

From: Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E]
Sent: Mon, 2 Oct 2017 14:40:54 +0000
To: Bernabe, Gayle (NIH/NIAID) [E];Chen, Ping (NIH/NIAID) [E];Marston, Hilary (NIH/NIAID) [E];Kurilla, Michael (NIH/NIAID) [E];Giovanni, Maria (NIH/NIAID) [E]
Cc: Meegan, James (NIH/NIAID) [E];Western, Karl (NIH/NIAID) [C];Auchincloss, Hugh (NIH/NIAID) [E]
Subject: FW: China's Interest in the Global Virome Project Presents an Opportunity for Global Health Cooperation

More of what we had heard but a well drafted overview cable.

Not sure if I may have sent this to some of you before but wanted to assure all had seen.

Gray

From: [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, October 2, 2017 9:28 AM
To: Trimble, Ted (NIH/NCI) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6); Stevens, Lisa (NIH/NCI) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6); Brown, Matthew (NIH/NCI) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6); Handley, Gray (NIH/NIAID) [E] [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Subject: FW: China's Interest in the Global Virome Project Presents an Opportunity for Global Health Cooperation

Official
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From: [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2017 10:21 AM
To: [REDACTED] (b) (6); Peter Schmeissner (HHS/OGA); 'Kerr, Lawrence (HHS/OS/OGA)'; Collin (OS/OGA) Weinberger (CTR)
Subject: Fw: China's Interest in the Global Virome Project Presents an Opportunity for Global Health Cooperation

FYI, this seems relevant to biobanking, IP, pandemic flu, and a bunch of other issue areas.

[REDACTED] (b) (6)

[REDACTED] (b) (6)

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2017 08:56
To: [REDACTED] (b) (6)
[REDACTED] (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Reply To: SMART Core

Cc:

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Subject: China's Interest in the Global Virome Project Presents an Opportunity for Global Health Cooperation

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SBU

Action Office: ESA, AID, RMA, PSA, EXEC, FAS

Info Office: PAS, LA

MRN: [17 BEIJING 2458](#)
Date/DTG: Sep 28, 2017 / 280753Z SEP 17
From: AMEMBASSY BEIJING
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE *ROUTINE*
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PREL, SHLH, TBIO, KGHI, CDC, AID, CN
Captions: SENSITIVE
Subject: China's Interest in the Global Virome Project Presents an Opportunity for Global Health Cooperation

1. (SBU) **Summary and Comment:** The proposed Global Virome Project (GVP), an international non-governmental organization built on a decade-long prototype initiated by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), seeks to address vulnerability from emerging diseases by creating a global database of viruses of animal origin and identifying those pathogens with greatest potential to jump to humans through sequencing their genomes, understanding the ecology involved in transmission, and assessing risk to humans. This knowledge could then be used to devise treatments and countermeasures. In the months leading up to the planned January 2018 launch of the Global Virome Project to codify this “proof of concept” into an international organization, China has expressed considerable interest in becoming a leader of this nascent global effort by contributing to collaborative academic papers, hosting symposia, participating in international activities, and by proposing its own associated China Virome Project. While the GVP will have to navigate complex issues concerning sharing of specimens and data across national borders, China’s interest in the Global Virome Project, represents a positive indication that health cooperation, safeguarding global health security, and advancing innovation in science remain priorities for China and presents new ground for potential U.S.-China collaboration. Absent U.S. government leadership in GVP agenda-setting,

governance, and funding the Chinese government could likely take a leading position in this potentially path breaking endeavor undermining years of USG leadership and considerable investment in this critical field of public health.

2. (SBU) By continuing to work with other nations, including China, and playing a leading role in the Global Virome Project, the United States would benefit from the advances in health science, intellectual property, and commerce that will come from it. U.S.-China collaboration on the Global Virome Project is an opportunity to lead innovation in science, collaborate with China, and potentially contribute to scientific breakthroughs. **End Summary and Comment.**

Health Security is a Global Agenda

3. (SBU) The Global Virome Project as proposed could be an important scientific contribution to the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). Launched in February 2014, the GHSA is a multi-sectoral effort aiming to accelerate implementation of the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations (IHR) in order to make the world safe and secure from infectious disease threats, whatever their source. Under the Global Health Security Agenda, the United States assists 31 countries and the Caribbean Community, including \$1 billion for 17 at-risk countries to strengthen global health security through a whole-of-government effort to prevent, detect, and respond to disease outbreaks at the local, subnational and national levels.

Pandemic Disease is a Global Threat

4. (SBU) A component to the overall Global Health Security Agenda is reducing the threat of pandemic disease, which is a widespread epidemic of naturally emerging deadly infectious pathogens. According to "The Global Virome Project," a collaborative paper written by several of the foremost experts on pandemic health issues, viruses of animal origin have caused significant outbreaks, such as SARS, influenza, MERS, Ebola, HIV, and Zika. Outbreaks such as these have had major economic and geopolitical impact and have threatened global security. There are an estimated 1.6 million such viruses worldwide. Scientists have estimated that only 1% of the potential viral threats have been identified and hundreds of thousands of unknown viruses in wildlife have the potential to infect people. However, less than 0.1% of all viruses with the potential to pose a threat to global health are estimated to have spilled over from animals to humans. With growing populations, reduced animal habitats and increasing international travel and trade, these types of emerging infectious diseases pose increasing risks of a global nature.

The Global Virome Project's Beginnings as a U.S. Investment

5. (SBU) GVP grew out of the PREDICT project of USAID, which has, over its seven year history, received \$130 million in U.S. funding and has thus far sampled over 56,000 wild animals and identified about 1000 new viruses. PREDICT hosts the GVP Secretariat at University of California-Davis. The GVP concept was validated at a gathering of international stakeholders in 2016, which included scientists and public health practitioners from the public and private sectors. Its first follow-up meeting was held in Beijing in early 2017, including a half-day session to initiate the associated China National Virome Project (CNVP). GVP expects

to be incorporated as an international not-for-profit organization prior to its official launch, which is planned for January 30, 2018 in Thailand at the Prince Mahidol Awards Conference.

The Global Virome Project's Audacious Agenda

6. (SBU) The Global Virome Project is, by the project leadership's own admission, ambitious. Over the course of ten years and at an estimated cost of \$1 billion (\$100 million a year for ten years), the Global Virome Project aims to sample 63% of global mammalian diversity to find 71% of mammalian viromes. The projected costs cover sample collection and laboratory analysis, with phases including countries with the highest diversity of mammalian species. Phase One includes 10 countries and 1562 mammals, Phase Two, 16 countries and 970 mammals, Phase Three with 23 countries and 447 mammals. GVP also expects to collect samples from 740 waterfowl species.

7. (SBU) GVP's core principles include embracing an international scope while fostering local ownership, promoting equitable access to data and benefits, instilling transparency, building national capabilities for prevention, detection, and response for emerging viral threats, and encouraging global ownership through an international alliance. If successful, this initiative will provide a wealth of publicly accessible unbiased data, which should enable innovative research on the mechanisms and ecology of disease transmission, and informatics focusing on virus families as opposed to individual viruses. Such research could accelerate the development of new diagnostics, vaccine technologies, and risk mitigation strategies against whole families of emerging viral diseases.

Like all Risky Endeavors Failure is a Possibility

8. (SBU) GVP looks to the Human Genome Project as a model, in which a comprehensive, ambitious approach led to the development of new technologies and a vast data resource now available to all. Unlike the Human Genome Project, GVP is by design not 'owned' by an institution or specific country, because of its international sampling scope. Its infrastructure will also be distributed globally. Thus GVP faces significant challenges as it transitions from a start-up to an independently operating foundation: Who will own the samples that are collected from many countries? Where will they be analyzed? Will all GVP data be freely available to the public? GVP expects to grapple with these legal and ethical issues very early, but it will take time for policies to be proposed and approved by the many countries that will be either allowing sample collection or storing specimens and data.

GVP Enjoys Strong Chinese Government Support in Principle and in Kind

9. (SBU) The Chinese government has shown strong interest in the Global Virome Project and is not shy about expressing interest in funding projects where Chinese scientists will take a lead. The new Director of China Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC), Dr. George Gao, a distinguished virologist, told EmbOffs that the Global Virome Project is a priority project that China CDC must push hard on to get stakeholders involved and organize funding. He stated that China's involvement in this project is a good follow-up to the August 21 World Health Organization dialogue meeting at which Health and Human Services Secretary

Price and US Ambassador Branstad where both sides agreed on the need for increased U.S.-China collaboration against growing health threats at the intersection of animal and human health. In February 2017, Gao led a symposium proposing a China virome project, however the specific details of how the two will integrate was left undefined.

10. (SBU) The Beijing Genomics Institute (BGI), now based in Shenzhen, made a blanket offer to conduct 30% of the sequencing for GVP, but did not provide details on how that sequencing would take place or where the subsequent data would be housed. Its current leader, Yang Huanming, was instrumental in China's involvement in the Human Genome Project in the 1990s, and is a proponent of sharing data. BGI's commitment (as opposed to Yang's commitment) to GVP's values of open, free access to data has not yet been officially stated however. [Note: The BGI group has enjoyed significant funding from the Chinese government. BGI Genomics became a publically-traded company in July 2017.]

11. (SBU) The GVP expects to raise its \$1 billion ten-year budget from a variety of sources, both public and private. Roughly \$5 million per year will cover operations of the non-governmental organization, to include working groups, sample and data standardization and management, and technical assistance to participating country field operations. However, specifics on funding commitments have not been publicly announced.

Both the U.S. and China Strongly Support GVP-related Collaborative Research

12. (SBU) Beyond creating the database of viral sequences which carries the \$1 billion price tag, GVP recognizes the importance of research on the mechanisms and ecology of infectious disease transmission. This type of research already enjoys strong support in both China and the United States, and scientists are increasingly collaborating with each other.

13. (SBU) Shi Zhengli, a senior scientist at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) who studied mechanisms of transmission of SARS between species, stated that CAS has already allocated funding for GVP-related research. Wang Zhengwu, Department of International Affairs at CAS, stated that CAS is working on a process and mechanism to support Chinese scientists with backing from the Ministry of Sciences and Technology and The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) for Global Virome Project type research. He noted that CAS encourages Chinese scientists to take part in or lead international research projects and that CAS has a budget for seed funding to incubate research projects, workshops, and collaboration that can be used for the Global Virome Project. Significant USG support for GVP-related research already exists, including the Ecology and Evolution of Infectious Diseases (EEID) program, which is jointly supported by NIH, USDA, and NSF, is actively seeking collaboration in China, and plans to host a joint workshop supported by NSFC and CAS in early 2017.

Global Virome Project Provides China a Platform for International Collaboration

14. (SBU) It is encouraging that China, along with other countries, is ready to take what started as a U.S.-led initiative and proof of concept to a global scale. The GVP still awaits a commitment of funding for its viral sampling and processing infrastructure. It is likely that the

Chinese government will engage both with funding and with in-kind support, which will likely give China a large voice in GVP governance and data-sharing policies. While U.S.-based NGOs and academics are likely to provide some leadership for the GVP, it will be important for the USG to remain engaged in significant ways with the GVP, to ensure that U.S. interests are adequately reflected in this effort, which will facilitate the development of countermeasures against future threats (pandemic preparedness), and enable rapid detection of viral threats and increase the capacity to handle them.

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Info: TOKYO, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*; SEOUL, AMEMBASSY *ROUTINE*;
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COLLECTIVE *ROUTINE*

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