else.

So I think, overall, his testimony was credible and the information in that paragraph was false and it was either intentionally or recklessly false.

And the one final argument, not really on today's testimony, but I just want to make this argument for the record.

Because based on the testimony yesterday -- or last week of Agent Elias, this is the first time, the Court remembers, that we found out that Agent Elias was not the person who drafted the wiretap affidavit. I think that the way -- because it was drafted by another agent in the office who left, and then Agent Elias signed the affidavit suggesting -- it's -- I think it's misleading to the Court that he was the person who drafted it.

And I talked to Mr. Faller, who is a long-time attorney at the US Attorney's Office. And I think he told me he had never heard of an affidavit being submitted to the Court that way, where one agent would draft it and then it would be signed by another person. And I think that in those cases it is misleading and deceptive and that the warrant should be invalidated on that basis as well.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. FALLER: Your Honor, everybody in this case has biases. On the defense side, on the law enforcement side, private citizens like Mr. Larson. There are people that have

opinions about just about everything in this case. Even the law enforcement officers, I think, can be said to have biases in regards to Mr. Holloway, who was the -- certainly the number one target in this.

But the problem is with law enforcement officers, even though they can have those biases, unlike private citizens, they're not supposed to act according to them. They're supposed to act according to the facts as they are presented. They are supposed to follow the evidence where it leads and not attempt to craft it in a way that gives the Court, or any other body attempting to weight the facts and the evidence, an inaccurate view of what took place.

And that's what has happened here. Because if you look at the paragraphs in the wiretap affidavit that talk about the Baptista incident and the involvement of then Undersheriff Larson, what is clear is that the facts that are being recited are to -- in an attempt to persuade the reader that Mr. Larson corruptly interfered with a criminal investigation.

And actually, if the things stated in the affidavit are true, that he actually committed crimes in doing so.

Because those would be crimes, trying to dissuade a witness.

Trying to interfere with the submission of a case to the district attorney's office. Those would be crimes.

And it was portrayed in those passages that this was

basically done on behalf of Bob Holloway. And this was part of the justification for the issuance of the wiretap order and a showing of necessity as to why other types of investigation would not be successful if they were instituted. And there's been much talk by everyone, and certainly the Court has rendered its own opinions, concerning Agent Cefalu.

But again, what becomes increasingly troubling is that regardless of what one's personal opinions of Agent Cefalu may be, it was clear in the testimony that was presented, that much of it presented by the other agents in trying to explain what had happened during the prior investigation and why it had been described as it was in the wiretap affidavit, were at least extremely suspect. And one interpretation is that it was outright false.

I keep coming back to -- and then when you -- when you overlay that with the fact that Agent Elias was not the author of the affidavit. And there are instances, I'm sure the Court has found, when there can actually be co-affiants, when two people have written different parts of an affidavit and have different things to provide to the Court as far as the probable cause is concerned.

And that is a -- that is a disclosure to the Court that more than one person has been responsible for drafting and attesting to what the Court is relying on. And that was not done here. And the only person that swore to anything was

Agent Elias. And it was clear that he was not the author.

I do understand the difference between author and affiant. But at the same time, the fact that he was only an editor and not an author in any respects presents a situation that is something that, in my view, the Court should have been told.

So the Court can at least make an inquiry. So that the Court can at least be able to satisfy itself that the person who is attesting and swearing to the facts in the affidavit actually has competent information and has been someone that actually produced the product.

Because I am sure that even though there is no record of it, that in the Court's mind, when Agent Elias swore to the affidavit, that the assumption was, as it would have been with anybody, that he was the author of it as well as the person who was the affiant.

I'd like to bring up one other fact about the Baptista incident. And I know the Court is -- has mentioned a couple of times. And that is that it turned out to -- I think the Court's words had been criminal conduct, that Mr. Holloway accepted responsibility for. That is true. Obviously.

THE COURT: Yes. We don't charge that to anybody in the investigation stage because nobody knew.

MR. FALLER: That's correct. And -- but what I am saying is that what's important -- and just highlighting,

what's important is what the knowledge of the people was at the time that the affidavit was created.

THE COURT: That's right. We don't use --

MR. FALLER: It's kind of like a search warrant, well, we found the stuff.

THE COURT: We don't use the 20/20 vision of hindsight.

MR. FALLER: Exactly.

THE COURT: No law enforcement officer is ever held to that standard.

MR. FALLER: I understand that and I just wanted to point that out. Because what supposedly Agent Elias and the people giving him information are relating is the facts as they were known at the time that the affidavit was created.

And at the time that the affidavit was created, there was an overall impression given that, through Undersheriff Larson, that Mr. Holloway had influence would have gone on in that investigation. I submit to the Court that is not true.

This is a very unusual situation where we have had testimony on opposite sides of issues by active and sworn law enforcement officers, which both can't be correct. Where the in retrospect things that are stated here have turned out not to be as represented to the Court.

It's -- it's our view that when there is so much uncertainty concerning the factual accuracy of what was given

to the Court in the first instance, that under the totalities of that circumstance, the government should not be allowed to benefit from those things that were portrayed to the Court as one way, but have turned out to be the other.

And there is a point at which, regardless of technical legal standards, that there is -- there is a line which should not be crossed in terms of the government being able to benefit from things that were done in, at best, sloppy and reckless manner and, at worst, an outright duplicatious manner.

Because I would submit to the Court that the information that was given to Elias about the Larson incident smacks of intentional representation from the investigators that were -- that were relating them information. And it was all done for a particular purpose. It was all done to get Bob Holloway. Ultimately. And I don't think anybody can really dispute the fact that that was the point of the exercise.

Now, whether that was -- there were legal means to do that is another -- is another discussion. But that was the point of the exercise. And far too many people in this were willing to go to inappropriate lengths to make that happen.

Again, everybody has biases. Everybody has motivations that may or may not be appropriate. But when it comes to law enforcement, those biases must be set aside and they must deal with the facts as they found them.

In this situation, they did not deal with the facts as they found them. They attempted to fashion them into something else to reach the end result.

And in that respect, Your Honor, they went beyond the line of candor with the Court in that affidavit and it should be set aside and the wiretap evidence that was derived therefrom should be suppressed.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. Would you like government to reply?

MS. MONTOYA: Yes, Your Honor. Regarding law enforcement biases, I would be shocked if there was an affidavit that was submitted to the Court where the officers did not believe that the person who was the target of the investigation was committing a crime.

And to say that they have such a bias that they manufactured evidence where none existed, I think, is just not borne out by the evidence.

What I find personally troubling about Mr. Cefalu is the fact that he's allowed to make the bald assertion regarding perjury committed by officers and the wiretap affidavit when, in fact, the man had never even read the wiretap affidavit. And so I think that we've all discussed at great length his testimony and what it means to this.

But where Mr. Faller's troubled by what law enforcement is doing, I'm troubled by what Cefalu did as it

related to this investigation. Not only while he was involved in it, but after he was involved in it.

Again, when -- I think that Mr. -- Special Agent Elias made it perfectly clear that he read the affidavit, he adopted the affidavit, he edited the affidavit and that he was satisfied that the information contained in the affidavit what was true and correct, based on his knowledge of the investigation, his direct participation in the investigation and the daily briefings that he and other officers had regarding the facts and such of this investigation.

And directing the Court to paragraph I on page ten, it does state that information is to be received from other law enforcement officers. And there really is nothing that was brought out by way of testimony that Mr. -- that Special Agent Elias put anything in the affidavit that he thought was false.

Regarding the Baptista incident, I mean, we've kind of beat that like a dead horse. But the bottom line is that there was information that was left out of the affidavit that was certainly beneficial to the position of law enforcement that this incident did, in fact, occur. And we went over that at the last hearing.

Again, I would ask the Court to deny -- it's the government's understanding that the Court, at the last hearing, ruled that even if taking out that particular portion

of the affidavit, that there was certainly enough information contained in the affidavit to support the issuance of the order authorizing the interceptions in this matter. And I would ask the Court to deny this motion.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

Is the matter submitted?

MS. MONTOYA: Submitted.

MR. BALAZS: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. FALLER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The Court intends that its decision now, it will issue further findings, but that it be supplemented by all my previous findings that have been oral. There hasn't been time, due to the pendency of this and other cases, to do complete findings in a written statement of decision.

That I have intended that my oral findings all be incorporated and there have been, I believe, at least four or five prior times at which I have made findings that relate to the issues raised by this affidavit.

And let me start with the suggestion that Agent Elias, as an affiant with the personal knowledge he described, the attendance at briefings and his presentation of the information to the court was either misleading or improper.

The Court recognizes that law enforcement officers are entitled to rely on not only hearsay, but the reports of other law enforcement officers. They must have a reasonable

belief in the reliability and the accuracy of what they present. They must be in good faith in not presenting something that they know to be false or that they believe is questionable or inaccurate. And if there are reservations that are required to make the statement not misleading and law enforcement has the information, they have a duty to provide it.

And here, the agent who had been the primary author of the affidavit and the predecessor case agent was transferring to another office and Agent Elias picked up the responsibility and assumed the duties for the wiretap application and that process.

The Court believes that he was an integral part of the investigation from June of '06 -- actually, I believe he started as early as May of '06, if not earlier. And was in daily briefings with the submitting officers. He was receiving information from confidential witnesses. Some informants. From many other law enforcement agencies. Local law enforcement agencies.

And I have taken the specific pinpoint and targeted alleged infirmities in this affidavit, including the incident that we have referred to as the Baptista incident, and I've excised them, and I've analyzed this affidavit without any of the objected to information in it. And there's overwhelming support for the issuance of the wiretap, putting out all of

the local information that is now apparently the subject of these motions.

But let's face reality, because the Court sat through a trial and heard what the relationship of these individuals inter se is. Mr. Holloway was a deputy sheriff for a number of years. He was apparently very popular then. He continues to be very popular with a segment of the population in the Stanislaus County area, including Denair, Turlock and the environs.

His wife was a 25 to 26 year employee of the Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office. She worked both for Captain DeLeon and she worked for Undersheriff Larson for many, many years. And, by all accounts, she was a good employee. Nobody terminated her. Nobody questioned her job skills.

And so what the Court understands is that there is an understandable basis for the relationships that exist between, if you will, the Holloways, the Larsons, the DeLeons and others that we have heard about. And I think that the truth lies somewhere in between what has attempted to be represented by both sides.

Certainly you don't think that Undersheriff Larson could deny that he was a friend of Bob Holloway's. DeLeon tried very hard to distance himself from Mr. Holloway during his trial, but I'm sure he was a friend to Mr. Holloway as

well. Certainly the phone conversations, the exhibition in the street between Mr. DeLeon and Mr. Holloway showed that, showed that familiarity, the continuing contact, whether we call it socializing or just simply social discourse.

There continues to be communication of a friendly nature. And you don't have to be a pal, you don't have to be a best friend, you don't have to be even a friend who shares time in each other's homes or goes to dinner or social or cultural events to be friends.

What that does create an appearance of and what it did raise here was putting aside all the specific details, a continuing communication between senior officers of the Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office, most now retired, and Mr. Holloway during times that were relevant.

Because what this affidavit establishes is this. Mr. Holloway is, if you will, a pied piper. He is someone who has a lifestyle that is of his choosing. He chooses to do business with and associate with outlaw motorcycle gangs.

And just like David Daniel Martel stood in this Court and when I said to him, "You are a Hells Angel" and he said proudly, "I am a Hells Angel. And I'll always be a Hells Angel." And what that stands for is we start with the word "outlaw." They profess it. They are the few. They are outside the morays and the standards of society. They commit crimes. And that is the Hells Angel way. That is what they

stand for. That is who they are. And they're very proud of it.

And so Mr. Holloway was a great source of irritation to local law enforcement because he chose to do business with, to engage in criminal conspiracy with, to engage in extortion with Hells Angels members. He had a very well known, very violent Hells Angel who was his chief mechanic, his best mechanic, Dugranrut.

And there is no question that when they are in the process of executing a task force search warrant on Dugranrut's house, Dugranrut has the ability, through Mr. Holloway, who picks up the phone, calls Captain DeLeon, who was then an active officer in the service of the Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office, and says, "he just needs a little time to get things together."

And when, in the history of law enforcement, do the crooks get to tell the cops, "I just need a little more time to get rid of the patch and get rid of the evidence, and then you can come in and execute the search warrant. And if you want me to surrender, we'll arrange for that too."

But at any rate, what we have is a relationship where Holloway felt he had the access and the ability to communicate with then senior officers in the Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office. And his business was the subject of constant scrutiny.

Now, the admissible part of this wiretap is there are a dozen stolen bikes, exported of stolen merchandise, receiving of stolen property incidents that are reported by either the confidential witness, one or two or others that show that there was trafficking in chopped, stolen, disassembled, refabricated motorcycles, motorcycle parts.

That there was extortion involved in the arrangements that Mr. Holloway had with outlaw motorcycle clubs to encourage the purchase by prospects through the clubs of motorcycles from him. And then if the bikes were not paid for, Mr. Holloway either himself or through others, would then threaten and/or extort the non-payors, the debtors, into paying their obligations.

That -- which in a 126-page affidavit, there's nobody who says any of that is false or that that's contrived or that that is misinterpreted.

And the suggestion that for the Court to be presented with information that Mr. Holloway, who parties with Hells Angels, who supports Hells Angels, there was a homicide committed in his business, he was acquitted of that.

But nonetheless, the individuals who are Hells Angel members, the Court generalizes, but I might be able to take judicial notice of, although I'm not, these individuals live violent lifestyles. That is in the nature of the kinds of activities that they engage in.

And so what we have in this affidavit is, even accepting everything that the defense says is true, none of this was knowingly false to Agent Elias. And if we look at the alleged discrepancies or differences between the bunch affidavit and the Larson affidavit testimony, I believe we have at least three material inaccuracies in Mr. Larson's affidavit that were revealed by his testimony today. Does that make him a wrongdoer? If he misrecollects or, in his zeal to defend himself, he's inaccurate? Again, we accept the human condition.

And given that he had been accused by Bunch, he didn't go to law enforcement and didn't offer his version to law enforcement. He offered his version to the defense, who he obviously felt more comfortable with because he believed that the defense had the more accurate information. Again, the truth lies somewhere in between.

But the Court does not find that either it is reckless disregard or that there is knowingly false information presented with the intent to deceive the Court.

Rather, if we want to go to the Baptista incident and analyze it for what it is, Baptista presented with a complaint. His motorcycle had been taken by Mr. Holloway. He had been forced to sign a paper by Mr. Holloway that, in effect, authorized Holloway to take the bike.

He said he was afraid of Holloway. He never changed

that statement. And he said he didn't want to prosecute. He didn't want to pursue the case because he was afraid of Holloway.

Well, certainly, there were pros and cons in that case. We have a decision made at either the sergeant or the lieutenant level that the case is not going to be prosecuted. And with the hindsight of 20/20 vision, given that his friends and family said he was an alcoholic, that he took drugs, that he was paranoid, that he had other problems, the sheriff chose not to present that to the DA. Is that usual? Well, again, we don't have any testimony on that.

And so what the Court understands ordinarily is that if somebody has stated on more than two occasions that they've been extorted, that their property has been taken and that they're afraid of someone, usually the prosecutor exercises discretion whether or not to decide that case is unmakeable and unwinnable.

Here, it was decided at the law enforcement level.

And two members of the law enforcement agency involved, or at least the district attorney's office, of a related law enforcement agency in the same county said the way this case was handled is unusual. Turns out that now that we have the whole story, not what they had, and they didn't have the whole story because they weren't talking to Undersheriff Larson, they didn't know. But what it looked like to them was that

Holloway gets another pass.

And so could they have presented that as they did?

The Court sees that it was justified. There were inaccuracies in their affidavits just like there were inaccuracies today in the testimony.

And in the final analysis, they had cause to believe that Mr. Holloway had special access to command level people in the Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office. And that in some of the incidents that are reported in the affidavit, that it made a difference.

Well, in the final analysis, in the case of Mr.

Baptista, what was the appearance and what was the information in possession of law enforcement as opposed to what is the truth? If we'll ever know the truth.

And in the final analysis, the Court doesn't find, with a 20/20 perfection of hindsight, that the officers shouldn't have presented that claim to either the Court or the District Attorney.

And that there are two sides to the story. And that there are good reasons for not prosecuting Mr. Baptista just like a zealous prosecutor might have said there are good reasons to prosecute.

And so in the final analysis, the Court doesn't find that there is, again, *Franks* type misconduct in presenting that to the Court, but excise it and don't consider it at all.

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pled guilty?

There's a mountain of evidence in this affidavit, which I chronicled most of last time. But I will refer to some additional areas. And remember that in the analysis, the pen registers were showing contact between Mr. Holloway at crucial times and former law enforcement or existing law enforcement senior officials, which certainly, given Holloway's activities, the lifestyle and the activities that he conducted at his business and other places would raise concern for any law enforcement officer. The affidavit reviewed the drug trafficking activities of Picchi and Picchi's close relationship with Holloway. Picchi's wife, who was a known drug addict, although I don't believe that that is in this affidavit. But the activities of Dugranrut, Kelly Brenton, James Copple, Ray Heffington, Dan Martel, Buddy Taylor, all of whom -- of course Dugranrut is dead. But those charged in this case, Heffington, Martel, Sotelo and many others all have pled guilty, engaged in the trafficking in stolen motorcycle parts, to the extortion count, as did -- I'm looking for his

MR. CULLERS: Ray Heffington.

MS. MONTOYA: Mike Orozco.

THE COURT: Orozco. Yeah. Mr. Orozco. Who admitted his extortion of the purchaser of a bike. Reference to the

name -- what -- who was the president of the other club who

activities of Gary Lavenduskey, Michael Pleasant. Known active Hells Angels. Gene Serrano, Bobby Garcia, Angelo Jacobo.

There was constant communication between Mr.

Holloway, those individuals, activities in Mr. Holloway's

business where those people work being observed. Either at

parties, Hells Angels parties, some sponsored by Mr. Holloway,

or at the business.

We have the -- one of the CW's, who went to, in 2007, Dugranrut's residence to, in effect, pay him to refabricate a bike out of stolen parts. And there is nothing infirm -- that was a consensual recording on one side.

There was additionally discussions between Brent Holloway concerning fabrication of a bike and financial arrangements and how the motorcycle -- this is Bob Holloway who was directly involved in the conversation -- could be put together. And an engine case, a frame and other parts which would be untraceable, and which would not be identified as stolen could be fabricated.

There is the Long Beach, the port of Long Beach offloading of motorcycles that were sent to Japan. There is a stolen motorcycle frame, a triple tree, that was in June of 2007 involving, again, Dugranrut and Kelly Brenton concerning a motorcycle.

There is additionally, in May of 2007, concerning a

Bill Litt, who had another motorcycle that had issues where Holloway is reported to have told Litt not to notify the CHP, not to tell the CHP or anyone where he purchased the motorcycle. And that Holloway would buy Litt another set of engine cases to replace ones that were apparently seized by the CHP because they were reported as stolen or at least the motorcycle had an illegal VIN.

There are many additional circumstances that fully justify the issuance of the authorization for these wiretaps. And so the Court finds that when we look at Agent Cefalu, Cefalu may have been a good agent at one time. He apparently rendered service that is noteworthy. He had reached the point in his relationship with his agency where he was no longer able to cooperate with task force members from other agencies. At least that's what his conduct demonstrated.

The reason he was removed from participation of the task force is he couldn't get along with anybody except his two undercover agents that were working.

But as to everybody else from other agencies, he was insulting, he was profane, he was difficult and the Court doesn't find that his information or knowledge, which could not have been helpful after March of 2006, was more than 20 months removed when this wiretap affidavit was presented.

The case had moved far beyond Cefalu. The case involved much more than Cefalu was focused on. And there was,

as the Court has identified in the affidavit, a series of other crimes, circumstances and events that Cefalu didn't even have any knowledge of and wasn't looking into, that made his limited knowledge and limited participation one that does not cause the Court to give any weight to his testimony. His testimony is so colored by his bias, which is absolute and complete, based on his express statements in lawsuits.

The Court hasn't visited his website, but the Court has received reports in these proceedings about his websites, his criticism of his fellow officers, his supervisors and others in the DEA, making it testimony that is simply unhelpful and so colored by bias.

And there are two noteworthy examples of bias that are overwhelming. The first, as has been stated in this proceeding, he criticized and calls false every aspect of the wiretap affidavit. He never read the wiretap affidavit. And he hasn't got the slightest idea of what's going on with three quarters of the investigation. So not only is he reckless, not only is he incompetent, but he does a disservice to the agency that he continues to be employed by.

And the Court finds he is simply unworthy of belief.

The second aspect that the Court has in previous hearings noted, and that is that there is no question that Agent Cefalu has stated in open court his aversion for wiretaps. The fact that he never has sought or obtained a

wiretap.

That he has such a bias when it comes to wiretap that he, the Court believes, evidenced an unwillingness to consider the use of wiretaps in law enforcement if he is involved. If he is either the agent in charge or a participating agent where he would be required to do the work because, of course, the work to obtain a wiretap is monumental.

The requirements of the law that must be met in terms of the showing of necessity and of the documentation and corroboration requirements are so stringent that it takes, as it did in this case, many, many months to put together the information.

But in the final analysis, the Court believes that this was an FBI managed investigation as it pertains to the wiretaps. That the agent had personal knowledge and, through law enforcement sources, information obtained where he heard these officers' report, he heard these officers provide explanations. He viewed evidence, he viewed reports, hundreds and hundreds of pages of reports that provide the probable cause facts.

And the Court is well satisfied that this wiretap application could be presented by Agent Elias. That the alleged failure to further investigate or failure to further ascertain inaccuracies, there were not facts before Agent Elias that gave him either actual or constructive notice that

further investigation was required. His activities were being overseen by at least one full-time Assistant United States

Attorney, who was assigned to the case.

And for all of these reasons and the reasons previously stated in my oral statement of decision the motion to suppress the wiretaps and the recorded conversations is denied.

Now, I believe, since we are not going to address today the subject of the claims of attorney/client and attorney/agent privilege, we'll do that on the 12th with the rest of the motions including the motions in limine.

Is there anything further today?

MR. FALLER: Your Honor, there is one other matter regarding the scheduling that I've discussed with Mr. Balazs and the US Attorney's Office. And also with Mr. Forkner when he has been here.

Obviously, with the pleas of the other defendants, this is a much different case than it was a month ago. And as we are preparing and as we are moving through the evidence and material that we are receiving from the government -- and I'm not casting aspersions, they've been very helpful when they give something to try and point out how it relates to a particular defendant.

We are, in many respects, overwhelmed as we are trying to get prepared for this matter. It's my request, and

1 I discussed it with Mr. Balazs and also Mr. Forkner, if we 2 could just get some additional time. Not only taken into 3 consideration this huge personal event I've got that's going to take place the week of the 31st, which I must say has 4 5 become a much bigger deal than I ever anticipated. If --6 MR. BALAZS: Tell the Court what that is. 7 MR. FALLER: Well, my only child is getting married. And it's becoming an event of weeks' proportion rather than 8 9 days' proportion. I see the chuckles on the other side of the 10 room and I'll take those in good humor. I assume they are 11 deliberate. 12 It would be our request if we could possibly begin 13 the trial on August 13th rather than July 20th. It would be, 14 I believe, beneficial to the manner in which the case can be 15 presented. It would be more efficiently done so. And I don't 16 believe anybody would be prejudiced by it. 17 I specifically talked to Mr. Forkner about that also. 18 I know the Court had quite a bit of time blocked out for it 19 when it was going to be a much huger case. And I think that 20 will still put us in the window. 21 THE CLERK: August 13th is a Friday. 22 MR. FALLER: I'm sorry. 23 MR. CULLERS: August 10th? 24 MR. FALLER: August 10th. MR. CULLERS: Is that the Ninth Circuit conference?

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              THE COURT:
                         The Ninth Circuit conference is the week
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     of the 16th. And the only day I would be here in that week is
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     Friday.
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              THE CLERK: We have two trials set the 24th and two
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     on the 31st.
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              THE COURT: Two trials set on the 24th and two trials
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     set on the 31st.
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              THE CLERK: August 3rd?
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              MR. FALLER: Well, how about August 9th? I mean, I'm
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     at the point of begging for anything I can get. I -- you
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     know, I'm sorry, I can't. I will not be able to be ready by
12
     the 3rd.
              But the 10th would -- if I could get the 10th or the
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     17th, I would be eternally grateful.
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              MS. MONTOYA: I have one of the trials on the 31st
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     that I'm ever hopeful will settle. But I don't have any
     information I can give the Court as to whether or not it will
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17
     settle.
              On August 31st.
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              MR. FALLER: When is the 9th circuit conference
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     again?
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                         The 16th.
              THE COURT:
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              MR. FALLER: So the Court will be dark pretty much
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     that entire week.
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              THE COURT:
                         The Friday is -- will be, you know, a
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     regular day. But Monday through Thursday, we will not be
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     here.
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1 MR. CULLERS: We could start on the 10th, Your Honor, 2 go until the 13th. I don't know if you want to give the jury 3 a week off or take some evidence on the 20th when you're back. 4 MR. FALLER: I don't really think it's going to be 5 two full weeks. 6 MR. CULLERS: Well, I don't know what Mr. --7 MR. BALAZS: It's a little bit hard to say. I know 8 we now have expert witness notices for, I think, five experts 9 for both sides. And Mr. Forkner has told me that he intends 10 to call a number of witnesses. So I think it will be more 11 than just a three-day trial. 12 MR. FALLER: Oh, I agree with that. 13 MR. BALAZS: How long it will go, it's a little bit 14 hard to say. 15 THE COURT: Well, what's the government's position? 16 MR. CULLERS: Well, Mr. Faller did speak to us before 17 And given his situation, you know, obviously we want 18 to accommodate him as much as we can. And our position was that that would be okay. But then I didn't realize about the 19 20 Ninth Circuit conference, which throws a monkey wrench into 21 But if we want to start on the 10th and resume against on 22 the 24th, I don't know if that's -- I just can't go into 23 September because I have a trial in September. 24 THE COURT: Right. What I'm wondering is this. Can 25 we get -- can we start any time earlier than the 10th?

1 MR. CULLERS: Do you want to pick a jury? 2 THE COURT: We can pick a jury on the Friday? MR. FALLER: Yeah. On the 6th? Yes. Yes. I could 3 4 pick a jury on the 6th. 5 THE COURT: All right. It seems to me that that 6 would be the best logistically. 7 MR. CULLERS: We have a -- I'm sorry, Your Honor, the problem is our subpoenas, everybody is coming in. 8 9 THE COURT: Right. I know. 10 MR. CULLERS: And has blocked off this time. 0ur 11 witnesses have. So I'm assuming this is okay for our 12 witnesses in terms of vacations and everything else. But --13 Right. Obviously I would make any MR. FALLER: 14 accommodations necessary for that. I realize that this is 15 something that I am asking for. 16 MS. MONTOYA: And perhaps we can do some checking 17 between now and the 12th to see if --18 THE COURT: To see what the situation is with your 19 witnesses. All right. We'll address this again on the 12th, because we had done that -- we had structured our whole court 20 21 calendar to be available for this trial. 22 MR. FALLER: I understand, Your Honor. And believe 23 me, I understand the accommodation I am asking for. I do not 24 do this lightly. 25 MR. CULLERS: So we can maybe just tell witnesses

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     tentatively that we're thinking of moving the trial to the
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     10th and just see if that week is good.
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              THE COURT: And what I would try to do is maybe move
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     the calendar on the 9th of August so we would have a trial
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     day.
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              MR. CULLERS: Oh, I see.
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              THE COURT: A full week of trial, five days.
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              MR. CULLERS: Oh, okay. Or we could pick a jury on
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     the 6th and just start up on the 10th. We could do that too.
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    Which would save time. That way on the 10th it would just be
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    witnesses and evidence going straight through.
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              THE COURT: Yes. If we had jury selection, opening
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     statements on the 6th.
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              MR. CULLERS: Yes. We might be able to do that or
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                That's a Friday. All right. We can check with
     something.
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     our witnesses and we can let counsel know. So we'll have an
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     idea.
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              MR. FALLER: We'll communicate between now --
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                          Yes. We'll address this on the 12th.
              THE COURT:
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              MR. FALLER: Thank you very much.
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              MR. CULLERS: Thank you.
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              THE COURT: All right. We are in recess.
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              (The proceedings were concluded at 3:37 p.m.)
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