STORY SION

E-Notice

2016-CH-00462

CALENDAR: 13

To: Alice Christine Svenson christine@svensonlawoffices.com

NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC. vs. THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF THE 2016-CH-00462

The transmission was received on 01/09/2017 at 4:00 PM and was ACCEPTED with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County on 01/09/2017 at 4:02 PM.

RULE TO SHOW CAUSE(SET FOR MOTION HEARING)

EXHIBITS

EXHIBITS

EXHIBITS

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DOROTHY BROWN CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

COOK COUNTY RICHARD J. DALEY CENTER, ROOM 1001 CHICAGO, IL 60602

(312) 603-5031 courtclerk@cookcountycourt.com

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS CHANCERY DIVISION COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION LERK DOROTHY BROWN

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.,)		
Plaintiff,)		
vs.)	1.5 0	TI 00 4 62
THE OFFICE OF THE MANOR) Case N	o.: 16 C	H 00462
THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR)		
OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO)		
) Honora	ble Judge De	emacopoulos
and)		
)		
RAHM EMANUEL, in his)		
official capacity as Mayor of the)		
city of Chicago)		
Defendants.)		
Defendants.)		
)		

PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR RULE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT

NOW COMES Plaintiff Judicial Watch, Inc. ("Plaintiff"), by counsel, and petitions this Court to enter an order for rule to show cause why Defendants The Office of the Mayor of the City of Chicago and Rahm Emanuel, in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Chicago, should not be held in contempt, and in support thereof states as follows:

- On September 23, 2016, after a full hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, this Honorable Court concluded as follows:
- (a) that Mayor Emanuel is a proper party to this cause,
- (b) denied Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Counts I and II of Plaintiff's Complaint;
- (c) did not rule on Defendant's motion to dismiss as to Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint;
- (d) ordered that "the parties are to decide the search terms, and Defendants' response shall come from the FOIA officer for the Officer of the Mayor." (See Attached Exhibit A,

- Order of September 23, 2016).
- 2. This Court further stated in open court that the parties are to meet and confer and agree upon search terms, saying that it would be "up to the parties to decide how they wish to define the search terms," (See Attached Exhibit B, transcript of proceedings of September 23, 2016, p. 27) and for a "new search to be done." (See p. 39).
- 3. Subsequent to the Court's order, the parties met and conferred. Plaintiff proposed 7 search terms and asked that the email accounts of 58 specific employees of the Office of the Mayor be searched for those specific terms for the time period of October 20, 2014 to December 2, 2015. Plaintiff also asked Defendants for information about how searches could be conducted so that Plaintiff could narrow the search parameters.
- 4. On November 3, 2016, Defendants informed Plaintiff's counsel that the searches yielded a result of over 900,000 emails. Defendants did not identify the methods it used or what its capabilities are.
- 5. Later that day, Plaintiff again asked Defendants about how searches could be conducted so that it could narrow the search parameters. For example, Plaintiff wants to know if Defendants can conduct searches with AND clauses or w/NUMBER OF WORDS clauses. In addition, Plaintiff asked Defendants if it is possible to break down the search results by terms and/or email accounts. Plaintiff believes such information may also allow it to narrow the search results.
- 6. In light of recent news and other court rulings¹, on November 8, 2016, Plaintiff requested that Defendants confirm that they are searching the non-government email accounts of

¹ *See* http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-rahm-emanuel-personal-email-met-1108-20161107-story.html

the 58 employees to the extent those employees were using other accounts besides their official government accounts to conduct official government business.

- 7. Plaintiff subsequently followed up with Defendants by email on November 16, 2016, November 28, 2016, and December 6, 2016 relative to all of the above issues. To date, Defendant has not responded to Plaintiff let alone answer any of the questions Plaintiff has posed concerning Defendants' search efforts.
- 8. Because Defendants have failed to respond to Plaintiff's inquires, Plaintiff cannot comply with the Court's September 23, 2016 order. In addition, Defendants' failure to respond to Plaintiff's inquiries violates the Court's order.
- 9. The conduct of the Defendants is willful and malicious and in contempt of the order previously entered in this cause.
 - 10. The conduct of the Defendants in failing to comply with the terms and conditions of the previous court order is without compelling cause or justification.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff petitions this Court to enter an order for a rule to show cause why Defendants should not be held in contempt and to order Defendants to comply with the Court's September 23, 2016 order.

Dated: January 9, 2017 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ A. Christine Svenson

Christine Svenson
Ill. Bar No. 6230370
Cook County Attorney ID No. 44565
SVENSON LAW OFFICES
505 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 350
Chicago, IL 60654

Tel: (312) 467-2900 Fax: (312) 467-2902 PAGE 1 of 1
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS CHANCERY DIVISION

		CHANCERY DIVISION CLERK DOROTHY BROWN
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represented by coursel, the 'court, it is herely on	angueur	heard before
(1) Mayor Rolen Evan. (2) (3) Notin to dispuss	iel so	proper party;
(3) The Court es not rule (4) The Existing the to done	ng on Cou	NTII;
9) The parties are to dece D's regions shall i for the Office on M	ime fur	the Feth officer
Attorney No.: 44565 Name: Salva	ENTERED:	Judge Anna Helen Demacopoulos
Atty. for: Nashle # 350	Dated:	SEP 2 3 2016
City/State/Zip: Qu 600000		Circuit Court – 2002
Telephone: 51546 F 39W	Indoe	Judge's No

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CIRCUIT COURT OF
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
CHANCERY DIVISION
CLERK DOROTHY BROWN

Judicial Watch vs Office of Mayor 16 CH 462

Report of Proceeding

Taken on: September 23, 2016

JENSEN LITIGATION SOLUTIONS

180 North LaSalle Street Suite 2800 Chicago, IL 60601 312.236.6936 877.653.6736 www.jensenlitigation.com



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           STATE OF ILLINOIS
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           COUNTY OF COOK
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                 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
                     COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION
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           JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.,
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                             Plaintiff,
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                                              No. 16 CH 00462
                   vs.
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           THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF
           THE CITY OF CHICAGO
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           and
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           RAHM EMANUEL, in his
           official capacity as Mayor
           of the city of Chicago
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                             Defendant.
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                     Report of proceedings had at the hearing in
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          the above-entitled cause before the HONORABLE ANNA HELEN
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          DEMACOPOULOS, Judge of said Court, commencing at 10:43
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          a.m. on September 23, 2016.
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          APPEARANCES:
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                SVENSON LAW OFFICES, by
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                MS. A. CHRISTINE SVENSON
                     On behalf of the Plaintiff;
     2.2
                CITY OF CHICAGO, LEGAL INFORMATION, INVESTIGATIONS
     23
                & PROSECUTIONS, by
                MR. PHILLIP SANTELL
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                     On behalf of the Defendant.
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Good morning, CounseL. THE COURT:

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MR. SANTELL: Good morning, your Honor. My name is Phillip Santell, S A N T E L L. This is corporation counsel for the City of Chicago representing defendant in this matter.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. SVENSON: Good morning, your Honor. Christine Svenson, S V E N S O N, on behalf of plaintiff, Judicial Watch, Inc.

You may be seated. I'm going to ask THE COURT: that you all argue from counsel table. I just ask that you stand so that you can be clearly heard. I know it's easier to spread out your paperwork at the table. We're here today on defendant's motion to dismiss.

MR. SANTELL: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: I have read -- I have the amended complaint, the defendant's motion, plaintiff's response, defendant's reply in supporting affidavit, and then plaintiff's sur-reply. I just have a question before we begin.

In the defendant's reply in supporting affidavit, there is a mention that in June of 2016, there was a subsequent response to the FOIA request. Does the plaintiff have that?



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MS. SVENSON: No. I'm glad you brought that up, your Honor, because we are not in possession of that. So I was surprised to see that in the affidavit. Counsel did produce to me yesterday a response, and it is dated with yesterday's date.

MR. SANTELL: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Please.

MR. SANTELL: This is a matter that I discussed with my supervisor who handled --

THE COURT: You need to be clearer.

MR. SANTELL: This is matter that I discussed with my supervisor, Amber Ritter, and this is a matter that came to my attention, and I wasn't sure whether or not there was a subsequent response that went out -- a clarified response that went out. It is true that in the reply it is mentioned. I looked for it. I could not find it. Therefore, I reached out to counsel to ensure she had it. She indicated to me that she couldn't find it.

Therefore, to ensure that everything was taken care of, I sent the one dated yesterday to her. It is exactly the same as the reply that went out on January 7th. The only thing that is different is that it is addressed from the Mayor's office as opposed to



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3 It is exactly the same. Except for the cover letter, the words, 4 THE COURT: 5 Chicago Police Department are replaced with Office of 6 the Mayor. MR. SANTELL: That is correct, your Honor. And is it dated July 14th? 8 THE COURT: 9 MR. SANTELL: Well, I'm not entirely sure if there 10 was one dated July 14th that was sent out. I would not 11 have sent it out, but I did send one to counsel 12 yesterday, and I have a copy of it with me today. 13 Do you have it now? THE COURT: 14 MS. SVENSON: I do. 15 THE COURT: Does that change anything for today? 16 MS. SVENSON: I don't think that it does. 17 THE COURT: Okay. At least we're clear that you 18 have a second response to the FOIA request. 19 MS. SVENSON: As of yesterday, yes. 20 All right. Counsel, go ahead. THE COURT: 21 MR. SANTELL: Thank you.

from the Chicago Police Department. All the exemptions

The records that were produced are the

Your Honor, today we're up on defendant's

motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant

to Section 2619.1, which combines both Section 2615 and



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2619. Here it's the defendant's contention that plaintiff's complaint fails under both 2615 and 2619 because it is excessively vague and without specific factual allegations. And looking at the face of the complaint, it is clear that the city has met its obligation under FOIA, which therefore both of these defeat the plaintiff's claim.

Starting with Section 2615, generally

Section 2615 deals with the legal sufficiency of the complaint based upon defects that are apparent on the face. It is important to note that Illinois is a fact pleading jurisdiction. Therefore, a plaintiff must allege specific facts not mere conclusions or conjecture. Legal conclusions and factual conclusions that are unsupported by allegations and specific fact will be disregarded in ruling on a motion to dismiss. That was in the case of Cummings versus City of Waterloo, which is available at 289 Ill. App 3rd, which I believe was the First District appellate case.

Generally speaking, the plaintiff must allege specific facts that allow a defendant to be essentially placed on notice of the claims that are against them and allow them to form a defense to those claims. Here in this case after amending their pleadings, plaintiffs



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still have not alleged specific facts that would enable them to survive a 2615 motion to dismiss.

Specifically, in Count 1, plaintiff alleges that they did not receive a response to the FOIA Looking at the face of the complaint and the documents that are attached to the subsequent findings, it is clear that this is simply not supported by the defendant's complaint. Plaintiff acknowledges in Paragraph 10 of their amended complaint that they received a response from the city dated January 7, 2016, and they have attached that response to their filings with this Court.

Now, plaintiff is arguing that this is somehow nonresponsive, but that's not the case, your Honor. It's simply the fact that this was a simple clerical error, that Chicago Police Department was listed when it should have been the Mayor's office.

But, counsel, everything that has been THE COURT: attached --

Yes, your Honor. MR. SANTELL:

-- and even the question that the Court THE COURT: had before we even began today and even your own admission that you yourself were unclear whether or not there was a specific response from the Mayor's office to



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this FOIA was unclear even as of yesterday.

MR. SANTELL: Now, my response to that, Judge, would be essentially -- it's not to be dismissive -- but I believe that it's a distinction without indifference. And the reason that I say that is because the FOIA response that went out to the plaintiff, I believe it was just over 3,000 documents, including documents from the City Law Department, from the Mayor's office, from It was a city wide search. I believe there are more than 20 e-mail inboxes that were searched.

Therefore, whether or not it's entitled from the Mayor's office or from CPD or from the Law Department or whatever it is, that's unimportant because if you look at the substance of the letter, it's clear that the Mayor's office inbox -- the Mayor's office -the Mayor's e-mail, his personal e-mail, was searched as well as his staff.

THE COURT: That's not clear. And the Mayor's office website itself -- and I'm going to quote it. "Each city department is a separate agency responsible for maintaining its own records. Requests should be submitted to the department that maintains the records you want."

MR. SANTELL: That's entirely true. Yes.



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THE COURT: So if you're demanding as a city that the requester make a request of the specific department, why is it okay then for the city to respond generically?

MR. SANTELL: Well, the city's position, Judge, is that this was a special instance. We had more than 30 requests from the same material covering the

October 2014 shooting of Laguan McDonald.

numerous different requesters asking for different

Therefore, in order to conserve resources and try to answer everyone's FOIA request in the truncated period of time that's required by FOIA, the city did something that might be unusual. What the city did is that we tried to come up with search terms and search -- and places to search that would essentially cover all of the requests and provide, in many cases, like this one, a lot more information than would have been provided if the individual searches were run.

For instance, if we would have simply searched the Mayor's office, all the information that was provided to plaintiff from the CPD, from the Law Department, that would have been excluded. So in this case, we kind of -- to deal with the exigency that's required by FOIA and to try to get the response out



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since there were so many in demand, we kind of -- for lack of a better term -- we try to come up with a group of search terms and inboxes in which to search to get these communications that would cover all of the requests. Given the fact that there's such a limited time and given the fact city resources were limited, this is a solution that was come up with.

THE COURT: Collectively.

MR. SANTELL: Essentially, yes.

THE COURT: And doesn't that defeat the whole purpose of individual public bodies under FOIA?

MR. SANTELL: No. We don't believe it does. We believe that this situation is different than your usual FOIA request. The usual FOIA request, if I may, let's say --

THE COURT: There is no usual in FOIA.

MR. SANTELL: That's correct, your Honor. Maybe a more typical FOIA request is a better way to put it.

A more typical FOIA request would say to the Department of Revenue, please, you know, tell me -- give me documentation related to how many boots the department maintains.

In this instance, this FOIA request and all these other requests were for documents from different



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city departments involving the same item. essentially, all these FOIA requests taken together it kind of forced us to look beyond just one department in order to try to fulfill the request, and that's what we tried to do, your Honor. We tried to fulfill the requests and tried to provide everyone with the documentation that is needed and documentation that they are asking for.

Look, I understand that in hindsight now when we're talking in a courtroom it's different than the time constraints as a public relations issue that the city was managing at the time to answer and respond to all of these FOIA requests. This may have been the expeditious and cost effective way to respond to the multiple FOIA requests. I get that, but now when we're in court and we're looking at the law specifically, it's very clear that the Mayor's office is different than the Chicago Police Department and the Law Department.

Yes, absolutely. That's true. MR. SANTELL:

So up until yesterday when it was very THE COURT: clear that the response was coming from the Mayor's office, Count No. 1 was -- you did not respond. The Mayor's office did not respond.



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MR. SANTELL: Well, your Honor, again, without being dismissive --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. SANTELL: -- I would argue.

THE COURT: You're in a difficult position standing here in this courtroom having to answer this question for other people that made that decision.

Well, the reason I would say that MR. SANTELL: that's perhaps a distinction without indifference is because the Mayor's staff, the Mayor's e-mail, everything was searched in response to her request. it is not the instance where Judicial Watch in this case is alleging that they sent a request to CPD, they sent a request to the Chicago Fire Department, they sent a request to the office of Emergency Management & Communications, and they only received this one request back. There are no other requests. They didn't make a request of CPD. So when they received the request, it should have been clear that it was simply an error that Chicago Police Department was listed at the top.

THE COURT: Then there's the subsequent e-mails to Ms. Ritter identifying it specifically. And I understand that in her position at the time I'm sure that it was chaos. I totally understand that, that it



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must have been chaos with all of the requests the various city departments were being inundated. But at some point in time, now that things have kind of settled, we still have to -- I'm still kind of restricted to what the FOIA statute says, and each individual agency in which each individual department of the city is an individual entity -- public body.

MR. SANTELL: Yes, absolutely. That's entirely true, your Honor, but the city's position is that although -- Let me phrase this another way.

That although each individual entity is its own body that in this particular instance, the request would have not been answered fully if these other bodies weren't involved.

THE COURT: So, in other words, the response still would have been the same. In other words, the documents that were turned over would still be the same.

MR. SANTELL: The documents from the Mayor's office would be exactly the same. Our position is that we gave -- we essentially went above and beyond. We gave a lot more documents in the interest of transparency to the plaintiff than their request they requested. Given the fact that the plaintiffs made no other requests of any other city agency --



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THE COURT: I don't know that, though. I don't know that based on these pleadings.

MR. SANTELL: Well, that's true, your Honor. Their allegations are they submitted a FOIA request on December 2nd and that they subsequently received a response on January 7th, but the response was entitled from the Chicago Police Department. Those are the allegations, if I'm not mistaken them.

Therefore, the city feels that we did respond. There was a clerical error in the response that had subsequently been cleared up. The responsive documents, everything, all the e-mails are identical. The exemptions that are asserted are identical. It's the same response essentially. It's just fashioned from the Mayor's office as opposed to CPD.

THE COURT: Let's move on to Count No. 2 as to the sufficiency of the search terms.

MR. SANTELL: Now, in the second count, plaintiff is alleging that the search was insufficient. As explained in Amber Ritter's affidavit, there were many requests for the same --

THE COURT: We just lost that. I want the record clear. Do you want to repeat that?

MR. SANTELL: As explained in Amber Ritter's

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affidavit, which is attached to our reply, the city had received many different requests for essentially the same information. Therefore, what the city did is we came up with inboxes to be searched and search terms to be used. We use the terms Laquan, Van Dyke, Van Dyke with a different spelling, and also LM, the abbreviation for Laquan McDonald. So, therefore, we came up with the terms that would be universally applicable and would pick out the relevant information and the relevant documents.

And, in addition, the responsive letter clearly states that, quote, we believe this production fulfills the terms of the FOIA request. To the extent you are seeking additional material, please direct a renewed FOIA request to the appropriate city department.

In this case, plaintiff did not submit a subsequent FOIA request. Instead, they filed a lawsuit against the city. They're arguing that the search was inadequate because the terms, dash-camera and recording, were not used in the terms that were searched. It's not clear from their request, which is very general, and is attached to their sur-reply. I believe it is Exhibit A.

Their request is for any and all records -THE COURT: Counsel, slow down.



I apologize. MR. SANTELL: Okay.

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You want a clean record. THE COURT:

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all records of communications sent to or from officials 4

MR. SANTELL:

There request was for, quote, any and

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in the office of the Mayor, including but not limited

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to, Mayor Rahm Emanuel, regarding, concerning or

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October 20, 2014 shooting of Laguan McDonald, including

but not limited to the release of any such video

relating to police dash-camera recording of the

recordings to the public.

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You skipped the words police THE COURT:

Now, plaintiff is attempting to argue that since the terms camera, recording or dash were not used, that the search is inadequate. Well, your Honor, there's a couple problems with that. First being that the generalized terms camera, dash, or recording would not gather materials responsive to this request. generalized terms that were not set out as search terms to be searched in the request -- there was no requests basically saying that please search the Mayor's staff or Mayor Rahm Emanuel's e-mail for these specific key That was not done. This generalized request was for material that dealt with the release of the material related to the shooting of Laguan McDonald.



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MR. SANTELL: Yes, your Honor, because that's what was released. The police dash-camera was released. That was the information that was released. So whether or not -- to gather responsive documents, the terms that were used were specific to this instance, Van Dyke, two spellings, Laquan, LM, those items. If we were to search CPD e-mails for dash or CPD e-mails for camera or recording or the Mayor's office, we would come up with perhaps a lot of things that would be irrelevant to these proceedings.

THE COURT: But there is more than one dash-cam video recording in this instance of the October 20th shooting; isn't there?

MR. SANTELL: I believe there were -- now I can't remember an exact number.

THE COURT: And that's exactly the point. If you limited the search to just Van Dyke, which is a officer, and you limited the search to the victim, Laquan McDonald or LM, and you limited the search to just those, you are excluding all of those other possible dash-cams that were involved.

MR. SANTELL: Well --

THE COURT: Because if those e-mails did not

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contain the victim's name, a single officer's name, then you are excluding all of those e-mails.

MR. SANTELL: Well, the e-mails that we excluded were e-mails that are not related at all to this proceeding. As your Honor can certainly imagine, there are hundreds of dash-cams in different vehicles all across the city of the Police Department. Whether or not there are communications that deal with those, they would have nothing at all to do with the Laquan McDonald instance for the period of time it was searched.

By using these expansive, open-ended terms, we would be bringing in perhaps -- I can't even guess as to how many additional e-mails, but they would not be relevant e-mails. The relevance would be Laquan McDonald, LM, Van Dyke as was searched. Those would be the relevant terms.

THE COURT: How did the terms -- The affidavit says that we -- I want to use the exact words -- gleaned from the many requests and then calculated to produce the broader set of relevant records.

Who made that decision, and if that was the case, were other requesters involved in making that decision excluding Judicial Watch?

MR. SANTELL: I don't believe that other requesters



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were involved. I think what occurred is that looking at the great number of requests the city received, that in order to answer them, perhaps terms were taken from certain letters. Again, I was not involved in that process. So I can't say definitively, but looking at the affidavit, I believe that's what it indicates, is that there wasn't necessarily a give and take so to speak with the requesters, but that looking at the request, these terms were used.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand, and I mean this sincerely that you standing in front of me having to answer these questions is very difficult, but these are questions that I have to ask as required by the statute. The statute is very specific that every single body must have a FOIA officer.

Who is the FOIA officer for the Office of the Mayor?

MR. SANTELL: At this time, I believe it was Chloe Rasmas.

THE COURT: Who?

MR. SANTELL: Chloe Rasmas I believe it was.

THE COURT: And we don't have any documents from her or him.

MR. SANTELL: What happened, your Honor, is the



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City of Chicago Department of Law represents basically all the agencies that were involved here. So this was -- my understanding is that this was handled through the Department of Law given the large number of requests and the different bodies that were involved -- different city entities that were involved.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SANTELL: So going ahead with Count 3, failure to produce all nonexempt information. Here, the plaintiff alleges that simply because there were redactions, that the production is incomplete. In this case, there were more than 3,000 e-mails that were produced. There were, I believe, five or six different exemptions that were cited.

Here, plaintiff doesn't allege any specifics as to what they take issue with. There is no indication that they take issue with, say, (d)(iv), for example, or (c), for example -- I'm sorry -- 7(1)(c) or (7)(1)(d)(iv) or any of the different FOIA exemptions. They basically state that this production was incomplete simply because it contained redactions. Judge, this doesn't give the city anything to go on so to speak in which to form a defense.

THE COURT: Has there ever been a request for an



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MR. SANTELL: Not from Judicial Watch, your Honor, as far as I'm aware. I'm sure counsel will be able to correct that if it's incorrect.

In addition, your Honor, Mayor Rahm Emanuel personally should be dismissed from the suit as well pursuant to Section 2615.

THE COURT: Why?

MR. SANTELL: Because looking at the authority to sue, which is found in 5 ILCS 140/11, which indicates denial of a request for public records injunctive or declaratory relief. It indicates that any person denied access to inspect or copy any public records by a public body may file suit for injunctive or declaratory relief.

If you switch to the definition section, which is found on 5ILCS140/2, public body is a defined term.

It's found under A. "Public body means all legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the State, State universities and colleges, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts or any other municipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees or commissions of the State and any subsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing, et cetera."

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Your Honor, there is no -- given this definition and given the fact that the language that allows someone to bring a suit for declaratory injunctive relief specifically lists a public body. We don't believe that the Mayor as an individual is an appropriate defendant in this matter.

Now, in opposition to this point --

THE COURT: The suit is in Rahn Emanuel in his official capacity. It's not his unofficial capacity.

MR. SANTELL: That is correct. Our position is that it should be simply against the Office of the Mayor, not against Rahn Emanuel.

In support of their argument that the Mayor is a proper party, counsel cites to an opinion from the First District Appellate Court in the matter of Quincy Stone (phonetic), which was decided in 1991. And I have a copy for your Honor if your Honor does not have one. This deals with the instance where --

THE COURT: Hold on just a second.

Go ahead

MR. SANTELL: This deals with the instance where someone is trying to bring injunctive suit against an alderman. And the issue before the Court is whether or not that alderman can be sued, whether or not the



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individual alderman is a public body. And in this lawsuit, the Court described FOIA as it used to be before the 2010 amendment. Before 2010, if you were denied anything from a public body, you had to appeal to the head of that public body. And essentially after you would receive a denial from the head of the public body, you would receive -- to use a phrase -- key to the courtroom, that essentially this was a prerequisite that had to be met prior to the ability to bring a suit.

Now, in this matter, there is language that indicates that this person should have brought suit against the Mayor and the city counsel. Now, the Mayor is the head of the city counsel, and they were together as a public body. Given the fact that this opinion is not as broad as the plaintiff's set it out to be, and we believe that it's distinguishable being the fact that it works with an older version of FOIA, and it's also dealing with an entirely different set of facts, which deals with alderman, city counsel and Mayor as head of city counsel. We believe this case is distinguishable.

We believe the FOIA definition of public body is clear under Section A as it was read and indicated into the record as well as the authority to sue a public body. We believe there is no authority to argue that



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the Mayor as an individual is an appropriate defendant under FOIA. Thank you.

THE COURT: Counsel.

MS. SVENSON: Thank you, your Honor.

At the outset, I would point out that defendant's motion to dismiss states plaintiff fails to plead facts showing that the city failed to respond.

That's Argument A. Argument B, plaintiff has not pled facts showing that the city failed to conduct a sufficient search. Argument C, plaintiff has not pled facts showing the city failed to produce all nonexempt information.

So that's just false. We pled that the office of the Mayor did not respond, that the office of the Mayor failed to conduct a sufficient search, that the office of the Mayor failed to produce all nonexempt information. That was addressed in counsel's argument, but I think it's important to note that they are trying to mislead the Court in saying that it's the city that's involved here. It's the Office of the Mayor. And simply put, the Office of the Mayor did not respond to our FOIA request.

The January 7th, 2016 letter by Ms. Ritter clearly states that she was responding to a FOIA request



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directed to the Chicago Police Department. She also states in your request you sought, quote, any and all records of communication sent to or from officials in the CPD, including but not limited to superintendant Garry McCarthy, regarding, concerning or relating to police dash-camera recording of the October 20, 2014 shooting of Laquan McDonald. That's false. That's not what we were seeking at all. It's very clear from our FOIA request what we were seeking.

So in our amended complaint, we specifically note that --

THE COURT: So now having received yesterday's response that clearly identifies the Office of the Mayor, does that satisfy the request?

MS. SVENSON: It does not. It did not come from the FOIA officer from the Office of the Mayor. We know that now. It does not provide us with -- the search was not accurate -- I'm sorry -- not complete.

THE COURT: Forget that. Let's stick with the issue of whether or not the Office of the Mayor has responded because that's a big issue.

MS. SVENSON: Right. We do not believe so.

There's no affidavit attached to the request, I don't believe.



Do you have the request that was sent 1 THE COURT: 2. yesterday for the Court to view? 3 MS. SVENSON: Yes. 4 THE COURT: Or the response. I'm sorry. The 5 response to the request. (Document tendered.) 6 THE COURT: Can I have one minute to read it? 8 MS. SVENSON: Sure. 9 So the body of it is exactly the same. THE COURT: 10 The only difference is it now says the Office of the 11 Mayor. 12 I believe that's correct. MS. SVENSON: PAGE 13 Okay. And the letter is signed by THE COURT: 14 Santell as assistant corporation counsel. 15 MR. SANTELL: That is correct, your Honor. 16 it to counsel yesterday. 17 THE COURT: Go ahead, Counsel. 18 MS. SVENSON: So, yes, we do not believe this was properly responsive because there is -- it does not come 19 20 from the FOIA officer from the Office of the Mayor, and there are no affidavits attached showing that they did a 21 22 complete search. 23 THE COURT: Go ahead.

Relating to the actual search, the



MS. SVENSON:

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search was inadequate, and they are trying to change the law or misread the law. It's not the requester's burden to show that they conducted an accurate search. It's their burden, and they just simply didn't do it. This is not about the shooting of Laquan McDonald. This is about the dash-cam recording. There was absolutely no search as we know for the term, quote, dash, unquote, quote, camera, unquote, quote, recording or any variance thereof.

THE COURT: So you get this response in January of 2016, and you see that it doesn't have those search terms. Is there any subsequent follow-up request?

MS. SVENSON: Yes.

THE COURT: I get there were some e-mails to

Ms. Ritter that say, hey, we FOIA the Mayor's office,

not CPD. Was there any follow up saying we want dash,

slash, camera, dash-camera request? Was there ever,

ever a second request?

MS. SVENSON: Yes, via e-mail. Those were in my client's e-mails to Ms. Ritter who specifically note those search terms weren't used, and we requested that they be used. I believe that those e-mails were attached to one of the --

THE COURT: They are. Just give me one second.



MS. SVENSON: Sure.

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THE COURT: Go ahead.

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We're alleging that the search was MS. SVENSON: not adequate, there was no affidavit containing facts that they conducted a thorough search. We did get the affidavit from Ms. Ritter. However, there were inaccuracies because we never received the July 2016 response that she claimed that she had sent. failed to produce by clear and convincing evidence that the information fell -- falls within the FOIA exemption. The information was redacted. There's no index, and there's no indication with the redacted information as to which exemption applies to what was redacted to.

THE COURT: So I haven't seen the redactions, and I'm not going to look at 3,000 e-mails. I'm telling you right now. So my question to Judicial Watch is this: The redactions that I have seen in other cases, when the redaction appears, it actually identifies which section it's being redacted under. In other words, personal information, deliberative process, attorney/client privilege, whatever. Do those redactions have the section cites?

I believe not. I should have double MS. SVENSON: checked that yesterday, but I'm certainly correct in



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saying that. Maybe counsel knows the answer to that.

MR. SANTELL: Judge, I don't believe -- To be totally honest with the Court --

THE COURT: I don't want anyone lying.

MR. SANTELL: -- I can't say. It's been so long since I looked at it, your Honor. I don't recall. Sorry.

MS. SVENSON: I'm 80 percent sure I'm right about that.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. SVENSON: Again, I don't believe we had any explanation for the redactions.

As I sit here today, we feel they have not responded properly, that they are trying to put the burden back on us, that they have disregarded the law. The law is clear that they have to show they conducted an exhaustive search pursuant to our FOIA request, and they haven't done so.

THE COURT: When you say that they have not claimed the appropriate exemption, but yet you can't tell me if the redactions have that, I mean, are you going to be objecting to a redaction when it relates to somebody's date of birth or Social Security number or personal information?



MS. SVENSON: No.

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So if the redactions are THE COURT: Okav. claiming an exemption that go to something specific, like a deliberative process or anything like that, that has to be specifically pled so that the Court can make a determination whether or not to do an in-camera inspection, which is probably more likely to happen, but if you're not going to be objecting to the exemption of some redactions, then we're just wasting our time. those need to be specifically pled.

Any other argument?

MS. SVENSON: No.

THE COURT: Mr. Santell.

If I may follow up. MR. SANTELL:

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SANTELL: The city takes issue with the characterization that anything the city has done has made an attempt to mislead the Court. We believe that, as your Honor said earlier, we've been entirely up front with the Court at all times. And we will take -- we take issue with the characterization that anything we've done is intended to mislead.

In this case, your Honor, plaintiff takes issue with the fact that there was no affidavit that was



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attached to the FOIA response. Your Honor, we never include affidavits as part of FOIA response.

THE COURT: But the statute says that the only person that can respond is the FOIA officer.

MR. SANTELL: Well, Judge, in this case, individuals with the Department of Law who are trained as FOIA officers with the Illinois Attorneys General's office responded to this request. Therefore, FOIA officers working for the Department of Law responded to the request, given the fact that the Department of Law represents all the agencies whose emails were produced with the request as part of the responsive documents.

Now, as to whether or not a subsequent FOIA request was made, your Honor, we don't believe that the attachment to the exhibit -- to the plaintiff's sur-reply establishes that a subsequent FOIA request was made.

THE COURT: A what? We can't hear you clearly when you read looking down.

MR. SANTELL: I'm sorry.

We don't believe that the attachments to plaintiff's sur-reply establish that a subsequent FOIA request was made. This lawsuit was filed on January 20. As of April 4, after the filing of the lawsuit, there is



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communications between a gentleman from Judicial Watch,
Michael Bekesha and Amber Ritter and Christine Svenson,
and it specifically references the lawsuit.

So, therefore, the lawsuit was already filed and was ongoing at that point in time regarding the response. Therefore, we don't believe there was a subsequent FOIA request made.

THE COURT: But, Mr. Santell, again, I give you -I know that this is difficult because you're standing
here having to answer for people who made decisions that
you may not have been a part of. I understand that.
And so, I don't mean any ill-feelings towards you
personally, but, again, I'm here to make a decision, all
right.

Somebody created the search terms, and those search terms traditionally with FOIA requests, people come together and it's the requester and the public body that create what search terms are going to be used.

That's a common practice, isn't it?

MR. SANTELL: Absolutely.

THE COURT: And so, I understand that in January of 2016 or in December of 2015 that the city was in a crisis situation that is a public relation issue that the Mayor's office, the city Law Department, the Chicago



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Police Department, everybody made a decision that, you know what, we're just going to give everything. But now that we're here in court in a lawsuit, I'm bound by the statute. And my question is is that in other cases, it's common that people get together, the requester and the public body, that come up with the search terms. That's what was done informally with these e-mails. It's not uncommon that that happens. So it doesn't require a second FOIA request.

MR. SANTELL: That's true. That is correct.

However, again, as your Honor has clearly said on the record, this was a situation that didn't necessarily afford the city time given the truncated -- given the five-day requirements set up by FOIA that we necessarily didn't have the luxury of time to do that with all the requesters.

And, finally, a detail factual basis for all the exemptions that were cited and relied upon is sent out in the letters that were provided on January 7th and yesterday to the plaintiff indicating what it was that was redacted and the basis for it. Therefore, we believe that we have shown in that correspondence the applicability of all of the exemptions.

That's all I have. Thank you, your Honor.



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All right. This is a motion to dismiss THE COURT: that has been filed by the Office of the Mayor. off, I want to address whether or not the Mayor himself, Rahn Emanuel, is a proper party to the lawsuit. believe that the FOIA statute requires that it's a public body that can be the subject of a FOIA request, and therefore any subsequent filings in a Circuit Court to review the response to that FOIA response would name the public body and the named official. In the case of People versus Stone, although I believe that the city is asking this Court to consider it as dicta, in that particular case, it was a lawsuit filed against the And in that specific case, it specifically alderman. states that the plaintiff there pursued the request of the records to the wrong person. Instead of suing the defendant individually, she must pursue her remedy against the head of the public body pursuant to the act. The act defines head of the public body as the president, mayor, chairman, president, officer and so on.

Therefore, plaintiff must pursue her remedy in the Circuit Court by filing an injunction, injunctive or declaratory relief against the Mayor and against the city counsel.



MR. SANTELL:

Yes your Honor.

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THE COURT: I understand that is under the old statute, but that specific part of the statute hasn't So I do believe that the Mayor is a proper changed. party.

If I may interject. The requirement MR. SANTELL: that an individual who was therefore -- whose FOIA request was denied appeal to the head of the public body has been thrown away as of the 2010 amendment, so FOIA has in fact changed.

I understand, but I still think that THE COURT: the Mayor is a proper named party, so he will remain as a named party.

This specific request was only to the Mayor's I do not know if Judicial Watch issued a FOIA request to other individuals or not or other bodies. Ι The only one that's in front of me at this don't know. time is the one that was sent to the Office of the Mayor of the city of Chicago. As of three minutes before we start this hearing, it was still unclear whether or not a response from the Office of the Mayor has been sent to Judicial Watch. And, again, I've said it repeatedly through this hearing, I completely understand, and it's understandable and it's reasonable how the city



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collectively responded to the multitude of FOIA requests after the release of the Laquan McDonald video by Judge Valderrama.

However, at this stage, we do have to look at the statute. So as it relates to Count No. 1, I do believe that the motion to dismiss under 2615 and 2619 will be denied. It may be a proper motion for summary judgment now that that subsequent response has been filed, but at this stage of the proceedings, I believe that they have stated a claim that the Office of the Mayor has not responded.

As to Count No. 2, the sufficiency of the search terms, again, collectively at that time, it may have been appropriate or they thought public relations-wise that's the way it should have been responded. Again, the statute is very clear that every single public body must have an officer. In this specific case, the responses come from Mr. Santell, even if we take the response that we're talking about that was tendered yesterday. Specifically the -- Just give me one second.

Each of the individual city departments are subsidiary bodies of Chicago, and public bodies is defined by FOIA. And the Court is citing Duncan Pub



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versus the City of Chicago at 709 N.E. 2d 1281, citing the Board of Regents of Regency University System versus Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d. Individual departments, which are city funded and city controlled are public bodies, and each individual is subject to the mandates of FOIA.

In this specific case, the Court is also looking at the attorney general's public access counselor and their recommendation. There they specifically define the FOIA officer and specifically define public records and who is required to respond to those public records. The response did not come from the office of the Mayor's FOIA officer. It came from the corporation counsel, which does represent the Mayor's office and the Mayor, but the FOIA statute is very clear that it must come from the FOIA officer.

In this specific case, there was multiple communications between the parties about the specific search term that was used. The Law Department through the corporation counsel representing the Office of the Mayor and the Mayor did not alter or change the requests of the search terms, even though the plaintiff here, Judicial Watch, had specifically asked them to do that. It very well may be that the 3,000 pages of e-mails that



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have already been tendered will include an additional --Strike that. That was very unclear.

It very well may be that the 3,000 e-mails that have already been tendered are all inclusive of everything that relates to the October 20, 2014 However, we all know that there's more than shooting. one dash-cam involved in the shooting that happened on October 20th of 2014 than just the one released by Judge I don't know if the search was inclusive Valderrama. enough as it relates to this specific request. And so, the defendant's motion to dismiss Count No. 2 is going to be denied.

Usually in FOIA requests we're dealing with motions for summary judgment. Here we are dealing with a motion to dismiss, which is different, but I think it's one in the same. So I think that the search is insufficient just using the search terms Laquan McDonald, Van Dyke spelled two different ways and LM. I'm going to leave it up to the parties to decide how they wish to define the search terms. I am not going to You all decide how the search terms -- because I don't know what you're looking for. However, plaintiff, you are going to be limited to what your original request was. You cannot expand it anymore from



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So the motion to dismiss Count No. 2 is today's date. going to be denied.

Count No. 3, I don't know what the new search is going to reveal. If it's going to be the same e-mails or different e-mails. So I'm going to not rule on Count No. 3. You may want to amend your complaint based on the new responses that you get. However, if there's going to be a new amended complaint that is going to allege that they haven't sufficiently claimed nonexempt information, then it needs to be specifically pled.

In other words, e-mail NO. 2055 claims an exemption of deliberative process, and we don't think that's true, then that will at least refine the search for me to do an in-camera inspection. And I will be willing to do the in-camera inspection at that time of the unredacted e-mails to make that determination.

Mr. Santell, if you could please make sure -and I can't imagine, unless the city is doing it differently than any other case -- every other case that I've done with a FOIA request and the city has redacted information, on the redaction it gives the specific section that is being used for that specific redaction. So that would be sufficient. And if the plaintiff, I'm



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hoping that you're not going to be objecting to personal information, because it will be an enormous task for me to go through that, but you're getting to the substance, and I think that's what you want.

So I'm going to not rule on Count No. 3 at this point based on my ruling on Count No. 1 and 2 asking for a new search to be done.

Your Honor, may I ask a question. MS. SVENSON: With respect to what you were saying about the plaintiff is limited to the original request, are you speaking about our request from our e -mails?

THE COURT: Your original FOIA request that was filed in December of 2015 specifically states, any and all records of communications sent to and from officials in the Office of the Mayor, including but not limited to Mayor Rahm Emanuel, comma, regarding, comma, concerning or relating to police dash-camera recordings of the October 20, 2014 shooting of Laquan McDonald, including but not limited to the release of any video recordings to the public.

Your subsequent e-mails specifically address the search terms that were used and that it did not include specific search terms.

So my question is, are we relegated MS. SVENSON:

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2 because we probably have more that we would like to submit? 3 But you're not going to get 4 THE COURT: No. 5 anything more than what you've already asked for in the 6 original FOIA. MS. SVENSON: Right. Okay. Thank you. Is that clear? 8 THE COURT: 9 That answers my question. MS. SVENSON: 10 You're not going to get anything more THE COURT: 11 than what your original request was. You're limited. If you want more than that, then you have to file a new FOIA. 14 Right. MS. SVENSON: 15 THE COURT: Have I addressed everything? 16 MS. SVENSON: I believe so. 17 MR. SANTELL: I believe so, your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Give me one minute to make sure I have 19 gone over my notes and addressed everything. 20 Actually, I do have one more thing MS. SVENSON: 21 once you're ready. 22 Are they going to be required to submit an

to just those search terms that we had suggested we use



There's no requirement that they need

affidavit showing?

THE COURT:

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1	to submit an affidavit, but the response, it's clear.
2	It should be coming from the FOIA officer.
3	Is there a problem with that?
4	MR. SANTELL: No.
5	THE COURT: At this stage now that we're tendering,
б	you know, almost a year later.
7	MR. SANTELL: No, your Honor. I don't believe
8	there's any sort of exigency involved here. I believe
9	we should be able to have the Mayor's FOIA officer
10	respond.
11	THE COURT: Since we're going to be doing a new
12	search at this point, they can file a new response from
13	the Office of the Mayor, from the Mayor's FOIA officer
14	with a new search terms.
15	Let me make sure I covered everything; I think
16	we have.
17	MS. SVENSON: Thank you, your Honor.
18	MR. SANTELL: Thank you, your Honor.
19	(Which were all the proceedings had
20	in the above-entitled cause.)
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1	STATE OF ILLINOIS)
2) SS. COUNTY OF COOK)
3	
4	Alexandra Szajna, being first duly sworn, on
5	oath says that she is a Certified Shorthand Reporter and
6	Registered Professional Reporter doing business in the
7	City of Chicago, County of Cook and the State of
8	Illinois;
9	That she reported in shorthand the proceedings
1.0	had at the foregoing hearing;
11	And that the foregoing is a true and correct
1.2	transcript of her shorthand notes so taken as aforesaid
13	and contains all the proceedings had at the said
1.4	hearing.
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16	alepandra Syajia
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18	ALEXANDRA SZAJNA, CSR, RPR CSR No. 084-004778
19	CSR NO. 004-004//0
20	SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3rd day of
21	October, A.D., 2016.
22	
23	Muson L. Sedalus Alison L. SEDAKIS Notary Public - State of Illinois My Commission Expires 3/14/2019
24	NOTARY PUBLIC
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CIRCUIT COURT OF
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
CHANCERY DIVISION
CLERK DOROTHY BROWN

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.,	
Plaintiff,) Case No.: 16 CH 00462
vs.	
THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO and)) Honorable Judge Demacopoulos)
RAHM EMANUEL, in his official capacity as Mayor of the city of Chicago Defendant. NOTICE OF PETITION))))))) FOR RULE TO SHOW CAUSE
Amber Ritter (via email amber.rittered Philip Santell (via email Philip.santed Assistant Corporation Counsel City of Chicago Department of Law 30 N. LaSalle Street Suite 1720 Chicago IL 60602 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January Parameters of Suite 1720 Chicago IL 60602	@cityofchicago.org)
her stead, the courtroom usually occupied by	y her in Courtroom 2008 of the Circuit Court of enter, Chicago IL, and present the attached Petition /s/ A. Christine Svenson

ELECTRONICALLY FILED 1/9/2017 4:00 PM 2016-CH-00462 PAGE 2 of 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies under penalties of perjury as provided by law pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/1-109, that the above notice and attached pleading(s) were EMAILED to the addresses listed above on or before 5:00 pm on January 9, 2017.

____/s/ A. Christine Svenson_____ A. Christine Svenson

Svenson Law Offices 505 N. LaSalle Street Suite 350 Chicago IL 60654 T: 312.467.2900 F: 312.467.2902

Attorney code no. 44565

Chancery DIVISION

Litigant List

Printed on 01/09/2017

Case Number: 2016-CH-00462 Page 1 of 1

Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs Name	Plaintiffs Address	State	Zip	Unit #
JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.			0000	

Total Plaintiffs: 1

Defendants

Defendant Name	Defendant Address	State	Unit #	Service By
THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR O		0000		
EMANUEL RAHM		0000		

Total Defendants: 2