

**Periodic Review Board:  
Subsequent Full Review, ISN 1456 Hassan Muhammad Ali Bin Attash  
January 25, 2022**

*Events:*

The January 25, 2022, Periodic Review Board subsequent full review for ISN 1456 Hassan Muhammad Ali Bin Attash (Bin Attash) convened on time at 9:00 a.m. under the observation of one non-governmental organization (NGO) representative from Judicial Watch and one media representative from the *New York Times*. Other NGOs and media had intended to observe, but an elevation of the health protection condition (HPCON) at the Pentagon led to unanticipated visitor restrictions that were unable to be overcome in the time allotted.

Bin Attash was accompanied at GTMO by a personal representative and an interpreter, though the Board noted that his private counsel was present at the Board's location. The detainee brought a large folio with him, which went unused during the public session.

The government described Bin Attash as being in association with Al Qaeda leadership. Though he was largely a facilitator in Pakistan, he also supported Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq. He was ultimately captured in Ramzi Bin Al Shibh's (ISN 10013) safehouse.

The detainee's personal representative stated that Bin Attash has spent his entire adult life in U.S. custody and is now comfortable with people of different backgrounds. He intends to work as a translator if transferred, since he is fluent in English. His personal representative submitted examples of ISN 1456's translation work to the Board.

The personal representative stated that the detainee believes his detention changed his life trajectory positively.

The detainee's private counsel did not make a statement in the open session or provide a statement to be read by his personal representative to the public.

*Observations:*

Bin Attash appeared healthy, alert, and well nourished. However, he fidgetted continuously, sighed a great deal, and adopted several postures that conveyed impatience. Unlike detainees who have exhibited nervousness, Bin Attash did not consult with his personal representative or interpreter, so he may have been "going through the motions" with the expectation of a favorable Board decision. The current political pressures on the Board make it likely that the detainee expects authorization for transfer.

The detainee's intent to work as a translator if transferred would make use of a skill he learned during his time at GTMO, however it would limit the destination country to locations where he could translate for legitimate causes – and where he could be strictly monitored and prevented from having contact with potential bad actors. This signifies English-speaking countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, none of which have been open to taking transferred detainees in recent years. Transfer to a Middle Eastern country would represent a significant security risk.