

From: H <hdr22@clintonemail.com> B6  
Sent: Monday, February 9, 2009 6:36 AM  
To: Cheryl Mills [redacted]  
Subject: Re: North Korea

RELEASE IN PART B6

I talked w Steve Bosworth last night. He will come see me Tuesday and if he is willing, I will ask him to do NK envoy.

From "Cheryl Mills"  
Date Mon, 9 Feb 2009 05:55:42 -0500  
To: <hdr22@clintonemail.com>  
Subject: Fw: North Korea

See traffic from bottom up

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-----Original Message-----

From: Wendy Sherman [redacted]  
To: Robert Einhorn [redacted]; Cheryl Mills; MillsCD@state.gov <MillsCD@state.gov>; Kurt Campbell External [redacted] Kurt Campbell [redacted]  
Sent: Fri Feb 06 14:48:54 2009  
Subject: RE: North Korea

By the way, the more senior person could be you, Bill Burns or Jim Steinberg if you didn't want to do an outside person. There just has to be someone more senior than the person who does the Six-party with Kim Gae Gwan, who is engaged, identified and ready to go.

Wendy R. Sherman

Principal

The Albright Group LLC

Albright Capital Management LLC

1101 New York Avenue NW

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20005

[redacted]

B6

f. +1-202-370-3599

[redacted]

B6

From Robert Einhorn [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, February 06, 2009 11:41 AM  
To: Wendy Sherman, Cheryl Mills; MillsCD@state.gov; Kurt Campbell External; Kurt Campbell  
Subject: RE: North Korea

Wendy, a few reactions to your ideas:

What worked in the second Bill Clinton term was having a respected, senior official in State (i.e., Wendy) who could bring other agencies together and lead the North Korea policy effort in Washington. One approach in the current Administration would be to have such a senior official serving both as Washington coordinator and as envoy, in which case s/he could have the stature to interact with Kang Suk Ju or the Dear Leader himself. Another model would be to have a senior line officer (e.g., EAP A/S) serve as Washington policy coordinator with another, equally or even more senior, official serving as envoy. A third model of having a Special Advisor for NE Asia Security (who would coordinate in DC and do some high-level diplomatic missions), a separate envoy (who would not be as senior), and a senior line officer with day-to-day responsibility for NE Asia, like the EAP A/S, strikes me as too many cooks in the kitchen. I would prefer either of the first two models.

I agree that we should have an early, general communication from the President to KJI (a video?) "extending his hand" and outlining the broad parameters of his approach toward the DPRK. But any direct contact with NK - even at a very general, tone-setting level - would need to be previewed to the allies and China in

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advance, lest we generate early suspicions of what we're up to That means we could use HRC's trip to preview such a contact, but not do the contact concurrently An HAK/MKA tandem emissary visit would be fine, but also after we had previewed it with our partners'

Bob

B6

From: Wendy Sherman  
Sent: Friday, February 06, 2009 10:54 AM  
To: Cheryl Mills; MillsCD@state.gov; Kurt Campbell External, Kurt Campbell; Robert Einhorn  
Subject: North Korea  
Importance: High

All-

I write you not in your official capacities or potential future capacities but as people focused on how to approach North Korea and following conversations at dinner last night. As some of you heard, I believe that the USG needs a somewhat revised approach to NK and the Six-Party Talks. I believe that it is probably necessary to return to a two tiered approach- that is a Special Advisor/Coordinator at a high level and a Special Envoy/Negotiator at a perhaps lower level. Part of Chris' problem (among many others imposed by the last administration) was that he could never reach up into higher levels of NK. NK is a very hierarchical system and KJI would believe that if Chris was negotiating day to day, then he wasn't senior enough for Kang Suk Ju or for KJI, himself. In addition, I suggested last night that at least the senior person, perhaps, be called a Special Advisor for Northeast Asia Security, focused on the 6 party talks as both a mechanism for NK and as the beginnings of a Northeast Asian Security framework. My thinking is that the paradigm needs to shift a bit. The actual work would not change since any advisor or negotiator will be working on alliance management as much as NK in the process required. In addition, as I thought about this further, although it would be ideal to announce the way forward before Secretary Clinton's trip, the chances of making the decision, finishing vetting and announcing are quite slim given the few days. Therefore, it would be important to say publicly that as part of the trip, HRC will be consulting and an announcement would come shortly after the trip. As part of that process, I believe it is essential to send a communication to KJI that HRC is coming to Asia, will be developing a way forward, and looks forward to the day when enough progress is made that she can come to NK as well. Obviously if to KJI, the letter likely comes from POTUS. Simultaneous with the trip, before or during, it would also be important to send someone to New York to speak with the NK per rep. One last somewhat outside the box thought is that HRC announce that she has asked an emissary or emissaries to travel to NK as she is going to Asia to assess where NK is and how they hope to move ahead. As some of you know Madeleine and Henry Kissinger discussed going at several points but Condi, in the end, never gave the green light. Just some thoughts as you all think ahead

Wendy

Wendy R. Sherman

Principal

The Albright Group LLC

Albright Capital Management LLC

1101 New York Avenue NW

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20005

f. +1-202-370-3599

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