



Homeland Security

MEMORANDUM OF ACTIVITY

Type of Activity: Personal Interview: [REDACTED], Customs and Border Protection

Case Number: I13-CBP-WFO-00549

Case Title: TECS Terrorist Records

On September 25, 2013, [REDACTED], Customs and Border Protection (CBP) [REDACTED] at the National Targeting Center (NTC) was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED], Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigation (INV), Washington Field Office (WFO) at the NTC, located at 12379 Sunrise Valley Drive, Suite C, Reston, VA regarding the complaint made by [REDACTED] that TECS records had been inappropriately altered and deleted.

[REDACTED] has been [REDACTED] is a [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. He is also responsible for [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] provided the following information:

The NTC was established in 2002 to target criminal and terrorism suspects trying to enter the U.S. The NTC coordinates with the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The TSC maintains the U.S. government's consolidated Terrorist Watchlist—a single database of identifying information about those known or reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist activity. Information gained from DHS components (e.g. information gained from CBP inspections and screenings) can be passed to the TSC, and information from the TSC can be passed to DHS entities such as CBP to prohibit watchlisted individuals from entering the country.

The TSC establishes the criteria for how individuals are nominated to the watchlist by placing strict criteria on the two databases the FBI maintains – the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) and the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). The TIDE is the U.S. government's central database on known or suspected international terrorists, and contains classified information provided by members of the Intelligence Community. The TSDB is the unclassified system run by the TSC which contains all of the Watchlisted subjects for screening and law enforcement purposes. The established criterions ensure that only accurate information is being added to the databases.

Name, Title, Signature, and Date: [REDACTED] 9/25/13 Special Agent	Reviewing Official Name, Title, Signature, and Date: [REDACTED] 9/25/13 Acting Special Agent in Charge - Washington Field Office
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From [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] the NTC [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was assigned work on [REDACTED] Project ([REDACTED] Project)<sup>1</sup>. [REDACTED] was already linking persons in TECS to [REDACTED], and had created a Memorandum of Information Received (MOIR)<sup>2</sup> on [REDACTED] in TECS. [REDACTED] was only supposed to research and document [REDACTED] finding in the Targeting Framework<sup>3</sup>. [REDACTED] was instructed not to put individuals on the Watchlist, but instead document them for nomination. TECS records were created to identify the nomination while it was being reviewed.

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After a meeting between the NTC, DHS Privacy Office and DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, it was determined that individuals could only be “watchlisted” based on an association with a known or suspected terrorist already “watchlisted” in the TSDB – not based on their affiliation with [REDACTED] (or any [REDACTED] organization).

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When [REDACTED] returned to [REDACTED] continued to do two things. First, [REDACTED] continued to enter subjects into TECS based on their affiliation with [REDACTED]. Second, [REDACTED] continued to enter subjects into TECS under the authority [REDACTED] had been granted while [REDACTED], and referenced the NTC event. Since [REDACTED] left [REDACTED]; however, the [REDACTED] had moved in other directions, and new guidelines had been established. [REDACTED] was unaware of the new protocols and objectives, and entered numerous records into TECS which were not in compliance. During this time, [REDACTED] nominated some individuals to the Watchlist, but [REDACTED] nominations were declined because there were [REDACTED] – only links to the [REDACTED] organization.

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The proper process for a CBP officer to nominate a subject to the Watchlist requires the officer to submit the nomination to his supervisor (GS-13 or above). After reviewing the nomination, the supervisor can forward it to the NTC, or they can refuse to submit it. A CBP supervisor does not have to forward nominations they feel are not worthy of submission. According to [REDACTED] how to create a TECS record for NTC purposes is a Standardized Operating Procedure.

<sup>1</sup> [REDACTED]

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<sup>2</sup> A Memorandum of Information Received (MOIR) is a TECS record which documents information an officer found, [REDACTED]

<sup>3</sup> Targeting Framework is the case management system for the National Targeting Center

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