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BY FED EX

August 24, 2009

Paul J. Orfanedes Jason B. Aldrich Judicial Watch, Inc. 501 School St. S.W. Suite 700 Washington, DC 20024

Re: Judicial Watch v. Central Intelligence Agency, 1:09CV1303 (GK) (D.D.C.)

Dear Paul and Jason,

The CIA has completed processing and/or reprocessing certain records in this matter, and has determined that it may release some of those records in whole or part. Enclosed please find copies of those records.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

ERIC SOSKIN
Trial Attorney
Federal Programs Branch

Civil Division



13 July 2004

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida (SUNF)

VOFORNAMA

Kitalid Shaykh Muhammadı Presminant Source On Al-Qa'ita (S/NT)

Key Findings (U)

Since his March 2063 capture, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (RSM), the driving force behind the 11 September attacks as well as several subsequent plots against US and Western targets worldwide, has become one of the IS Government's key sources on al-Qa'ida. As a detaines, he has provided assessed reports that have shed light on al-Qa'ida's strategic dectrine, plots and probable targets, key operatives, and the likely methods for attacks in the US homeland, leading to the disruption of several plots against the United States.


Information from KSM has not only dramatically expanded our universe
of knowledge on al-Calida's plots but has provided leads that assisted
directly in the capture of other terrorists, including Jamesh Islamiya
leader Hambali


KSM steedfastly maintains that his overriding priority was to strike the United States but says that immediately after 11 September he realized that a follow on strack in the United States would be difficult because of new security measures. As a result, KSM's plots against the US homeland from late 2001 were opportunistic and limited, including a plot to fly a hijacked plane into the tellest building on the US West Coast and a plan to send al-Qailda operative and US citizen Jose Padilla to set off bombs in high-rise spartment buildings in a US city. (2)



CIA assesses that Kan has revealed at least the broad outlines of the set of introvist attacks upon which he and his Hautenantz focused from about 1999 until his detendent four years later. We judge that KEM has been gamerally accurate because his information tends to be consistent, and much of it has been corroborated by fellow detainess and other reporting.

SECRETY







Khalid Shaykh Muhammadi Preaminent Source On Al-Qa'ida (S/DF)

What KSM Has Told Us (SANF)



Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad (Kilif), the
driving force behind the
11 September attacks as
well as sevaral
subsequent plots against
US and Western targets
worldwide, has become,
since his capture in
Marah 2003, a key
intelligence source for
the US Government on
al-Quida's plots and

paraonalities. Debrishings since his detection have yielded reports that have shed light on the plots, capabilities, the identity and location of al-Qa'ida operatives, and affiliated terrorist cuganizations and networks. He has provided information on al-Qa'ida's stratugic doctrine, probable targets, the impact of striking each target set, and likely methods of sincoke inside the United States.

- KSM has also provided in considerable detail the traits and profiles that al-Qa'ida sought in Western operatives after the 11 September attacks.
- In addition, KSM has given us insight into how al-Qa'ids might conduct surveillance of potential targets in the United Stares, how it might select targets.

It will take years to determine definitively all the plots in which KSM was involved and of which he was aware, but our extensive debriefings of various KSM itemenants since early 2003 suggest that he has divulged at least the irroad cutlines of his natwork's most significant plots against the United States and pleawhere in his role as al-Qa'ida's chief of operations outside Afghanisten:

- Striking the United States. Despite KSM's execution that a post-1! September attack in the United States would be difficult because of more stringent security measures, he has admitted to hatching a plot in late 2001 to use Jemash Islamiya (II) operatives to crash a hijsoked airliner into the tallest building on the US West Coast. From lane 2001 until carly 2003, KSM also conceived several low-level plots, including an early 2002 plan to send al-Qa'ids operative and US citizen Jose Padilla to set off bombs in high-rise apartment buildings in an unspecified major US city and an mently 2003 plot to coupley a network of Pakistanis including lyman Foris and Majid Khan-to target gas stations, railroad nacia, and the Brooklyn Bridge in New York. KSM has also spoken at length about operative Ja'far al-Tayyar, admitting that al-Qu'ida had tasked al-Tayyer to case specific targets in New York City in 2001.
- Amache in Aria, Ruropa, she Middle East. During 2000-2001, KSM plotted attacks against US and other targets in Southeast Asia using al-Qa'ida and II operatives, but after the 11 September attacks he claims that he largely regarded II operatives as a resource for his plots against targets in Europe and

BEOMET


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Using KSM To Implicate
Sufact in CBRN Plotting
(SUNP)

CIVIL DIV/FED PRO BR


Reporting from KSM fas greatly advanced our understanding of al-Qa'ida's unthrax program.

- In response to questions about al-Qa'ida's efforts to acquire WMD, KSM revealed he had met three individuals involved in al-Qa'ida's program to produce anthrax. He appears to have calculated, incorrectly, that we had this information already, given that one of the three—Yatid Surfact—had been in foreign oustedy for several months before KSM's arrest for unrelated retroitst activity.
- when confroned with the information provided by KSM, Yazid, who had access to press reports and therepipe knew of KSM's capture, activately adjust become he figured it was KSM who betrayed him. Eventually, Yazid admined his principal role in the antirax program and priviled some figure that are included in the time, still all large scaling its facility was at the time, still all large scaling its facility was numerally the information provided by KSM that led in the capture of Yazid's two principal scaling in the antirax program.





"Historical Plots. KSM has been one of the primary sources on understanding how the 11 September attacks were conceived, planned, and executed While KSM was the manager of the 11 September plot, he claims to lank knowledge of many aspects of the eneck's planning and execution because Bin Ladin and his deceased deputy Muhammad 'Arif played a key rule in the selection of operatives, and Remai Bin al-Shibh, not KSM, was in direct contact with the 11 September bijacious once they were in the United States. KSM also has provided a fair amount of detail on the 1994-95 "Bojinka" plot-formulated along with his nephew Remei Yousef-in which they conspired to explode in mideir a dozen US-flagged airliners over the Pacific Ocean (9)



ESM has not admitted in a role in the bombing by II operatives of nightchuhe in Ball in Cotober 2002; Humbali claims that he financed these bombings from funding provided by KSM for attacks in general in Southerst Asia.

KSM's Roledex A Boon For Operations (SUNF)

KSM's decade-long eareer as a terrorist, during which he met with a broad range of Islamic extremists from around the world, has made him a key source of information on memorous at Qs'ida operatives and other mujahidin. He has provided intelligence that has led directly to the capture of operatives of flashed out our understanding of the activities of important detainess, which in turn assisted in the debriatings of these individuals.





Similarly, information that KSM provided to us on Majid Khan in the spring of 2003 was the crucial first link in the chain that led us to the capture of prominent JI lander and al-Qa'ida associate Hambali in August 2003 and more than a dozen Southeast Arlan operatives elated for attanks against the US


homeland. KSM told in about Rhan's role in delivering \$50,000 in December 2002 to operatives associated with Hambell.

- In an example of how information from one detained can be used in debricking enother detained in a "building-block" process. Khan—who had been detained in Pakistan in early 2003—was confronted with KSM's information about the money and acknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named "Zubais." Khan sho provided Zubair's physical description and contact number. Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June 2003.
- During dehriatings, Zubeir revested that he worked directly for Hambell

thiormation Zubair provided by Zubair to

Naxt, KSM—when explicitly queried on the issue—identified Hambell's brother, 'Abd ai-Harli, as a prospective exposurer to Hambell.

Bringing the story full circle, 'Abd al-Hadi identified a cell of II operatives—some of them pilots—whom Hambali had sent to Karachi for possible al-Qa'ida operations. When confronted with his brother's revelations, Hambali admitted that ha was grooming members of the cell for US operations—at the behast of KSM—probably as part of KSM's plot to fly hijacked planes into the tallest building on the US West Coast.







KSM's Information Seems Cradible ... (8/845)


KSM

the Heathrow plot and operatives targeted for missions against the United States after 11 September—has been consistent with or convoluted by separating from other details.

- Shortly after his capture, KSM probably was willing to divulge limited information on the Heathrew plot because key Heathrew plotts Ramai Bin al-Shibh had been detained about six mooths carifor. Nevertheless, KSM withhold details about the evolution of the operation until confronted with reporting from two other operatives knowledgeable concerning the plot—Khallad Bin 'Attach and KSM's naphew Atumer al-Baluchi—who were caught
- KSM sise provided much more specific information on al-Qa'ida's operational activities with II and the identities of II operatives only after he was confronted by detailed questions derived from the debrickings of II leader and al-Oa'ida associate
 Hambali,








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
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Appendix: Blography of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) (U)

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) was born on 24 April 1965; his father, a cleric who died in 1969, moved to Kurwait along with other Baluchi relatives from Iran in the 1950s and early 1960s, when large numbers of migrants haveled to the Gulf region from across the Muslim World to take advantage of the oil boom. In a lengthy sunobiographical statement made after his capture, KSM nound that he had a rebellious streak from childhood; he claimed that in grade solmol, he and his naphew, World Trade Conter bomber Ramai Yoused, tore down the Kurwalti flag from their school. He also stated that he joined the Muslim Brotherhood as a toenager as an expression of his defiance against the secular world he new around him.

In addition to Ramei Yousef, another five rolatives of KSM are mirorists, the most notable of whom are nonhew 'Ali 'Abd al-Aziz 'Ali (a.k.a. 'Ammer), a key facilitator for the 11 September attacks



KSM's limited and negative experiences in the United States—which included a brief juil stay because of unyaid bills—almost certainly helped propel him on his path to become a terrarist. KSM stated in his juilhouse autobiography that, while attending North Carolina A&T State University, he focused on his studies and associated primarily with follow Islamist students from the Middle Bast.



He stated that his contacts with Americans, while minimal, confirmed his view that the United States was a debauched and rapist country.

After graduating from A&T in 1986 with a degree in machanical originaring. KSM said that he travaled to Afghanistan to participate in the fighting against the Soviet Army there. He stated that most of his time in Afghanistan during this period was directed to support work for other mujahidin. (SA)

KSM also has identified the terrorist activities of his nephew Ramel Yousef, along with his anger at the US Government's support of Israel, as playing a pivotal role in his decision to engage in terrorism against the United States. In 1992, KSM says he provided about \$1,000 to help fund Yousef's bombing of the World Trade Canter, adding that he was impressed by the ease with which his nephery was able to operate in the United States.

He then joined Yousel in the Philippines in 1994. to plan the "Bojinka" plot—the simultaneous bombings of a dozon US-flagged commercial sirliners over the Pacific.

· After the Bojinks plot was disrupted and Yousel was caught in early 1995, KSM escaped but was subsequently indicated in the United Status for his role in the plot and wont into hiding.



While preparing the Bojinka plot, Youref and KSM also discussed the idea of using planes as missiles to strike targets in the United States, including the White House and the Contral Intelligence Agency, KSM says that, in 1996, he expanded the idea of using planes as missiles by conceiving of a plot of hijecting too strikes to strike simultaneously targets on both courts of the United States. (8/

KSM traveled to Afghamistan in the mid-1990s to gain the support of Usanz Bin Ladia and thereby hopefully obtain the resources necessary to realize the operation. The al-Qa'ide leader at first demutred but changed his mind in lam 1999 and provided KSM operatives and funding for a scaled-down version of his hijecking operation. This planning culminated in the 11 September

e Before September 2001, KSM was neither a formal member of al-Qa'lda nor a member of its leadership council, but in addition to managing the 11 September operation, he headed



al-Qa'ida's Media Comminee and oversaw offices during 2000-2001 to work with Best Asian Jamesh Islamiya (II) operatives to Jamesh terrorist atracks in Southeast Asia against US and leracli targeta,

 KSM has stated that he intentionally did not sweet bay ah (a piedge of loyalty) in Bin Ladin until after September 2001 so that he could have ignored a decision by the al-Qa'ida leadership to cancel the 11 September attacks. Ø

After late 2001, the collapse of the Taliban regime, the dispense of al-Qa'ida's loadership, and the prestige associated with angineering the If September stracks combined to propel KSM into the role of operations which for al-Qa'ida acound the world.


 KSM stated that he had planned a second wave of hijanking smarks even before September 2001 but shifted his sim from the United States to the United Kingdom because of the United States? post-11 September society posture and the British Government's strong support for Washington's globel war on terror.

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- In addition to attempting to propire this so-called "Heathrow Plot"—in which he planned to have multiple singert attack Heathrow Airport and other targets in the United Kingdom KSM also laumahed a number of plots against the United States.
- Although he was responsible for operational plotting, KSM stated that during most of 2002, he spent considerable time managing the movement and housing of operatives and their families from Afghanistan to Pakistan and then conwards to the Middle Rest. (SUDITY

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3 June 2005

Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida (S#NF)

Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida (S/DA)

Key Findings (U)

Since 11 September 2001, detained reporting has become a crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts, aiding intelligence and law enforcement operations to capture additional terrorists, helping to thwart terrorist plots, and advancing our analysis of the al-Qa'ida target. In addition, detaineds have been able to clarify and provide context for information collected from other sources; they also have provided unique insights into different aspects of the terrorist organization, including its leadership, attack strategy and tactics, and CBRN capabilities and ambitions.

the reporting is disseminated broadly within the US

Government (281/

Detainees have given us a wealth of useful information on al-Qa'ida members and associates; in fact, detainees have played some role

a hearly every capture of al-Qa'ida members and associates since 2002, including helping us unravel most of the network associated with the now detained 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM). KSM provided information that set the stage for the detention of Hambali, lead contact of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) to al-Qa'ida, and most of his network.

 Detainee information was also key to wrapping up such important al-Qa'ida members and associates as

Jose Padilla and Iyman Faris.

One of the gains to detaining the additional terrorists has been the thwarting of a number of al-Qa'ida operations in the United States and overseas. Jose Padilla was detained as he was arriving in Chicago with plans to mount an attack. Similarly, Walid Bin 'Attash (a.k.a. Khallad) was captured on the verge of mounting attacks against the US Consulate in Karachi, Westerners at the Karachi Airport, and Western housing areas.

Since 11 September, the capture and debriefing of detainees also has transformed our understanding of al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist groups,



providing increased avenues for sophisticated analysis. Before the capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002,

Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa'ida's organizational structure, key operatives, and modus operandi. It also was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, who identified KSM as the mastermind of the 11 September attacks.

• In the nearly four years since 11 September 2001, successive detainees have helped us gauge our progress in the fight against al-Qa'ida by providing updated information on the changing structure and health of the organization.

Despite the unquestionable utility of detainee reporting, uncorroborated information from detainees must be regarded with some degree of suspicion. Detainees have been known to pass incomplete or intentionally misleading information, moreover, we assess that each detainee very likely has information that he will not reveal



Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida (S/NF)



Since 11 September 2001, reporting from high value al-Qa'ida detaineos has become a crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts, contributing directly and indirectly to intelligence and law-enforcement operations against the al-Qa'ida target. In addition, detainees have been able to clarify and provide context for information collected from other sources; they also have provided unique insights into different aspects of the terrorist organization, including its leadership, attack strategy and tactics, and CBRN capabilities and ambitions.

 Detainee reporting since early 2003 has been a major foundation for much of the Intelligence Community's analysis on al-Qa'ida, both in terms of current intelligence publications and of more in-depth intelligence assessments.

detainee reporting is disseminated broadly among US intelligence and lawenforcement entities

*High Value Detainee (HVD): A detainee who—in large part due to his having held a position in or in association with al Qa ida before detention that afforded him significant information about the group—has advanced our understanding of terrorism on multiple fronts

Medium: Value: Detainee (MVD): A detainee (Whose reporting advanced our knowledge of al-Qaida, but only on a limited range of ssues.

Low Value Detainee (LVD): A detainee who may have provided some information on a specific issue, but whose overall reporting has not advanced our knowledge of al Qa'ida (SOC)

Helping Target Other Terrorists (SANF)


High and medium value detainees have given us a wealth of useful information on al-Qa'ida members and associates, including new details on the personalities and activities of known terrorists.


Detainees also divulge, either wittingly or unwittingly, details about terrorists who are unknown to us. As is information from other collection streams, detainee reporting is often incomplete or too general to lead directly to arrests; instead, detainees provide critical pieces to the puzzle, which, when combined with other reporting, have helped direct an investigation's focus and led to the capture of terrorists.

Defining al-Qu'ida Detainees (SAT)

Detained members and associates of al Qa'ida fall into three basic categories, based on their position and access and the reporting they have provided

This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,





Unraveling Hambali's Network


In March 2003, al-Qa'ida external operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) provided information about an al-Qa'ida operative, Majid Khan, who he was aware had recently been captured. KSM-possibly believing the detained operative was "talking"—admitted to having tasked Majid with delivering a large sum of money to individuals working for another senior al-Qa'ida associate.

- In an example of how information from one detainee can be used in debriefing another detainee in a "building block" process, Khan-confronted with KSM's information about the moneyacknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named "Zubair" and provided Zubair's physical description and contact number. Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June 2003.
- During debriefings, Zubair revealed that he worked directly for Hambali, who was the principle Jemaah Islamiya (JI) conduit to al-Qa'ida. Zubair provided information

we used the information Zubair provided to track down and arrest Hambali.

 Next, KSM—when explicitly queried on the issue-identified Hambali's brother, 'Abd al-Hadi (a.k.a. Rusman Gunawan) as a prospective successor to Hambali.

 Bringing the story full circle, 'Abd al-Hadi identified a cell of JI operatives whom Hambali had sent to Karachi for training. When confronted with his brother's revelations, Hambali admitted that some members of the cell were eventually to be groomed for US operations—at the behest of KSM—possibly as part of KSM's plot to fly hijacked planes into the tallest building on the US west coast.1 (\$/




Bringing New Targets to Light

A variety of detainee reporting has provided us initial information about individuals having links to al-Qa'ida and has given us insight into individuals about whom we had some reporting but whose


See Appendix A: Capture of Al-Qa'ida's Southeast Asian Chief Hambali (SANF). (SANF)

al-Qa'ida involvement was unclear. For example, detainees in mid-2003 helped us build a list of approximately 70 individuals—many of whom we had never heard of before—that al-Qa'ida deemed suitable for Western operations.



• Ja'far al-Tayyar first came to the FBI's attention when Abu Zubaydah named him as one of the most likely individuals to be used by al-Qa'ida for operations in the United States or Europe.

provided additional details



Aiding US Law Enforcement Efforts (SUPIF)

Many actionable leads provided by detainee reporting have assisted the efforts of the FBI, local law enforcement, and the Department of Defense. Such information has led to arrests, helped in questioning suspects, and may ultimately be used in a judicial process.

Soon after his arrest, KSM described an Ohio-based truck driver whom the FBI identified as Iyman Faris, and who was already under suspicion for his contacts with al-Qa'ida operative Majid Khan. The FBI and CIA shared intelligence from interviews of KSM, Khan, and Faris on a near real-time basis and quickly ascertained that Faris had met and accepted operational taskings from KSM on several occasions. Faris is currently serving a 20-year sentence for conspiracy and material support to a terrorist organization.

with Sayf al-Rahman Paracha—who also used the mame Saifullah al-Rahman Paracha—to smuggle explosives into the United States for a planned attack in New York prompted the FBI to investigate Paracha's business ties in the United States. The investigation also involved questioning Paracha's son, Uzair Paracha, in New York and resulted in designating in May 2003 Sayf al-Rahman Paracha an enemy combatant. Sayf al-Rahman Paracha entered into US custody in July 2003, and Uzair was indicted in the Federal Court in Manhattan. Sayf al-Rahman Paracha remains in detention at Guantanamo Bay.



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Revealing Plots, Potential Targets (S/NF)

Detainee reporting has helped thwart a number of al-Qa'ida plots to attack targets in the West and elsewhere. Not only have detainees reported on potential targets and techniques that al-Qa'ida operational planners have considered but arrests also have disrupted attack plans in progress.





In response to questions about al-Qa'ida's efforts to acquire WMD, KSM also revealed he had met three individuals involved in al-Qa'ida's program to produce anthrax. He apparently calculatedincorrectly—that we had this information already, given that one of the three—JI operative and al-Qa'ida associate Vazid Sufaat-had been in foreign custody for unrelated terrorist activity.

 After being confronted with KSM's reporting, Sufaat eventually admitted his principal role in the anthrax program and provided information on his at-large assistants. Ultimately, the information from Sufaat and KSM ed to the capture of Sufaat's two assistants in the authrax program. (8/

US Targets Here and Abroad

Abu Zubaydah was the first of several detainees to reveal a significant quantity of general threat information against targets abroad and in the United States-including the White House and other US symbols.

 Reporting from Abu Zub baseline for debriefing of 	aydah has been used as a ther senior detainees	Ì.
		2
probable targets and meth	nods for attacks	

Debriefings of mid-level al-Qa'ida operatives also have reported on specific plots against US interests.

A key Somali operative working with al-Qa'ida and al-Ittihad al-Islami in East Africa, Hassan Ahmed Guleed after his capture that East African al-Qa'ida leader planned to attack the US military at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti using explosive-laden water tankers.



Heathrow Airport Plot

Shortly after his capture in March 2003, KSM divulged limited information about his plot to use commercial airliners to attack Heathrow Airport and other targets in the United Kingdom. He discussed the plot probably because he suspected that key al-Qa'ida 11 September facilitator and Heathrow Airport plotter Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who had been detained six months previously, had already revealed the information.

 Debriefers used KSM's and Bin al-Shibh's reporting to confront Walid Bin 'Attash (a.k.a. Khallad) and Ammar al-Baluchi, who were caught two months after KSM. Khallad admitted to having been involved in the plot and revealed that he had directed cell leader locating pilots who could hijack planes and crash them into the airport. Khallad said he and operative had considered some 10 countries as possible launch sites for the hijacking attempts and that they narrowed the options to the

 Khallad's statements provided leverage in debriefings of KSM. KSM fleshed out the status of the operation, including identifying an additional target in the United Kingdom-

Revealing the Karachi Plots


When confronted with information provided by Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad admitted during debriefings that al-Qa'ida was planning to attack the US Consulate in Karachi.

Aiding Our Understanding of Al-Qa'ida (SANE)

Since 11 September, the capture and debriefing of HVDs has significantly advanced our understanding of al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist groups. Before the capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002, we had significant gaps in knowledge about al-Qa'ida's organizational structure, key members and associates, capabilities, and its presence around the globe. Within months of his arrest, Abu Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa'ida's organizational structure, key operatives, and modus operandi. Early in his detention, his information on al-Qa'ida's Shura Council and its various committees added to what we were learning

• In addition, Abu Zubaydah's identification early in his detention of KSM as the mastermind of 11 September and al-Qa'ida's premier terrorist planner and of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri as another,' key al-Qa'ida operational planner corroborated information

Since 11 September, successive detainees have helped us gauge our progress in the fight against al-Qa'ida by providing updated information on the changing structure and health of the organization




the organizations until his arrest in July 2004, he has reported on how he forged passports and to whom he supplied them,

also provided invaluable insights in reports that have aided our analysis of al-Qa'ida's current organization, the personalities of. its key members, and al-Qa'ida's decisionmaking process. His reporting has contributed to our understanding of the enemy, how al-Qa'ida members interact with each other, how they are organized, and what their personal networks are like.

particular, he was able to give insight into operations chief Abu Faraj al-Libi. NYT

Ahmed Khalfam Ghailani (a.k.a. Haytham al-Kini, a.k.a. Fupi) a Tanzanian al-Qa'ida member who was indicted for his role in the 1998 East Africa US Embassy bombings, has provided new insights into al-Qa'ida's skills and networks. As a facilitator and one of al-Qa'ida's top document forgers since the 11 September attacks, with access to individuals across



also reported that trained the bombmakers responsible for the bombing of the US Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, in June 2002 and the assassination attempt against President Musharraf in early 2002.

in confronting detainees to persuade them to talk about topics they would otherwise not reveal.

For example, lists of names found on the computer -a key al-Qa'ida financial operative and facilitator for the 11 September attacks-seized in March 2003 represented al-Qa'ida members who were to receive funds. Debriefers questioned detainees extensively on the names to determine who they were and how important they were to the organization. The information

helped us to better understand al-Qa'ida's hierarchy, revenues, and expenditures, as well as funds that were available to families.

The same computer contained a list of e-mail addresses for individuals KSM helped deploy abroad who he hoped would execute operations;

Illuminating Other Collection (SARF)


Detainees have been particularly useful in sorting out the large volumes of documents and computer data seized in raids. Such information potentially can be used in legal proceedings

Some also can be used

Challenges of Detainee Reporting (SUNF)

Detainees, by virtue of their circumstances, have an adversarial relationship with their debriefers; they often try pass incomplete or intentionally misleading information, perhaps hoping that the volume of the reporting will make it difficult to sort out the truth. admitted outright that there were some topics-

he would not discuss.



elaborated on his plan to crash commercial airlines into Heathrow Airport; he may have assumed that Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who was captured in December 2002, had already divulged this plan.

Refusing To Budge on Certain Topics (SARF)

We assess that each detained very likely has information that he will not reveal

Detainees' information must be corroborated using multiple sources of intelligence; uncorroborated information from detainees must be regarded with some degree of suspicion. Sometimes the detainee gives information he calculates—rightly or wrongly—that the debriefers already know.

 Uncharacteristic for most detainces, KSM almost immediately following his capture in March 2003

