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INFO	LOG-00	MFA-00	NP-00	AF-00	A-00	CA-00	CIAE-00
	INL-00	DODE-00	DOTD-00	WHA-00	EAP-00	EB-00	ED-01
	EUR-00	OICC-00	AAAE-00	FLIE-00	UTED-00	VL-00	FLLE-00
	INR-00	L-00	VCE-00	M-00	NEA-00	DGP-00	NSAE-00
	OIG-00	NIA-00	PER-00	P-00	ST-00	IRM-00	SSO-00
	SS-00	SA-00	SSJS-00	FLF-00	BJG-00	LCA-00	DSCC-00
	PRM-00	SAS-00	/001R				

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B6, B7(C)

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TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND PARTIAL RELEASE

B6, B7(C)

SENSITIVE, FOR RSOS

CONCURRENCE REQUESTED - DHS, FBI

I.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ASEC, PTER

SUBJECT: FBI/DHS INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN--BESLAN LESSONS

EARNED//SCHOOL SECURITY GUIDANCE

REF: FBI/DHS INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 150


THE FOLLOWING FBI/DHS BULLETIN IS BEING RETRANSMITTED TO RSOS TO ADVISE RECIPIENTS OF THE POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF THE SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 CHECHEN AFFILIATED TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE SCHOOL IN BESLAN, NORTH OSSETIA, RUSSIA, AND TO PROVIDE PROTECTIVE MEASURE GUIDANCE.

THERE IS NO IMMINENT THREAT TO U.S. SCHOOLS AND THE GROUP THAT CONDUCTED THE OPERATION HAS NEVER ATTACKED OR THREATENED TO ATTACK US INTERESTS. HOWEVER, THE EXTENSIVE MEDIA COVERAGE AND THE HIGH CASUALTY RATE GENERATED BY THE INCIDENT

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IN BESLAN WARRANT A SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM THAT INCIDENT AND PROTECTIVE MEASURE GUIDANCE FOR HELPING TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO A SIMILAR TERRORIST ATTACK WERE IT TO OCCUR IN THE UNITED STATES.



4. RECIPIENTS ARE REMINDED THAT THE INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN IS DESIGNATED "SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" AND SHOULD NOT BE DISSEMINATED BEYOND LAW ENFORCEMENT CIRCLES.

5. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE PLANNING AND TACTICS REPORTEDLY USED BY THE TERRORIST ASSAULT TEAM AGAINST THE BESLAN SCHOOL AND THE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES' RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS HAS IDENTIFIED SEVERAL ITEMS THAT LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION AND SECURITY PERSONNEL MAY CONSIDER WHEN DEVELOPING SCHOOL SECURITY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS.

6. REPORTING INDICATES THAT APPROXIMATELY THIRTY TERRORISTS USED A STOLEN POLICE OR MILITARY TRUCK FOR TRANSPORTATION TO THE SCHOOL GROUNDS. UPON ARRIVING AT THE SCHOOL, THE TERRORISTS REPORTEDLY WERE STOPPED AT A GATE BY A FOUR-PERSON GUARD FORCE THAT HAD BEEN STATIONED AT THE SCHOOL TO INCREASE THE PROTECTION AT SENSITIVE ESTABLISHMENTS, WHICH INCLUDED SCHOOLS IN THE CAUCASUS REGION. AS THE SECURITY GUARDS CONDUCTED AN IDENTIFICATION CHECK, THE TERRORISTS REPORTEDLY OPENED FIRE, KILLING TWO AND INJURING TWO. THEY ALSO KILLED SIX PARENTS WHO RUSHED TO THE ASSISTANCE OF THE SECURITY GUARDS.

7. THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT THE TERRORISTS HAD PRE-POSITIONED A LARGE CACHE OF WEAPONS, INCLUDING EXPLOSIVES AND AMMUNITION, WITHIN THE SCHOOL BUILDING PRIOR TO THE ATTACK. THEY MAY HAVE EITHER UTILIZED A GROUP OF ETHNIC CHECHENS INVOLVED IN RENOVATION WORK AT SCHOOLS IN THE REGION OVER THE SUMMER TO HIDE THE WEAPONS UNDER THE FLOOR OF THE SCHOOL, OR POSED AS CONSTRUCTION WORKERS TO SMUGGLE THE WEAPONS INSIDE. REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE WEAPONS MAY HAVE BEEN DISGUISED AS CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT EMPLACED AT THE

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SCHOOL. IN ADDITION TO STORING WEAPONS, A SCHOOL WORKER REPORTED THAT HE OBSERVED FALSE-FRONTED WALLS, WHICH PRIOR TO THE ATTACK WERE COVERED IN TEMPORARY STUCCO, THAT WERE GOUGED OUT DURING THE STAND-OFF TO SERVE AS SHELTERED FIRING POSITIONS. IF THESE ACCOUNTS ARE TRUE, THIS WOULD INDICATE THAT THE ATTACKERS HAD BEEN PLANNING THE ATTACK FOR MONTHS, WOULD HAVE HAD DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACILITY GROUNDS AND BUILDING INTERIORS, AND WOULD HAVE LIKELY BEEN CONDUCTING SOME TYPE OF PRE-OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE OF BUILDING OPERATIONS AND STAFF.

8. REPORTS CONCERNING THE TERRORISTS' ACTIONS ONCE INSIDE THE SCHOOL BUILDING PROVIDE SOME INDICATION THAT CHECHEN AFFILIATED TERRORISTS ARE APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS OPERATIONS WITHIN RUSSIA.

-- USING THE EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM THE OCTOBER 2002 MOSCOW THEATER HOSTAGE CRISIS WHERE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES UTILIZED AN INCAPACITATING AGENT AGAINST THE TERRORISTS AND HOSTAGES, THE TERRORISTS REPORTEDLY KNOCKED OUT ALL THE WINDOWS IN THE GYMNASIUM WHERE THE HOSTAGES WERE BEING HELD TO IMPROVE VENTILATION WITH THE HOPE OF NEGATING ANY USE OF INCAPACITATING GASES. SOME REPORTING ALSO SUGGESTS THAT THE BESLAN ATTACKERS HAD GAS MASKS AND BROUGHT DOGS TO ALERT THEM TO THE USE OF GAS.


-- TERRORISTS REPORTEDLY SEPARATED THE CHILDREN FROM THE PARENTS AND TEACHERS AND PLACED SOME OF THE CHILDREN NEAR THE WINDOWS TO DISCOURAGE ATTEMPTS BY SECURITY FORCES TO RAID THE BUILDING.

-- THE TERRORISTS WIRED THE SCHOOL BUILDING GYMNASIUM AND SURROUNDING AREA WITH AT LEAST FIFTEEN IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IEDS) AND/OR MINES. IN ADDITION, REPORTING INDICATES THAT SEVERAL ASSAULT LEADERS MAY HAVE HAD THE CAPABILITY TO DETONATE ALL OF THE EXPLOSIVES, AS WELL AS THE SUICIDE BELTS WORN BY THE TWO FEMALE TERRORISTS. THIS DIFFERS FROM THE 2002 MOSCOW THEATER ATTACK IN WHICH, APPARENTLY, NO ONE TERRORIST HAD THE CAPABILITY TO DETONATE ALL OF THE EXPLOSIVES. ACCORDING TO A VARIETY OF REPORTING, NO SINGLE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AGENCY HAD CLEAR ON-SCENE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE NUMEROUS FEDERAL AND REGIONAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES. THE OUTCOME OF THE ATTACK UPON THE SCHOOL IN BESLAN AFFIRMS THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING A THOROUGH RESPONSE PLAN THAT OUTLINES CLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE EVENT OF A POTENTIAL TERRORIST OR HOSTAGE SITUATION. IN ADDITION, THE DIFFICULTY EXPERIENCED BY RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES IN MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE CORDON DURING THE BESLAN INCIDENT HIGHLIGHTS THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A SECURE PERIMETER.

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9. MOST SCHOOL DISTRICTS HAVE ALREADY DEVELOPED EMERGENCY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLANS. THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES ARE PROVIDED FOR USE DURING THE REGULAR REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THOSE PLANS. PROTECTIVE MEASURES IN THE SHORT-TERM SHOULD EMPHASIZE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR SCHOOL POPULATIONS AND FACILITIES. THESE PROTECTIVE MEASURES INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:



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10. AMONG THE MEASURES SCHOOLS SHOULD CONSIDER ARE THE FOLLOWING:


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10. THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES MAY SUGGEST TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE OF EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES. ALONE, EACH INDICATOR CAN RESULT FROM LEGITIMATE RECREATIONAL OR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES OR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY NOT RELATED TO TERRORISM; MULTIPLE INDICATORS, HOWEVER, COULD SUGGEST A HEIGHTENED TERRORIST THREAT:

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11. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, SECURITY PERSONNEL, AND EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATORS SHOULD BE AWARE AND REMAIN ALERT TO INDICATORS OF SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH LOCAL SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE JURISDICTIONS AND ASK PERSONNEL TO REPORT SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES. SCHOOL OFFICIALS ARE ENCOURAGED TO REVIEW AND UPDATE THEIR EVACUATION PLANS AS WELL AS SECURITY AND EMERGENCY POLICIES. IN ADDITION TO PLANNING AND THE NEED FOR FREQUENT EXERCISES INVOLVING BOTH THE SCHOOLS AND THE FIRST RESPONDER COMMUNITY (LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FIRE/EMS), PLANNING AND EXERCISES SHOULD INVOLVE THE LOCAL MEDICAL COMMUNITY TO ENSURE THAT MASS CASUALTY CONTINGENCIES ARE FULLY COVERED. EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR CHILDREN IS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS AND SHOULD BE FACTORED INTO ANY PLAN OR EXERCISE. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS JOINT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION WILL DISSEMINATE THIS INFORMATION IN ITS OWN FORMAT TO ITS CONSTITUENTS USING DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CHANNELS.

12. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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