

**Periodic Review Board:
Subsequent Full Review Hearing, ISN 569 Suhayl Abdul Anam Al Sharbi**

Hearing Summary:

Four observers attended the 22 June 2021 Periodic Review Board (PRB) subsequent full review hearing for ISN 569 Suhayl Abdul Anam Al Sharbi. The observers represented:

- Judicial Watch, Inc.
- Indiana University
- ARD (German radio and television)
- *The Telegraph*

The government reiterated its previous findings, asserting that ISN 569 had traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan and trained with Al Qaeda prior to the events of 9/11. Though he had become a bodyguard for Osama Bin Laden, he was reportedly also part of a 9/11-like hijacking plan that ISN 10024 Khalid Shaikh Muhammad planned or attempted to lead in Southwest Asia.

The personal representative stated that the detainee was optimistic about the PRB program, appeared to have respect for him as his representative and the United States, and has expressed regret for his past. ISN 569 asked to be released to Oman or another Middle Eastern country, though the personal representative said that the detainee understood that Yemen was not an option due to continuing unrest.

Observations:

Due to communication system upgrades occurring at GTMO, visual observation was unavailable and audio observation was patchy, at one point streaming live then pausing for 20 or 30 seconds to enact the broadcast delay. ISN 569 was in attendance and all proceedings were translated for him loudly and at length, but visual verification was not possible.

Prior government summaries about this detainee discussed his travels and participation in extremist activities in greater detail, including his travels to Malaysia and Pakistan, his statements in support or admiration of the 9/11 hijackers, and his active resistance and violence toward GTMO staff members. The reduction in information provided in the government summaries has been a multi-year trend, but it seems particularly stark in this instance and possibly indicative of an intent to reduce the apparent threat the detainee represents.

Earlier summaries noted that ISN 569 does not maintain contact with known terrorists or extremists and only sporadically with his own family. If he is authorized for transfer, Oman is a known ally that has previously accepted detainees and might be considered. However, without family ties to provide for the detainee, a non-Middle Eastern country willing and able to provide better support and monitoring is likely to be preferred to help reduce the threat of recidivism.

Since the reasons given by past Boards for not authorizing this detainee for transfer do not appear to have been addressed, his transfer is likely to be authorized due to the current political climate.