Skip to content

Judicial Watch • Al Nashiri

Al Nashiri

Al Nashiri

Page 1: Al Nashiri

Category:

Number of Pages:15

Date Created:April 24, 2011

Date Uploaded to the Library:February 02, 2015

Tags:alNashiri


File Scanned for Malware

Donate now to keep these documents public!


See Generated Text   ∨

Autogenerated text from PDF

DEPARTMENT DEFENSE 
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO 
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA 
APO 09360 

JTF-GTMO-CDR December 2006 
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW9lst Avenue, Miami, 33172 
SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP (S) 
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment 	(S//NF) Personal Information: 
 	
JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abd al-Rahim Hussein 
Muhammad Abdah al-Nashiri 

 	
Aliases and Current/True Name: Saeed Abdallah
Abu Abu Bilal Muhammad 
Umr Sa'id

Eid Eid Shannan 
Muthib Thawab al-Ahnaf 

 	
Place Birth: Saudi Arabia 

 	
Date Birth: 1965 

 	
Citizenship: Yemen 

 	
Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-010015DP 	(U//FOUO) Health: Detainee good health. 	(S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment: 
(S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). 
(S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee one al-Qaida's most skilled, capable, and prolific operational coordinators. Detainee reported directly UBL and led his own alQaida group that was responsible for conducting operations outside Afghanistan. Detainee has been linked many dozen plots attack and western interests 

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958, AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20311208 

include the successful USS COLE and LIMBURG attacks. Detainee has close connections most senior al-Qaida members and long history jihadist activity. JTFGTMO determined this detainee be: 
 HIGH risk, likely pose threat the US, its interests and allies. 

 HIGH threat from detention perspective. 

 HIGH intelligence value. (S//NF) Account Detainee's Timeline: 
The following section based consolidation several accounts from various significant individuals order assemble feasible timeline. 	(S//NF) Timeline from 1992 1997: From 1992 1993, detainee fought the
Tajikistan jihadwhere met al-Qaida operative, Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash aka (Khallad) aka (Silver), for the first time. The leader detainee's group during the trip was Hamza al-Ghamdi, who had been Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) bodyguard and long-time
jihadist.In 1993, detainee trained al-Qaida's Jihad-Wal Camp near Khowst, Afghanistan
(AF), where met al-Qaida operative, Abu Zubaydah for the first time.Later 1994, detainee and Khallad met UBL Jalalabad, AF, where the two them stayed UBL guesthouse for week. During that time, detainee listened UBL speak about the coming battle with the US. Detainee eventually returned Saudi Arabia then traveled Yemen while Khallad remained Afghanistan. 1995, detainee, Hamza al-Ghamdi and 10-15 member group were route northern Afghanistan fight the Tajik jihad, but were unable cross the border into Tajikistan. Detainee then traveled southern Afghanistan where learned UBL had
returned from Sudan.By late 1996, detainee wanted learn the status some his uncles who had gone Afghanistan for jihad. also wanted know more about the Taliban. During this timeframe, while Hamza al-Ghamdi was serving one UBL's bodyguards, detainee saw UBL for the second time, Kandahar, and listened him speak about the
coming battle with the US.In early 1997, detainee stayed Afghanistan, traveling back 
and forth from Kandahar the front lines Kabul and alalabad. Detainee said fought TD-314/11500-04, TD-314/11164-03 TD-314/38699-03 TD-314/49853-02 TD-314/52239-02 TD-314/64177-03, TD-314/17348-04 TD-314/17348-04, TD-314/52239-02 
with the Taliban against the United Islamic Front for the Salvation Afghanistan (UIFSA), but was not commander. Detainee contracted malaria while visiting the front lines and became very ill returned Kandahar where again met UBL while staying UBL's
airport guest house. (S//NF) Timeline from 1998 2000: 1998, after learning his cousin Jihad Harazi's suicide bombing the Embassy Kenya, detainee joined al-Qaida. this time detainee completely agreed with UBL's message attack the US. Once joined alQaida, detainee trained Ibn al-Khattab's camp and trained variety weapons. Sometime 1998, detainee met privately with UBL and was introduced the idea attacking western vessel off the coast Yemen. week later, traveled Yemen. Around late-1998 early-1999, detainee fled back Afghanistan after learning that Khallad
was detained Yemeni authorities.In late spring 1999, after six-to-seven months 
Afghanistan, UBL provided detainee with $2,000 USD return Yemen, purchase boat,
and observe the travel Navy ships and oil tankers off the coast. Detainee cased the Red Sea powerboat over the course three-to-four months. September October 1999, UBL recalled detainee Afghanistan, requesting summary his findings. Detainee reported having seen several oil tankers, but Navy ships the area.
UBL then instructed detainee case activity the Port Aden, YM.In late November 1999, detainee flew back Yemen, and, per UBL's instructions, met with Jamal Muhammad Ahmed Ali al-Badawi, suspect the COLE attack. February 2000, after the attack the USS THE SULLIVANS failed due the explosives-laden boat capsizing and sinking soon after was launched, detainee returned Afghanistan. Despite the
setback, UBL told detainee try the operation again.Upon returning Yemen September 2000, detainee chose Hassan al-Khamiri and Ibrahim al-Thawr aka (al-Nebras) his suicide operatives for the operation that would eventually occur against the USS COLE. Detainee received phone call from Khallad who told him that UBL wanted them replaced. Detainee was angry about this decision and went Afghanistan immediately talk UBL and explain that changing operatives would set things back. Prior departing for Afghanistan, detainee gave his two operatives Yemen instructions carry out the
attack the next warship that entered the port.Two-to-three weeks after detainee TD-314/52239-02, TD-314/09594-03 TD-314/08879-04 TD-314/08879-04 TD-314/52239-02, TD-314/08879-04 TD-314/04078-03 TD-314/08879-04 TD-314/08879-04 
SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued 
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP (S)
returned Afghanistan, USS COLE was attacked his operatives.Detainee met with 
UBL November 2000, and following the meeting returned the front lines.15 	(S//NF) Timeline from 2001to2002: January 2001, detainee traveled from Karachi Lahore, Pakistan (PK), recruit operatives for Strait Hormuz (SoH) operation.In March April 2001, UBL instructed detainee Karachi and research the availability and price large fishing boat for the SoH attack. UBL told detainee take Muhammad Hasan Ghulam Rabbani aka (Abu Badr al-Pakistani), ISN US9PK-001461DP (PK-1461), with him for assistance. Detainee and PK-1461 spent two weeks Karachi collecting information before detainee returned Afghanistan advise UBL that the boats they saw were expensive and had mechanical problems. UBL instructed detainee return Karachi and looked for fishing boat large enough hold two smaller boats. UBL provided detainee additional money and instructed him begin searching for ship; research the availability and cost small fishing boat; learn Karachi's boat registration process; and study the Port Karachi's entry and exit procedures using fishing expeditions cover. UBL told detainee take Umayr Bin Attash, ISN PK9SA-001456DP (SA-1456), with him Karachi. SA1456 cooked and ran errands for detainee and PK-1461. Instead acquiring the ship for the SoH operation Karachi, detainee ultimately sent al-Qaida operatives the UAE who
then purchased 300-400 ton ship for the attacks. September 2001, detainee was recovering the Laiaqa Hospital Karachi
following tonsillectomy.When learned the attacks and the pending US-led military response, hurried his recovery and returned the front lines Afghanistan.20 October 2001, detainee met with UBL Kabul and was told complete the SoH operation headed toward Pakistan.21 Detainee traveled Kandahar around November 200122 where met with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) discuss the SoH operation and detainee's planned travel Saudi Arabia and the UAE.23 Detainee then traveled the Zormat region Afghanistanand the mountains between Kabul and Khowst, where he, Khallad, and Abu
Faraj al-Libi fought under the command Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi.Around TD-314/05653-03, TD-314/08879-04 TD-314/05653-03 TD-314/09594-03 TD-314/11991-03, TD-314/38975-02, Analyst Note: SA-1456 the brother ofKhallad Bin Attash. TD-314/38682-02 TD-314/38682-02 TD-314/05653-03 TD-314/09515-03 TD-314/09515-03, TD-314/29878-03, Analyst Note: TD-314/29878, the senior al-Qaida members reportedly 
met Zormat December 2002, but these meetings are assessed have taken place December 2001 vice 2002. TD-314/12068-03, TD-314/38532-02 TD-314/09515-03, TD-314/29878-03 TD-314/03141-03, TD-314/13836-03 NOFORNI 20311208 
November/December 2001, Abu Zubaydah traveled Zormat for informal meeting with 
most the al-Qaida leadership including KSM, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, Abu Tayyib, Abu
Yasir al-Jazairi, and Sayf al-Adel.By December, detainee was still Zormat meetin with his mujahid associates Khallad, Abu Faraj al-Libi, and KSM planning for more attacks. Around January 2002, Abu Zubaydah facilitated detainee's travel Bannu, PK, from
Birmal, AF, with group 10-15 mujahideen.During January February 2002, detainee 
visited PK-1461 Karachi and together they helped facilitate the travel plans muj ahideen
out Afghanistan.Detainee stayed house with Khallad and his brother, SA-1456, for several days, then provided the house Abdu Ali al-Hajj Sharqawi aka (Riyadh the Facilitator), ISN PK9YM-001457DP (YM-1457). While this house, KSM and Khallad
discussed trying help his associates Pakistan flee their home countries.Meanwhile,
KSM put together training program for assassinations and kidnappingsas well pistol and computer training. The training was not intended prepare the participants for any specific operation but keep the residents the safe houses occupied. KSM told the men prepare depart for other countries soon possible and that they should plan and 
33execute small operations against the US. March 2002, detainee traveled the Arabian Peninsula via Indonesia and Bangladesh. then traveled between Qatar, Oman, the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.While Dubai March 2002, detainee contacted and met with Sanad Yislam al-Kazimi, ISN US9YM-001453DP (YM-1453), who asked case the road from UAE Yemen, via Oman. Detainee told YM-1453 that intended use truck transport explosives along this route and wanted YM-1453 report the security situation include the presence
roadblocks and the level security the borders. While detainee was Dubai, Khallad telephoned him approximately three occasions: first advise him that the Moroccan cell members who were casing for the SoG operation needed money; second, tell him that Saudi national Zayd al-Khayr had called with offer acquire prepaid telephone cards from Indonesia; third, tell him that Yemeni cell member Walid al-Shayba needed someone
with explosives expertise place explosives boat for the Yemen operation.In April 
2002, detainee visited Qatar; attempted enter Saudi Arabia, but was denied entry. TD-314/51970-02 TD-314/03141-03, TD-314/09515-03, TD-314/09155-04, TD-314/11500-04 TD-314/49853-02, TD-314/10133-03, TD-314/11500-04 TD-314/25790-03, TD-314/22294-02 TD-314/09515-03, TD-314/24552-02 TD-314/11500-04 TD-314/10133-03, TD-314/39587-02 TD-314/06945-03 TD-314/07162-03 TD-314/48167-03 TD-314/07162-03, Analyst Note: The Yemeni operation assessed refer the attack the LIMBURG. 

SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued 
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP (S) 
Detainee therefore returned Dubai and halted work the SoH operation. Two months after the SoH operation was abandoned detainee began planning for the Port Rashid operation.38 June 2002, detainee was Dubai find and sell the ship acquired Muhammad Ahmad Haza al-Darbi, ISN US9SA-000768DP (SA-768) for the aborted SoH operation; however, could not locate the ship. July 2002, detainee rented apartment Dubai and met with YM-145339 regarding the procurement explosives for the Port
Rashid operation. They also went the Dubai flying club check pilot lessons.In September 2002, after about month Saudi Arabia, detainee returned Dubai review the Port Rashid project and received word from Abu Hajir that plans for the attack the Embassy Riyadh were continuing (NFI).41 October 2002, Abu Shahid called detainee celebrate the successful LIMBURG attack and advise that was redirecting all his 
42attention toward attacking the Embassy Sanaa, YM. (S//NF) Capture Information: 
(S//NF) November 2002, senior officials told the press that detainee was captured the UAE earlier the month and was custody.43 
(S) Property Held: None 
(S) Transferred JTF-GTMO: September 2006 
(S//NF) Reasons for Transfer JTF-GTMO: Detainee was transferred JTFGTMO face prosecution for terrorist activities against the United States. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: 
(S) Assessment: Detainee assessed HIGH risk, likely pose threat the US, its interests and allies. 
(S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee one the highest-ranking, most skilled, and dangerous al-Qaida operatives captured date. has proven ability TD-314/09515-03 TD-314/07162-03, TD-314/09515-03, TD-314/13836-03, TD-314/39022-03 TD-314/09515-03, TD-314/11280-03 TD-314/07162-03 TD-314/07162-03 TD-314/07162-03 TERR-005-022-2004, TD-314/22893-05, ICC DAILY TERRORISM SUMMARY 22-NOV-2002, GMP20040602000010 
SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued 
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP (S) 
plan and carry out attacks against the US, its interests and allies, linked many dozen plots attack and western interests. Detainee masterminded the October 2000 attack against the USS COLE and the October 2002 attack against the merchant vessel (MN) LIMBURG. From least April 2001, detainee directed maritime and land-based terrorist attacks, many targeting military interests, include (but not limited to) plot sink warship tanker the Strait Hormuz (SoH) intended block the Strait; plot using explosives-filled airplane against western warships Port Rashid, Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE); plot blow the Embassy Sanaa, YM; maritime attacks the Red Sea and off the coasts al-Hudaydah and Aden, YM; and disrupted maritime operation targeting US, United Kingdom (UK), and other NATO ships and submarines the Strait Gibraltar (SoG). Detainee has direct, long-term links most senior al-Qaida members and long term participant militant jihad. 
 (S/ INF) Detainee one al-Qaida' most skilled and capable operational coordinators who headed his own al-Qaida group comprised mostly Saudis and Yemenis. His cell was responsible for conducting suicide and sabotage operations
outside Afghanistan.Detainee explained that dealt directly with UBL without any 
intermediaries. Detainee and KSM mutually agreed avoid each other's operations just case either was arrested.Detainee has been considered more senior al-Qaida than 
KSM and did not have answer anyone regarding financial matters and the spending al-Qaida money.Detainee dedicated jihad that reportedly received 
injections promote impotence and recommended the injections others more time
could spent the jihad (rather than being distracted women).
 (S/INF) Detainee conceived, planned, organized, and led numerous plots against interests and allies including the successful attacks the USS COLE and French M/V LIMBURG. (S/ INF) Detainee was the senior operative who masterminded and coordinated the USS COLE attack Yemen.48 
 
(S/ INF) According detainee, private meeting Afghanistan 1998, the original idea for the attack the USS COLE was relayed him directly UBL. The objective was attack western oil tanker off the coast Yemen. Detainee traveled Yemen week later and his team began the process assembling the necessary components, such boat and explosives, and 
49began the requisite training and surveillance. TD-314/16930-02, TD-314/34532-02 TD-314/16245-04 TD-314/38975-02 IIR 044 0068 TERR-005-022-2004, ANTITERRORISM FORCE PROTECTION 22-NOV-2002 TD-314/08879-04 
SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued 
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP (S) 
 
(S//NF) Fawaz al-Rabii aka (Furqan al-Tajiki),50 operative the USS COLE attack, reported that the attack was authorized and funded UBL, planned the detainee, and carried out Hassan al-Khamiri and Ibrahim alThawr aka (al-Nebras).51 
 
(S//NF) Detainee stated the USS COLE suicide bombers, Hassan and Nebras, were chosen because Hassan knew the area and Nebras could operate the boat.52 (S//NF) Before successfully attacking the USS COLE, detainee organized and attempted similar attack the USS THE SULLIVANS. The mission failed because the boat with the explosives capsized and sank after was launched for the attack.53 (SIINF) Detainee planned the successful suicide attack the French oil tanker M/V LIMBURG,54 requested UBL.55 (S//NF) Detainee admitted that was involved plan attack oil tankers the Arabian Gulf/SoH using suicide operatives six-to-seven meter-long explosiveladen boats. Detainee planned lower smaller boats into the sea from larger boat and have them attack tankers. Detainee said that the other al-Qaida personnel involved the operation were SA-768 and four Yemenis: Salman, Abu al-Shahid, Musab, and Gharib. Detainee stated that UBL first talked him about the plan Afghanistan April May 2001 and they talked about again Afghanistan October 2001. Detainee also stated that the operation was canceled because problems communicating with UBL and the inability acquire the necessary explosives from Pakistan.56 

 
(S) SA-768 confirmed his participation this operation when admitted that purchased boat for terrorist attack the direction detainee. The vessel was utilized against oil tanker the SoH. 
 
(S//NF) SA-1456 reported that PK-1461 knew large transport ship and plan detainee conduct attack against shipping, probably the SoH. SA-1456 thought the ship might used mother ship and would deploy smaller vessels located the ship using crane. Once deployed, the Analyst Note: Fawaz, deceased October 2006, the brother JTF-GTMO detainee Salman Yahya Hassan Mohammed Rabeii, ISN US9YM-000508DP. TD-314/36314-03 TD-314/38699-03 TD-314/08879-04, TD-314/08019-04 TD-314/36314-03 TD-314/08690-03, Analyst Note: The M/V LIMBURG was bombed off the Yemeni coast October 2002. TD-314/06945-03, TD-314/26905-04, TD-314/38682-02, TD-314/09515-03, TD-314/11991-03 IIR 034 1003 
SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued 
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP (S) 
smaller ships would attack ships. SA-1456 believed the ship was located
the UAE. (S/INF) The Port Rashid operation was the successor detainee's aborted SoH 
plot. 	The operation involved hijacking airplane from local airfield, loading
with explosives and then flying into western warship docked Port Rashid.Detainee explained that had planned instruct YM-1453 obtain explosives for use the Port Rashid operation from Yemeni al-Qaida cell leader Abu Shahid and 
60deliver the explosives the runway located the Dubai flying club.
 
(SllNF) According YM-1453, detainee instructed him scout the route from Yemen the UAE and mentioned that truck would eventually transport explosives along the route, hidden under produce fish. Detainee had YM-1453 fly over the proposed operating area and took aerial photographs al-Sharka 
61Airport, UAE.
 
(SI INF) KSM confirmed the plans, which had been devised detainee target aircraft carriers Port Rashid, were executed January 2003. After detainee' arrest, the targets changed include ships near Kuwait and 
62Qatar. (SI INF) spring 2002, al-Qaida was planning terrorist operations against the and Embassies Sanaa.63 The late Abu Hafs al-Masri aka (Muhammad Atef) selected detainee one two al-Qaida members organize the mechanics and logistics the attacks against the Embassy Sanaa using estimated one
ton TNT; however, the attack was delayed due the 9/11 attacks.Operatives 
from detainee's cell proposed acquire assault rifles and explosives and attack either
the the Embassy Sanaa. 
 
(SI INF) Detainee approved the proposal against the embassies principal. Detainee expressed his interest simultaneous operations against many embassies possible, but instructed that they attempt single multiple attacks the embassies the priority order US, UK, France, and Cuba. The attacks were occur using Russian-manufactured rockets and bombs. small amount detainee' funding was used for the purchase munitions for the TD-314/37835-02 TERR-005-022-2004 TD-314/27813-03 
001453 SIR 01-0CT-2004, TD-314/08690-03 
TD-314/12984-03, Analyst Note: aircraft carriers are too large make port calls Port Rashid, but they 
make port calls Jebel Ali, also the UAE. TD-314/04879-03, ANTITERRORISM FORCE PROTECTION MESSAGE 28-FEB-2004, TD-314/21827-04 TD-314/01604-02 TD-314/00537-03 
proposed embassy attack. The group had discussed the use briefcase bomb
attacks contingency plan.
 
(SI/NF) Detainee was involved plot involving smuggling vehicles and explosives from Oman Yemen, possibly indicating plans attack with multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED's) Yemen Oman.(Analyst Note: This line reporting may have come from detainee's instructions YM-1453 deliver explosives from Yemen the UAE for the Port Rashid operation.) (S//NF) Between December 2001 and May 2002, planning was underway identify potential and Israeli targets (or near) Morocco for SoG attack. December 2001, two Saudi nationals approached detainee Zormat and offered
identify potential and Israeli targets Morocco. Detainee confided one 
the Saudi nationals, Hilal al-Assiri, that had been thinking for some time about 
executing operation against North Atlantic alliance submarines the SoG and 
asked Assiri monitor ship movements, rent apartment, and buy boat order 
69be ready whenever detainee contacted him start the operation.
 
(S//NF) Detainee advised the operatives that had personally chosen the military base Gibraltar the target for the operation. Detainee explained had seen news documentary the base and thought was good target. Detainee provided the operatives $10,000 USD for living and preliminary operational expenses and instructed them conduct extensive surveillance the base. Abu Hijah, who had many friends the Moroccan fishing industry, was instructed lease fishing boat use cover for the surveillance activity. Once the surveillance report and operational rlans were complete, detainee was 
7submit the report UBL for final approval. 
 
(S//NF) May June 2002, KSM learned the disrupted plan attack the military base Gibraltar and was upset with detainee KSM had idea that any such planning was underway that any operatives had been directed Morocco support any such plan. tum, Sayf al-Adel was upset with KSM also was unaware the plan and assumed KSM had directed without
coordinating with him.(Analyst Note: This demonstrates detainee operated separately within al-Qaida from KSM and Sayf al-Adel's operations.) TD-314/01554-03 ANTITERRORISM FORCE PROTECTION 22-NOV-2002 TD-314/16245-04, TD-314/01869-03; Analyst Note: While TD-314/01869-03 written though detainee 
third-person, according TD-314/16245-04, TD-314/01869-03 report from detainee. TD-314/24552-02, TD-314/12998-03, TD-314/32216-02 TD-314/01869-03 TD-314/12068-03 
SECRET 11NOFORN1120311208 (S//NF) According Abu Zubaydah, detainee and KSM had plan for another attack the after September 2001. noted that the plan was blessed UBL sometime after the 9/11 operations. Abu Zubaydah stated that, his opinion, UBL wanted the impact this attack greater than those September 2001. With that mind, Abu Zubaydah believed that the plan called for either car and/or truck bombs targeted against large and/or tall buildings, 9/11-style attack. Abu Zubaydah stated that the explosives will manufactured from chemicals, noting that such explosives "are easy make," and identified the building almost 
certam target. (S/ INF) Detainee may have evaluated potential operations South Korea and the Philippines. Afghanistan, late 2001, detainee had seen another al-Qaida member's passport which held visa for South Korea. Detainee had asked that operative temporarily surrender his passport Khallad could make copy the South Korean visa stamp. The day after the al-Qaida member gave Khallad his passport, saw high quality copy the South Korean visa stamp nylon-like 

73paper, which believed was used make stamp the visa. 
 
(S/INF) Abu Zubaydah said detainee was planning operation Asia, not the was previously reported.74 (S//NF) August 2002, Abu Hurayrah, brother Ali Yahya Mahdi al-Rimi, ISN US9YM-000167DP (YM-167), proposed detainee plan attack aircraft Oman using surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Abu Hurayrah claimed had acquired money for the purchase the missiles. Detainee instructed Abu Hurayrah travel Yemen and buy many weapons and explosives could with the funds. early October, Abu Hurayrah telephoned him Dubai from Yemen and indicated that weaons and explosives were not easy acquire Yemen once had been the case. (S/ INF) KSM encouraged detainee conduct small operations against targets Saudi Arabia, such ambushes persons automobiles and kidnappings citizens.
 
(S//NF) senior al-Qaida member said that during unspecified timeframe detainee and two Saudi cell members came upon man whose car had broken down alongside road Saudi Arabia. The cell members initially thought the man was citizen and wanted kill him. When the cell members discovered 
77the man was not citizen, his life was spared. TD-314/16584-02 TD-314/03043-03 TD-314/03233-05 TD-314/11724-03 TD-314/06945-03 TD-314/02524-03 NOFORN 20311208 (S//NF) Detainee was reportedly involved operation targeting Ras Tanura Port, major petroleum facility Saudi Arabia.78 
 (S//NF) Detainee has ties numerous high-level al-Qaida leaders, some most significant are below listed: (S//NF) Detainee worked directly for UBL79 and pledged bayat (an oath allegiance) him. Detainee believed was being pushed UBL continue planning aggressive operations after September 2001 against interests the
Arabian Gulfregion without much regard for his own security.Detainee said that spoke openly with UBL and, thought UBL was wrong, would tell him so. Detainee said UBL wanted him participate operation, would incumbent upon UBL convince detainee the operation was important their 
cause. (S//NF) Abu Hafs al-Masri aka (Muhammad Atef): KSM reported that UBL placed detainee charge operations Yemen, which was isolated from KSM' and Muhammad Atefs operations although Muhammad Atefwas the one primarily 
83in charge all operations. 	(S//NF) Detainee and KSM met Kandahar and were both Zormat with many
other senior al-Qaida members December 2001.Detainee also met with KSM 
three different occasions late February 2002 Karachi and met with 9/11 planner, 
Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, ISN US9YM-010013DP (YM-10013), one the meetings.85 (S//NF) Abu Zubaydah reported that detainee al-Qaida operative who reported directly UBL. Abu Zubaydah stated detainee headed his own al-Qaida group comprising most Saudis and Yemenis, which was responsible for conducting operations outside Afghanistan, similar KSM. Abu Zubaydah has known detainee since 1993, and added that was well known detainee has excellent contacts within both the Yemeni tribes and Yemeni security services. These contacts provided travel documents and cover for extremists.88 (Analyst Note: These contacts contribute detainee' risk handed over Yemeni officials.) ANTITERRORISM FORCE PROTECTION 22-NOV-2002 TD-314/03387-03 TD-314/13597-03 TD-314/08690-03 TD-314/16245-04 TD-314/35339-03 TD-314/29878-03, TD-314/12068-03, TD-314/38532-02, Analyst Note: TD-314/29878, the senior al-Qaida 
members reportedly met Zormat December 2002, but these meetings are assessed have taken place 
December 2001 vice 2002. TD-314/06945-03 TD-314/16930-02 TD-314/49853-02 TD-314/33916-02 (S//NF) Al-Qaida military operations commander, Sayf al-Adel: detainee thought that al-Adel served al-Qaida administrative function, such taking care matters for UBL and running guesthouse. Detainee said first met al-Adel 
891995 when al-Adel was charge the guesthouse Jalalabad. (S//NF) Al-Qaida planner, Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash aka (Khallad) aka 
(Silver), ISN US9YM-010014DP (YM-10014), assisted detainee facilitating
mujahideen,planning operations,and detainee considered him friend. 	(S//NF) Hamza al-Ghamdi, former UBL bodyguard and long-time jihadist, was charge guesthouse and training for al-Qaida Kabul.Detainee and al94
Ghamdi fought the Tajikistan jihad together the early 1990's. (S//NF) Jihad Harazi aka (Azzam), who was suicide bomber the 1998 
Embassy bombing Kenya, was detainee' cousin. result learning his
cousin's successful operation, detainee joined al-Qaida. (S//NF) Ibn Shaykh al-Libi reported that detainee and Khallad served two roles 
al-Qaida; operational planners and emergency points contact for operatives
deployed conduct attacks. (S//NF) Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi: Detainee last saw al-Hadi late 2001 the 
Zormat area Afghanistan when al-Hadi wanted stay and firht the US. Detainee
said that al-Hadi only answered UBL and Muhammad Atef.Detainee fought
under his command. (S//NF) Detainee met Ramzi Bin al-Shibh Karachi while meeting with KSM but did not have any interest him. According detainee, al-Shibh was new affiliate without operational record. (Analyst note: This could indication 
100that detainee did not know al-Shibh's role the 9/11 attacks.) (S//NF) Detainee first saw Sulayman Abu Ghayth shortly after the attack the USS COLE. Detainee described Abu Ghayth previously being Imam mosque Kuwait before becoming associated with UBL. Detainee also said Abu TD-314/16245-04 TD-314/03504-03 TD-314/52240-02 TD-314/08879-04 TD-314/17348-04, IIR 034 0863 02, IIR 034 0297 05, IIR 034 0796 TD-314/38699-03 TD-314/11614-05, TD-314/32877-03 TD-314/52239-02 TD-314/08327-02 TD-314/39020-03 TD-314/03141-03 
JOO TD-314/06945-03 

Ghayth was UBL's spokesman and was always with UBL and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Detainee last saw him Kabul week prior the coalition invasion the city.
 (S//NF) Detainee has connections JTF-GTMO detainees (not all JTF-GTMO detainees who are tied detainee are listed here, only those significance): (S//NF) Detainee identified Salim Ahmed Salim Hamdan, ISN US9YM000149DP, driver and bodyuard for UBL Afghanistan who began working for UBL after UBL left Sudan.10 	(S) Humud Dakhil Humud Said al-Jadani, ISN US9SA-000230DP, reported that 103

detainee was very dangerous and very senior al-Qaida. (S//NF) Faez Muhammad Ahmed al-Kandari, ISN US9KU-000552DP, traveled 
with detainee and both were facilitated Abu Zubaydah from Peshawar, PK, 104
Afghanistan April 2000.105 	(S//NF) SA-768 worked for detainee, most notably the SoH operation, 106
well the Port Rashidand SoG operations.107 (S//NF) YM-1453 received instructions from detainee scout the route from 
Yemen the UAE, which YM-1453 was transport explosives for the Port 108
Rashid operation. 109 (S//NF) SA-1456, Khallad's brother, cooked and ran errands for detainee. (S//NF) YM-1457 reported that late 2001, arrived Karachi assist Arab 

fighters. Upon arriving Karachi, moved into detainee's home and immediately 110
began seek funds support the muhajideen and their travel Afghanistan.111 (S//NF) PK-1461 worked for detaineeand was responsible for facilitating the 
travel detainee Karachi. 	PK-1461 drove detainee around Karachi, purchased 112
things for him and was always with detainee since did not speak Urdu.
 	(S//NF) Detainee participated militant jihad the following locations: 113 	(S//NF) Tajikistan from 1992 1993.114 (S/INF) Chechnya; detainee arrived there December 1994.

IOI TD-314/38699-03 
102 TD-314/22893-05
103 IIR 034 0323 
104 TD-314/06467-03 
105 TD-314/37810-03, TD-314/13836-03, TD-314/26905-04 
106 TD-314/02552-03 
107 TD-314/47202-02 

108 TD-314/27813-03, TD-314/48167-03, 001453 SIR 01-0CT-2004, 001453 SAR 04-DEC-2002 
109 TD-314/11991-03, TD-314/43326-02 
110 TD-314/04584-04, TD-314/10133-03 
Ill TD-314/25875-03, TD-314/33000-05 
112 TD-314/38975-02 
113 TD-314/11500-04, TD-314/11164-03 
114 TD-314/11614-05, TD-314/36521-04, TD-314/51914-04 NOFORN 20311208 
JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-010015DP (S) 115 	(S/INF) Azerbaijan; detainee stayed guesthouse owned Ibn al-Khattab.116 	(S/INF) Afghanistan. 117

 
(S/ INF) Detainee trained Jihad Wal camp, near Khowst.118
 
(S/INF) Detainee trained Khaldan camp.119
 
(S/INF) Detainee trained explosives al-Faruq.
 (S/INF) Detainee trained Ibn al-Khattab's camp after joining al-Qaida.120 (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee detention threat level assessed HIGH based DoD initial 90-day observation. 

,urJWVLY
HARRY HARRIS, JR. Rear Admiral, Navy f)111rcait Commanding 

115 TD-314/11614-05, TD-314/19840-05
116 
TD-314/17348-04 117 TD-314/49853-02 
118 
TD-314/06467-03 119 TD-314/06467-03 
120 
TD-314/52239-02 NOFORN 20311208