Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

30 August 2019

David F. Rothstein Judicial Watch, Inc. 425 Third Street SW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20024

Reference: F-2018-02062; Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-00672

Dear Mr. Rothstein:

This is a final response to the 29 June 2018 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, William F. Marshall, Judicial Watch, Inc., for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector General's report issued in November 1996 relating to a drug-running, money laundering and intelligence gathering operation involving an airport in Mena, Arkansas.

We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3141, as amended.

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to the request and identified two (2) responsive documents. One (1) document may be released in its entirety and one (1) document may be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(d) and/or (b)(7)(f). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on the enclosed document.

This concludes our response to the referenced request.

Sincerely,

Mark Lilly

Information and Privacy Coordinator

**Enclosures** 

## Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General

# REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



## UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION REGARDING PURPORTED CIA ACTIVITIES AT OR AROUND MENA, ARKANSAS AND RELATED TOPICS

November 8, 1996

Frederick P. Hitz Inspector General A. R. Cinquegrana
Deputy Inspector General
for Investigations

Approved for Release Date MAY 1997

# OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS STAFF

# REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION REGARDING PURPORTED CIA ACTIVITIES AT OR AROUND MENA, ARKANSAS AND RELATED TOPICS

**November 8, 1996** 

### INTRODUCTION -

- 1. On February 8, 1996, the Chairman of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives ("Banking Committee"), wrote to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and requested that the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conduct an investigation regarding long-standing allegations of money laundering and other illegal or improper activities at or around the airport at Mena, Arkansas and any Agency contacts with certain individuals and organizations of interest to the Banking Committee. The DCI agreed to the Banking Committee's request and, on March 13, 1996, formally requested that OIG conduct an investigation.
- 2. On March 21, 1996, the Banking Committee broadened its request regarding one of the individuals referenced in its original request and, on May 1, 1996, OIG was asked to expand its inquiry to include an additional individual who might have connections to the allegations under review. On June 26, 1996, the Banking Committee again requested that OIG expand its investigation to include another individual who might have relevant ties to the Mena inquiry. On

October 17, 1996, the Banking Committee submitted another request that OIG include two additional individuals with possible connections to the matters under review. This is an unclassified summary of the findings and conclusions of the OIG investigation. The full details have been included in a classified Report of Investigation that has been made available to the Banking Committee and the intelligence oversight committees of Congress as well as certain other federal agencies.

# PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES

- 3. OIG's inquiry focused only on allegations of CIA involvement in activities pertaining to Mena and any CIA contacts with certain individuals and organizations of interest to the Banking Committee. No attempt was made to investigate the wide range of allegations, rumors and innuendo unrelated to CIA that exist regarding Mena and related topics. Furthermore, OIG's inquiry was based almost exclusively on information in CIA files or provided by current or former CIA employees.
- 4. OIG responded to the Banking Committee's inquiry by forming an investigative team that included three Investigators, one Research Assistant and two Secretaries. OIG then constructed a comprehensive tasking memorandum that was distributed to all key CIA components. Each component was requested to identify all information in its possession pertaining to the subjects of the investigation.
- 5. The OIG tasking memorandum directed that responses include all relevant official and "soft files," memoranda, taskings, notes, letters, correspondence, communications, computer mail messages, cable traffic, briefing books, calendars, and personal notes. All categories of material were to be included in responses regardless of their classification or sensitivity. Requests from the Banking Committee that were received subsequent to the tasking memorandum were relayed through focal points to the appropriate Agency components.

- 6. In addition, OIG issued an Employee Bulletin to all CIA Headquarters area personnel asking CIA employees to provide OIG with any personal knowledge they might have regarding these topics. A worldwide cable including the same message was issued to all Agency field personnel. OIG also placed an article in the Agency's internal newsletter requesting that CIA employees contact OIG with any personal knowledge regarding these matters.
- 7. Approximately 40,000 pages of materials were reviewed in connection with this inquiry and over 40 individuals were interviewed. These interviews included current and former Agency employees and were conducted locally and domestically. In addition, discussions were held with non-Agency personnel who appeared to be in a position to provide relevant information.

# QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND FINDINGS

8. The OIG investigation involved the following questions, as presented by the House Banking Committee:

DID CIA, OR ANYONE ACTING ON CIA'S BEHALF, CARRY OUT ANY ACTIVITIES AT MENA, ARKANSAS, OR THE AREA NORTH OF MENA, KNOWN AS NELLA, ARKANSAS? IF SO, DID CIA BRIEF, OR OTHERWISE COMMUNICATE THIS INFORMATION TO ARKANSAS STATE OFFICIALS IN THE 1980s?

9. No evidence has been found to indicate that CIA or anyone acting on its behalf participated in, or otherwise had knowledge of, any illegal or improper activities in Mena, Arkansas, or the area north of Mena known as Nella, Arkansas. It has been determined that CIA did engage in the following authorized and lawful activities at Mena Intermountain Airport during a three-year period between 1980 and the present:

- CIA participated in a joint training operation with another federal agency at Mena Intermountain Airport. The CIA's role in this two-week exercise was classified and not publicly disclosed. All coordination and interface with local officials was handled by the other federal agency.
- Certain Mena Intermountain Airport businesses occasionally were contracted with to perform routine aviation-related services on equipment owned by the CIA. The selection of these businesses was based upon the companies' ability to perform the required services at competitive prices and on their professional reputations within aviation circles. The companies and their employees were not informed that CIA owned the equipment that was being serviced.

WHAT WAS THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF ANY CIA CONTACT OR RELATIONSHIP WITH ADLER BERRIMAN SEAL AND HIS ACTIVITIES?

10. Adler Berriman "Barry" Seal was never employed by CIA in any capacity. The only limited contact any CIA personnel had with Seal was during a two-day period in 1984 when Seal was involved in a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) sting operation that subsequently implicated a Nicaraguan Government\* official and members of the Medellin drug cartel in a conspiracy to smuggle cocaine into the United States. CIA provided technical support to this operation which involved the installation of two 35mm cameras into a C-123K airplane that Seal used during the operation. CIA personnel discussed with Seal options for installing the cameras in the aircraft, and instructed him on the methods of operating the cameras. Other CIA personnel who were present had passing or

<sup>\*</sup> The Government of Nicaragua was also widely known as the Sandinista Government during the relevant time period.

otherwise brief discussions with Seal. During the course of these discussions, Seal was escorted by DEA personnel. No evidence has been found to indicate that CIA knew Seal's true identity prior to the operation or that its personnel had any other contact with Seal before or after this 1984 operation.

DID CIA REQUEST DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ) OR OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES TERMINATE OR ALTER ANY INVESTIGATIONS OR PROSECUTIONS RELATING TO MONEY LAUNDERING ACTIVITIES AT OR AROUND MENA, ARKANSAS?

11. No evidence has been found to indicate that CIA or its personnel requested directly or indirectly that DoJ or other federal agencies terminate or alter any investigations or prosecutions relating to money laundering activities at or around Mena, Arkansas.

WHAT WAS THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF ANY CIA CONTACT OR RELATIONSHIP WITH LARRY DOUGLASS "L.D." BROWN?

12. Agency records indicate that Larry Douglass Brown was an applicant for employment with CIA in 1984 and that he did have contact with one or, possibly, two CIA recruitment personnel in that context. Those records also indicate that a decision was made on December 4, 1984 not to offer him such employment. No evidence has been found to indicate that he was employed or otherwise associated with CIA.

WHAT WAS THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF ANY CIA CONTACT OR RELATIONSHIP FROM 1980 TO THE PRESENT WITH CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS OR BUSINESSES BASED AT, OR OPERATING THROUGH, THE AIRPORT AT MENA, ARKANSAS?

13. No evidence has been found that CIA had contact with any individuals or businesses based at, or operating through, the airport at Mena, Arkansas, except for the joint training operation and maintenance activities addressed elsewhere in this summary.

Furthermore, no evidence has been found that CIA was associated with money laundering, narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, or other illegal activities at or around Mena, Arkansas at any time.

CONCUR:

Frederick P. Hitz

**Inspector General** 

Date

11/8/96

Obtained Via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc.

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Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General OIG/!NV RECORD COPY DO NOT REMOVE FROM OFFICIAL FILE

# REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



# INVESTIGATION REGARDING PURPORTED CIA ACTIVITIES AT OR AROUND MENA, ARKANSAS AND RELATED TOPICS

(96-0036-IG)

November 8, 1996

Frederick P. Hitz Inspector General			
A. R. Cinquegrana Deputy Inspector General for Investigations	Investigutors	Assistants	(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(f)
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# OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS STAFF

# REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

INVESTIGATION REGARDING PURPORTED CIA ACTIVITIES AT OR AROUND MENA, ARKANSAS AND RELATED TOPICS (96-0036-IG)

**November 8, 1996** 

#### INTRODUCTION

- 1. (U) On February 8, 1996, the Chairman of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives ("Banking Committee"), wrote to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and requested that the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conduct an investigation regarding long-standing allegations of money laundering and other illegal or improper activities at or around the airport at Mena, Arkansas. The DCI agreed to the Banking Committee's request and, on March 13, 1996, formally requested that OIG conduct an investigation.
- 2. (U) On March 21, 1996, the Banking Committee broadened its request regarding one of the individuals referenced in its original request and, on May 1, 1996, OIG was asked to expand its inquiry to include an additional individual who might have connections to the Mena matter. On June 26, 1996, the Banking Committee again requested that OIG expand its investigation to include another individual who might have relevant ties to the Mena investigation.

On October 17, 1996, the Banking Committee submitted another request that OIG expand its inquiry to include two additional individuals with possible connections to the matters under review.

### **SUMMARY**

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anyone acting on i	its beha	alf partic	ipated i	n, or otherwise h	ad		
knowledge of, ille	gal or i	mproper	r activiti	es at Mena, Arka	nsas,	or the	
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4.—(S)—In late June 1984, CIA had contact with Adler Berriman "Barry" Seal in the context of CIA support to a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operation.¹ This DEA operation subsequently implicated a Nicaraguan Government² official and members of the Medellin drug cartel in a conspiracy to smuggle cocaine into the United States. No evidence has been found to indicate that CIA or its personnel had any other contact with Seal before or after the June 1984 operation.

5. (S) No evidence has been found to indicate that CIA or its personnel requested directly or indirectly that the Department of Justice (DoJ) or other federal agencies terminate or alter any investigations or prosecutions relating to money laundering activit at or around Mena, Arkansas. CIA personnel did offer to support DEA effort in 1984	ries
6. (AIUO/U) According to Agency records, Arkansas State Trooper Larry Douglass "L. D." Brown applied for employment wi CIA in 1984	th  (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
1 (U) It appears that CIA did not know Seal's identity until the day of the operation, June 1984.  2 (U) The Government of Nicaragua was also widely known as the Sandinista Government during the relevant time period.	(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(d)

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7. (U) All these CIA activities were consistent with appropriate Executive Orders, U.S. law and CIA regulatory guidelines. No evidence has been found to indicate that CIA employees or affiliates violated any local, state, or federal law, or engaged in any activities inconsistent with their CIA employment or affiliation.

## PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES

8. (AIUO/U) OIG responded to the I inquiry by forming an investigative team the		(b)(3) NatSecAct
Investigators, one Research Assistant and to	wo Secretaries. OIG th	nen
	ng memorandum that	
was distributed to all key CIA components	· ·	ind
requested that they identify all information	in their possession	(b)(3) NatSecAct
pertaining to the subjects of the investigation		3
inquiry focused only on allegations of CIA i		
attempt was made to investigate the wide ra	ange of allegations and	d
rumors unrelated to CIA that have been ger		
and related topics. OIG's inquiry was based		
information in CIA files or provided by curr		
employees.		(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c)
		(-)(-)
Q (AILO/II) The OIC testing memory	mandum to CIA	
9. (AIUO/U) The OIG tasking memo		
A 100	able terms and was	
organized into four broad topic areas, inclu	лт <b>g</b> : (b)(3) N	latSecAct

Whether CIA, or anyone acting on CIA's behalf, carried out any activities at Mena, Arkansas, or the area north of Mena, known as Nella, Arkansas, and, if so, whether CIA briefed, or otherwise communicated with, Arkansas state officials in the 1980s;

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- Whether there was any CIA contact or relationship with Adler Berriman Seal (aka Barry Seal, A. B. Seal, FNU Billings, Berry Seal, Eric Arthur, Ellis McKenzie, "El Gordo," Joseph Warren Church) and his activities;
- Whether CIA attempted to influence or request, directly or indirectly, that the DoJ or other federal agencies terminate or alter any investigations or prosecutions of money laundering activities at or around Mena, Arkansas; and
- Whether CIA had any contact with certain individuals or businesses (b)(3) NatSecAct money laundering, narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, or other illegal activities (including illicit aircraft modifications) based at, or operating through, the airport at Mena, Arkansas, from 1980 to the present.


The tasking memorandum directed that responses include all relevant official and soft files, memoranda, taskings, notes, letters, correspondence, communications, Lotus Notes and other computer mail messages, cable traffic, briefing books, calendars, and personal notes. All categories of material were to be included in responses regardless of their classification or sensitivity.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

10. (AIUO/U) Subsequently, OIG received additional requests from the Banking Committee and relayed these requests through focal points to the appropriate Agency components. Focal points were asked on to expand their respective inquiries regarding Arkansas State Trooper L.D. Brown to include an alias, "Michael Johnson."

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)





### **QUESTIONS PRESENTED**

- 13. (AIUO/U) This Report addresses the following questions, as presented by the House Banking Committee:
  - Did CIA, or anyone acting on CIA's behalf, carry out any activities at Mena, Arkansas, or the area north of Mena, known as Nella, Arkansas? If so, did CIA brief, or otherwise communicate, this

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information to Arkansas state officials in the 1980s?

- What was the nature and extent of any CIA contact or relationship with Adler Berriman Seal and his activities?
- Did CIA request directly or indirectly that the DoJ or other federal agencies terminate or alter any investigations or prosecutions relating to money laundering activities at or around Mena, Arkansas?
- What was the nature and extent of any CIA contact or relationship with Larry Douglass "L.D." Brown?
- What was the nature and extent of any CIA contact or relationship from 1980 to the present with certain individuals or businesses based at, or operating through, the airport at Mena, Arkansas?

#### **FINDINGS**

	ANSAS? IF SO, DID CIA BRIEF, OR OTHER THIS INFORMATION TO ARKANSAS STATE		
1980s?	(b)(	1)	
	(b)(	3) NatSecAct	
14. <del>(S)</del> ]	No evidence has been found to indicate	any CIA	
activities at, n	ear, or relating to Mena prior to	CIA did, in fact.	
conduct certai	n activities at Mena Intermountain Air	port between	
	These activities fall into two categories	es: (a) support to	
a DoD tra	nining exercise	and	(b)(1)
(b) routine	maintenance of CIA		(b)(3) NatSecAc
	No evidence has been found to indi	cate that these	

activities were inconsistent with, or otherwise violated, relevant Executive Orders, statutes or regulatory guidelines.

DoD Exercise		(b)(1)			
A. Backgro	ound		[9		
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					Yi
	8 <del>-SECI</del>	CFT—		(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	

B. Prelude to Deployment

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
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	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSe (b)(7)(c)
20. (S) The Major states that, as part of the advance arrangements, he personally briefed the supervisor for the Arkansas State Police district that encompassed the Mena area. The Major also says that he made a point to visit and brief the Mayor of Mena, either the Mena Chief of Police or the county sheriff, and the person responsible for operating Mena Intermountain Airport. The purpose of the briefings was to inform the officials—	
	(b)(1)
I and the second	

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	(b)(1)
	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c)
no evidence has been found to indicate	
that CIA representatives communicated with any Arkansas officials regarding the exercise.	
D. Deployment	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
	(1)(4)
	(b)(1)
11 —SECRET	)(3) NatSecAct

E. Exercise Climax (b)(1)

	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c)
(S) Following the completion of the exercise,  F. Operational Security	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c)
13 <del>SECRET</del>	(b)(1)

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Ī	G. Local Lore	
	36.—(S)—local lore regarding the airport at Mena already existed at the the exercise. As an example, the Major recalls a passing discurs with two brothers whose company owned the hangar that was for the exercise. In discussing the airport, the brothers insing the Major that the CIA might have used the airport in the passing un running," possibly to the Contras.	ssion s rented uated to
*	The Major characterizes the brothers' comments as rumors and innuendo, lacking in details	e (b)(1) · (b)(3) NatSecAct
3' FM		(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
est d	4	
1 in 4 in 1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in	11	(b)(1)
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	37. (S)—The Major also recalls that an employee of the airport who was responsible for refueling airplanes often made comments to him regarding the airport's allegedly colorful past. As recalled by the Major, this individual was somewhat "gossipy" and never provided the Major with specific examples to support his stories.  38. (S)—Another comments that she was told by one of the two brothers that a CIA airplane or helicopter had crashed into a mountain near Mena several years before. Reportedly, the site of the crash had been sealed off and no one had been allowed into the area. What led to the conclusion that the crashed aircraft belonged to CIA was not disclosed to	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c) (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c)
20	39. (S) Several exercise participants also recall noticing that a	(b)(7)(c)
9.5	derelict C-130-or its L-100 commercial equivalent—was parked at	
£.	Mena Intermountain Airport.	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
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				(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)	Maintenan	ce of CIA		(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSe	cAct 41. <del>(S)</del>	contract with	companies	(b)(1)
The state of the s	Mena Intermountain Airpor	t to service CIA	companies	(b)(3) NatSecAct
	CIA personnel a companies' ability to perform prices and on their reputation performed between	ppears to have been been to the required services	s at competitive cles. All work wa	as b)(1)
2	portornica between			b)(3) NatSecAct
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		(b)(7)(c)
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£	50. <del>(S)</del> No evidence has been found to indicate that	(b)(1)
×		(b)(3) NatSecAc
1	business or persons in the town of Mena,	(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
	its airport, or officials of the State of Arkansas, were told or aware	(5)(.)(5)
	being serviced	
: ile	were owned by CIA. (b)(1)	
1	(b)(3) NatSecAc	*1
*	DoD Exercise Activities at or Near Nella, Arkansas	
ı	51. <del>(S)</del> No evidence has been found to indicate that CIA or	
ž.	anyone acting on CIA's behalf conducted any activity at or around	
4	Nella, Arkansas either before, during or after the	
o)(1)	exercise at Mena. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecA	ct
b)(3) NatSe	cAct	<b>-</b>
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20 SECRET (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	
52. (S) According to participants and Agency	
records, all exercise activities were staged out of Mena Intermountain	
Airport.	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
What was the nature and extent of any CIA contact or	(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
RELATIONSHIP WITH ADLER BERRIMAN SEAL AND HIS ACTIVITIES?	
	(1) (3) NatSecAct
55. (S) Based upon CIA records and the recollections of current and former CIA personnel who were involved in this support activity, it appears that Seal's true identity was not disclosed to CIA personnel by DEA.	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(d)
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56.—(S)—It later became public knowledge that Seal, piloting a Fairchild C-123K nicknamed Fat Lady,  Seal activated a concealed camera that surreptitiously	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
photographed a number of individuals loading and supervising the loading of almost 700 kilograms of cocaine onto the airplane.	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
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
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
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
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100. <del>(S)</del>	The C-123K used for was nicknamed "Fat Lady."  CIA took any part in to install the two concealed cameras as previously	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(d)  (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
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	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
H. Inquiries to the CIA Regarding Barry Seal  105. (S) Following the DEA sting operation, the CIA received external inquiries in September 1984 and January 1985 requestinformation in its possession pertaining to Barry Seal. The sea of CIA records that were conducted in response to the request produced no information regarding Seal since CIA had no relationship with Seal pertaining to the DEA stroperation and never	ting any arches ts (b)(3) NatSecAct ing
identified Seal by name. As a result, his name was not reflected CIA records.  (b)(7)(d)	
(b)(3) NatSe	ecAct

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# Chronology of Significant Events: DEA Sting Operation Using Adler Berriman Seal (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(D)(7)(d)	77	
DEA informs of sting operation and		
	(b)(1)	
requests permission to provide DEA with technical assistance.	(b)(3) NatSec	Act
	(b)(1	)
CIA Headquarters provisionally approves technical support request.	(b)(3 (b)(7	3) NatSecAct
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	(b)(1	)
	(b)(6 (b)(6 (b)(7	3) NatSecAct 3) ()(c)
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48 <del>-SECRET</del>- Obtained Via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc.

1985 CIA has no record of Seal.	(b)(1)
1986 February 19 Seal murdered in Baton Rouge, Louisiana	(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
February 19 Seal murdered in Baton Rouge, Louisiana	

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DID CIA REQUEST DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OR OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES TERMINATE OR ALTER ANY INVESTIGATIONS OR PROSECUTIONS RELATING TO MONEY LAUNDERING ACTIVITIES AT OR AROUND MENA, ARKANSAS?

115. (AIUO/U) No evidence has been found to indicate that CIA directly or indirectly attempted to influence DoJ or other federal agencies to terminate or alter any investigations or prosecutions relating to activities at or around Mena, Arkansas.

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(d)

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	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)
	(b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(d)
What was the nature and extent of any CIA contact or	
RELATIONSHIP WITH LARRY DOUGLASS "L. D." BROWN?	
119. <del>(C)</del> Agency records indicate that Larry Douglass Brown was an applicant for employment with the CIA in 1984.	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
no	
evidence has been found to indicate that Brown ever worked for the Agency in any capacity.	
	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
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	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
	(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
What was the nature and extent of any CIA contact or relationship from 1980 to the present with certain individuals or businesses based at, or operating through, the airport at Mena, Arkansas?  132. (AIUO/U) The House Banking Committee expressed interest in any relevant CIA connection with the following individuals and companies: J. V. Brotherton, Terry Capehart, Glen Conrad, Earl Covel, Cal Edwards, Michael Eigleston, Joe Evans,	
Michael Johnson, Robert Maddern, George Reeb, Charles Roulet, Brodix, Blue Diamond, Eagle Aviation, Fokker Air, Global Associates, Goodner Aircraft Painting, Reebaire, Rose Upholstery, Southern Cross Aviation,	(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)
No evidence has been found to indicate that CIA was aware of any money laundering, narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, or other unlawful activities	(b)(7)(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct
	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
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(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
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#### **CONCLUSIONS**

135. (AIUO) CIA did conduct certain activities in Mena, Arkansas. However, these activities were consistent with CIA's charter and were not related to money laundering, narcotics trafficking, or arms smuggling. No evidence has been found to indicate that CIA communicated information concerning these activities to Arkansas officials.

 56 <del>-SECRET</del> -	(b)(3) NatSecAc (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)		

136. (AIUO/U) CIA did have contact with Barry Seal in June 1984 in connection with a DEA sting operation. No evidence has been found to indicate that CIA had any contact with Seal before or after this operation. (b)(3) NatSecAct

137. (AIUO/U) No evidence has been found to indicate that CIA directly or indirectly attempted to influence the DoJ or other federal agencies to terminate or alter any investigations or prosecutions relating to money laundering activities at or around Mena, Arkansas.

138. (AIUO/U) L. D. Brown did apply for employment with CIA in 1984.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

been found to indicate that Brown was employed by CIA in any capacity.

139. (AHUO/U) No evidence has been found that CIA had contact with any individuals or businesses based at, or operating through, the airport at Mena, Arkansas, except for the joint training operation and maintenance activities addressed elsewhere in this Report. Furthermore, no evidence has been found that CIA was associated with money laundering, narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, or other illegal activities at or around Mena, Arkansas at any time.

A. R. Cipquegrana

CONCUR:

Frederick P. Hitz

Inspector General

11/8/96

Date

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