Glad to have you back in the mix. In point of fact, the IP address in question (81.80) is not CBP, but rather one of the external addresses for general outbound TIC traffic (round-robined from any of the components). The confusion about this originated from the NCATS team, who associated it with your component (falsely) through their cyber hygiene activities. We have clarified this with NPPD management, OCIO and representatives of the NCATS team at the 1700 touchpoint today, and I will send a follow up email to them (the NCATS team) tomorrow explaining the architecture of the external facing TIC space.

Let me know if you need any additional information.

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(Acting) Chief, DHS ESOC Office of the Chief Information Security Officer Department of Homeland Security

Mobile: 202-657-(b)(6)

From: 1^{(b)(6)}

Sent: Thursday, December 08, 2016 8:19:24 PM

To: DHS ESOC; DHS ESOC Leads
Cc: CSIRC; (b)(6)

Subject: Regarding "Letter to Secretary Johnson"

Good Evening ESOC,

I have to provide our AC with an update on this by NLT 0700. I've been informed by my leadership that there was some email traffic circulating on this topic:

"Sent: Thursday, December 8, 2016 4:53 PM

Subject: RE: Conference call regarding "Letter to Sec. Johnson

As I understand it, the facts as we know it are:

- This same CBP IP address previously was reported to us by Princess Cruise Lines in the last few weeks. CIO/ESOC assessed that the CBP computer was just doing normal web browsing to Princess Cruise Lines.
- ESOC assesses that the CBP computer was just doing normal browsing to Georgia's Secretary
 of State office on Nov 15 as well."

CBP CSOC respectfully requests some clarification on the following information:

- Please define "normal browsing" as it is refenced in the text highlighted above.
- How was ESOC able to link that to IP address to CBP when it was reported by Princess Cruise Lines?
- How was ESOC able to assess that the CBP computer was just doing normal browsing activity to Princess Cruise Lines?