

#### Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

June 28, 2019

MR. WILLIAM F MARSHALL JUDICIAL WATCH SUITE 800 425 THIRD STREET, SOUTHWEST WASHINGTON, DC 20024

FOIPA Request No.: 1391365-000

Civil Action No.: 18-cv-154

Subject: Communications between Peter Strzok and

Lisa Page (February 1, 2015 – Present)

Dear Mr. Marshall:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statue headings with indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Sec	tion 552	Section 552a
(b)(1)	(b)(7)(A)	(d)(5)
(b)(2)	(b)(7)(B)	(j)(2)
(b)(3)	<b>☑</b> (b)(7)(C)	(k)(1)
	(b)(7)(D)	(k)(2)
	(b)(7)(E)	(k)(3)
	(b)(7)(F)	(k)(4)
(b)(4)	(b)(8)	(k)(5)
<b>☑</b> (b)(5)	(b)(9)	(k)(6)
<b>✓</b> (b)(6)		(k)(7)

500 pages of potentially responsive records were reviewed.

- 35 pages are being released in whole or in part.
- 0 pages are being withheld in full per exemptions.
- 57 pages are being withheld duplicate.
  - 6 pages are being withheld referral/consult.
- 402 pages were determined to be non-records/non-responsive to the FOIA request.

Below you will also find additional informational paragraphs about your request. Where applicable, check boxes are used to provide you with more information about the processing of your request. Please read each item carefully.

V	Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency (ies) [OGA].
	This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.

We are consulting with another agency. when the consultation is completed.	The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information
· ·	and pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and Privacy Act (b)([)([),[]), this response neither confirms nor denies the

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See 5 U.S. C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010). This response is limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Explanation of Exemptions.

Please direct any further inquiries about this case to the Assistant United States Attorney representing the Government in this matter. Please use the FOIPA Request Number and/or Civil Action Number in all correspondence or inquiries concerning your request.

You may direct any further inquiries to the attorney representing the Government in this matter.

V

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

In response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, enclosed is a processed copy of Bates Stamped documents, FBI(18-cv-154)-5536 through FBI(18-cv-154)-6035. The enclosed documents represent the thirteenth interim release of information responsive to your request.

The FBI conducted email searches for any email communication between Peter Strzok and Lisa Page. This search located both official government records and non-record personal communications between these two individuals.

The FBI reviewed 500 pages of these emails. While conducting this review, the FBI individually analyzed the emails to determine whether they pertained to official government business constituting records under the FOIA or whether they consisted of purely personal communications between the two individuals. As a result of the FBI's review, it determined 402 pages were non-record, personal communications not subject to the FOIA; and 98 pages consisted of responsive FBI records.

As previously indicated, document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning another agency (ies). We are consulting with the other agency (ies) and are awaiting their response. Our office has processed all other information currently in our possession. The FBI will correspond with you regarding those documents when the consultation is completed.

To minimize costs to both you and the FBI, duplicate copies of the same document were not processed.

#### EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

#### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual:
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

#### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence:
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service he release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOIA Request No.:1391365-000 Civil
Action No.: 18-cv-154

#### Total Withheld Page(s) = 465

Bates Page Reference	Dongon for Withhalding
	Reason for Withholding
	(i.e., exemptions with coded
	rationale, duplicate, sealed by
FBI(18-cv-154)-5536 thru FBI(18-cv-	order of court, etc.) Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5560	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5562 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5590	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5591	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-758
FBI(18-cv-154)-5592	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5594	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-761
FBI(18-cv-154)-5595 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5659	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5660 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-5661	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-921
FBI(18-cv-154)-5662 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5677	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5678 thru FBI(18-cv-	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-943 thru
154)-5680	FBI(18-cv-154)-946
FBI(18-cv-154)-5681 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-5684	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-957 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-958
FBI(18-cv-154)-5685 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5770	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5771	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-1124
FBI(18-cv-154)-5772 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5847	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5849	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-1176
FBI(18-cv-154)-5850 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5858   FBI(18-cv-154)-5859 thru FBI(18-cv-	to the FOIA request  Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-1219
154)-5866	thru FBI(18-cv-154)-1222
FBI(18-cv-154)-5871 thru FBI(18-cv-	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-5867
154)-5874	thru FBI(18-cv-154)-5870
FBI(18-cv-154)-5875 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5881	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5882 thru FBI(18-cv-	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-1256
154)-5883	thru FBI(18-cv-154)-1259
FBI(18-cv-154)-5884 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154) - 5897	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5898 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-5899	Referral/Consult
FBI(18-cv-154)-5900 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5901   FBI(18-cv-154)-5902 thru FBI(18-cv-	to the FOIA request  Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-1354
154)-5904	thru FBI(18-cv-154)-1354
FBI(18-cv-154)-5905 thru FBI(18-cv-	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-1359
154)-5909	thru FBI(18-cv-154)-1361

	1 - 1 - 1
FBI(18-cv-154)-5910 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5913	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5914	Referral/Consult
FBI(18-cv-154)-5916 thru FBI(18-cv-154)-5920	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-1372
FBI(18-cv-154)-5923	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-1377
FBI(18-cv-154)-5924 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5931	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5934 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5947	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5948	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-1397
· ·	thru FBI(18-cv-154)-1398
FBI(18-cv-154)-5954 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5966	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5967 thru FBI(18-cv-	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-1437
154)-5968	thru FBI(18-cv-154)-1438
FBI(18-cv-154)-5969 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5973	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-5977 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-5997	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-6000 thru FBI(18-cv-	- C 1/G 1:
154)-6002	Referral/Consult
FBI(18-cv-154)-6004 thru FBI(18-cv-	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-6013
154)-6012	thru FBI(18-cv-154)-6021
EDI (10 av. 154) 6022	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
FBI(18-cv-154)-6022	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-6024 thru FBI(18-cv-	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-1451
154)-6025	thru FBI(18-cv-154)-1452
FBI(18-cv-154)-6028 thru FBI(18-cv-	Other - Non-records/Non-responsive
154)-6033	to the FOIA request
FBI(18-cv-154)-6034 thru FBI(18-cv-	Duplicate to FBI(18-cv-154)-4885
154)-6035	thru FBI(18-cv-154)-4887
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#### XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

X Deleted Page(s) X

X No Duplication Fee X

X For this Page X

#### Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

		7 2 3
From:	Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI)	# % %
Sent:	Wednesday, October 21, 2015 12:18 PM	
To:	Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)	)2 3 3
Subject:	FW: CCL list	34 84 84 85
From: WF) (FBI)  Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 12:15 PM  To: Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI)  Subject: CCL list		b6 −1 b7C −1
Pete, attached	is the link to Commerce Controlled List, if needed.	# # #
http://www.b	is.doc.gov/index.php/regulations/commerce-control-list-ccl	
		b6 −1 b7С −1

From:	Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI)
Sent:	Monday, November 02, 2015 11:43 AM
To:	Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject:	RE: Yayl
es. And good; nouth-vomits w	I think blue could work. Of course want to hear about it. I promise to hide my little blech hile you do.
rom: Page, Lisa Sent: Monday, N To: Strzok, Peter Subject: RE: Ya	ovember 02, 2015 11:42 AM P. (WF) (FBI)
No way! On fbi he blue!	net? And this whole project is going to be awesome. I'm even getting excited (possibly) about
Original	message
From: "Strzok, I	Peter P. (WF) (FBI)
Date: 11/02/201	5 11:07 AM (GMT-05:00)
Fo: "Page, Lisa (	C. (OGC) (FBI)"
Subject Yay!	
lust sent you an	actual CPC-related legal work question!
Peter P. Strzok II	
Marie Call Call St. JA. SA.	d Agent in Charge
Washington Fie	
a accommon person of the	The supposes

b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -6

b6 -1 b7C -1

From: Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI)

Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2016 2:53 PM

To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

Subject: Fwd: National Security Letters and Leak Investigations | Just Security

From: Peter

Date: 01/26/2016 2:22 PM (GMT-05:00)

To: "Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI)

Subject: National Security Letters and Leak Investigations | Just Security

https://www.justsecurity.org/28903/nsis-leak-investigations/

b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -6

#s		
From:	Strzok, Peter P. (WF) (FBI)	
Sent:	Sunday, January 31, 2016 9:05 AM	
To:	Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)	
Subject:	RE: Revised IC Safe Harbor Letter (from using IPad)	b6 -2 b7С -2
I have no idea. Yahoo! account	It's not clear what account iPad used. at DNI is the one with the t.	b6 -2 b7C -2
C	with the IC IG investigating use of private servers and webmail, perhaps it's not an for he/DNI staff to be doing the same? I don't know.	
From: "Page, Li Date: 01/31/20 To: "Strzok, Pet	message sa C. (OGC) (FBI)' sa C.	b6 -1, 2 b7C -1, 2 b7E -6
From: "Strzok, F Date: 01/31/20 To: "Page, Lisa	message  Peter P. (WF) (FB))'  16 8:53 AM (GMT-05:00)  C. (OGC) (FBI)'  vised IC Safe Harbor Letter (from using IPad)	b6 -1, 2 b7C -1, 2 b7E -6
	MIT GIVEN EVERYTHING GOING ON WHY ISUSING A YAHOO! ACCOUNT FOR THIS? rently a Yahoo! account fromIPad")	ъ6 −2 ъ7С −2
Make him stop		
From: "Page, Li Date: 01/31/20 To: "Strzok, Pet Subject: Fwd: R	messagesa C. (OGC) (FBI)  116 8:42 AM (GMT-05:00)  er P. (WF) (FBI)  evised IC Safe Harbor Letter (from using Pad)	b6 -1, 2 b7C -1, 2 b7E -6
The latest. Will comments.	send the document as well. We have to respond by noon. Of course I offered to collect	
From: "Baker, J Date: 01/30/20	message ames A. (OGC) (FBI)  116 8:27 PM (GMT-05:00)  ndrew G. (DO) (FBI)  "Page 11:00 (OCC) (CDI)!  DO) (FBI)	b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -6
	FBI (18-C)	/-154)-5867

Obtained via FOIA by Ju <mark>fficial Watch, Inc.</mark>	b6 -1, 2
(DO) (FBI)" (OGC) (FBI)"	b7C -1, 2
'Anderson, Trisha 8.(OGC) (FBI)'	b7E -6
(OGC) (FBI)"	
Subject: Fwd: Revised IC Safe Harbor Letter (from using iPad)	
NSA comments below.	
<del>200</del> :	
Original message	
From: "Gerstell, Glenn S'	
Date: 01/30/2016 8:14 PM (GMT-05:00)	
To	b6 -1, 2
	b7C -1, 2
	b7E −6
"Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)"	
"Anderson, Trisha B.(OGC) (FBI)"	
(NSD) (JMD)'	
[ [ [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]	
Subject: Re: Revised IC Safe Harbor Letter (from using Pad)	
Judgeon New New Year Country Center (110)	
At the risk of duplication for some of you, since there seem to be two email chains, here's the text of our	
response just sent to priginal email below:	b6 -2
	b7C −2
*****	
	b6 -2
The NSA team has reviewed the email frombelow and the attached Summary of Information and has	b7C -2
the following comments:	
a.	
	<del>-</del>
2.	コ
	1,5
	b5 -1 b7E -11
	_ļ
2	
3.	
	1
	1
	J <sub>E4</sub> \ 5066
FBI (18-C	<del>v-</del> 154)-5868

Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc.	
	1.F 4
	b5 -1 b7E -11
We appreciate everyone's efforts here. Thanks.	
Glenn	
GLENN S. GERSTELL	
NSA General Counsel	
From: Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 05:48 FM	
b b	6 -1, 2
	7C -1, 2 7E -6
Gerstell, Glenn S;	
Subject: Fw: Revised IC Safe Harbor Letter (from using Pad)	
All please see below from requesting your immediate (i.e., by tomorrow) review of the	b6 -2
EC's proposed changes toletter discussing US surveillance law and policywill be in	b7C −2
transit back to DC tomorrow and I think will land around 3 or so. Please reply to all. Many thanks.	
_Regards,	
	b6 -2
On Saturday, January 30, 2016 5:21 PM, wrote:	ъ7С -2
and the state of the state of the second th	b7E -6
Team -	
This requires essentially immediate clearance, given the time frame can you please send to	b6 -2
CIA and FBI, and make sure that NSA has it (I think I included them but am not sure it went	ъ7С -2
through) please provide to others in DOJ as appropriate.	
Attached is a redline version of changes to the IC letter. We had several hours of discussion about this with the EC team today. In my view, the changes in this document are all acceptable, or	
	-2
to entron the precentation (e.g. eliminating explicit references to the	C -2
and while I like the original phrases I don't think they are necessary.	E -4, 11
Others are a bit more substantive but I think are acceptable; a couple are questionable. Plese	
review closely, and and note some questions that need answers. b6 -2	
	154) 50 <i>60</i>
FBI (18-cv-	TD4)-D808

I nere is one more issue	b6 -2 b7C -2
representative here and the most reasonable, believe that they need some sort of metrics that they can point to	b7E -11
has proposed that as part of the annual review.	1
has proposed that as part of the arman review,	b5 -1
	b6 -2 b7C -2 b7E -11
I told	 ]
	b5 -1 b6 -2
	b7C -2 b7E -11
Thanks in advance. I will be in flight landing around 3 PM. Please collect comments and circulate to this distro asap.	1
	b6 −2 b7С −2

Subject: Mtg with and Lisa Page

b6 -1 b7C -1

Location: 4869

Start: Monday, February 29, 2016 4:30 PM End: Monday, February 29, 2016 5:00 PM

Recurrence: (none)

Meeting Status: Accepted

Organizer: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Required Attendees: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) (CYD) (FBI)

b6 -1 b7C -1

When: Monday, February 29, 2016 4:30 PM-5:00 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).

Where: 4869

Note: The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.

\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*

Reschedule per DD Special Counsel request

From:	Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)	
Sent:	Monday, February 29, 2016 9:29 PM	
To:	Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)	
Subject:	RE: Wilkinson call	
B's novessore	o have a chain of command and gatekeepers. Otherwise you'd have 790 idiots calling	
Section 11 American Property and Colored 1 18	and DD every day	
and the state of t	message	
	sa C. (OGC) (FBI)	b6 -1 b7C -1
	16 9:26 PM (GMT-05:00)	b7E -6
Subject: RE: Wi	er P. (CD) (FBI)	
adoject, RE. W	ikinsun can	
I totally get it.	completely hate this about our organization, but it is what it is. Np.	
Original	message	
From: "Strzok, F	Peter P. (CD) (FBI) <sup>1</sup>	b6 -1
State of the second sec	16 9:26 PM (GMT-05:00)	b7C -1 b7E -6
	C. (OGC) (FBI)"	
Subject: RE: Wi	Ikinson call	
Sorry. I'm just i	n a different position.	
Original	message	
1 to	sa C. (OGC) (FBI)"	b6 -1
	16 9:24 PM (GMT-05:00)	b7C -1 b7E -6
To: "Strzok, Pet	er P. (CD) (FBI)'	D/E -6
Subject: RE: Wi	Ikinson call	
Okay.		
Original	message	
A STATE OF THE STA	Peter P. (CD) (FBI)	b6 -1
	16 9:23 PM (G <u>MT-05:00)</u>	b7C -1 b7E -6
To: "Page, Lisa	C. (OGC) (FBI)*	D/E 0
Subject: RE: Wi	ikinson call	
I can't. This isn	't life or death and I need to give the chain of command a few minutes to work.	
Original	message	
	sa C. (OGC) (FBI)"	b6 -1
	16 9:21 PM (GMT-05:00)	b7C -1 b7E -6
-250300 percentitions - economical probuses	er P. (CD) (FBI)"	2,2 0
Subject: RE: Wi		

Just call him.	
	b6 -1 b7C -1
Original message From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) Date: 02/29/2016 9:18 PM (GMT-05:00) To: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) Subject: Fwd: Wilkinson call	b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -6
Fyi below, couldn't reach Bill. Bill will probably call me back later.	
Original message From: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"  Date: 02/29/2016 9:17 PM (GMT-05:00)  To: "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)"  Subject: Wilkinson call	b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -6
Jim, if you have not yet called Beth back, please hold off until Bill can get some information to you. Thanks,	

Pete

## Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) Wednesday, March 02, 2016 6:59 AM Sent: To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) Fwd: Beth W Subject: Fyi ----- Original message -From: (OGC) (FBI) Date: 03/02/2016 6:50 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" Subject: Fwd: Beth W See below from Jim. ---- Original message ------From: "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)" Date: 03/01/2016 10:15 PM (GMT-05:00) To "Anderson, Trisha B.(OGC) (FBI)" (OGC) (FBI)" Subject: RE: Beth W Just did. She starts a trial tomorrow and wants to think about it so we should not reach out about scheduling yet. She appreciated the heads up about the pending press articles. She wants to meet with the DD but can only meet on the weekends right now. I will check his availability tomorrow. Thanks. ----- Original message (OGC) (FBI) From:

Jim -

Subject: Beth W

Date: 03/01/2016 8:02 PM (GMT-05:00)

To: "Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)

Did you get a chance to speak to Beth Wilkinson? CES wants to reach out to discuss scheduling additional interviews, but wanted some feedback from you first.

"Anderson, Trisha B.(OGC) (FBI)"

b6 -1

b7C -1

b7E -6

b6 -1

b7C -1

b7E -6

b6 -1

b7C -1 b7E -6

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b6 -1 b7C -1

	Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc.	:
Strzok, Peter I	P. (CD) (FBI)	
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		
From:	Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)	
Sent:	Friday, March 04, 2016 11:32 AM	
To:	Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)	
Subject:	RE: Following up	
Also you need t	o know whatand she discussed. I can tell you over lunch	b6 −3 b7C −3
From: Page, Lisa Sent: Friday, Ma To: Strzok, Peter Subject: RE: Fo	arch 04, 2016 11:30 AM -P. (CD) (FBI)	
He's not calling.	Don't worry about it.	
To: Page, Lisa C. Subject: RE: Fo	arch 04, 2016 11:29 AM (OGC) (FBI)	
From: Page, Lisa Sent: Friday, Ma To: Strzok, Peter Subject: FW: Fo	arch 04, 2016 11:10 AM P. (CD) (FBI)	
FYSA		
Sent: Friday, Ma To: Mccabe, And	nes A. (OGC) (FBI) arch 04, 2016 10:08 AM lrew G. (DO) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) lichael B. (DO) (FBI); Priestap, E W. (CD) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B.(OGC) (FBI)	b6 -1 b7C -1
Andy:		
Do you want to	try to do this today?	
Jim		

From: Beth Wilkinson [mailto:bwilkinson@wilkinsonwalsh.com]

Sent: Friday, March 04, 2016 9:55 AM To: Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI)

Subject: Following up

Any chance we can schedule the meeting we discussed? I actually came back to DC for 24 hours and I could mile endin 200 dinter in militar Cinicki et Licentine, makin

## Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc. meet today it it's doadle on your side. Sorry for the last minute notice.

Beth A. Wilkinson | Founding Partner bwilkinson@wilkinsonwalsh.com

Wilkinson Walsh + Eskovitz PLLC
Office: (202) 847-4010 | Fax: (202) 847-4005
1900 M Street, N.W.
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20036
www.wilkinsonwalsh.com

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) Friday, March 04, 2016 5:20 PM Sent: To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI) Subject: FW: Interview From: Baker, James A. (OGC) (FBI) Sent: Friday, March 04, 2016 5:19 PM b6 -1, 2 To: Steinbach, Michael B. (DO) (FBI); Priestap, E.W. (CD) (FBI); Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI); Toscas, George (NSD) b7C -1, 2 (JMD); Laufman, David (NSD) (JMD) [NSD] (JMD); Anderson, Trisha B.(OGC) (FBI); (OGC) (FBI) Subject: Interview today or tomorrow about

I just spoke with 8eth. I think we are now back on track. She is going to call scheduling the next interview. Given the witness's personal schedule, 8eth said that it may not happen for a few weeks but she will work that out with

We also discussed making sure that this is done at a secure location in a discreet way; she will work with and the FBI team on that as well but I said that we will make sure that it happens in a high quality way.

Thanks.

Jim

b6 -2

b7C -2

Strzok, Peter P	. (CD) (FBI)	Įs.
From:	Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)	
Sent:	Friday, March 04, 2016 7:20 PM	
To:	Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)	
Subject:	Fwd: Interview	
Subject.	rwu, mierwew	
Fysa. He made	me laugh.	
Original	message	
A CONTRACTOR OF A STATE OF A STAT	imes A. (OGC) (FBI)"	b6 -1 b7C -1
	16 6:08 PM (GMT-05:00)	b7E -6
To: "Strzok, Pete	to general and a region of the second and the secon	
Subject: RE: Inte	italeA	
She understands	it needs to be in a SCIF. She seems more comfortable with NYFO, but I think would be open	
THE PROPERTY OF STREET, AND ADDRESS OF STREET	she can get in and out in a discreet manner (i.e., no chance of a press stakeout or too many	
people in the of	fice seeing them and having awareness of what is going on).	
is there an offsit	e somewhere in the DC area that might be better? If so, don't tell me where it is.	
Thanks.		
Jim		
From: Strzok, Pet Sent: Friday, Ma To: Baker, James Subject: RE: Inte	rch 04, 2016 5:23 PM A. (OGC) (FBI)	
Thanks lim		b5 -3
Sent: Friday, Ma To: Steinbach, Mi	nes A. (OGC) (FBI) rch 04, 2016 5:19 PM chael B. (DO) (FBI); Priestap, E W. (CD) (FBI); Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI); Toscas, <u>George (NSD)</u> David (NSD) (JMD); NSD) (JMD); Anderson, Trisha B.(OGC) (FBI);	b6 -1, 2 b7C -1, 2
scheduling the n	Beth. I think we are now back on track. She is going to call today or tomorrow about ext interview. Given the witness's personal schedule, Beth said that it may not happen for a he will work that out with	ъ6 −2 ъ7С −2
N 92.500 L 500	ed making sure that this is done at a secure location in a discreet way; she will work with FBI team on that as well but I said that we will make sure that it happens in a high quality	

Thanks.

iim

	Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch
Strzok, Peter F	P. (CD) (FBI)
From:	Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent:	Tuesday, March 15, 2016 10:58 PM
To:	Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject:	RE: Chairman Grassley correspondence re C

linton email Let's talk, I have thoughts. We need to get it out. ----- Original message -----b6 -1 From: "Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)" b7C -1 Date: 03/15/2016 10:57 PM (GMT-05:00) b7E -6 To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" Subject: RE: Chairman Grassley correspondence re Clinton email Trisha asked me today if I would be willing to look at this tomorrow since will be gone. I haven't mentioned to just wanted to let you know. From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2016 10:54 PM b6 -1 (OGC) (FBI) b7C -1 Subject: RE: Chairman Grassley correspondence re Clinton email Your metro system can only be fed up for so long. Thurs and Fri will be fine. Leave your Samsung turned off until Sun, we'll be fine. And go home. You hitting boot camp tomorrow morning before you fly out? ----- Original message (OGC) (FBI)" b6 -1 From b7C -1 Date: 03/15/2016 10:51 PM (GMT-05:00) b7E -6 To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)" Subject: RE: Chairman Grassley correspondence re Clinton email Scary, yes. We've been working together for too long. Yes, I'm still at work, but I'm wrapping up. The extra hours are payback for the 3 days off. work tomorrow, and he expects to be really busy like he always is when I'm out. I will have my Samsung with me, if you need anything over the next few days. Hopefully, you will not spend the entire week in traffic!

Eram Ctrock Dator D (CD) (EDT)

Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc.	
Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2016 10:20 PM	
To(OGC) (FBI)	b6 -1
Subject: RE: Chairman Grassley correspondence re Clinton email	ь7C -
Thanks. At least our timing is scarily on sync on the issue. Are you STILL at work?	
Original message	
From: OGC) (FBI)*	
Date: 03/15/2016 10:16 PM (GMT-05:00)	b5 -1
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"	b6 -1 b7C -1
Subject: RE: Chairman Grassley correspondence re Clinton email	b7E -6
Ym still working on it.	]
I just sent an email to Beth Beers about the status.	•
	ia -
From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2016 9:56 PM	
To: (OGC) (FBI)	b6 -1
Subject: Fwd: Chairman Grassley correspondence re Clinton email	b7C -
Fyi below. How's the Grassley whistle-blower protection response?	
Original message	
From: "Priestap, E.W. (CD) (FBI)"	
Date: 03/15/2016 9:53 PM (GMT_05-00)	b6 -1
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"	b7C -
Cc "Moffa Ionathan C (CD) (FBI)" (OGC) (FBI)"	572
Section 1980 Company of the Company	
Subject: RE: Chairman Grassley correspondence re Clinton email	
Pete: OCA advised that they don't need a response until COB tomorrow. Thx, Bill	
Original message	
From: "Priestap, E.W. (CD) (FBI)	b6 -1
Date: 03/15/2016 5:49 PM (GMT-05:00)	b7С - b7Е -
To: "Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)	
Cc: "Moffa: Jonathan C: (CD) (FBI)"  OGC) (FBI)"	
Subject: FW: Chairman Grassley correspondence re Clinton email	
Pete: In case you haven't yet seen the below. Please let me know your thoughts tomorrow AM. (I'm having	
dinner with the Brits tonight.) Thanks, Bill	

Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc. From: Beers, Elizabeth R. (DO) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2016 1:43 PM To: Priestap, E.W. (CD) (FBI); Anderson, Trisha B. (OGC) (FBI) (OGC) (FBI); Sabol, Sherry E. (OGC) Cc (OGC) (FBI); (DO) (FBI); (FBI) Subject: Chairman Grassley correspondence re Clinton email All - olease see attached and two requests: Please let me know if you've got any concerns. From OCA's perspective, this approach is consistent with the position taken in similar situations in the past. Secondly, we need the status of the FBI's draft response to the letter to the FBI concerning the non-disclosure issue (incoming attached). My understanding is that a response has been drafted and is being reviewed, but it hasn't made it to OCA yet - please update and let me know how we can assist. Thanks,

Meth Beers

<del>PRO OFFICE A CO</del>PPLICATION OFFICE

b7C -1

b6 -1

b5 -1

b6 -1

b7C -1

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2016 10:04 AM

To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

Subject: Two things

Actual work!:)

Have sonething to show you

Want to talk about the Grassley response

Subject: Discuss reporting

Start: Thursday, March 17, 2016 3:15 PM End: Thursday, March 17, 2016 4:00 PM

Recurrence: (none)

Meeting Status: Accepted

Organizer: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Required Attendees: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

When: Thursday, March 17, 2016 3:15 PM-4:00 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).

Note: The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.

\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*~\*

Placeholder because if we don't schedule it, time will collapse, and this is the only common open time today...but get it if you need to reschedule this

From:	Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent:	Thursday, March 17, 2016 6:40 PM
To:	Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject:	RE: 11 in Bills office tomorrow
Rgr.	and another CyD guy will also attend.
Original	message
	onathan C. (CD) (FBI)"
	16 6:39 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Pet	<u>er P. (CD)</u> (FBI)" 'Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)"
Subject: RE: 11	In Bills office tomorrow
	are both in with EAD Steinbach in Rm. 4017 from 10am-11am tomorrow, but we can just a hall and go in with the AD right afterward.
5 - 5 - 5 - 5 - 5 - 5 - 5 - 5 - 5 - 5 -	message
	Peter P. (CD) (FBI)"
	116 4:48 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Page, Lisa	C. (OGC) (FBI)"  "Moffe, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI)"
Subject: 11 in E	Sills office tomorrow

Jon can you get your guy (who will be the briefer) there?

FBI (18-cv-154)-6003

b6 -1 b7C -1

b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -6

> b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -6

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2016 8:49 PM

To: Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

Attachments: R43112.pdf

Peter P. Strzok II
Section Chief
Counterespionage Section (CD4)
FBIHQ
O)

b6 -1 b7C -1



# Independent Counsels, Special Prosecutors, Special Counsels, and the Role of Congress

Jack Maskell Legislative Attorney

June 20, 2013

Congressional Research Service

7-5700 www.crs.gov

R43112

## Summary

This report provides information on the procedure for the appointment of an "independent counsel," a "special prosecutor," or a "special counsel" to investigate and prosecute potential or possible violations of federal criminal law by officials in the executive branch of the federal government and in federal agencies. Specifically examined is the role or authority of Congress in requiring an independent or special counsel investigation of executive branch officials.

Under the Constitution and its separation of powers principles and structure, Congress has no direct role in federal law enforcement, nor in triggering or initiating the appointment of any prosecutor for any particular matter (other than the advice and consent role of the Senate regarding certain nominations made by the President). Congress, however, has recognized inherent authority to conduct oversight hearings and legislative investigations by its committees into misconduct, mismanagement, or any other malfeasance relating to the officers and agencies of the executive branch of government to assure the government's proper functioning, to assure the proper expenditure of funds that Congress appropriates, and to explore the need for remedial legislation. Revelations from such investigations and oversight, in addition to providing information for remedial legislation, may contribute to the public pressure on the Administration or Department of Justice to appoint an "independent" counsel or prosecutor to investigate uncovered evidence or allegations of wrongdoing by persons in the Administration.

Congress may also have a legislative role in designing a statutory mechanism for the appointment of "independent counsels" or "special prosecutors," as it did in title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. Under the provisions of that law relating to the appointment of "independent counsels" (called "special prosecutors" until 1983), the Attorney General was directed to petition a special three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals to name an independent counsel upon the receipt of credible allegations of criminal misconduct by certain high-level personnel in the executive branch of the federal government whose prosecution by the Administration might give rise to an appearance of a conflict of interest. In 1999, Congress allowed the "independent counsel" provisions of law to expire. Upon the expiration of the law in June of 1999, no new "independent counsels" or "special prosecutors" may be appointed by a three-judge panel upon the application of the Attorney General.

The Attorney General retains the general authority to designate or name individuals as "special counsels" to conduct investigations or prosecutions of particular matters or individuals on behalf of the United States. Under regulations issued by the Attorney General in 1999, the Attorney General may appoint a "special counsel" from outside of the Department of Justice who acts as a special employee of the Department of Justice under the direction of the Attorney General. The Attorney General, however, may also appoint an individual as a special counsel, and may invest that individual with a greater degree of independence and autonomy to conduct investigations and prosecutions, regardless of any "special counsel" regulations, as Attorneys General did in 1973, 1994, and 2003. In 1973, Attorney General Elliot Richardson named Archibald Cox to be the "special prosecutor" for the "Watergate" investigation; in 1994, during an earlier expiration of the independent counsel provisions of law, Attorney General Janet Reno named a "regulatory" independent counsel Robert Fisk to investigate allegations concerning the matter known as "Whitewater"; and in 2003, Attorney General Ashcroft recused himself from the investigation of the leak of the identity of a CIA agent, and Deputy Attorney General Comey named U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald to be special counsel "with all the authority of the Attorney General" to pursue that matter.

#### Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc.

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llegations of misconduct by federal officials in the executive branch of the federal government often lead to a renewed interest in the mechanisms of the appointment of a "special prosecutor," an "independent counsel," or a "special counsel" to investigate and possibly to prosecute cases of perceived or potential criminal misconduct against government officials. Specifically, in the context of the appointment of a special prosecutor, an independent counsel, or a special counsel, questions have arisen concerning the particular role of Congress in this process.

#### Role of Congress; Investigations and Legislation

Congress may initiate and conduct congressional investigations and hearings through various committees—including standing committees, select committees, or joint committees—into a wide range of the details, scope, authority, and impact of programs, policies, and conduct of executive branch officials and agencies of the federal government. Congress has a recognized inherent authority for oversight of the executive agencies and departments of government to ensure their efficient and proper functioning according to the laws that Congress has passed, to assure the proper expenditure of funds that Congress appropriates, and to explore and consider the need for possible remedial legislation.1

Under separation of powers principles provided structurally within the Constitution, however, any criminal prosecutions on behalf of the United States relating to liability of any officer or employee of the government, or concerning the conduct of any other persons who may violate federal law, are considered to be executive functions under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, and ultimately under the authority of the President to "take Care that the laws be faithfully executed." 2 Within the structure of the U.S. Government and the executive branch, all law enforcement functions involving criminal prosecutions on behalf of the United States are to be conducted by the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General of the United States, or his or her designee.3

Congressional hearings and investigations, in addition to providing general oversight and information for possible remedial legislation, may bring to light information and facts which may contribute to the public pressure on the Administration or the Attorney General to appoint an "independent" counsel or prosecutor to investigate matters in which high-level officials of the Administration might be implicated. In 1973, during the press and congressional revelations in the "Watergate" matter, the nomination of then-Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson to be Attorney General was pending before the Senate for advice and consent. The Senate Committee reviewing the nomination obtained from Mr. Richardson an agreement that he would name an "independent" special prosecutor to pursue the "Watergate" allegations, 4 and Mr. Richardson, as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 435 (1977), concerning Congress' implied oversight and investigative authority incident to its Article 1, legislative powers. See, generally, CRS Report RL30240, Congressional Oversight Manual, by Todd Garvey et al.; CRS Report R41079, Congressional Oversight: An Overview, by Walter J. Oleszek.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> U.S. CONST., art. II, §3. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685 - 697 (1988), holding that federal law enforcement is an Article II, executive function.

<sup>3</sup> See 28 U.S.C. §§516, 519, 547.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Hearings, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Nomination of Elliot L. Richardson to be Attorney General, 93rd Cong., at 5-7, 18-20 (May 9, 1973).

Attorney General, then appointed under his own authority former federal judge Archibald Cox as "special prosecutor." In 2003, responding to public pressure and congressional calls for independent scrutiny of the allegations concerning possible White House connections to the leaking of the identity of a covert CIA employee, the Justice Department in the Bush Administration named a current U.S. Attorney, Patrick Fitzgerald, as a "special counsel" with full independent authority and autonomy to pursue the matter.

### "Independent Counsel" or "Special Prosecutor" Legislation

In addition to congressional investigation and informational functions, Congress may have a legislative role in creating in law a mechanism for the appointment of independent counsels or special prosecutors in certain circumstances, as was done in 1978 largely in response to the incidents collectively known as "Watergate." Originally enacted as title VI of the "Ethics in Government Act of 1978," these provisions of law had authorized the appointment of "independent counsels" (or "special prosecutors," as they were known before 1983) by a special three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upon the application of the Attorney General.

Those parts of the Ethics in Government Act relating to independent counsels regularly had five-year "sunset" provisions, and were eventually allowed by Congress to expire after June 30, 1999. Since the law's expiration no "independent counsel" or "special prosecutor," as those terms have been used since 1978, may now be appointed by an independent judicial panel upon the request of the Attorney General to investigate or prosecute a matter on behalf of the United States.

Under the former independent counsel law, *only* the Attorney General of the United States was authorized to request an appointment of an "independent counsel," and that mechanism was one of the reasons that the Supreme Court had found the former provisions of law constitutional against separation of powers and Appointment Clause challenges. Although the former independent counsel statute had been phrased in mandatory terms (the Attorney General "shall apply" for an independent counsel in certain specified circumstances), the decision to seek the

<sup>6</sup> See transcript of the Department of Justice Press Conference, Deputy Attorney General James Comey, December 30, 2003, at http://www.justice.gov/archive/osc/documents/2006\_03\_17\_exhibits\_a\_d.pdf (Appendix D), and letters from Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey, to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney, December 30, 2003, and February 6, 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Morrison v. Olson, *supra* at 694-695, noting Congress' limited role in the statutory scheme and the fact that the judicial branch entity "has no power to appoint an independent counsel *sua sponte*; it may only do so upon the specific request of the Attorney General...."

<sup>5 38</sup> Fed. Reg. 14688 (June 4, 1973).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> For background information, see, for example, Maskell, *The Independent Counsel Law, FEDERAL BAR JOURNAL*, Vol. 45, No. 6, at 29-30 (July 1998).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> P.L. 95-521, title VI, 92 Stat. 1867 (October 26, 1978). Appointees of the special judicial panel had originally been called "special prosecutors," but were re-named "independent counsels" in the provisions' reauthorization and amendment in 1983. P.L. 97-409, §2(a)(1), 96 Stat. 2039-41 (Jan. 3, 1983).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The law was reauthorized for the last time on June 30, 1994, P.L. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732, and expired under the five-year "sunset" provision on June 30, 1999.

<sup>10 28</sup> U.S.C. §592.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> 28 U.S.C. §592. <sup>11</sup> Morrison v. Ole

appointment of an independent counsel was always a matter within the Attorney General's discretion, and was *not* reviewable in court. 12

The role of Congress under the former independent counsel law was very limited. Under the former provisions of law, Congress could not "order" or "trigger" the appointment of a prosecutor or independent counsel, because of constitutional separation of powers principles, but majorities of either party within the House or Senate Judiciary Committees could have requested action by the Attorney General. <sup>13</sup> The Attorney General was not required to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel in response to such congressional request; and if the Attorney General did not make such application, he or she was directed merely to respond to Congress with the reasons an independent counsel was not appointed. <sup>14</sup>

The mechanisms for appointing counsels under the former law were "triggered" when the Attorney General received "specific" and "credible" information alleging that certain high-level officials in the Administration had committed serious federal offenses, or when the Attorney General determined that an investigation of allegations of a violation of a federal criminal statute by any person would create "a personal, financial, or political conflict of interest" for the Department of Justice to investigate or prosecute. Thus, while addressing the conflict of interest inherent in an administration's investigation of one of its own members was the principal purpose of the statute, the law also provided a so-called "catch-all" provision, added in 1983, to allow the Attorney General to request an independent counsel for anyone, whether or not the person was in the President's Administration, when the Attorney General perceived a conflict of interest for the Department of Justice to investigate or prosecute the matter.

It is possible, in theory, that Congress could reauthorize the independent counsel law, or provisions of law somewhat similar to the former independent counsel law, to instruct the Attorney General to seek the appointment of an "independent counsel" under certain circumstances. It may be noted in this regard that the independent counsel law had, in fact, been allowed to expire previously for a period of time: in 1992 the law expired under its five-year "sunset" provision when it was not reauthorized in the 102<sup>nd</sup> Congress. It was not until the publicity in the so-called "Whitewater" matter that Congress eventually reauthorized the law again in 1994. <sup>16</sup>

## "Special Counsels" and Department of Justice Regulations

When the independent counsel law expired after June 30, 1999, the Attorney General promulgated specific regulations concerning the appointment of outside, temporary counsels in certain circumstances. <sup>17</sup> Such personnel appointed by the Attorney General from outside of the Department of Justice to conduct investigations and possible prosecutions of certain sensitive matters, or matters which may raise a conflict of interest for Justice Department personnel, are called "special counsels." These special counsels are appointed by, are answerable to, and may

14 28 U.S.C. §592(g)(2) and (3).

-

<sup>12 28</sup> U.S.C. §592(f). Morrison v. Olson, supra at 695.

<sup>13 28</sup> U.S.C. §592(g)(1).

<sup>15 28</sup> U.S.C. §591(a), (b), and (c).

<sup>16</sup> P.L. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732, June 30, 1994.

<sup>17 28</sup> C.F.R. Part 600, §§600.1 to 600.10; 64 Fed. Reg. 37038-37044, July 9, 1999.

have their prosecutorial or investigative decisions countermanded by, the Attorney General. The "special counsels" under these regulations have, therefore, by express design, less "independence" from the Attorney General and the Department of Justice than did the "independent counsels" under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, or the "special prosecutors" appointed by the Attorney General for the Watergate matter. One special counsel that was appointed under the new regulations, former Senator John Danforth, was appointed by Attorney General Reno on September 9, 1999, to be special counsel to investigate the "Branch Davidian incident" near Waco, Texas, to determine if there had been any misconduct on the part of federal law enforcement personnel.

Under the Justice Department regulations, the appointment of a "special counsel" is completely discretionary with the Attorney General. The criteria for the Attorney General's decision is whether a prosecution or investigation of a "matter" or of a person may raise a conflict of interest for the Department of Justice, or whether there exist "other extraordinary circumstances," and when, in light of these conflicts or circumstances, the Attorney General finds that it is in the "public interest" to appoint such counsel. 18 The most significant departures in the "special counsel" regulations from the former statutory "independent counsel" schemes are that (1) the Attorney General, and not an independent body such as the three-judge panel, actually names the person who is to be the special counsel; (2) the Attorney General, and not an outside panel, establishes and defines the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the special counsel; (3) the general jurisdiction of the special counsel is limited to the specific matter referred to him or her (and not also to "related" matters), as well as collateral offenses arising out of the investigation which "interfere" with the investigation; (4) the special counsel is subject to all the notification, and "review and approval" provisions of the internal Department of Justice procedures, policies, and practices (but may circumvent certain review and approval procedures by consulting directly with the Attorney General); (5) the Attorney General must be notified concerning significant actions that the special counsel is to take, and may countermand any proposed action by the special counsel; (6) appeals of cases by the special counsel must be approved by the Solicitor General of the United States, a presidential political appointee; and (7) Justice Department regulations provide that a special counsel may be removed by the Attorney General for "misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including violation of Department policies," while the statute provided that independent counsels could be removed by the Attorney General for "good cause, physical or mental disability."

## Other "Special Counsels"

In addition to the specific special counsel regulations promulgated in 1999, the Attorney General of the United States, under the general statutory authority of the Attorney General to hire staff and oversee the conduct of federal criminal investigations and prosecutions, may appoint staff to the Department of Justice on a part-time or intermittent basis, or may re-assign current prosecutorial personnel already employed by the Department, to conduct and coordinate particular criminal investigations and possible criminal prosecutions.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> 28 C.F.R. §600.1, also §600.2. If the Attorney General is recused from a matter, then the Acting Attorney General will appoint when deemed warranted. For a broader discussion of the "special counsel" regulations, see CRS Report RL31246, *Independent Counsel Law Expiration and the Appointment of "Special Counsels"*, by Jack Maskell.

<sup>19 28</sup> U.S.C. §§509, 510, and 515.

With the increased public attention in 1993-1994 to allegations concerning the President and First Lady in what became known as the "Whitewater" matter, the Attorney General of the United States, not having a statute under which to request the appointment of an independent counsel by a court, named on her own authority a "special counsel" or "regulatory independent counsel," with authority and powers nearly identical to those of statutory independent counsels to investigate and potentially to prosecute any wrongdoing involved in the "Whitewater" and related matters. 20

On December 30, 2003, Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey, in his capacity as Acting Attorney General (upon recusal of Attorney General Ashcroft), designated Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, as the "special counsel" to investigate the alleged unauthorized disclosure of a CIA employee's identity. Special Counsel Fitzgerald was delegated significantly more independence in his authority and operations than a special counsel would have under the existing regulations promulgated in 1999. It may be noted that the Government Accountability Office ruled that the expenses for the investigation by Special Counsel Fitzgerald, although he was not appointed under the standing "special counsel" regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice, and was a current and existing U.S. Attorney, could be paid from the permanent, indefinite appropriation for independent counsels in the Department of Justice. 22

#### **Author Contact Information**

Jack Maskell Legislative Attorney imaskell@crs.loc.gov, 7-6972

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> 59 Federal Register 5321-5322, February 4, 1994. After the reauthorization of the independent counsel statute in 1994, the special three-judge panel appointed a new, statutory independent counsel.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> See letters from James B. Comey, Acting Attorney General, to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney, December 30, 2003, and February 6, 2004, setting out the broad delegation of authority of Fitzgerald and distinguishing his designation from the appointment of a special counsel under the existing DOJ regulations at 28 C.F.R. Part 600.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> United States Government Accountability Office, B-302582, Special Counsel and Permanent Indefinite Appropriation, September 30, 2004.

From: Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2016 10:00 PM

To: Priestap, E.W. (CD) (FBI); Moffa, Jonathan C. (CD) (FBI); Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)

Cc: (CD) (FBI)

Subject: Mye brief

b6 -1 b7C -1

#### Bill,

Per our earlier discussion, cyber folks are able to brief at 9:30, they will meet us in your office. Pete

Strzok, Peter I	P. (CD) (FBI)	
From:	Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)	
Sent:	Friday, March 18, 2016 7:44 PM	
To:	Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)	× 3
Subject:	flight info	
19 March		
		b6 <b>-1</b>
Thurs 24 March	า้	
		b6 <b>-1</b>
Friday 25 Marc		

b6 -1, 3

From:	Strzok, Peter P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent:	Sunday, March 20, 2016 6:34 PM
To:	Page, Lisa C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject:	Fwd: You available to talk?
My frustration	
	message
-4	Peter P. (CD) (FBI)'
- 1 - 0.010 (0.000 )   0.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000	nathan C. (CD) (FBI)"
The state of the second of the second	u available to talk?
Sure, probably	around 930-10 your time?
Big news of the	e day? Beth said none of the laptops we have had the original 60k. The two that did
	- the personal work laptops of Cheryl and Heather.
	That they are still using now. Funny that never cane up before now.
Sec	cause that issue hasn't come up in this or other cases. ?
	estate un sament sus de la comunicación
Original	message
	Ionathan C. (CD) (FBI)
	016 6:26 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Strzok, Pet	ter P. (CD) (FBI)"
Subject: RE: Yo	ou available to talk?
Mid-flights/tra	veling. Later tonight maybe?
₩.,	
	message
	Peter P. (CD) (FBI)'
	016 4:03 PM (GMT <del>-06:00)</del>
	nathan C. (CD) (FBI)'
oubject, fou av	/anable to taik(

b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -6

b6 -2 b7C -2 b7E -4

b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -6

b6 -1 b7C -1 b7E -6