From:

H <hdr22@clintonemail.com>

Sent:

Friday, March 20, 2009 7:52 AM

To:

Huma Abedin < HAbedin@hillaryclinton.com>

Subject:

Fw: Update

Pls print.	
Original Mes	sage
From: <jkeane< td=""><td></td></jkeane<>	

Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2009 03:46:01 To Hillary Clinton<hdr22@clintonemail.com>

Subject Update

Hillary

Know you are spending more time on Afghanistan as you inch closer to a POTUS decision. As such, would like to offer some thoughts. I realize I am somewhat radioactive as a result of articles and books which not only sensationalized my role in the Surge but misrepresented it Despite that, my track record on COIN and understanding of irregular warfare and what it takes to succeed, speaks for itself.

Some thoughts --We do not, now, have an effective civil/ military strategy that leads to defeat of the insurgency and a stable Afghanistan (I also believe, as you

know, McKieman, is not the leader to get us there)

-- when thinking about Afghanistan and our desires to succeed you must select options which are decisive I have learned much from our past failures in Iraq but one lesson overwhelms all others and that is: there are no shortcuts to defeating an insurgency We took these shortcuts, using a short war, minimalist, strategy for 3 years in Iraq and we came dangerously close to defeat, with potential dire consequences. We turned this around when we put into effect a decisive strategy with the right leader and the needed forces to support it. Thank God those who were advocating doing less lost to those who wanted, finally, a decisive option. These were the words I used to present it to the POTUS and the words I urged the POTUS/VPOTUS to use when examining other options which advocated less. "General, is this a decisive force that will defeat the insurgency". "General, do we have the right strategy, now, to win". Most insurgencies are defeated (75 per cent) and don't let others tell you there is no clear victory in these kind of wars. Its true the ending may have some ambiguity to it because the enemy leaves the battlefield without a surrender or comes into the political process(as in Iraq). But the outcome eventually is very clear, and we know whether we lost or won, whether the region is more stable as a result and whether our own security and interests are enhanced

-- I urge you to go for the decisive option, which means all the forces requested to include the additional 13K US forces, a robust ANA(at least 300K) required civilian capacity, necessary financing and demand a coherent civil/military strategy from the Generals that leads to victory.

--You cannot presume the generals have the right strategy to win, our own military history is that in most wars we had the wrong strategy, initially,

but in time, made the necessary adjustments. We are at that moment in Afghanistan.

--if you keep McKieman, as I suspect you will, because he enjoys high level support, then I recommend that Petraeus who is one of the best irregular warfare generals we have) be told that he must get his intellectual capital into the details of the civil/military strategy to include the needed organizational headquarters, force dispositions, force employment, the structure and ways and means to establish the rule of law and a judicial system, and the structure and plans to bring better governance at the local level, while improving the effectiveness of the central government -- I know much of COIN is largely non-mulitary and others will play a key role but none of that will matter much if we do not have the right military

-- Henry Kissinger asked me off line on one of our many discussions on Iraq as members of SECDEF policy board, what is US military strategy to defeat the insurgency? I answered, we do not have one, because we are training the ISF so they can defeat the insurgency. He answered, we will lose, Jack, just as we did in Vietnam, because our military strategy will fail to enable viable political solutions and stability and we will lose the political and moral support of the American people. He iterated further that our failed military strategy in Vietnam, for 3 years under Westmoreland, robbed us of political will(despite the fact Abrams turned it around later). He of course, was right, and his thoughts helped me to go forward with a strategy

Please keep these scribblings for your eyes only If you desire to discuss, am always available for you All the best, Jack

Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T

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