

*relative to* the others. These other groups then will have been disproportionately impacted by a voting practice or procedure, in a historical context in which they have suffered race-based discrimination. Do these groups have Section 2 claims? And in whose favor would such claims be decided?

For all of these reasons, *Veasey*'s standard does not make sense of Section 2, it makes a mess of it. The causation requirement favored by the clear majority of circuits to consider the issue, which requirement derives from the plain language of Section 2, is the only logical way to interpret the statute.

The District Court in this case properly focused on Appellants' failure to show a discriminatory "result" proscribed by Section 2 – let alone a discriminatory impact sufficient to rise to the level of a denial or abridgment of an equal opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of [] choice." 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). As the District Court powerfully summarized the relevant facts:

Minorities do not have less opportunity to vote under Alabama's Photo ID law, because everyone has the same opportunity to obtain an ID. Black, Hispanic, and white voters are equally able to sign a voter registration form or registration form update. They have the same opportunity to get to a registrar's office, and to the extent there is a difference in convenience, they have the same opportunity to request a home visit. Insofar as it is less convenient for the poor to get an ID than it is for those who have greater means, that is as true for poor whites as it is for poor minority voters. A Black voter and a white voter of equal means who each lack ID and a birth certificate, and who each live an equal distance away from the registrar's office, are in the exact same position: They can each get a photo ID at no charge