



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 18, 2016

Case No. F-2015-17164
Segments: M-01IC1, L-01IC1,
L-01IC2IC1, DS-02IC1, H-01

James F. Peterson
Judicial Watch
425 Third Street SW, Suite 800
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Mr. Peterson:

I refer to our letter dated July 18, 2016, regarding the release of material under the Freedom of Information Act (the "FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552.

The review of an additional 19 documents responsive to your request has been completed. After reviewing these documents, we have determined that 10 may be released with excisions and 9 must be withheld in full. The Department withheld the 9 documents in their entirety under FOIA Exemptions 3, 5, 6, 7(E), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6) and (b)(7)(E). An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material.

Please be advised that this completes the processing of your request. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Robert Prince, Senior Counsel at 202-305-3654 or Robert.Prince@usdoj.gov. Please refer to the case number F-2015-17164 and civil action number 16-cv-00153, in all correspondence regarding this request.


Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Eric F. Stein" followed by the initials "PVS".

Eric F. Stein, Acting Co-Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.

Benghazi Compound B & C



Benghazi Compound B & C

CORRECTIVE MEASURES

1.

2.

3.

4.

B7(E)

5. Gate B1 is being considered as the primary entry for vehicles into Compound B. The vehicle screening point is under development by the RSO.

6.

7. Widen to 5 meters the existing pedestrian opening between Villa B and C to allow vehicle access. Construct a new gravel driveway to connect the two villa compounds to allow a secondary vehicle egress. Consider the use of gravel from the existing access driveway between Villa B and A.

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, September 21, 2012 2:28 PM
To: McKay, Ian R <McKayIR@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Benghazi Conference Call

B6
B7(C)

RELEASE IN PART
B5, B7(C), B6

From: Rolph, Nancy C
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2011 2:07 PM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: Benghazi Conference Call

B6
B7(C)

B5

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2011 11:04 AM
To: Rolph, Nancy C
Subject: Benghazi Conference Call

B6
B7(C)

Main Points:

I advised that [Redacted] is scheduled to arrive in Benghazi this Wednesday and M confirmed that all travel arrangements are set for him.

B6
B7(C)

The owner of the Interim Villa signed the lease and it is being sent to WDC for review/signature.

TNC guards are able to start tomorrow (2 guard posts, 24/7).

There was discussion about the Compound Villa and the fact that the owner needs to show evidence of ownership of property adjacent to the compound that USG needs to lease (in addition to the compound itself) to achieve setback.

[Redacted] advised that there is a SOW for the installation of two drop arms and it will take 10 days to install both.

B6
B7(C)

Chain link fence (9 ft.) installation adjacent to orchard is 80% done.

It was mentioned that DS waivers may need to be obtained for the Compound Villa and it could take 6 weeks for approval. I advised that we could expedite the process.

There will be a conference call tomorrow at 0930.

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, January 30, 2012 3:37 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]; Meehan, Daniel F <MeehanDF@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Physical Security Upgrades- Mission Benghazi
Attach: A.JPG; B.JPG; C.JPG; D.JPG; E.JPG; F.JPG; Benghazi Compound set back for Villa C.pptx

RELEASE IN PART
B7(C),B6

B6
B7(C)

FYI

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, January 30, 2012 2:02 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Physical Security Upgrades- Mission Benghazi

Good evening [redacted]

Since my last email re: Mission Benghazi's physical security upgrades, I've been able to acquire +/-reposition additional barriers to ensure our Northern wall on Villa-C compound is now protected with an increase in. Due to weather conditions (rain) we could not get the crane to maneuver these "steroid-esque" jersey barriers. Only in Benghazi can you take the public road for additional set-back. With the funding of the AM for two drop arms I'm planning to position them at C + D photos. One lane will be an entrance and the other egress.

I'm working with new MGMT officer to purchase arresting-type cable to link the independent barriers for additional strength. Once the drop arms are in place I can reposition the LGF, WTM and screening area on Villa-A compound.

FYI

R,
[redacted]

Classified by Director A/GIS/IPS, Acting, DoS on 08/18/2016 ~ Class: SECRET ~ Reason: 1.4(D)B1 ~
Declassify on: 08/08/2041

From: McKay, Ian R </O=SBUSTATE/OU=SA20 AG/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=MCKAYIR>
Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 12:30 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Benghazi Security site plans 2011 DOJ

B6
B7(E)

Great, thanks.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 12:15 PM
To: McKay, Ian R
Subject: RE: Benghazi Security site plans 2011 DOJ

B6
B7(E)

That is correct. The office annex next to Villa B had more than [redacted] of setback from the perimeter wall of the property. jd

B7(E)

From: McKay, Ian R
Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 11:04 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Benghazi Security site plans 2011 DOJ

B6
B7(C)

Thanks. On this map, setback is only [redacted] from the structure labeled bofficeb to the section labeled bprivate property.b Your email below indicates that we actually leased the section labeled bprivate propertyb as well, so presumably setback should have been labeled to the street, which presumably would have been over 100 feet.

B7(E)

As a result, it appears that this facility had 100 feet of setback, so even if SECCA was applicable we would not have needed a setback waiver. Can you please confirm that this is correct?

Thanks again,
Ian

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 10:43 AM
To: McKay, Ian R
Subject: FW: Benghazi Security site plans 2011 DOJ

B6
B7(C)

Ian, here is some additional info which should help, jd

RELEASE IN PART
B1, B7(E), B7(C), B6

<< File: Benghazi Compound B & C option.docx >>

From: McKay, Ian R
Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 10:25 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Benghazi Security site plans 2011 DOJ

B6
B7(C)

I understand the collocation issue, but just want to confirm that a setback waiver would not have been needed. Can you confirm that there was 100 feet of setback at the site discussed below? What about the bannexb site?

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 10:20 AM
To: McKay, Ian R
Subject: RE: Benghazi Security site plans 2011 DOJ

B6
B7(C)

Not true, in the strict interpretation of SECCA, we would have to had [redacted]
[redacted] for SECCA not to apply. [redacted] would have to submit a letter stating [redacted]
[redacted] jd

1.4(D)
1.4(D)
B1 1.4(D)
B1

From: McKay, Ian R
Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 9:57 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Benghazi Security site plans 2011 DOJ

B6
B7(C)

Thanks, so just to confirm, in responding to Congress can we say that even if SECCA was applicable we would not have sought a waiver for Benghazi because the office was sited more than 100 feet from the perimeter of the property?

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 9:19 AM
To: McKay, Ian R
Subject: RE: Benghazi Security site plans 2011 DOJ

B6
B7(C)

Ian, The private property in question, we leased as part of the entire piece of residential property from street to street and then subdivided it with a interior temporary fence-line, so the office structure had more than 100 feet to the perimeter wall of the property. Villa C was for residential use for staff assigned to Post. I believe that all office activities were conducted from the structure next to Villa B, jd

From: McKay, Ian R
Sent: Friday, September 21, 2012 3:51 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Benghazi Security site plans 2011 DOJ

B6
B7(C)

[redacted]

B6
B7(C)

I'm trying to pin down the setback distances, and the attachment here titled bBenghazi Compound B C Optionb suggests that it had less than 100 feet of setback. Specifically, the map shows that the office on the Villa B lot had [redacted] of setback to the perimeter of the property. Is that number correct, or is there some reason to think that the section labeled bprivate propertyb to the south of that office building (to the buildingb left as itb presented in this attachment) was actually part of the compound?

B7(E)

It would also appear that the guest house on the Villa C clearly had less than 100 feet of setback, but it's not clear whether SECCA would have applied to that structure. Do you know what it was used for? Did it contain office space?

Thanks,
Ian

<< File: Benghazi Compound B & C option.docx >>

RELEASE IN PART
B7(E),B7(C),B6

R

B6
B7(C)

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Thursday, September 13, 2012 2:05 PM
To: DS-IP-NEA [Redacted]
Subject: FW: Urgent Benghazi waivers

FYI

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Thursday, September 13, 2012 2:02 PM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: FW: Urgent Benghazi waivers

[Redacted]
DS/C Special Assistant
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Office: [Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Thursday, September 13, 2012 1:52 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: Urgent Benghazi waivers

[Redacted] PSD's contribution:

The attached .pdf file includes a summary of the compound. Diagrams are included. The text below provides an overview of the physical security upgrades made after our survey. DS/C/PSP is not aware of any outstanding physical security issues requested by post that have not been addressed. We are still assembling all pertinent documents but I think this is a good beginning.

- 
Approved Future
of Benghazi Op...
- 
US Mission
Benghazi Comp...
- 
Security
Survey_Villa Co...
- 
Temporary Fence
Plan.pptx

The Special Mission in Benghazi was established with a limited life-span and was to close down in December 2011; however, in that same month, M approved a decision memo to keep the Post open until December 2012. Villas 'B' and 'C' needed some upgrades which the owner/property manager agreed to do, to include:

- putting window grillwork on the windows of the small office structure

- [redacted]
- increasing outside lighting.

B7(E)

The property manager for the owners also agreed to punch a hole in the wall between the two compounds for vehicle and pedestrian access and relocate some old factory machines on the property to block the unused vehicle gates. Up until this time, Post used available FAVs on the inside to block vehicle gates.

Following close coordination with post, OBO, and IP over the previous months, several DS offices (PSD, LGP, and Residential Security) provided funding in the amount of approximately \$80K for facility and structure upgrades that included:

- Concrete, jersey-type barriers installed curbside and on the villa grounds to block unused vehicle gates.
- Four steel, manual drop-arms (vehicle barriers) for access control and anti-ram protection.
- Compound lighting increased for LGP observation.
- Barbed wire installed on top of the existing perimeter wall to raise height.
- Installation of barbed wire on top of the interior chain link fence to create a secondary barrier.
- Installation of several LGP platforms for property and street surveillance.
- Construction of four guard booths.
- Installation of steel grillwork on all windows not already treated with this protection.
- [redacted]
- Erecting sandbag emplacements for internal defense purposes.
- Hardening villas with safe rooms with a steel door.

B7(E)

SBU

B6
B7(C)

This email is UNCLASSIFIED

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, September 13, 2012 1:04 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Urgent Benghazi waivers
Importance: High

To all the PDAS has asked that Countermeasures provide any Physical Security Surveys for Benghazi ASAP. Additionally he has asked that we assemble all documents and related equipment that was provided for Benghazi to date. Please send all information and documents to [redacted] and myself.

Regards,

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, September 13, 2012 12:18 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Urgent Benghazi waivers

[redacted] thank you for your quick reply to the FO.

Regards,

B6
B7(C)

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, September 13, 2012 12:04 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Urgent Benghazi waivers
Importance: High

Urgent!! Do we have any waivers for Benghazi! The PDAS is going on the hill in 30 min.

- In addition to whether the United States or the host governments had intelligence prior to the attacks in Egypt, Libya, or Yemen, please expand your response to include an assessment of attacks that took place at any U.S. missions from September 11 – 13, 2012. Please also discuss whether there were adequate mechanisms in place to share that information on a timely basis with U.S. security personnel posted at the mission.
- Please provide an assessment of the state of security of other U.S. embassies and consulates in high threat environments that were not attacked from September 11 – 13, 2012."

RELEASE IN PART
B7(C),B6

10/01/2012 Representative Bill Cassidy to Secretary Clinton (response sent 10/24)

- "What was the State Department's level of knowledge surrounding the attacks, particularly regarding whether or not there was knowledge of a potential protest or if there was indication of a potential planned attack?
- Considering the attacks in Benghazi earlier this year, what requirements did the Benghazi consulate meet in order to obtain a waiver for a lower security level?
- When will the official report on the attack of our embassy be released?
- What is the State Department's plan to inform Members of Congress as the investigation progresses so they can perform their responsibility of Congressional oversight?
- Now that the Administration is labeling the Benghazi Consulate attacks as an act of terrorism, what is being done to protect other U.S. embassies from similar attacks?
- How will the State Department improve coordinated communications with Members of Congress in the future?"

10/02/2012 Chairman Darrell Issa to Secretary Clinton (response sent)

Summary: lists several security incidents in Libya in the months prior to the September 11 attack.

- Was State Department headquarters in Washington aware of all of the above incidents [security related incidents in Libya]? If not, why not?
- If so, what measures did the State Department take to match the level of security provided to the U.S. Mission in Libya to the level of threat?
- Please detail any requests made by Embassy Tripoli to State Department headquarters for additional security, whether in general or in light of specific attacks mentioned above. How did the Department respond to each of those requests?

10/15/2012 Chairman Heana Ros-Lehtinen to Secretary Clinton (response sent 11/12)

- Was there a waiver of the minimum security requirements at the Post in Benghazi? Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charlene Lamb testified before Congress that, "we had the correct number of assets in Benghazi at the time of 9/11." When asked whether there were any budget considerations that led her not to increase the number of people in the security force in Benghazi, she answered, "No sir." Acknowledging that hindsight is 20/20, do you believe the risk assessment for Benghazi was adequate?

- How will the Department re-evaluate the risk assessment process for other vulnerable U.S. sites overseas as a result of the Benghazi attack? What re-assessments, if any, have taken place regarding attacks against our posts in Egypt and Yemen on 9/11 and the ensuing days and weeks?
- In the February 2012 report on the Department's waivers of security requirements mandated by the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, there were two waivers for U.S. diplomatic buildings in Sanaa, Yemen. Can you explain the process by which the Department determines waivers of physical security requirements and provide an explanation of how the waivers for Yemen were justified?
- Was there a waiver of the minimum security requirements at the post in Benghazi?
- Did the Government of Libya fail to fulfill its commitment to the security of the U.S. diplomatic mission? What should have been done differently?
- In August 2011, the Department requested \$800,000 in NADR funds to improve the capability of Libyan law enforcement to combat terrorists and terrorist organizations. In September 2012, the Department requested \$4,000,000 for Libyan border security. Given the concern with law enforcement capability in Libya, why was security outside our consulate in Benghazi left in the hands of Libyan personnel?
- At what point do risk-mitigation measures reach a level that withdrawal from an overseas post is deemed to be necessary? Or as [redacted] so aptly asked: "How thin does the ice have to get before someone falls through?"

B6
B7(C)

10/18/2012 Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee (Senators Lieberman and Collins (interim response sent 10/26)

- Briefing request to address the following: (1) the threat assessment regarding the U.S. diplomatic missions in Benghazi and Tripoli prior to the attack; (2) the security needs and security in place for diplomatic personnel in Libya, including Tripoli and Benghazi; (3) any requests for additional security for the U.S. embassy, diplomatic missions or diplomatic personnel in Libya; (4) a detailed description and chronology of the attack; and (5) what was known about the attack in its immediate aftermath and what additional information has come to light since then, including an assessment of whether any initial public statements issued by members of the Administration in the days following the attack were inaccurate and, if so, why.
- Please provide an explanation of, including documents describing, the roles and responsibilities of U.S. government agencies and interagency coordination among such agencies for the security of U.S. diplomatic missions and diplomatic personnel.
- How does the State Department determine the appropriate nature or level of security to be provided for Department facilities abroad?
 - What are the respective roles and responsibilities of U.S. Ambassadors, Regional Security Officers, and senior officials with the with the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security Service in providing for the security of diplomatic facilities and personnel?

Classification Extended on : 08/10/2016 ~ Class: SECRET ~ Authority: DSCG 11-1 ~ Declassify on: 10/03/2032

B6
B7(C)

From: [Redacted] **RELEASE IN PART**
Sent: Wednesday, October 03, 2012 10:58 AM **B1,B7(E),B7(C),1.4(C),B6**
To: [Redacted]
Cc: DS-IP-NEA; [Redacted]
Subject: FW: Updated Libya briefing paper for DAS Lamb's meeting with DCM Hicks
Attachments: Libya Full DAS Briefing Paper DCM Hicks(DRAFT)v1.docx; Tab 1 Tripoli EAC 12 Tripoli 78.docx; Tab 2 Benghazi EAC.docx; Tab 3 CMR overview.pdf; Tab 3a Villa Compound.ppt; Tab 3b CMR compound.ppt; Tab 4 Benghazi_Compound_overview_Nov2011.pdf; Tab 5 Tripoli [Redacted] Exception Memo.pdf; Tab 6 Bengazhi [Redacted] Exception Memo.pdf

1.4(C)
B1

Importance: High

B6
B7(C)

Per your request here is the most recent one, but things have changed since 9/11 a quick synopsis of some of the bigger changes:

1. Embassy operations have moved out of the CMR and now are located in the Interim compounds;
2. FAST Marines are currently deployed, [Redacted] at Interim compound [Redacted] at the Annex;
3. An FBI team is in Tripoli conducting an investigation into the attack on Benghazi;
4. DS has 2 MSD teams in Tripoli (11 personnel);
5. Post is tracking 2 CODEL visits this week Corker and Issa.
6. Post is still on Ordered departure.

B7(E)

Regards,

[Redacted]
 Desk Officer for Near Eastern Affairs
 Diplomatic Security International Programs
 Office Ph: [Redacted]
 Mobile Ph: [Redacted]
 Email: [Redacted]

B6
B7(C)

IAW E.O. 12958 this email is authorized up to SECRET

This document is UNCLASSIFIED//NOFORN when separated from SECRET//NOFORN attachment(s).

Sensitivity: Sensitive
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Derived From: Derived from: Derived from: Derived from previous message in thread.
Declassify On: 2022/10/03

SECRET/NOFORN

RELEASE IN PART
B1, B7(E), 1.4(D), B7(C), B6, 1.4(C)

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY BRIEFING PAPER FOR DAS LAMB'S MEETING WITH DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION GREGORY N. HICKS



U.S. Embassy, Tripoli

May 9, 2012 at 1400-1500 hours

Classification Extended on : 08/10/2016 ~ Class: SECRET ~ Authority: DSCG 11-1 ~ Declassify on:
05/09/2037

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) Gregory N. Hicks, a FS-01, has had a 20-year career at the Department of State. Greg Hicks has served in five overseas assignments in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, and Gambia. During four tours in Washington, Greg has served as Deputy Director of the Office of Investment Affairs, as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs, as a trade policy negotiator for the Office of the United States Trade Representative, and as Country Officer for Vietnam, Oman, and Yemen. Greg played key roles in the negotiation of Vietnam's WTO accession, the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, and Oman's WTO accession, as well as the renegotiation of U.S. military base access in Oman. He has received five Meritorious Service Increases, three individual Superior Honor Awards, and three individual Meritorious Honor Awards, and numerous group awards.

(U) The former Chief of Mission Residence (CMR) now serves as general office space and houses the majority of offices (including AMB and DCM) needed for embassy operations. The Ambassador currently resides in one of the villas on the housing compound. Because of the severe space limitations, the villa is shared by the Ambassador (who occupies one of the two bedrooms on the second floor), the DCM (who occupies the other bedroom on the same floor [with a private bathroom]), the RSO Operations Center on the first floor, the DOD Security Support Team OPS room, and two DS agents (currently MSD) who share a bedroom on the first floor. Post is in the process of relocating the RSO Operations Center and should have it completely moved by the time the Ambassador arrives on or about May 15. The villa has a large kitchen that is rarely used for its purpose as most meals are taken at the cafeteria, and a living room which is used for a variety of gatherings, including country team meetings.

B7(E)

(SBU) The Deputy Chief of Mission has a protective detail that consists of The driver of the DCM's vehicle is a DS trained LES.

(SBU) The Ambassador's armored vehicle is primarily a C level Suburban.

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

II. ISSUES

RSO's Primary Concerns – Militias, Celebratory Fire and Terrorism

(SBU) U.S. Embassy reporting indicates tensions between competing militias and uncontrolled gunfire are the most prevalent and immediate security threats to personnel in Libya. Post reports that it is unlikely that the GoL will make any effort to disband the militias, as they recognize that the militias will be needed to provide security for the upcoming national elections scheduled for June.

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1
B1

(SBU) Additionally, large stocks of unaccounted for and uncontrolled bulk explosives, artillery and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rounds, and widespread distribution of small arms may negatively affect the tenuous security and political situation in the long term.

(SBU) Highlighting the threat of celebratory fire is a specific incident that occurred on February 14, when one SST member was grazed in the arm by celebratory fire while walking on the residential compound in Tripoli.

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
1.4(D)
B1

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
1.4(D)
B1

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP – Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

Government of Libya (GoL) support for Host Nation provided security for U.S. Embassy compounds, Surveillance Detection team and armed LES Security Escorts

(SBU) The GoL's delays in forming an interim government resulted in a leadership void on critical security issues. Although Post has made repeated requests for armed, uniformed host government security at our residential and office compounds, the GoL has not provided any consistent level of support. Despite repeated demarches by the Ambassador, the Minister of Interior has not responded to formal requests for static, host nation security for the diplomatic facilities in Tripoli.

(SBU) For a couple of months the GoL provided one marked police car with two officers from 1000-2200 hours in Tripoli. The vehicle split it's time randomly between the two primary USG facilities in Tripoli, the temporary Embassy (formerly the CMR) and the new villa compound (separated by about 1.5 miles) and often is unaccountable for significant periods of time during duty hours. As of May 1st, the Government of Libya has ceased providing marked police car and officers. The Col. in charge has proven extremely difficult to work with and continued to assert that he wanted housing, salaries, and access to water, air conditioning, and TV for his officers. RSO is in discussion with other GoL units with responsibility for Diplomatic protection and working with the FM to build a temporary guard booth area at both the villas and the CMR for future police unit use.

B7(E)

(SBU) Post will also need to engage the current government with the creation of a [redacted] Given the decentralized security environment, which includes non-government controlled militias, [redacted] and personnel is likely to generate an increased risk that such personnel will be detained and subjected to interrogation and investigation by various militias, local police, and MOI security teams. Even if approved by the GoL, various non-government entities do not possess the control or professionalism to recognize GoL permits or authorization to operate.

(SBU) Post is developing plans to transition our security staffing from an MSD and SST-based model to one that incorporates more locally-based assets. The first class of 11 LES Security Escorts graduated on April 26.

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

B7(E)

(SBU) As of May 3 the RSO has submitted applications [redacted]
[redacted] This will be one of the talking points
for the outgoing Ambassador Gene Cretz with the MFA, so Post is cautiously
optimistic that authorization will be granted by the GoL [redacted]
[redacted]

(SBU) DS requires a COM approval memo for [redacted] it has been in the
executive office since January.

1.4(D)
B1

Diplomatic Pouch

(S/NF) [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) Post has resumed regular unclassified service, via Turkish Airlines. All
European carriers, including Lufthansa, are prohibited from carrying air cargo due
to EU security regulations which Libya fails to meet.

Armored Vehicles

B7(E)

(SBU) Post's current AV fleet consists of [redacted] vehicles. Post is in the process of
hiring additional LES drivers to support movement missions for both Benghazi and
Tripoli.

(SBU) According to Post's records, between September 17, 2011 and February 20,
2012, MSD, SST and RSO supported a total of 1,028 movement requests (average
of 6.6 per day) to 2,099 venues (average of 13.5 per day). These moves do not
include the Ambassador's or the DCM's movements as they have a dedicated
DS/SST protective detail.

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

B7(E)

(SBU) DEAV has also ordered [] armored passenger vans, these vehicles need to be procured, outfitted and shipped. DEAV estimates that these [] vans will be at Post by August 2012.

(SBU) CSO is in the process of turning over [] vehicles to NEA from their existing AV fleet. NEA plans on sending [] to Tunis to replace AVs they sent to Libya and the remaining [] to Tripoli.

(SBU) NEA, Post and DS/IP were discussing the option of sending [] of the [] AVs currently located in Benghazi to Tripoli. However, Post does not anticipate moving these vehicles from Benghazi due to recent vehicle breakdowns and mechanical issues in Benghazi.

(SBU) MSD assets in Tripoli can provide the drivers training to the newly hired LES drivers.

Physical Security of the New Villa Compound

(SBU) Post was given authority to occupy the residential compounds 'condition as is' by M. This "temporary" facility will transition to an "Interim" facility once the OBO make ready/upgrade project has been completed. Currently OBO estimates completion in April of 2013, however this date is likely to shift to the right as funding for the project has not been identified.

(SBU) DS/PSD/PCB has stated that waivers and exceptions will be needed, but can be delayed under the designation "temporary" facility. This will allow OBO and Post the necessary time to implement the physical and technical security upgrades required for a diplomatic facility. Upgrades will be done to the maximum extent feasible to meet SECCA and OSPB requirements and standards. A formal waiver and exception package will be assembled and processed for the Department at the time the upgrades are completed.

Consular Operations

(SBU) Post has proposed enclosing the carport to establish temporary office space from which it could conduct limited consular operations. Post has discussed proposed construction design and floor plans with OBO and DS/PSD and is

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

awaiting approval for this activity to be initiated along with the funding to implement. The RSO has reported that he can support the projected 40-50 applicants a day projected in this plan. Responsibility for funding the project has not been determined and no work has begun. M has requested that different potential options be brought to the table. DS/IP and DS/PSD participated in a meeting on this topic with Post, M, DS, CA, NEA and OBO representatives on May 3, to establish options for M to choose from on how the Department will proceed. NEA/EX is preparing a decision memo with input from OBO. It is currently in the clearance process and recommends moving forward with the car port plan.

Summary of recent RSO reports for Tripoli

(SBU) On May 2 the Deputy LGF commander was detained for over 3 hours along with several other Libyan citizens by armed youth at a former Ghaddafi regime compound. The Deputy LGF commander, with the assistance of a Libyan National Transitional Government (NTC) guard in the group of detainees, scaled a wall, escaped the compound, and fled to the U.S. Embassy's GSO warehouse. RSO coordinated recovery of the vehicle with TNC security officials, who directed two militia (Tajoura & Souk Al-Juma) brigades and national army units to the area.

The Status of the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

(SBU) As time has passed the mission has evolved from a Special Envoy mission into something closer to an American Presence-Post. DS/IP was informed several times that the mission would end once various milestones had been reached in Libya in 2011, such as the opening of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli and the movement of the GoL from Benghazi to Tripoli. In late December, M determined that the mission in Benghazi would continue through calendar year 2012. Both Ambassador Cretz and Ambassador Stevens have expressed interest in keeping Benghazi open past the current scheduled end date of calendar year 2012 in their recent meetings with A/S Boswell.

(SBU) Due to the ambiguity surrounding the duration of the U.S. Mission in Benghazi, RSO Benghazi has encountered funding issues for projects that are commonplace at most U.S. missions. DS provides support for this mission through field expedient physical security projects, TDY staffing, and LGF support.

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

(SBU) Since the compound is made up of two short-term leased residential properties, on adjacent plots, various offices within DS have provided the funding vice OBO/SM for local security upgrades to be implemented. Locally fabricated drop arms have been recently installed to replace [REDACTED]

B7(E)

[REDACTED] Additional lighting and window grills have been installed and concrete jersey type barriers have been placed curbside for anti ram protection. An internal temporary chain link fence with razor ribbon should be completed on or about May 9. The temporary fence, drop arm barriers and concrete barriers will be salvaged and relocated to Tripoli if Benghazi closes at the end of 2012.

Summary of recent RSO reports for Benghazi

(SBU) On 6 April, 2012, the Mission came under attack from a small Improvised Explosive Device (IED) thrown over the compound wall. No one was injured, and the acting RSO and QRF responded quickly. Disgruntled former contract guards are strongly suspected to be the culprits, but after their initial capture by the one of the 17th Feb. Martyrs Brigade members assigned to the mission near the scene of the explosion, they have been released by the 17th Feb. Martyrs Brigade. The two suspects have filed an official complaint against the apprehending militia member stating that he used excess force by firing a warning shot in the air when they did not respond to his verbal commands to stop. Currently no official GoL action has been taken against the 17th Feb. Martyrs Brigade member.

(SBU) On 10 April, 2012, an IED was thrown at a vehicle carrying the United Nations (UN) Special Envoy to Libya. No injuries were sustained; however, UN security staff believes they were specifically targeted.

(SBU) In both instances, the IEDs were small handmade explosives, approximately 6.5 centimeters tall and 7.6 centimeters in diameter, called "jelatina." Jelatina are used in Benghazi and the surrounding area for fishing, and are fairly common and easily obtained. They are typically a blast only device and those used in the attacks did not contain a fragmentation mechanism, limiting their effectiveness as IEDs.

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1,4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

(SBU) The compound also experiences nightly celebratory fire. This is usually intensified on the weekends and when there is a wedding in the area (there is a wedding hall less 400 yards from the compound, and another being built directly across the street). On 20 April, 2012, unusually heavy celebratory fire resulted in compound staff finding several expended bullets scattered around the Mission grounds.

III. POST DESCRIPTION

(SBU) The former Embassy facility was known as the "Villa" compound and was created by leasing adjacent properties to form a small two-acre compound. The Villa facility was upgraded by OBO at a cost of approximately \$11 million when the project was completed in October 2010. Appropriate SECCA waivers and OSPB exceptions were requested and sent forward in January 2011 however in February, soon after submission of the package, the Revolution began.

(U) The Villa Embassy site was subsequently trashed by government loyalists with significant structural damage done to several of the leased Villas, which rendered the facility unusable for Post civil war re-opening operations. When DOS personnel returned to Tripoli in September 2011, the Villa site was inspected and subsequently ruled out due to the substantial damage. Other options were explored by the small State survey team for re-opening operations and one was identified in October 2011.

(SBU) Several adjacent plots of land in close proximity (1.5 miles away) to the current Chief of Mission residence (which suffered light damage) were identified for leasing. Located south of the city along the airport road in a mixed residential/open space area, these plots had large Villas on them and/or townhouse type structures in various stages of construction. Post was able to discuss and arrive at agreeable terms with most of the owners, and with an OBO Real Estate representative on the ground, signed leases for approximately eight adjacent properties to create a contiguous compound of several acres.

(SBU) This newly leased facility is in the process of being upgraded by Post with start-up funding being provided by OBO for field expedient security upgrades to include a pre-screening facility outside the compound on the vehicle access road, installing access controls and vehicle barriers and raising the height of existing

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

perimeter barriers/walls (or erecting new walls) to enclose property now under USG lease. This new wall work, funded at \$221,000, was delayed by OBO for the Hill compound (office designated area) until after Post gained control of the property in January 2012, and a site survey plan was completed to establish the legal property lines. This survey was reviewed by OBO and construction is currently underway.

B7(E)

(SBU) Post is also having several locally fabricated steel drop arm barriers installed at vehicle access points, and is constructing [redacted] one entry point for access control to the facility; razor ribbon and security lighting are also going to be installed where necessary. DS/ST support is being provided by Cairo ESC personnel with CCTV and alarm installation. [redacted]

[redacted] and a [redacted] provided in the fly-away kit, can be installed. Post has installed a temporary but substantial steel stud, sheet metal construction fence along this section of the Hill compound approximately one meter out into the roadway, with approval of nearby neighbors, to allow for the new perimeter wall to be constructed along the property line of the Hill compound.

(SBU) Post has removed some, but not all of the physical and technical security hardware which could be salvaged from the old Villa compound to re-install at the new Embassy facility. Some installed hardware such as three Delta surface-mounted wedge barriers were assessed and due to the various degree of damage to each, it was determined that these units will be left in place. Post intends to transfer these units to another government agency for refurbishment and re-use at their stand alone facility which is approximately two miles from the new Embassy compound. Additionally, Post has about 20 concrete jersey-type barriers, razor ribbon, and several hundred feet of chain link fencing remaining at the Villa compound which will be removed for re-use at the new compound during OBO decommissioning activities for this soon-to-be abandoned complex.

(SBU) OBO sent a physical security fly-away kit of several shipping containers to Post which has been received and is currently staged on the Hill compound. This kit includes pre-fabricated FE/BR rated CACs (2), a Post One-type guard booth, three surface mounted vehicle barriers, several hundred feet of razor ribbon, and several hundred feet of non-climbable steel security fence sections which can be quickly erected along with additional technical security equipment for Post use.

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP -- Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

(SBU) There are several physical security upgrade projects for this newly established diplomatic residential facility in various stages of construction and /or completion. OBO has been supportive with providing the additional funding for follow-up upgrade work as identified by the RSO/FMO for either the embassy residential facility or the Chief of Mission residence. Most recently, OBO provided Post with the funding required to replace the perimeter wall at Residential Compound Four (Tab 3a). The existing wall with vehicle gates and doorways will be replaced with an approved solid perimeter barrier with no access to this residential compound from the roadway. An internal doorway will be created between residential compounds three and four for [redacted] via the secondary [redacted] at residential compound one. B7(E)

(SBU) Official office operations are primarily conducted on a temporary basis from the Chief of Mission Residence which is located approximately 1.5 miles away from the residential complex. Located in a residential area, the CMR is a large Villa located on a moderately sized compound which has a perimeter barrier defining the property. RSO intends to relocate and utilize [redacted] in the fly-away kit at the vehicle entrance to the CMR until such time as official office activities can be relocated to the Hill office compound.

(SBU) Post is currently utilizing two OBO provided towable delta barriers at the Villas and RAO compound, with the third to be deployed to the CMR. The FM has received funding to remove security items from the former Embassy compound, including the [redacted] and store them at the GSO warehouse until such time as they can be examined by appropriate technical staff to determine usability. This will be done as part of the decommissioning of the former Embassy site.

Chief of Mission Residence

(SBU) The CMR is a large leased residential compound with a large two-story residence and garden area located on the outskirts of the city and near the airport. Post has utilized this facility to be a temporary host for Chancery office operations with some limited office activities being conducted at the larger nearby residential/office compound. The CMR will be returned to being the

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


SECRET/NOFORN

Ambassador's residence when the OBO make ready/upgrade project at the larger Embassy compound is completed.

OBO project

(SBU) OBO has a pending \$20 million upgrade/make ready project for the new residential/office facility that will upgrade the Hill compound into a suitable platform for office operations and address the variety of deficiencies that have been identified on the residential compounds. A Turkish contractor, with a good record in OBO and who did the work on the abandoned Villa compound, will do this work and will be given the contract under a recently signed OBO sole source arrangement. A four member OBO/DS team visited Post during the March 18 to 25 timeframe to conduct a pre-bid meeting/conference with four representatives of the Turkish contractor. A senior DS/PSD/PCB officer was part of this team and provided the technical details required for the additional physical security upgrades that will be incorporated into this OBO project. These upgrades will include

B7(E)



The contractor will also be installing a complete infrastructure/backbone to support office operations and residential needs of the Mission for the foreseeable future. OBO expects that the project will run from June 2012 through March 2013, with final acceptance taking place in April 2013.

(SBU) Funding for this project has not been obtained from the various agencies, so it is unlikely that the timeline presented by OBO will be achieved. OBO was basing its timeline projections on the contract being awarded on May 17, but it appears unlikely that funding will be secured in that time frame. There are indications that it might be several months before other government agencies are able to obtain their portion of the funds as they require congressional approval. OBO reports that the project completion date will shift to the right on a day-by-day ratio until the contract is awarded.

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

CAA space

(SBU) OBO has a smaller, stand-alone \$7 million project for the CAA container emplacement (20 units), which is moving forward—shipping is planned for June of 2012 with completion estimated to be in December of 2012 timeframe. The scope of work has been identified and funded, transit security via ship from CONUS to Post has been identified, and the Congressional Certification has been received. OBO has been coordinating with DIA who will be providing their own CAA-rated containers (three units) which will be folded into the larger OBO project. [redacted]

B7(E)

[redacted] once the final footprint has been finalized. Additional hardening measures for [redacted] will be addressed at a later date.

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP – Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

Benghazi

(SBU) U.S. Mission Benghazi is situated on an eight-acre compound, comprised of two rented villas, each with two buildings that make up the housing, office space, cafeteria, and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) housing. The compound is surrounded by a perimeter wall, currently being upgraded, with one primary and two secondary gates. Commercial, multi-story buildings are being constructed on higher ground to the south that will have direct line of sight into the compound when completed.

NEC

(SBU) Obtaining a NEC site has been and remains a priority with OBO and DS since Post was re-opened, and this action has been exceptionally difficult in a real estate market that has insufficient capacity to support the commercial and office space needs that the lifting of UN sanctions generated. During the February 24, 2012 meeting with M on Tripoli, OBO stated that six of eight lots remain under active consideration. However, OBO intends to engage a local real estate firm to conduct a property search on our behalf to ascertain if additional properties with clear title might be available for a NEC site acquisition.

IV. TRAVEL POLICY

(SBU) Post's Mission Travel Security Policy (MTSP) was implemented on December 23, 2011 through Tripoli Security Directive 2011-10. It was based on the availability of [] MSD teams and an SST contingent, whose duties include handling ongoing Local Guard Force and Local Bodyguards training, running the Embassy's RSO Operations Center, as well as performing protective duties. Since March 14, the MSD presence has been reduced to [] teams, severely limiting post's ability to cover protective duties for off-compound travel. RSO and MSD estimate that, under the existing MTSP and until the planned LES bodyguard force is fully operational, MSD staffing of [] would enable post to support [] moves per day, in addition to the COM's and DCM's movements. To

B7(E)

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

assist Post in the interim, DS/IP has authorized three cycles of six Agents on a 60-day TDY to Tripoli.

B7(E)

(SBU) On February 28, EAC members agreed that the overall security environment in Tripoli had improved to a point that a [redacted] daytime hours – allowing USDH staff to travel [redacted] presence, provided that the LES driver and USDH staff had undergone appropriate training [redacted] was appropriate. Since the February 28 EAC, RSO and IRM had conducted a review of post's available radios and determined that we have a sufficient number of handheld radios that would allow Post to provide [redacted] for all USDH staff and LES drivers. Per the February 28 meeting, the EAC agreed that the appropriate conditions – including additional radios – were in place to modify the [redacted] The policy was implemented on March 10, 2012.

V. RSO STAFFING

Tripoli

NAME	ARRIVAL DATE	DEPARTURE DATE
TDY RSO [redacted]	9/1/2012	8/1/2012
ARSO [redacted]	4/26/2012	4/24/2013
TDY ARSO [redacted]	4/12/2012	6/7/2012
TDY ARSO [redacted]	4/19/2012	6/18/2012

B6
B7(C)

INCOMING PCS PERSONNEL

RSO [redacted]	7/24/2012	7/24/2013
ARSO [redacted]	6/15/2012	6/15/2013

B6
B7(C)

TDY Personnel identified but pending visas; WAE [redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted]

TDY personnel identified for the next 60 day rotation anticipated to be mid June;
[redacted]

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP – Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

Mobile Security Deployments (MSD)

B7(E)

(SBU) DS/IP is currently planning on maintaining [redacted] consisting of [redacted] agents in Tripoli to provide security support and complete training of the LES Security Escort team. [redacted] is scheduled to depart at the end of June. [redacted] is scheduled to depart on or about September 2. [redacted] is planning on overlapping the relief of the [redacted] to assist in post security support over the July 4 holiday.

DOD Security Support Team (SST)

B7(E)

(SBU) The Department of Defense is providing [redacted] security personnel at the request of the Department of State. The current ExecSec requesting DOD assistance expires on August 5, 2012.

RSO STAFFING Benghazi

NAME	ARRIVAL DATE	DEPARTURE DATE
TDY RSO [redacted]	4/2/2012	5/29/2012
TDY ARSO [redacted]	4/12/2012	5/31/2012
TDY ARSO [redacted]	4/25/2012	6/8/2012

B6
B7(C)

Engineering Services Office

B7(E)

(U) Technical security support is provided by the Engineering Services Center (ESC) located in Cairo, Egypt. ESC Cairo is staffed with [redacted] Security Engineering Officers (SEO), [redacted] Security Technical Specialist (STS), [redacted] US Navy Seabees, one Foreign Service Office Management Specialist (OMS) and [redacted] locally engaged staff. The ESC is directly responsible for missions in [redacted]

[redacted] The Officer in Charge is SEO [redacted]
The Regional Director of Security Engineering (RDSE) for Near Eastern Affairs, [redacted] is also resident within ESC Cairo.

B6
B7(C)

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

Foreign Service National Investigators (FSNI)

(U) Foreign Service National Investigators conduct background investigations of Locally Employed Staff (LES) and contractors, assist the RSO with Host Nation security and police liaison, and other law enforcement and security related duties as directed by the RSO.

Local Guard Force (LGF) Program

(SBU) The Tripoli Local Guard, Surveillance Detection and Bodyguard Programs are provided by personnel hired under Personnel Services Agreements (PSA). Local Guard services for the American Presence Post in Benghazi are provided through a commercial contract with the Blue Mountain Group.

B7(E)

(SBU) Tripoli's Local Guard Program is comprised of [redacted] Guards provide 24/7 coverage that includes access control, vehicle screening, and pedestrian screening. [redacted] PSA Security Escort/bodyguards provide protection to the Chief of Mission and Embassy personnel during off compound movements. [redacted] Security Escort/bodyguard candidates will be recycled for the firearms portion of training and [redacted] will be attending the PRS and medical training portion all [redacted] of which should be completed with-in the month of May. [redacted] new bodyguard candidates have been identified and RSO is holding interviews for [redacted] more next week for the next Security Escort/bodyguard training class scheduled to begin on or about May 20. DS/FPD has approved funding for a stipend to be paid to the host country police, but there is no existing MOU between the Department and the GoL.

(SBU) Benghazi's Local Guard Program is provided through a commercial contract with The Blue Mountain Group, at a cost of \$784,524 per year. The contract is for one year and was awarded February 17, 2012, with an effective start date of March 1, 2012. Benghazi's Local Guard Program is comprised of approximately [redacted] personnel staffing [redacted] Guards provide 24/7 coverage that includes access control, vehicle screening, and pedestrian screening. The TNC provides a contingent of armed Host Nation Security Forces for perimeter security at the U. S. Mission in Benghazi.

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

B7(E)

Surveillance Detection (SD) Program



Residential Security Program

(SBU) Tripoli's current housing is at the Villa compound and is comprised of villas and duplexes with single and double occupancy bedrooms. All pre-revolution leased COM residences are being returned to the landlords. Post is authorized one 24/7 mobile patrol staffed with two people in the vehicle, and are in the process of being re-integrated into the LGF.

(SBU) In Benghazi DS/IP/OPO approved and funded emergency escape hatches for five villa residences to enhance Post's residential security. Funding has also been provided for the installation of four guard booths to improve the working conditions for the local guard and host country security forces providing perimeter security to the Benghazi compound.

Funding profile:

Local Guard Program:	\$3,099,892
Bodyguard Program:	\$ 754,000
Residential Security Upgrades:	\$ 120,000
Surveillance Detection:	\$ 130,173
Total	\$ 4,104,065

VI. INTELLIGENCE & THREAT ANALYSIS

Security Environment Threat List (SETL) Ratings for Tripoli:

(SBU) Terrorism: High	(SBU) Political Violence: Critical +
(SBU) Residential Crime: High	(SBU) Non-Residential Crime: High
(S/NF) <input type="text"/>	(S/NF) <input type="text"/>

1.4(C)
B1

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

Summary

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1
1.4(D)
B1

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1
1.4(D)
B1

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1
1.4(D)
B1

1.4(D)
B1

Political Violence

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

DS/TIA/ITA is unaware of any serious incidences concerning U.S. Government travel inside Tripoli or Benghazi, but nevertheless highlights the following security incidents:

- (SBU) An improvised explosive device (IED) was thrown at the 4-vehicle motorcade of the UN Special Envoy to Libya in Benghazi on April 10, 2012. The IED missed its target, detonating and creating an 8-inch diameter hole in the street. No injuries were reported.

- (S/NF) [Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1
1.4(D)
B1

- (SBU) On the night of January 23, 2012, a firefight occurred between two militias in Tripoli's Fashlum district. The fight lasted 60 to 90 minutes, and included small arms fire, and three RPG explosions. At least two fatalities were confirmed. A second firefight on the same night occurred at a checkpoint located a few meters from the al-Waddan Hotel in Tripoli. Sustained gunfire and explosions ensued, however no fatalities have been reported. The incident apparently precipitated from confusion over identification documents.

- (S/NF) [Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1
1.4(D)
B1

(S/NF) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.4(D)
B1

SECRET/NOFORN

(SBU) Slow-paced reform and the absence of a strong, central leadership figure in the TNC have led to unrest in Libya's militias, as well as among the general population. After two weeks of widespread protests in Benghazi, approximately 200 protesters attacked TNC headquarters on January 21, 2012 over frustration with the pace of reforms in Libya, recently created election laws, and the lack of progress made in paying salaries and resolving financial and other obligations in eastern Libya. The demonstration continued to intensify throughout the day; at least one grenade was thrown as the attackers broke through the gate and into the compound housing the council's offices, but there were no reports of casualties. The 17 February Brigade, a local Benghazi militia loyal to the TNC, reportedly secured the headquarters and calmed protesters. According to open source reporting, the TNC has since drafted new election laws.

(S/NF)


SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.4(D)
B1


SECRET/NOFORN

(S/NF)



Terrorism

(S/NF)



1.4(D)
B1
1.4(D)
B1


(S/NF)



SECRET/NOFORN


Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN



1.4(D)
B1

(S/NF) [Redacted]



Crime

(U) Crime against foreigners is a growing problem in Libya. Weapons looted from military and police warehouses have proliferated among Libyans. The most common types of crime are property crimes of opportunity, including vehicle burglaries. Pick-pocketing and residential burglaries are also on the increase. Women routinely face verbal harassment. While physical violence is uncommon, there have been instances of assault against women, ranging from sexual groping or assault and battery to attempted rape.

(S/NF) [Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1 1.4(D)
B1

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1

[Redacted]

Host Nation Capabilities

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S/NF)

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP – Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

1.4(D)
B1



VII. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS


(S/NF)



1.4(D)
1.4(D)
B1

Bilateral Relations

(S/NF)



1.4(D)
1.4(D)
B1

Intelligence Services Capabilities

(S/NF)



1.4(D)
R1
1.4(D)
B1

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1(D)
B1

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1(D)
1.4(D)
B1

Third Country Threat

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1(D)
1.4(D)
B1

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1(D)
1.4(D)
B1

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

1.4(D)
B1

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

Criminal Investigations

(U) Professional Responsibility (PR) and Protective Intelligence Investigations (PII) have no active cases in Libya.

VIII. SECURITY TECHNOLOGY

Technical Threat Level

(S/NF)

[Redacted]

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

1.4(D)
B1

(S/NF) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Technical Security Assessments

(S/NF) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Operational support

(SBU) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

B7(E)
B7(E)

(U) Cairo remains a dynamic security environment. ESC Cairo is heavily engaged in assisting the Department reestablish diplomatic operations in Libya. ESC staff has made frequent trips to Tripoli and Benghazi to install temporary CCTV, Selectone, inspect equipment, safes and other security hardware for the RSO and Mobile Security Division teams. ESC teams have traveled to Tripoli three times since operations resumed. All salvageable security equipment from the old Kaddafi-era Embassy site has been removed, including three Digital Video Recorders that provided hours of video from dozens of security cameras showing the attack and destruction of the compound by former regime operatives.

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

B7(E)

Currently a major project is underway to provide approximately [] security cameras, [] Selectone speakers and supporting equipment for the MSD team and Tactical Operations Center. This project is fully funded and in the shipping phase. OBO is responsible for temporary and permanent technical security systems to support the temporary Embassy compound; ESC has taken responsibility to provide systems to support the MSD team. These two similar efforts are being coordinated between DS, ESC and OBO/SM to avoid duplication and maximize resources.

(U) An ESC Cairo team of [] were deployed to Benghazi 26 February through 01 March to assisting Benghazi with the decommissioning of Villa A. This was the ESC's third visit to Benghazi since the special mission opened. The ESC team removed several security cameras, cabling and Selectone speakers. The team also installed, repaired or adjusted similar systems at the remaining two villas. These systems are used primarily by the RSO. This was the first visit to Libya that has included a Seabee team member since President Obama issued an order for "no boots on the ground" by US military personnel. ESC Cairo worked with DS, NEA and DOD to obtain White House permission for the trip.

VIII. EMERGENCY PLANNING

(SBU) Libya's Emergency Action Plan (EAP) was last updated in Feb. 2011, but reflects operations at the previous villa compound. Post has requested a delay in preparing the yearly update until mission operations become more normalized. Post conducts frequent EAC meetings to review the security situation and Post policies to ensure that emergency planning is current and relevant given the dynamic situation in Libya. Currently RSO at Post has recommended high-threat trained Agents be sent to Tripoli, and Benghazi has been all high-threat trained agents. RSO will add this topic to the next EAC meeting to get Post's recommended position on whether to have high-threat trained agents or not.

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

IX. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) COUNTERMEASURES

(SBU) WMD Countermeasures Training was conducted in Tripoli in November 2010. Approximately 82.83% of mission employees received WMD general awareness training. LGF received additional countermeasures training. First responders received training and equipment.

(SBU) WMD has provided equipment to replace what was lost after the embassy was evacuated.

X. ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE (ATA) PROGRAM

(SBU) The GoL has requested assistance from the mission in regards to obtaining equipment and training for police and dignitary protection. RSO specifically mentioned that the GoL was looking for Protection of National Leadership (VIP protection), Vital Installation Security and Leadership courses. The RSO has begun working with ATA to establish a training program in Libya.

(SBU) ATA has an assessment team scheduled for a TDY in August of 2012. CT Bureau states that no training will take place using NADR/ATA funding until an assessment is completed. Post believes that the MOI in Libya would look unfavorably on an assessment, because the UN and the EU have already completed exhaustive assessments.

(SBU) Libya is currently on the Partner Nation List and is considered "active." There is \$800,000 in the FY 12 decision base for Libya; however this money has not been put forth for a Congressional Notification (CN) by the CT Bureau. ATA reports that it is averaging 90 days for a CN to clear once submitted.

XI. REWARDS FOR JUSTICE (RFJ)

(S/NF/LIMDIS)



1.4(D)
B1

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/TP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

1.4(D)
B1

[Redacted]

(S/NF/LIMDIS) [Redacted]

(SBU) On March 24, 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) requested that RFJ propose to the Secretary an increased reward offer for information leading to the arrest or conviction of those responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. On July 1, 2011, the Department of State increased its portion of the reward offer from up to \$2 million to up to \$5 million in order to bring the reward offer amount in-line with contemporary reward offer amounts. Given the severity of the attack and its repercussions, a reward offer of up to \$5 million was appropriate.

(S/NF) [Redacted]

XII. OVERSEAS SECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (OSAC)

(U) The Tripoli Country Council has continued to meet monthly throughout the country's transition. The group arranges options to engage simultaneously through both teleconference and in-person meetings. The group generally consists of between 10-15 constituents, whose meetings discuss ongoing safety and security concerns, the current condition of their facilities and the surrounding areas and the status of their operations. The Council's role was critical throughout the transition, serving as a venue for exchanging security information between the RSO and private sector to the benefit of both. The private sector co-chair is currently Occidental Petroleum.

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

The U.S. Private Sector continues to face security issues in Libya. The private sector is primarily concerned with militia violence, rule of law, and political stability.

XIII. OIG AND GAO REPORTS

(SBU) The last OIG report, from December 2008, was the Inspection of Embassy Tripoli, Libya – ISP-I-09-01A, with the Classified Annex ISP-S-09-01A. DS is not listed as having action for any recommendation in the unclassified report. The OIG closed the Classified Annex and all of its recommendations in September, 2010. There are no GAO reports for Post on file.

XIV. SECURITY VIOLATIONS

(SBU) There have been no reported security violations in Tripoli or Benghazi in 2012.

XV. Office of Foreign Missions (OFM)

Libyan Embassy Quietly Looking for New Chancery Site

(SBU) The Office of Foreign Missions routinely receives calls from noted real estate agents in Washington stating that the Libyans are interested in purchasing property somewhere in the District so that it can relocate its chancery operations from the Watergate. However, the Embassy has of yet not formally sought OFM's approval for a plan to purchase any new properties. Based on this knowledge, OFM has shared with M and others the possibility of offering the Libyan a property at the portion of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) the Department plans to redevelop for foreign chancery use in exchange for property in Tripoli. Under such a scenario, the Department would most likely not be able to offer the Libyans more than 2.5 to 3 acres. However, a variety of mutually beneficial reciprocal deals could be worked from such an offer. Further, whereas, the majority of the parcels at WRAMC will require new construction, there are two existing buildings that could easily be repurposed for chancery use, thus offering both land and a building would further enhance our ability to leverage such an offer. OFM has not yet had discussions with the Libyan Embassy concerning the

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP – Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

prospects of relocating their chancery operations to the WRAMC, but anticipates the Libyans will announce their intention in the near future.

Attachments

Tab 1: Tripoli EAC

Tab 2: Benghazi EAC

Tab 3: Imagery Tripoli

Tab 4: Imagery Benghazi

Tab 5: Tripoli

Tab 6: Benghazi

1.4(C)
B1

Drafter: DS/IP/NEA -

B6
B7(C)

Clearance: DS/IP - Charlene Lamb ()
DS/IP/NEA -

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

Classified by: DS/IP - Charlene R. Lamb
E.O. 13526, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

B6
B7(C)

From: Rayburn, Dorothy J
Sent: Thursday, September 13, 2012 11:51 AM
To: Drucker, Joy E; [redacted] Chartrand, Jennifer; Rademacher, Paul R; Bulgrin, Julie K; Devine, Kristin; Canedo, Denese; H_DAS
Cc: Canedo, Denese; [redacted] DS CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
Subject: RE:

RELEASE IN PART
B7(C),B6

For today's call, Amb. Boswell may be asked whether State had sent up a justification for a waiver of the DS criteria for Benghazi.

From: Drucker, Joy E
Sent: Thursday, September 13, 2012 11:28 AM
To: Drucker, Joy E; [redacted]; Chartrand, Jennifer; Rayburn, Dorothy J; Rademacher, Paul R; Bulgrin, Julie K; Devine, Kristin; Canedo, Denese; H_DAS
Cc: Canedo, Denese; [redacted] DS CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
Subject: RE:

Notes after the call.

From: Bulgrin, Julie K
Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2012 7:55 PM
To: H_Egypt; Canedo, Denese; Lang, Alan; 'Rodriguez, Miguel'; 'Arguelles, Adam'; 'Lundeberg, Greta'; 'Ortiz, Michael'; 'Lee, Collin'; Pitkin, Douglas A; Maier, Christina A
Subject: Write up of U/S Kennedy Call with Hill re Libya

The call ended up starting around 6:30pm. Here are the raw notes.

Staff names from beginning.

- Alan goldsmith - hfac
- Jen Stewart - speaker
- Chris - Risch
- Erin - hac
- Jason Rauch - mccaskill
- Marin Stein - nelson
- Rich Harper - Feinstein
- Mike Phelan - SFRC
- Rachel Ieman - house rules
- Robert Marcus - hfac
- Rep. Wilson office
- Bob Corker office
- Preeti Shah - Durbin
- Brian - Schwartz
- Jason Steinbaum - hfac
- Alan Makovsky - hfac

U/S Kennedy

Benghazi was an interim office. As soon as Benghazi fell, we got back in and had two compounds.

All times est

4pm – Benghazi main compound took on fire from libyan extremists.

4:15pm – broke through and somehow building set fire. Libyan guard force and us mil personnel engaged/exchanged fire.

- Three people inside bldg at the time – amb, imo, and rso
- Try to evacuate bldg under fire and smoke.
- When rso got out, he found he didn't have others. attempted to get others out when not.
- Found sean dead of apparent asphyxiation.
- Then went back in to try to get ambo, but couldn't find him. Driven by the bldg by smoke, fire, and small arms.

4:45pm – us security personnel from annex reached compound to try to get in. took heavy fire and retreated to annex.

5:20pm – US and Libyan security made another attempt and were finally able to gain access to main building, secure the rso's (five) – one badly injured to lungs smoke damage, plus remains of sean smith. Then retreated due to fire.

Approximately 5:40-50 – annex under attack – included possible mortars, rpgs, etc. two us personnel wounded, two killed. Finally were able to gain control over compound. During that time, we believe ambo had been taken to hospital by others. However, attempts to get to compound – were unable to break through going through to hospital.

Somehow, Libyans brought body of ambo to hospital during time of retreat.

Then retreated to Benghazi airport. Three badly injured. Put the injured and a small number of personnel to Tripoli.

Got in second aircraft. During the time between the first and second aircraft, local employee was able to get body of ambo from hospital and bring him to airport. All personnel was evac from Benghazi.

Today got medivac c-17. Libyans treated wounded well. Then also reduced staff to emergency levels.

Then landed at ramstein afb. Longstool hospital.

Personnel will be held at hotel for a week or so in case can go back in, if necessary.

This is fog of war. Less than 18 hours.

This is an initial report. Haven't been able to interview everyone yet.

Starr- was ambo still alive when he was extracted?

- We were told by a phone call that they were taken by Libyan bystanders – ambo got out, collapsed on edge of compound, and taken to the hospital.

Rick Kessler – hfac- so last time we saw ambo was when rso and others were exiting bldg. how many ds personnel were in bldg and annex?

- Two ds at main bldg, 25-30 at annex. Approximately 15 security personnel.
- Three amcits at main bldg. other four security officers were in other buildings on the compound returning fire.
- Annex is several miles away from main compound.

Alan Makovsky – any estimate of number of attackers?

- We think 20-40 at first attack, maybe close to 100 in second attack.
- No idea who they might have been? There has been a group who has claimed responsibility, but we're investigating it ourselves to identify group.

Victor – Rubio – situation in Tripoli

- Relatively stable. PM express regret, deep humiliation. Have increased our security.
- We have reduced staffing.
- We have two compounds. First embassy was burned out.
- No attacks in Tripoli.
- Just this morning, we have moved all personnel to one of two compounds.

Perry – SFRC – any reason to think this wasn't premeditated? How effect operations regionally?

- I am not prepared to render formal opinion, except to say attack of this nature says this is semi-complex attack. This is personal opinion.
- We called senior security officer and embassies worldwide. We are operating.

Paul Foldi – SFRC – what was ambo doing in Benghazi and was it publicized?

- He makes periodic trips – duality to Libya.
 - We don't widely advertise his travel.
 - He does do appointments, so it's known
- Paul Grove – any info on attackers killed or wounded? Any information?
- Believe there were wounded. Think that we couldn't gain access to hospital because some attacking forces had taken their wounded to hospital and effectively shut down hospital.
 - Govt is offering assistance. We are going to follow-up in any possible way
- Chris McCain – cooperation from GOL?
- GOL is shaken and embarrassed. Govt truly wants good relations.
 - They have given us additional security support.
 - Their dedication and capabilities do not match in equal strength.
- AnneMarie – HACFO – security footprint – role of contract forces, militias, and if MSG contingent there.
- No MSGs. Used alternate security. Contract guard force – unarmed. A unit of GOL security personnel – 6 people – who lived in barracks on compound at all times.
- Robert carter – burgess – typical arrangement for consulate?
- This is a special office.
 - In our smaller installations, there are probably more am security in Benghazi than any other office of comparable size. To have five RSOs on compound, it's odd.
 - In terms of timeline – was it true there was an initial attack then second attack? Unclear.
 - o Attack started at 10pm their time on main compound. 1015 breach compound...then go through the timeline again.
- Matt Zweig- HFAC – light and medium weapons used – what do you mean?
- We're talking AK-47. Medium – RPGs or mortars.
- Ayotte – some forewarning that attacks will happen?
- none.
- Steve Marchese – HACFO – how many attackers?
- Not sure. Attack at 10pm. 20-30 on first compound, maybe as many as 100 on second.
 - Did they take over hospital?
 - o We got call warning us of dangers of trying to reach hospital, but we were never able to break through.
 - o We believe they never knew who he was. His body wasn't desecrated. And our national was able to take him away.
- Rob – Ayotte – any video cameras on compound?
- No, interim compound.
- Mike P – ssrc – any arrangement for Libyan forces at compound? What arrangement?
- There was a six person detachment in residence on the compound. When we called for assistance, it didn't come immediately, not in as heavy numbers, but we cannot say Libyans w/in capabilities that they didn't muster help. From compound one to two, they did assist us, to airport. There was will, but not capability.
- Brent Woolfork – HFAC – at second site, was there for 6.5 hours, then got permission to leave from DC.
- When they called us, they said they were leaving and we said yes. No one was holding them there.
 - Did Libyans provide help the entire time? - yes.
- Alan Makovsky – hfac – given the fact that this incident was going on for such a long time, was any thought that US troops could be brought in to help?
- All avenues were being considered. We were in contact with senior levels of DOD, National Security Staff, etc.
 - Why weren't troops inserted? – the entire thing lasted approximately 4.5 hours. No US forces within time to get there.
- Matt Zweig – HFAC – was there preexisting plan for QRF for such an occurrence?
- Yes, we knew who to call in such an incident. It took awhile for them to get there.
 - Started at 4, then at 5:20, they had second sorti which included Libyans.
- Chris – Risch – What is security footing of embassy and consulate on 9/11?

- Equivalent of defcon 5. We had discussions, conducted EACs, planned, etc. Any embassy depends on host nation for preponderance of security.

Rob Carter – was this an attack under the cover of a protest?

- No this was a direct breaching attack.
- Do we have any ideas of who launched? Leads?
 - o Some claims from someone who has never made threat before, but everyone is looking at this closely.
- Do we believe coordinated w/Cairo?
 - o Attack in Cairo was a demonstration. There were no weapons shown or used. A few cans of spray paint.

Matt Zweig – speaking in broad terms, are there any additional threats to the region to our compounds/embassies?

- Generally speaking, there have been demonstrations. Tunis, Cairo, Sudan. We are monitoring (overarching term) as we were two days ago – in constant contact with host nations and security forces.

Who is in charge in Tripoli now?

-Charge is Gregory Hicks. Formerly DCM.

Alan Makovsky – Any plans regarding Chris' return/remains? Memorial service?

- We are working on this, hopefully for Friday afternoon.
- There will be a memorial service. Will let you know.

Marin Stein – when will we learn the identity of others?

- Some problems finding the next of kin.

Were they State Department employees?

- Yes.

AnneMarie – Can someone give us an update on Egypt?

- We have been talking govt-to-govt.
- Apology
- We're talking to them = deploying additional police forces. Getting good cooperation.

Steve – refused to pull protesters off wall?

- It took police awhile to get protesters off the wall. They were there.
- We invited them in to remove the 6-8 who got in.

-for those of you who aren't there, there are three buildings. They were running around the grounds, but didn't penetrate the buildings.

Julie K. Bulgrin
Legislative Management Officer
for Near Eastern Affairs
Bureau of Legislative Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Phone: (202) 647-8729

SBU
This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Drucker, Joy E
Sent: Thursday, September 13, 2012 11:27 AM

To: [redacted] A; Chartrand, Jennifer; Rayburn, Dorothy J; Rademacher, Paul R; Bulgrin, Julie K; Devine, Kristin; Canedo, Denese; H_DAS
Cc: Canedo, Denese; [redacted] DS CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
Subject: RE:

B6
B7(C)

I can send you H's write up after the call, but I don't think we asked for points to be generated and I think he spoke from the cuff, but I'm adding others to weigh in if they know more!

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, September 13, 2012 11:23 AM
To: Drucker, Joy E
Cc: Canedo, Denese; [redacted] DS CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
Subject: RE:

Can I get the points from the U/S call with the Hill staff yesterday. I need to share with Ambassador Boswell. Thanks..

[redacted]
Legislative Affairs Advisor
Office of the Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Office: [redacted]
BB: [redacted]

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Drucker, Joy E
Sent: Thursday, September 13, 2012 11:02 AM
To: Maier, Christina A; [redacted] Bulgrin, Julie K; Canedo, Denese
Cc: Chartrand, Jennifer; Rademacher, Paul R; Rayburn, Dorothy J; Blumenfeld, Joshua R; Kramer, Rori A; Rodriguez, Laura I; H_DAS
Subject:

Just linking us all up by email as we seek to stand up a conference call on embassy security in light of events and in advance of House CR floor consideration. We're all waiting to hear back from Christy and [redacted] on whether this is doable and timing, but in the interim could Julie and Denese tee up a draft email to relevant staff so we're poised to send as soon as we get word. Joy and Jen and someone from the Sen. Team should just make sure we have the right list and are standing by to clear it.

RELEASE IN PART
B5, B7(C), B6

Harris, Katherine A

From: Gleeson, Kevin M
Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2012 5:35 PM
To: [REDACTED] B6
Cc: Whitney, Robert T (Eli); DS CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS; Anthony, Joseph M B7(C)
Subject: Benghazi SECCA
Attachments: Benghazi SECCA Qs-As L revisions.docx



B5

Please let me know if you have any questions about this.

Kevin