



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 26, 2016

Case No. F-2015-06322

Segments: IPS-0021
IPS-0022

Mr. William F. Marshall
425 Third Street SW, Suite 800
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Mr. Marshall:

I refer to our letter dated September 26, 2016, regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (the "FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The processing of records responsive to your request is ongoing and has yielded an additional 118 documents. After reviewing these documents, we have determined that 47 may be released in full, 69 may be released with excisions, and 2 must be withheld in full. All released material is enclosed.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made excisions, the applicable exemptions are marked on each document. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released. For the documents withheld in full, we have cited FOIA Exemptions 5 and 6, 5 U.S.C. §§552 (b)(5) and (b)(6).

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Trial Attorney, James Bickford, at (202) 305-7632 or James.Bickford@usdoj.gov. Please refer to the case number shown above in all correspondence about this case.

Sincerely,

Susan A. Weimer for

Eric F. Stein, Acting Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosure: As stated

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

(b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:

- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
- 1.4(b) Foreign government information
- 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
- 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
- 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
- 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
- 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
- 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction

(b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency

(b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:

ARMSEXP	Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c)
CIA PERS/ORG	Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)
EXPORT CONTROL	Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c)
FS ACT	Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004
INA	Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f)
IRAN	Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505

(b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information

(b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product

(b)(6) Personal privacy information

(b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:

- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
- (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
- (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (D) disclose confidential sources
- (E) disclose investigation techniques
- (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual

(b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions

(b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

From: H [HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, September 27, 2009 8:54:06 AM
To: 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov'; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: UNGA schedule

RELEASE IN FULL

Thank you so much.

----- Original Message -----

From: Valmoro, Lona J <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>
To: H; Huma Abedin
Sent: Sun Sep 27 08:31:05 2009
Subject: Re: UNGA schedule

Yes, I can send within the hour.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Valmoro, Lona J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Sun Sep 27 08:10:34 2009
Subject: UNGA schedule

I am trying to organize all of my notes and need a list of the dates and times of all my mtgs and events. Unfortunately the cards on which I take my notes do not have dates and times which they usually do (and I would like them always to include). Can you send to me?

From: Valmoro, Lona J [ValmoroLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, September 27, 2009 9:37:09 AM
To: H; Huma Abedin
CC: Valmoro, Lona J
Subject: List of UNGA Meetings as of 9/27

RELEASE IN PART
B5

Attachments: List of UNGA Meetings and Events as of September 27th.docx

Please find below and attached the list of UNGA meetings/events as of today.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2009

8:15 am CEO BREAKFAST DISCUSSION AND NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
9:45 am OPENING BELL CEREMONY

11:00 am MEETING w/KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER YU
11:40 am

12:30 pm MEETING w/PACIFIC ISLAND LEADERS
1:30 pm

1:45 pm MEETING w/CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER KOHOUT
2:10 pm

2:15 pm MEETING w/TURKMENISTAN PRESIDENT BERDIMUHAMMEDOV
2:40 pm

2:45 pm MEETING w/GEORGIAN PRESIDENT SAAKASHVILI
3:30 pm

4:00 pm MEETING w/JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER OKADA
4:55 pm

5:00 pm TRILATERAL STRATEGIC DIALOGUE w/AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN
6:00 pm

6:30 pm MEETING w/COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT ARIAS
7:00 pm

8:45 pm THE PRESIDENT'S MEET AND GREET w/USUN
9:05 pm

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2009

8:00 am LAUNCH OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SOCIAL PROTECTION
8:30 am NETWORK

9:15 am CLIMATE CHANGE SUMMIT OPENING
9:45 am

10:30 am POTUS MEETING w/ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU
11:10 am

11:15 am POTUS MEETING w/PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY PRESIDENT
12:00 pm ABBAS

12:05 pm POTUS MEETING w/PM NETANYAHU AND PRESIDENT ABBAS
12:50 pm

1:15 pm POTUS LUNCH FOR AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE
2:30 pm

3:30 pm POTUS MEETING w/CHINESE PRESIDENT HU JINTAO

4:45 pm

6:00 pm PULL-ASIDE w/SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER BILDT

6:10 pm

6:10 pm SWEDISH-HOSTED MEETING w/EU FOREIGN MINISTERS

6:55 pm

7:00 pm TRANSATLANTIC DINNER w/EU AND NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS

8:00 pm

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2009

8:45 am

8:55 am

9:00 am POTUS' MEETING w/JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER HATOYAMA

9:30 am

10:00 am PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

10:45 am

10:50 am

11:55 am

12:00 pm THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING w/TOP TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES TO UNPKO

1:00 pm

1:05 pm WREATH LAYING AND VISIT TO THE MEMORIAL TO UN STAFF KILLED IN IRAQ

1:10 pm

1:15 pm UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LUNCH FOR HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

2:45 pm

3:00 pm

3:10 pm

3:15 pm THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING w/RUSSIAN PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV

4:15 pm

5:00 pm FRIENDS OF BURMA MINISTERIAL

5:30 pm

5:40 pm P5+1 PRE-BRIEF MEETING with U/S BURNS

5:55 pm

6:00pm P5+1 MEETING

7:00 pm

7:25 pm PRESIDENT'S RECEPTION FOR HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

9:00 pm

9:25 pm G-8 FOREIGN MINISTERS DINNER

10:00 pm

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2009

8:00 am MEETING w/FIRST MINISTER OF NORTHERN IRELAND PETER ROBINSON

8:15 am

8:20 am MEETING w/DEPUTY FIRST MINISTER OF NORTHERN IRELAND MARTIN MCGUINNESS

8:35 am

B5

HA 09/01/2015

8:40 am JOINT MEETING w/FIRST MINISTER OF NORTHERN IRELAND
8:55 am PETER ROBINSON AND DEPUTY FIRST MINISTER MARTIN MCGUINNESS

9:15 am UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SPECIAL SESSION
11:15 am ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

11:20 am CTBT ARTICLE XIV CONFERENCE
11:30 am

12:00 pm POTUS MEETING w/FRIENDS OF DEMOCRATIC PAKISTAN
1:15 pm

1:30 pm LUNCH w/WOMEN HEADS OF STATE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS
2:30 pm

(Note: Need to check with HRC/Huma whether or not this drop-by happened.)

2:50 pm DROP-BY AT P5+1+GCC+3 LUNCHEON (T)
2:55 pm

3:00 pm MEETING w/QUARTET MEMBERS
4:00 pm

4:15 pm MEETING w/QATAR AMIR SHEIKH BIN KHALIFA AL THANI
4:30 pm

4:55 pm MEETING w/TAJIKISTAN PRESIDENT RAHMON
5:15 pm

5:30 pm MEETING w/PAKISTAN PRESIDENT ZARDARI
6:30 pm

7:30 pm PRIVATE MEETING w/THE CONSORT OF HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR
8:00 pm OF QATAR SHEIKHA MOZA BIN NASSER AL MISNAD

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2009

8:00 am COMBATING VIOLENCE AGAINST GIRLS REMARKS
8:45 am

9:15 am MEETING w/BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER LETERME
9:45 am

10:00 am HAITI KEY PLAYERS MEETING
11:00 am

11:20 am PULL-ASIDE w/SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-
11:30 am GENERAL KAI EIDE

11:30 am FRIENDS OF AFGHANISTAN MEETING
12:00 pm

1:00 pm CLINTON GLOBAL INITIATIVE CLOSING PLENARY
2:15 pm

3:45 pm MEETING w/CARIBBEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS
4:45 pm

5:00 pm MEETING w/INDIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER KRISHNA
5:25 pm

5:30 pm MEETING w/AZERBAIJANI FOREIGN MINISTER MAMMADYAROV
6:00 pm

6:30 pm MEETING w/IRAQI PRESIDENT TALABANI
7:30 pm

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2009

9:15 am COFFEE w/EU HIGH REPRESENTATIVE SOLANA
9:55 am

10:00 am MEETING w/PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT MARTINELLI
10:30 am

11:00 am US-MEXICO HIGH LEVEL GROUP MEETING
12:00 pm

1:00 pm MEETING w/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC)
1:45 pm

1:45 pm MEETING w/GCC + 3
2:45 pm

3:05 pm MEETING w/KAZAKHSTANI FM SAUDABAYEV
3:30 pm

4:00 pm FOOD SECURITY EVENT
5:30 pm

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2009

10:00 am MEETING w/AFGHAN FM SPANTA
10:30 am

11:00 am MEETING w/ARMENIAN FM NALBANDIAN
11:30 am

12:00 pm MEETING w/TURKISH FM DAVUTOGLU
1:00 pm

1:15 pm MEETING w/CAMBODIAN DPM/FM NAMHONG
1:45 pm

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2009

10:00 am REMARKS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 1820 INTERVENTION
11:30 am

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, September 27, 2009 11:30:01 AM
To: H; 'SullivanJJ@state.gov'
Subject: Re: [REDACTED]

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

Will get u full update.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: Huma Abedin; 'sullivanjj@state.gov' <sullivanjj@state.gov>
Sent: Sun Sep 27 11:29:22 2009
Subject: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ? Have we asked Chinese to let us take helicopter in to retrieve?

HA 09/01/2015

From: Gokhan Ozkok [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 7:45:04 AM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: RE: Turkish American invitation to Secretary Clinton

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

Dear Huma,

I am back in the USA. I am looking forward to Iona's email and phone. I can be reached at [REDACTED] anytime.

Best,

Gokhan Ozkok

From: Huma@clintonemail.com
To: gozko [REDACTED]
Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2009 12:09:52 -0400
Subject: RE: Turkish American invitation to Secretary Clinton

thank you so much
hope all is well
i have shared with team here and Iona will be in touch soon

From: Gokhan Ozkok [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2009 3:56 AM
To: huma abedin; Huma Abedin
Subject: Turkish American invitation to Secretary Clinton

Dear Huma,

I hope everything is going great for you and the Madam Secretary!

Our friends in DC have been running a very successful foundation namely the Rumi Forum (www.rumiforum.org) since 1999 where Mr. Gulen is the honorary president. They would like to give the prestigious 2009 Rumi Peace and Dialogue Award for Extraordinary Public Service most deserving to our friend Madam secretary. I attached their letter.

Please share with Secretary Clinton.

Best,

Gokhan

Ready for Fall shows? Use Bing to find helpful ratings and reviews on digital tv's. [Click here.](#)

Hotmail® has ever-growing storage! Don't worry about storage limits. [Check it out.](#)

From: Valmoro, Lona J [ValmoroLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 9:33:53 AM
To: H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Schedule

RELEASE IN PART
B5

Yes, on our list to discuss with you.
Will add US/EU to 2010 calendar.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Valmoro, Lona J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Mon Sep 28 09:29:13 2009
Subject: Schedule

Am I scheduled to attend Iraqi business conference in Washington? Can you be sure Bagley and Balderston are helping on this?

Just heard today that

[REDACTED]

B5

RELEASE IN PART
B5, B6

From: Abedin, Huma <AbodinH@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 11:34 AM
To: humamabedin [redacted]
Subject: Print Fw: draft of tuesday, 9/29
Attach: September.29.09.draft.doc

B6

From: Valmore, Lona J
To: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Mon Sep 28 11:33:46 2009
Subject: draft of tuesday, 9/29

PREV RON Washington, DC

8:15 am **DEPART** Private Residence
En route State Department
[drive time:

8:25 am **PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFING**
8:30 am Secretary's Office

8:30 am **DAILY SMALL STAFF MEETING**
8:45 am Secretary's Office
Participants: Cheryl, Huma, Jake, Joe, and Lona

8:45 am **DAILY SENIOR STAFF MEETING**
9:15 am Secretary's Conference Room
Participants: Jim Steinberg, Jack Lew, Bill Burns, Pat Kennedy, P.J. Crowley, Dan Smith, Harold Koh, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Ian Kelly, Rich Verma and Joe Macmanus

9:30 am **ANGELS IN ADOPTION RECEPTION**
9:50 am Exhibit Hall, First Floor
PRESS TBD

Program:

10:00 am **MEETING w/CHERYL AND DANIEL YOHANNES**
10:30 am Secretary's Office
Contact:

10:30 am **OFFICE TIME**
11:10 am Secretary's Office

11:15 am **DEPART** State Department
En route White House
[drive time: 5 minutes]

11:20 am [redacted]
11:30 am [redacted]

B5

11:30 am **EXPANDED DELEGATION MEETING w/NATO SECRETARY**
12:00 pm **GENERAL RASMUSSEN**
Oval Office
CLOSED PRESS

Participants:

12:00 pm **PRESS SPRAY w/NATO SECRETARY GENERAL RASMUSSEN**
12:10 pm Oval Office

12:15 pm **DEPART** White House
En route State Department
[drive time: 5 minutes]

12:20 pm **OFFICE TIME**
1:05 pm Secretary's Office

1:10 pm **DEPART** State Department
En route White House
[drive time: 5 minutes]

1:15 pm
4:15 pm



B5

4:20 pm **DEPART** White House
En route State Department
[drive time: 5 minutes]

4:25 pm **ARRIVE** State Department

4:30 pm **PARADE PHOTO SHOOT (T)**
5:10 pm Room Tbd

5:10 pm **DEPART** State Department
En route White House
[drive time: 5 minutes]

5:15 pm
6:30 pm



6:35 pm **DEPART** White House
En route State Department
[drive time: 5 minutes]

6:40 pm **ARRIVE** State Department

6:45 pm **OFFICE TIME**

HA 09/01/2015

7:20 pm Secretary's Office

7:25 pm **DEPART** State Department
En route Washington National Airport
[drive time: 15 minutes]

7:40 pm **ARRIVE** Washington National Airport

8:00 pm **DEPART** Washington National via US Airways Shuttle #
En route LaGuardia Airport
[flight time: 1 hour, 15 minutes]

9:15 pm **ARRIVE** LaGuardia Airport

9:20 pm **DEPART** LaGuardia Airport
En route Private Residence
[drive time: 45 minutes]

10:05 pm **ARRIVE** Private Residence

HRC RON Chappaqua, NY
WJC RON Sarasota, FL

Weather.
Washington, DC:
Chappaqua, NY:

Lona Valmoro
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
202-647-9071 (direct)

HA 09/01/2015

**SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009**

**RELEASE IN PART
B5, B6**

11am DRAFT

WASHINGTON, DC/CHAPPAQUA, NY

SPECIAL ASSISTANT: LONA VALMORO

OFFICE (202) 647-9071

CELL

STAFF ASSISTANT: LINDA DEWAN

OFFICE (202) 647-5733

CELL

PREV RON Washington, DC

8:15 am **DEPART** Private Residence
En route State Department
[drive time:

8:25 am **PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFING**
8:30 am Secretary's Office

8:30 am **DAILY SMALL STAFF MEETING**
8:45 am Secretary's Office
Participants: Cheryl, Huma, Jake, Joe, and Lona

8:45 am **DAILY SENIOR STAFF MEETING**
9:15 am Secretary's Conference Room
Participants: Jim Steinberg, Jack Lew, Bill Burns, Pat Kennedy, P J Crowley,
Dan Smith, Harold Koh, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Ian Kelly, Rich Verma and Joe
Macmanus

9:30 am **ANGELS IN ADOPTION RECEPTION**
9:50 am Exhibit Hall, First Floor
PRESS TBD

Program:

10:00 am **MEETING w/CHERYL AND DANIEL YOHANNES**
10:30 am Secretary's Office
Contact:

10:30 am **OFFICE TIME**
11:10 am Secretary's Office

11:15 am **DEPART** State Department
En route White House
[drive time: 5 minutes]

**SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009**

B5

11:20 am
11:30 am



11:30 am
12:00 pm

**EXPANDED DELEGATION MEETING w/NATO SECRETARY
GENERAL RASMUSSEN**
Oval Office
CLOSED PRESS

Participants:

12:00 pm
12:10 pm

PRESS SPRAY w/NATO SECRETARY GENERAL RASMUSSEN
Oval Office

12:15 pm

DEPART White House
En route State Department
[drive time: 5 minutes]

12:20 pm
1:05 pm

OFFICE TIME
Secretary's Office

1:10 pm

DEPART State Department
En route White House
[drive time: 5 minutes]

1:15 pm
4:15 pm



4:20 pm

DEPART White House
En route State Department
[drive time: 5 minutes]

4:25 pm

ARRIVE State Department

4:30 pm
5:10 pm

PARADE PHOTO SHOOT (T)
Room Tbd

5:10 pm

DEPART State Department
En route White House
[drive time: 5 minutes]

**SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009**

5:15 pm
6:30 pm



B5

6:35 pm **DEPART** White House
En route State Department
[drive time: 5 minutes]

6:40 pm **ARRIVE** State Department

6:45 pm **OFFICE TIME**
7:20 pm Secretary's Office

7:25 pm **DEPART** State Department
En route Washington National Airport
[drive time: 15 minutes]

7:40 pm **ARRIVE** Washington National Airport

8:00 pm **DEPART** Washington National via US Airways Shuttle #
En route LaGuardia Airport
[flight time: 1 hour, 15 minutes]

9:15 pm **ARRIVE** LaGuardia Airport

9:20 pm **DEPART** LaGuardia Airport
En route Private Residence
[drive time: 45 minutes]

10:05 pm **ARRIVE** Private Residence

HRC RON Chappaqua, NY
WJC RON Sarasota, FL

Weather:
Washington, DC:
Chappaqua, NY:

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 11:49:48 AM
To: 'MillsCD@state.gov'
Subject: Re: Friday Presentation on Urgent Threat - Bill Burns will not be at the Retreat

RELEASE IN PART
B6

Yes she confirmed she wants to move the whole retreat until bill can attend. Which leaves the question of what to do about the dinner on thursday.

----- Original Message -----

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
To: H
Cc: Huma Abedin
Sent: Mon Sep 28 11:14:33 2009
Subject: RE: Friday Presentation on Urgent Threat - Bill Burns will not be at the Retreat

He indicated he will not be back until Friday night or Saturday am -- are you saying postpone the entire Retreat?

-----Original Message-----

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 10:56 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Friday Presentation on Urgent Threat - Bill Burns will not be at the Retreat

Cheryl--we should postpone until we get Bill there.

----- Original Message -----

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
To: H
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Mon Sep 28 10:26:39 2009
Subject: FW: Friday Presentation on Urgent Threat - Bill Burns will not be at the Retreat

FYI below

From: Burns, William J
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 10:21 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Subject: RE: Friday Presentation on Urgent Threat

Cheryl,

I'll be in Geneva with P5+1 and Iranians Oct 1-2. Won't get back at earliest until late evening Oct 2 -- more likely Oct 3.

Bill

From: Mills, Cheryl D
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 10:19 AM
To: Burns, William J; Holbrooke, Richard C; Mitchell, George J; Boswell, Eric
Cc: Toiv, Nora F; Woytovech, Suzonne M; Rudman, Mara; Deiban, Donna D;
Subject: Friday Presentation on Urgent Threat

B6

Dear Gentlemen:

On Friday, Oct 2, 2009, the Secretary is hosting Leadership Retreat.

Would you each kindly give 5 minutes overview in your respective areas of leadership on a panel regarding the following urgent threats, in particular:

Iran: Bill Burns

Middle East: George Mitchell

Af/PaK: Richard Holbrooke

North Korea: Eric Bosworth

Would you please advise Nora Toiv, who is copied on this message if you cannot present.

Thanks so much.

cdm

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 11:54:06 AM
To: 'williamsbarrett' [redacted]
Subject: Re: Fwd: Retreat - PLEASE READ IF YOU CAN B/F NOON ON MONDAY

RELEASE IN PART
B5, B6

Thank you!

----- Original Message -----

From: williamsbarrett [redacted] <williamsbarrett@ [redacted]>
To: Huma Abedin; Humamabedin [redacted] <Humamabedin@ [redacted]>
Sent: Mon Sep 28 11:50:59 2009
Subject: Fwd: Retreat - PLEASE READ IF YOU CAN B/F NOON ON MONDAY

Sorry didn't mean to leave you off

-----Original Message-----

From: williamsbarrett [redacted]
To: cheryl.mills [redacted]; jake.sullivan [redacted]
Cc: capriciamarshall [redacted]
Sent: Mon, Sep 28, 2009 10:21 am
Subject: Re: Retreat - PLEASE READ IF YOU CAN B/F NOON ON MONDAY

B6

I think this schedule easily takes you to 6:30 pm - unless you guys know this crowd and believe there will be no questions. The way it is set up now all of the question and answer periods are likely to be cut off in order to get to the next presentation and stay somewhat on time. You can, of course, work through the coffee breaks.

B5



-----Original Message-----

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>

To: williamsbarrett[REDACTED] Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>

Cc: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>; Marshall, Capricia P <MarshallCP@state.gov>

Sent: Sun, Sep 27, 2009 10:41 pm

Subject: Retreat - PLEASE READ IF YOU CAN B/F NOON ON MONDAY

B6

Maggie/Jake:

Here is the revised schedule.

It cuts down a lot by making panels.

0A

HRC does want folks to speak and not just listen and in concerned we build in opportunities for that – she particularly wants each bureau to be able to state what their top 3 priorities are – not sure how to do that, even in an hour, even if you do list style – so you will see that challenge.

Would welcome your feedback by tomorrow b/c I need to get folks prepared – the only ones who know they are speaking at the moment are jack, jim, am and Mitchell – I need to do the others.

Caprica – Maggie had great idea to have someone taking picture that then can start showing up on the screen at lunch time and throughout to reflect the work going and just generally create some warmth – we should discuss things like room, atmosphere, etc. so that is all set up – or better – we shouldn't and you make recommendations and decisions based upon the agenda and what we're trying to accomplish. J

Thanks

cdm <<2009-09-27 Senior Leadership Retreat - Discussion Draft.docx>>

RELEASE IN PART B6

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 12:03 PM
To: humamahedin [redacted]
Subject: Fw: Thursday Night Dinner
Attach: RSVP Update 9-27-09 .xlsx

B6

From: Jones, Natalie R
To: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Mon Sep 28 11:53:52 2009
Subject: Thursday Night Dinner

Huma – I've included a proposed menu for Thursday evening. Please let know of any changes. We are at 82 total right now (principals plus spouses/partners), with 30 principals pending. We will follow up with them today. RSVP spreadsheet attached.

I've also included some outstanding questions/pending items for Thursday – please answer when you can. Thanks!

Pending Items

- *Is HRC paying for all costs associated with dinner?
- *Valet Parking – Do you want valet parking or should people park themselves at the Pan-Hellenic Center across the Street?
- *Flowers – Should Joel coordinate arrangements with Jack Lucky for house and table centerpieces?
- *Bar – Do you want a full bar or just wine (white)/beer/water/soft drinks? There will be two bars – one in the kitchen, and one outside.
- *Outside Lighting – The dinner will be from 7 – 9 p.m. (sundown is 6:58 p.m.) – do you want outside lighting?
- *Heat Lamps – Weather will be high of 68, low of 51 that day – it will probably be in the high 50's around dinner time – do you want heat lamps?
- *Tables – There will be café tables (3.5/4 foot rounds that seat about 6-8 people) and cocktail/cabaret tables outside
- *Nametags – Protocol will print nametags and distribute at the door
- *Coat Check – Joel will provide staff for coat check
- *Music – Will there be recorded music available?
- *Speaking Program – Will there be a speaking program/HRC will give brief remarks? When? Wireless microphone is available, correct?

MENU

Passed Hors D'Oeuvres

Barolo Braised Beef on Fresh Corn Polenta Cakes

Cumin Fire Shrimp

Baby Artichokes with Saffron Aioli

Vegetable Samosas

Dinner Buffet

Beef Tenderloin with Sauce Gribiche

Pesto Grilled Salmon and Vegetable Kebabs

Rosemary Chicken Grilled Skewers

Miniature Crab and Spinach Gratin

Autumn Vegetable Tart

Butternut Squash Risotto

Caesar Salad Cones

Haricots Verts Salad with Wild Mushrooms

Harvest Breads with a Selection of Spreads

Dessert Buffet

Miniature Caramel Apple "Lollipops"

Miniature Red Velvet Cupcakes

Chocolate Glazed Brownie Points

Almond Toffee Barquettes

Pear and Candied Ginger Turnovers

Miniature Seasonal Fruit Tartlets

Coffee, Decaffeinated Coffee, and Tea

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 12:37 PM
To: humamabedin [REDACTED]
Subject: Fw: Seating, Guest List, Menu for tonight NATO Dinner
Attach: Seating Package.docx

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

From: Fielder, Rebecca A
To: Valmoro, Lona J; Abedin, Huma
Cc: Jones, Natalie R; Marshall, Capricia P; Rubin, Ali M
Sent: Mon Sep 28 12:32:40 2009
Subject: Seating, Guest List, Menu for tonight NATO Dinner

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Rebecca Fielder
Protocol Officer
U.S. Department of State
Office of The Chief of Protocol
S/CPR, Suite 1238
2201 C Street, NW
Washington D.C. 20520
Direct: [REDACTED]
Fax: (202) 647-0708
Email: FielderRA@state.gov

Menu

RELEASE IN FULL

Salad of Fall Greens

Butternut Squash, Cranberries, Asiago Cheese, and Almonds
Maple Mustard Vinaigrette

or

Orange Oil Roasted Halibut

Lemon Pepper Broth

Carrot Risotto

Sugar Snap Peas and Yellow Peppers

or

Caramelized Apple Panna Cotta Tart

Apricot Coulis

Provenance Sauvignon Blanc 2007

HA 09/01/2015

RELEASE IN FULL

From: Valmoro, Lona J [ValmoroLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2009 6:40:53 AM
To: H; Huma Abedin
CC: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: Friday

Will do.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Valmoro, Lona J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Tue Sep 29 06:36:28 2009
Subject: Friday

Holbrooke wants a long—2-3 hour mtg—and I want to do that on Friday. Pls confirm w him the time. We will do in the ops center so if we want Eikenberry and Paterson on video, we can do. Let's get this nailed down so I can plan rest of day.

HA 09/01/2015

From: Cherie Blair [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2009 10:17:46 AM
To: H
CC: Huma Abedin
Subject: RE: Sorry to miss you

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

I would love to see you if you have a spare minute let me know. The disability project is going to be run out of the office next door to the Cherie Blair Foundation for Women so hopefully there is a lot of scope for collaboration

-----Original Message-----

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: 29 September 2009 12:08
To: Cherie Blair
Cc: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Sorry to miss you

I really enjoyed my time w our friend and hope we can work together on issues including your project on people w disabilities. I'm copying Huma who was w me so we can do follow up.

Sorry I didn't see you and had only a few minutes w Tony at the Quartet mtg.

I may be in London later this month and will let you know if that happens. All the best.

----- Original Message -----

From: Cherie Blair [REDACTED]
To: H
Sent: Sat Sep 26 08:49:39 2009
Subject: Sorry to miss you

But it was great to see Bill on such good form.
My friend from Q really enjoyed your meeting and felt it had gone well! hope you did too
Sent from my HTC Touch Pro

This message has been scanned by MailController - www.MailController.altohiway.com

HA 09/01/2015

From: H [HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2009 6:42:18 PM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: I'm on my way back

RELEASE IN FULL

If he can't come, set a time for me to call him before his dinner w Axelrod.

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
To: H; 'sullivanjj@state.gov' <sullivanjj@state.gov>
Sent: Tue Sep 29 18:41:01 2009
Subject: RE: I'm on my way back

will call him now

From: H
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2009 6:40 PM
To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'; Huma Abedin
Subject: I'm on my way back

And would like to see Holbrooke before I go to airport if you can get him to come up.

HA 09/01/2015

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2009 7:17:08 PM
To: H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: I'm on my way back

RELEASE IN FULL

Sorry -- I had to step out for a bit. Heading back now.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Tue Sep 29 18:40:02 2009
Subject: I'm on my way back

And would like to see Holbrooke before I go to airport if you can get him to come up.

From: H [HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Thursday, October 01, 2009 7:27:32 AM
To: Huma Abedin; 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
Subject: Geneva

RELEASE IN FULL

What's happening in HRC in Geneva? Do I need to call anyone? Peres is asking me to personally call and I feel I should but need update so I'm on the phone w Harold.

HA 09/01/2015

From: Valmoro, Lona J [ValmoroLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Thursday, October 01, 2009 8:38:55 AM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: RE: Hillary: You're addressing a group on Africa on Thursday. Joe Wilson will be there and...

RELEASE IN PART
B6

FYI, I sent him an email, haven't heard back.

-----Original Message-----

From: Huma Abedin [mailto:Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Thursday, October 01, 2009 8:35 AM
To: H; Valmoro, Lona J
Cc: 'sbwhoeop' [redacted]
Subject: Re: Hillary: You're addressing a group on Africa on Thursday Joe Wilson will be there and...

Ill be sure to find him for you.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov' <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>; Huma Abedin
Cc: 'sbwhoeop' [redacted] <sbwhoeop [redacted]>
Sent: Wed Sep 30 20:46:22 2009
Subject: Fw: Hillary: You're addressing a group on Africa on Thursday. Joe Wilson will be there and...

B6

Pls be sure I see Joe.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: 'sbwhoeop' [redacted] <sbwhoeop [redacted]>
Sent: Wed Sep 30 20:45:26 2009
Subject: Re: Hillary: You're addressing a group on Africa on Thursday. Joe Wilson will be there and...

I certainly will. I'm copying Lona and Huma so they can arrange a visit.

----- Original Message -----

From: sbwhoeop [redacted] <sbwhoeop [redacted]>
To: H
Sent: Wed Sep 30 19:17:34 2009
Subject: Hillary: You're addressing a group on Africa on Thursday. Joe Wilson will be there and...

wants to say hello to you. Please look out for him. Thanks. Sid

HA 09/01/2015

From: sbwhoeop [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, October 01, 2009 8:41:48 AM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Hillary: You're addressing a group on Africa on Thursday. Joe Wilson will be there and...

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

Huma: just look for Joe. He knows you're looking for him. Sid

-----Original Message-----

From: Huma Abedin
To: Hillary Clinton
To: 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov'
Cc: 'sbwhoeop' [redacted]
Sent: Oct 1, 2009 8:35 AM
Subject: Re: Hillary: You're addressing a group on Africa on Thursday. Joe Wilson will be there and...

Ill be sure to find him for you.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov' <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>; Huma Abedin
Cc: 'sbwhoeop' [redacted] <sbwhoeop [redacted]>
Sent: Wed Sep 30 20:46:22 2009
Subject: Fw: Hillary: You're addressing a group on Africa on Thursday. Joe Wilson will be there and...

Pls be sure I see Joe.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: 'sbwhoeop' [redacted] <sbwhoeop [redacted]>
Sent: Wed Sep 30 20:45:26 2009
Subject: Re: Hillary: You're addressing a group on Africa on Thursday. Joe Wilson will be there and...

I certainly will. I'm copying Lona and Huma so they can arrange a visit.

----- Original Message -----

From: sbwhoeop [redacted] <sbwhoeop [redacted]>
To: H
Sent: Wed Sep 30 19:17:34 2009
Subject: Hillary: You're addressing a group on Africa on Thursday. Joe Wilson will be there and...

wants to say hello to you. Please look out for him. Thanks. Sid

Sent via Cingular Xpress Mail with Blackberry

From: H [HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Saturday, October 03, 2009 9:40:53 AM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Clark

RELEASE IN FULL

I'm talking to him.

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
To: H
Sent: Sat Oct 03 09:27:53 2009
Subject: Re: Clark

Yes

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Sat Oct 03 09:15:13 2009
Subject: Re: Clark

Can he talk right now? Can ops get him for me?

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
To: H
Sent: Sat Oct 03 09:00:59 2009
Subject: Clark

Wes clark wants to give you his thoughts on afghanistan. Said he was with several current and retired military officials the other night. Was hoping to talk to you today. Asked if I could give him a time if you were willing so he could be somewhere private.

HA 09/01/2015

RELEASE IN FULL

From: Valmoro, Lona J [ValmoroLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Saturday, October 03, 2009 8:14:42 PM
To: H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Tomorrow

Sounds good.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Valmoro, Lona J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Sat Oct 03 20:10:11 2009
Subject: Tomorrow

I want to take the 3 pm shuttle and I want to meet w Jake and the Holbrooke team either at State or my house whichever they prefer.

HA 09/01/2015

RELEASE IN FULL

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Saturday, October 03, 2009 8:19:10 PM
To: H; 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov'
Subject: Re: Tomorrow

Ok we can make that work.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov' <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>; Huma Abedin
Sent: Sat Oct 03 20:10:11 2009
Subject: Tomorrow

I want to take the 3 pm shuttle and I want to meet w Jake and the Holbrooke team either at State or my house whichever they prefer.

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2009 11:33 AM
To: humamabedin [REDACTED]
Subject: Fw: Draft Holbrooke Team
Attach: Pak Paper 10-03dcjjs.docx

RELEASE IN PART
B5

B6

From: Mills, Cheryl D
To: Abedin, Huma
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Sun Oct 04 11:18:47 2009
Subject: FW: Draft Holbrooke Team

From: Mills, Cheryl D
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 11:18 AM
To: 'H'
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Draft Holbrooke Team

HRC:

Attached is the draft memo in its current state from the Holbrooke team (it does not yet include RCH's hand edits which he just sent in).

As you will see, the beginning of this memo lays out 4 strategic interests, 3 of which overlap with the goals we discussed in our conversation; the fourth goes to the international consequences of success or failure.

Assuming we go with the approach we discussed, a cover memo should work reasonably well with this document (excepting the discussion on the foreign aid piece). See if you agree.

To actually see the document in its current form with showing edits – you need to print the attached version.

Below is the version that accepts all the proposed edits and eliminates the comments so you can read on BB if you choose.

cdm

DRAFT 10-03



B5

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- *[Potential placeholder for additional mention of Trilateral Dialogue or FODP, despite earlier references.]*

DRAFT 10-03

RELEASE IN
PART B5

B5

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
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B5



- *[Potential placeholder for additional mention of Trilateral Dialogue or FODP, despite earlier references.]*

From: H [HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 12:53:57 PM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Checking in

RELEASE IN FULL

Yes. Thx.

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
To: H
Sent: Sun Oct 04 12:52:19 2009
Subject: Re: Checking in

Did u get the fax ok?

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Sun Oct 04 11:57:57 2009
Subject: Re: Checking in

Not right now. Will I meet you at the shuttle?

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
To: H
Sent: Sun Oct 04 11:35:30 2009
Subject: Checking in

I'm faxing the document from holbrookes team right now that cdm emailed.
Anything else u need me to do?

HA 09/01/2015

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2009 6:36 PM
To: humamabedin [redacted]
Subject: Fw: northern ireland concept paper
Attach: concept paper stormont.doc

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

From: Beale, Courtney A Kramer
To: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Sun Oct 04 18:01:26 2009
Subject: FW: northern ireland concept paper

Here's the other draft concept paper I was asked to include with the briefing book tonight.

Courtney

From: Megan Rooney [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 5:12 PM
To: S_SpecialAssistants
Subject: Fwd: northern ireland concept paper

Hi Specials!

Here is a concept paper for the Secretary's remarks to the Stormont Assembly in Northern Ireland

Would you please include in her book for tomorrow?

Thanks!

--Megan
[redacted]

B6

From: H [HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, October 04, 2009 11:27:41 PM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Fw: US AID personnel

RELEASE IN PART
B5,B6

Pls print.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: H
Sent: Sun Oct 04 22:57:16 2009
Subject: Fw: US AID personnel

----- Original Message -----


From: H
To: 'cheryl.mills' <cheryl.mills>
Cc: H2
Sent: Sun Oct 04 22:27:21 2009
Subject: US AID personnel

B6

I have gone over the "priority" list and know very few of the names. Here are comments on the ones I know or whose names I recognize in the order the names appear. Let's discuss tomorrow.

B5
B6





B5
B6

HA 09/01/2015

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, October 05, 2009 6:04:01 AM
To: 'humamabedin' [redacted]
Subject: Fw: US AID personnel

B6

RELEASE IN PART
B5, B6

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Sun Oct 04 23:27:41 2009
Subject: Fw: US AID personnel

Pls print.

----- Original Message -----


From: H
To: H
Sent: Sun Oct 04 22:57:16 2009
Subject: Fw: US AID personnel

----- Original Message -----


From: H
To: 'cheryl.mills' [redacted] <cheryl.mills@redacted>
Cc: H2
Sent: Sun Oct 04 22:27:21 2009
Subject: US AID personnel

B6

I have gone over the "priority" list and know very few of the names. Here are comments on the ones I know or whose names I recognize in the order the names appear. Let's discuss tomorrow.



B5
B6



B5
B6

HA 09/01/2015

From: cheryl.mills [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2009 5:24:04 AM
To: Maggie Williams; Huma Abedin; Capricia Marshall [redacted]
CC: Cheryl Mills
Subject: Fw: US AID personnel

RELEASE IN PART
B5,B6

B6

Staffing usaid

I am purposefully on [redacted]

B6

I have asked joanne to give you each a list of the a usaid positions and the list margaret and cynthia have come up with as State rec (which reflect either unfilled priorities from our State list or their own recommendations).

I need to have you review and identify folks we would rec for each position. I would then like to do a call this thurs about the list you all come up with.

Let me know if you can't or prefer not to participate.

I will ask Margaret for a list of left over priorities so we have that list too.

Thanks.

Cdm
Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T

-----Original Message-----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>

Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2009 22:27:21


To: 'cheryl.mills [redacted]' <cheryl.mills [redacted]>

Cc: H2 <hr15@att.blackberry.net>

Subject: US AID personnel

B6

I have gone over the "priority" list and know very few of the names. Here are comments on the ones I know or whose names I recognize in the order the names appear. Let's discuss tomorrow.



B5
B6

B5
B6



From: H [HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2009 6:32:51 AM
To: 'JilotyLC@state.gov'; Huma Abedin
Subject:

RELEASE IN FULL

When I was at UNGA, I had foreign leader facebook's that I would like to see. Can you find for me?

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2009 6:34:13 AM
To: H; 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov'
Subject: Re: Schedule

RELEASE IN FULL

Ok we will follow up.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov' <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>; Huma Abedin
Sent: Tue Oct 06 06:31:39 2009
Subject: Schedule

I told Andrew I would do the things he requested in his memo to me and he should talk to you about scheduling.

HA 09/01/2015

RELEASE IN FULL

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2009 6:34:25 AM
To: H; 'JilotyLC@state.gov'
Subject: Re:

Yes I have a copy.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: 'JilotyLC@state.gov' <JilotyLC@state.gov>; Huma Abedin
Sent: Tue Oct 06 06:32:51 2009
Subject:

When I was at UNGA, I had foreign leader facebook's that I would like to see. Can you find for me?

HA 09/01/2015

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2009 7:49:30 AM
To: 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov'
Subject: Re: Schedule

RELEASE IN FULL

We will do keane at the office.

----- Original Message -----

From: Valmoro, Lona J <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>
To: H; Huma Abedin
Sent: Tue Oct 06 06:35:15 2009
Subject: Re: Schedule

Sounds good -- and I apologize about all of the private meetings today, I should have done a separate schedule for you.
2:30pm is Ken Feinberg.
4pm is Lou D'Allesandro dropping by for a quick hello.
6pm is General Keane and he knows we will get back to him about location. 6pm is the earliest he can do today.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Valmoro, Lona J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Tue Oct 06 06:31:39 2009
Subject: Schedule

I told Andrew I would do the things he requested in his memo to me and he should talk to you about scheduling.

From: Valmoro, Lona J [ValmoroLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Thursday, October 08, 2009 7:30:57 AM
To: H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Climate meeting

RELEASE IN FULL

It actually happened yesterday and we found out after the fact. Todd said he would send you a read out.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Valmoro, Lona J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Thu Oct 08 07:20:21 2009
Subject: Climate meeting

Is this off?

From: Ed Matthews [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 08, 2009 3:02:18 PM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: speaking request

B6

RELEASE IN PART
B6

Dear Huma

You won't recall, but we had some contact during campaign days and other Hillary-activities. I have been privileged to be her pastor at Ist/U. Methodist/Little Rock,

I continue to be contacted to "open a way" for some entity to extend spkg. invitation to her -- most of which I chose not to do. But have just had a contact from Dr. Tom Long, theologian-prof. at the U. Meth. Candler School of Theology, Emory Univ. hopeful there would be a way to get before her scheduling sec'y. an invitation to be guest spkr. as a conference being planned for "in the Spring, '10" around a project the Univ. is developing to "encourage teaching of UN and Global Justice".

This is something where she'd be fantastic as a presenter. (And it's a good U. Meth. institution, allowing her to continue to contribute to the denomination's well-being, following the admonition of Methodism's founder John Wesley, "the world is our parish".)

If appropriate, would you provide me with name and contact info for me to pursue such an invitation? -- and perhaps some tips for most effective way to go about this.

And if opportunity presents itself, give our greetings and hug to dear Hillary. Wow! -what a sched.l, what pressure! -- what a great job is doing!

Let there be Peace!

Ed

HA 09/01/2015

From: Huma Abedin (Huma@clintonemail.com)
Sent: Thursday, October 08, 2009 8:10:04 PM
To: 'humamabedin'
Subject: Fw: Memo on latest N.I. negotiations; yr trip; from Shaun W. Sid

B6

Attachments: hrc memo n. ireland 100809.docx

RELEASE IN PART
B1,1.4(D),B6

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Thu Oct 08 20:09:04 2009
Subject: Fw: Memo on latest N.I. negotiations; yr trip; from Shaun W. Sid

Pls print.

----- Original Message -----

From: sbwhoeop <sbwhoeop>
To: H
Sent: Thu Oct 08 20:08:03 2009
Subject: Memo on latest N.I. negotiations; yr trip; from Shaun W. Sid

CONFIDENTIAL

October 8, 2009

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Latest/N. Ireland

After five hours of talk at Downing Street tonight, Thursday, October 8, Shaun Woodward tells me that it seems Gordon Brown has brokered a financial package with Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness that may in turn break the deadlock on devolution of policing and justice. They have covered the major issues in stage two in their discussions. On Monday, Brown will formally set out the details in a letter to Robinson and McGuinness. Gordon will share these with you when you meet with him on Sunday at Chequers. Shaun says that both Robinson and McGuinness, subject to some minor details, should be in a position to recommend to Unionists and Nationalists that this is a strong deal. The letter will confirm the details.

1.4(D)
B1

I hope that's right.

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 01/29/2016 ~ Class:
CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason: 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on:
10/07/2024

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Friday, October 09, 2009 8:17:06 AM
To: Doug Band
Subject: Re: Request for help

RELEASE IN PART
B6

Ok.

----- Original Message -----

From: Doug Band
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Fri Oct 09 07:27:20 2009
Subject: Fw: Request for help

Not getting involved nor want to do him a favor

----- Original Message -----

From: Doug Band
To: 'ephi' <ephi@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Fri Oct 09 07:26:56 2009
Subject: Re: Request for help

Unfortunately, we don't
Will check around
Thx

----- Original Message -----

From: Ephi Gildor <Ephi@clintonemail.com>
To: 'DBand' <DBand@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Fri Oct 09 05:19:55 2009
Subject: Fw: Request for help

Doug please see my email below
I wonder if u can help
The other possibility is if you know the ceo of freeport
It is a new orleans based company that run the biggest gold mine in the world near the mountain
They can approve anything in this area and in fact in the past approved for very selected people to go via the mine
I wonder if you or the president know somewhere in the company
We are so desperate
We planned this expedition for many months

Respectfully

Ephi

----- Original Message -----

From: Ephi Gildor
To: 'abedinh@state.gov' <abedinh@state.gov>
Sent: Fri Oct 09 05:09:08 2009
Subject: Request for help

Hi huma
I am in papua indonesia
We are 6 members in expedition attempting to try to climb the tallest mountain in the oceania
The name of the mountain is carstensz (it was done before)
We travelled for 10 days and currently we are in small town called nabire
We were suppose to fly for 1 hour with helicopter to base camp
The helicopter was missing a part which arrived
Because of local politics they do not approve our flight

We are so desperate and I wonder if you can help us
Probably one phone call can help a lot to solve the issue because it is just local politics

Respectfully

Ephi

This message contains confidential information intended only for the addressee(s) named above. If you are not the named addressee, you should not disseminate or copy this email. Please notify the sender immediately by email if you have received this email by mistake, and please delete this email from your system. This message should not be construed as an invitation or offer to buy or sell any securities or financial instruments.

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 9, 2009 7:14 PM
To: humanabedin@
Subject: Fw: EUR Oct 09 Final as of departure
Attach: EUR Oct 09 Final as of departure.docx

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

From: Bennett, Virginia L

To: Abedin, Huma; Hanley, Monica R; Sullivan, Jacob J; Lukens, Lewis A; Hunter, Theresa M; Reines, Philippe I; Adler, Caroline E; Yehl, Ashley C (PACE); Valmore, Lona J; Coleman, Claire L; Inzerillo, Suzanne M; Mills, Pamela G; Turner, Michael A; SES-Line Officer4 (Pascual, Michael); Narain, Paul F; Lukens, Lewis A; Lan, Melissa J; Montgomery, Molly C; Piechowski, Jon E; Tillemann, Tomica S; Button, Case; Balderston, Kris M; Toiv, Nora F; Wells, Alice G; Jiloty, Lauren C; Macmanus, Joseph E; Muscatine, Lissa

Sent: Fri Oct 09 18:46:22 2009

Subject: EUR Oct 09 Final as of departure

Final as of departure attached.

Moscow and Kazan still tentative, though!

virginia

RELEASE IN FULL

10/9/09

Version 19

Current as of Departure

**Schedule for Visit to Zurich, London, Dublin, Belfast,
Moscow, and Kazan**

Friday, October 9, 2009

EDT Local

9:30pm 9:30pm Depart AAFB ert Zurich
Flight time: 7 hours, 40 mins, time change+6

Saturday, October 10, 2009

5:10am 11:10am Arrive Zurich
➤ Press: Press TBD

5:20am 11:20am Depart Zurich airport for Dolder Grand Hotel
(20 minute drive)

5:40am 11:40am Arrive hotel

Personal time (1 hour, 20 minutes)

7:05am 1:05pm Pre-brief (10 minutes)

7:15am 1:15pm Today Show (25 minutes)

7:45am 1:45pm Private lunch with FM Kouchner (60 minutes)
➤ Press: Closed press / Official photographer

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Version 19

Current as of Departure

9:00am 3:00pm Meeting with Armenian FM Nalbandian (20 minutes)
➤ *Press:* Camera spray

9:30am 3:30pm Meeting with Swiss FM Calmy-Rey (30 mins)
➤ *Press:* Camera spray

10:10am 4:10pm Meeting with Turkish FM Davutoglu (20 mins)
➤ *Press:* Camera spray

10:35am 4:35pm Depart Dolder Grand Hotel University of Zurich (10 minute drive)

10:45am 4:45pm Greeted by FM Calmy-Rey on arrival
➤ *Press:* Pooled press

11:00am 5:00pm Turkey-Armenia Signing Ceremony
➤ *Press:* Open press
➤ *Remarks:* 3-5 minutes

12:10pm 6:10 pm Group Photo
➤ *Press:* Open press

12:20pm 6:20pm Radio Interviews (20 minutes)

12:45pm 6:45pm Depart venue to Zurich airport (20 minute drive)

1:10pm 7:10pm Depart Zurich to London
Flight time 1 hour, 40 mins, time change -1
➤ *Press:* Closed press

10/9/09
Version 19
Current as of Departure

2:50pm 7:50pm Arrive London Heathrow
➤ *Press: Open press*

3:00pm 8:00pm Depart Heathrow ert Grosvenor House (30
minute drive)

4:00pm 9:00pm Private Meeting with Northern Ireland
Secretary Shaun Woodward (20 minutes)
➤ *Press: Closed press*

RON London

Sunday, October 11, 2009

3:10am 8:10am Depart suite ert motorcade

3:15am 8:15am Depart Grosvenor House ert Carlton Gardens
(10 minutes)

3:30am 8:30am Breakfast meeting with FS Miliband at
Carlton Gardens (1 hour)
➤ *Press: Pooled camera spray*

4:30am 9:30am Press Pre-brief (5 minutes)

4:40am 9:40am Joint press availability with Foreign Secretary
Miliband (20 minutes)
➤ *Press: Open press*
➤ *Remarks: 2-3 minutes*

5:05am 10:05am Depart Carlton Gardens ert Chequers (1 hour
drive)

-10/9/09
Version 19
Current as of Departure

6:10am	11:10am	Meeting with Prime Minister Brown (45 minutes) ➤ <i>Press</i> : Camera spray upon arrival [media access issues TBD]
7:00am	12:00pm	Depart ert Heathrow Airport (35 minute drive)
7:45am	12:45pm	Depart London Heathrow ert Dublin Flight time: 1 hour, 5 minutes, no time change ➤ <i>Press</i> : Open press
8:50am	1:50pm	Arrive Dublin International Airport ➤ <i>Press</i> : Open press
9:00am	2:00pm	Depart Dublin International Airport ert Farmleigh House (20 minute drive)
9:25am	2:25pm	Joint press availability with PM Cowen (15 minutes) ➤ <i>Press</i> : Open press ➤ <i>Remarks</i> : 3-4 minutes
9:40am	2:40am	Restricted Meeting with PM Brian Cowen (30 minutes) ➤ <i>Press</i> : Camera spray
10:15am	3:15pm	Meeting with Foreign Minister Michael Martin (40 minutes) ➤ <i>Press</i> : Camera spray

10/9/09

Version 19

Current as of Departure

11:05am 4:05pm Depart Farmleigh House ert Aras an
Uachtarain (5 minute drive)

11:15am 4:15pm Meeting with President McAleese (30
minutes) at Aras an Uachtarain
➤ *Press*: Camera spray during book signing
➤ *Remarks*: 2-3 minutes

11:50am 4:50pm Depart Aras an Uachtarain OTR (15 minute
drive)

12:10pm 5:10pm OTR with Ambassador Rooney (45 minutes)

1:00pm 6:00pm Radio Interview: The Right Hook (10 minutes)

1:15pm 6:15pm Depart Downtown Area for Dublin
International Airport (20 minute drive)

1:45pm 6:45pm Depart Dublin, Ireland ert Belfast, Northern
Ireland, United Kingdom
Flight time: 40 minutes, no time change
➤ *Press*: Open press

2:25pm 7:25pm Arrive Aldergrove RAF, Belfast International
Airport
➤ *Press*: Open for travelers only/closed for
local press

2:35pm 7:35pm Depart Aldergrove RAF, Belfast International
Airport ert Europa Hotel (30 minute drive)

10/9/09

Version 19

Current as of Departure

- 3:15pm 8:15pm Arrive Europa Hotel
➤ *Press*: Closed press/official photographer
- 3:25pm 8:25pm Optional: Drop-by at Invest Northern Ireland dinner (10 minutes)
➤ *Press*: Closed press (official photographs likely released)

RON Belfast

Monday, October 12, 2009

- 3:25am 8:25am Depart Suite ert motorcade
- 3:30am 8:30am Depart Europa Hotel ert Stormont Castle (25 minute drive)
- 3:50am 8:50am Arrive Stormont, met by First Minister Robinson and Deputy First Minister McGuinness
➤ *Press*: Camera spray upon arrival
- 4:00am 9:00am Meeting with First Minister Robinson
➤ *Press*: Closed press/official photographer
- 4:15am 9:15am Meeting with Deputy First Minister McGuinness
➤ *Press*: Closed press/official photographer
- 4:40am 9:30am Joint Meeting with First Minister Robinson and Deputy First Minister McGuinness
➤ *Press*: Camera spray

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Version 19

Current as of Departure

4:50am	9:50am	Press Pre-brief (5 minutes)
5:00am	10:00am	Joint Press Statements with Robinson / McGuinness (10 minutes) ➤ <i>Press</i> : Open press, no Q&A ➤ <i>Remarks</i> : 2-3 minutes
5:10am	10:10am	Depart Stormont Castle for Stormont Assembly (5 minutes)
5:30am	10:30am	Address to Full Session of Stormont Assembly (15 minutes) ➤ <i>Press</i> : Open press for arrival and remarks; official photographer for guest book signing ➤ <i>Remarks</i> : 15 minutes
5:50am	10:50am	Depart Stormont Assembly to Queen's University (20 minute drive)
TBD	TBD	Pull-aside with Reg Empey, UUP (10 minutes) ➤ <i>Press</i> : Closed press/official photographer
6:25am	11:25am	Roundtable with U.S. and Northern Ireland Working Groups (1 hour) ➤ <i>Press</i> : Camera spray ➤ <i>Remarks</i> : Informal introductory remarks
7:30am	12:30pm	Press Conference with Q&A (15 minutes) ➤ <i>Press</i> : Open press ➤ <i>Remarks</i> : 2-3 minutes
7:50am	12:50pm	Depart Queens University to City Hall (10 minute drive)

10/9/09

Version 19

Current as of Departure

- | | | |
|---------|--------|--|
| 8:00am | 1:00pm | City Hall Ribbon Cutting in honor of the Rededication of City Hall (10 minutes)
➤ <i>Press:</i> Open press upon arrival; official photographer for guest book signing |
| 8:20am | 1:20pm | Vital Voices Reception at City Hall (15 minutes)
➤ <i>Press:</i> Closed press/official photographer |
| 8:35am | 1:35pm | Reception hosted by the Lord Mayor
➤ <i>Press:</i> Open press for remarks
➤ <i>Remarks:</i> 2-3 minutes at a podium |
| 9:10am | 2:10pm | Radio Interview: BBC Northern Ireland (10 minutes) |
| 9:25am | 2:25pm | Meet and Greet with Consulate and Embassy London Staff (5 minutes)
➤ <i>Press:</i> Open press for travelers
➤ <i>Remarks:</i> 3-5 minutes |
| 9:30am | 2:30pm | Photo with City Hall Staff (5 minutes)
➤ <i>Press:</i> Official photographer |
| 9:35am | 2:35pm | Depart City Hall ert Aldergrove RAF, Belfast International Airport (30 minute drive) |
| 10:15am | 3:15pm | Depart Belfast ert Moscow
Flight time: 3 hours, 25 minutes, time change +3 hours
➤ <i>Press:</i> Open for travelers only/closed for local press |

10/9/09
Version 19
Current as of Departure

1:40pm 9:40pm Arrive Moscow Vnukovo Airport
➤ *Press:* Open press

1:50pm 9:50pm Depart airport for hotel (30-35 minutes)

2:25pm 10:25pm Arrive Ritz Carlton Moscow

RON Moscow

Tuesday, October 13, 2009

12:00am 8:00am Pre-brief

12:50am 8:50am Depart Ritz ert Embassy (10 minute drive)

1:05am 9:05am Embassy Meet and Greet (30 minutes)
➤ *Press:* Open press for travelers
➤ *Remarks:* 3-5 minutes

1:40am 9:40am Depart Embassy ert MFA Guest House
Osobnyak (15 minute drive)

2:00am 10:00am Restricted Meeting with FM Lavrov (1 hour)
➤ *Press:* Camera spray

3:00am 11:00am Expanded Bilateral Meeting with FM
Lavrov (1 hour)
➤ *Press:* Camera spray

4:00am 12:00pm Bilateral Working Lunch (1 hour 30 minutes)
➤ *Press:* Official photographer at top

10/9/09

Version 19

Current as of Departure

5:35am	1:35pm	Press pre-brief (10 minutes)
5:45am	1:45pm	Joint Press Availability (25 minutes) ➤ <i>Press:</i> Open press ➤ <i>Remarks:</i> 5-6 minutes
6:15am	2:15pm	Depart Osobnyak Guest House ert Spaso House (10 minute drive)
6:30am	2:30pm	Civil Society Reception (55 minutes) ➤ <i>Press:</i> Open press ➤ <i>Remarks:</i> 5-6 minutes at a podium
7:30am	3:30pm	Depart Spaso House ert Boeing Design Center (10 minute drive)
7:45am	3:45pm	Visit to joint U.S.-Russia Boeing Design Center (1 hour) ➤ <i>Press:</i> Pooled press for the tour; open press for remarks ➤ <i>Remarks:</i> 3-5 minutes at a podium
8:45am	4:45pm	Depart Boeing Design Center ert Kremlin (10 minute drive)
9:00am	5:00pm	Meeting with President Medvedev (60 minutes) ➤ <i>Press:</i> Pooled camera spray
10:05am	6:05pm	Depart Kremlin ert Ritz Carlton Hotel (5 minute drive)
10:10am	6:10pm	Personal / staff time (30 minutes)

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Version 19
Current as of Departure

10:45am 6:45pm Depart ert Bolshoi New Stage (10 minutes)

11:00am 7:00pm Love of Three Oranges Opera
(2 hours, 35 minutes, including 20 minute
intermission)
➤ Press: Press invited as guests

1:40pm 9:40pm Depart ert hotel (15 minutes)

1:55pm 9:55pm Arrive Ritz Carlton

RON Ritz Carlton Hotel, Moscow

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

12:00am 8:00am Interview: Nightline (40 minutes)

12:50am 8:50am Depart Ritz-Carlton ert Ekho Moskvyy (10
minute drive).

1:05am 9:05am Ekho Moskvyy Radio interview (15
minutes)
➤ Press: Pooled press

1:25am 9:25am Interview with Russian Newsweek (10
minutes)

1:40am 9:40am Depart Ekho Moskvyy ert Moscow State
University (20 minutes)

10/9/09

Version 19

Current as of Departure

- 2:00am 10:00am Ribbon-cutting for the installation of the Walt Whitman Statue at Moscow State University, with FM Lavrov and Mayor of Moscow (20 minutes)
 ➤ *Press:* Open press
 ➤ *Remarks:* Informal remarks/bullet points
- 2:30am 10:30am Town Hall at Moscow State University (45 minutes)
 ➤ *Press:* Open press
 ➤ *Remarks:* 4-5 minutes
- 3:20am 11:20am Depart Moscow State University ert Vnukovo Airport (35 minutes)
- 4:00am 12:00pm Depart Vnukovo Airport ert Kazan
 Flight time: 1 hour 20 minutes, no time change
 ➤ *Press:* Open press
- 5:20am 1:20pm Arrive Kazan Airport
 ➤ *Press:* Open press
- 5:25am 1:25pm Arrival Ceremony (10 minutes)
 ➤ *Press:* Open press
- 5:40am 1:40pm Depart Kazan Airport ert Kazan Kremlin (30 minute drive)
- 6:15am 2:15pm Tour of Kazan Kremlin (45 minutes)
 ➤ *Press:* [Open press]
 ➤ *Remarks:* [Informal remarks/bullet points]

10/9/09

Version 19

Current as of Departure

7:05am 3:05pm (T) Meeting with President of the Republic of
Tatarstan M.S. Shaymiyev (20 minutes)
Venue: Kazan Kremlin
➤ *Press:* [Camera spray]
➤ *Remarks:* TBD

7:30am 3:30pm (T) Fostering Dialogue Roundtable
(1 hour)
➤ *Press:* [Camera spray]
➤ *Remarks:* TBD

8:35am 4:35pm (T) Depart ert airport (30 minutes)

9:05am 5:05pm Depart Kazan ert Shannon Airport
Flight time 5 hours, 10 minutes, time change
-3 hours
➤ *Press:* Open press

2:15pm 7:15pm Arrive Shannon (refuel)

3:45pm 8:45pm Depart Shannon ert AAFB
Flight time: 7 hours, 25 minutes; time
change -5 hours

11:10pm 11:10pm Arrive AAFB

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 9, 2009 7:26 PM
To: humamabedin [REDACTED]
Subject: Fw: S Final Leader Gifts and Photobook and Master Trip Spreadsheet
Attach: S Final Leader Gifts and Photobook_Europe_.pdf, 10-2009 EUROPE TRIP London, Zurich, Dublin, Belfast, Moscow and Kazan (MASTER).xlsx

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

From: Ballantine, Liza W
To: Abedin, Huma
Cc: Marshall, Capricia P; Cheng, Dennis W; Jack, Katie; Solomon, David A; Hanley, Monica R; Rubin, Ali M; Ballantine, Liza W
Sent: Fri Oct 09 19:24:14 2009
Subject: S Final Leader Gifts and Photobook and Master Trip Spreadsheet

Hi Huma,

Attached you will please find the Final Gift Selections for the following:

On the occasion of The Secretary's trip to Zurich, London, Dublin, Belfast, Moscow, and Kazan: October 9 - October 14, 2009

- S Leader Gifts and Photobook (Final)
- Master Trip Gift Spreadsheet

Please note the Master Trip Spreadsheet is also included in the packet we enclose with the trunk. Please let me know if we can be more helpful in any way! Thanks so much.

Safe journey,
Liza

Liza W. Ballantine
Office of the Chief of Protocol
United States Department of State
S/CPR, Suite 1238
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

202.647.1161 (office)
[REDACTED] (cell)
ballantinew@state.gov

B6

From: Ballantine, Liza W
Sent: Friday, October 09, 2009 7:06 PM
To: Rubin, Ali M
Cc: Cheng, Dennis W
Subject: S Final Leader Gifts and Photobook; Master Trip Spreadsheet

Please advise how to get to Huma. I can print out now

Liza W. Ballantine
Office of the Chief of Protocol
United States Department of State
S/CPR, Suite 1238
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

202.647.1161 (office)
[redacted] (cell)
ballantincmw@state.gov

B6

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, October 10, 2009 6:51 PM
To: humamabedin [REDACTED]
Subject: Fw: Fwd latest draft of stormont
Attach: Stormont 101009 4pm doc; ATT444400.txt

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

----- Original Message -----

From: Megan Rooney <[REDACTED]>
To: Abedin, Huma
Cc: Inzerillo, Suzanne M
Sent: Sat Oct 10 18:26:47 2009
Subject: Fwd: latest draft of stormont

Huma,

Here's the latest draft of the Stormont address I've sent it to Line and the Specials as well. There may be more edits over the next day, but if the Secretary wants to review the latest, here it is.

Hope everything is going well!

Megan

Draft 3

October 10, 2009 4pm


Rooney (x7-7203, [REDACTED])

Muscatine [REDACTED]


B6

RELEASE IN PART
B5, B6

**SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
ADDRESS TO THE STORMONT ASSEMBLY
BELFAST, NORTHERN IRELAND
MONDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2009**



B5



B5

B5





B5

Thank you.

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, October 11, 2009 1:23:22 PM
To: 'humamabedin' [redacted]
Subject: Print Fw: CA Port-Amer Endorsement Letter

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

Attachments: CA Port-Amer Congressmen.pdf

----- Original Message -----

From: Marc Pacheco [redacted]
To: Huma Abedin; Huma Abedin <habedin@hillaryclinton.com>
Sent: Fri Oct 09 16:24:18 2009
Subject: FW: CA Port-Amer Endorsement Letter

Huma,
Please know that the Portuguese American caucus in the Congress has sent a letter to the President on my behalf.
Please let the Secretary know that this bi-partisan group of the only Portuguese Americans in the Congress is supporting me for an Ambassadorship.
Marc

> **From:** campaign@marcpacheco.org
> **To:** senatorpacheco [redacted]
> **Subject:** CA Port-Amer Endorsement Letter
> **Date:** Fri, 9 Oct 2009 16:11:35 -0400
>
> Attached you will find the endorsement letter from Portuguese-American
> Congressmen.

Hotmail: Free, trusted and rich email service. Get it now. <<http://clk.atdmt.com/GBL/go/171222984/direct/01/>>

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

RELEASE IN FULL

October 7, 2009

President Barack Obama
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to ask your consideration of Massachusetts State Senator Marc R. Pacheco to serve as your Ambassador to Portugal. His record of service in Massachusetts, combined with his tireless work with the Portuguese-American community in his state and his own Portuguese heritage makes him an ideal candidate for this position.


Each of us has known Senator Pacheco for many years and have seen the work he has done during the thirty years he has been in public service. He has represented a large Portuguese-American community in the State Senate, and has a strong relationship with the Portuguese people and government. In fact, the Portuguese government awarded Senator Pacheco its highest civilian honor, the Commander of the Order of Prince Henry the Navigator, in 1998 because of his work in the Portuguese-American community in Massachusetts and his work to strengthen US-Portugal relations.

Senator Pacheco has a great understanding of US-Portugal relations and is aware of the deep ties that Portuguese-Americans, even second and third generations, have to Portugal. He knows the history and issues affecting these communities, and possesses a deep understanding of the challenges that Portuguese immigrants face when they come to our nation. As the only Portuguese-Americans in the House of Representatives, we know how important it would be to have someone with Portuguese roots, like Senator Pacheco, serving as our Ambassador to Portugal.

We are confident that Senator Pacheco's experience and record of legislative accomplishments, along with this knowledge of US-Portugal issues make him the best choice to serve as Ambassador to Portugal.

Thank you for your consideration. Please feel free to contact us should you have any questions.


Sincerely,



JIM COSTA
Member of Congress



DEVIN NUNES
Member of Congress



DENNIS CARDOZA
Member of Congress

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, October 12, 2009 2:11:38 AM
To: 'humamabedin' [redacted]
Subject: Fw: H: Memo on your speech meeting on Monday. Sid

RELEASE IN PART
B1,1.4(D),B6

B6

Attachments: hrc memo ni meeting 101209.docx

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Mon Oct 12 02:06:15 2009
Subject: Fw: H: Memo on your speech meeting on Monday. Sid

Pls print.

----- Original Message -----

From: sbwhoeop [redacted] <sbwhoeop [redacted]>
To: H
Sent: Sun Oct 11 20:46:43 2009
Subject: H: Memo on your speech meeting on Monday. Sid

B6

CONFIDENTIAL

October 11, 2009

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Your speech and meeting on Monday

I have not seen your speech obviously that you will deliver Monday morning at Stormont. Shaun tells me that it's a good speech, and you're right not to instruct the parties what to do but to encourage them to address why completing devolution needs to be done. [redacted]

1.4(D)
B1

[redacted] That's it.

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 01/29/2016 ~ Class:
CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason: 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on:
10/10/2024

HA 09/01/2015

From: kkhan [redacted]
Sent: Monday, October 12, 2009 12:31:02 PM
To: HAbedin@hillaryclinton.com; Huma_abedin@clinton.senate.gov
Subject: Fwd: Meeting with Ambassador Holbrooke

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

-----Original Message-----

From: Chaudhary, Shamila N <ChaudharySN@state.gov>
To: KKhan [redacted]
Sent: Wed, May 6, 2009 9:00 pm
Subject: RE: Meeting with Ambassador Holbrooke

Hi Kamran – I've heard there is no dinner – play for a 2-3pm registration/reception followed by 3-6pm meeting with chai/heavy refreshments.

Looking forward to meeting you!
Shamila

From: KKhan [redacted] [mailto:KKhan [redacted]]
Sent: Wednesday, May 06, 2009 3:14 PM
To: 20Chaudhary, Shamila N
Subject: Meeting with Ambassador Holbrooke

Shamila,

A group of Pakistani Americans would like to call on Ambassador Holbrooke. These are people who are very involved in political and civic affairs and bring a valuable insight to an increasingly complex situation that Pakistan faces. The names are: Rashid Chaudary, Dr. Akbar Ahmed, M.M. Arain MD, Munir Akhtar, Asif Mahmood MD, Ghaffar Khattak and myself. Apart from bringing a unique perspective, these are folks who have many important relationships in Pakistan.

Thanks for your help. If you have any question please call me at [redacted]

Be Well.

Best,
Kamran Khan

Remember Mom this Mother's Day! [Find a florist near you now.](#)

From: Doug Band [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, October 12, 2009 9:25:19 PM
To: Oscar Flores; Hannah Richert; Justin Cooper; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Need some help

RELEASE IN PART
B6

All huma

----- Original Message -----

From: Oscar Flores
To: Doug Band; Hannah Richert; Justin Cooper
Sent: Mon Oct 12 11:17:41 2009
Subject: Fw: Need some help

Fyi

----- Original Message -----

From: Lara Farrar [REDACTED]
To: Oscar Flores
Sent: Mon Oct 12 11:07:22 2009
Subject: Need some help

B6

Hi Oscar,

I don't know if you can help me with this, but I have been reporting on a refugee from Sudan who suffered in the genocide here who is stuck in China. His visa expires in a couple of days and he has no way to get out of the country. He cannot go to the Sudanese embassy for obvious reasons. Do you know any organizations who could help him? Or would you mind asking the President if he has any thoughts? I have been trying to help him as much as I can but obviously have limited resources. He escaped Sudan, has done some volunteer work for the UN in Egypt and has been a student at the American University in Cairo. His situation seems pretty desperate. I am trying to find someone who can offer some advice. If you can try to ask anyone around you as soon as possible, I would be very appreciative.

Hope you are well.

lara

--
--

Lara Farrar
Reporter



From: Reines, Philippe I [reinesp@state.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2009 2:26:54 PM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Out of Office AutoReply: HRC re Lili Smith

RELEASE IN FULL

I'm traveling with infrequent access to email. If you need immediate assistance, please contact Ellen Connell at ConnelleK2@state.gov - otherwise, I will respond as soon as possible

From: Iris Anaya [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2009 3:59:25 PM
To: habedin@hillaryclinton.com; JilotyLC@state.gov
Subject: Contacting you on behalf of Alfonso Fanjul

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

Hello Huma and Lauren:

Mr. Alfonso Fanjul would like to meet with Secretary Clinton. He plans to be in DC on **Tuesday, October 20**, and would be able to meet at whatever time is convenient to the Secretary if she were available. If it cannot happen on the mentioned date, please suggest a couple of dates that might be convenient for Secretary Clinton to meet with Mr. Fanjul, and he would try to arrange his schedule accordingly.

Thank you for your kind assistance with this matter and we look forward to hearing from you.

Best regards,

Iris

Iris Anaya

Personal Assistant

to Alfonso Fanjul

Chairman and CEO

Fanjul Corp.

[REDACTED] Direct

(561) 655-6303, Main

(561) 835-4795, Fax

[REDACTED]

HA 09/01/2015

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2009 12:18:30 AM
To: mmoore [redacted]
Subject: RE: Hey Huma

RELEASE IN PART
 B6

strange i just did a search and found nothing but will get right on it

From: Minyon Moore [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2009 12:09 AM
To: Huma Abedin; Minyon Moore; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Hey Huma

Sorry I cc'd you on email where Madam secretary indicated she wanted to send a letter.

From: "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.gov>
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2009 23:26:01 -0400
To: Minyon Moore [redacted]; Huma Abedin<Huma@clintonemail.com>
Subject: RE: Hey Huma

What are you talking about

Bakewell?

I don't know anything about a letter

From: Minyon Moore [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2009 2:31 AM
To: Huma Abedin
Cc: Abedin, Huma
Subject: Hey Huma
Importance: High

B6

Hope you are well.... Do you know if the letter HRC will be sending Danny will be ready in time to be read at the Funeral on Friday. Will be lots of whose who attending.

From: Jiloty, Lauren C [JilotyLC@state.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2009 2:41:08 PM
To: Iris_Anaya [redacted] habedin [redacted].com
CC: Valmoro, Lona J
Subject: Re: Pls acknowledge receipt of my e-mail from yesterday re setting up a meeting between Secretary Clinton and Alfonso Fanjul. Thank you.

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

We have been overseas and out of email range. Please talk to Lona Valmoro copied on this email about setting up a meeting

From: Iris Anaya [redacted]
To: Huma Abedin [redacted] Jiloty, Lauren C
Sent: Wed Oct 14 13:34:12 2009
Subject: Pls acknowledge receipt of my e-mail from yesterday re setting up a meeting between Secretary Clinton and Alfonso Fanjul. Thank you..

Iris Anaya

Personal Assistant

to Alfonso Fanjul

Chairman and CEO

Fanjul Corp.

[redacted] Direct

(561) 655-6303, Main

(561) 835-4795, Fax

[redacted]

HA 09/01/2015

From: Valmore, Lona J [ValmoreLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2009 3:26:21 PM
To: Iris_Anaya [redacted]
CC: Jiloty, Lauren C; habedin [redacted]
Subject: Re: Setting up a meeting between Secretary Clinton and Alfonso Fanjul

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

Thanks Iris, I will be back in touch.

From: Iris Anaya [redacted]
To: Valmore, Lona J
Cc: Jiloty, Lauren C; Huma Abedin [redacted]
Sent: Wed Oct 14 15:02:14 2009
Subject: Setting up a meeting between Secretary Clinton and Alfonso Fanjul

Hello Lona:

At Lauren Jiloty's suggestion, I am contacting you to set up a meeting between Secretary Clinton and Alfonso Fanjul--

Mr. Alfonso Fanjul plans to be in DC on **Tuesday, October 20**, and would be able to meet at a time convenient to the Secretary if she were available. If it cannot happen on the mentioned date, please suggest a couple of dates that might be convenient for Secretary Clinton to meet with Mr. Fanjul, and he would try to arrange his schedule accordingly.

Thank you for your kind assistance with this matter and we look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Iris

Iris Anaya

Personal Assistant

to Alfonso Fanjul

[redacted] Direct

HA 09/01/2015

(561) 655-6303, Main

(561) 835-4795, Fax

[REDACTED]

B6

From: Jiloty, Lauren C [mailto:JilotyLC@state.gov]

Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2009 2:41 PM

To: Iris Anaya; habedin [REDACTED]

Cc: Valmoro, Lona J

Subject: Re: Pls acknowledge receipt of my e-mail from yesterday re setting up a meeting between Secretary Clinton and Alfonso Fanjul. Thank you.

We have been overseas and out of email range. Please talk to lona valmoro copied on this email about setting up a meeting

From: Iris Anaya <[REDACTED]>

To: Huma Abedin <[REDACTED]> Jiloty, Lauren C

Sent: Wed Oct 14 13:34:12 2009

Subject: Pls acknowledge receipt of my e-mail from yesterday re setting up a meeting between Secretary Clinton and Alfonso Fanjul. Thank you.

Iris Anaya

Personal Assistant

to Alfonso Fanjul

Chairman and CEO

Fanjul Corp.

[REDACTED] Direct

HA 09/01/2015

(561) 655-6303, Main

(561) 835-4795, Fax

B6

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2009 5:56 PM
To: humamabedin [REDACTED]
Subject: Fw: Final Schedule, Friday October 16th
Attach: October.16.09.final.doc

RELEASE IN PART
B5,B6

B6

From: Valmore, Lona J
To: Valmore, Lona J; S S-FinalSchedule
Cc: 'tkrinvic' [REDACTED]; 'justin' [REDACTED]
<justin [REDACTED]>; 'Jon' [REDACTED]; 'doug' [REDACTED]
<doug [REDACTED]>; 'laura' [REDACTED]
'hannah' [REDACTED]; 'jschlichter' [REDACTED]; 'msteenburg' [REDACTED]
<msteenburg [REDACTED]>; 'jzimmerebner' [REDACTED]
Balderston, Kris M; Adler, Caroline E; Kanick, Elizabeth L; Schwerin, Dan B (PACE); Crowley, Philip J; Stern, Todd D
(S/SECC); 'oscar' [REDACTED]; 'rooney' [REDACTED]; Rooney, Megan; Rubin, Ali M; Marshall, Capricia P; Klevorick, Caitlin B; Otero, Mildred
(LAC/AA); Barnard, Thomas A; Colon, Ricardo; Cheng, Dennis W; Jeffress, Michael B; Tillemann, Tomicah S; Peña, Laura;
Verveer, Melanne S; Merrill, Nicholas S (PACE); Merrill, Nicholas S; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Schwerin, Daniel B

Sent: Thu Oct 15 17:41:59 2009

Subject: Final Schedule, Friday October 16th

PREV RON Washington, DC

8:15 am **DEPART** Private Residence
En route State Department
[drive time: 10 minutes]

8:25 am **ARRIVE** State Department

8:25 am **PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFING**
8:30 am Secretary's Office

8:30 am **DAILY SMALL STAFF MEETING**
8:45 am Secretary's Office
Participants: Cheryl, Huma, Jake, Joe and Lona

8:45 am **DAILY MEETING w/SENIOR STAFF**
9:15 am Secretary's Conference Room
Participants: Jim Steinberg, Jack Lew, P.J. Crowley, Dan Smith,
Cheryl Mills, Harold Koh, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Ian Kelly, Rich Verma,
and Joe Macmanus

9:30 am **VIDEO TAPINGS**
9:45 am Studio Room 2404
Staff/Contact: Dan Schwerin

- Alliance for Youth
- UNESCO Video
- US/China Clean Energy Partnership
- Italian Earthquake Relief

HA 09/01/2015

9:50 am **TAPED TELEVISION INTERVIEW w/JILL DOUGHERTY, CNN**
 10:00 am Studio Room 2404
 Staff/Contact: Philippe

10:10 am **DEPART** State Department

10:15 am

10:15 am
 11:15 am

11:20 am

En route State Department
 [drive time: 5 minutes]

11:25 am **ARRIVE** State Department

11:45 am **VIP RECEPTION FOR MARSHALL LUNCHEON**

12:00 pm James Monroe Room, 8th Floor
 Staff: Lauren

Note: 20 people attending, mix and mingle.

12:00 pm **LUNCHEON HOSTED BY U/S PATRICK KENNEDY FOR 50TH**
 12:40 pm **ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF GEORGE C. MARSHALL, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE**

Benjamin Franklin Room, 8th Floor
 Contact: M Kathleen Helton-Floyd x71500
 Staff: Lauren
OPEN PRESS

Note: Approximately 220 guests attending.

- HRC escorted to 8th floor to join Defense Secretary Gates and Lt. General Brent Scowcroft in James Monroe Room.
- HRC escorted into Benjamin Franklin Room and seated at table.
- Welcome remarks by Brian Shaw, President of George C. Marshall Foundation.
- U/S Patrick Kennedy gives remarks and introduces HRC.
- HRC gives remarks (6 minutes) and introduces Lt. General Brent Scowcroft.
- Lt. General Brent Scowcroft gives remarks including a tribute to Defense Secretary Gates.
- Lt. General Scowcroft and John Adams present Marshall Medal to Secretary Gates followed by a photo with previous award recipients.
- Secretary Gates gives remarks.
- Brian Shaw invites guests to enjoy lunch, HRC and Gates depart.

12:45 pm **OFFICE TIME**
 2:30 pm Secretary's Office

B5

B6

2:30 pm **CONFERENCE CALL w/AGRICULTURE SECRETARY
TOM VILSACK AND MEDIA TBD**

Secretary's Office
Call in Number: 888-673-9789
Passcode: Foodsecurity
Contact: Cheryl Benton, PA

3:00 pm **REMARKS TO THE GLOBAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS
(PAO) CONFERENCE**

Location: George C. Marshall Center
Contact: R Joseph Witters x79160, Cell
Staff: Lauren
CLOSED PRESS

B6

Note: Approximately 250 people attending.

- U/S Judith McHale meets HRC in her office and escorts down to the Marshall Center Auditorium.
- U/S gives brief remarks and introduces HRC.
- HRC gives brief remarks (3-5 minutes) and takes questions, moderated by U/S McHale.

3:30 pm **BRIEFING ON SUDAN ROLL-OUT OVERVIEW**
4:30 pm Secretary's Office

4:30 pm (t) **MEETING w/JIM STEINBERG**
5:00 pm (t) Secretary's Office

5:00 pm **OFFICE TIME**
6:15 pm Secretary's Office

6:20 pm **DEPART** State Department
En route Washington Reagan National Airport
[drive time: 20 minutes]

6:40 pm **ARRIVE** Washington National Airport

7:00 pm **DEPART** Washington National Airport via US Airways Shuttle #2184
En route New York, NY
[flight time: 1 hour, 20 minutes]

8:20 pm **ARRIVE** LaGuardia Airport

8:30 pm **DEPART** LaGuardia Airport
En route Private Residence
[drive time: 50 minutes]

9:20 pm **ARRIVE** Private Residence

HRC RON Chappaqua, NY
WJC RON Little Rock, Arkansas

Weather:
Washington, DC: Rain, 48/42.
Chappaqua, NY: Rain, 48/37.

HA 09/01/2015

RELEASE IN PART
B5, B6

**SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2009/WORLD FOOD DAY**

FINAL

WASHINGTON, DC/CHAPPAQUA, NY

SPECIAL ASSISTANT: LONA VALMORO
OFFICE (202) 647-9071
CELL

B6

STAFF ASSISTANT: LINDA DEWAN
OFFICE (202) 647-5733
CELL

PREV RON Washington, DC

8:15 am **DEPART** Private Residence
En route State Department
[drive time: 10 minutes]

8:25 am **ARRIVE** State Department

8:25 am **PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFING**
8:30 am Secretary's Office

8:30 am **DAILY SMALL STAFF MEETING**
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and Joe Macmanus

9:30 am **VIDEO TAPINGS**
9:45 am Studio Room 2404
Staff/Contact: Dan Schwerin

- Alliance for Youth
- UNESCO Video
- US/China Clean Energy Partnership
- Italian Earthquake Relief

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10:00 am Studio Room 2404
Staff/Contact: Philippe

10:10 am **DEPART** State Department

10:15 am

10:15 am

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En route State Department
[drive time: 5 minutes]

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Benjamin Franklin Room, 8th Floor
Contact: M Kathleen Helton-Floyd x71500
Staff: Lauren
OPEN PRESS

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**SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2009/WORLD FOOD DAY**

- U/S Patrick Kennedy gives remarks and introduces HRC.
- HRC gives remarks (6 minutes) and introduces Lt. General Brent Scowcroft.
- Lt. General Brent Scowcroft gives remarks including a tribute to Defense Secretary Gates.
- Lt. General Scowcroft and John Adams present Marshall Medal to Secretary Gates followed by a photo with previous award recipients.
- Secretary Gates gives remarks.
- Brian Shaw invites guests to enjoy lunch, HRC and Gates depart

12:45 pm **OFFICE TIME**
2:30 pm Secretary's Office

2:30 pm **CONFERENCE CALL w/AGRICULTURE SECRETARY**
2:50 pm **TOM VILSACK AND MEDIA TBD**
Secretary's Office
Call in Number: 888-673-9789
Passcode: Foodsecurity
Contact: Cheryl Benton, PA

3:00 pm **REMARKS TO THE GLOBAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS**
3:30 pm **(PAO) CONFERENCE**
Location: George C. Marshall Center
Contact: R Joseph Witters x79160, Cell
Staff: Lauren
CLOSED PRESS

B6

Note: Approximately 250 people attending.

- U/S Judith McHale meets HRC in her office and escorts down to the Marshall Center Auditorium.
- U/S gives brief remarks and introduces HRC.
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3:30 pm **BRIEFING ON SUDAN ROLL-OUT OVERVIEW**
4:30 pm Secretary's Office

**SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2009/WORLD FOOD DAY**

4:30 pm (t) **MEETING w/JIM STEINBERG**
5:00 pm (t) Secretary's Office

5:00 pm **OFFICE TIME**
6:15 pm Secretary's Office

6:20 pm **DEPART** State Department
En route Washington Reagan National Airport
[drive time: 20 minutes]

6:40 pm **ARRIVE** Washington National Airport

7:00 pm **DEPART** Washington National Airport via US Airways Shuttle #2184
En route New York, NY
[flight time: 1 hour, 20 minutes]

8:20 pm **ARRIVE** LaGuardia Airport

8:30 pm **DEPART** LaGuardia Airport
En route Private Residence
[drive time: 50 minutes]

9:20 pm **ARRIVE** Private Residence

HRC RON Chappaqua, NY
WJC RON Little Rock, Arkansas

Weather:
Washington, DC: Rain, 48/42
Chappaqua, NY: Rain, 48/37.

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2009 6:52:43 PM.
To: 'reinesp@state.gov'
Subject: Re: HRC re Lili Smith

RELEASE IN PART
B6

I have to find it from her email

----- Original Message -----

From: Reines, Philippe I <reinesp@state.gov>
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Thu Oct 15 15:52:53 2009
Subject: RE: HRC re Lili Smith

Can you send me the note she sent Ace

From: Huma Abedin [mailto:Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2009 2:20 PM
To: Reines, Philippe I
Subject: FW: HRC re Lili Smith

can we discuss? what do you think?

From: Dan Newman [redacted]
Sent: Monday, October 12, 2009 9:29 PM
To: HAbedin@hillaryclinton.com
Subject: HRC re Lili Smith

B6

Hi Huma,

This is Dan Newman – Ace Smith's partner. [redacted]

Carla Marinucci, the SF Chronicle political reporter is writing a news obit about Lili. Do you think HRC would be willing to contribute a comment or talk to Carla for her piece? Can send via me or directly to Carla - cmarinucci@sfchronicle.com, (415) 777-6064.

Thank you so much.

Best,

Dan

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2009 7:27:49 PM
To: H
Subject: Re: Troops

RELEASE IN PART
B6

Ok

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Thu Oct 15 19:26:43 2009
Subject: Fw: Troops

Pls print for me.

----- Original Message -----

From: Mark J. Penn [redacted]
To: H
Sent: Thu Oct 08 03:26:41 2009
Subject: Troops

B6

I have to say that this argument that the Taliban are ok to ignore is dangerous morally and politically.

The argument at the time was that harboring terrorism was the same as launching terrorism and that those who harbored would be held responsible. This also had long term deterrence value against regimes that would outsource the dirty work.

To now even consider giving the Taliban a pass after harboring terrorists who committed direct attacks on new York and Washington defies the imagination. This wasn't some embassy bombing but a strike right at our country. The white house or congress barely escaped destruction. Saddam Hussein wasn't connected to al Qaeda but the Taliban surely were without question.

And Teheran and north Korea are watching carefully, gauging how much resolve the us has in stopping their plans. If the us lets the Taliban off the hook then they certainly can conclude it will do nothing beyond sanctions with them. And essentially letting karzai twist in the wind also suggests the us does not live up to it's commitments, giving pause to those who would help the us.

Politically, this is also quite dangerous. Obama maintained throughout the campaign and the start of his presidency that this is the one to fight and backing down here makes him and the administration vulnerable to losing moderate support and seeming weak and indecisive. A single terrorist incident would be blamed on the admin. failing to do the job right.

I could go on and on with other negative ramifications but of all the options it appears to me any strategy that says fighting the taliban are not in the strategic interests of the us should be doa.

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2009 7:27:55 PM
To: 'humamabedin' [redacted]
Subject: Fw: Troops

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Thu Oct 15 19:26:43 2009
Subject: Fw: Troops

Pls print for me.

----- Original Message -----

From: Mark J. Penn [redacted]
To: H
Sent: Thu Oct 08 03:26:41 2009
Subject: Troops

I have to say that this argument that the Taliban are ok to ignore is dangerous morally and politically.

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I could go on and on with other negative ramifications but of all the options it appears to me any strategy that says fighting the Taliban are not in the strategic interests of the US should be done.

RELEASE IN PART
B6

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2009 7:59 PM
To: humamabedin [REDACTED]
Subject: Fw: draft pak schedule
Attach: S TRIP PAK.docx

B6

From: Bommer, Ashley F
To: Abedin, Huma; Sullivan, John L; Reines, Philippe I; Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Wohlers, Paul; Lukens, Lewis A; Chollet, Derek H; Goodman, Mary Beth; Pauli, Rosemarie; Nasr, S Vali R; Gandhi, Sajit J
Sent: Fri Oct 16 18:58:16 2009
Subject: draft pak schedule

Draft Schedule per meeting. This is just the shell. Will continue to add once we get concept approved/times worked out. Please email any comments back, and will revise and send again. Thanks, Ashley

**SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
SUNDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2009**

RELEASE IN PART
B6

FINAL

CHAPPAQUA, NY/WASHINGTON, DC

SPECIAL ASSISTANT: LONA VALMORO

OFFICE (202) 647-9071

CELL

STAFF ASSISTANT: LINDA DEWAN

OFFICE (202) 647-5733

CELL

PREV RON Chappaqua, New York

B6

NO PUBLIC SCHEDULE

7:55 pm (t) **DEPART** Private Residence
En route LaGuardia Airport
[drive time: 45 minutes]

8:40 pm (t) **ARRIVE** LaGuardia Airport (LGA)

9:00 pm (t) **DEPART** LaGuardia Airport (LGA) via US Airways Shuttle #2191
En route Reagan National Airport (DCA)
[flight time: 1 hour, 20 minutes]

10:20 pm (t) **ARRIVE** Reagan National Airport

10:25 pm (t) **DEPART** Reagan National Airport
En route Private Residence
[drive time: 15 minutes]

10:40 pm (t) **ARRIVE** Private Residence

HRC RON Washington, DC (T)

Weather:

Chappaqua, NY: Mostly cloudy, 46/38.

Washington, DC: Mostly cloudy, 49/40.

FYI:

6:30pm

's 50th Birthday Party

Location: Wallace Hall, Church of St. Ignatius of Loyola
980 Park Avenue at 84th Street, NYC

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Saturday, October 17, 2009 6:23:44 PM
To: Doug Band
Subject: Re: Final Schedule, Sunday October 18th

RELEASE IN PART
B6

She's gone back and forth.

----- Original Message -----

From: Doug Band
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Sat Oct 17 17:51:49 2009
Subject: Fw: Final Schedule, Sunday October 18th

She going to paul farmer

----- Original Message -----

From: Valmoro, Lona J <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>
To: Valmoro, Lona J <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>; S_S-FinalSchedule <S_S-FinalSchedule@state.gov>
Cc: tkrinvid [redacted] <tkrinvid [redacted]>; Justin Cooper; Jon Davidson; Doug Band; Laura Graham; Hannah Richert; [redacted]; jschlichter [redacted]
<jschlichter [redacted]>; bhall [redacted] <bhall [redacted]>; jzimmerebner [redacted]
msteenburg [redacted] <msteenburg [redacted]>; jzimmerebner [redacted]
Balderston, Kris M <BalderstonKM@state.gov>; Adler, Caroline E
<AdlerCE@state.gov>; Kanick, Elizabeth L <KanickEL@state.gov>; Crowley, Philip J <CrowleyPJ@state.gov>; Stern,
Todd D (S/SECC) <SternTD@state.gov>; Oscar Flores; [redacted]
Rooney, Megan <RooneyM@state.gov>; Rubin, Ali M <RubinAM@state.gov>; Marshall, Capricia P
<MarshallCP@state.gov>; Klevorick, Caitlin B <KlevorickCB@state.gov>; Otero, Mildred (LAC/AA) <motero@usaid.gov>;
Barnard, Thomas A <BarnardTA@state.gov>; Colon, Ricardo <colonr@state.gov>; Cheng, Dennis W
<ChengDW@state.gov>; Jeffress, Michael B <JeffressMB@state.gov>; Tillemann, Tomicah S <TillemannTS@state.gov>;
Peña, Laura <Penal@state.gov>; Verveer, Melanne S <VerveerMS@state.gov>; Merrill, Nicholas S (PACE)
<MerrillINS@state.gov>; Merrill, Nicholas S <MerrillNS2@state.gov>; [redacted]
[redacted] Schwerin, Daniel B <SchwerinDB@state.gov>
Sent: Sat Oct 17 15:28:36 2009
Subject: Final Schedule, Sunday October 18th

PREV RON Chappaqua, New York

NO PUBLIC SCHEDULE

7:55 pm (t) DEPART Private Residence
En route LaGuardia Airport
[drive time: 45 minutes]

8:40 pm (t) ARRIVE LaGuardia Airport (LGA)

9:00 pm (t) DEPART LaGuardia Airport (LGA) via US Airways Shuttle #2191

En route Reagan National Airport (DCA)

[flight time: 1 hour, 20 minutes]

10:20 pm (t) ARRIVE Reagan National Airport

10:25 pm (t) DEPART Reagan National Airport

En route Private Residence

[drive time: 15 minutes]

10:40 pm (t) ARRIVE Private Residence

HRC RON Washington, DC (T)

B6

Weather:

Chappaqua, NY: Mostly cloudy, 46/38.

Washington, DC: Mostly cloudy, 49/40..

From: H [HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Saturday, October 17, 2009 11:58:38 PM
To: 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov'; Huma Abedin
Subject: Schedule

RELEASE IN FULL

I need copies of schedules for 6/1 thru 6/4, 7/16-7/20

Pls schedule call for me w South African FM this week

From: Valmoro, Lona J [ValmoroLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2009 6:39:42 AM
To: H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Schedule

RELEASE IN FULL

Sounds good – will have copies for you tomorrow morning of those schedules.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Valmoro, Lona J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Sat Oct 17 23:58:38 2009
Subject: Schedule

I need copies of schedules for 6/1 thru 6/4, 7/16-7/20

Pls schedule call for me w South African FM this week

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2009 10:16:00 AM
To: H; 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov'
Subject: Re: Return to DC

RELEASE IN FULL

Left him a message
I don't think it will be a problem today, but will doublecheck.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov' <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>; Huma Abedin
Sent: Sun Oct 18 09:38:09 2009
Subject: Return to DC

I'm worried about the weather and taking the 9pm shuttle. Can we check w Mario and find out if I should leave earlier or take the train?

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2009 2:32:00 PM
To: 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov'
Subject: Re: seats 3A and 3C tonight on the 9pm

RELEASE IN FULL

Thx,

----- Original Message -----

From: Valmoro, Lona J <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Sun Oct 18 12:41:03 2009
Subject: seats 3A and 3C tonight on the 9pm

-----Original Message-----

From: Huma Abedin [mailto:Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2009 11:55 AM
To: Valmoro, Lona J
Subject: Re: Return to DC

No wp

----- Original Message -----

From: Valmoro, Lona J <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Sun Oct 18 11:44:32 2009
Subject: Re: Return to DC

Should I tell folks we are definitely planning on the 9pm? Any chance of White Plains tomorrow?

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>; Valmoro, Lona J
Sent: Sun Oct 18 11:38:48 2009
Subject: Re: Return to DC

Confirmed with mario. Weather supposed to improve throughout the day. In fact he said, the later the better so we are ok for the 9.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov' <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>; Huma Abedin
Sent: Sun Oct 18 09:38:09 2009
Subject: Return to DC

I'm worried about the weather and taking the 9pm shuttle. Can we check w Mario and find out if I should leave earlier or take the train?

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2009 5:12 PM
To: humamabedin [redacted]
Subject: Print Fw: Guest List, Seating and Menu for Women of the Senate Dinner
Attach: Guest List as of October 16.docx; Menu.docx; Seating .docx

RELEASE IN PART
B6

B6

From: Beale, Courtney A Kramer
To: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Sun Oct 18 16:32:59 2009
Subject: FW: Guest List, Seating and Menu for Women of the Senate Dinner

Hi Huma,

If you'd like for me to include this menu and seating information in the book for tomorrow, can you confirm that you approved the seating?

Thanks,

Courtney

From: Dewan, Linda L
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2009 2:24 PM
To: Valmoro, Lona J; S_SpecialAssistants
Cc: Dewan, Linda L
Subject: FW: Guest List, Seating and Menu for Women of the Senate Dinner

From: Guice, April J
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2009 2:08 PM
To: Abedin, Huma
Cc: Jones, Natalie R; Jiloty, Lauren C; Dewan, Linda L; Marshall, Capricia P
Subject: Guest List, Seating and Menu for Women of the Senate Dinner

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thank you

April

<<Guest List as of October 16.docx>> <<Menu.docx>> <<Seating .docx>>

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{ DATE 11 }

**Guest List for Dinner by Secretary of State
in honor of the
Women of the Senate
Monday, October 19, 2009
from 18:30 to 21:00 o'clock
James Monroe Room**

RELEASE IN FULL

GUEST LIST

HOSTESS
accept The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State

CONGRESS
accept The Honorable Barbara Boxer
Senator (D-CA)

accept The Honorable Maria Cantwell
Senator (D-WA)

accept The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Senator (R-ME)

accept The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Senator (D-CA)

accept The Honorable Kristen E. Gillibrand
Senator (D-NY)

accept The Honorable Kay Hagan
Senator (D-NC)

accept The Honorable Amy Klobuchar
Senator (D-MN)

accept The Honorable Blanche L. Lincoln
Senator (D-AR)

accept The Honorable Claire McCaskill
Senator (D-MO)

accept The Honorable Patty Murray
Senator (D-WA)

accept The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen
Senator (D-NH)

accept The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe
Senator (R-ME)

accept The Honorable Debbie Stabenow
Senator (D-MI)

{ DATE W }

accept **DEPARTMENT OF STATE**
Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter
Director, Office of Policy Planning

accept **Ms. Cheryl D. Mills**
Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State

accept **The Honorable Richard Verma**
Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs

accept **Ms. Anita Botti**
Deputy Director, Global Women's Issues

{ DATE 11 }

DECLINED INVITATIONS

CONGRESS

regret The Honorable Kay Hutchison
Senator (R-TX)

regret The Honorable Mary L. Landrieu
Senator (D-LA)

regret The Honorable Barbara Mikulski
Senator (D-MD)

regret The Honorable Lisa Murkowski
Senator (R-AK)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

regret The Honorable Melanne Verveer
Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues

MENU

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Orange Carpaccio with Fennel
Red Cabbage Slaw, Hearts of Palm and Olives
Citrus Orange Vinaigrette

Filet of Rockfish
Tomatoes and Basil

Broccolini and Roasted Red Pepper Timbale

Grilled Asparagus

Cinnamon Poached Pear

Women of the Vine Cellars Sauvignon Blanc 2007

Women of the Vine Cellars Tempranillo 2004

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From: H [HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2009 7:59:50 PM
To: 'ValmoreLJ@state.gov'; Huma Abedin
Subject: Meetings

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I need to start a weekly mtg w the Undersecretaries. Could we do it at 9 on Wednesdays?

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From: Verma, Richard R [VermaRR@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, October 18, 2009 8:00:09 PM
To: H
CC: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Sudan calls

Susan called Payne today. We have also sent paper to Payne's africa subcommittee staff director.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Verma, Richard R
Cc: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Sun Oct 18 19:58:12 2009
Subject: Sudan calls

I spoke w Berman who asked that someone call Payne. Do you know if that is happening?

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From: Valmore, Lona J [ValmoreLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2009 6:44:31 AM
To: H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Allida Black's Eleanor Roosevelt human rights event

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She actually moved the event to Geneva in December. Melanne feels we should just send a video, it is not worth factoring into our travel overseas. I will show you the invite today.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Valmore, Lona J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Mon Oct 19 06:41:30 2009
Subject: Allida Black's Eleanor Roosevelt human rights event

I thought there was an event this Fall (maybe even honoring me?) But, did it not happen or did I not go? What happened?

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From: Bird, Peter A [BirdPA@state.gov]
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2009 4:23:24 PM
To: habedin@hillaryclinton.com; Paul3A1[redacted] asutton[redacted]
alterology[redacted] ntanden[redacted]; Anders, Jaroslaw Z; kanders[redacted]
wantholis[redacted] aberger[redacted] aschers[redacted] catk[redacted]
john.barker[redacted] Diana.h.beinar[redacted] peter.beinart[redacted]
Benjamin, Daniel S; sbiddle[redacted]; Bisdee, Sharon C; kbledowski[redacted]
mbrzezinski[redacted]
CC: Glantz, Mary E; Schamber, Maria D
Subject: Ambassador Lee Feinstein Swearing-In Ceremony

RELEASE IN PART B6

B6

Attachments: Feinstein Swearing In.doc

Attached is an invitation to attend Ambassador Lee A. Feinstein's official Swearing-In Ceremony. The Ceremony will be held on Friday, October 30 in the Benjamin Franklin Room at the Department of State.

Please RSVP with your full name, date of birth, and either your Social Security Number or Drivers License Number.

Many thanks,

Pete Bird

Department of State

Office of Central European Affairs

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*You are cordially invited to attend
the Swearing-in Ceremony of
Lee A. Feinstein
as Ambassador of the United States of America
to the Republic of Poland*

*Friday, October 30, 2009
At Four o'clock*

*Benjamin Franklin Room
Department of State
2201 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006*

*RFPVP to Peter Bird
E-mail: Bird.PA@state.gov
Tel: 202-647-0460*

*Please provide date of birth and identification number
(either social security number or driver's license number)*


*Please arrive by 3:30 pm.
Photo identification is required for admittance*

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From: cheryl.mills [redacted]
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2009 10:43:55 PM
To: Philippe Reines
CC: Maggie Williams; Evelyn Lieberman; Jake Sullivan; Nora Toiv; Huma Abedin; Cheryl Mills; Capricia Marshall [redacted]
Subject: Fw: more...gatekeeper crap (ben smith)

RELEASE IN PART
B5, B6

B6



B5
B6

Cdm

Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T

From: Nora Toiv <[redacted]>
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2009 21:52:56 -0400
To: Cheryl Mills [redacted]
Subject: more...gatekeeper crap (ben smith)

B6

Clinton's gatekeeper

Al Kamen channels some Foggy Bottom grumbling blaming Cheryl Mills, Hillary Clinton's chief of staff for making Clinton inaccessible to career diplomats.

(Laura has the counter-argument.)

Across town, Mills has also gotten some backs up in the White House during her tenure, as I

HA 09/01/2015

mentioned in passing a while ago. A top lawyer in the Clinton White House, Mills was been a hard-liner during the Clinton campaign, pushing for sharper-edged attacks on Obama. She brought some of that stance to State, where she fought tooth and nail in the early days of the administration to control mid-level staff jobs, like the agency's White House liaison, and to ensure that those jobs went to "Hillary people" rather than "Obama people," people on both sides has told me.

Mills has shaped a State-Department-as-Hillaryland, where political staffers are loyal to the Secretary, and where I can't think of a single appointee who supported Obama during the campaign. But the power remains in the White House, and the result has been, some Clinton backers worry, a certain marginalization.

Posted by Ben Smith 12:22 PM

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From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2009 11:13:21 PM
To: 'Iris Anaya' [redacted]
Subject: Re: Please reply

B6

Did u get me email about 1pm mtg?

----- Original Message -----

From: Iris Anaya [redacted]
To: Jiloty, Lauren C <JilotyLC@state.gov>
Cc: Huma Abedin <habedin@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Mon Oct 19 16:44:23 2009
Subject: FW: Please reply

Have tried to contact Huma but she has not replied. Please help.

Also, Huma had asked the reason why Mr. Fanjul wanted to meet with Hillary. I sent her an e-mail telling her to call Mr. Fanjul that he would explain the reason to her by phone

Mr. Fanjul is here in the office now if you or Huma want to call [redacted]

Thank you and please reply.

Warm regards,

Iris

From: Iris Anaya
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2009 3:05 PM
To: 'Huma Abedin'
Subject: Please reply

Need to know if Secretary Clinton will have the time tomorrow to meet with Mr. Alfonso (Alfy) Fanjul. Please advise.

Iris Anaya

Personal Assistant

to Alfonso Fanjul

Chairman and CEO

Fanjul Corp.

[redacted] Direct

(561) 655-6303, Main

(561) 835-4795, Fax

B6

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2009 12:14 AM
To: humamabedin [REDACTED]
Subject: Print Fw: Fwd: Asia Society-CAP_4-China Collaboration on CCS report draft
Attach: Asia Society DRAFT CCS report 10-9-09.pdf; ATT473625.htm

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B6

B6

From: Muscatine Lissa [REDACTED]
To: Abedin, Huma; Jiloty, Lauren C
Sent: Mon Oct 12 20:03:55 2009
Subject: Fwd: Asia Society-CAP_4-China Collaboration on CCS report draft

Huma and Lauren:

This is for HRC from Orville Schell. Obviously she won't be able to look at it on the trip, but can we make sure she gets it once she is back in the office?

Thanks.

Lissa

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Orville Schell" <oschell@asiasociety.org>
Date: October 10, 2009 12:01:52 AM EDT
To: <lmuscatine [REDACTED]>, <MuscatineL@state.gov>, "Orville Schell" <oschell@asiasociety.org>
Subject: Fw: Asia Society-CAP_4-China Collaboration on CCS report draft

Lissa:
Don't know what the best way is to get this to Sec Clinton. But, at last, here is the Asia Society/CAP's "road-map" for Sino-US cooperation on carbon capture and sequestration.
When I saw her after the S@ED, she said they needed some "concrete" plans for cooperation, especially as the summit in Beijing looms and she wanted to see this as soon as it was ready. So, here it is.

I am in Copenhagen at a big climate summit for global editors. Do hope the world will rise to this occasion!

Will keep trying on a joint coffee. In fact, I'll probably be in DC on the 26th. If late afternoon can work, let me know

All best, Orville

----- Original Message -----

From: Laura Chang
To: Orville Schell
Sent: Fri Oct 09 23:01:41 2009
Subject: Asia Society CCS report draft

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A Roadmap for U.S.-China Collaboration on Carbon Capture and Sequestration

October 2009

A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN:



Center for American Progress



MONITOR

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A Roadmap for U.S.-China Collaboration on Carbon Capture and Sequestration

With Contributions By

Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations

Orville Schell

Arthur Ross Director

Albert G. Chang

Fellow

Laura Chang

Program Officer

and

Center for American Progress

Andrew Light

Senior Fellow

Julian L. Wong

Senior Policy Analyst

Dan Sanchez

Special Advisor

with

Monitor Group

Scott R. Daniels

Senior Partner

Kurt Dassel

Partner

Vivek Sekhar

Consultant

John Benjamin Woo

Consultant

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

S. Julio Friedmann

Carbon Management Program Leader, Energy & Environmental Directorate

This is the second report in the Initiative for U.S.-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate

<http://www.asiasociety.org/climate/>



Vishakha N. Desai, President



John Podesta, President and CEO

HA 09/01/2015

Acknowledgements

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Dietrich Gross CEO, Jupiter Oxygen Corporation
Tony Haymet Director, Scripps Institution of Oceanography
Gang He Research Associate, Stanford University Program on Energy and Sustainable Development
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Stephen Wittrig Director, Advanced Technologies Group Research and Technologies, BP and Tsinghua University Low Carbon Laboratory

The views expressed in this report are those of the primary authors only and do not necessarily represent those of the above contributors and reviewers.

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I. Executive Summary

Global greenhouse gas emissions are fast approaching unsustainable and alarming levels. There is broad consensus that these emissions, caused primarily from the burning of fossil fuels, have led to global warming. It is increasingly evident that maintaining the current trajectory of greenhouse gas emissions poses wide-ranging and potentially catastrophic risks to natural systems and human welfare. It is also clear that an unprecedented level of global cooperation will be necessary to successfully confront the immense challenge of reversing the effects of climate change.

The United States and China are the world's largest greenhouse gas emitters. Collaboration between the two nations, therefore, offers the greatest opportunity for achieving meaningful reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions. The time is ripe for such collaboration. The two countries have participated in various global commitments on technology cooperation, including the 2007 Bali Action Plan and the Major Economies Forum declarations on Energy and Climate after the G-8 summit in Italy this July. The United States and China also made joint commitments at the July 2009 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in the form of a "Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment," and during U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu's recent trip to China.

The United States can translate this political goodwill into concrete action, but it will need to begin laying out a roadmap for progress on areas of mutual concern. U.S. leadership in this critical area would strengthen bilateral relations between the United States and China, while building momentum towards a successful outcome at the United Nations multilateral climate change negotiations in Copenhagen this December.

One critical pathway for collaboration specifically identified in the United States and China's recent joint commitments is carbon capture and sequestration technology, or CCS, which has the potential to mitigate emissions from coal-fired power plants. The United States and China's continued reliance on coal-fired power to generate electricity is a reality that must be addressed in any comprehensive climate change policy.

CCS is a process that separates and captures carbon dioxide, or CO₂, from industrial and power plant flue streams, then compresses the gas and stores it underground, most likely in geological formations. The process essentially captures the greenhouse gas emissions before they enter the atmosphere and stores them underground. The technology has advanced significantly over the past decade and components of CCS have already proven successful in projects around the world.

While CCS still faces considerable technological, financial, and regulatory hurdles, it offers a potential pathway for helping achieve the scientifically-required reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions that energy efficiency, conservation and renewable energies are unlikely to meet on their own. Nothing in our report should be interpreted as suggesting that any one carbon abatement option is more important than any other. It

is clear, however, that neither country can achieve the emissions reductions it needs to make without addressing its heavy reliance on coal. CCS should therefore be included in a portfolio of climate change mitigation efforts, if it is demonstrated to offer effective and meaningful reductions in carbon emissions.

While the general purpose of this report is to help bring about a new partnership between the U.S. and China, the immediate aim is to help catalyze U.S. leadership to action by sketching out a concrete, collaborative new plan of action on carbon capture and sequestration that the United States government can adopt as it confronts the twin challenges of addressing climate change and strengthening Sino-U.S. relations.

A three-pronged approach to CCS collaboration

A successful partnership on CCS should advance long-term research, development, and deployment of commercial-scale CCS, while at the same time laying the foundation for potential emissions reductions. The three-pronged recommendation below identifies near term opportunities where collaboration can begin immediately and produce early milestones, while simultaneously advancing the longer-term goals of retrofitting existing plants and developing new financing architecture for wider CCS deployment.

1. Sequester the pure CO₂ streams on existing commercial plants

China has installed more than 100 coal gasifiers that produce as a byproduct pure streams of CO₂ that are currently vented directly into the atmosphere. Emissions from these gasifier plants are more straightforward and less costly to capture than emissions from combustion plants and should therefore be the immediate focus of collaboration. The United States and China should work together during the first phase of CCS collaboration on developing rapid, large-scale demonstrations of geological sequestration for these pure streams of CO₂ that exist today in China. These existing streams are relatively easier to capture and should provide an early successful collaboration between the United States and China.

The United States and China should identify a set of projects at multiple sites in China, and the United States should make substantial contributions to those projects in practice, equipment, and science. Such collaboration could test and compare various sequestration technologies while building the regulatory and financial infrastructure and protocols needed for widespread deployment.

Building up these technologies in China would allow the projects to be completed at less cost than would be possible independently, and such experience could be brought back to the United States to accelerate domestic implementation. Each project would cost \$50-\$100 million total, with a potential U.S. contribution of \$20-\$40 million. The timeframe would likely be two to five years from planning to implementation, upon agreement.

2. Invest in research and development on retrofitting older power plants

The second prong should focus on spearheading research, development, and demonstration for post-combustion CCS technologies that can be used to retrofit older coal-fired plants

over the medium and long term. While opportunities exist for collaboration on new coal-fired plants (and China has demonstrated interest in outfitting its new plants with pre-combustion capture capabilities, mostly through Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle technologies), collaborating on new plants alone will not be sufficient to meet global abatement targets because it does nothing to "clean" existing plants. Both countries must ultimately deal with their existing fleet of coal-fired conventional plants in order to meet global targets, either by shutting these down or retrofitting them for CCS.

This effort would identify plants in both countries for large-scale retrofit demonstrations that would help develop and test different new capture technologies to improve effectiveness and lower costs. It would also outline a long-term strategy for retrofitting coal-fired power plants in both the United States and China that respects the political, industrial, and financial dispositions of each.

The research and development center (which might be set up within existing U.S. Department of Energy calls for a collaborative research center) should begin operation immediately. Retrofit demonstration projects would take longer to begin—likely five years from inception to breaking ground (three years for identifying a project and two additional years of preparation).

3. Catalyze markets for CCS

In the absence of a market mechanism for carbon reduction in China, the United States and China will have to provide financial incentives for private capital to invest in carbon capture and sequestration projects. Motivating such private capital will require catalytic public funding as long as there is no private market for carbon abatement or an international structure that can be used to monetize such investments with sufficient offsets.

The United States should consider developing government-backed public finance structures, such as risk insurance or guarantees of CO₂ prices for a set amount of successfully abated carbon similar to those proposed by the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454. Such support could serve as an initial bridge to market mechanisms.

The United States can in parallel move for the inclusion of CCS-abated carbon in future regimes such as the Clean Development Mechanism (the Kyoto Protocol's carbon offset system that allows developed countries to offset their emissions by paying for clean-energy projects in developing countries.) This would help establish a medium-term path for private capital to seek returns on investments in first generation CCS projects. This can also help liquidate the initial U.S. government-backed public finance measures.

This initial groundwork can form the basis for a domestic or regional market for abated CO₂ to support longer-term capital investments and the commercialization of U.S. and developed world technologies. Nonetheless, one thing is self-evident: the United States and China will have to eventually build an international mechanism to reduce the costs of second and third generation technologies aimed at meeting global 2020 and 2050 CO₂ output targets.

The benefits of collaboration on CCS

This roadmap has been undertaken with the assumption that the United States and China both stand to gain more through collaboration than through independent pursuit of CCS. The practical benefits of a bilateral collaboration will include more rapid deployment, job creation, and lower costs.

1. Accelerate U.S. technology

American expertise in sequestration technology and research is well developed and ready to be immediately applied in China as part of a new program. Cooperation between the two countries would accelerate the market penetration of this technology. Conducting initial sequestration projects using the high-purity CO₂ streams more readily available in China will allow both sides to benefit from the faster execution and lower costs that China offers.

Proving technologies as quickly as possible is critical to accelerate development of cost assessments, technical findings, risk profiles, and regulatory frameworks. The working knowledge of CCS practices and protocols gained from initial demonstrations in China would also be available to the United States and would help to accelerate the deployment of CCS facilities in the United States by five to 10 years, with benefits to utility, energy, and technology companies.

2. Create U.S. jobs

By taking advantage of U.S. technology and heavy equipment purchases and testing, projects in both the United States and in China would help to improve the competitiveness of U.S. firms in a global market, while also supporting industry and creating jobs in the United States. Although China is developing much cutting-edge technology of its own in this field, a significant amount of the most advanced technology and research and development in the world would logically end up being exported to China to supply its new CCS market. Such collaborative projects would also spur U.S. domestic job growth again through acceleration of wide-scale deployment of CCS technology. Our estimates show that in a baseline scenario, the CCS sector would create 127,000 direct and indirect net-new jobs in the United States by 2022. A five-year acceleration increases that to 430,000 in 2022, and a 10-year acceleration gets us 943,000 in 2022.

3. Lower U.S. electricity prices

As CCS is increasingly viewed as a critical part of global carbon abatement efforts, the acceleration of the development of this technology could yield significant reductions in the ensuing electricity rates. Some of the costs of abatement will be borne by utility companies, and some of those costs could be passed on to ratepayers depending on the structure of the pricing mechanism on carbon. CCS collaboration would add value by reducing CCS costs and thus ensuring electricity rates remain lower than might otherwise be the case. McKinsey & Company estimates the global potential of scalable CCS by 2030 to be 3.65 gigatons per year of CO₂-equivalent abatement, which we estimate will cost \$959 billion

globally to achieve over the 20 year period. If we are able to accelerate CCS initiatives by five years through cooperation with China, we estimate that the same abatement could be achieved at a cost of \$934 billion, saving \$25 billion. If the collaboration accelerated CCS deployment by 10 years, we estimate the same abatement could be achieved for \$859 billion, saving \$100 billion. The U.S. share of the cost savings is approximately \$5 billion in the scenario with a five-year acceleration, and \$18 billion with a 10-year acceleration.

4. Increase Chinese CCS expertise

U.S.-China cooperation will provide China with access to new advanced CCS technology, so it too stands to gain the requisite expertise to become even more competitive in a burgeoning future green tech market.

5. Facilitate additional collaboration in preferred Chinese areas

Collaborating with the United States on CCS will give China more political capital to press for collaborative efforts in other preferred areas, such as technology transfer and investment in the fields of renewable energy and energy efficiency.

6. Direct cost savings

Several key components of CCS are cheaper in China than in the United States. These include steel, cement, labor, and the savings from more rapid project completion. Focused joint effort could therefore reduce the cost of individual retrofit projects and construction time by as much as 50 percent.

7. Risk sharing

By combining resources, the United States and China share the risks of CCS failure instead of each country bearing such risks separately.

8. Financial sureness in the market

Creating standards for safe, effective projects will give the financial community the confidence and tools for investments in ongoing emissions reduction projects in both countries.

9. Rapid emissions reductions

If this roadmap is implemented, the first phase could result in the indefinite storage of nearly 10 million tons of CO₂ (which would otherwise enter the atmosphere) each year beginning two to five years after project initiation. This reduction in emissions would be the equivalent of taking 2.5 million cars off the road or shutting down three 500 megawatt coal-fired power plants every year.

The global climate crisis demands bold leadership, new partnerships, and the transition to a low-carbon economy. Whatever the outcome of Copenhagen, the solution to global climate change will most likely be borne as much from myriad national and bilateral efforts as from any grand, multinational agreement. It is in recognition of this likelihood that we offer this roadmap.

II. The case for U.S.-China collaboration on climate solutions

"If the two goliaths on the world stage can join hands and commit each other—at the highest levels—to a long-term, vigorous climate and energy partnership, it will truly change the world."

—Todd Stern, U.S. Envoy for Climate Change, in prepared remarks at the Center for American Progress on June 3, 2009

The dangers of global climate change

Global greenhouse gas emissions are fast approaching unsustainable and alarming levels. Unless we alter our current trajectory, we may soon cross a dangerous threshold leaving us with ever fewer options for remedy.

Scientific consensus leaves little doubt as to the causes of global climate change or the gravity of its consequences. Broad and overwhelming evidence demonstrates that the increased concentrations of heat-trapping greenhouse gas in the atmosphere since the industrial age are attributable to human activity—particularly the combustion of fossil fuels—and have led to an increasingly rapid rise in global temperatures.

Indeed, the most recent Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change affirms this correlation with its highest level of certainty yet. It finds a 35 percent increase in atmospheric concentration of CO₂ from preindustrial levels to 2005, which, at 379 parts per million, "by far" exceed the natural range over the last 650,000 years.¹ Global temperatures rose an average of 0.8 degrees Celsius over the last century, with the past three decades alone accounting for a 0.6 degrees Celsius increase.² Mid-range estimates by the IPCC predict a temperature increase between 1.8 and 4.0 degrees Celsius by the end of the century.³

Abrupt and potentially catastrophic disruptions to human and natural systems loom. Researchers are documenting increased droughts and floods, ocean acidification, loss in snow cover and sea ice, rise in sea level, and loss of biodiversity.⁴ Climate change is increasingly discussed in national security terms, as food and water scarcity trigger migration, conflict, and political instability.⁵

Researchers are forecasting costly setbacks for the U.S. economy and national security, including rising property damage from storm surges and wildfires, loss in agricultural output from heat waves and droughts, disruptions to U.S. and Arctic infrastructure and pipelines, threats to clean air and water, and new and destabilizing immigration flows from resource-scarce regions.⁶ Moreover, climate-induced humanitarian crises around the world have the potential to strain U.S. resources even further.⁷

The problems for China are expected to be no less severe. China's spectacular economic growth over the past several decades has come with a price. According to the United Nations

Development Program, China is home to 16 of the world's 20 most polluted cities, with one-third of the urban population breathing heavily polluted air.⁴ Conservative estimates show that environmental degradation costs China 8 percent of GDP per year.⁵ Confronting climate change in China is increasingly understood to be critical not only for environmental protection, but also for the maintenance of China's economic, political, and social stability.

Worldwide CO₂ emissions are projected to increase by 39 percent from 2006 to 2030 without a major change in global energy policies and practices that directly address coal.⁶ Given this scenario, scientists argue that the world could reach a dangerous "tipping point" in two to three decades, if not sooner, whereby a relatively slight temperature increase triggers disproportionate and irreversible damages.⁷

The need for U.S.-China cooperation


The world has long needed the United States to demonstrate bold leadership on anthropogenic climate change. This report seeks to illuminate one pathway to catalyze United States leadership through a bilateral framework. The simple reality is that for any remedy for global climate change to be meaningful, the United States and China—the world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gases—must find a way to stand together, collaboratively, at the center of a global effort. As previous reports from both the Asia Society and Center for American Progress have articulated, elevating energy and climate in the U.S.-China agenda would not only demonstrate leadership in addressing the climate imperative, but has the potential to fundamentally reshape the dynamics between the two countries in a positive and comprehensive way.⁸

Yet these two countries still find themselves in a state of paralysis on this critical issue. Many U.S. stakeholders worry that the United States will be at a disadvantage if it signs any domestic legislation or international agreements committing to limits on greenhouse gas emissions unless developing countries such as China agree to similar measures. The Chinese government, on the other hand, firmly opposes placing an absolute limit on its own emissions, pointing to developed countries' responsibility to remedy the effects of their historic cumulative emissions that have led to global warming.

Meanwhile, the United States and China continue to rely heavily on coal to produce energy; it accounts for 50 percent and 80 percent of current electricity generation, respectively. If these two countries cannot find a way to come together to jointly address the problems caused by these emissions, it is highly unlikely that the world will be able to agree on a strategy for effective mitigation any time soon or that the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen this December will arrive at any meaningful outcome.


Thus, cooperation between the United States and China is a critical and requisite step to gain the kind of confidence and trust needed to spearhead progress toward an effective global solution. Fortunately, with a new U.S. presidential administration and an increasingly environmentally-conscious Chinese government, this moment is replete with possibility for these two countries to jointly alter the current state of reluctance that has prevailed until now.

U.S. and China: Annual, Cumulative and Per Capita CO₂ Emissions




Sources: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), 2007; the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP), 2007; Population Reference Bureau 2007 World Population Data Sheet

Power Generation by Fuel



Source: "International Energy Outlook 2009", Energy Information Administration, May 2009

Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal Use (2005-2030)



Note: 2005 data is actual; 2010-2030 data is projected

Source: "International Energy Outlook 2009", Energy Information Administration, May 2009

III. A focus on carbon capture and sequestration

"When people in America say, or people in Europe say, 'Well, we can turn our back on coal. Why bother with carbon capture and storage?' I would say we have to develop the technologies first, because otherwise we would turn our back on 25 percent of the coal reserves in the world, which are in our borders."

—Steven Chu, U.S. Energy Secretary, September 22, 2009¹³

Carbon capture and sequestration offers a way to neutralize the harmful emissions that come from the United States and China's heavy reliance on coal. Both countries will continue to depend on burning large amounts of coal for the foreseeable future, and thus, if this technology can be proven at sufficient levels of scale and safety, the deployment of CCS technologies is an essential element in any effort to stabilize global greenhouse gas emissions.¹⁴

While CCS still faces considerable technological, financial, and regulatory hurdles, it offers a potential pathway for helping achieve the scientifically-required reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions that energy efficiency, conservation and renewable energies are unlikely to meet on their own. Nothing in our report should be interpreted as suggesting that any one carbon abatement option is more important than any other. There is a compelling argument, however, that neither country can achieve the emissions reductions it needs to make without addressing its heavy reliance on coal. CCS should therefore be included in a portfolio of climate change mitigation efforts if it is demonstrated to offer effective and meaningful reductions in carbon emissions.

The July 2009 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington D.C. resulted not only in more friendly relations, but in a groundbreaking Memorandum of Understanding committing both parties to create, among other things, active channels for CCS cooperation.¹⁵ The newly established U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center has clean coal, including CCS, as one of three listed areas of research.¹⁶ These bilateral pledges follow the G8's ambitious goal of establishing 20 commercial CCS projects by 2020, with China playing an integral role.¹⁷


This roadmap for moving forward on CCS collaboration arrives at an opportune time to help translate some of this recently generated goodwill into concrete and active cooperation by suggesting practical ways of galvanizing the efforts of the two into an equitable and effective partnership. Cooperation on CCS, while only one of many areas of necessary cooperation on clean energy and low-carbon technologies, can bring about a win-win partnership.

What can carbon capture and sequestration do?

CCS technology has been gaining ground as an important potential element in remedying climate change. Several institutions have recently carried out studies examining the technical viability and abatement potential of CCS, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the International Energy Agency, the U.S. Department of Energy, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, and the Electric Power Research Institute. Their findings have led to a number of conclusions:

1. CCS appears technically sound and feasible, as demonstrated by analogous long-lived industrial processes, as well as a handful of successful projects already implemented in different parts of the world.
2. Deploying CCS will decrease the cost of achieving stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of carbon in a range of scenarios by 50 percent to 80 percent.
3. It is highly unlikely that stabilization below 550 parts per million (ppm) of CO₂-equivalent in the atmosphere can be achieved without CCS.¹⁸ Energy efficiency efforts, while low in cost, achieve roughly a quarter of the global need required for emissions reductions. CCS and renewable energy efforts, on the other hand, can address roughly three-quarters of the global need for emissions reductions.¹⁹

Rapid action is required of both the U.S. and China in the coal sector for climate stabilization



How does carbon capture and sequestration work?

Steps Involved in Carbon Capture and Sequestration
1. Separate and capture CO ₂ from industrial and power plant flue streams after combustion or prior to combustion through new generation technologies.
2. Compress and transport the captured CO ₂ to storage sites at high concentrations.
3. Inject the captured CO ₂ into suitable deep geological formations, where it remains sequestered indefinitely.


While CCS technology is applicable to a number of contexts—such as natural gas and biomass power generation, petroleum refining, biofuels production, cement making and chemical manufacturing—it is considered a critical technology for reducing CO₂ emissions in coal-fired power generation and can refer to either post-combustion or pre-combustion capture from such plants.²⁰

Pre-combustion capture involves the removal of CO₂ prior to combustion to produce hydrogen. CO₂ can be captured from the synthesis gas that emerges from the coal gasification reactor before it is mixed with air in a combustion turbine. Pre-combustion CO₂ capture is applicable to coal power plants, with much of the focus on Integrated Coal Gasification Combined Cycle technology. Pre-combustion capture technology requires significant modifications of the power plant, and is therefore only viable for new power plants, not existing plants.


Post-combustion capture refers to the removal of the dilute CO₂ from flue gases after hydrocarbon combustion. Existing industrial plants and power stations can be retrofitted with post-combustion capture technology without significant modifications to the original plant. This roadmap focuses primarily on post-combustion capture applications.

The most promising reservoirs for carbon sequestration are porous and permeable rock bodies, generally at depths of roughly one kilometer, where the proper pressure and temperature conditions enable CO₂ to enter a “supercritical phase” in which its viscosity and density become similar to that of oil. A substantial number of these underground geological reservoirs appear to have the potential to store hundreds to thousands of gigatons of CO₂. For example, saline formations that contain brine in their pore volumes (salinities greater than 10,000 ppm) are particularly suited for storage and are widely distributed geographically. The U.S. Department of Energy has estimated that saline formations in North America can hold between 1,300 and 3,000 gigatons of CO₂,²¹ with comparable volume estimates for mainland China, as well.²²

China's three pathways for CCS in research, demonstration, and deployment



CCS Cross section



Source: Robert Socolow, "Can we Bury Global Warming?" Scientific American, 2005. Illustration by David Fierstein; Concept by Julio Friedmann

What needs to be done to improve carbon capture and sequestration technology?

CCS collaboration should focus on advancing three areas:

1. Demonstration plants: Accelerate the deployment of post-combustion CO₂ flue-gas capture and geological storage demonstrations for a coal-fired power plant at full commercial scale.

While each of the recommended CCS technologies and courses of action have been individually tested in real-world conditions, in the case of post-combustion flue-gas capture of CO₂ and its storage underground, there has yet to be a full commercial scale demonstration at a coal-fired power plant.”

Without greater certainty of the cost effectiveness and technical feasibility of large-scale capture and sequestration, few will risk investing sufficient private capital in CCS to sustain a meaningful level of deployment.

It is thus critical to lower these financial risks by conducting multiple real-world demonstration projects that entail capture of CO₂ at large power plants, the transportation of CO₂ via pipelines to storage sites, its injection into a range of geological formations, the long-term monitoring of those storage sites for safety, and the formulation of new funding models.

2. Cost: Generate an accurate estimate of the costs of CCS, engage in concerted efforts to reduce these costs and develop workable funding models.

It is important to generate an accurate estimate of the costs of CCS and potential scale, timelines, and pathways to cost reductions as soon as possible. Initial costs will be high, but to make abatement affordable and thus achievable, the cost of CCS needs to be brought down through actual experience in CCS demonstration projects.”

3. Commercial deployment: Accelerate research, development, and deployment of CCS technologies across new and existing coal-fired power plants.

In order to make a significant impact on global emissions, both the United States and China will need to scale up the deployment of CCS technologies across a large percentage of both new and existing power plants and start capturing and sequestering many millions of tons of CO₂.

This raises questions about regulatory policy, legal frameworks, and operational practice that must be informed by the field by technical findings, providing businesses with the kinds of economic and regulatory certainty they require to make investment decisions in CCS technologies.

IV. A roadmap for U.S.-China Collaboration

A successful U.S.-China program of collaboration must be built on mutual respect and recognition of both countries' expertise and incentives. But it must also lay the track for substantial emissions abatement and be able to evolve and grow over time. While the general purpose of this roadmap is to help bring about a new partnership between the United States and China, the immediate aim is to catalyze U.S. leadership by sketching out a concrete, collaborative new plan of action on CCS that the United States government could consider adopting as it confronts the twin challenges of remedying climate change and strengthening U.S.-China relations. This roadmap is also intended to complement, and not substitute, other ongoing bilateral and multilateral collaborations on CCS that China has with other countries.⁴⁵ By working in parallel, the hope is that the collective efforts will yield lessons that help accelerate CCS deployment globally.

The three-prong program below outlines a process that can start immediately to produce early milestones while working toward the longer-term goals of retrofitting existing plants and developing critical new financing structures.

1. Sequestration of available pure streams of CO₂

- Rapidly implement demonstrations of geological carbon sequestration for existing low-cost, pure streams of CO₂ in China.

2. Retrofit research, development, and deployment

- Spearhead a major new collaborative research and development project on both the capture and the sequestration aspects of CO₂ produced by conventional coal-fired plants in both the United States and China.
- Identify potential large-scale pulverized coal combustion projects that are ready for retrofits in China and the United States.
- Outline a strategy to begin retrofitting plants in both countries, while at the same time continuing to find comprehensive ways to lower costs, improve effectiveness, and advance scale-up.

3. Catalyze markets for CCS

- Establish mechanisms to guarantee that companies that store carbon now will be paid a certain amount per ton at a point in the future, either by the private market for carbon or by the government in the event that market has not developed sufficiently.

The central elements of this roadmap help address many of the concerns and hurdles that have impeded the use of CCS as a meaningful technological answer to a crucial climate change challenge.

First, beginning relatively low-cost, concrete actions should allow both countries to start demonstrating new leadership in the near term.

Second, accelerating the development of CCS practices, protocols, and standards should help provide businesses and governments the information they need to invest in and deploy CCS more confidently and swiftly in the future. Successful deployment can also help to keep energy costs low and accelerate the development of green-collar CCS jobs in key U.S. and Chinese regions and markets.

Third, the roadmap will lead to the creation of financial mechanisms to support large-scale projects at relatively low cost.

Finally, the roadmap will accelerate the reduction of cost and provide the performance experience needed to scale up the mass deployment of CCS rapidly enough to make a meaningful impact on emissions worldwide.

1. Sequestration of available pure streams of CO₂

China is currently a global leader in coal gasification development and deployment, having already installed well over 100 large gasifiers of different designs for a variety of uses. These gasifiers are outside the power sector and are used to make chemical feedstocks or hydrogen for fertilizer, chemicals, and other related products. What makes these gasifiers relevant to this project is that they also create byproduct streams of CO₂ that are very pure. In essence, they produce "pre-captured" CO₂ that is relatively easier to capture and could provide an early success for collaboration between the United States and China.²⁶

Cooperation between the United States and China could begin almost immediately at several sites where China has already completed feasibility studies and is planning some actual sequestration projects.

These "pre-captured" streams of CO₂ provide opportunities that are not available in the United States to store carbon at a relatively low cost of \$5-\$10 per ton of sequestered CO₂, including the cost of compression, drilling, and monitoring. Over a five-year period, the total cost for each project would be approximately \$50-\$100 million.²⁷ The Chinese could cover the main costs of the energy penalty, compressors, drilling, geophysical survey, assessment, injection, and operation and maintenance—roughly 60 percent of each project.²⁸

The United States could contribute \$20-\$40 million per year for science and technology, demonstration, and implementation of sequestration practices; advanced technical support; heavy equipment through support from U.S. technical and service companies; and input from universities and national labs. Five such projects, each sequestering 2 to 3 million tons of CO₂ per year, would not only provide a path-breaking test, but also reduce global emissions by roughly 10 to 15 million tons of CO₂ each year. The United States' share of costs for the five projects would be between \$100 to \$200 million in total. The cost for each such sequestration project is far lower than the \$1 to \$3 billion price tag of a single post-combustion carbon capture retrofit project in China.²⁹

Moreover, collaboration could begin almost immediately at several sites, most of which are located near key sequestration targets such as the Bohai, Songliao, and Ordos Basins and which are geologically similar to many U.S. basins.³⁰

For instance, Shenhua's direct coal-to-liquids plant in Ordos, Inner Mongolia produces about 3.6 million tons of CO₂ per year and has been designated by the Chinese government to be the site for China's first large scale CO₂ sequestration project.³¹ If the Ordos sequestration project were to be undertaken in collaboration with U.S. experts and companies that have experience in this kind of operation, it could become a world-class project that showcases U.S.-China cooperation on CCS technology.

The synergies inherent in such a project would benefit both countries as well as the world at large. Collaboration would not only increase the probability of success and lower the cost of such projects, but would build shared knowledge of how to design, monitor, operate, and maintain these operations.³² It would also demonstrate that large-scale sequestration is possible in China, sending an encouraging message to interested public and private entities elsewhere in the world. And such a collaborative platform would allow the United States and China to build practices, protocols, and new intellectual property rights agreements that could help catalyze the CCS industry in both countries and allow for the collection of scientific knowledge that would speed up the deployment of CCS worldwide.³³

Since China already intends to carry out sequestration projects on its own, particularly in the field of enhanced oil recovery, it makes sense for China to collaborate with the United States to reduce costs and share risks. Collaboration would also accelerate opportunities to showcase commercial viability to the world by leveraging Chinese capabilities and leadership. And since these sequestration projects focus chiefly on practice, know-how and experience rather than specific technology and hardware, it is likely that the two countries could largely sidestep major intellectual property rights issues.

But most importantly, such collaborative sequestration projects would allow for a new kind of partnership that would not require overly burdensome new investment, and thus allow the United States and China to begin cooperating immediately.

2. Retrofit research, development, and deployment

The predicted trajectory of global emissions makes it evident that the planet will never meet global abatement targets unless something is done about the way we burn coal. China has shown interest in outfitting its new coal plants with pre-combustion capture capabilities, mostly through Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle technologies. United States and China collaboration on this front could support a number of public and private partnerships to accelerate such IGCC demonstrations.³⁴

Yet collaborating on new plants alone will not be sufficient to meet global abatement targets because it does nothing to "clean" existing plants. Both countries must ultimately deal with their existing fleet of conventional coal-fired plants in order to meet global targets, either by shutting down these plants or retrofitting them for CCS. Both countries have acknowledged this necessity and have begun strategic investments in research and development that would enable retrofits on existing plants.

Department of Energy Secretary Steven Chu's recent announcement that the United States will engage in joint research with China offers a timely opportunity. As part of this

venture, Washington and Beijing should jointly pursue an aggressive new series of intensive research and development projects centered on retrofitting coal-fired plants with low-cost, effective CCS technology. This R&D stage should begin immediately so that deployment of the technology can begin shortly after phase one is complete.

It is true that China has expressed reluctance to deploy CCS retrofits rapidly within its existing coal fleet.³⁵ Recent papers have pointed out that China's overriding interest in economic growth and energy security make CCS deployment not the first order of priority.³⁶

This roadmap focuses on laying the groundwork for eventual broad-scale retrofitting by setting up the preconditions for future CCS deployment that is not inimical to China's present priorities. CCS has yet to be proven feasible and cost effective on a large scale. So, the goal is to enable research that attempts to reduce the cost of retrofitting and make CCS more efficient in order to create an environment over time in which both countries can determine, on the basis of the results of their collaborative R&D, whether broad-scale CCS deployment is a realistic course of action.

Incentives may change as key advances make the technology more or less appealing. It is also possible that the devastating costs of global warming will escalate to such a level that the cost of not mitigating emissions from burning coal will become so great for China to bear that options will need to be reassessed.

Determining project viability alone would require two to three years of front-end engineering design studies alone. Several years of planning and analysis would also then be needed to select potential retrofit projects likely to succeed in each country. It is also important to note that only about half of U.S. plants have sufficient heat rate and efficiency to warrant consideration.³⁷

Given all of these factors, the first several years of discussion and experimentation on coal-fired plant retrofits should focus on three goals:

1. Engage in a wide array of research and development initiatives on both the capture and sequestration sides of retrofitting coal-fired plants as soon as possible to lower costs, improve effectiveness, and scale up these technologies for global application.

- Both countries should build upon the multidisciplinary research centers already announced by the U.S. Department of Energy and Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology. Such centers should gather and disseminate the lessons learned on technology, regulation, business models, financing, plant operations, and demonstration projects. This will enable the two countries to deploy CCS more rapidly when political and financial conditions permit.
- China and the United States should establish large-scale research and education campaigns that focus on the devastating long-term costs of climate change, the need for CCS to combat climate change, and the technical feasibility and safety of CO₂ sequestration.

- On the capture side, key research is necessary in post-combustion capture (e.g., solvents, sorbents, membranes, ionic liquids) and oxy-fired retrofit technologies (e.g., solid-fuel combustion research, flame-shape design, flue-gas recirculation, O₂ separations) that focuses on reducing capital and operational costs in retrofitting existing plants.
- On the sequestration side, research should focus on developing and demonstrating techniques for long-term monitoring of sequestered CO₂, identifying potential hazards, protecting groundwater quality, and developing broad expertise in the relevant management practice.
- Research should also include design, drilling, and technology transfer efforts as they pertain to CCS deployment.³⁸

2. Identify plants in China and the United States that are strong candidates for large-scale retrofit demonstrations.

- Screen the existing fleet of coal-fired plants to identify those in both countries that are strong candidates for retrofit demonstrations. Such plants would include subcritical pulverized coal plants (400 megawatts or larger, or about 2 million tons per year) that have space, designs suitable for retrofitting, and sequestration resources nearby.
- Project selection would be followed by preliminary front-end engineering design studies to determine technical viability, possible failure modes, and likely cost. Such an effort would require access to plant engineering information and geotechnical information, and a transparent process to share results from studies.
- Plants selected for retrofit (and alternates) would be announced after two to three years of collaborative analysis. Researchers would have assessed potential retrofit technologies during this time and developed preliminary designs, leading to the development of formal plant retrofit designs and procurement estimations of heavy equipment needs.
- Groundbreaking and retrofit would begin at key sites within five years, with the goal of CO₂ injection commencing one to three years later.

3. Outline a broad, medium- to long-term strategy for retrofitting power-sector coal plants in China and the United States in a way that embraces the countries' respective political, industrial, and financial conditions and needs.

- Devise a strategy for mutually establishing targets for growth, emission abatement, energy intensity, and price.
- Focus working groups on both technical and nontechnical aspects—political, regulatory, and legal—concerns in each country to develop mutually agreeable standards and best practices for power sector retrofits, geological sequestration, power plant management, and regulatory frameworks.

A careful structure will have to be crafted to protect the intellectual property rights associated with this type of cross-border sharing. Private companies should be allowed to negotiate their own intellectual property terms. They are in the best position to know how

to protect their rights, assess the value of their intellectual property and understand the cost of not entering the collaborative market.

As an example, it might be possible for U.S. companies to set up a licensing fee for use of their technologies. The Jupiter Oxygen project in India solved the IPR problem by partnering with a local company and giving that company exclusive rights to a particular technology in exchange for a licensing fee.²⁹ Such a strategy effectively incents local companies to guard against rights infringements themselves, thus adding an additional layer of defense with eyes and ears on the ground.

It might also be possible to develop an insurance fund jointly backed by the United States and Chinese governments that insures U.S. companies who share their intellectual property in this critical area with China, much the way the Overseas Private Investment Corporation insures risky trade deals.

Both parties can likely generate a wide range of other creative solutions. But it may be that this challenge is not as inhibiting as some fear. After all, China may become a vast market for CCS. U.S. companies that want to be major players in this market will see the benefits of early collaboration with major Chinese players. Intellectual property risks will therefore be tempered by the marketplace's growing economic potential. Market allure will be sufficient in many cases to drive companies to formulate their own case-specific arrangements.

The United States and China will have to examine a broad range of issues relevant to their regulatory governance. It will be important as the collaboration becomes more concrete to discuss issues of liability, safety, measurement, and verification; project design and management; channels of communication; and eventual site closure. It will be important to negotiate these issues in detail down the road.

3. Catalyze markets for CCS deployment

Lack of an economic return, and uncertainty around the timing and level of that return, are the key financing barriers that slow the advancement of CCS projects. Unlike many other technologies that help reduce greenhouse gas emissions such as nuclear, hydroelectric, wind, solar, biofuels, waste recycling, and energy efficiency, there is no established market—no body of paying customers—for companies that offer CCS equipment and services beyond some secondary sources such as oil production.

Our assumption is that such a market will eventually come into being through various cap-and-trade systems or a tax on carbon. So, the key financing challenge is building a bridge between today and a point in time when such a market for sequestered CO₂ exists. Without this bridge, private sector investment will flow into CCS projects slowly and tentatively at best. A bridge would enable the flow of private investments to grow stronger over time. Experience and innovation will lower the cost of sequestered CO₂, resulting in an increased rate of supply at any given price. There are short- and medium-term solutions for building this bridge.

Short-term (Year 0 to 5): Use public funds to support U.S. companies to participate in sequestration projects in China while simultaneously providing a guaranteed return for private capital investments in CCS that could be redeemed at a future point.

U.S. tax dollars would be allocated primarily to U.S. companies, constituting a form of economic stimulus—albeit one without great multiples since much of the work would take place in China. It would also be an investment in the competitiveness of U.S. companies pursuing a potentially lucrative global CCS market. Industry might “co-invest” in these projects because they would gain an advantage over competitors in the form of early experience in large-scale sequestration.

One strategy to simulate a market value for abated carbon ahead of its actual formation might entail provisions similar to those laid out in the American Clean Energy and Security Act. In this scenario, the U.S. would provide a guaranteed payment (perhaps \$60 per ton) for an initial fixed volume of CO₂ successfully sequestered, in China or elsewhere. Like in the Waxman-Markey legislation, the price per ton would vary depending on the fraction of carbon captured (i.e. higher support for 85% capture and lower support for lower capture rates). This guarantee could be structured as a time-triggered insurance payout, so that there would be no outlay of U.S. capital until 2020, for example, and then only if a market instrument were not yet available to monetize the successfully abated carbon. The U.S. government would essentially promise to pay in the future, if the market has not yet come into existence.

The number of tons of sequestered carbon could be limited to an amount large enough to encourage several demonstration projects over the next five years, but small enough so as not to “break-the-bank” in the unlikely event that there was no functioning market for sequestered carbon. We would suggest the funding be offered over a five year period for up to 1,500 MW of capacity.⁴⁰ Since this much capacity generates about 9 million tons per year, the maximum exposure (assuming a 100 percent capture and sequestration rate) would be about \$540 million per year (\$60 per ton multiplied by 9 million tons), in the event that no private market for abated carbon had developed by the specified time for payout.

In addition to mechanisms encouraging CCS in the power sector, we would also suggest an analogous mechanism for the industrial sector. There are numerous industrial operations in China that produce CO₂ as a by-product of their normal operations, and are now venting this carbon into the atmosphere. That CO₂ should be captured and stored underground in order to accelerate learning and develop capabilities in this area. Since the capture is already happening, the price to encourage storage can be much lower. We suggest funds for \$20 per ton of CO₂ stored up to the first 30 million tons. This represents a maximum exposure of \$600 million (\$20 per ton multiplied by 30 million tons) in the event there is no private market available.

Such a mechanism could also serve as a platform to eventually include a broader set of international stakeholders to participate in the stimulation and evolution of successful public-private partnerships around CCS deployment.

Medium-term (Year 6 to 10): Push for the inclusion of sequestered carbon in a new Clean Development Mechanism-type offset regime to create access to other capital pools

The Clean Development Mechanism is the Kyoto Protocol's carbon offset system that allows developed countries to offset their emissions by paying for clean-energy projects in developing countries. CCS is not currently eligible for the CDM credits, but it should be leveraged to provide revenue to companies sequestering carbon. As of now, a wind farm built in a developing country might count as a carbon offset for a European emitter of greenhouse gases, but a CCS project does not.

CCS was excluded from CDM funding in part because of significant opposition to coal-based sources of energy.⁴¹ Changing these requirements to include CCS will not be simple. But the United States and China should actively push for such inclusion in a new post-Kyoto CDM-like mechanism over the medium-term.

Long-term (Year 11 and beyond): Global market for abated carbon

The basic challenge to create a revenue source to pay for sequestered carbon is clear, as is the short-term solution: building a financing bridge between now and the day a functioning market for CO₂ comes into being. Once there is a value for carbon, the capital markets can then structure mechanisms to aggregate, apportion, and manage capital flows according to supply and demand.

The long-term solution to the financing challenge posed by CCS is, of course, a global market for abated carbon, whether that abatement happens in the United States, China, or elsewhere. This subject is being addressed elsewhere, so we confine our comments here to simply noting that a global market must eventually be realized; the financing bridge proposed herein must lead to something in the end.⁴²

A group of experts would need to study and formulate the details of such a new financing infrastructure—answering how much to pay per ton of sequestered CO₂; how many tons will be covered; when will the money be paid; and what requirements will be needed to monitor the sites to make sure the CO₂ stays underground. One such group, the World Economic Forum Business-Expert Task Force on Low-Carbon Prosperity, has offered several specific proposals for public-private investment models to catalyze investment from institutional investors that we summarize in Box A.

BOX A

Accelerating Investment in Low-Carbon Technologies in Developing Countries *Proposals from the World Economic Forum Business-Expert Task Force on Low-Carbon Prosperity*

For the full recommendations: www.weforum.org/climate

Institutional investors, such as public and private pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, endowments and private banks offer the largest potential source of necessary long-term private investment in low-carbon technologies in developing countries.

Public-private investment models in which public credit enhancement and regulatory capacity building is combined with private institutional capital has the potential to unlock significant investment flows for low-carbon energy systems in developing countries.

Proposals:

Multilateral Development Bank Low-carbon Challenge Funds:

Public-private, low-carbon infrastructure investment funds in each developing country region which draw in equity from institutional end-investors such as pension and sovereign wealth funds and use a new generation of public finance (risk mitigation) mechanisms from multilateral and bilateral development finance institutions. Multilateral and bilateral development finance institutions would bid out preferential access to regional packages of their public finance mechanisms to leading global (or regional) fund management firms, who would tender for the bids. Such a model could catalyze up to US\$ 10 billion per region per three-year cycle, ready for business by 2011.

Regional Low-Carbon Cornerstone Funds:

Regional cornerstone funds for low-carbon infrastructure would be created and administered by the IADB, AfDB, AsDB, EBRD and EIB or through establishment of specialized institutions modeled on the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation. They would raise anchor equity (e.g. US\$ 5 billion) from major institutional investors as well as official and philanthropic donors and then invite leading global and regional fund management firms to establish low-carbon energy funds, clean infrastructure funds, low-carbon building funds, green-tech funds, etc. by bidding for a distribution of part (e.g. US\$ 1 billion) of the anchor equity. This model could catalyze US\$ 50 to 75 billion per region each three years and could be ready for business before the start of the second commitment period in early 2013.

A note on enhanced oil recovery

CO₂ can, and has long been, used for enhancing oil extraction from fields by displacing oil through the injection of pressurized CO₂ gas. CO₂ has other limited industrial uses that carry a positive secondary economic benefit. But demand from all of these potential CO₂ sinks is nowhere near enough to sequester the carbon dioxide emissions that must be mitigated to slow down the rate of climate change.

Some analysts in China believe that enhanced oil recovery, or EOR, has the potential to create and improve initial commercial opportunities for CCS in China. However, the market potential for EOR will likely be limited. China's seven largest oil fields can likely store only between 10-20 million tons CO₂ per year. This volume could be met in the near term with pure CO₂ streams from coal-to-chemical plants in a handful of locations. Such sources could be captured, transported, and used for EOR for \$5-10 per ton—mainly the cost of compression and pipelines—and might be suitable for near-term purchase agreements between PetroChina and CO₂ suppliers. But EOR cannot be counted on for large annual emissions reductions and will not incent more than a limited number of projects.

Yet the Chinese are very interested in EOR, in large part because of the incremental oil production that results. Thus, it might therefore be of tactical importance in initiating U.S.-Chinese collaboration to embrace some such projects.

The GreenGen project in Tianjin provides an example of that kind of platform, wherein real technical and economic findings and gains are likely within an enhanced oil recovery platform. Initial support could be used to provide funding for the start-up phase of collaborative projects.

These are only a few financing ideas. It has become increasingly clear through the process of writing this report that there is no ready-made solution to this issue; it is a challenge that will necessitate ongoing exploration. And since finance lays at the center of the CCS question, there is an urgent need to have a specialized working group tasked to focus specifically on the question of financing, which will be able to dig deeper and generate even more innovative options.

V. Clearing political hurdles in the United States and China

The global nature of climate change demands new forms of partnerships. These partnerships are necessary to accelerate CO₂ emissions reductions and the transition to a low-carbon economy, and do so while producing tangible and near-term benefits for all parties involved. There are political challenges to CCS collaboration despite the fact that both the United States and China ultimately stand to profit more through collaboration than through pursuing independent pathways.

Obstacles in the United States

While support for action on climate change is growing in the United States, substantial obstacles still persist.⁴³ A complicating factor in the CCS debate is the United States' relationship with the major carbon emitting countries in the developing world, especially those with whom it has a competitive trade relationship.⁴⁴ Many Americans and their representatives refuse to support a price on carbon or mandatory emissions reductions for fear of creating a competitive disadvantage for the United States. Given the existing political climate in the United States, any collaboration with China will have to navigate a number of barriers to overcome such fears.

Congress will most likely oppose the use of U.S. tax dollars to fund collaborative projects in China unless they bring substantial co-benefits to American workers.

The United States trade deficit with China and its continued reliance on Beijing to finance U.S. budget deficits are topics that tend to dominate the bilateral economic relationship. The fact that the Chinese economy appears to be recovering more quickly from the global financial crisis than that of the United States reinforces a perception of those imbalances and creates further resistance against funding collaborations.⁴⁵

Congress's historic relationship with developing nations on climate change has been competitive and apprehensive.

When the Clinton administration brought the Kyoto Protocol back to the United States, the Senate responded with the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution (passing 95-0), which defiantly proclaimed that there would be no ratification of any international climate treaty that failed to include defined emissions commitments from developing countries, something not called for in the Protocol itself.

The House more recently passed this year's Foreign Relations Authorization bill (H.R. 2410), which included a specific provision requiring the State Department to ensure that international treaties do not weaken U.S. companies' intellectual property rights. It also made reference to both climate treaties and low-carbon technologies.⁴⁶

What's more, the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, now passed by the House (but not the Senate), includes provisions that would essentially enact border tax adjustments on imports from countries that fail to implement legally binding controls on their greenhouse gas emissions. The bill would also require the EPA administrator to "annually prepare and certify a report to Congress regarding whether China and India have adopted greenhouse gas emissions standards at least as strict as those standards required under this Act."

The federal government must address public concerns surrounding CCS.

Although "clean coal" is being widely hailed by many industry groups,⁴⁷ some environmentalists doubt the viability of large-scale sequestration, citing CCS's high cost and the lack of proven technology.⁴⁸ Sequestering carbon also raises potential environmental concerns—such as leakage, earthquakes, and negative interactions with groundwater—that have led to a recent upsurge in activism in other parts of the world and even protests against early sequestration projects in Europe.⁴⁹ The United States can expect similar opposition at home as sequestration projects begin. Yet it is also true that the public's attitude cannot evolve from suspicion to support unless and until there are U.S. CCS demonstrations greater than 300,000 tons per year.

Overcoming obstacles in the United States

Any collaboration with China on CCS must address the concerns outlined above. Fortunately, despite these concerns, CCS has nonetheless managed to win substantial initial support among key U.S. stakeholders.

Public sector

The Department of Energy has begun substantial work cleaning up coal pollution by addressing both conventional pollutants and carbon emissions. Along with several utility companies, the DOE has invested in a number of CCS demonstration plants.⁵⁰ And the Obama administration has begun actively encouraging more domestic CCS deployment. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allocates \$3.4 billion to CCS pilot projects, including \$1 billion to the FutureGen project in Illinois. ACES also supports CCS, providing financial incentives to eligible projects for the sequestration of CO₂ in the form of emissions allowances under the proposed economy-wide cap-and-trade scheme.⁵¹

Commercial sector

The commercial sector has substantial potential to develop, fund, and deploy CCS technology. Despite a sagging fourth quarter, private companies invested \$8.4 billion in "clean-tech" industries in 2008. Although relatively little went into CCS, this number is expected to grow as the recession ends.⁵²

U.S. companies working in electric power technology, such as General Electric and American Electric Power, are generally supportive of CCS technologies. The U.S. Climate

Action Partnership—an alliance of businesses and leading environmental non-governmental organizations including the Natural Resources Defense Council and Environmental Defense Fund—endorses policies furthering the development and deployment of CCS. And sensing which way political winds are blowing, many U.S. utilities are beginning to show an interest in investing in CCS retrofits because there may soon be substantial export opportunities for CCS technology.

Labor unions

Large unions (such as the United Mine Workers of America and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers), as well as labor union federations (such as the AFL-CIO), have strong interest in seeing coal-fired power generation and related technologies to help gain a new life for coal-dependent jobs in a carbon-constrained world. There are approximately 397,000 permanent, full-time jobs in electric power generation and distribution in the United States and an additional 78,800 jobs in the coal mining sector.³³ Approximately 19 percent of workers in the mining industry were unionized in 2006.³⁴

Moreover, a study completed by BBC Research and Consulting found that constructing one CCS plant would directly create between 13,000 and 14,000 job-years and 36,000 to 38,000 subsidiary job-years. Ongoing operation and maintenance functions promise to create an additional 1,200 to 1,300 more job-years throughout the economy.

And a study completed by the National Energy Technology Laboratory calculates that the development and deployment of advanced coal technologies would create up to 75,000 new job-years, primarily in manufacturing—growing to 200,000 per year by 2020. Given the effects of the recent recession, the promise of clean coal as a new technology understandably garners significant support from multiple sectors. This support is augmented by environmental groups such as the Clean Air Task Force and Natural Resources Defense Council and commerce groups such as the Apollo Alliance and the Council for American Competitiveness.

Benefits of CCS collaboration to the United States

CCS collaboration could help accelerate eventual CCS deployment in the United States.

American expertise in sequestration technology and research and development is well developed and ready to be immediately exported to China as part of a new program. Rapid Chinese deployment times and relatively fewer regulatory obstacles should enable the United States and China to explore CCS far more rapidly than they could independently. Our estimate is that, in the long run, knowledge gained from such collaboration can be applied to accelerate the deployment of CCS facilities in the United States by 5 to 10 years. This would follow from reduced timelines for several key enabling framework components: Accelerated development of protocols and practices in the United States and China on sequestration deployment; accelerated documentation of site criteria required for financial

market engagement; demonstration of CCS deployment in key Chinese basins with a high degree of transparency and documentation; increased investment in cost-reducing capture technologies and an early start at resolving potential intellectual property concerns; identification of new sources for investment in projects in power-sector retrofits and new-builds; and increased trust and relationship building between the two key nations in a globally manifested CCS industry.

This acceleration of CCS development will require sustained investments over the research and development period, platforms to share results, and a scientific program that can deliver the key geological and engineering information to all stakeholders quickly and conclusively.

And it is only by demonstrating sequestration technology on a large scale that we can definitively allay safety concerns in both countries.⁵⁵ At the same time, collaboration will help develop regulatory frameworks, risk profiles, technical findings, practices, and protocols that will encourage new potential operators, regulators, investors, and public stakeholders.

CCS collaboration could create U.S. jobs.


Collaboration would facilitate the entry of many U.S. stakeholders in a potentially massive CCS market in China. This would benefit U.S. labor markets by stimulating new opportunities at utility companies, energy companies and high-tech companies, thereby creating more U.S. jobs.

More importantly, CCS initiatives stand to create millions of new jobs in both skilled and unskilled areas during the construction and retrofit phase, as well as during ongoing operation. Our model makes working assumptions about how U.S.-China cooperation on CCS could accelerate the development and deployment of CCS technology and has considered each of these types of jobs as well as indirect jobs associated with CCS initiatives, based on industry data.⁵⁶ The acceleration of CCS efforts greatly improves the jobs picture when we examine the current baseline, five-year accelerated, and 10-year accelerated scenarios.

In the baseline scenario, we project CCS-related employment increasing slowly as new builds and retrofits take off, growing to 243,000 direct jobs and 473,000 indirect jobs globally in 2022. A five-year acceleration of CCS efforts drastically increases the amount of employment driven by CCS to approximately 819,000 direct jobs and 1.6 million indirect jobs globally in 2022. The more aggressive 10-year acceleration scenario results in over 1.8 million direct jobs and 3.5 million indirect jobs in 2022.⁵⁷

We expect the U.S. share of these jobs to increase from a 2022 baseline scenario of 43,000 direct jobs and 84,000 indirect jobs to 145,000 direct and 285,000 indirect jobs with a five-year acceleration, and 318,000 direct and 625,000 indirect jobs with a 10-year acceleration.⁵⁸

Total U.S. Employment Associated with CCS, by Year



Source: Monitor analysis; BBC Research & Consulting "Employment and Other Economic Benefits from Advanced Coal Electric Generation with Carbon Capture and Storage (preliminary results)" February 2009 (<http://www.americaspower.org/content/download/1459/10428/file/BBC%20FINAL%20020709.pdf>); McKinsey & Co. "Pathways to a Low-Carbon Economy" Version 2 (http://www.mckinsey.com/clientervice/ccs/pathways_low_carbon_economy.asp)

CCS collaboration could reduce U.S. electricity prices.

If the U.S. Congress passes a final climate bill that creates a price for carbon, and CCS is deemed to be an inevitable carbon abatement solution, ratepayers also stand to benefit from reduced electricity bills when CCS deployment is able to scale faster than it otherwise could without collaboration. CCS is increasingly viewed as a critical part of any eventual global carbon abatement effort, and the acceleration of CCS development could yield significant reductions in the electricity rates that would ensue under such a program. Some of the costs of abatement will be borne by utility companies, and some of those costs could be passed on to ratepayers depending on the structure of the pricing mechanism on carbon. The United States and China will almost certainly achieve CCS cost reductions more quickly by collaborating than by working independently. Our estimate of a five to 10 year acceleration of CCS deployment through cooperation shows that cost savings would be significant.


Current baseline estimates project the cost of CCS abatement to drop to \$95.58 per tCO₂e by 2015, and drop further to \$55.14 per tCO₂e by 2030.⁵⁹ Accelerating this cost curve will allow the overall CCS abatement effort to be achieved at lower cost.

In the baseline scenario, using the costs noted above, we project achieving a total global abatement of 3.65 Gt CO₂-equivalent per year in 20 years at a total cost of \$959 billion. By accelerating the cost curve five years, the same total abatement can be achieved at a total cost of \$934 billion, saving \$25 billion.⁶⁰ A more aggressive 10-year acceleration results in a total cost of \$859 billion, \$100 billion.⁶¹ The U.S. share of cost savings is approximately \$5 billion

in the scenario with a five-year acceleration, and \$18 billion with a 10-year acceleration.⁶²

The accelerated cost curve both lowers total costs, and hence electricity prices, and reduces the time needed to achieve a given level of abatement. This results in greater emissions reductions beyond baseline estimates, which suggests that if we undertake efforts to accelerate the cost curve, CCS could form a larger portion of the overall abatement effort than currently assumed in the baseline estimates.

**CCS Abatement Cost (U.S. Share)
for a total abatement of 3.65 Gt CO₂e/yr**



Source: McKinsey & Co "Pathways to a Low-Carbon Economy" Version 2 (http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccs/pathways_low_carbon_economy.asp)

CCS collaboration could reduce costs for the United States.

Because several key components of CCS are cheaper in China than in the United States—including steel, cement, labor, and the savings from more rapid project completions—a focused joint effort could therefore reduce the cost of individual retrofit projects and construction time by as much as 50 percent. Moreover, by fostering a mutually beneficial, trusting relationship, the United States will also gain a better chance to learn from future Chinese developments and thus accelerate cost reductions in deployment at home.

Collaboration could allow the U.S. to share the risks.

Combining resources will allow the United States and China to share not only the benefits, but also the risks of failure, which will internationalize these risks. Some American companies have already weighed their business risks in the advanced coal sector and have come out in favor of being early movers in collaborating with China. Recent partnerships announced between Duke Energy Corp. and ENN Group and between Duke Energy and China

Huaneng Group highlight the opportunities being seized for risk-sharing and cost reduction through collaboration.⁶³ Additionally, KBR and Southern Company recently announced a deal with Beijing Guoneng Yinghui Clean Energy Engineering Co., Ltd. to license IGCC technology for use at Dongguan IGCC Power Plant in Guangdong Province. This deal will be the first commercial implementation of the TRIG technology for IGCC.⁶⁴


Obstacles in China

China's primary commitment will continue to be to economic development and political stability, and it is depending on scientific innovation to reduce the environmental costs of its growth. However, the extreme pace of China's economic rise is making those costs prohibitive.

China became the world's largest annual emitter of greenhouse gases in 2007. While its emissions are only one-fourth those of the United States on a per capita basis and its cumulative historical emissions are similarly unequal,⁶⁵ due to rising urbanization and per capita incomes, China's energy demands will more than double from 2005 levels by 2030.⁶⁶ China has rich coal reserves and it will choose to burn even more coal to meet these new demands despite the fact that coal already contributes 80 percent of China's aggregate CO₂ emissions.⁶⁷ Indeed, China has been adding coal-fired power production capacity at an increasingly rapid rate.⁶⁸ Conservative studies estimate that China is now bringing online two 500 megawatt, coal-fired power plants every week, or an annual increase equal to the UK's entire power grid.⁶⁹

China power and coal builds

China has installed more than 500,000 Megawatts of coal capacity in the past 10 years



Given this context, there are several obstacles CCS faces in China:

China's core interests are in energy security and economic development.

Beijing recognizes the dangers of CO₂ emissions, but its overriding interest lies in maintaining continued rapid economic growth and energy security. Lacking sufficient oil and natural gas reserves of its own, China has become highly dependent on domestic coal and foreign oil imports.⁷⁰ But it has also devoted an impressive amount of economic resources to developing renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies to reduce its dependence on foreign oil.⁷¹ Most joint U.S.-China energy projects to date have therefore focused on limiting greenhouse gasses indirectly by promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy.

Given China's overriding concern of economic development, it is not surprising that CCS projects are viewed with a certain skepticism. After all, it is expensive to retrofit a plant with CCS technology and CCS plants require more coal to produce the same amount of electricity.⁷² Understandably, China has also been far more concerned with sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and mercury pollution from coal-fired electricity generation—pollution with immediate health consequences—than with carbon emissions, which have long-term effects.⁷³ Therefore, because CCS is expensive, fails to diversify China's energy sources, focuses on global rather than immediate and local environmental problems, and comes with technical uncertainties and an onerous "energy penalty," Beijing has been cautious in committing to an aggressive program in this field.

Chinese climate negotiators expect developed countries to take the primary responsibility for emissions reductions.

Speaking on behalf of the G77, a consortium of developing countries, China often argues that since developed nations created the problem of climate change, they should inherit the primary responsibility for remedying it.⁷⁴ Indeed, China has even gone so far as to call on developed countries to reduce their emissions by 40 percent from 1990 levels by 2020, as well as to contribute 0.5 percent to 1 percent of their GDP to helping developing nations reduce their emissions, both of which are unlikely to happen.⁷⁵ Because China is wary of being singled out from other developing countries for heightened criticism and having a heavier burden imposed on it because of its dynamic growth, it has rejected the imposition of emissions caps.⁷⁶ Instead, China has preferred to set the bar low and overperform, lest it become hobbled by a "defined limit" that it may be unable to meet and that limit its growth.⁷⁷

Overcoming obstacles in China

Any prospective CCS collaboration must recognize China's underlying priorities of economic development and energy security, and successfully address the challenges of costs and other uncertainties in deployment. However, there are reasons to believe that various Chinese stakeholders would be receptive to collaborative overtures in the field of CCS, especially if these overtures are made with the right incentives and with the U.S. explicitly

taking responsibility for its fair share of the historic burden. Opportunities for China include transfers of cutting-edge technology and technical expertise in a future market, external financial support, future green collaboration in other preferred areas,⁷⁸ as well as improved U.S.-China relations. Demonstrating and developing CCS technology could also help establish China as a leader in innovation, technology and climate change mitigation efforts.

China has become increasingly proactive in addressing climate change and greenhouse gas emissions.

Across the political, academic, and civic spectrums, Chinese leaders have begun to acknowledge both publicly and privately that climate change is a problem that must be taken seriously.⁷⁹ China has set aggressive targets for renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear power and transportation, and has been working to meet many of these domestic targets.⁸⁰ Although precise allocations of China's 4 trillion yuan stimulus package announced last year have been difficult to determine, one government source says roughly 580 billion yuan (just under \$100 billion) was allocated for climate change mitigation projects.⁸¹

What's more, China has been rapidly pioneering new technologies in solar, wind, and hydro power, and has become the world's largest user of hydro power and solar thermal heating and the fourth largest user of wind power in the world.⁸² Indeed, China is moving at a remarkable pace in becoming a world leader in low-carbon power, all the while creating a large number of new green jobs.⁸³ These national priorities have at last begun influencing decision making at regional levels, as Beijing has begun to change the metrics by which it evaluates local leaders—mixing economic growth indices with environmental ones—thus incubating a new kind of environmental local leadership.⁸⁴

A recent and quite hopeful report commissioned by China's National Development and Reform Commission and the State Council suggests that CO₂ emissions in China could slow by 2020 and peak by 2030 rather than 2050 with the right energy policies in place. The report also shows that this goal does not have to come at the cost of lowered economic growth. In fact, the report suggests that requisite investments to make China a global leader in low-carbon technologies could simultaneously help remedy climate change and boost domestic economic growth.⁸⁵ Such reports are only some of many examples of Chinese officials' willingness to address CO₂ emissions more proactively,⁸⁶ even while global conversations often remain quite politicized and polarized.

The 10th Standing Committee of China's Eleventh National People's Congress on August 27, 2009 confirmed a new call to arms on greenhouse gas emissions. The Standing Committee recognized that a response to climate change is "vital to human survival," and called on "the whole society to participate in a wide range of actions to address climate change."⁸⁷ Most recently on September 22, 2009, President Hu Jintao pledged at the United Nations General Assembly to reduce CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP from 2005 to 2020, one of the clearest indications to date of China's willingness to assume greater responsibility in global emissions reductions.⁸⁸

The Chinese government and commercial sector are making investments in CCS

China has already made commitments to build large CCS demonstration plants and has explicitly acknowledged that the deployment of CCS in China's power sector is something that needs to happen in the future.⁸⁹ The Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress just recently proposed that now is the time to "encourage and support the use of clean coal technologies," including the use of CCS.⁹⁰ Investments in CCS have been made by NDRC, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. These include GreenGen in Tianjin, the sequestration component of Shenhua's direct coal-to-liquid plant in Ordos, Inner Mongolia, and the Thermal Power Research Institute/Huaneng post-combustion capture demonstrations in Beijing and Shanghai.⁹¹

NDRC and MOST investments in gasifier technology developments at TPRI and East China University have led to the licensing, construction, and deployment of large commercial gasifiers in China and the United States, and to the development of PCC technology at TPRI. China has used these investments to establish itself as an active player in the CCS field and a potential global competitor in advanced clean coal technology.⁹²

The commercial sector in China has also begun to show interest in CCS, especially among the large state-run power and oil companies. The right incentives would help make these companies even more interested in obtaining and developing CCS technology and becoming more globally competitive in a future CCS market. After all, Chinese entrepreneurs have been extremely successful in capitalizing on China's transition to a low-carbon economy, specifically with regard to renewable energy and energy efficiency.

These public and private sector trends reflect the fact that attitudes toward CCS in China are neither homogenous nor immutable and that some experts and key decision makers in China are very supportive of CCS. The primary concerns relate to the energy penalty and the cost of CCS given that there is no price for carbon.⁹³ But this reluctance might eventually wane if the cost of CCS drops over time, if some form of price support for carbon develops in the foreseeable future, and if the U.S. is willing to play a more active leadership role.⁹⁴

China aspires to enhance its global reputation as a responsible and peaceful rising power.

Collaborating with the United States as an equal partner to help solve one of the world's most ominous crises would give China an unparalleled opportunity to assume global leadership.

Indeed, a new chapter is opening both in China's own development and U.S.-China relations with the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China and its three decades of "reform and opening" just passed. A joint project on CCS provides a logical and meaningful place to begin weaving a new narrative for Sino-U.S. relations over the next decade.

VI. Conclusion

This year marked the 30th anniversary of U.S.-China rapprochement. The two countries find themselves once again at a tipping point moment in history. While this important relationship will most certainly evolve in dramatic ways over the next few years, what is uncertain is how it will evolve.

At the same time that the United States and China are reaching to reformat their relations, the world is being confronted by an unprecedented challenge: global climate change. Our immediate short-term interests on the issue may not always seem to be in complete accord, but our long-term interests are unalterably aligned toward the need to collectively solve this daunting global problem.

One area that now presents itself as a logical starting point for collaboration is in carbon capture and sequestration for coal-fired power plants, which make up a structural part of both nations' energy systems. If United States President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao could forge a partnership on this issue at their summit meeting in November, it would be an unprecedented step forward not only in the world's efforts to come to terms with climate change, but also in U.S.-China relations. We hope the roadmap outlined in this report can help enable leaders on both sides to seize this opportunity to bring their respective countries together in a meaningful new program of collaboration in this critical area of clean energy technology. Not only would such a step help test CCS as a workable answer to CO₂ mitigation and improve bilateral relations, but it would give a signal at the U.N. climate summit in Copenhagen this December that the U.S. and China are fully engaged in seeking a solution.

Now is the time to start the arduous, but not unhelpful, journey toward closer U.S.-China collaboration, and climate change is an important area for concerted joint effort. There will doubtless be many areas of disagreement that will have to be researched and negotiated, but the immediate challenge is to begin. Such a beginning could catalyze the United States and China to move forward in a convincingly collaborative way.

Acknowledgments

The challenge of undertaking a project such as this roadmap—the successor to the Asia Society and Pew Center on Global Climate Change's "A Roadmap for US-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate Change"—has not only been to help formulate new and effective policy, but to also bring together a collegium of interested and well-informed specialists from civil society, business, science, academia, and government who will henceforth be able to continue collaborating. Those who have worked long and hard on this report share a deep concern about the effects of climate change on our planet and were thus willing to participate in a project aimed at sketching out a concrete course of action to address the emissions from coal-fired plants.

The project was started by the Asia Society's Center on U.S.-China Relations and the Center for American Progress. Thanks are due to Asia Society President Vishakha Desai. Laura Chang and Albert G. Chang, who did much of the heavy lifting at the Asia Society, are due special thanks. They were assisted by John Delury, Leah Thompson, Andrew Smeall, Michael Zhao and Ariane Wu.

At the Center for American Progress, thanks are due to President and CEO John Podesta, who traveled to Beijing to participate in Asia Society's kick-off conference with Peking and Tsinghua Universities on climate change remedies in April 2009. And special thanks are due Julian L. Wong and Dan Sanchez who worked long and hard with Asia Society colleagues to research and write this report.

Without the input of our collegium of experts, it would have been very difficult to get this project "right." This cadre of specialists came from almost every relevant field, and we thank them for all their help along the way. But a very special note of appreciation must be accorded S. Julio Friedmann, from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Dr. Friedmann was extraordinarily generous in sharing his time and expertise, and in drafting key elements of this roadmap.

This report would have had a far less likely prospect of reaching completion without the extraordinary generosity of the Monitor Group who, through the good offices of Peter Schwartz at the Global Business Network, Monitor's sister organization, worked tirelessly and pro bono to galvanize this effort to completion. Scott Daniels and Kurt Dassel headed the very committed and well-informed Monitor team and were ably assisted by Vivek Sekhar and John Benjamin Woo.

We do hope the recommendations of this roadmap will provide a starting point for the governments of both the U.S. and China—as well as all the other stakeholders who are essential to the success of any such public/private partnership—to begin effecting a meaningful collaboration in CCS.

Finally, projects like this cannot begin, much less come to successful fruition, without the financial wherewithal to undertake them. We were underwritten by some very generous support from Jon Anda, the Open Society Institute, the 11th Hour Project and Climate Works, which enabled us to carry out this venture. We are deeply grateful to them.

Orville Schell
Arthur Ross Director,
Center on U.S.-China Relations
Asia Society

Andrew Light
Senior Fellow
Coordinator, International Climate Policy
Center for American Progress

Appendices

List of Acronyms

ACES	American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454)
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CCS	Carbon Capture and Sequestration
CO2	Carbon Dioxide
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IEA	International Energy Agency
IGCC	Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NDRC	China's National Development and Reform Commission
MOST	China's Ministry of Science and Technology
PCC	Post-Combustion Capture
ppm	Parts per Million
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
TPRI	Thermal Power Research Institute
UMWA	United Mine Workers of American
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Appendix A: Profiles of Selected CCS Projects in the U.S.

CO2 Capture Commercial Projects

Source: IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme

Shady Point, Warrior Run, and Bellingham Cogeneration Power Plants

Project Overview: These plants generate electricity and produce food-grade CO2 from flue gases

Goals:

- Commercial-scale, economical and environmentally-acceptable power generation coupled with CO2 production

Great Plains Synfuels Plant (GPSP) CO2 Capture and Compression

Project Overview: The GPSP is the only commercial-scale coal gasification plant in the United States that manufactures natural gas

Goals:

- To deliver CO2 to the Weyburn unit in Canada

CO2 Capture R&D Projects

Source: IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme

CANMET Energy Technology Centre (CETC) R&D Oxyfuel Combustion for CO2 Capture

Project Overview: The CETC's pre-competitive collaborative R&D program in Ottawa, tackles the development of combustion and pollution abatement technologies for fossil fuels in oxygen (O2) and recycled flue gas (RFG) atmospheres for the purpose of producing high purity CO2 streams that are capture ready for transport and storage.

Goals:

- To develop energy-efficient integrated multi-pollutant control, waste management and CO2 capture technologies for combustion-based applications
- To provide information for the scale-up, design and operation of large scale industrial and utility plants based on the oxy-fuel concept

Physics and Chemistry of Coal-Seam CO₂ Sequestration and Coalbed Methane Production

Project Overview: The research will ultimately provide guidelines for drilling of new CBM production wells and enable field engineers to determine if cases of poor CO₂ sequestration and/or low methane productivity can be attributed to non-ideal coal bed temperatures/ depths or, perhaps, to other factors

Goals:

- To determine the temperature dependence of CO₂ sequestration and methane production.
- To determine adsorption isotherms for pure gases in a static system for coals of NETL interest.
- To develop a flow system to generate adsorption isotherms via numerical techniques established for data analysis

CO₂ Geological Storage R&D Projects

Source: IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme

American Electrical Power (AEP) Mountaineer Plant Research Project

Project Overview: In November 2002, the U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE) announced a major new research project to begin studying the potential for geological storage of CO₂ at AEP's Mountaineer plant in New Haven, West Virginia, USA

Goals:

- To answer the question of whether the rocks above the possible storage areas are sturdy enough and sufficiently free of interconnected fractures to assure that the CO₂ cannot gradually escape

Large scale CO₂ Transportation and Deep Ocean Sequestration

Project Overview: Assessing technical and economic viability of large-scale CO₂ transportation and deep ocean storage

Goals:

- To assess technical and economic viability of ocean storage using enhanced pipe-laying technology
- To resolve engineering challenges to oceanic tanker transport
- To develop appropriate offshore floating platform/barge for vertical CO₂ injection

Laboratory Investigations in Support of Carbon Dioxide-Limestone Sequestration in the Ocean

Project Overview: The project will carry out investigations into the preparation and characteristics of CO₂/water/limestone mixtures for the ocean sequestration of CO₂

Goals:

- To produce a series of emulsions comprising mixtures of liquid CO₂, water and ground limestone
- To test and analyze such emulsions in terms of their chemical and structural characteristics
- To carry out modeling studies of behavior of emulsions after discharge into the ocean
- To produce the optimal mix of reagents such that a stable emulsion is formed with a density greater than that of seawater

CCS Power Generation Projects

Source: Stephen Wittrig, Director of Advanced Technologies for BP

AEP Alstom Mountaineer (WVA)

Developer: AEP w/Alstom, RWE, NETL and BMI

Size MW: 30 MW

Capture Process: Post-combustion capture

CO₂ Fate: Sequestration (saline aquifer)

Start-up: 2009

AEP Alstom Northeastern (OK)

Developer: AEPI Alstom

Size MW: 200 MW

Capture Process: Post-combustion capture

CO₂ Fate: EOR

Start-up: 2011

Antelope Valley (ND)

Developer: Basin Electric; Powerspan (USDA loan)

Size MW: 120 MW

Capture Process: Post-combustion capture

CO₂ Fate: EOR (Pipe to Canada)

Start-up: 2012

W A Parish (TX)

Developer: NRG Energy with Powerspan

Size MW: Hueneng 125 MW

Capture Process: Post-combustion capture

CO2 Fate: EOR

Start-up: 2012

Appalachian Power

Developer: AEP

Combustion: IGCC

Size MW: 629 MW

Capture Process: Pre-combustion capture

CO2 Fate: Undecided

Start-up: 2012

FutureGen (IL)

Developer: FutureGen Alliance, 9 international participants remain

Combustion: IGCC

Size MW: 275 MW

Capture Process: Pre-combustion capture

CO2 Fate: Sequestration

Start-up: 2012

AMPGS (OH)

Developer: American Municipal Power-Ohio, Inc. ; Bechtel Power Corporation;
Powerspan

Combustion: IGCC

Size MW: 1000 MW

Capture Process: Post-combustion capture

CO2 Fate: EOR

Start-up: 2015

Appendix B: Profiles of Selected CCS Projects in China

CO2 Capture R&D Projects

Source: IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme

Near Zero Emissions Coal for China (NZECC)

Project Overview: The Phase 1 assessment will explore options for demonstrating CCS for coal-fired power generation in China

Goals:

- To explore options for the demonstration of CCS applied to a coal power plant in China
- To build knowledge and capacity on CCS in China

CO2 Geological Storage R&D Projects

Source: IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme

Development of Coal bed Methane Technology/Carbon Dioxide Sequestration Project (CCCDP)

Project Overview: The project is addressing a number of issues leading to an ECBM/CO2 sequestration demonstration project in China via transfer of Canadian technology

Goals:

- To undertake a programme of work leading to a demonstration project in China
- To produce an inventory of suitable coal beds
- To produce a detailed site selection process
- To carry out micro-pilot and large scale testing in selected areas
- To carry out evaluation and training exercises

EOR Application at Liaohe Oil Field in China

Project Overview: The project is examining the injection of boiler flue gas for enhanced oil recovery coupled with CO2 sequestration in a Chinese oil field

Goals:

- To carry out injection trials using steam and/or flue gases in order to boost oil output and sequester CO2
- To develop the next phase of the project investigating CO2 separation via membrane technology and enriching CO2 levels in combustion flue gas through the use of recirculation technology

CCS Power Generation Projects

Source: Stephen Wittrig, Director of Advanced Technologies for BP

CSIRO PCC Program

Developer: Thermal Power Research Institute (China); Huaneng Group and CSIRO (Australia)

Combustion: Coal Steam Power

Size MW: Huaneng Beijing host plant is 845 MW

Capture Process: Post-combustion capture retrofit

CO2 Fate: Carbonated beverages

Start-up: 2008

Shanghai Shidongkou Second Power Plant

Developer: Huaneng Power International (project in Shanghai for Shanghai 2010 EXPO)

Combustion: Coal Steam Power

Capture Process: Post-combustion capture retrofit

CO2 Fate: Local sales, food and industry, possibly eventual offshore EOR

Start-up: Early 2010

GreenGen

Developer: China Huaneng Group (51%) plus the other 4 State Power companies, Shenhua, China Coal, Peabody has applied to join

Combustion: IGCC

Size MW: 250 MW expanding to 650MW

Capture Process: Pre-combustion

CO2 Fate: Sequestration / EOR

Start-up: 250 MW IGCC plant in 2011, 650 MW IGCC with PC capture in 2013; add EOR CCS in approx 2015

Shenhua CtL

Developer: Shenhua Group

Capture Process: Probably Rectisol (Coal conversion processes such as this plant capture the CO2 as part of the process and emit practically pure CO2)

CO2 Fate: Sequestration (saline aquifer and depleted oil fields)

Start-up: CtL operational CCS 2011

- ²⁰ See Scottish Centre for Carbon Storage, "Post-Combustion Capture," October 27, 2007, at <http://www.geos.ed.ac.uk/sccs/capture/postcombustion.html> and National Energy Technology Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, "Carbon Sequestration: CO2 Capture," accessed October 1, 2009, at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/core_rd/co2capture.html
- ²¹ U.S. Department of Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory, Carbon Sequestration Atlas of the United States and Canada, 2nd ed., 2008, at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/refshelf/atlas1/atlas1.pdf.
- ²² Casie Davidson, "The Potential for CCS Deployment in China," Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, May 29, 2008, at http://www.pnl.gov/gtsp/docs/2008/GTSP3_China.pdf.
- ²³ This is an important distinction, because the concentrations of CO2 in a power plant's flue are lower and therefore harder and more expensive to capture. CO2 has been transported and successfully stored underground (e.g., in Sleipner, Norway, and Weyburn, Canada), but at about 1/3 the volumes that would be generated by a single large power plant. Demonstrations involving the injection of 10 times that amount (that is, the CO2 from several power plants) are needed.
- ²⁴ This can be done by identifying the most efficient current technologies, developing more efficient technologies for the future, identifying best practices in operations and integration, and so forth
- ²⁵ The joint UK-China Near Zero Emissions Coal initiative (see <http://www.nzec.info/>) and the Australia-China collaboration on post-combustion capture between Australian government research organization CSIRO and China's Thermal Power Research Institute (see http://www.csiro.au/news/newsletters/Energy/0408_energy/HTML/PCC.htm) are examples of bilateral CCS projects involving China. The Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (see <http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org>) and Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute in Australia (see <http://www.globalccsinstitute.com>) are examples of multilateral efforts in CCS that China is involved in
- ²⁶ For further recommendations on U.S. international sequestration collaboration, See Friedmann, S.J., and Newmark, R.L., "Ch 4 Commercial Deployment of Geologic Carbon Sequestration" in Clean Air Task Force, Coal Without Carbon: An Investment Plan for Federal Action, September 2009, at http://www.coaltransition.org/filebin/pdf/Coal_Without_Carbon_Final_High-Resolution.pdf
- ²⁷ Friedmann, S.J., 2006, The scientific case for large CO2 storage projects worldwide: Where they should go, what they should look like, and how much they should cost, 8th Greenhouse Gas Technology Conference, Trondheim, Norway
- ²⁸ Chinese entities will likely over 60 to 80 percent of the project costs in local expenses, such as drilling, site characterization, geophysical surveys, pipelines, and compressors. The US would likely cover 20 to 40 percent, which would include field scientific and technical support, travel, simulation and analysis, injection planning support, and CO2 injection monitoring and verification. For Chinese participation in a comparable US project, the costs would be reversed
- ²⁹ Most of the cost for projects is capital costs, and are reflected in the estimates printed here. There would be a non-zero operating cost as well – roughly \$5 to 10 million per year for "pre-captured" pure stream projects and \$40 to 200 million per year for retrofit projects. These are costs to be born by the operator, but could potentially be covered through one of the financial mechanisms discussed herein.
- ³⁰ J. K. Newlands and R. Langford, CO2 Storage Prospectivity of Selected Sedimentary Basins in the Region of China and South East Asia (Australian Government, Geoscience Australia, Record 2005/13)
- ³¹ Qingyun Sun, "CTL Development in China," U.S. China Energy Center, West Virginia University, April 24, 2008, at <http://files.asme.org/Communities/Technical/Energy/16089.pdf>
- ³² A U.S.-China sequestration collaboration at Ordos could draw lessons from similar collaborative projects around the world, such as the In Salah (Algeria) sequestration project which is injecting around one million tons of CO2 per year into gas reservoirs. In Salah began sequestering CO2 in 2004 through a public/private partnership including BP (32%), Sonatrach (35%) and Statoil (32%) and has set precedents for regulations and verification of CO2 storage.
- ³³ Umbrella organizations such as the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) might help facilitate collaborative research, information exchanges and networking. In particular, the policy group of the CSLF conducts research into legal, regulatory, and intellectual property rights issues that could help inform proposed U.S.-China sequestration collaboration. See <http://www.csforum.org/index.html>
- ³⁴ These projects could include collaboration over Now Gen (Duke Energy's new Edwardsport IGCC-CCS plant) and Green Gen in China (Huaneng's near-zero emission coal-fired plant). Such cooperation between the world's first two demonstration plants with near-zero emission would help accelerate further deployment, ensure a low-carbon success, create new jobs and demonstrate leadership in both Washington and Beijing.
- ³⁵ Heads of major government agencies in China (NDRC, NEA, and Ministry of Commerce) and Vice-Premier Wang Qishan have argued that the additional heat, energy, and coal requirements for PCC will reduce power output, lower the rate of economic growth, and reduce coal availability for future generations.

⁵⁷ Indirect jobs are jobs created due to the purchase of goods and services by directly affected industries from other firms as well as purchases by employees of directly and indirectly affected businesses.

⁵⁸ The U.S. share of the jobs created is estimated by multiplying the global job figures by 17.69 percent, which is the U.S. share of emissions resulting from coal consumption in 2006 based on data derived from Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual 2006, at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/leaf/table4co2.xls>. We expect that our calculations of the U.S. share of global jobs in the five-year and 10-year acceleration scenarios may be an underestimate. To the extent that the United States, as a result of this collaboration and other efforts is seen to be an early mover of CCS development and deployment, the United States may expect to create a larger share of global CCS jobs than other coal consuming countries.

⁵⁹ See McKinsey & Co., "Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy," 2009, at http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccs/pathways_low_carbon_economy.asp.

⁶⁰ Over a 15-year period.

⁶¹ Over a 12-year period (ramping up plant construction is assumed to require an additional 2 years).

⁶² Like the global job figures (see footnote [57] and accompanying text), the U.S. share of the cost savings is estimated by multiplying the global cost saving figures by 17.69 percent, which is the U.S. share of emissions resulting from coal consumption in 2006. Again, as in the job analysis, this may be low estimate as a result of the United States' early movement in developing and deploying CCS technology compared to other coal consuming countries.

⁶³ See "Duke Energy and China-based ENN Group Sign Clean Technology Agreement," press release, September 23 2009, at <http://www.duke-energy.com/news/releases/2009092301.asp>; and "Duke Energy Signs MOU with China Huaneng Group to Pursue Renewable and Other Clean-Energy Technologies," press release, August 10 2009, at <http://www.duke-energy.com/news/releases/2009081001.asp>.

⁶⁴ See "KBR Awarded Clean Coal Contract by Beijing Guoneng Yinghui Clean Energy Engineering Co., Ltd. for First Commercial TRIG™ Implementation Worldwide," press release, September 18, 2009, at http://www.kbr.com/news/press_releases/2009/09/18/KBR-Awarded-Clean-Coal-Contract-by-Beijing-Guoneng-Yinghui-Clean-Energy-Engineering-Co-Ltd-for-First-Commercial-TRIG-Implementation-Worldwide.aspx.

⁶⁵ See U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Broadening the Bilateral: Seizing the Opportunity for Meaningful Collaboration on Climate Change (Senate Report 111-24, 2009), <http://foreign.senate.gov/China.pdf>.

⁶⁶ 70 percent of China's emissions currently come from industry, and by 2030, 350 million Chinese, or 1.25 million per month, will move to urban areas, each requiring 3.5 times more energy to sustain than his or rural counterpart. This rise in China's energy demand would account for one-third of the worldwide increases in energy demand from 2005 to 2030. See U.S. Senate Committee, Broadening: see also Jerald J. Fletcher and Qingyun Sun, "CO2 Sequestration Options for the Shenhua DCL Plant: A Pre-Feasibility Study," West Virginia University, Natural Resource Analysis Center, April 1, 2007, at http://www.nrac.wvu.edu/projects/sheia/publications/CarbonSequestration/WVU/Shenhua_Sequestration_Options_AnnexIIactivity_01Apr2007.doc.

⁶⁷ China has been the world's largest coal user since 1986; see Fletcher and Sun, CO2 Sequestration Options.

⁶⁸ To meet the demand for electricity that is expected to accompany China's rapid growth, an additional 600 gigawatts of coal-fired capacity (net of retirements) is projected to be brought online in China by 2030. In the near term, the IEQ2009 projections show a substantial amount of new coal builds, with 192 gigawatts of capacity additions between 2006 and 2010. See "Chapter 4—Coal," in DOE/EIA, IEQ2009, 2009, at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/coal.html>.

⁶⁹ If by 2050 every country in the world were to cut its emissions by 80%, China's projected emissions alone—driven primarily by coal—would increase average global temperatures by a dangerous 2.7%. See Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "The Future of Coal: Summary Report," 2007, at http://web.mit.edu/coal/The_Future_of_Coal_Summary_Report.pdf.

⁷⁰ China has 1.4% of the world's oil reserves and 1.2% of the world's gas reserves; see Fletcher and Sun, CO2 Sequestration Options.

⁷¹ In 2008, sustainable energy investment in China grew to \$15.6 billion, an 18% increase. See Sustainable Energy Finance Initiative (SEFI), "Global Trends In Sustainable Energy Investment 2009 Report" 2009, at <http://sefi.unep.org/english/globaltrends2009.html>. In 2008, sustainable energy investment in China grew to \$15.6 billion, an 18% increase.

⁷² See MIT, Retro-Fitting.

⁷³ See Gov.cn, The 11th Five-Year, 2006, at http://www.gov.cn/english/special/115y_index.htm, which calls for a 10% reduction in chemical oxygen demand (COD) and SO2 from 2005 levels by 2010.

⁷⁴ People's Republic of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Implementation of the Bali Roadmap: China's Position on the Copenhagen Climate Conference, 2009), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/t20090521_280382.htm ("Developed countries shall take responsibility for their historical cumulative emissions and current high per capita emissions to change their unsustainable way of life and to substantially reduce their emissions and, at the same time, to provide financial support and transfer technology to developing countries")

⁷⁵ See U.S. Senate Committee, Broadening.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Science and International Affairs, Georgetown University, interview by Monitor Group, July 30, 2009.

⁷⁸ Energy Technology Innovation Policy (ETIP) Research Group, Tufts University, telephone interview by Monitor Group, August 13, 2009

⁷⁹ See U.S. Senate Committee, Broadening. The report notes the agreement among political and military leaders, energy executives, scientists, students, and environmental experts.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ GOV.cn, "China calls for more efforts to tackle climate change," July 10, 2009, at http://www.gov.cn/english/2009-07/10/content_1361669.htm.

⁸² Julian L. Wong and Andrew Light, "China Begins its Transition to a Clean Energy Economy: China's Climate Progress by the Numbers," Center for American Progress, June 4, 2009, at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/china_energy_numbers.html

⁸³ Xinhua, "China injects 'green power' into economy," August 18, 2008, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-08/18/content_8583270.htm

⁸⁴ See U.S. Senate Committee, Broadening.

⁸⁵ Fu Jing, "Emissions to Peak at 2030: Report," China Daily, August 18, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/18/content_8580379.htm.

⁸⁶ See Wong and Light, China Begins.

⁸⁷ Gov.cn. China Legislature Ends Session, Adopts Armed Police Law, Climate Change Resolution (Gov.cn, 2009), http://english.gov.cn/2009-08/28/content_1403439.htm

⁸⁸ Julian L. Wong and Isabel Hilton, "Hu Speaks- What Next?" Chinadialogue, Sept 24, 2009 <http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/3262-Hu-speaks-what-next>

⁸⁹ In 2005, CCS was integrated into China's "National Medium and Long-term Science and Technology Development Plan towards 2020." In China's 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), the National High Tech Program ("863" Program) also includes support for CCS

⁹⁰ See Standing Committee of the National People's Congress—Climate Change Resolution, August 27, 2009 at http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/cwh/1110/2009-08/27/content_1516122.htm ("....." [English: To accelerate the research, development and deployment of major climate technologies particularly in the fields of energy conservation and energy efficiency, clean coal, renewable energy, nuclear energy and related low carbon technologies; to explore the development of carbon capture and sequestration....])

⁹¹ The following Web sites provide information about these projects: GreenGen Project, <http://www.greeneng.com.cn/en/index.asp>; TPRI, Key R&D Programs Funded by Government Authorities in Recent Years, <http://www.tpri.com.cn/eng/important.htm>; Shenhua Group Corporation Limited, http://www.shenhua.com.cn/english/kiyf_2.html

⁹² See Friedman, "Sea Change."

⁹³ Remarks by David B. Sandalow, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Energy for Policy and International Affairs, at the Center for American Progress, July 22, 2009.

⁹⁴ Unless developed countries set up some sort of new multilateral offset fund to begin paying for those industries that capture and sequester CO₂, an eventuality which is not soon likely on a meaningful scale.

From: Iris Anaya [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2009 9:08:43 AM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: RE: Please reply

RELEASE IN PART B6

B6

No - I have not received the e-mail. Should I tell Alfie his meeting is at 1:00 PM? Also, please forward meeting address. Thank you SO MUCH for all your help.

By the way, did you receive the 19-page fax?

-----Original Message-----

From: Huma Abedin [mailto:Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2009 11:13 PM
To: Iris Anaya
Subject: Re: Please reply

Did u get me email about 1pm mtg?

----- Original Message -----

From: Iris Anaya [redacted]
To: Jiloty, Lauren C <JilotyLC@state.gov>
Cc: Huma Abedin <habedin@state.gov>
Sent: Mon Oct 19 16:44:23 2009
Subject: FW: Please reply

B6

Have tried to contact Huma but she has not replied. Please help.

Also, Huma had asked the reason why Mr. Fanjul wanted to meet with Hillary. I sent her an e-mail telling her to call Mr. Fanjul that he would explain the reason to her by phone.

Mr. Fanjul is here in the office now if you or Huma want to call [redacted]

B6

Thank you and please reply.

Warm regards,

Iris

From: Iris Anaya
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2009 3:05 PM
To: 'Huma Abedin'
Subject: Please reply

Need to know if Secretary Clinton will have the time tomorrow to meet with Mr. Alfonso (Alfy) Fanjul. Please advise.

Iris Anaya

HA 09/01/2015

Personal Assistant

to Alfonso Fanjul

Chairman and CEO

Fanjul Corp.

[REDACTED]

(561) 655-6303, Main

(561) 835-4795, Fax

[REDACTED]

B6.

From: capriciamarshall [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2009 10:43:34 AM
To: Jake Sullivan; Philippe Reines
CC: CDM; Maggie Williams; Evelyn & Ed Lieberman; Nora Toiv; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: more...gatekeeper crap (ben smith)

RELEASE IN PART B5,B6

B6

I discussed with cdm a few events I would like her to host - [REDACTED]

B5

Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T

From: Jake Sullivan [REDACTED]
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2009 10:08:56 -0400
To: <preines [REDACTED]>
Cc: CDM<cheryl.mills [REDACTED]>; Maggie Williams [REDACTED] Evelyn Lieberman [REDACTED]; Nora Toiv< [REDACTED]> Huma Abedin<Huma@clintonemail.com>; CPM<capriciamarshall [REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: more...gatekeeper crap (ben smith)

B6

i really like the idea [REDACTED] pir, call me when you have a sec.

B5

On Tue, Oct 20, 2009 at 6:34 AM, PIR <preines [REDACTED]> wrote:

B6

Cheryl, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


B5

I'd rather expend our energy there - it will have more of an impact.

HA 09/01/2015

From: cheryl.mills [redacted]
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2009 02:43:55 +0000
To: Philippe Reines<[redacted]>
Cc: Maggie Williams<[redacted]>; Evelyn Lieberman<[redacted]>; Jake Sullivan<[redacted]> Nora Toiv<[redacted]>; Huma Abedin- personal email<huma@clintonemail.com>; Cheryl Mills<[redacted]>; Capricia Marshall<[redacted]>
Subject: Fw: more...gatekeeper crap (ben smith)

B6



B5
B6

Cdm

Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T

From: Nora Toiv [redacted]
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2009 21:52:56 -0400
To: Cheryl Mills<[redacted]>
Subject: more...gatekeeper crap (ben smith)

B6

Clinton's gatekeeper

Al Kamen channels some Foggy Bottom grumbling blaming Cheryl Mills, Hillary Clinton's chief of staff for making Clinton inaccessible to career diplomats.

(Laura has the counter-argument.)

HA 09/01/2015

Across town, Mills has also gotten some backs up in the White House during her tenure, as I mentioned in passing a while ago. A top lawyer in the Clinton White House, Mills was been a hard-liner during the Clinton campaign, pushing for sharper-edged attacks on Obama. She brought some of that stance to State, where she fought tooth and nail in the early days of the administration to control mid-level staff jobs, like the agency's White House liaison, and to ensure that those jobs went to "Hillary people" rather than "Obama people," people on both sides has told me.

Mills has shaped a State-Department-as-Hillaryland, where political staffers are loyal to the Secretary, and where I can't think of a single appointee who supported Obama during the campaign. But the power remains in the White House, and the result has been, some Clinton backers worry, a certain marginalization.

Posted by Ben Smith 12:22 PM

HA 09/01/2015

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2009 11:10:51 AM
To: 'capriciamarshall' [redacted]
Subject: Re: [redacted] - résumé

RELEASE IN PART B6

B6

Tell them to do talking points
And we will sign

----- Original Message -----

From: capriciamarshall [redacted]
To: Huma Abedin; H
Sent: Tue Oct 20 09:25:13 2009
Subject: Re: [redacted] - résumé

Yes - and it is. ..

-----Original Message-----

From: Huma Abedin
To: 'capriciamarshall' [redacted]
To: Clinton
Sent: Oct 20, 2009 8:29 AM
Subject: Re: Fwd: [redacted] - résumé

A recommendation letter?
This must be the young daughter.

----- Original Message -----

From: Capricia Marshall [redacted]
To: Huma Abedin; H
Sent: Tue Oct 20 08:12:18 2009
Subject: Fwd: [redacted] - résumé

This is [redacted] who is interested in attending Georgetown next year. She is clearly a good student. She is hoping for your support.

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]
Date: 2009/10/18
Subject: [redacted] - résumé
To: capriciamarshall [redacted]

Dear Ambassador Marshall,

Thank you very much for helping me with my college admissions process.
As per our conversation I have attached my résumé in this e-mail.

Thanks again for taking the time to help me, please let me know if you need any additional information.

Respectfully,

[redacted]

Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T

HA 09/01/2015

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2009 10:32 PM
To: humamabedin [redacted]
Subject: Fw: Final Memo for S Development Session tomorrow -- pse make sure you give her this one rather than the one i just sent to development group
Attach: S_Development_Memo_10_22_09 final.docx

RELEASE IN PART B6

B6

From: Slaughter, Anne-Marie
To: Abedin, Huma; Mills, Cheryl D
Sent: Thu Oct 22 21:04:05 2009
Subject: Final Memo for S Development Session tomorrow -- pse make sure you give her this one rather than the one i just sent to development group

Psc get it to her asap. Thanks.

Anne-Marie Slaughter
Director of Policy Planning
U.S. Department of State
(202) 647-2972

HA 09/01/2015

From: PIR [preines [redacted]]
Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 10:50:29 AM
To: Jake Sullivan; H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Parade

RELEASE IN PART B6

B6

Plus - I made a new friend in Les Gelb - we have connected on our love of cats (he has 3)

-----Original Message-----

From: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2009 10:49:20
To: <preines [redacted]> <HDR22@clintonemail.com>; <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Re: Parade

I second Philippe's take, on all counts.

----- Original Message -----

From: PIR <preines [redacted]>
To: Evergreen <HDR22@clintonemail.com>; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Sat Oct 24 10:26:17 2009
Subject: Re: Parade

Photo is gorgeous (and there are 20 more online, some are really great)

The article is good, just way too short, so it became very matter of fact, didn't include a lot of the great stuff he saw that day. They cut what he turned in half.

But for this readership, that length is probably perfect. It supposedly gets seen by 70 million people. 69 million probably never open it up and just see it in their Sunday paper, so the cover is the ballgame. Story is basically an excuse for the cover. And the cover is a homerun.

In the end, I firmly believe it will be the totality all these in-depth projects like Vogue, National Geographic, Nightline, Time - which I know are annoying - that are going to create a collage documenting your success, especially in terms of style and work ethic, which I believe is what people are most interested when it comes to their perception and approval of you.

-----Original Message-----

From: Evergreen
To: PIR
To: Huma Abedin
To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
Subject: Parade
Sent: Oct 24, 2009 10:17 AM

What did you think of the photo and article?

HA 09/01/2015

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 1:45:31 PM
To: 'preines [REDACTED]'; H; 'SullivanJJ@state.gov'
Subject: Re: Parade

RELEASE IN PART B6

B6

Love it!!

----- Original Message -----

From: PIR [REDACTED]
To: H; Huma Abedin; 'sullivanjj@state.gov' <sullivanjj@state.gov>
Sent: Sat Oct 24 10:26:17 2009
Subject: Re: Parade

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The article is good, just way too short, so it became very matter of fact, didn't include a lot of the great stuff he saw that day. They cut what he turned in in half.

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-----Original Message-----

From: Evergreen
To: PIR
To: Huma Abedin
To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
Subject: Parade
Sent: Oct 24, 2009 10:17 AM

What did you think of the photo and article?

HA 09/01/2015

RELEASE IN PART B6

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 3:48 PM
To: humamabedin
Subject: Fw: Coming to a doorstep near you...

B6


From: Adler, Caroline E
To: Reines, Philippe I; Merrill, Nicholas S; Schwerin, Daniel B; Yehl, Ashley C (PACE); Connell, Ellen K; Abedin, Huma; Sullivan, Jacob J; Valmore, Lona J; Jiloty, Lauren C; Coleman, Claire L; Hanley, Monica R; S_SpecialAssistants; Toiv, Nora F; Mills, Cheryl D; Dewan, Linda L; Rubin, Ali M
Sent: Fri Oct 23 15:21:20 2009
Subject: Coming to a doorstep near you...

(Parade has a circulation of 32 million and a readership of 71 million)

<http://www.parade.com/news/2009/10/25-24-hours-with-secretary-of-state-hillary-clinton.html>

Parade Magazine: 24 Hours With Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

by Leslie H. Gelb
published: 10/25/2009



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"We're going to work you to death," Hillary Clinton promised me with a laugh. She was taking me—and PARADE's readers—along on a typical day in the life of the U.S. Secretary of State. Our 24 hours together would prove both grueling and inspirational, full of diplomatic pageantry, big meetings with policy brainiacs, small sessions with trusted aides, a stream of time-consuming formal duties, and, of course, phone calls and more phone calls. The Secretary allowed me to be a fly on the wall for almost every minute, under the constantly watchful eyes of the Diplomatic Security Service. Having known her since her husband began his first run for the White House in 1991, I couldn't stop myself from calling her Hillary. To everyone else, however, she was always Madame Secretary.

[See Our Exclusive Photo Essay: A Day in the Life of Madame Secretary](#)

September 15

6:45 p.m. *Iftar* Dinner

Two hundred prominent Muslim-American leaders gather at the State Department for *iftar*, the evening meal when

Muslims break their daily fast during the holy month of Ramadan. All enter the glittering Benjamin Franklin State Dining Room for an evening of low-key politicking. Muslims have been seeking a position in American politics commensurate with their roughly 6 million in numbers. Clinton is looking for support in upcoming talks between deadlocked Palestinians and Israelis. The evening's big surprise: After Clinton's brief talk, a rabbi strolls about introducing the Arab kingdom of Bahrain's ambassador to the U.S.—w ho is both a woman and a Jew.

September 16

8:30 a.m. Daily Small Staff Meeting

The Secretary and six of her closest aides, including Chief of Staff Cheryl Mills and Deputy Chief Huma Abedin, both of whom worked on her Presidential campaign, review the day's schedule, looking for trouble and opportunities. They meet in Clinton's small, personal office just behind her larger, formal quarters. Practically every day begins this way. They touch on various explosive international hot spots: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea. Though they don't talk about it, they seem ever aware of President Barack Obama's iron-handed control of decisions. One worry today: the President's decision to cancel the U.S. missile shield in Eastern Europe—a move bound to displease Poles, Czechs, and Republicans.

8:45 a.m. Daily Senior Staff Meeting

The State Department's top 15 officials gather in Clinton's formal conference room to expand on matters discussed at the preceding meeting. Deputy Secretary Jack Lew talks about helping Pakistan with its severe energy shortages. Clinton says she wants to find "a signature project" that catches Pakistani attention and demonstrates American assistance. Then she comes back to stalemated Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, telling key aides to "get the Jordanians and Egyptians to talk to the Palestinians." Whatever subject comes up, Clinton calls on her practical instinct: "We've got to do a better job explaining to people around the world what we're doing."



Exclusive Photo Essay:
A Day in the Life of Hillary Clinton

9 a.m. Breakfast With Rep. Nita Lowey

Down from the seventh floor to the first for a session with Representative Lowey (D., N.Y.), Clinton's friend and a key House leader on Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have a frank discussion of growing opposition on Capitol Hill to the war in Afghanistan—and what to do about it.

9:30 a.m. Energy-Security Briefing

State Department energy czar David Goldwyn briefs Clinton on two key Obama priorities: finding alternatives to importing foreign oil and reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. Clinton listens carefully, then urges Goldwyn to "identify people we need to hire" and press forward.

10:50 a.m. Recording Videos

Clinton records four thank-you videos to various people and groups.

11:05 a.m. Visit to the White House

Clinton's new bomb-proof limo slips through the side entrance of the White House so she can meet with President Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. They discuss trade issues and Canada's shift away from a combat role in the war in Afghanistan. I'm not allowed into this meeting.

12:10 p.m. Ceremony for Senegalese Diplomats

For any who doubt the continuing majesty and importance of America in the world, this event is a stunning curative. The U.S. is giving \$540 million in aid to Senegal. While that's no big deal to the few Americans in attendance, the 250 Senegalese and African leaders present brim with pride. Clinton sticks to no-nonsense themes: "We want to be partners, not a patron." And: "Senegal's government and people have to make sure we deliver to your country what we both

promise." In diplomacy, this counts as blunt talk, but her audience likes it anyway.


24 Hours With Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

by Leslie H. Gelb

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Exclusive

Photo Essay:
[A Day in the Life of Hillary Clinton](#)

1 p.m. Lunch With Leslie Gelb

We eat in the courtyard adjoining the State Department's first-floor employee cafeteria. Diners gape as Clinton goes through the line, although she does this—most unusually for the nation's top diplomat—nearly once a month. Many burst into applause.

We sit at a table away from the crowd. Clinton has a hard edge to her foreign-policy views and generally positions herself to the right of her colleagues in national security. Yet she staunchly defends President Obama and his prerogatives. While she's "not satisfied that we're executing as we should" in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere, she nonetheless argues for continuing "present directions" in most areas. When I question whether the U.S. really has vital interests in Afghanistan, she shoots back that if we simply leave and allow the Taliban to return, al-Qaeda "would come right back, and we'd be worse off in Pakistan." She continues: "Despite how hard Afghanistan is, we have to make progress. And what we do and what happens in Afghanistan will affect Pakistan." Regarding Iran, she says, "We can't choose negotiating partners in countries like Iran. So we've got to look for ways to change the

perceptions of those we have to negotiate with."

And what of the rumors, I venture, that she's unhappy and may step down to run for governor of New York or her old Senate seat? She guffaws. "What nonsense! I love this job and working for President Obama and trying to do something about the critical problems we face in the world—and that's what I'm going to do."

2:15 p.m. U.S.-India Strategy Dialogue

Some 60 Executive Branch officials assemble to discuss strategy toward India—one of the new major powers in the world. Clinton stays briefly to bless the effort.

3 p.m. Meeting With Bangladeshi Foreign Minister

The new Bangladeshi foreign minister, Dipu Moni, a woman with perfect British-accented diction, regales Clinton about the positive changes under way in her country, which is led by a female prime minister. Clinton advises: "You need to continue to strengthen your middle class, continue to engage with your political opposition, help women in your society—and we'll help you." She adds, "Democracy has to deliver, or people will turn away." Before they leave for a joint press conference, Clinton suggests a limit of "only one question for each of us, because otherwise they'll just ask me questions on every subject except Bangladesh." Clinton proves right, but Moni departs happy nonetheless. She would be on television throughout her part of the world, alongside the U.S. Secretary of State. There is no American coverage of the event.

4 p.m. Swearing-in of Maria Otero, Undersecretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs

Again in the Franklin room, a couple of hundred people, including Senators and Congressmen, stand for a historic

occasion: the swearing-in of the first Hispanic undersecretary of state—who is a woman to boot. Clinton allows her sly sense of humor to peek through. She teases Otero about the hundreds of uncles, aunts, and cousins in attendance, much to the delight of the crowd. The Hispanic vote matters to Democrats, and Otero has a fine reputation.

4:30 p.m. Meeting With Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale and Special Representative Richard Holbrooke

McHale and Holbrooke describe a practical way to counter Taliban propaganda and enhance America's image in Pakistan. Their approach turns on two key facts: that 50% of Pakistanis are illiterate and that 60% of them are under age 30. The idea: reach them through radio, cellphones, and cable TV. Clinton approves and orders swift action.

See Our Exclusive Photo Essay: A Day in the Life of Madame Secretary

5:30 p.m. Swearing-in of James Smith, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

Clinton doesn't do every swearing-in, but this one is for Saudi Arabia, an important country, and the new ambassador is a former Air Force general who represents a constituency where Democrats don't have much support. After giving short, personal remarks and spending an hour hobnobbing, Clinton departs to begin a battery of telephone calls.

On a line electronically secured from eavesdroppers, she converses with George Mitchell, the Middle East envoy (twice); National Security Advisor James Jones (twice); U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry (from Kabul); Dennis Blair, the director of national intelligence; and Sen. John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

7:30 p.m. Policy Dinner on Iran

Some 30 Iran experts from inside and outside the government assemble for a dinner and discussion that lasts until 9 p.m. Clinton loves to stir the pot, so she tells the assembled guests about our lunch. "Les Gelb," she says, "told me today that in the next five to 10 years, Iran would be our closest ally in that region of the world, that the two countries have common interests, and that America has genuine public support in Iran." Few agree, but Clinton gets a good argument going.

I scurry to catch the last flight back to New York. The Secretary, with her unfailing smile, repairs to her office for more calls and reading. It's hard to read the mind of someone frozen in the public spotlight like Hillary Clinton. She has to be perpetually onstage. But what I think I glimpse beneath the unflagging smile and constant concentration is a very tired person—tense, frustrated, but absolutely determined to make her tenure as Secretary of State a success and to accomplish important things.

Leslie H. Gelb is president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and has served in senior positions in the Departments of State and Defense. He is the author of the book "Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy."

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RELEASE IN FULL

The Annual Report

The *Annual Report on International Religious Freedom* records the status of respect for religious freedom in all countries during the period from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009. The *Annual Report's* primary focus is on the actions of governments, including those that contribute to religious repression or tolerate violence against religious minorities as well as those that protect and promote religious freedom. Each country report contains sections covering the country's religious demography; government respect for religious freedom (including the legal and policy framework, restrictions on religious freedom, abuses of religious freedom, and improvements and positive developments); societal respect for religious freedom; and U.S. Government policy and actions. We strive to report fairly and accurately, with sensitivity to the complexity of religious freedom in varied settings.

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRF Act) designates the promotion of religious freedom for all persons as a core objective of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. advocacy for religious freedom is grounded in our commitment to advance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms worldwide. The vast majority of the world's population professes some religious belief or identification. The right to believe or not to believe, without fear of government interference or restriction, provides an essential foundation for human dignity, robust civil society, and sustainable democracy. This principle holds a central place in American culture, values, and history. It is also a global concern; both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights articulate the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief.

The IRF Act also provides the mandate for this report and prescribes the principal topics for this Executive Summary: following an introductory overview of challenges to religious freedom, Part I outlines the religious freedom situations in selected countries, Part II addresses U.S. actions in designated countries of particular concern (CPCs), and Part III discusses improvements and positive developments, with a special section on efforts to promote interfaith dialogue and understanding.

State-Sponsored Challenges to Religious Freedom

Religious freedom can be restricted in a variety of ways, from the overt to the subtle. The five categories below provide an analytic framework for recognizing the range of limitations on religious freedom.

1) Authoritarian Governments. The most severe abuses take place in certain strict authoritarian regimes that seek to control all religious thought and expression as part of a more comprehensive state control of expression and civic life. These regimes regard some groups as enemies of the state because of their religious beliefs or because they undermine unquestioned loyalty to the state. Some governments cite political security concerns as a pretext to repress peaceful religious practice. This report distinguishes between expression of legitimate political grievances by groups of religious believers and misuse of religion to advocate and undertake violence against other groups or the state.

2) Hostility toward minorities. Serious abuses occur where there is state hostility toward minority or non-approved religious groups. While not exerting full control over these groups, some governments intimidate and harass religious minorities and tolerate societal abuses against them. In severe cases, governments may demand that minority adherents renounce their faith or force them to relocate or even flee the country. This report takes careful note of the relationships between religious identity and ethnicity, especially in cases in which a government dominated by a majority ethno-religious group suppressed the religious expression of minority groups. Also detailed in this report are instances in which governments were hostile to a minority religious group because of the group's real or perceived political ideology or affiliation.

3) Failure to address societal intolerance. Some states fail to address forces of intolerance against certain religious groups. In these countries, laws may discourage religious discrimination or persecution, but officials fail to prevent attacks, harassment, or other harmful acts against certain individuals or religious groups. Protecting religious freedom requires more than having good laws and policies in place. Governments also have the responsibility to work at all levels to prevent abuses, to bring abusers to justice, to provide redress to victims when appropriate, and to proactively foster an environment of respect and tolerance for all people.

4) Institutionalized bias. Governments sometimes restrict religious freedom by enacting discriminatory legislation or taking concrete action to favor majority religions. These circumstances often result from historical dominance by a majority religious group and can result in institutionalized bias against new or

historic minority religious communities. This report highlights instances in which government endorsement of a particular interpretation of the majority religion resulted in restrictions on adherents of that religion who follow a different interpretation.

5) Illegitimacy. Some governments discriminate against specific groups by identifying them as dangerous or illegitimate because they are regarded as dangerous to individuals or societal order, describing the groups with terms such as "cults" or "sects," thereby perpetuating the stigmatization of the groups and encouraging or implicitly condoning acts of violence against them. This practice is relatively common even in countries where religious freedom is otherwise respected.

Multilateral, Global, and Regional Challenges to Religious Freedom

In addition to these country-by-country concerns, the wide spectrum of efforts to undermine the right to religious freedom extends to multilateral, regional, and global fora. For instance, over the past decade, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an inter-governmental organization comprising 57 states with majority or significant Muslim populations, has worked through the United Nations (UN) to advance the concept of "defamation of religions" by introducing annual resolutions on this subject at the UN Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly. While the United States deplores actions that exhibit disrespect for particular religious traditions, including Islam, we do not agree with the "defamation of religions" concept because it is inconsistent with the freedoms of religion and expression.

The United States understands the primary concern of the resolution to be the negative stereotyping of members of religious groups, particularly minority groups, and the contribution of such stereotypes to disrespect and discrimination. The United States shares concerns about the impact of negative stereotypes and believes that such stereotyping, particularly when promoted by community, religious, or government leaders, contributes to disrespect, discrimination, and in some cases, to violence. The United States, however, believes the best way for governments to address these issues is to develop robust legal regimes to address acts of discrimination and bias-inspired crime; to condemn hateful ideology and proactively reach out to all religious communities, especially minority groups; and to defend vigorously the rights of individuals to practice their religion freely and to exercise their freedom of expression.

The forcible return of individuals from another country to face persecution or abuse in their home country in retribution for their religious activism is also of grave concern to the United States. During the reporting period, the Government of China reportedly sought the forcible return of several Muslims living in other countries, including Syria; during previous periods it had done so with Muslims living in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Some had reportedly protested restrictions on the Hajj and encouraged other Muslims to pray and fast during Ramadan. There were credible reports that the Government of China tortured and, in some cases, executed individuals who had been forcibly returned, including some who advocated for religious freedom. Similarly, the Government of Uzbekistan continued to pursue the extradition of suspected Uzbek religious extremists from third countries, particularly from Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine, including those who had sought asylum. During the reporting period, at least two individuals seeking political asylum in Kyrgyzstan were forcibly extradited to Uzbekistan and imprisoned on religious extremism charges.

PART I: RESTRICTIONS, ABUSES AND CONCERNS

This section summarizes overall conditions during the reporting period in some countries where violations of religious freedom have been noteworthy. Some of these countries have also seen some positive developments, and these are highlighted in Part III. Additional information can be found in the country reports.

Afghanistan

The Constitution states that Islam is the "religion of the state" and that "no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam." In 2004, the Constitution accorded Shi'a and Sunni Islam equal recognition. It proclaims that "followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of law." The Government took limited steps to increase religious freedom; however, serious problems remained. In April 2009 President Karzai signed a controversial law limiting the rights of women from the Shi'a minority. International partners of Afghanistan objected strongly to the law. The President agreed to suspend enactment of the law until the Ministry of Justice had reviewed and amended it. The review process was ongoing at the end of the reporting period. Although the Government and political leaders aspire to a national environment that respects the right to religious freedom, the residual effects of years of jihad against the former Soviet Union, Taliban rule, civil strife, popular suspicion regarding outside influence of foreigners, and still weak democratic institutions hindered the realization of this aspiration. Intolerance was manifested in harassment and occasional violence against religious minorities.

and Muslims perceived as not respecting Islamic strictures. Within the Muslim population, relations among the different sects continued to be difficult. Non-Muslim minority groups, including Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs, continued to face incidents of discrimination and persecution. Many citizens understand conversion as contravening the tenets of Islam and Shari'a, and most local Christians do not publicly state their beliefs or gather openly to worship.

Azerbaijan

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion. There were changes to the Constitution approved during the reporting period, however, that undermined religious freedom. On March 18, 2009, a national referendum approved a series of amendments to the Constitution; two amendments limit the spreading and propagandizing of religion. On May 8, the Milli Majlis (Parliament) passed an amended Law on Freedom of Religion, signed by the President on May 29, which could result in a more restrictive system of registration for religious groups. In spite of these developments, the Government continued to respect the religious freedom of the majority of citizens, with some notable exceptions for members of religions considered non-traditional. Both Muslim and non-traditional Christian groups reportedly experienced monitoring as well as instances of harassment and detention. There were mosque closures as well as State and locally sponsored raids on evangelical Protestant religious groups.

Brunei

Government respect for religious freedom deteriorated during the reporting period as the Government restricted religious freedom for non-Muslims. Non-Muslims were prohibited from receiving religious education in private religious schools, which had previously been allowed. Non-Muslims also faced social and, at times, official pressure to conform to Islamic guidelines on behavior. The Government maintained a ban on a number of groups it considered "deviant." Government policies generally discouraged the population from being exposed to religions besides Islam. Across denominational lines, non-Muslim religious leaders stated that they were subject to undue influence and duress and some were threatened with fines and/or imprisonment. Active monitoring of churches and disruption of supply shipments and mail were reported. Laws and regulations generally limited access to religious literature, places of worship, and public religious gatherings for non-Muslims. The Government continued to favor the propagation of Shafi'i beliefs and practices, as well as the Malay Islamic Monarchy belief system, particularly through public events and the education system. Muslims remained subject to the Government's interpretation of Shari'a (Islamic law).

Burma

The 2008 Constitution provides for freedom of religion; however, it also grants broad exceptions that allow the regime to restrict those rights at will. Most adherents of registered religions were permitted to worship as they chose, but the Government continued to infiltrate and monitor activities of virtually all organizations, including religious ones. It systematically restricted efforts by Buddhist clergy to promote human rights and political freedom. Many of the Buddhist monks arrested in the violent crackdown that followed the pro-democracy demonstrations of September 2007, including prominent activist monk U Gambira, remained in prison serving long sentences. The Government actively promoted Theravada Buddhism, particularly among minority ethnic groups. Although there were no new reports of forced conversions of non-Buddhists, the Government applied pressure on students and poor youth to convert to Buddhism. Adherence to Buddhism remains generally a prerequisite for promotion to senior government and military ranks. Anti-Muslim violence continued, as did the close monitoring of Muslims' activities. Restrictions on Christians and other non-Buddhist minority groups also continued throughout the country.

China

The Constitution protects only "normal religious activities," and officials have wide latitude to interpret the meaning of "normal." Citizens do not have the ability to bring legal action based on the Constitution's guarantees of religious freedom. The Government officially restricts legal religious practice to the five (Buddhist, Taoist, Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant) state-sanctioned "patriotic religious associations." The treatment of religious groups varied significantly among different religions and different locations. During the reporting period, officials continued to scrutinize and in some cases interfere with the activities of religious and spiritual groups. In some areas government officials violated the rights of members of unregistered Protestant and Catholic groups, Uighur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, and members of groups the Government determined to be "evil religions," especially the Falun Gong. The Government strongly opposed the profession of loyalty to religious leadership outside the country, most notably the Pope and the Dalai Lama. Government officials asked some unregistered Protestant house churches in Beijing to stop meeting during the 2008 Olympic Games.

China - Tibetan Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region

The Government's repression of religious freedom remained severe in Tibetan areas and in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Religious adherents in the XUAR, the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), and other

Tibetan areas suffered severe restrictions on religious activity, as a consequence of the Government's tendency to conflate concerns about separatism and religious extremism with peaceful expressions of religious beliefs and political views. In the XUAR, the Government's concerns also included terrorism. After the March 2008 protests in the TAR and other Tibetan regions, the Government harshly criticized the Dalai Lama and accused him of instigating the protests. Ethnic Tibetans and Uighurs had difficulty obtaining passports from the Government, limiting their ability to travel abroad for religious purposes. Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns also reported that they were frequently denied registration at hotels, particularly during sensitive times, including the period around the Beijing Olympics.

Cuba

The Constitution recognizes the right of citizens to practice any religious belief within the framework of respect for the law; however, the Government continued to assert itself over all aspects of social life, including religious expression. Religious groups complained about widespread surveillance and infiltration by state security agents. Various religious groups reported fewer restrictions on politically sensitive expression, the ability to hold religious activities, increased capacity to conduct charitable and community service projects, fewer import and travel restrictions, permission to repair buildings, and significant increases in membership. The Government continued to maintain strict controls on the construction of new buildings for religious purposes, and permission was difficult to obtain. The Government does not permit private schools, including religious schools.

Egypt

The Constitution provides for freedom of belief and the practice of religious rites, although the Government places restrictions on these rights in practice. Islam is the official state religion, and the principles of Shari'a (Islamic law) are the primary source for legislation. The status of respect for religious freedom by the Government declined somewhat during the reporting period, based on the failure to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of increased incidents of sectarian violence. There were some positive developments, however, including actions by the courts and the Ministry of Interior that opened the door for the possibility that all of the country's Baha'is would eventually be issued national identification documents that contain a dash or the term "other" in the religious affiliation field. The Government continued to sponsor "reconciliation sessions" following sectarian attacks, which generally precluded the prosecution of perpetrators of crimes against Copts and prevented their recourse to the judicial system for restitution. This practice contributed to a climate of impunity that encouraged repetition of the

assaults. Members of non-Muslim religious minorities officially recognized by the Government generally worshipped without harassment. Christians, however, and members of the Baha'i Faith--which is not recognized by the Government--face personal and collective discrimination in many areas. The Government detained members of Islamic religious minority groups, including Quranists and Shi'a, and detained and harassed some converts from Islam to Christianity and pressured them to revert to Islam. One Christian convert told U.S. officials that government authorities had raped her. A court sentenced a Coptic priest to five years of hard labor for officiating at a wedding between a Copt and a convert from Islam who allegedly presented false identification documentation. There continued to be religious discrimination and sectarian tension in society during the period covered by this report, and Egypt's quasi-governmental National Council on Human Rights expressed concern in its fifth report, released in May 2009, over growing sectarian tension, including the burning of an unlicensed Coptic Church and of homes belonging to Baha'is.

Eritrea

The Constitution, ratified by the National Assembly in 1997, provides for religious freedom; however, the Government has yet to implement the Constitution. Although the Government requires religious groups to register, since 2002 it has not approved any registrations beyond the country's four principal religious groups: the Eritrean Orthodox Church, the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church of Eritrea, Islam, and the Roman Catholic Church. The Government's record on religious freedom remained poor during the reporting period. The Government failed to approve religious groups that fulfilled the registration requirements, and arrested persons during religious gatherings. The Government continued to harass and detain members of unapproved religious groups and retained substantial control over the four approved religious groups, requiring them to submit a list of religious leaders for enrollment in military/national service. The Government held religious prisoners in harsh conditions for long periods and without due process. There continued to be reports of torture of religious detainees and forced recantations of faith by some adherents of unregistered religious groups held in detention as a precondition of their release. During the reporting period, there were reliable reports that authorities detained without charges several hundred members of unregistered religious groups. Reports indicated there were more than 3,000 Christians from unregistered groups detained in prison. Citizens generally were tolerant of one another in the practice of their religion, with the exception of societal attitudes toward Jehovah's Witnesses and Pentecostal groups.

Fiji

Prior to its abrogation in April 2009, the Constitution expressly provided for freedom of religion. The country's current laws and policies contributed to the generally free practice of religion; however, the role of religion continued to be politically contentious. There was a decline in the status of government respect for religious freedom during the reporting period as a result of a nationwide "Christian crusade" directed by the Police Commissioner. All police officers and their families, regardless of their religious beliefs, were required to attend evangelistic rallies at all police divisions and major police stations in the country. There were reports of Hindu and Muslim police officers joining the commissioner's church for fear of being denied promotions or losing their jobs. The Police Force asserted that the Christian crusade was highly successful, resulting in a 50 percent decrease in crime, and would continue.

India

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the National Government generally respected this right in practice. Some state and local governments imposed limits on this freedom, however. Although the vast majority of citizens of every religious group lived in peaceful coexistence, some organized societal attacks against minority religious groups occurred. State police and enforcement agencies often did not act swiftly to effectively counter such attacks. Religious extremists committed numerous terrorist attacks throughout the country during the reporting period, including the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai that targeted luxury hotels, a crowded railway station, a Jewish center, a hospital, and restaurants. Violence erupted in August 2008 in Orissa after individuals affiliated with left-wing Maoist extremists killed a Hindu religious leader in Kandhamal, one of the country's poorest districts. According to government statistics, 40 persons died and 134 were injured. Although most victims were Christians, the underlying causes that led to the violence have complex ethnic, economic, religious, and political roots related to land ownership and government-reserved employment and educational benefits. The police arrested 1,200 persons and registered more than 1,000 criminal cases. On April 21, 2009, police arrested Maoist leader P. Rama Rao in connection with the murder of the Hindu leader. According to several independent accounts, an estimated 3,200 refugees remained in relief camps, down from 24,000 in the immediate aftermath of the violence. Numerous cases were in the courts at the end of the reporting period, including cases in connection with the 2002 Gujarat violence, the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, and more recent attacks against Christians. Some extremists continued to view ineffective investigation and prosecution of attacks as a signal that they could commit such violence with impunity. In general, India's democratic system, open society, independent legal

institutions, vibrant civil society, and press all provided mechanisms to address violations of religious freedom when they did occur.

Indonesia

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respected religious freedom in practice; however, ongoing government restrictions, particularly among unrecognized religions and sects of the recognized religions considered "deviant," were significant exceptions. In some cases, however, the Government tolerated discrimination against and the abuse of religious minorities by societal groups and private actors. Some groups used violence and intimidation to force shut at least nine churches and 12 Ahmadiyya mosques, and many perpetrators were not brought to justice. Even though the central Government holds authority over religious matters, it did not try to overturn any local laws that restricted rights guaranteed in the Constitution. Members of minority religious groups continued to experience some official discrimination in the form of administrative difficulties, often in the context of civil registration of marriages and births or the issuance of identity cards.

Iran

The Constitution provides that "other Islamic denominations are to be accorded full respect" and recognizes the country's pre-Islamic religious groups--Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews--as "protected" religious minorities. Article 4 of the Constitution states that all laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. Despite constitutional guarantees, in practice those who are not Shi'a Muslims faced substantial discrimination. Respect for religious freedom in the country continued to deteriorate. Government rhetoric and actions created a threatening atmosphere for nearly all non-Shi'a religious groups, most notably for Baha'is, as well as for Sufi Muslims, evangelical Christians, and members of the Jewish community. Reports of government imprisonment, harassment, intimidation, and discrimination based on religious beliefs continued during the reporting period. Baha'i religious groups reported arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, expulsion from universities, and confiscation of property. Government-controlled broadcast and print media intensified negative campaigns against religious minorities, particularly Baha'is, during the reporting period. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continued a virulent anti-Semitic campaign, questioning the existence and scope of the Holocaust. Sufis faced an increasing repression campaign including arbitrary arrest and detention, confiscation of property, and defamatory attacks in newspapers and in sermons by Shi'a clerics. The Government vigilantly enforced its prohibition on proselytizing by some Christian groups by closely monitoring their activities, closing some churches, and arresting

Christian converts. Laws based on religious affiliation continued to be used to stifle freedom of expression, including through imprisonment of public figures.

Iraq

The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief and practice for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The Government generally endorsed these rights, but violence by terrorists, extremists, and criminal gangs restricted the free exercise of religion and posed a significant threat to the country's vulnerable religious minorities. Radical Islamic elements from outside the Government exerted pressure on individuals and groups to conform to extremist interpretations of Islam's precepts; sectarian violence, including attacks on clergy and places of worship, hampered the ability to practice religion freely. The Government's growing will and capacity to challenge its militant opponents resulted in a decrease in the overall level of violence and the Government became increasingly successful in restoring security, in a generally nonsectarian manner, throughout the country. Since 2003 the Government has generally not engaged in the persecution of any religious group, calling instead for tolerance and acceptance of all religious minorities. The overall magnitude of sectarian violence declined during the reporting period, but numerous incidents occurred. The general lawlessness that permitted criminal gangs, terrorists, and insurgents to victimize citizens with impunity affected persons of all ethnicities and religious groups, and the mass-casualty attacks primarily targeted the majority Shi'a population. Very few of the perpetrators of violence committed against Christians and other religious minorities in the country have been punished; arrests following a murder or other crime are rare.

Israel

The Israeli Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty provides for freedom of worship and the Government generally respected this right in practice. While there is no constitution, government policy continued to support the generally free practice of religion. The Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty refers to the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, which provides for the protection of religious freedom. In addition, numerous Supreme Court rulings incorporate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including their religious freedom provisions, into the country's body of law. The Declaration describes the country as a Jewish state, establishing Judaism as the dominant religion while also promising full social and political equality, regardless of religious affiliation, and the Basic Law describes the country as a "Jewish and democratic state." Government policy continued to support the generally free practice of religion,

although governmental and legal discrimination against non-Jews and non-Orthodox streams of Judaism continued. Governmental allocations of state resources favored Orthodox (including Modern and National Religious streams of Orthodoxy) and ultra-Orthodox (sometimes referred to as "Haredi") Jewish religious groups and institutions. Some individuals and groups committed abusive and discriminatory practices against Israeli-Arab Muslims, evangelical Christians, and Messianic Jews (persons who identify as Jews and follow Jewish traditions but believe Jesus was the Messiah), which continued at an elevated level. Relations among religious and ethnic groups--between Jews and non-Jews, Muslims and Christians, Arabs and non-Arabs, secular and religious Jews, and among the different streams of Judaism--often were strained during the reporting period. This was due primarily to the continuing Israel-Palestinian conflict and the Government's unequal treatment of non-Orthodox Jews, including the Government's recognition of only Orthodox Jewish religious authorities in personal and some civil status matters concerning Jews. Tensions between Israeli Jews and Palestinians were inflamed further during and in the aftermath of Israel's December 2008-January 2009 military campaign "Operation Cast Lead" against Hamas in the Gaza strip.

Occupied Territories

The Palestinian Authority (PA) does not have a constitution but has stated that the Palestinian Basic Law functions as its temporary constitution. The Basic Law states that Islam is the official religion and the principles of Shari'a (Islamic law) shall be the main source of legislation, but it provides for freedom of belief, worship and the performance of religious rites, unless they violate public order or morality. The Basic Law also proscribes discrimination based on religion and stipulates that all citizens are equal before the law and that basic human rights and liberties shall be protected. Israel exercised varying degrees of legal, military, and economic control in the Occupied Territories, and the Israeli Government generally respected the right to freedom of religion there during the reporting period. Despite these provisions for freedom of religion in the PA's Basic Law and the Israeli Government's Declaration of Independence, religious freedom restrictions continued in the Occupied Territories. In particular, Israel's strict closure policies and the separation barrier constructed by the Government of Israel had the effect of severely restricting the ability of Palestinian Muslims and Christians to reach places of worship and to practice their religious rites. Israeli law also restricted the ability of Israeli Jews to reach places of worship in areas under Palestinian control. The status of respect for religious freedom by the PA was unchanged during the reporting period, although problems persisted. The Gaza Strip remained under the control of Hamas during the reporting period, and the PA was therefore unable to

enforce respect for religious freedom or address reports of harassment of religious groups in the Gaza Strip: Christians and Muslims generally enjoyed good relations, although tensions existed. Tensions between Jews and non-Jews remained high, and continuing violence heightened those tensions.

Laos

During the reporting period, the overall status of respect for religious freedom did not significantly change. As was the case during previous reporting periods, officials in urban areas tended to show more acceptance of a variety of religious practices than those in rural areas. The law does not recognize a state religion; however, the Government's financial support and promotion of Buddhism, along with its willingness to exempt Buddhism from a number of restrictions, gave the religion an elevated status. Authorities in some of the country's 17 provinces continued to be suspicious of non-Buddhist religious communities and displayed intolerance for minority religious practice, particularly Protestant groups, whether or not they were officially recognized. Officials generally respected the constitutionally guaranteed rights of members of most religious groups to worship, albeit within strict constraints imposed by the Government. Some local officials, however, reportedly interfered with the right of Protestants to worship in a number of places, particularly in Luang Namtha and Bolikhamsai provinces. Arrests and detentions of Protestants reportedly occurred in Luang Namtha, Phongsali, and Savannakhet provinces. At the end of the reporting period, there were two known religious prisoners, both Protestants. A number of other Protestants were being detained for reasons other than their religion, although religion was alleged to have been a contributing factor in their arrests. Local officials also reportedly pressured Protestants in some locations to renounce their faith on threat of arrest or forceful eviction from their villages in Bolikhamsai, Houaphan, Salavan, Luang Prabang, Attapeu, Oudomsai, and Luang Namtha provinces.

Malaysia

The Constitution of Malaysia provides for religious freedom; however, other constitutional provisions designate Islam as "the religion of the Federation," define all ethnic Malays as Muslim, give the Government authority to regulate Islamic religious affairs, and prohibit the propagation of other faiths among Muslims. In general, there were few reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice. Malaysia maintains a dual legal system with both secular and Shari'a courts, the latter of which have jurisdiction over the Muslim population in certain civil matters. Shari'a courts generally prohibited those officially registered as Muslims from legally converting to another faith. Those who attempted conversion were deemed "apostates" and sometimes sent to

religious "rehabilitation" centers, where they received coerced religious instruction. The Government maintained a list of 56 "deviant" Islamic sects, and members of these and other banned groups may also be subject to "rehabilitation." Officials at the state level sometimes interfered with mosque activity by using mosques to convey political messages, preventing certain imams from speaking, and overseeing the content of sermons. Religious minorities remained generally free to practice their beliefs. Nevertheless, over the past several years, many have expressed concern that the civil court system has gradually ceded jurisdiction to Shari'a courts, particularly in areas of family law involving disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims. Religious minorities continued to face alleged violations of property rights and limitations on religious expression. The Hindu community continued to express concern about the demolition of Hindu temples.

Nigeria

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, including freedom to change one's religion or belief and freedom to manifest and propagate one's religion or belief through worship, teaching, practice, and observance. The Constitution prohibits state and local governments from adopting a state religion or giving preferential treatment to any religious or ethnic community, but the Constitution also provides that states may establish courts based on common law or customary law systems. Twelve northern states use Shari'a courts to adjudicate criminal and civil matters for Muslims and common law and customary law courts to adjudicate cases involving non-Muslims. The Government generally respected religious freedom in practice, although local political actors stoked sectarian violence with impunity, occasionally using religion as a catalyst. Violence, tension, and hostility between Christian and Muslim communities increased, as political and socioeconomic conflicts often divided persons along religious lines and were expressed in the targeting of religious symbols and spaces. Sectarian violence, exacerbated by indigene/settler laws, discriminatory employment practices, livelihood differences, and resource competition, was particularly acute in the Middle Belt and served to heighten tensions between religious groups, even in parts of the country that did not experience the violence. Religious differences often paralleled and exacerbated differences between ethnic groups. While the law prohibited religious discrimination in employment and other practices, some private businesses continued to discriminate on the basis of religion or ethnicity in their hiring practices. In many communities, Muslims or Christians who converted to another religion reportedly faced ostracism by members of their former religion.

North Korea

Although the Constitution provides for "freedom of religious belief," genuine religious freedom does not exist, and there was no change in the extremely poor level of respect for religious freedom during the reporting period. The Government severely restricted religious freedom, including organized religious activity, except that which was supervised tightly by officially recognized groups linked to the Government. Some foreigners who have visited the country stated that services at state-authorized churches appeared staged and contained political content supportive of the regime. The 2008 Korean Institute for National Unification White Paper indicated that the regime used authorized religious entities for external propaganda and political purposes, and that citizens were strictly barred from entering places of worship. Defectors reported the regime increased its investigation, repression, and persecution of unauthorized religious groups in recent years. Despite these restrictions, reports indicated contacts with religious personnel both inside the country and across the border in China appeared to be increasing. In June 2009 South Korean activists reported that Ri Hyon Ok was publicly executed for distributing Bibles in the city of Ryongchon near the Chinese border. She was allegedly accused of spying and organizing dissidents. These claims could not be independently verified. An estimated 150,000 to 200,000 persons were believed to be held in political prison camps in remote areas, some for religious reasons. Prison conditions are harsh; torture and starvation are common. Refugees and defectors who had been in prison stated that prisoners held on the basis of their religious beliefs generally were treated worse than other inmates.

Pakistan

The country is an Islamic republic; Islam is the state religion, and the Constitution requires that laws be consistent with Islamic principles. Despite some positive steps to improve the treatment of religious minorities during the reporting period, discussed in Part III, serious problems remained. Law enforcement personnel abused religious minorities in custody. Security forces and other government agencies did not adequately prevent or address societal abuse against minorities. Discriminatory legislation and the Government's failure to take action against societal forces hostile to those who practice a different religious belief fostered religious intolerance, acts of violence, and intimidation against religious minorities. Specific laws that discriminate against religious minorities include anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy laws that provide the death penalty for defiling Islam or its prophets. The Ahmadiyya community continued to face governmental and societal discrimination and legal bars to the practice of its religious beliefs. Members of minority Islamic sects also claimed governmental discrimination. Freedom of speech is subject to "reasonable" restrictions in the interests of the

"glory of Islam." Relations among religious communities were tense. Societal discrimination against religious minorities was widespread, and societal violence against such groups occurred. Non-governmental actors, including terrorist and extremist groups and individuals, targeted religious congregations. A domestic insurgency led by Sunni Taliban elements increased acts of violence and intimidation against religious minorities and exacerbated existing sectarian tensions. Imposition of extremist religious views on the majority Muslims loomed large as a threat throughout the reporting period due to the increased activity of an extremist insurgency, particularly in the Swat Valley. In various incidents, Muslims with liberal views, particularly women, were asked to follow a strict version of Islam and were threatened with dire consequences if they did not abide by it.

Russia

Although the Government generally respected freedom of religion for most of the population, authorities imposed restrictions on certain religious minorities and did not always respect separation of church and state and the equality of all religions before the law. Vague legislation to counter "extremism" has had a detrimental effect on religious freedom. There were indications that security services treated the leadership and literature of some minority religious groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses, as security threats. Alexander Dvorkin, an outspoken proponent of categorizing minority religious groups as extremist cults and "sects," was elected to head the Council of Experts that makes recommendations on designating these religious groups. Societal attitudes toward traditionally Muslim ethnic groups were negative in many regions, and there were manifestations of anti-Semitism as well as hostility toward Roman Catholics and other non-Orthodox Christian denominations. Instances of religiously motivated violence continued, although often it was difficult to determine whether xenophobic, religious, or ethnic prejudices were the primary motivation behind violent attacks. Conservative activists claiming ties to the Russian Orthodox Church occasionally disseminated negative publications and held protest meetings against religions considered nontraditional, including alternative Orthodox congregations. Some Russian Orthodox Church clergy, including Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill, publicly stated opposition to the expansion of the presence of some non-Orthodox Christian denominations, though other prominent societal leaders took positive steps to promote religious freedom. Many religious groups had difficulty acquiring land or permits to build houses of worship, and nontraditional denominations frequently complained that they were unable to obtain venues for worship.

Saudi Arabia

Freedom of religion is neither recognized nor protected under Saudi law and it is severely restricted in practice. The Government confirmed that, as a matter of policy, it guarantees and protects the right to private worship for all, including non-Muslims who gather in homes for religious services. This right was not always respected in practice and is not defined in law. The King's official title is "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques," reflecting the importance the royal family attaches to upholding Islam within the country as a central pillar of its legitimacy, both domestically and within the global Muslim community. The deep connection between the Al-Saud family and the religious establishment results in significant pressure on the state and society to adhere to the official Saudi interpretation of Islam and conservative societal norms. Some Muslims who do not adhere to this interpretation faced significant political, economic, legal, social, and religious discrimination, including limited employment and educational opportunities, underrepresentation in official institutions, and restrictions on the practice of their faith and on the building of places of worship and community centers. The largest group affected was the Shi'a. Moreover, the public practice of non-Muslim religions is prohibited, and the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV) continued to conduct raids of private non-Muslim religious gatherings. Although the Government also confirmed its stated policy to protect the right to possess and use personal religious materials, it did not provide for this right in law or practice. There were fewer charges of harassment and abuse at the hands of the CPVPV than in previous years, but incidents of CPVPV excesses continued to cause many non-Muslims to worship in secret, for fear of the police and CPVPV. Saudi textbooks continued to contain overtly intolerant statements against Jews and Christians and subtly intolerant statements against Shi'a and other religious groups, notwithstanding Government efforts to review educational materials to remove or revise such statements.

Somalia

Although the Transitional Federal Charter provides for religious freedom, there were limits on the extent to which this right was respected in practice. The Charter establishes Islam as the national religion, and proselytizing for any religion other than Islam is strictly prohibited. Moreover, statutes and regulations provide no effective recourse for violations of religious freedom. The independent regions of Somaliland and Puntland establish Islam as the official religion. On May 10, 2009, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) ratified legislation to implement Shari'a law nationwide. In practice, the TFG does not have the capacity or mechanisms to implement the legislation uniformly. The TFG generally did not enforce legal protections of religious freedom. There was a decline in the status of respect for religious freedom during the reporting period, primarily as a result of

extremist militias taking control over significant territory in the country. Militia groups, particularly those associated with the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization al-Shabaab, often imposed through violence a strict interpretation of Islam on communities under their control. In religiously motivated violence, al-Shabaab destroyed the tombs of revered Sufi clerics and killed clerics, civilians, and government officials of Sufi orientation. In targeted assassinations, members of these extremist groups killed TFG officials and allies they denounced as non-Muslims or apostates. There were also reports that individuals who do not practice Islam experienced discrimination, violence, and detention because of their religious beliefs. There were no public places of worship for non-Muslims in the country. A political process to establish peace and stability in the country continued.

Sudan

The Interim National Constitution (INC) provided for freedom of religion throughout the country; however, the INC enshrined Shari'a as a source of legislation in the north, and the official laws and policies of the Government of National Unity (GNU) favor Islam in the north. The Constitution of Southern Sudan provides for freedom of religion in the south, and other laws and policies of the Government of South Sudan contributed to the generally free practice of religion in the 10 states of the south. Although the GNU generally did not vigorously enforce its strictest restrictions on religious freedom, it generally did not respect religious plurality and continued to place some restrictions on Christians in the north. Even so, unlike in prior reporting periods, Christian churches in the north reported that they held regular religious services and large holiday celebrations without government interference. There were some reports of societal abuses and discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice, and religious prejudices remained prevalent throughout the country.

Tajikistan

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, but legislation and governmental decrees contradict this right. The Government continued to promote secularism and allowed religious practice only under tight controls. Respect for religious freedom continued to decline during the reporting period. The Government passed a new religion law that includes significant restrictions on religious expression, particularly among the country's majority Muslim population, and it continued to use the registration process to hinder, influence, or intimidate religious organizations and communities. The Government expanded its efforts to control virtually all aspects of religious life, and government officials actively monitored religious groups, institutions, and figures. Government policies

reflected a concern about Islamic extremism, and government officials used these concerns to justify imposing restrictions and engaging in surveillance.

Turkey

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and other laws and policies contributed to the generally free practice of religion; however, constitutional provisions regarding the integrity and existence of the secular state restricted these rights. There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom by the Government during the reporting period. The Government continued to impose limitations on Muslim and other religious groups and significant restrictions on individuals' Islamic religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions, including universities, for the stated reason of preserving the "secular state." Authorities continued their broad ban on wearing Islamic religious headscarves in government offices as well as in public schools. Minority religious groups faced difficulties in worshipping, registering with the Government, and training their members. Societal threats against non-Muslims created an atmosphere of pressure and diminished freedom for some non-Muslim communities. Many Christians, Baha'is, and heterodox Muslims faced societal suspicion and mistrust, and some elements of society continued to express anti-Semitic sentiments.

Turkmenistan

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion and does not establish a state religion; however, in practice the Government continued to restrict the free practice of religion. There were small improvements in the status of respect for religious freedom by the Government during the reporting period, but troubling developments in the treatment of some registered and unregistered groups continued. All groups must register to gain legal status; unregistered religious activity is illegal and may be punished by administrative fines. Several religious groups remained unable to register, and the Government restricted registered groups' ability to own property, print or import religious materials, and host foreign guests. There were reports of raids and arbitrary detentions involving Jehovah's Witnesses.

Uzbekistan

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion and for the principle of separation of church and state; however, the 1998 Religion Law restricts many rights only to registered religious groups and limits which groups may register. Respect for religious freedom declined in several respects during the reporting period. The Government's campaign against unauthorized Islamic groups

suspected of extremist sentiments or activities continued; alleged members were arrested and sentenced to lengthy jail terms. The number of individuals imprisoned for membership in extremist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir appeared to decrease for the second year in a row; however, the Government appeared to shift its focus to Nur, a Turkish Muslim group, arresting at least 33 alleged Nur members and sentencing many of them to prison terms ranging from six to 12 years. The Government did not interfere with worshippers at sanctioned mosques and permitted the operation of other religious groups it considered mainstream. Some minority religious groups remained unregistered because they were unable to satisfy the strict registration requirements set out by the law. These groups, particularly those perceived as engaging in proselytism, experienced raids, harassment, and the detention of their leaders and members; some faced criminal charges. Religious groups enjoyed generally tolerant relations, although some minority religious groups continued to face negative media coverage and neighbors, family, and employers sometimes continued to pressure ethnic Uzbek Christians.

Venezuela

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion on the condition that the practice of a religion does not violate public morality, decency, or the public order. The Government generally respected the practice of religious freedom; however, religious groups, like others that criticized the Government, were subject to harassment and intimidation. During the reporting period leaders within the Catholic Church issued several statements critical of the country's democracy and human rights record. In response, President Chavez and other government officials on multiple occasions publicly criticized specific Catholic bishops and the Papal Nuncio. On April 6, 2009, the Catholic Episcopal Conference of Venezuela (CEV) issued a communiqué warning that the country's democratic system was "at risk of collapse." On April 13, 2009, unknown assailants robbed the Caracas headquarters of the CEV, stealing a laptop computer. Jewish leaders reported numerous incidents of anti-Semitism including graffiti, slurs, political cartoons, and media commentary. In January 2009 armed gunmen vandalized the Tiferet Israel synagogue, the oldest synagogue in Caracas, held the building for several hours, and spray-painted the walls with anti-Semitic slurs. In February 2009 criminal charges were filed against 11 persons, including several police officers, in connection with the vandalism. There were some efforts by the Government to limit the influence of religious groups in certain geographic, social, and political areas. Foreign missionaries, who require special visas, noted continued difficulties, especially for access to indigenous areas.

Vietnam

Respect for religious freedom and practice continued to improve in some regards during the reporting period, though significant problems remained. The Government took further steps to implement its 2004 Ordinance on Religion and Belief and supplemental decrees on religious policy issued in 2005. During the reporting period, the Government granted national recognition to five Protestant denominations and four additional religions: the Bani Muslim Sect, the Threefold Enlightened Truth Path, the Threefold Southern Tradition, and the Baha'i Community. Also during the reporting period, the Government granted national registration certificates to one additional Protestant denomination as well as two additional religious groups. Some problems remained with implementation, primarily at the provincial and village level, including the slow pace--in some cases inaction--of registration of Protestant congregations in the north and the Northwest and Central Highlands; inconsistent application of procedures for the registration of congregations; and other cumbersome legal requirements and restrictions on religious recruitment. In some areas where registrations have been slow, Protestant congregations experienced harassment, such as in Tra Vinh province in the Mekong Delta and some isolated areas in the Northwest Highlands. There were unresolved property claims with virtually all religious groups including the Catholic Church, SECV, ECVN, and many smaller denominations, resulting, in particular, in large-scale Catholic protests that were forcibly repressed.

Yemen

The Constitution does not protect or inhibit freedom of religion. The Constitution declares that Islam is the state religion and that Shari'a (Islamic law) is the source of all legislation. Muslims and followers of religious groups other than Islam are free to worship according to their beliefs; however, the Government prohibits conversion from Islam and the proselytizing of Muslims. There was a decrease in the status of respect for religious freedom by the Government during the reporting period, particularly with regard to the Baha'i and Jewish communities. Following increased harassment, threats, and the killing of a Jewish community leader, many Jewish residents of Amran governorate began making plans to leave Yemen. The Government appeared unwilling or unable to increase security for the remaining Jewish population. For the first time, based on fears for the community's safety in Yemen, the U.S. Government initiated a special process to refer the Yemeni Jews for refugee resettlement in the United States. During the reporting period, the Government detained members of the Baha'i community because of their religious beliefs and they faced deportation, and there were reports of arrests of Christian converts. Some Zaydi Muslims reported that they continued to feel targeted by government entities for their religious affiliation.

PART II: U.S. ACTIONS IN COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN

This section highlights actions by U.S. government officials to promote religious freedom and to encourage governments to take positive steps to improve religious freedom conditions in the Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs). The IRF Act requires an annual review of the status of religious freedom worldwide and the designation as CPCs of countries that have "engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom" during the reporting period. Following the designation, a period of negotiation may ensue, in which the United States seeks to work with a designated country to bring about change. Subsequently, depending upon the results of these discussions, the Secretary of State takes one or more actions, pursuant to the IRF Act.

Options for such actions include application of sanctions or negotiation of a bilateral agreement to improve religious freedom. Sanctions may be waived to further the purpose of the IRF Act or to further national interest. Some of these countries have also seen limited positive developments under circumstances where abuses of religious freedom are generally severe, and these are highlighted in Part III. Additional information can be found in the country reports. The Office of International Religious Freedom, headed by an Ambassador at Large, works throughout the year to promote religious freedom in each CPC.

In addition to its efforts in CPCs, the Department of State monitors religious persecution and discrimination worldwide, implements policies, develops initiatives, funds programs, and actively works bilaterally and multilaterally to foster greater respect for religious freedom. Through diplomacy, the United States seeks to promote freedom of religion and conscience throughout the world as a fundamental human right and as a source of stability for all countries.

Burma

Burma first was designated a CPC in 1999 and most recently was re-designated on January 16, 2009. As the action under the IRF Act, the Secretary designated the existing ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(1), pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act. The U.S. Government has a wide array of financial and trade sanctions in place against Burma for its violations of human rights. The passage and signing into law in July 2008 of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese Junta Anti-Democratic Efforts Act further strengthened these sanctions. The U.S. Government advocated religious freedom with all strata of society, including government officials, religious leaders, private citizens, scholars, foreign

diplomats, and international business and media representatives. Through outreach and travel, when not blocked by regime officials, embassy representatives offered support to and exchanged information with many otherwise isolated local nongovernmental organizations and religious leaders. The U.S. Government funded a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees program to issue identification cards to undocumented Rohingya Muslims to facilitate their registration of births and marriages and access to basic education and health care.

China

China first was designated a CPC in 1999 and most recently was re-designated on January 16, 2009. As the action under the IRF Act, the Secretary designated the existing ongoing restrictions on exports to China of crime control and detection instruments and equipment, under P.L. 101-246 and the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1990 and 1991, pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act. The U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, and the Consulates General in Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Wuhan made a concerted effort to encourage greater religious freedom in China. U.S. officials condemned abuses while supporting positive trends within the country and urged the Government to expand the scope of religious freedom for both registered and unregistered religious groups according to citizens' constitutional and internationally recognized rights. U.S. officials protested the imprisonment of, asked to attend the trials of, and requested further information about numerous individual religious prisoners. U.S. officials encouraged the Government to address policies that restricted Tibetan Buddhist religious practices and contributed to tensions in the TAR and other Tibetan regions. Secretary of State Clinton raised religious freedom issues in meetings with Chinese leaders and attended services at a registered Protestant church in February 2009. In May 2009 Speaker of the House of Representatives Pelosi raised religious freedom concerns and attended mass at a registered Catholic church in Shanghai.

Eritrea

Eritrea first was designated a CPC in 2004 and most recently was re-designated on January 16, 2009. As the action under the IRF Act, the Secretary designated the ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a), pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act. The U.S. Ambassador and other embassy officers raised the cases of detention and restrictions on unregistered religious groups in prior reporting periods with officials in the President's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the leaders of the sole legal political party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice. Despite repeated attempts, government authorities responsible for religious affairs did not grant U.S. embassy officials opportunities

to specifically discuss instances of religious freedom abuse during the reporting period.

Iran

Iran first was designated a CPC in 1999 and most recently was re-designated on January 16, 2009. As the action under the IRF Act, the Secretary designated the existing ongoing restrictions on United States security assistance in accordance with section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act. The United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran, and thus it does not raise directly with the Government the restrictions the Government places on religious freedom and other abuses the Government commits against adherents of minority religious groups. The U.S. Government makes its position clear in public statements and reports, support for relevant UN and nongovernmental organization efforts, and diplomatic initiatives to press for an end to government abuses. The United States calls on other countries with bilateral relations with Iran to use those ties to press the Government on religious freedom and human rights. On numerous occasions, the U.S. State Department spokesman has addressed the situation of the Baha'i and Jewish communities in the country. In UN resolutions, the U.S. Government has publicly condemned the treatment of the Baha'is, including a resolution that passed in the General Assembly in 2008. The U.S. Government encourages other governments to make similar statements.

North Korea

The Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK) first was designated a CPC in 2001 and most recently was re-designated on January 16, 2009. As the action under the IRF Act, the Secretary designated the existing ongoing restrictions to which North Korea is subject pursuant to sections 402 and 409 of the Trade Act of 1974 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment), pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act. The United States has no diplomatic relations with North Korea, and thus it does not raise directly with the Government the restrictions the Government places on religious freedom and other abuses the Government commits against adherents of minority religious groups. The U.S. Government raised its concerns about the deplorable state of human rights in the country with bilateral partners and in multilateral forums. In December 2008 the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution with U.S. co-sponsorship that condemned the country's poor human rights record, expressing special concern at "continuing reports of systemic, widespread and grave violations" of human rights. The resolution called on North Korea to fulfill its obligations under human rights instruments to which it is a party and further urged the Government to permit UN special representatives to visit and to ensure that humanitarian organizations have free access to the country. The

Department of State continued to support programs that document human rights abuses and increase the availability of outside information in the country, and provided support to NGOs that seek to build the capacity of South Korea-based NGOs in their efforts to improve and expand monitoring and reporting of the human rights situation in North Korea. Radio Free Asia and Voice of America also provided regular Korean-language broadcasting.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia first was designated a CPC in 2004 and most recently was re-designated on January 16, 2009. The Secretary authorized a waiver of actions under the IRF Act to further the purposes of the Act, pursuant to section 407 of the Act. U.S. government policy is to press the Government consistently to honor its public commitment to permit private religious worship by non-Muslims, eliminate discrimination against minorities, promote tolerance toward non-Muslims, and combat extremism. During the reporting period, the U.S. Ambassador met with senior government and religious leaders regarding religious freedom and raised with senior officials specific cases of violations. Other senior U.S. officials encouraged the Government to honor policies to halt the dissemination of intolerant literature and extremist ideology within the country and around the world, protect private worship for all religious groups, curb harassment of religious groups, and promote tolerance toward all religions. Senior U.S. officials supported provisions calling for religious tolerance, including elimination of discrimination against religious minorities, improved respect for human rights, and improved accountability and transparency in these matters. They also raised specific cases and instances of religious freedom violations with senior Saudi officials. An official from the U.S. Department of State's Office of International Religious Freedom visited Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dhahran to promote U.S. views on religious freedom.

Sudan

Sudan first was designated a CPC in 1999 and most recently was re-designated on January 16, 2009. As the action under the IRF Act, the Secretary designated the use of the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any loan or other use of the funds of international financial institutions to or for Sudan consistent with 1621 of the International Financial Institutions Act, pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act. The U.S. Government encouraged respect for religious freedom in its discussions with the Government of National Unity and urged it to fulfill the promise of religious freedom in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Interim National Constitution. U.S. embassy officials met regularly with leaders

from many Muslim and Christian groups in Khartoum, Juba, and elsewhere, noting the importance of religious freedom and the extent of U.S. interest and concern.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan first was designated a CPC in 2006 and was re-designated on January 16, 2009. The Secretary authorized a 180-day waiver of actions under the IRF Act, effective January 16, 2009, to further the purposes of the Act, pursuant to section 407 of the Act. During the reporting period, the U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan and other embassy officials met with local religious leaders, human rights activists, and government officials to discuss specific issues of human rights and religious freedom. The Embassy emphasized the importance of religious freedom by hosting a variety of discussions and providing small grants to local groups focusing on religious freedom, and intervening with difficulties religious groups or faith-based foreign aid organizations faced. In November 2008, the Embassy hosted a roundtable with colleagues from other foreign missions and representatives from several evangelical Protestant denominations and the Jehovah's Witnesses to discuss issues affecting those communities. Officials in Washington, D.C., met on several occasions with Embassy of Uzbekistan officials to convey U.S. concerns regarding religious freedom. U.S. officials, both in Washington, D.C., and in Tashkent, encouraged the Government to release religious prisoners of conscience and revise its laws on religion, including lowering the 100-member minimum required to form a religious group, lifting restrictions on the importation and publication of religious literature, and eliminating legal provisions prohibiting the private teaching of religion, which the U.S. Government believes is an essential element for preventing further radicalization of young Muslims.

PART III: IMPROVEMENTS AND POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS

This section highlights specific improvements in religious freedom conditions and positive developments during the reporting period that could lead to significant and lasting change. These developments took place across varied settings and do not reflect an overall assessment of religious freedom conditions in a country; some countries listed below already have excellent records on religious freedom, and others do not. Data from previous *Annual Reports* suggest that improvements in respect for religious freedom often develop incrementally over time, usually alongside complex and ongoing concerns. This section recognizes steps government and prominent societal actors took toward the achievement of significant improvements in religious freedom conditions, which must be identified under the IRF Act. Additional information helpful for placing these developments in context can be found in the country reports.

Australia

The Government has put in place extensive programs to promote respect for religious pluralism and in December 2008 established the Multicultural Advisory Council to provide advice on social "cohesion issues relating to Australia's cultural and religious diversity." The Government worked with Muslim leaders on the Advisory Council to develop de-radicalization programs for convicted terrorists. In December 2008, the Government launched the National Human Rights Consultation to seek the views of the public on how better to protect human rights. It was due to report to the Government by August 31, 2009. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission was preparing a report entitled *Freedom of Religion and Belief in the 21st Century*. Prominent Catholic, Anglican, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist leaders launched the Ambrose Centre for Religious Liberty in April 2009. One of the Centre's concerns is that the country's anti-vilification laws can be used against religious leaders who express views critical of other religions.

Bahrain

The Ministry of Education worked with the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs to develop a new religious education curriculum that covers the five principal schools of Islamic jurisprudence and practices and includes content opposing extremism. The Government has yet to give the curriculum its approval, after which it will go to Parliament for legislative approval. Also during the reporting period, the Government allowed members of some Christian churches to visit Christian prison inmates regularly to provide clothing and Christian literature.

Bangladesh

On December 29, 2008, the Awami League (AL), an avowedly secular party that enjoys broad support from religious minorities, won power in the first parliamentary elections since 2001. These elections were largely free of the violence and intimidation against religious minorities that had characterized earlier ones. The Government initiated efforts to reform the curriculum of Islamic religious schools, known as madrassahs, to standardize education. The Government also appointed members of the minority communities to senior leadership positions and took steps to promote interfaith understanding. For example, government leaders issued statements on the eve of religious holidays calling for peace and warned that they would take action against those attempting to disrupt the celebrations. There were reports of societal abuses and discrimination based on religious belief or practice, but figures suggested that they declined significantly in comparison to the previous reporting period.

Brazil

In September 2008 the Rio de Janeiro State Legislature created a religious intolerance hotline number to register cases of discrimination or threats against any religion. In January 2009 representatives of various religious groups met in Rio de Janeiro to launch the NGO-published *Guide to Combat Racism and Religious Intolerance (Freedom Manual)*, written by a former state secretary of human rights. Police distributed the manual to police stations and religious organizations in Rio de Janeiro to advise officers on how to respond to discrimination complaints.

China

During the reporting period, government officials allowed increased space for some unregistered religious groups they viewed as non-threatening. The government took cautious measures to promote Buddhism, Taoism, and some folk religions within the framework of the Patriotic Religious Associations (PRAs). For example, in March the state-sanctioned Buddhist Association of China co-organized the Second World Buddhist Forum in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province. Most Christian groups, the majority of which were not affiliated with one of the PRAs, no longer operated in strict secrecy, and a branch of the State Council held an unprecedented meeting with a delegation of house church leaders. Reinforcing comments President Hu Jintao made in a 2007 speech to the 17th Chinese Communist Party National People's Congress, the Government stated in its new National Human Rights Action Plan that it would "encourage and support religious circles in launching social welfare programs [and] exploring methods and channels for religions to better serve society and promote the people's well-being." The Government did not indicate whether these statements would apply to unregistered religious groups outside the PRAs.

Germany

Chancellor Merkel accompanied U.S. President Barack Obama to the former concentration camp at Buchenwald during the President's June 5, 2009, visit, commemorating the victims of the Holocaust and the Nazi regime. The Government monitored right-wing extremists, conducted investigations into anti-Semitic crimes, and at times banned extremist groups deemed a threat to public order. Authorities sought to address right-wing extremism by conducting a variety of education programs to promote tolerance, many focusing on anti-Semitism and xenophobia. On November 4, 2008, the Bundestag passed a resolution addressing anti-Semitism in which it called upon the Government to create an experts group to coordinate government activities to combat anti-Semitism and provide routine

reports and an action plan to address the issue. The Government promoted tolerance by establishing dialogues with representatives of immigrant and Muslim groups on the integration of minorities and immigrants and on Islamic matters at the Chancellor and Interior Minister levels. On the local level, the Government hosted an exhibition on Muslim integration and the first Government Iftar. The Government released a progress report on its 2007 National Integration Plan, in which state and local authorities, representatives of minority groups, and the Government adopted measures and voluntary commitments relating to integration.

India

Government officials responded to a number of new and previous violent events, helping to prevent communal violence and providing relief and rehabilitation packages for victims and their families.

Indonesia

The Government prosecuted two key leaders of hardline Muslim organizations who were convicted and sentenced to 18 months in prison for their role in organized violence against a peaceful demonstration in support of religious freedom and pluralism. Although the two leaders were released after serving only nine months, the convictions are examples of the Government's growing willingness to pursue criminal actions in cases of violence against religious minorities. The Government also prosecuted terrorists responsible for religiously tinged violence in Sulawesi and the Maluku.

Kazakhstan

The Constitutional Council ruled in February 2009 that proposed amendments to the religion law were unconstitutional. In response to concerns about the restrictive nature of the legislation, the Government had received expert legal assistance from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and had incorporated some of its suggestions into the text of the legislation. On April 14, 2009, the President's Human Rights Commission (HRC), an advisory body within the Presidential Administration, presented the National Action Plan on Human Rights for 2009-12, the country's first such plan. One of the HRC's recommendations is that the Ministry of Justice, in collaboration with nongovernmental organizations, begin publishing annual reports on the status of religious freedom in the country. It also proposed that by 2011, the country should amend its religious legislation to bring it in line with international standards. The President signed the Action Plan in June 2009. In comparison to the previous reporting period, the Government's criticism

of "nontraditional religious groups" decreased. With the Atyrau group's registration, local Jehovah's Witnesses achieved registration in all 14 oblasts.

Lebanon

Citizens were able to remove their religious affiliation from their civil registry records following the February 11, 2009, issuance of a circular allowing citizens to remove their confessional identity from their civil registry records if they wish to do so.

Moldova

Following an April 2008 ruling of the Chisinau Appeals Court, all Jehovah's Witnesses missionaries received work permits. On February 2, 2009, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) added two new courses dedicated to religious freedom to training programs of the National Institute of Justice and instituted related seminars in the first semester of 2009. Following a July 1, 2008, roundtable discussion supported by the United Nations Development Program between the Government and religious groups, the Government published on the MOJ website a guide to the laws and regulations that govern registration of religious groups and their component parts.

The Netherlands

In 2008 the Government began a four-year, \$38 million (€26 million) outreach campaign to schools and neighborhoods to counter anti-Muslim sentiments, Islamic extremism, and right-wing nationalism. These efforts raised public awareness and triggered debate, but concerns about the policy's effectiveness remained. The Government regularly told prosecutors and the police to give proper attention to incidents of discrimination. In March 2009 Parliament adopted a law obliging all local governments to create antidiscrimination units. The Government followed up with a campaign to encourage victims to report incidents of discrimination. The Government also took measures to deal more effectively with discrimination and incitement to hatred on the Internet; however, critics charged that law enforcement agencies could do considerably more.

New Zealand

The New Zealand Human Rights Commission (HRC) continued to implement its Statement on Religious Diversity published in 2007, which aims to provide for equal treatment of all faiths before the state, the right to safety for religious individuals and communities, freedom of religious expression, the right to recognition and reasonable accommodation for religious groups, and the promotion of understanding in education. On March 26, 2009, the New Zealand police

released a new edition of "A Practical Reference to Religious Diversity" as a guide for its officers. The publication contains information on various faiths and religious practices in New Zealand and is designed to assist police in working within diverse religious communities. The guide also sets out basic human rights principles concerning religious diversity.

Oman

The Government lifted previous limitations on the number of religious workers in the country and shortened the process for granting permission to religious leaders to enter the country from two months to one week.

Pakistan

The Government took some limited steps to improve its treatment of religious minorities during the reporting period. The democratically elected Government appointed a Roman Catholic as Federal Minister for Minorities Affairs and upgraded his position to a cabinet minister. The Government allocated a 5 percent quota for religious minorities in all federal jobs and directed provincial governments to implement the same at the provincial level. The Government also decided to celebrate Minorities' Day on August 11 every year at the national level.

Qatar

The Government took steps during the reporting period to allow for increased religious expression, as the Indian Inter-Denominational Christian Church complex at Mesaimmer (offering Protestant and Catholic services) was inaugurated, and construction continued on four additional church facilities within the complex. In 2008 a Roman Catholic church opened for services, the first church built in Doha.

Saudi Arabia

While overall government policies continued to place severe restrictions on religious freedom, there were incremental improvements in specific areas during the reporting period, including better protection of the right to possess and use religious materials; increased scrutiny of and training for the members of the CPVPV; somewhat greater authority and capacity for official human rights entities to operate; limited education reform; and select measures to combat extremist ideology, including close scrutiny of Friday sermons by the Government; and sermons by leading clerics promoting tolerance and moderation.

Serbia

During the reporting period there were a number of positive developments. On November 26, 2008, Assistant Religion Minister Dragan Novakovic expressed to

the media his regret that most attacks on religious communities were prosecuted as minor offenses such as disturbing the peace instead of as incitement of hatred, which carries more severe penalties. In April 2009 Assistant Minister Novakovic visited a licensed Adventist high school in Novi Sad. On December 18, 2008, he met with Jehovah's Witnesses' representatives in Belgrade, the first such visit of a government official to the group's premises. Local authorities in Mladenovac issued a permit to the Christian Adventist Church to continue construction of its house of worship, a project that had been halted for more than two years due to previous decisions ordering destruction of the building. There continued to be progress on restitution of religious property seized in 1945 or later.

Spain

The City of Madrid held its first International Seminar on Anti-Semitism. City authorities of Lleida approved the construction of the first purpose-built mosque in Catalonia in modern times.

Tunisia

The Government facilitated and promoted the annual Jewish pilgrimage to the El-Ghriba Synagogue in Djerba, celebrated on the Jewish holiday of Lag B'Omer, and approximately 6,000 Jews, most with ties to the country, traveled from abroad to participate. According to the president of the Djerban Jewish community, attendance was the largest since al-Qa'ida attacked the synagogue in 2002, killing 21 persons. Local Jewish leaders stated that 20 to 25 percent of these pilgrims were Israeli citizens traveling under the relaxed travel policies that went into effect in 2004.

Turkmenistan

Despite continued problems, there were many small improvements during the reporting period. A policeman was fined a significant amount for beating a member of Jehovah's Witnesses in the only case of physical brutality reported. Two religious groups reported being able to share their faiths publicly without harassment for the first time. One unregistered group's leader reported that the group's adherents gathered in small groups in private apartments and were no longer raided by police or fined as occurred in the past. Government promotion of the *Ruhnama*, the former president's book on the spiritual and cultural life of the country, decreased. The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief carried out a mission. The Government continued construction of large mosques in each of the provincial capitals, as well as smaller mosques in a number of villages and towns. All groups reported an easing of tensions.

Vietnam

Despite continued abuses, the Government took steps to assist in the training of new religious leadership--Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, and other religions--by facilitating the construction of new training facilities and furthering the education of thousands of monks, priests, nuns, and pastors. New congregations were registered in many of the country's 64 provinces, a number of new religious groups were both recognized and registered at the national level, and citizens were generally allowed to practice religion more freely. The Catholic Church, various Protestant congregations, and other smaller religious groups reported that their ability to gather and worship improved and that the Government eased restrictions on the assignment of new clergy. The Government also permitted Buddhists, Catholics, and Protestants to hold several large-scale religious services throughout the country with more than 10,000 religious followers participating at each event. The Catholic Church reported that the Government approved the establishment of one additional Catholic seminary in Nam Dinh Province. Protestants and Catholics across the north reported improvement in most officials' attitudes toward their religion, and in general Protestants and Catholics were allowed to gather for worship without harassment, despite some isolated incidents.

Initiatives Toward Interfaith Tolerance and Understanding

In addition to the improvements and positive developments described above, many governments and key societal actors made new efforts during the reporting period to promote tolerance, dialogue, and an environment conducive to societal coexistence between religions. More information about most of these initiatives can be found in the country reports; there is no country report on the Vatican, however.

International Initiatives

International interfaith initiatives are growing in many parts of the world, and the Middle East region in particular has seen a growing interest in intra-faith and interfaith dialogue. There have been repeated calls for the promotion of tolerance, dialogue, and coexistence, resulting in joint efforts both within and beyond the region. The Doha Conference on Interfaith Dialogue has convened annually in Qatar since 2002. Jordanian King Abdullah's "Amman Message" of 2004 has promoted a number of interfaith conferences and activities and was an important precursor to further efforts. In Saudi Arabia, the Muslim World League held an intra-faith conference for Muslims, which was followed by the July 2008 Interfaith

Conference in Madrid and then by Saudi King Abdullah's Interfaith Dialogue Initiative in November 2008 at the United Nations.

The October 2007 release of a 21-page letter organized by Jordan's Prince Talal and signed by 138 Muslim leaders from around the world formed the basis for several ongoing initiatives. The letter was addressed to the Pope and other Christian leaders after the Pope's controversial Regensburg speech of September 2006 and in effect articulated for the first time a consensus among widely diverse (but not all) members of the Muslim community. The Vatican responded publicly in late November 2007, and in the spring of 2008 Muslims and Christians, primarily Roman Catholics, met to begin a dialogue based on the letter's recognition of their shared scriptures requiring love of God and one's neighbor. The first Catholic-Muslim Forum met formally in November 2008. In the meantime, Yale Divinity School organized a three-page reply signed by 300 Christian scholars and leaders representing scores of denominations and institutions. The Archbishop of Canterbury and others also issued separate personal responses.

The Vatican has also been involved in the Mecca-based World Muslim League initiative discussed above and in an ongoing dialogue with Shi'a, mostly Iranians. The Holy See has taken a leading role in recent engagement with Islam, accompanied by growing interest from diverse religious groups and regions.

Muslims engaged in dialogue with the Holy See seek greater respect for Islam, particularly in the West, and wish to emphasize that Islam is a religion of peace and disassociate it from violence. The Holy See favors a dialogue that will lead to greater religious freedom and tolerance for differences. In the letter exchange between Prince Talal and the Vatican, analysts have noted references from both sides to longstanding areas of concern, such as respect for the dignity of every human person and respect for religious freedom, often expressed in terms of "reciprocity." Other areas of concern include educating the public on the essential elements of both religions, sharing religious experience, and promoting mutual respect instead of violence, especially among the young.

Within-Country Initiatives

Argentina: The Government continued to sponsor numerous interfaith dialogues, including high-profile events such as Religious Freedom Day.

Hungary: In light of increased reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice, especially anti-Semitic rhetoric, Christian churches and the Jewish community continued to organize regular events under the auspices of the Christian-Jewish Society, which brings together religious academicians for discussions. The Budapest conference of the Catholic-Jewish Relations International Committee issued a statement declaring that Catholic and Jewish dialogue that results in growing friendship and understanding is a "sign of hope and inspiration for our troubled world."

India: Efforts at ecumenical understanding brought religious leaders together to defuse religious tensions. Prominent leaders of all religious groups made public efforts to show respect for other religious groups by celebrating their holidays and attending social events such as weddings. Muslim groups protested against the mistreatment of Christians by Hindu extremists. Christian clergy and spokespersons for Christian organizations issued public statements condemning anti-Muslim violence in places such as Gujarat. In the aftermath of the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist strikes, religious leaders of all communities condemned the attacks and issued statements to maintain communal harmony.

Norway: The Council for Religious and Philosophical Communities, including the state church and other religious communities, organized events including a "dialogue conference" and a debate about religion in educational institutions. The Oslo Coalition for Freedom of Religious Beliefs facilitated closer coordination and international cooperation on religious freedom issues and conducted research projects on New Directions in Islamic Thought and Practice, Facilitating Freedom of Religion, Missionary Activities and Human Rights, and Teaching for Tolerance and Religious Freedom.

Oman: The Government sponsored regular interfaith dialogues and fora for examining differing interpretations of Islam, Christianity, and philosophical approaches that are not tied to a specific religion.

Samoa: Religious freedom issues were discussed and debated at the Pacific Futures Law and Religion Symposium, which brought together the Head of State, Chief Justice, Deputy Prime Minister, religious leaders, and academics.

South Korea: Prominent religious leaders regularly met privately and under government auspices to promote understanding and tolerance.

Switzerland: Religious communities in approximately 40 cities across the country joined together to celebrate a "Week of Religions" under the motto "Getting to Know Each Other." For a week, Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, and Baha'is invited each other to attend their religious services and held a series of special events such as music concerts, panel discussions, round table meetings, and open discussion forums.

Syria: The Government and civil society hosted numerous interfaith dialogue events and conferences, including "The Message of Peace in Islam," "Islam and the West," "Religion and Respect: Learning from Each Other's Faith," and a workshop on the role of women in promoting interfaith dialogue. The "Sham Spiritual Oasis" architecture exhibition, sponsored by Wadi Deir Mar Musa and the European Union, featured proposals by international architects for an eco-cultural way station that would provide a multi-functional space for people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds to join one another for meditation and educational cooperation. The Government announced that the winning design would be built at Deir Mar Musa on 14 hectares of land the Government donated.

Thailand: In accordance with a clause retained in the 2007 Constitution requiring the Government to "promote good understanding and harmony among followers of all religions," the Government actively sponsored interfaith dialogue through regular meetings and numerous public education programs, including youth reconciliation camps, popular media, and initiatives for poverty relief and crime prevention.

Ukraine: The Government continued to promote interfaith understanding by frequently consulting with the All-Ukraine Council of Churches and Religious Organizations, which represents more than 90 percent of the religiously active population. In April 2009 the Ministry of Defense and major religious groups formed the Council for Pastoral Support.

We are encouraged by this growing recognition by governments and religious leaders that extremism is a common enemy and that freedom and respectful religious coexistence are critical to our shared future. We look forward to broadening these conversations to include the full diversity of faith traditions and to build a world in which all are free to choose and practice their faith and live according to their conscience.

INTRODUCTION

RELEASE IN FULL

Freedom of religion is central to the ability of peoples to live together.

--President Barack Obama

In his landmark speech at Cairo University, President Obama articulated his vision for "a new beginning" between the United States and Muslims around the world — a relationship based on mutual interest and mutual respect. Building stronger ties, he said, requires "a sustained effort to listen to each other, to learn from each other, to respect one another, and to seek common ground." This renewed engagement compels us not to shirk from contentious issues but rather to "face these tensions squarely" and work as partners to solve problems.

The Department of State offers its *Annual Report on International Religious Freedom* in this spirit of dialogue and cooperation. Religion is a global phenomenon; all countries face the challenges and opportunities religious diversity poses, and no country has a perfect record on religious freedom. As Americans we are rightfully proud of our own heritage of religious liberty; countless religious refugees have fled persecution in their homelands and found sanctuary on our shores. But we are also painfully aware of our nation's past mistreatment of certain minority groups. From the public execution of Quakers in mid-17th century Massachusetts Bay Colony to the expulsion of Mormons from Missouri in 1838-39 to the discrimination many Muslim Americans felt following 9/11, our society has long struggled to accommodate its religious diversity. Yet we have learned from experience that we are enriched by a pluralism that is endorsed by government and embraced by society. Through the *Annual Report* and other diplomatic efforts, we encourage all nations to protect religious freedom and promote religious tolerance for all groups and individuals. As President Obama said in Cairo:

"People in every country should be free to choose and live their faith based upon the persuasion of the mind and the heart and the soul. This tolerance is essential for religion to thrive, but it's being challenged in many different ways."

The *Annual Report* surveys those "many different ways" in 198 countries and territories. Covering both deteriorations and improvements in the status of governmental and societal respect for religious freedom, the *Annual Report* aims to be comprehensive and balanced, considering the diversity and dynamism of the world's religious traditions and socio-political contexts. Despite the varied

conditions religious communities encounter around the globe, the principled and practical reasons for safeguarding their freedom remain the same: religious freedom is a fundamental right, a social good, a source of stability, and a key to international security. President Obama touched on issues related to each of these four reasons in remarks given throughout this past year.

First, religious freedom is the birthright of all people, regardless of their faith or lack thereof. Enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments, the freedom to profess, practice, and propagate one's faith must be respected by all societies and governments. The United States takes this obligation seriously. "America will always stand," the President said in his Ramadan message to Muslims, "for the universal rights of all people to speak their mind, practice their religion, contribute fully to society, and have confidence in the rule of law."

Second, religious freedom empowers communities of faith to advance the common good. On balance, freedom tends to channel the convictions and passions of faith into acts of service and positive engagement in the public square. In the United States scores of religious groups, from the largest denominations to the smallest local congregations, have put their faith into practice and helped to build a more just and compassionate society. In announcing the establishment of the White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships, President Obama said, "There is a force for good greater than government. It is an expression of faith, this yearning to give back, this hungering for a purpose larger than our own, that reveals itself not simply in places of worship but in senior centers and shelters, schools, and hospitals."

Third, religious freedom is not only a human right and social good, it is imperative for national stability. Authoritarian regimes that repress religious groups and ideas in the name of stability create the very conditions that subvert their stated goals. Repression radicalizes. Coercive and arbitrary interference in peaceful religious practice can harden resentment against the state and lead some to separatism or insurgency. By contrast, "freedom of religion and expression," the President remarked to the Turkish Parliament, "lead to a strong and vibrant civil society that only strengthens the state... An enduring commitment to the rule of law is the only way to achieve the security that comes from justice for all people."

Fourth, in an age when terrorist groups export their hatred around the world, religious freedom is critical to international security. As the President noted in Cairo, "when violent extremists operate in one stretch of mountains, people are

endangered across an ocean." Governments must ensure that their policies on religion do not have negative international consequences. Regimes that manipulate religion or marginalize minority groups exacerbate interreligious tension and throw fuel on the fire of radical religious ideologies. Environments of robust religious freedom, on the other hand, foster communal harmony and embolden voices of moderation to openly refute extremists on religious grounds.

In light of the benefits of religious freedom and the dangers of denying it, the United States promotes this universal right as a core objective of its foreign policy. The *Annual Report* is the flagship tool in this effort. It informs our bilateral policies and diplomatic strategies, shines a spotlight on abusive governments, and gives hope to millions who suffer on account of their faith. The *Report* also serves as a rich resource of detailed data on religion in society, and we greatly value the contributions of activists and scholars who make use of our reports and enrich our understanding of the complex causes and effects of religious freedom and persecution. We welcome further analysis using our reports, as well as critiques of U.S. domestic and international religious freedom policies. It is our hope that the *Annual Report* stimulates global dialogue and inspires cooperative action leading to a more just and secure world.

Michael Posner

Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

HA 09/01/2015

PREFACE

RELEASE IN FULL

Why the Reports are Prepared

The Department of State submits this report to the Congress in compliance with Section 102(b) of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998. The law provides that the Secretary of State, with the assistance of the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, shall transmit to Congress "an Annual Report on International Religious Freedom supplementing the most recent Human Rights Reports by providing additional detailed information with respect to matters involving international religious freedom."

How the Reports are Prepared

U.S. embassies prepare the initial drafts of these reports, gathering information from a variety of sources, including government and religious officials, nongovernmental organizations, journalists, human rights monitors, religious groups, and academics. This information gathering can be hazardous, and U.S. Foreign Service Officers regularly go to great lengths, under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate reports of human rights abuse, to monitor elections, and to come to the aid of individuals at risk because of their religious beliefs.

The Office of International Religious Freedom collaborated in collecting and analyzing information for the country reports, drawing on the expertise of other Department of State offices, religious organizations, other non-governmental organizations, foreign government officials, representatives from the United Nations and other international and regional organizations and institutions, and experts from academia and the media. In compiling and editing the country reports, the Office of International Religious Freedom consulted with experts on issues of religious discrimination and persecution, religious leaders from a wide variety of faiths, and experts on legal matters. The office's guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant information was assessed as objectively, thoroughly, and fairly as possible.

A wide range of U.S. government departments, agencies, and offices will use the report to shape policy; conduct diplomacy; inform assistance, training, and other resource allocations; and help determine which countries have engaged in or

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tolerated "particularly severe violations" of religious freedom, otherwise known as Countries of Particular Concern.

A Word on Usage

When this report states that a government "generally respected" the right of religious freedom over the reporting period, this phrase signifies that the government attempted to protect religious freedom in the fullest sense. "Generally respected" is thus the highest level of respect for religious freedom assigned by this report. The phrase "generally respected" is used because the protection and promotion of religious freedom is a dynamic endeavor; it cannot be stated categorically that any government fully respected this right over the reporting year, even in the best of circumstances.

Acknowledgements

The 2009 report covers the period from July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2009, and reflects a year of dedicated effort by hundreds of Foreign Service and Civil Service Officers in the Department of State and U.S. missions abroad. We thank the many Foreign Service Officers at our embassies and consulates abroad for monitoring and promoting religious freedom, and for chronicling in detail the status of religious liberty. In addition to their efforts, we acknowledge the diligent labor and tireless commitment to religious freedom of those within the Office of International Religious Freedom whose work made this report possible: Clarissa Adamson, Ali Aghaebrahim, Sylvia Ayub, Nasreen Badat, Judson Birdsall, M. A. Borst, Alexandra Brewer, Mark Carlson, Barbara Cates, Warren Cofsky, Courtney Cook, Graham Couturier, Doug Dearborn, Kurt Donnelly, Brian Fabbi, Augustine Fahey, Nathan Godsey, A. T. Gombis, Nancy Hewett, Nathan Hitchen, Victor Huser, Alicia Juskewycz, Emilie Kao, Justin Kern, Sarah Kim, Gwendolyn Mack, Safia Mohamoud, Fidel Mahangel, Alexander McLaren, Joannella Morales, Sarah Nelson, Aaron Pina, David Rodearmel, Lana Salih, Tarika Sethi, Andrea Sidari, Lauren Smith, and Abdelnour Zaiback. The work of all of these individuals advances the cause of freedom, ensures accuracy in our reporting, and brings hope to repressed people around the world.

Cover Photo Credits

All cover images are copyright AP Photos.

Members of the Jewish priestly caste wear prayer shawls as they perform the tri-annual blessing of the Jewish people by the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, 1996. (AP PHOTO/Eyal Warshavsky)

A Palestinian Muslim worshipper prays inside the Dome of the Rock Mosque during the second Friday prayers of the holy fasting month of Ramadan 2007. (AP Photo/Muhammed Muheisen)

South Africa's Soweto Gospel Choir, performs in Johannesburg, South Africa, 2007. (AP Photo/Themba Hadebe)

A woman prays in the St. Peter's church in Wadowice, southern Poland, 2005. (AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski)

A Hindu child makes offerings during the Hindu festival of Deepavali at a temple in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2006. (AP Photo/Andy Wong)

A Muslim offers a prayer outside a mosque during the fasting month of Ramadan in Kuala Lumpur, 2002. (AP Photo/Andy Wong)

A young Thai novice Buddhist monk lights a candle in Bangkok, Thailand, 2005. (AP Photo/David Longstreath)

A man offers prayers at the Peace Park before the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombing in Nagasaki, southwestern Japan 2005. (AP Photo/Junji Kurokawa)

A nun of Missionaries of Charity prays beside the tomb of Mother Teresa in Calcutta, India, 2003. (AP Photo/Bikas Das)

Released by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Rights and Labor, Office of International Religious Freedom in coordination with the Bureau of Public Affairs, October 2009

From: Valmoro, Lona J [ValmoroLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 4:17:59 PM
To: H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Monday

RELEASE IN FULL

We would just need to adjust the timing for the International Freedom Report. Let me take care of that and we should be all set.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Valmoro, Lona J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Sat Oct 24 13:46:38 2009
Subject: Monday

Jim Jones just called to ask me if I can meet at the WH from 11:30 to 12:30 on Monday? What needs to be moved?

HA 09/01/2015

- Taped television interview with Anwar Iqbal of Dawn News in the Franklin Room.
- Taped television interview with Sami Abraham of Geo TV in the Monroe Room.

11:00 am **BILATERAL w/SINGAPORE MINISTER MENTOR LEE**
11:20 am **KUAN YEW**

Secretary's Conference Room
Contact: Desk Mary-Gardner Coppola x72769
CAMERA SPRAY (in Treaty Room following bilateral)

Staff: S Jake Sullivan
EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell
PA Ian Kelly, Spokesman
EAP Mary-Gardner Coppola, Notetaker

Singaporean Participants: Minister Mentor LEE Kuan Yew
Ambassador CHAN Heng Chee
Principal Private Secretary CHEE Hong Tat
Embassy First Secretary WONG Jia Yi Adeline

11:25 am **DEPART** State Department
En route White House
(drive time: 5 minutes)

11:30 am **MEETING w/POTUS**
12:30 pm White House Situation Room
Contact: Jessica Wright Office [REDACTED]
Attending: VP, Gates, Jones, Emanuel, Donilon, Brennan, McDonough, Rhodes and Blinken

B6

12:30 pm **DEPART** White House
En route State Department
(drive time: 5 minutes)

12:40 pm **OFFICE TIME**
1:15 pm Secretary's Office

1:15 pm **MEETING w/JEFF FELTMAN**
2:00 pm Secretary's Outer Office
Contact: NEA Sandy Grigola x77209
Staff: Huma and Jake

2:15 pm **RELEASE OF THE ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL**
2:25 pm **RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 2009**
Press Briefing Room 2209
Contact: DRL Lynda Walker-Johnson x71024
OPEN PRESS

- HRC gives brief remarks.
- A/S Mike Posner gives brief remarks.
- HRC departs.

2:30 pm **OFFICE TIME**
3:30 pm Secretary's Office

3:30 pm **MEETING w/BILL DRAYTON**
4:00 pm Secretary's Outer Office
Contact: Samara Lemke Office [REDACTED]
Staff: Jack, Cheryl and Anne-Marie

4:00 pm **MEETING w/UNDER SECRETARY BOB HORMATS**

HA 09/01/2015

4:30 pm Secretary's Office
Contact: Ellen Nelson x77575
Staff: Mike Fuchs

4:30 pm OFFICE TIME
7:00 pm Secretary's Office

7:00 pm MEETING w/BILL AND MELINDA GATES

7:45 pm Secretary's Outer Office
Contact: Katy Button, Office [REDACTED] Rob Rozen Cell [REDACTED]
Staff: Cheryl and Jen Klein

B6

Note: Michael Deich, Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs, attending as well.

7:50 pm DEPART State Department
En route Private Residence
[drive time: 10 minutes]

8:00 pm ARRIVE Private Residence

HRC RON Washington, DC
WJC RON Chappaqua, NY

Weather:
Washington, DC: Showers, 62/42.

HA 09/01/2015

**SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
MONDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2009**

RELEASE IN PART B6

FINAL

WASHINGTON, DC

SPECIAL ASSISTANT: LONA VALMORO
OFFICE (202) 647-9071
CELL

STAFF ASSISTANT: LINDA DEWAN
OFFICE (202) 647-5733
CELL

PREV RON Washington, DC

B6

HAPPY BIRTHDAY!

8:15 am **DEPART** Private Residence
En route State Department
[drive time: 10 minutes]

8:25 am **ARRIVE** State Department

8:25 am **PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFING**
8:30 am Secretary's Office

8:30 am **DAILY SMALL STAFF MEETING**
8:45 am Secretary's Office
Attending: Cheryl, Huma, Jake, Joe, and Lona

8:45 am **DAILY SENIOR STAFF MEETING**
9:15 am Secretary's Conference Room
Participants: Jim Steinberg, Jack Lew, Bill Burns, Pat Kennedy, P.J. Crowley,
Dan Smith, Harold Koh, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Ian Kelly, Rich Verma and
Joe Macmanus

9:15 am **MONDAY MEETING w/ASSISTANT SECRETARIES**
10:00 am Principals Conference Room 7516

10:00 am **PRESS/VIDEO TIME**
10:55 am 8th Floor Reception Rooms
Staff/Contact: PA Caroline Adler x77232

- Photo shoot with Marco Grob, Time Magazine, in the Jefferson Room.
- Video tapings in the Franklin Room (Russian Bicentennial Celebration;
Countering Violent Extremism; and the Global Entrepreneurship Week)

**SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
MONDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2009**

- Taped television interview with Anwar Iqbal of Dawn News in the Franklin Room.
- Taped television interview with Sami Abraham of Geo TV in the Monroe Room.

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11:20 am **KUAN YEW**

Secretary's Conference Room
Contact: Desk Mary-Gardner Coppola x72769
CAMERA SPRAY (in Treaty Room following bilateral)

Staff: S Jake Sullivan
EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell
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[drive time: 5 minutes]

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12:30 pm White House Situation Room
Contact: Jessica Wright Office
Attending: VP, Gates, Jones, Emanuel, Donilon, Brennan, McDonough, Rhodes and Blinken

B6

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En route State Department
[drive time: 5 minutes]

12:40 pm **OFFICE TIME**
1:15 pm Secretary's Office

1:15 pm **MEETING w/JEFF FELTMAN**
2:00 pm Secretary's Outer Office
Contact: NEA Sandy Grigola x77209
Staff: Huma and Jake

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MONDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2009**

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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 2009**

2:25 pm Press Briefing Room 2209
Contact: DRL Lynda Walker-Johnson x71024
OPEN PRESS

- HRC gives brief remarks.
- A/S Mike Posner gives brief remarks.
- HRC departs.

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3:30 pm Secretary's Office

3:30 pm **MEETING w/BILL DRAYTON**
4:00 pm Secretary's Outer Office
Contact: Samara Lemke Office [redacted]
Staff: Jack, Cheryl and Anne-Marie

B6

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4:30 pm Secretary's Office
Contact: Ellen Nelson x77575
Staff: Mike Fuchs

4:30 pm **OFFICE TIME**
7:00 pm Secretary's Office

7:00 pm **MEETING w/BILL AND MELINDA GATES**
7:45 pm Secretary's Outer Office
Contact: Katy Button Office [redacted] Rob Rozen Cell [redacted]
Staff: Cheryl and Jen Klein

Note: Michael Deich, Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs,
attending as well.

7:50 pm **DEPART** State Department
En route Private Residence
[drive time: 10 minutes]

8:00 pm **ARRIVE** Private Residence

HRC RON Washington, DC
WJC RON Chappaqua, NY

**SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
MONDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2009**

Weather:

Washington, DC: Showers, 62/42.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

RELEASE IN PART B5

Date: Monday, October 26, 2009

Time: 10:00 am ET – 11:00 a.m.

Location: Ben Franklin Room and Monroe Room

Re: Pre-trip Media: 2 Taped TV interviews with Dawn TV and Geo TV

You will tape two 7-10 minute TV interviews in advance of your trip to Pakistan. Both interviews are embargoed until you are wheels down on Wednesday, October 28, so there is no need to conceal the trip.

The primary purpose of your interviews is to reach the people of Pakistan immediately upon arrival in Islamabad, and to set the tone for the trip.

The following is the scenario for the 2 interviews:

1. After recording videos in the Ben Franklin Room, you will tape a 7-10 minute interview with Mr. Anwar Iqbal, Senior Correspondent for Pakistan's English-language commercial broadcaster, Dawn TV (You also conducted a interview with Mr. Anwar Iqbal on July 17, 2009, prior to your trip to India – transcript attached)
2. Following the interview with Dawn TV in the Ben Franklin Room, you will proceed to the Monroe Room to tape the second interview with Mr. Sami Abraham of Geo TV.

This briefing memo contains the following:

- Affirmative trip message
- Background on Dawn TV & Geo TV
- Biographies of interviewers
- Possible questions and guidance
- Transcript of July 17 interview with Anwar Iqbal

AFFIRMATIVE TRIP MESSAGE

B5

[Redacted]

○

[Redacted]

Further points

[Redacted]

B5

• *Especially for American media:*

BACKGROUND ON DAWN TV & GEO TV

Dawn TV is the only English television channel in Pakistan. It was launched three years ago and is owned by the Dawn Group Newspaper, the country's oldest media organization founded by Jinnah (established before the creation of Pakistan in 1943). Dawn TV's audience is nationwide but because it is English-only, the audience is mostly well educated, NGO's, diplomatic and government circles. To expand reach, additional Pakistani channels will run the interview with Urdu sub-titles.

Geo TV is Pakistan's largest 24-hour satellite news channel in Pakistan. The television network was founded in May 2002, and is part of the Independent Media Group. The Independent Media Group also owns Pakistan's second largest English daily newspaper (The News) and the largest Urdu language newspaper (Daily Jang). In 2007, the Pakistani government halted the transmission of Geo News following the network's coverage of the demonstrations against President Musharraf's suspension of the Chief Justice Chaudhry. Since assuming office, President Zardari has also temporarily banned Geo TV and other private broadcasters. The station was suspended in March 2009 following its coverage of protests for the restoration of the Supreme Court Justices dismissed by former President Musharraf. Geo TV's transmission was also suspended by the government during the siege of Pakistan's military headquarters by suspected Pakistani Taliban militants on October 10, 2009.

Mr. Anwar Iqbal has over 20 years of experience with various international media organizations covering a variety of beats -- from city affairs to international politics. He covered the phenomenon of Muslim militancy in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East for the past 15 years. Fluent in English, Urdu, Punjabi, Bengali, Pushto and Persian, Mr. Iqbal joined Dawn News in 2002, and previously worked for UPI and the News (based in Islamabad). He has interviewed President Obama, President George W. Bush, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom (2005), National Security Adviser Gen. James Jones (2009), Senator John Kerry (2009), Senator Tom Harkin (2008).

Mr. Sami Abraham has worked for the Independent Media Group of Pakistan since 1996. Mr. Abraham moved to the United States in 1989 and served as the DC correspondent for The Frontier Post until 1993, when he joined the Daily Muslim as the Senior Political Reporter. Mr. Abraham was an integral part of Geo TV's unprecedented efforts to provide coverage of the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections from Washington DC to Pakistan. Mr. Abraham has also interviewed former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, Meraj Khalid, President Asif Ali Zardari, Former President Farooq Khan Leghari, Mujhaden leader Gulbadin Hikmatyar, and Ambassador Holbrook.

Dawn TV

Pre-Tnp Media Brief Page 4

Q:

[Redacted]

B5

[Redacted]

Q:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

- *[Walt Whitman story from Moscow....]*

-

B5

Q:

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Q:

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B5

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
[Redacted]

Q:

[Redacted]

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B5



Q:



Q:



Q:



Q: A Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, while talking about the Kerry-Lugar bill also talks about "American hubris," the habit of lecturing others.

B5

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Q. Wall Street Journal, in a recent editorial, stresses the need for the US to be a smart power in dealing with others. And say that the US is not being smart in Pakistan.

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Q:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

File: mp media brief Page 9

HA 09/01/2015

B5

• [REDACTED]

Q:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

• [REDACTED]

Q:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

• [REDACTED]

Q:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

• [REDACTED]

Q:

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B5

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- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

Q:

[Redacted]

- [Redacted]

Geo TV

[Redacted]

Q:

[Redacted]

B5

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B5

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Q:

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[REDACTED]

Q:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B5

• [REDACTED]

Q: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

• [REDACTED]

Q: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

• [REDACTED]

Q: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

TRANSCRIPT OF JULY 17 INTERVIEW WITH ANWAR IQBAL

QUESTION: So I have to get it going – very brief because I know you don't have that much time.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you.

QUESTION: So it's about your visit to India.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Are you going with an initiative for restarting the India-Pakistan talks?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I'm going with the hope that has been ignited in the last weeks that India and Pakistan will pursue a dialogue again, and it was a very promising meeting between Prime Minister Gillani and Prime Minister Singh, the follow-on meeting between Prime Minister Singh and President Zardari, which suggests that there is an interest and a seriousness on the part of both governments in trying to work toward resolution of some of the longstanding differences.

I have always believed, and you may have heard me say in many meetings of my friends in the Pakistani and American community, that Pakistan's future is unlimited. The potential for economic growth and for influence in the region is, in my view, as great as any country's. But there has to be a commitment to trying to focus on the internal developments of Pakistan, and that requires dealing with and trying to resolve some of the outstanding concerns.

QUESTION: With India?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes, with India.

QUESTION: And according to the media report, you're going to conclude two agreements during this visit: for nuclear plants and for selling 126 fighter jets to India. Do Pakistanis have reasons to fear the outcome of your visit?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Not at all. And we don't yet have any agreements resolved between us, but my goal in going to India is to work with the Indian Government on a range of issues – agriculture, health, education, strategic cooperation, climate change, clean energy, just a very vast array of concern. And I think that all of these issues are ones that are important not only to Indians, but, I would argue, also to Pakistanis. Trade between India and Pakistan, if we were ever able to come to that point, would benefit both countries. Cooperation across borders on matters having to do with agriculture, education, so many other issues would be mutually beneficial.

So the point of our trip is to certainly broaden and deepen our relationship with India. And I will be coming to Pakistan in the fall and be looking to do the exact same thing with Pakistan.

QUESTION: But whenever somebody says that they would want India to play a leading role in the region, and you said that this week, the Pakistanis fear that perhaps it would translate to a subservient role for Pakistan and will lead to bullying by Afghanistan. How would you allay these fears?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, that is certainly not at all what is intended. I think that what we see now in the region is a very courageous, sustained effort by Pakistan against the internal miscreants, those who would destabilize the Pakistani Government and democracy, who kill innocent people, who are – they are not at all part of Pakistan's future. And so what Pakistan is doing is, in my view, very important, as Pakistan tries to stabilize your democracy so that you can build on development. Actual economic development was going well.

There were a lot of positive steps. And some of the government's policies are working out well. There seems to be a growing acceptance of how Pakistan is doing with the global economic recession. But the constant threat from the internal terrorists is one that has to be dealt with in order for Pakistan to grow and flourish.

So I see what is happening in Pakistan as a necessary set of steps to get Pakistan to the point where the future is unlimited. With India, I think India has had steady growth. They've had a very clear set of goals that they've been able to pursue because they are a largely stable and internally secure country now. That's what I want to see for Pakistan. And then I think you can be in a friendly competition for jobs and for prosperity and for growth and for education statistics.

I often say that when Pakistani Americans come to the United States, they are among the most successful people in our country, and they are among our professionals and our business leaders and our academics and in every other walk of life. I would hope to see a day when Pakistanis would have the same opportunities in their own country, and that's what I would like to work toward with you.

QUESTION: You actually, help found an organization called the Pakistan Foundation.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes.

QUESTION: What are your expectations from the Pakistan Foundation?

SECRETARY CLINTON: It's interesting because – as you know, because we have some mutual friends, there are so many Pakistani Americans who are very successful financially. They still have family in Pakistan. They travel often back to Pakistan. They have a very deep connection to their homeland. And I thought it would be important to try to convince Pakistani Americans to be putting forward financial resources to work back in Pakistan.

And I know; I have friends who have done that. They've built schools, they've built health clinics, but to do it in an organized way. So we created the idea and then turned it over to the Pakistani Americans and the Pakistan Government, which was very interested. And so people are raising money and identifying projects.

We also reached out to Pakistani American doctors and asked if they'd be willing to serve and care for the internally displaced people, because of the fighting against the Taliban and al-Qaeda and all of their allies. And so we have Pakistani American doctors taking vacation, going to Swat or Bunair or other places to provide medical care.

So I think that there is an opportunity for Pakistani Americans to feel more committed and connected to the future that you are building in Pakistan.

QUESTION: Now, the anti-Americanism in Pakistan. We know that both governments are committed to fighting terrorism, and there is a realization in Pakistan too – that this is a war that they need to win. But this somehow does not convey to the people there. They don't trust the US and still have a lot anti-American feelings. So how do you overcome this problem?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I hope that more and more people in Pakistan understand that President Obama and I have no other interest than providing assistance to the Pakistani people, and, increasingly, Americans – not just the Pakistani Americans, but other Americans want to help the people of Pakistan. We are not in any way making decisions, interfering or dictating. That is not our intent at all. But we want to be helpful because we see this courageous fight that you are waging. We know how hard it is because we are fighting the same enemy. We have been attacked. We know what that means.

We also see how the vast majority of Pakistanis just want a better life for themselves and their children. So if we can be helpful in helping to provide schools or textbooks or health programs and physicians, nurses, things that will actually help improve the daily lives of the people of Pakistan, that's what we are interested in doing.

QUESTION: You once said that America too – made mistakes in Pakistan. What were those mistakes and how would you avoid them?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think that if you go back and look at the history between the United States and Pakistan, we were not always as sensitive or understanding of the needs of the Pakistani people. We were not always constant in our support and our friendship for Pakistan. We encouraged Pakistan to create the forces that fought against the Soviet Union occupation in Afghanistan and then left you to deal with the aftermath. So it's been, I would argue, a relationship that hasn't been as constant and as effective as we would want it to be.

Now, we will continue to make mistakes. I mean, we are just human beings; we know that. But we want to be as honest in admitting them as possible, learning from them, and then trying to move forward. We weren't as supportive of Pakistan's democracy as we could have and should have been in the past.

But our goal now is to be there as a constant friend and a country that Pakistan, not just the government, but the people can rely on to build up more trust and understanding between us, and to be of assistance when asked by Pakistan.

QUESTION: And do you have complaints against Pakistan too – particularly when you see that the Pakistani people, the Pakistani administration, and the Pakistani media fail to understand your point of view, they fail to appreciate your sentiments?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I think it requires time. We have started a much deeper engagement with Pakistan on all levels. We've even established a trilateral relationship between the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to try to work through some of the common problems we face. I hope that there is a growing awareness that President Obama and I care deeply about the future of Pakistan, and particularly want to reverse some of the misconceptions and perceptions that existed in the past.

So I hope that we're going to be given a fair hearing. I hope that people will look at us and say there is something different here, it's not the same old, same old attitude.

I know that President Obama, when he spoke with you, talked about how much he loved Pakistani food. I --

QUESTION: And do you?

SECRETARY CLINTON: I echo that. I am also a fan.

But it's more than that. It's a sense that the people of Pakistan are working hard for a better future. And we want to be of help. And we have no – we have no claims, we have no interest other than assisting you in achieving the kind of sovereignty and self-determination and very solid democracy, and then results for people. I mean, democracy in and of itself is only the means to an end of a better life, so that every child has a chance to live up to his or her God-given potential to get an education, to get the healthcare he or she needs, to have their parents have jobs with rising wages and dignity. I mean, that's what all people are looking for, and the people of Pakistan deserve that.

QUESTION: Drone attacks. I think it was Senator John Kerry, who stated they are making more enemies than they are killing. Do you agree with this comment?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I don't comment on any matter that is of that nature. But I think that what we see is what's happening on the ground with the Pakistani army and the sacrifices that they're making. And I think that it's important that we pursue joint efforts against those who would murder innocent Pakistanis, innocent Americans, innocent Indians, people who were just going about their daily lives and have no reason to be targeted the way that they are.

So our goal is to see you and help you in whatever way is appropriate to defeat the enemy who wants to totally, radically change Pakistan.

QUESTION: Yesterday, you said in your speech that there was some good Taliban in Afghanistan, I mean, you didn't use the word, good Taliban, but indicated that. Are there good Taliban in Pakistan and can they be engaged too?

SECRETARY CLINTON: I think that would be up to the Pakistani Government to determine, but it does seem to us that people get caught up in these organizations, sometimes because they're paid, sometimes because they're intimidated, sometimes because they think there is -- that they mean something other than what they do. And for those who are willing to put down arms against the Pakistani Government, who are willing to renounce violence and try to work to achieve a better life for themselves in connection with the democracy that Pakistan is, I certainly think that it would be appropriate for Pakistan to consider that.

But I am reminded that Pakistan did try that. Pakistan tried to, in a very open way, reach an agreement with the Taliban and their related organization. And I'm told they didn't keep it. I mean, they didn't abide by it. They resumed their aggressive behavior, their violence, their terrorism. So I think that it's up to the Pakistani Government, of course, to decide what's appropriate for Pakistan.

QUESTION: President Obama (inaudible), in an interview, he talked about (inaudible) --

SECRETARY CLINTON: That's okay.

QUESTION: Talked about Taliban issue -- sorry, just --

SECRETARY CLINTON: Yeah, no problem.

QUESTION: There are some in Pakistan who say that Indians are using Balochistan to interfere in Balochistan. Will you discuss this with the India? In his inaugural speech, President Obama said that Kashmir is one issue that needs to be resolved. And now, your administration does not seem to talk about it. It seems that they no longer see Kashmir as an issue that needs to be resolved.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I'm going to raise everything that we believe is of significance with the Indian Government. I believe that it is in India's interest for Pakistan to be stable, democratic, free of terrorism. I think that the disputes between India and Pakistan, which are historical and long-standing, should be looked at with fresh eyes, and there should be an effort to build some mutual trust. And from what I hear, it was a very good meeting between Prime Minister Singh and Prime Minister Gillani.

The United States stands ready to support the steps that India and Pakistan may take together, but we know that the only way these matters can be finally resolved is between the two countries, but it's not just the government, but the people. And so we will encourage that, but we know that it has to be left to Pakistan and India for there to be any resolution.

QUESTION: So Kashmir is still seen as a dispute that needs to be resolved?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, it certainly should be on the agenda of discussion between India and Pakistan.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you. It was good to talk to you. Thank you.

From: Valmoro, Lona J [ValmoroLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2009 7:31:56 PM
To: Huma Abedin; H
Subject: Re: Schedule

RELEASE IN FULL

Agree and he speaks fluent English so no translation needed.

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
To: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>; Valmoro, Lona J
Sent: Sun Oct 25 19:26:37 2009
Subject: Re: Schedule

Yes that's right
Desk has told them u were called to white house at last minute.
If u feel strongly, we can try and make something else work.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: 'ValmoroLJ@state.gov' <ValmoroLJ@state.gov>; Huma Abedin
Sent: Sun Oct 25 19:23:57 2009
Subject: Schedule

I guess from the schedule, we couldn't change the time of the Singapore mtg to later? I'm sorry we only have 20 minutes now. Is that right?

HA 09/01/2015

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2009 9:02:10 PM
To: H; 'SullivanJJ@state.gov'
Subject: Re: Pakistan interviews

RELEASE IN FULL

Yes, vali is working on an answer sheet for some of the tough q and a like blackwater, drones, quetta shura and nuclear security. You will have tonite or tomorrow am.

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov' <sullivanjj@state.gov>; Huma Abedin
Sent: Sun Oct 25 20:06:15 2009
Subject: Pakistan interviews

Do we have good answers for the Blackwater allegations? What exactly are they? And what's been said before?

HA 09/01/2015

From: Jiloty, Lauren C [JilotyLC@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2009 9:59:49 PM
To: Huma Abedin; Hanley, Monica R
Subject: Re: Passing of Mother of Senator [REDACTED]

RELEASE IN PART B6

B6

Ok

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
To: Hanley, Monica R; Jiloty, Lauren C
Sent: Sun Oct 25 21:43:07 2009
Subject: Fw: Passing of Mother of Senator [REDACTED]

Pls put him on call list for first thing tomorrow
 And do a letter too pls
 Thx

----- Original Message -----

From: Doug Band
To: Hannah Richert; Justin Cooper; Oscar Flores
Cc: Huma Abedin
Sent: Sun Oct 25 17:48:56 2009
Subject: Fw: Passing of Mother of Senator [REDACTED]

Of

Pls tell wjc

-----Original Message-----

From: Draft email
To: Doug Band
Subject: Fw: Passing of Mother of Senator [REDACTED]
Sent: Oct 25, 2009 5:49 PM

-----Original Message-----

From: Angel "Ricky" Urena
To: Draft
Subject: Fw: Passing of Mother of Senator [REDACTED]
Sent: Oct 25, 2009 4:32 PM

-----Original Message-----

From: Fabiola Rodriguez-Ciampoli
To: Laura Pena
To: Angel Urena
Subject: Passing of Mother of Senator [REDACTED]
Sent: Oct 25, 2009 4:04 PM

Hey guys, I know your bosses are very well informed, but just in case they haven't heard-- [REDACTED] mom passed away on Friday night. See details below. --- On Sun, 10/25/09, Roberto Frugone [REDACTED] wrote: From: Roberto Frugone <[REDACTED]> Subject: La Causa Newsletter of NJ ** Passing of [REDACTED] To: "Roberto C. Frugone" <[REDACTED]> Date: Sunday, October 25, 2009, 7:16 PM Lideres, I email to share some sad news with you. Late Friday night Senator [REDACTED]

Here are the arrangements:

Viewing: Monday, October 26th from 2:00-4:00pm and 7:00-9:00pm
 Funeral: Tuesday, October 27th at 11:00am

Location: Leber Funeral Home
 2000 Kennedy Blvd
 Union City, NJ 07087

HA 09/01/2015

In lieu of flowers the family is asking that contributions be made to:

Alzheimer's Association
Greater New Jersey
400 Morris Avenue
Suite 251
Denville, NJ 07834
Phone (973) 586-4300



B6

HA 09/01/2015

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2009 10:58 PM
To: humamabedin [REDACTED]
Subject: Fw: Pakistan and Morocco Options and Photobook
Attach: Options and Photobook _Pakistan and Morocco_.pdf

RELEASE IN PART B6

B6

From: Ballantine, Liza W
To: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Sun Oct 25 22:50:45 2009
Subject: Pakistan and Morocco Options and Photobook

Hi Huma,
Attached please find Options and Photobook for the following:
-Pakistan PM
-King of Morocco
-Princess of Morocco (Final Selection: Gold Earrings)
- Children of King and Princess
-Morocco PM
-Morocco FM

We reviewed earlier with Capricia as well. So let us know what you think. Thanks!

Liza W. Ballantine
Office of the Chief of Protocol
United States Department of State
S/CPR, Suite 1238
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

202.647.1161 (office)

[REDACTED]
ballantinemw@state.gov

HA 09/01/2015

From: Abedin, Huma [AbedinH@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2009 11:11:45 PM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Fw: Pakistan Media Briefing

RELEASE IN PART B6

Attachments: Pre Trip Pak Media (2).docx

From: Abedin, Huma
To: 'humamabedin'
Sent: Sun Oct 25 19:10:04 2009
Subject: FW: Pakistan Media Briefing

B6

From: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2009 5:03 PM
To: 'Oscar Flores'
Cc: 'H'
Subject: Pakistan Media Briefing

Oscar, these are the briefings we just completed for her pakistani media interviews tomorrow. Can you print ?

HA 09/01/2015

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2009 11:32:39 PM
To: 'humamabedin'
Subject: Fw: Honduras

RELEASE IN PART
B1,1.4(D),B6

B6

-----Original Message-----

From: Hrc
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Oct 25, 2009 11:19 PM
Subject: Fw: Honduras

Classified by Director A/GIS/IPS, Acting, DoS on
06/30/2015 ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason:
1.4(D), B1 ~ Declassify on: 10/25/2019


Pls print.

----- Original Message -----

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
To: H
Sent: Sun Oct 25 11:13:17 2009
Subject: RE: Honduras

First, Tom's travel date hasn't been set – will be Tuesday or Wednesday we think. He is coordinating with Dan Restrepo to see if they can go together.

1.4(D)
B1



-----Original Message Truncated-----

From: Abedin, Huma [AbedinH@state.gov]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 12:04:52 AM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Fw:


RELEASE IN PART B5,B6

----- Original Message -----

From: huma abedin <[REDACTED]>
To: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Sun Oct 25 18:41:16 2009

B6

HRC
Pakistan Cheat Sheet



B5

trip, some

H 00/01/2017



B5

HA 09/01/2015

RELEASE IN FULL

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 12:10:25 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: RE: FINAL briefing - added foundation answer. this is going to hrc now

no that is coming separately
shes going to bed so i wanted to give her this packet

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 12:05 AM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: FINAL briefing - added foundation answer. this is going to hrc now

Does this have tough qa vali referenced?

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
To: Nasr, S Vali R; Sullivan, Jacob J; Reines, Philippe I
Cc: Bommer, Ashley F; Adler, Caroline E
Sent: Sun Oct 25 23:58:33 2009
Subject: FINAL briefing - added foundation answer. this is going to hrc now

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 12:10:59 AM
To: Huma Abedin; Nasrsvr@state.gov; SullivanJJ@state.gov; reinesp@state.gov
CC: bommera1@state.gov; adlerce@state.gov
Subject:

RELEASE IN FULL

Importance: Low

Attachments: HRC Pakistan Notes.doc

this is a little cheat sheet she asked for on pakistan.
i gave her but wanted you to have also just in case.

HA 09/01/2015

From: jake.sullivan [redacted]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 1:00:52 AM
To: preines [redacted] CDM; Huma Abedin; Maggie Williams
Subject: Re: Clinton's influence in Team Obama: a nuanced role

RELEASE IN PART B5,B6


B6

I disagree with much of PIR's analysis but absolutely agree with the prescription.

Sent from my BlackBerry® smartphone with SprintSpeed

From: "PIR" <preines [redacted]>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2009 02:21:18 +0000
To: CDM [redacted] Jake Sullivan < [redacted]>; Huma
Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>; Maggie Williams < [redacted]>
Subject: Re: Clinton's influence in Team Obama: a nuanced role

B6



B5

From: cheryl.mills [redacted]
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2009 01:47:49 +0000

B6

To: Jake Sullivan [redacted] Philippe Reines [redacted] Humā Abedin-
personal email<huma@clintonemail.com>; Maggie Williams [redacted]
Cc: Cheryl Mills [redacted]
Subject: Fw: Clinton's influence in Team Obama: a nuanced role

B6

The gauntlet is thrown down again . . .

We must address

Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T

From: Nora Toiv [redacted]
Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2009 21:41:13 -0400
To: Cheryl Mills [redacted]
Subject: Clinton's influence in Team Obama: a nuanced role

B6

http://www.reuters.com/resources/images/logo_reuters_media_us.gif
<http://www.reuters.com/resources/images/spacer.gif>

[Print](#) | [Close this window](#)

Clinton's influence in Team Obama: a nuanced role

Sat Oct 24, 2009 8:11am EDT

By [Jeff Mason](#) - Analysis

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Hillary Clinton has found her voice but finding her place in the top-down foreign policy apparatus that is the Obama administration has proven more elusive.

The former first lady, senator and presidential candidate has, by her own and others' accounts, transitioned well into the role of secretary of state.

She says she loves her job, gets along well with President Barack Obama and wants to rebuild the U.S. relationship with the rest of the world.

But how much power does she have? Some nine months into her tenure, that is an open question.

With no clear signature policy issue of her own and a team of special envoys handling hot spots such as Afghanistan and the Middle East, Clinton has had to fight off suggestions that she has been sidelined.

Other eminent foreign policy players such as Vice President Joe Biden and a White House National Security Council run by a tightly knit team of former Obama campaign advisers have made it harder for Clinton to make her mark.

Still, the politician-turned-emissary has established a rhythm and unique style in addressing the world as Obama's top diplomat.

On trips to Asia, Africa and most recently Russia, Clinton has brought notable star power to meetings with leaders while holding meetings with local citizens to give voice to Obama's policy of engagement with civil society and government.

She hits the road again to visit Marrakech, Morocco, on November 2-3 for a meeting designed to spur reforms and growth in the Arab world and to hold talks with Arab foreign ministers about the stymied Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Back in Washington, she spends significant periods of time at the White House, among the most of any of Obama's cabinet members noted on his public schedule.

"Her voice is respected and heard and she is a strong, strong part of his overall cabinet and a leader within the foreign policy team," senior Obama adviser Valerie Jarrett told Reuters, dismissing reports Clinton has been sidelined.

"They meet, if she is in town, every week. She is a part of every single foreign policy meeting that he has with the rest of his foreign policy team."

Clinton herself dismisses any suggestion that she is marginalized within the administration.

"I find it absurd," she said in an interview with NBC television. "I find it beyond any realistic assessment of what I'm doing every day."

NATURAL TENSION

Analysts paint a more nuanced picture of Clinton's role in the foreign policy team.

She has a seat at the decision-making table but her lack of a signature issue could be a liability.

"The challenge has been ... the defining of her subject areas," said Heather Conley, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former deputy assistant secretary of state.

Noting the White House and the special envoys held sway over big items such as Iran and Afghanistan, Conley said Clinton had to show which issues fell under her direct purview.

"She needs to identify those issues where she's the lead," Conley said. "I think they're still working those kinks out."

This week, for example, the most delicate diplomatic work conducted by the United States may have been Senator John Kerry's helping to persuade Afghan President Hamid Karzai to agree to a run-off in the fraud-marred August election.

Asked if he felt eclipsed, Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, told reporters: "I'm not sure how to answer that. I'd like to make a joke and say I'm always happy to be eclipsed by John Kerry but then you'll take it seriously and then I'll cause more problems."

Clinton's past rivalry with Obama notwithstanding, analysts also pointed to a natural tension between the White House and the State Department on foreign policy leadership.

"Every secretary of state has competition for influence on foreign policy and that's especially true in administrations like Obama's where other senior officials such as Vice President Biden have expertise in the area," said Larry Sabato, a professor at the University of Virginia.

"No secretary of state gets to be 'president for foreign affairs.' Even Kissinger couldn't pull that off," he said, referring to Henry Kissinger, the powerful top diplomat in the Nixon administration.

Julian Zelizer, a professor at Princeton University, said Clinton has had some successes, signature issue or not, in rekindling relations with U.S. allies after low points reached under former President George W. Bush's administration.

"Clinton has been taking some big steps in repairing U.S. relations in other parts of the globe," he said. "She is on the front lines of opening dialogue with allies and adversaries."

(Editing by John O'Callaghan)

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DCSIMG

From: H [HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 7:31:28 AM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Plane question

RELEASE IN FULL

I may need to ask Richard to fly w us after all so pls decide how we can do that if necessary.

11/02/2016

From: Valmoro, Lona J [ValmoroLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 7:46:30 AM
To: H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Mentor Minister

RELEASE IN FULL

We can reach out to see if he can come in the afternoon.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Valmoro, Lona J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Mon Oct 26 07:38:59 2009
Subject: Mentor Minister

Is there any way to reschedule so I have more time around the interviews and photo shoot before going to WH?

HA 09/01/2015

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 8:06:12 AM
To: 'humamabedin'
Subject: Fw: Honduras

RELEASE IN PART
B1,B5,1.4(D),B6

B6

----- Original Message -----

From: H
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Mon Oct 26 07:27:12 2009
Subject: Fw: Honduras

All of this did not print last night. It stopped after Fourth!

Classified by Director A/GIS/IPS, Acting, DoS on 06/30/2015
~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason: 1.4(D), B1 ~ Declassify
on: 10/25/2019

----- Original Message -----

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
To: H
Sent: Sun Oct 25 23:49:45 2009
Subject: Re: Honduras

Sounds good.

There will be those who take a hard line on the elections, but perhaps some fence-sitting countries could be persuaded on conditional recognition. I'll flag it for Tom and Craig.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Sun Oct 25 23:18:40 2009
Subject: Re: Honduras

Let's discuss tomorrow w Tom and Craig.


B5

----- Original Message -----

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
To: H
Sent: Sun Oct 25 11:13:17 2009
Subject: RE: Honduras.

First, Tom's travel date hasn't been set – will be Tuesday or Wednesday we think. He is coordinating with Dan Restrepo to see if they can go together.

1.4(D)
B1



1.4(D)
B1

So that's where we are. We'll have more to report tomorrow.

-----Original Message-----

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]

Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 2:23 PM

To: Sullivan, Jacob J

Subject: Honduras

What's the latest?

HA 09/01/2015

From: Valmoro, Lona J [ValmoroLJ@state.gov]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 8:22:31 AM
To: H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Mentor Minister

RELEASE IN FULL

All set -- Singapore Minister will be at 4:30pm.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Valmoro, Lona J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Mon Oct 26 07:38:59 2009
Subject: Mentor Minister

Is there any way to reschedule so I have more time around the interviews and photo shoot before going to WH?

HA 09/01/2015

From: Bird, Peter A [BirdPA@state.gov]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 3:38:25 PM
CC: Glantz, Mary E; Schamber, Maria D
Subject: Ambassador Feinstein Swearing-In Ceremony RSVP

RELEASE IN FULL

Attachments: Feinstein Swearing In.doc

Attached is an invitation to attend Ambassador Lee A. Feinstein's official Swearing-In Ceremony. The Ceremony will be held on Friday, October 30 in the Benjamin Franklin Room at the Department of State.

Please RSVP with your full name, date of birth, and either your Social Security Number or Drivers License Number.

Many thanks,

Pete Bird

Department of State

Office of Central European Affairs

HA 09/01/2015



RELEASE IN FULL

*You are cordially invited to attend
the Swearing-in Ceremony of
Lee A. Feinstein
as Ambassador of the United States of America
to the Republic of Poland*

*Friday, October 30, 2009
At Four o'clock*

*Benjamin Franklin Room
Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006*

*: RSVP to Peter Bird
E-mail: BirdPA@state.gov
Tel: 202-647-0460*

*Please provide date of birth and identification number
(either social security number or driver's license number)*

*Please arrive by 3:30 pm
Photo identification is required for admittance*

HA 09/01/2015

From: Jiloty, Lauren C [JilotyLC@state.gov]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 10:22:06 PM
To: Huma Abedin; Hanley, Monica R
Subject: Re: Can we move cristophe to 645?

RELEASE IN FULL

Will try to get in touch now

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
To: Jiloty, Lauren C; Hanley, Monica R
Sent: Mon Oct 26 21:58:05 2009
Subject: Can we move cristophe to 645?

HA 09/01/2015

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 11:15:07 PM
To: 'JilotyLC@state.gov'
Subject: Re: Can we move cristophe to 645?

RELEASE IN FULL

Thx

----- Original Message -----

From: Jiloty, Lauren C <JilotyLC@state.gov>
To: Huma Abedin; Hanley, Monica R <HanleyMR@state.gov>
Sent: Mon Oct 26 22:28:10 2009
Subject: Re: Can we move cristophe to 645?

He is set for 645.

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
To: Jiloty, Lauren C; Hanley, Monica R
Sent: Mon Oct 26 21:58:05 2009
Subject: Can we move cristophe to 645?

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2009 6:15:28 AM
To: H
Subject: No word from kristy. Crisophe confirmed for 645.

RELEASE IN FULL

HA 09/01/2015

From: Huma Abedin [Huma@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2009 7:51:14 AM
To: Doug Band
Subject: Re: Where is she dec 2

RELEASE IN FULL

Greece

----- Original Message -----

From: Doug Band
To: Huma Abedin
Sent: Tue Oct 27 07:48:12 2009
Subject: Where is she dec 2

HA 09/01/2015

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2009 2:53:31 PM
To: H; Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: I spoke w Cheryl and we're waiting until tomorrow to decide.

RELEASE IN FULL

We're here next door and about to check in w cdm.

----- Original Message -----

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Wed Oct 28 14:52:46 2009
Subject: I spoke w Cheryl and we're waiting until tomorrow to decide.

HA 09/01/2015

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2009 1:22 AM
To: humamabedin [REDACTED]
Subject: Print Fw: updated private line block -- attached
Attach: updated private line block through november 20th.docx

RELEASE IN PART B6

B6

From: Valmoro, Lona J
To: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Thu Oct 29 17:08:33 2009
Subject: updated private line block -- attached

HA 09/01/2015

HRC PRIVATE LINE BLOCK

Updated as of { TIME \@ "h:mm am/pm" * MERGEFORMAT } on { DATE \@ "M/d/yyyy" * MERGEFORMAT }

Friday, October 30, 2009

RELEASE IN PART B6

Prev Ron Tbd

HRC Ron UAE (T)

WJC Ron London

Saturday, October 31, 2009

Prev Ron UAE (T)

HRC Ron Israel (T)

WJC Ron Slovenia

Sunday, November 1, 2009

Prev Ron Israel (T)

HRC Ron Morocco

WJC Ron Istanbul, Turkey

Monday, November 2, 2009

Prev Ron Morocco

HRC Ron Morocco

WJC Ron Abu Dhabi

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Prev Ron Morocco

Depart Morocco en route AAFB

6:00 pm (T) Arrive AAFB

HRC Ron Washington, DC

WJC Ron Dubai

Wednesday, November 4, 2009

Prev Ron Washington, DC

8:25am	Presidential Daily Briefing
8:30am	Secretary's Office
8:30am	Daily Small Senior Staff Meeting
8:40am	Secretary's Office
8:45am	Daily Senior Staff Meeting
8:55am	Secretary's Conference Room
9:00am	US/EU Summit Meetings
11:15am	Ben Franklin Room
	Note: US/EU Energy Council from 9:00am-9:55am
	US/EU Ministerial Meeting from 10:00am-10:45am
	Press Avail from 10:55am-11:10am
12:00pm	Office Time
3:00pm	Secretary's Office
3:00pm	Meeting with Foreign Minister Sikorski, Poland
3:45pm	Secretary's Conference Room
	Press Avail in Treaty Room
3:45pm	Videos
4:00pm	Marshall Room
	Welcoming Remarks for State Ethics Video
	State's 2 nd Annual Exchanges Connect Video Contest (ECA)
	Overseas Security Advisor Council's 24 th Annual Briefing (DS)
	International Center for Journalists Awards Dinner (honoring Ms. Namegabe from Congo)
	Combined Federal Campaign
5:00 pm	Meeting with Congressman Ike Skelton
5:30pm	Secretary's Office
	Contact: Ryan Dillon Office 202-225-2876
HRC Ron	Washington, DC
WJC Ron	Zurich, Switzerland

Thursday, November 5, 2009

Prev Ron Washington, DC

Two requests pending:

Time Tbd Meeting with Japanese FM

Time Tbd Meeting with Spanish FM

8:25am	Presidential Daily Briefing
8:30am	Secretary's Office
8:30am	Daily Small Senior Staff Meeting
8:40am	Secretary's Office
8:45am	Daily Senior Staff Meeting
9:15am	Secretary's Conference Room
9:15am	Thursday Meeting with Regional Bureau Secretaries
10:00am	Deputy's Conference Room
10:05am	Drop-by with Ambassador Swanee Hunt
10:10am	Secretary's Office
10:15am	2009 State Awards Ceremony
10:35am	Ben Franklin Room
	Note: HRC to give 5-7 minutes of remarks.
	Press Tbd
11:00am	Office Time
1:00pm	Secretary's Office
1:15pm	Meeting with German FM Westerwelle
1:45pm	Secretary's Conference Room
1:50pm	Press Avail
2:00pm	Treaty Room
2:15pm	Meeting with US Ambassador Ivo Daalder
2:30pm	Secretary's Office
2:45pm	Photo with Jessica Alba
2:50pm	Secretary's Office
3:00pm	Meeting with the Families of the Iran Hikers
3:30pm	Secretary's Outer Office
3:45pm	Weekly Meeting with POTUS
4:15pm	Oval Office
4:30pm	Weekly PC Meeting
6:00pm	White House Situation Room

6:15pm Meeting/Meet and Greet with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew
 6:30pm 8th Floor, Monroe Room.

6:30pm Dinner Honoring the Visit of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew
 8:30pm (t) Ben Franklin Room, 8th Floor
 Open Press (at the top for remarks only)

HRC Ron Washington, DC
 WJC Ron En route New York

Friday, November 6, 2009

Prev Ron Washington, DC

8:25am Presidential Daily Briefing
 8:30am Secretary's Office

8:30am Daily Small Senior Staff Meeting
 8:40am Secretary's Office

8:45am Daily Senior Staff Meeting
 9:15am Secretary's Conference Room

9:30am Weekly Meeting with Susan Rice
 10:00am Secretary's Office

10:15am Hold for NSC/Office Time
 11:15am Tbd

12:15pm No Limits Luncheon
 1:15pm Location: Ronald Reagan Building
 Request for 60 person photo line (not confirmed), remarks at the luncheon.

Note Holding both the 2:00pm and 3:00pm shuttle for departure.

HRC Ron Chappaqua, NY
 WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

FYI:
 Munich Conference/Atlantic Council Event
 Location: DC

Saturday, November 7, 2009

Prev Ron Chappaqua, NY

10:00am Commissioning of the USS New York (T)
 11:15am (t) Pier 88
 Note: 1000 people attending. HRC to keynote for 8-10 minutes.
 Advance: Paul Narain
 Captain Mike Walley
 Open Press

B6

7:00pm (t) Depart LaGuardia en route Paris

HRC Ron En route Paris
 WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Sunday, November 8, 2009

Prev Ron En route Paris

HRC Ron Berlin, Germany
 WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Monday, November 9, 2009

Prev Ron Berlin, Germany

HRC Ron Berlin, Germany
 WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Tuesday, November 10, 2009

Prev Ron Berlin, Germany

HRC Ron Singapore
 WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Wednesday, November 11, 2009

Prev Ron Singapore

HRC Ron Singapore
 WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Thursday, November 12, 2009

Prev Ron Singapore

HA 09/01/2015

HRC Ron \ Manila, Philippines
WJC Ron En route Israel

Friday, November 13, 2009

Prev Ron Philippines

HRC Ron Singapore
WJC Ron Israel

Saturday, November 14, 2009

Prev Ron Singapore

HRC Ron Singapore
WJC Ron Israel

Sunday, November 15, 2009

Prev Ron Singapore

HRC Ron Shanghai, China
WJC Ron En route New York

Monday, November 16, 2009

Prev Ron Shanghai, China

HRC Ron Beijing, China
WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

Prev Ron Beijing, China

HRC Ron Beijing, China
WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

Prev Ron Beijing, China

HRC Ron Seoul, Korea
WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY (T)

Thursday, November 19, 2009

Prev Ron Seoul, Korea

Return from Overseas Travel

HRC Ron Washington, DC

HA 09/01/2015

WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Friday, November 20, 2009
Prev Ron Washington, DC

Staff Retreat and Reception
Blair House/Whitehaven

HRC Ron Tbd
WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

From: Abodin, Huma <AbodinH@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2009 8:12 AM
To: humamabedin [REDACTED]
Subject: Print Fw: Refaming the Domestic Debate on Sudan

RELEASE IN PART B5,B6

B6


From: Mills, Cheryl D
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Cc: Abedin, Huma
Sent: Fri Oct 30 06:12:46 2009
Subject: Fw: Refaming the Domestic Debate on Sudan

Fyi



From: Scott Graton [REDACTED]
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Shortley, Timothy R; Burns, William J; Steinberg, James B
Sent: Fri Oct 30 02:56:14 2009
Subject: Refaming the Domestic Debate on Sudan

B6

Cheryl, I'd appreciate your passing this note to Secretary Clinton. I'd rather not have this idea swirling around in email circles until she gets an opportunity to evaluate the concept. With gratitude, Scott



B5

Jonathan S. Gratton, Maj Gen (Ret)
President's Special Envoy to Sudan
O: (202) 647-5855
M: 
H: 

B6

From: Doug Band [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, October 30, 2009 2:19:09 PM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: OFAC Cover Letter.pdf - Adobe Reader

RELEASE IN PART B6

B6

Happy to tell them whatever you want

----- Original Message -----

From: Huma Abedin
To: Doug Band
Sent: Fri Oct 30 10:36:00 2009
Subject: RE: OFAC Cover Letter.pdf - Adobe Reader

oh boy
ofac situation is a mess
there wont be a good answer until there is a policy
are you sure ?

From: Doug Band
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2009 7:43 AM
To: Huma Abedin
Subject: Fw: OFAC Cover Letter.pdf - Adobe Reader

Another cuba q [REDACTED]

Can we just connect her with the right person?

B6

----- Original Message -----

From: Charlie Ann Syrett [REDACTED]
To: Doug Band
Sent: Thu Oct 29 07:42:22 2009
Subject: RE: OFAC Cover Letter.pdf - Adobe Reader

B6

Thx Doug...
No: re: State Dept...do you have any suggestions as to who to go to
first...any connection to the Cuba desk?
Thx.
CAS

-----Original Message-----

From: Doug Band [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 29, 2009 7:08 AM
To: 'csyrett' [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: OFAC Cover Letter.pdf - Adobe Reader

B6

B6

Thank you, very kind

We don't have a coordinated outreach on the volunteer level. On the cgi
website you can make commitments and follow through on them. But will think
on it

You are right, there are many things we wish we had the capacity and
resources to get involved in. The problems in that regard are complex as you
can imagine. We do many things for many organizations as you can imagine.
Happy to discuss ways we can help

Have you been connected with state department yet?

----- Original Message -----

From: Charlie Ann Syrett [REDACTED]
To: Doug Band; [REDACTED]
Sent: Mon Oct 26 15:52:42 2009
Subject: FW: OFAC Cover Letter.pdf - Adobe Reader

B6
B6

HA 09/01/2015

Doug:

Hope all is well.

B6

I have a few things to run by you:

1. Related to the Clinton Foundation:

A. We had several people over for dinner the other night and we were talking about the Foundation. Several asked how do you get plugged in to do volunteer work. I simply referred them to the web site...is there a volunteer coordinator that they could call/email etc.

B. My focus has been with raising cancer awareness ... Does the Foundation embrace that issue in any way. I studied the web site and was unable to find any project in that arena. I realize the Foundation cannot do everything...but, I have some thoughts about how to expand the concept of healthy children and fighting child obesity to include an emphasis on cancer prevention. Would love to pick your brain about this...either here in Sarasota or when I am in NYC...perhaps, I could come by and discuss this... As I always, say, it can't hurt to ask!
Thanks for any help with this concept!

Now for my Cuba project:

2. RE: the SYC Charitable Foundation's effort to go to Cuba:

If you recall, you and I began corresponding regarding this effort several months ago. Your referral to Senator Nelson's office was most helpful and finally, our application has been filed (via the attached cover letter) and we are waiting word from OFAC. We have been advised that OFAC will probably sit tight until it receives a clear message from the Administration as to its position on Cuba. However, we have also been advised to mobilize political support for this. ...meaning, the more people who communicate that this is a worthwhile, non-threatening request for travel to Cuba...well, then we have a chance of OFAC issuing its stamp of approval. The cover letter will provide you with a clear understanding of what it is we are trying to do.

We keep reading about different groups traveling to Cuba, so we know that cultural exchanges and participation in sporting events are considered and approved by OFAC...so, we are not asking for something out of the ordinary. And, by the way, Mote in Sarasota recently hosted a group of Cuban scientists.

So, my request is: (a) is this something that President Clinton could assist with...either with a phone call or letter; (b) is this something that Secretary of State Clinton could assist with...either a phone call or letter...or even pointing us to the right persons. From the sounds of it, we just need a nod from the right person.

I spoke with Ambassador Hyde about this and she suggested that we find out who sits at the Cuba Desk within the State Department and then see what input you/we can provide that person with. (c) If neither President or Secty. Clinton are the right persons, do you have any suggestion as to who we should contact in Congress?

I am not certain if [redacted] already contacted you about the Cuba effort...but, she is also working on the SYC Charitable Foundations effort to go to Cuba. We did not want to double team you so, if she has already talked to you about this, forgive my "nagging" again!

B6

That's it for now...if you could give it some thought and get back to me I would appreciate it. Feel free to call me on my cell [REDACTED] I realize how busy you are ...so, when you get the chance.

B6

Oh, yes, the President's visit is still the talk of the town...you did a fabulous job. [REDACTED]

B6

Thanks for everything, Doug. Hope to see you soon, Charlie Ann

-----Original Message-----

From: Jim Syrett [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2009 3:00 PM
To: 'Charlie Ann Syrett'
Subject: OFAC Cover Letter.pdf - Adobe Reader

B6

No virus found in this incoming message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 8.5.423 / Virus Database: 270.14.32/2460 - Release Date: 10/26/09
08:10:00

No virus found in this incoming message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 8.5.423 / Virus Database: 270.14.37/2466 - Release Date: 10/28/09
19:39:00

HRC PRIVATE LINE BLOCK

Updated as of { TIME \@ "h:mm am/pm" * MERGEFORMAT } on { DATE \@ "M/d/yyyy" * MERGEFORMAT }

Sunday, November 1, 2009

RELEASE IN PART B6

Prev Ron Israel

HRC Ron Morocco
WJC Ron Istanbul, Turkey

Monday, November 2, 2009

Prev Ron Morocco

HRC Ron Morocco
WJC Ron Istanbul, Turkey

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Prev Ron Morocco

Depart Morocco en route AAFB

6:00 pm (T) Arrive AAFB

HRC Ron Washington, DC
WJC Ron Dubai

Wednesday, November 4, 2009

Prev Ron Washington, DC

8:25am Presidential Daily Briefing
8:30am Secretary's Office

8:30am Daily Small Senior Staff Meeting
8:40am Secretary's Office

8:45am Daily Senior Staff Meeting
9:00am Secretary's Conference Room

9:10am US/EU Ministerial Meeting
9:55am Monroe Room
Official Photo at the top of the meeting

HA 09/01/2015

10:00am	US/EU Energy Summit
10:45am	Benjamin Franklin Room
	Camera Spray at the top of the meeting
10:45am	Pre-Brief for Press Avail
10:55am	Secretary's Office
10:55am	Press Avail with Tbd (Chu, Bildt, EU Representative)
11:10am	Treaty Room
11:15am	Office Time
2:00pm	Secretary's Office
2:30pm	Pre-Brief for POTUS Meeting
2:45pm	Secretary's Office
3:00pm	Meeting with Foreign Minister Sikorski, Poland
3:45pm	Secretary's Conference Room
	Press Avail in Treaty Room
4:00pm	Videos
4:30pm	Marshall Room
	Welcoming Remarks for State Ethics Video
	State's 2 nd Annual Exchanges Connect Video Contest (ECA)
	Overseas Security Advisor Council's 24 th Annual Briefing (DS)
	International Center for Journalists Awards Dinner (honoring Ms. Namegabe from Congo)
	Combined Federal Campaign
4:30pm	Meeting with US Ambassador Ivo Daalder
4:45pm	Secretary's Office
5:00 pm	Meeting with Congressman Ike Skelton
5:30pm	Secretary's Office
	Contact: Ryan Dillon Office 202-225-2876
HRC Ron	Washington, DC
WJC Ron	Zurich, Switzerland

Thursday, November 5, 2009

Prev Ron Washington, DC

8:25am	Presidential Daily Briefing
8:30am	Secretary's Office

8:30am	Daily Small Senior Staff Meeting
8:40am	Secretary's Office
8:45am	Daily Senior Staff Meeting
9:15am	Secretary's Conference Room
9:15am	Thursday Meeting with Regional Bureau Secretaries
10:00am	Deputy's Conference Room
10:05am	Drop-by with Ambassador Swanee Hunt
10:10am	Secretary's Office
10:15am	2009 State Awards Ceremony
10:35am	Ben Franklin Room
	Note: HRC to give 5-7 minutes of remarks.
	Press Tbd
11:00am	Office Time
1:00pm	Secretary's Office
1:15pm	Meeting with German FM Westerwelle
1:45pm	Secretary's Conference Room
1:50pm	Press Avail
2:00pm	Treaty Room
Time Tbd	Pre-Brief for PC Meeting
2:45pm	Photo with Jessica Alba
2:50pm	Secretary's Office
3:00pm	Meeting with the Families of the Iran Hikers
3:30pm	Secretary's Outer Office
4:00pm (t)	Weekly Meeting with POTUS
4:30pm (t)	Oval Office
5:00pm	Weekly PC Meeting
6:30pm	White House Situation Room
6:50pm	Pull-Aside with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew
6:55pm	8 th Floor, Monroe Room
7:00pm	Dinner Honoring the Visit of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew
8:30pm	Ben Franklin Room, 8th Floor

Open Press (at the top for remarks only)

HRC Ron Washington, DC
WJC Ron En route New York

Friday, November 6, 2009

Prev Ron Washington, DC

8:25am Presidential Daily Briefing

8:30am Secretary's Office

8:30am Daily Small Senior Staff Meeting

8:40am Secretary's Office

8:45am Daily Senior Staff Meeting

9:15am Secretary's Conference Room

9:30am Weekly Meeting with Susan Rice

10:00am Secretary's Office

10:15am Hold for NSC/Office Time

11:15am Tbd

11:30am Bilateral with the FM of Japan

12:00pm Secretary's Conference Room

Camera Spray (at the top of the meeting)

12:10 pm Depart State en route Ronald Reagan Building

12:20pm Keynote Speaker at the No Limits Luncheon

1:20pm Location: Ballroom Tbd

Ronald Reagan Building

Request for 60 person photo line (not confirmed), remarks at the luncheon.

Open Press

Advance: Laura Lucas

1:25 pm Depart Ronald Reagan Building en route National

Note: Holding both the 2:00pm and 3:00pm shuttle for departures.

2:00pm Depart National en route LaGuardia

3:00 pm

HRC Ron Chappaqua, NY

WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

FYI:
Munich Conference/Atlantic Council Event
Location: DC

Saturday, November 7, 2009

Prev Ron Chappaqua, NY

10:00am Commissioning of the USS New York

11:15am Pier 88

Note: 1000 people attending. HRC to keynote for 8-10 minutes.

Advance: Paul Narain

Captain Mike Walley

Open Press

B6

7:00pm (t) Depart LaGuardia en route Paris

HRC Ron En route Paris

WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Sunday, November 8, 2009

Prev Ron En route Paris

HRC Ron Berlin, Germany

WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Monday, November 9, 2009

Prev Ron Berlin, Germany

HRC Ron Berlin, Germany

WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Tuesday, November 10, 2009

Prev Ron Berlin, Germany

HRC Ron Singapore

WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Wednesday, November 11, 2009

Prev Ron Singapore

HA 09/01/2015

HRC Ron Singapore
WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Thursday, November 12, 2009

Prev Ron Singapore

HRC Ron Manila, Philippines
WJC Ron En route Israel

Friday, November 13, 2009

Prev Ron Philippines

HRC Ron Singapore
WJC Ron Israel

Saturday, November 14, 2009

Prev Ron Singapore

HRC Ron Singapore
WJC Ron Israel

Sunday, November 15, 2009

Prev Ron Singapore

HRC Ron Shanghai, China
WJC Ron En route New York

Monday, November 16, 2009

Prev Ron Shanghai, China

HRC Ron Beijing, China
WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

Prev Ron Beijing, China

HRC Ron Beijing, China
WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

Prev Ron Beijing, China

HRC Ron Seoul, Korea

WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY (T)

Thursday, November 19, 2009

Prev Ron Seoul, Korea

Return from Overseas Travel

HRC Ron Washington, DC

WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY

Friday, November 20, 2009

Prev Ron Washington, DC

Staff Retreat and Reception
Blair House/Whitehaven

HRC Ron Tbd

WJC Ron Chappaqua, NY