

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

in the late 2000s, and all CBPOs were given protocols to follow to have terrorist information uploaded into TECS.

The policy stated the CBPO will provide the terrorist information to his supervisor who will forward the information up the CBP chain-of-command. [REDACTED] stated that if CBP management concurred with the information, they would forward the information to the NTC for final vetting. [REDACTED] advised that no CBPO was allowed to put in terrorist lookouts or terrorist information in TECS without going through this protocol.

[REDACTED] stated he [REDACTED] CBP, [REDACTED] a project related to multiple terrorist lookout records TECS. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] had entered hundreds of records that were outside the CBP policy guidelines as they related to TECS entries for terrorists. [REDACTED] a project to remove or modify the TECS entries to conform to the current policies of CBP. [REDACTED] stated that to the best of his recollection, there were nearly 1000 TECS records that needed to be modified. [REDACTED] advised that it took [REDACTED] approximately 6 months to complete the TECS modifications.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was given standard verbiage to input into the TECS record of all the records [REDACTED] modified. [REDACTED] stated some of the information [REDACTED] was using to place terrorist lookouts on individuals was coming from newspapers, online inquiries and public sources of knowledge. This information was not corroborated through [REDACTED] personal contact with the individuals.

After [REDACTED] completed this project [REDACTED] was assigned to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] was assigned to [REDACTED] while [REDACTED] however, [REDACTED] decided to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not get selected for [REDACTED] due to [REDACTED] having less seniority than other CBPOs who bid on this position. [REDACTED] indicated he does not believe [REDACTED] was retaliated against by CBP management by not being selected for [REDACTED] and believes it was based solely on seniority. (Exhibit 12)

On August 22, 2013, [REDACTED], CBP, was interviewed by DHS OIG. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] recently issued [REDACTED], to [REDACTED] improperly entering TECS records as it related to terrorist organizations. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] that the CBP policy does not allow CBPOs to create TECS records which are directly related to terrorism. (Exhibit 13)

On August 22, 2013, [REDACTED], CBP, [REDACTED], was interviewed by DHS OIG. [REDACTED] stated that CBP policy states any CBPO who believes an individual is involved in terrorist activities can submit a nomination packet through their chain-of-command to be reviewed by the NTC. [REDACTED] recounted several instances whereby [REDACTED] operated outside of the CBP guidelines as they relate to the entering of terrorist suspects in TECS.

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