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11	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
12	COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO		
13	CVNTHIA CEDI ETTI	Cose No CCC 16 556164	
14	CYNTHIA CERLETTI,	Case No.: CGC-16-556164	
15	Plaintiff, v.		
16	VICKI HENNESSY, in her Official Capacity	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND	
17	as Sheriff of the City and County of San Francisco.	INJUNCTIVE RELIEF	
18	Defendant.		
19			
20	INTRO	DUCTION	
21	Plaintiff CYNTHIA CERLETTI	, a taxpayer and resident of the City and County of	
22	San Francisco, California ("CCSF") seeks to enjoin Defendant VICKI HENNESSY, in her		
23	official capacity as Sheriff of CCSF, from expe	nding taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed	
24	resources illegally by substantially restricting, if not prohibiting, San Francisco Sheriff's		
25	Department ("SFSD") personnel from sharing information with federal immigration officials		
26	about the citizenship, immigration status, and time and date of release of criminal aliens in		
27	SFSD's custody. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's restrictions are unlawful because they are		
28	preempted by federal law.		
	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DEC	LARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 1	

2. Jurisdiction in this case is founded on California's common law taxpayer standing doctrine and Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, which grants California taxpayers the right to sue government officials to prevent unlawful expenditures of taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources. The mere expending of a paid, public official's time performing illegal or unauthorized acts constitutes an unlawful use of funds that may be enjoined, and it is immaterial that the amount of the expenditure is small or that enjoining the illegal expenditure will permit a savings of tax funds. *Blair v. Pitchess*, 5 Cal.3d 258, 268 (1971).

3. Venue in this Court is appropriate under Section 393 of the Code of Civil Procedure as Defendant is an official of CCSF and the taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources at issue are being expended in CCSF. *Regents of the University of California v. Karst*, 3 Cal.3d 529, 542 (1970) ("[F]or the purpose of venue, the action arises in the county where the agency spends the tax money that causes the alleged injury.").

PARTIES

- 4. Plaintiff CYNTHIA CERLETTI is a citizen and taxpayer, and has paid property and other local taxes to CCSF during the one-year period prior to the commencement of this action.
- 5. Defendant VICKI HENNESSY is the Sheriff of CCSF, a public officer and the head of SFSD. Defendant is charged by law with keeping CCSF's jail and receiving all prisoners committed to jail by competent authorities. S.F. Cal. Charter § 6.105. Defendant is being sued in her official capacity.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I.

6. "The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens." *Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012). "This authority rests, in part, on the National Government's constitutional power to 'establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,' Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and its inherent power as a sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations." *Arizona* 567 U.S. at 394-95.

"Federal governance of immigration and alien status is extensive and complex." *Id.* at 395.

- 7. "Congress has specified which aliens may be removed from the United States and the procedures for doing so" through the enactment of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.* ("INA"). *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 396. "A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials." *Id.*
- 8. State and local governments enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens. *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982). That power is committed to the political branches of the federal government. *Id*.
- 9. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") is an agency within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") charged with enforcing the INA. ICE "conducts criminal investigations involving the enforcement of immigration-related statutes." *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 397 (internal citations and quotations omitted). "ICE officers are responsible for the identification, apprehension, and removal of illegal aliens from the United States." *Id.*
- 10. To aid in the enforcement of the INA, Congress has long sought to encourage full and open communication between state and local entities and federal immigration officials.Congress also has sought to remove obstacles to such communication.
- 11. In August 1996, the U.S. Congress amended the INA to include a provision prohibiting all restrictions on State or local government entities sending or receiving information to or from federal immigration officials regarding an alien's immigration status. 8 U.S.C. § 1644.
- 12. In September 1996, Congress amended the INA again to further clarify that no Federal, State, or local government entity can be prohibited or in any way restricted from sending information to or receiving information from federal immigration officials regarding an individual's citizenship or immigration status. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a). The amendment also expressly prohibits all restrictions on Federal, State, or local government entities sending, requesting, receiving, or exchanging information to, from, or with federal immigration officials regarding an individual's immigration status. *Id.* at 1373(b).
- 13. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court found that "[c]onsultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system." *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 411. The

Court also noted that Congress "has encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration violations." *Id.* at 412 (*quoting* 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A)). According to the Court, examples of such cooperation include "allow[ing] federal immigration officials to gain access to detainees held in state facilities" and state officials "responding to requests for information about when an alien will be released from their custody." *Id.* at 410 (internal citations omitted).

II.

- 14. Congress also has mandated that the Attorney General take certain categories of criminal aliens into custody upon their release by federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). These categories include, *inter alia*, aliens convicted of aggravated felonies, two or more crimes of moral turpitude or a single crime of moral turpitude for which the alien has been sentenced to at least one (1) year in jail, controlled substance and certain firearm offenses, and terrorist activities. *Id.* Congress requires the Attorney General to take any such alien into custody "when the alien is released without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense."
- 15. The federal government also has prioritized these same categories of criminal aliens, as well as other categories, for removal. Exec. Order No. 13768, § 5, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017).
- 16. At all relevant times until April 2017, DHS categorized certain criminal aliens as "suspected priority aliens" and designated them as immigration enforcement priorities. When ICE learned of a "suspected priority alien" in a state or local law enforcement agency's custody, it issued a DHS Form I-247N "Request for Voluntary Notification of Release of Suspected Priority Alien" to the law enforcement agency. The notice identified the name, date of birth, suspected citizenship, and sex of the subject. It informed the law enforcement agency that ICE suspected the subject was a removable alien and "an immigration enforcement priority" and identified, from a list of options (*e.g.*, conviction of an aggravated felony or "significant misdemeanor"), why the subject was an enforcement priority. The law enforcement agency was asked to "provide notice as early as practicable (at least 48 hours, if possible, before the subject is released from your

custody." The reason for the request was "to allow DHS an opportunity to determine whether there is probable cause to conclude that he or she is a removable alien."

17. In April 2017, ICE began using a "consolidated" form, DHS Form I-247A entitled "Immigration Detainer – Notice of Action," to request information about the release of a criminal alien and provide notice of ICE's intent to assume custody of the alien. Like the earlier form, a DHS Form I-247A gives the name, date of birth, suspected citizenship, and sex of the subject. Unlike the earlier form, however, the new form informs the law enforcement agency that "DHS has determined that probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien" and identifies, from a list of options, the basis for the probable cause determination. The form also provides contact information for providing the notification.

III.

- 18. CCSF has declared itself a "City and County of Refuge" and, to this end, has adopted what it calls a "Sanctuary City" law. In a section entitled "Immigration Status," CCSF's Sanctuary City law generally prohibits, with limited exceptions, the use of City funds or resources to gather or disseminate information about an individual's "release status" or "any other such personal information." S.F. Cal. Admin. Code ch. 12H.2(a) and (c).
- 19. CCSF's Sanctuary City law defines "personal information" broadly to include "any confidential, identifying information about an individual." S.F. Cal. Admin. Code ch. 12I.2. On information and belief, "identifying information about an individual" includes information about the individual's citizenship and immigration status.
- 20. A separate section of CCSF's Sanctuary City law, entitled "Restrictions on Law Enforcement Officials," prohibits responding to a "federal immigration officer's notification request," which is defined to include formal and informal requests for notification of "an individual's release from local custody." S.F. Cal. Admin. Code ch. 12I.2 and 12I.3
- 21. The only exception to this prohibition is a notification request regarding an individual who has been convicted of a "Violent Felony" in the past seven years, a "Serious Felony" in the pasts five years, or three separate, particular, serious or violent felonies in the past five years, provided further that a magistrate has also determined there is currently probable cause

to believe the alien is guilty of a particular, serious or violent felony and has ordered the alien to answer for the offense. S.F. Cal. Admin. Code ch. 12I.3(d). Even if the individual meets both criteria, before responding to a notification request, law enforcement officials also are required to consider whether any "mitigating factors" warrant denial of the request. *Id*.

IV.

- 22. Since taking office, Defendant has substantially restricted, if not prohibited, SFSD personnel's communications with ICE about inmates' citizenship and immigration status and the time and date of criminal aliens' release from SFSD's custody. On information and belief, these restrictions reflect Defendant's independent judgment about how aliens should be classified when they commit crimes, whether and when criminal aliens should or should not be removed from the United States, and, more generally, the conditions that should be granted or imposed on aliens in the United States. They also reflect, on information and belief, her judgment about how CCSF's Sanctuary City law should be read and implemented.
- 23. Before Defendant took office, her predecessor had issued a directive to "All SFSD Personnel" expressly prohibiting them from providing information to ICE representatives about the "citizenship/immigration status of any inmate" or "release dates or times" of inmates, among other information.
- 24. After Defendant took office, she issued a directive on April 11, 2016, Reference No. 2016-051, entitled "Immigration and Custom Enforcement Procedure (ICE) Contact and Communication," purportedly revoking her predecessor's directive and putting in place her own.
- 25. On information and belief, Defendant's April 11, 2016 directive keeps in place her predecessor's prohibition on SFSD personnel providing information to ICE about inmates' citizenship or immigration status. Under the headers "AUTHORIZED" and "NOT AUTHORIZED," Defendant's directive lists categories of information SFSD personnel are and are not authorized to provide ICE. While Defendant's predecessor's directive had expressly stated that SFSD personnel "shall not provide" information to ICE representatives about the "citizenship/immigration status of any inmate," Defendant's April 11, 2016 directive does not identify "citizenship/immigration status" as information SFSD personnel are authorized to

provide. Citizenship and immigration status are not listed under either header. In addition, the directive states, "Any questions or requests received from ICE representatives, especially those not covered here, shall be referred to Sheriff's Legal Counsel." At a minimum, Defendant's directive prohibits SFSD personnel from providing information about inmates' citizenship or immigration status to ICE directly, but must instead refer any ICE requests for such information to Defendant's counsel.

26. Like her predecessor's directive, Defendant's April 11, 2016 directive expressly prohibits SFSD personnel from providing inmates' "release dates and times" to ICE. Under the "NOT AUTHORIZED" header, the directive states that "Sheriff's staff members are not authorized to provide . . . Release dates and times" to ICE representatives and advises SFSD personnel that

Per Administrative Code 12H.2.1 we are currently in the process of working on guidelines that will initiate a review process for each person for whom we receive a request for notification of release. We have been reviewing all requests for notification of release received to date for this purpose . . . All ICE requests for Voluntary Notification (DHS Form I-247D or I-247N) will continue to be forwarded to Administration without action.

- 27. On information and belief, Defendant subsequently developed her own classifications of criminal aliens, different from the classifications of criminal aliens set forth in the INA and Executive Order 13768, to apply in determining whether SFSD will provide inmates' release dates and times to ICE. On further information and belief, Defendant's classifications of criminal aliens are similar, but not identical, to the classifications set forth in CCSF's Sanctuary City law. On information and belief, these determinations have been centralized within SFSD to ensure Defendant's control over them. On further information and belief, these determinations require an analysis of whether an alien subject to an ICE notification request meets a specific criminal history threshold and whether any "mitigating factors" warrant denial of the request.
- 28. Pursuant to CCSF Administrative Code Chapter 12I.5, Defendant is required to report, on a semi-annual basis, all communications received from federal immigration officials and all communication SFSD made to federal immigration officials, including but not limited to release notification requests and responses. S.F. Cal. Admin. Code ch. 12I.5.

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29. In a September 28, 2016 report Defendant provided to CCSF Mayor Edwin Lee, SFSD received 58 communications from ICE between January 1, 2016 and June 30, 2016, including 4 request for detention, 3 requests for transfer, and 51 requests for release information, but SFSD did not respond to any of them. Other than a meeting between Defendant, her staff, and ICE officials on February 11, 2016, Defendant reported no other communication to or from SFSD and ICE.

V.

- 30. SFSD receives millions of dollars in taxpayer support annually. In Fiscal year 2014-15, SFSD was appropriated approximately \$190 million from CCSF's general fund to finance its operations. In Fiscal Years 2015-16, SFSD was appropriated nearly \$200 million from CCSF's general fund to finance its operations. CCSF's adopted budget for Fiscal Year 2016-17 appropriated nearly \$208 million to SFSD from the general fund to finance SFSD's operations. The primary source of funds for CCSF's general fund are property taxes and other local taxes such as those paid by Plaintiff.
- 31. On information and belief, Defendant has expended taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources purportedly revoking and replacing her predecessor's directive. On information and belief, Defendant also has expended taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources preparing and issuing her own directive and restrictions on sharing information with ICE, communicating her directive and information-sharing restrictions to SFSD personnel, CCFS's Board of Supervisors, and others in CCFS's government, training SFSD personnel on the directive and restrictions, and implementing, enforcing, defending, and otherwise carrying out the directive and restrictions.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Taxpayer Claim – Citizenship and Immigration Status) (Express Preemption)

- 32. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 to 31 by reference as if fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows:
 - 33. An actual and justiciable controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff

and Defendant. Plaintiff contends that she has paid property and other local taxes to CCSF during the one-year period prior to the commencement of this action and that Defendant is expending taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources illegally by substantially restricting, if not prohibiting, SFSD personnel from sharing information about inmates' citizenship or immigration status with ICE. Plaintiff further contends that these restrictions are illegal because they are expressly preempted by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 and the INA. On information and belief, Defendant contends she is not expending taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources illegally.

- 34. Plaintiff has been irreparably harmed and will continue to be irreparably harmed by Defendant's illegal expenditure of taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources. On information and belief, these illegal expenditures will continue unless and until enjoined.
- 35. A judicial declaration pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1060 is necessary and appropriate so that the parties may ascertain their respective legal rights and duties with respect to Defendant's illegal expenditure of taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources.
 - 36. Plaintiff also has no adequate remedy at law.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Taxpayer Claim – Release Information)

(Express Preemption)

- 37. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 to 36 by reference as if fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows:
- 38. An actual and justiciable controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiff contends that she has paid property and other local taxes to CCSF during the one-year period prior to the commencement of this action and that Defendant is expending taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources illegally by substantially restricting, if not prohibiting, SFSD personnel from sharing information with ICE about the release dates and times of suspected priority aliens. Plaintiff further contends that these restrictions are illegal because they are expressly preempted by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644. On information and belief,

Defendant contends she is not expending Plaintiff's taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources illegally.

- 39. Plaintiff has been irreparably harmed and will continue to be irreparably harmed by Defendant's illegal expenditure of taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources. On information and belief, these illegal expenditures will continue unless and until enjoined.
- 40. A judicial declaration pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1060 is necessary and appropriate so that the parties may ascertain their respective legal rights and duties with respect to Defendant's illegal expenditure of taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources.
 - 41. Plaintiff also has no adequate remedy at law.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Taxpayer Claim – Release Information)

(Implied Preemption)

- 42. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 to 41 by reference as if fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows:
- 43. An actual and justiciable controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiff contends that she has paid property and other local taxes to CCSF during the one-year period prior to the commencement of this action and that Defendant is expending taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources illegally by substantially restricting, if not prohibiting, SFSD personnel from sharing information with ICE about the release dates and times of suspected priority aliens. Plaintiff further contends that these restrictions are illegal because they are impliedly preempted by the INA as they stand as an obstacle to a clear purpose and objective of Congress and constitute an impermissible state or local classification of aliens and/or regulation of immigration. On information and belief, Defendant contends she is not expending Plaintiff's taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources illegally.
- 44. Plaintiff has been irreparably harmed and will continue to be irreparably harmed by Defendant's illegal expenditure of taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources. On information and belief, these illegal expenditures will continue unless and until enjoined.

1	45.	A judicial declaration pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1060 is	
2	necessary and appropriate so that the parties may ascertain their respective legal rights and duties		
3	with respect to Defendant's illegal expenditure of taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed		
4	resources.		
5	46.	Plaintiff also has no adequate remedy at law.	
6	PRAYER FOR RELIEF		
7	WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief against Defendant:		
8	First Cause of Action		
9	1.	A judgment declaring Defendant's expenditure of taxpayer funds and taxpayer-	
10	financed resources substantially restricting, if not prohibiting, SFSD personnel from sharing		
11	information about inmates' citizenship or immigration status with ICE to be illegal;		
12	2.	An injunction permanently prohibiting Defendant from expending or causing the	
13	expenditure of taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources to substantially restrict, if not		
14	prohibit, SFSD personnel from sharing information about inmates' citizenship or immigration		
15	status with ICE;		
16	3.	Costs of suit herein;	
17	4.	Reasonable attorney's fees under the Private Attorney General Statute, Code of	
18	Civil Procedure § 1021.5, the Common Fund Doctrine, and the Substantial Benefit Doctrine; and		
19	5.	Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.	
20	Second Cause of Action		
21	1.	A judgment declaring Defendant's expenditure of taxpayer funds and taxpayer-	
22	financed resources substantially restricting, if not prohibiting, SFSD personnel from sharing		
23	information with ICE about the release dates and times of suspected priority aliens to be illegal;		
24	2.	An injunction permanently prohibiting Defendant from expending or causing the	
25	expenditure of taxpayer funds and taxpayer-financed resources to substantially restrict, if not		
26	prohibit, SFSD personnel from sharing information with ICE about the release dates and times of		
27	suspected priority aliens;		
28	3.	Costs of suit herein;	