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Schuette Decision

Schuette Decision

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Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 
Syllabus 
NOTE: Where feasible, syllabus (headnote) will released, isbeing done connection with this case, the time the opinion issued.The syllabus constitutes part the opinion the Court but has beenprepared the Reporter Decisions for the convenience the reader. See United States Detroit Timber Lumber Co., 200 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
SCHUETTE, ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHIGAN COALITION DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION AND IMMIGRATION RIGHTS AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITY ANY MEANS NECESSARY (BAMN) AL. 
CERTIORARI THE UNITED STATES COURT APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
No. 12682. Argued October 15, 2013Decided April 22, 2014 
After this Court decided that the University Michigans undergraduate admissions plans use race-based preferences violated theEqual Protection Clause, Gratz Bollinger, 539 244, 270, but that the law school admission plans more limited use did not, Grutter Bollinger, 539 306, 343, Michigan voters adopted Proposal 2,now Art. 26, the State Constitution, which, relevant here, prohibits the use race-based preferences part the admissionsprocess for state universities. consolidated challenges, the District Court granted summary judgment Michigan, thus upholding Proposal but the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the proposalviolated the principles Washington Seattle School Dist. No. 458 457.  
Held: The judgment reversed. 
701 466, reversed. JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE ALITO, concluded that there authority the Federal Constitution inthis Courts precedents for the Judiciary set aside Michigan laws that commit the voters the determination whether racial preferences may considered governmental decisions, particular with respect school admissions.  Pp. 418.
(a) This case not about the constitutionality, the merits, ofrace-conscious admissions policies higher education.  Here, the principle that the consideration race admissions permissible 
Syllabus 
when certain conditions are met not being challenged.  Rather, the question concerns whether, and what manner, voters the States may choose prohibit the consideration such racial preferences. Where States have prohibited race-conscious admissions policies,universities have responded experimenting with wide variety ofalternative approaches. Grutter, supra, 342.  The decision byMichigan voters reflects the ongoing national dialogue about suchpractices.  Pp. 45.
(b) 
The Sixth Circuits determination that Seattle controlled here extends Seattles holding case presenting quite different issues toreach mistaken conclusion.  Pp. 518.

(1) necessary consider first the relevant cases preceding Seattle and the background against which Seattle arose. Both Reitman Mulkey, 387 369, and Hunter Erickson, 393 385, involved demonstrated injuries the basis race that, reasons state encouragement participation, became more aggravated. Mulkey, voter-enacted amendment the California Constitution prohibiting state legislative interference with owners prerogative decline sell rent residential property any basis barred thechallenging parties, account race, from invoking the protection Californias statutes, thus preventing them from leasing residential property. Hunter, voters overturned Akron ordinance that was enacted address widespread racial discrimination housingsales and rentals had forced many live  unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded  segregated housing, 393 S., 391.In Seattle, after the school board adopted mandatory busing program alleviate racial isolation minority students local schools,voters passed state initiative that barred busing desegregate. This Court found that the state initiative had the practical effect removing the authority address racial problem from the existing decisionmaking body, such way burden minority interests busing advocates who must now seek relief from the statelegislature, from the statewide electorate.  458 S., 474. Pp. 58.

(2) 
Seattle best understood case which the state action had the serious risk, not purpose, causing specific injuries account race had been the case Mulkey and Hunter. While there had been judicial finding jure segregation with respect Seattles school district, finding that would required today, see Parents Involved Community Schools Seattle School Dist. No. 551 701, 720721, Seattle must understood Seattle understood itself, case which neither the State nor the United States challenge[d] the propriety race-conscious student assignments for the purpose achieving integration, even absent finding 

Syllabus prior jure segregation.  458 472, 15. 
Seattles broad language, however, went well beyond the analysis needed resolve the case. Seizing upon the statement Justice Harlans concurrence Hunter that the procedural change thatcase had the clear purpose making more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities achieve legislation that their interest, 385 S., 395, the Seattle Court established new and farreaching rationale: Where government policy inures primarily the benefit the minority and minorities consider the policy  in their interest,  then any state action that place[s] effective decisionmaking authority over that policy at different level government subject strict scrutiny.  458 S., 472, 474. Pp. 811.
(3) the extent Seattle read require the Court determineand declare which political policies serve the interest group defined racial terms, that rationale was unnecessary the decision Seattle; has support precedent; and raises serious equalprotection concerns. cautioning against impermissible racial stereotypes, this Court has rejected the assumption that all individualsof the same race think alike, see Shaw Reno, 509 630, 647, but that proposition would necessary beginning point were the Seattle formulation control.  And were deemed necessary toprobe how some races define their own interest political matters,still another beginning point would define individuals according race.  Such venture would undertaken with clear legal standards accepted sources guide judicial decision. would also result in, impose high risk of, inquiries and categories dependent upon demeaning stereotypes, classifications questionableconstitutionality their own terms.  Assuming these steps could betaken, the court would next required determine the policyrealms which groups defined race had political interest.  That undertaking, again without guidance from accepted legal standards,would risk the creation incentives for those who support opposecertain policies cast the debate terms racial advantage disadvantage. Adoption the Seattle formulation could affect any number laws decisions, involving, e.g., tax policy housing subsidies. And racial division would validated, not discouraged. can argued that objections the larger consequences the Seattle formulation need not confronted here, for race was undoubted subject the ballot issue. But other problems raised Seattle, such racial definitions, still apply.  And the principal flaw inthe Sixth Circuits decision remains: Here there was infliction specific injury the kind issue Mulkey and Hunter and the history the Seattle schools, and there precedent for extending 
Syllabus 
these cases restrict the right Michigan voters determine thatrace-based preferences granted state entities should ended.The Sixth Circuits judgment also calls into question other States long-settled rulings policies similar Michigans. 
Unlike the injuries Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle, the questionhere not how address prevent injury caused account race but whether voters may determine whether policy race-based preferences should continued. approving Proposal and thereby adding 26 their State Constitution, Michigan voters exercisedtheir privilege enact laws basic exercise their democraticpower, bypassing public officials they deemed not responsive theirconcerns about policy granting race-based preferences.  The mandate for segregated schools, Brown Board Education, 347 483, and scores other examples teach that individual libertyhas constitutional protection.  But this Nations constitutional systemalso embraces the right citizens speak and debate and learn and then, matter political will, act through lawful electoralprocess, Michigan voters have done here.  These precepts are not inconsistent with the well-established principle that when hurt injury inflicted racial minorities the encouragement command laws other state action, the Constitution requires redress the courts.  Such circumstances were present Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle, but they are not present here.  Pp. 1118.
JUSTICE SCALIA, joined JUSTICE THOMAS, agreed that 26 rightlystands, though not because passes muster under the politicalprocess doctrine. likely does not, but the cases establishing thatdoctrine should overruled.  They are patently atextual, unadministrable, and contrary this Courts traditional equal protection jurisprudence. The question here, every case which neutral state action said deny equal protection account race, whether the challenged action reflects racially discriminatory purpose. plainly does not. Pp. 118.
(a) 
The Court Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held 26 unconstitutional under the so-called political-process doctrine, derived from Washington Seattle School Dist. No. 458 457, and Hunter Erickson, 393 385. those cases, one level government exercised borrowed authority over apparently racial issue until ahigher level government called the loan.  This Court deemed each revocation equal-protection violation, without regard whetherthere was evidence invidious purpose discriminate.  The relentless, radical logic Hunter and Seattle would point similar conclusion here, many other cases.  Pp. 37.

(b) 
The problems with the political-process doctrine begin with itstriggering prong, which assigns court the task determining 

Syllabus 
whether law that reallocates policymaking authority concerns aracial issue, Seattle, 458 S., 473, i.e., whether adopting oneposition the question would at bottom inur[e] primarily thebenefit the minority, and designed for that purpose, id., 472. Such freeform judicial musing into ethnic and racial interests involves judges the dirty business dividing the Nation into racial blocs, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. FCC, 497 547, 603, 610 (OConnor, J., dissenting), and promotes racial stereotyping, see Shaw Reno, 509 630, 647.  More fundamentally, the analysismisreads the Equal Protection Clause protect particular groups, construction that has been repudiated long line cases understanding equal protection personal right. Adarand Constructors, Inc. Pea, 515 200, 224, 230.  Pp. 712.
(c) 
The second part the Hunter-Seattle analysis directs court todetermine whether the challenged act place[s] effective decisionmaking authority over [the] racial issue different level government, Seattle, supra, 474; but, another line cases, the Court has emphasized the near-limitless sovereignty each State designits governing structure sees fit, see, e.g., Holt Civic Club Tuscaloosa, 439 60, 71.  Taken the limits its logic, Hunter-Seattle the gaping exception that nearly swallows the rule structural state sovereignty, which would seem permit State givecertain powers cities, later assign the same powers counties, and even reclaim them for itself. Pp. 1215.

(d) 
Hunter and Seattle also endorse version the propositionthat facially neutral law may deny equal protection solely because has disparate racial impact.  That equal-protection theory has been squarely and soundly rejected unwavering line cases holding that violation the Equal Protection Clause requiresstate action motivated discriminatory intent, Hernandez New York, 500 352, 372373 (OConnor, J., concurring judgment), and that official action will not held unconstitutional solely because results racially disproportionate impact, Arlington Heights Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 252, 264265.  Respondents cannot prove that the action here reflects racially discriminatory purpose, for any law expressly requiring state actors afford all persons equal protection the laws does not cannotdeny to any person equal protection the laws, Const., Amdt. 14, 1.  Pp. 1517.

JUSTICE BREYER agreed that the amendment consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, but for different reasons.  First, this case addresses the amendment only applies to, and forbids, raceconscious admissions programs that consider race solely order toobtain the educational benefits diverse student body.  Second, the 
Syllabus 
Constitution permits, but does not require, the use the kind race-conscious programs now barred the Michigan Constitution.It foresees the ballot box, not the courts, the normal instrument for resolving debates about the merits these programs.  Third, Hunter Erickson, 393 385, and Washington Seattle School Dist. No. 458 457, which reflect the important principle thatan individuals ability participate meaningfully the political process should independent his race, not apply here.  Those cases involved restructuring the political process that changed thepolitical level which policies were enacted, while this case involvesan amendment that took decisionmaking authority away from unelected actors and placed the hands the voters.  Hence, this case does not involve diminution the minoritys ability participate the political process.  Extending the holding Hunter and Seattle situations where decisionmaking authority moved from administrative body political one would also create significant difficulties, given the nature the administrative process.  Furthermore, the principle underlying Hunter and Seattle runs against competing principle favoring decisionmaking through the democratic process.  Pp. 16.
 KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment the Court and delivered anopinion, which ROBERTS, J., and ALITO, J., joined.  ROBERTS, J., filed concurring opinion.  SCALIA, J., filed opinion concurring the judgment, which THOMAS, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed opinion concurring the judgment. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed dissenting opinion, which GINSBURG, J., joined.  KAGAN, J., took part the consideration decision the case. 
Opinion KENNEDY, 
NOTICE: This opinion subject formal revision before publication thepreliminary print the United States Reports. Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter Decisions, Supreme Court the United States, Washington, 20543, any typographical other formal errors, orderthat corrections may made before the preliminary print goes press. 

SUPREME COURT THE UNITED STATES 
No. 12682 
BILL SCHUETTE, ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHI-
GAN, PETITIONER COALITION DEFEND AF- 
FIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION AND IMMI- 
GRANT RIGHTS AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITY ANY MEANS NECESSARY (BAMN), AL. WRIT CERTIORARI THE UNITED STATES COURT 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 
[April 22, 2014] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY announced the judgment the Court and delivered opinion, which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE ALITO join. 
The Court this case must determine whether amendment the Constitution the State Michigan, approved and enacted its voters, invalid under theEqual Protection Clause the Fourteenth Amendment tothe Constitution the United States. 2003 the Court reviewed the constitutionality twoadmissions systems the University Michigan, one for its undergraduate class and one for its law school.  The undergraduate admissions plan was addressed Gratz Bollinger, 539 244.  The law school admission plan was addressed Grutter Bollinger, 539 306.  Each admissions process permitted the explicit consideration applicants race. Gratz, the Court invalidated the undergraduate plan violation the Equal ProtectionClause. 539 S., 270. Grutter, the Court found 
Opinion KENNEDY, 
constitutional flaw the law school admission plans more limited use race-based preferences.  539 S., 
343. response the Courts decision Gratz, the university revised its undergraduate admissions process, but the revision still allowed limited use race-based preferences. After statewide debate the question racial preferences the context governmental decisionmaking, the voters, 2006, adopted amendment the State Constitution prohibiting state and other governmental entities Michigan from granting certain preferences, includingrace-based preferences, wide range actions and decisions. Under the terms the amendment, race-based preferences cannot part the admissions process for state universities. That particular prohibition central the instant case. 
The ballot proposal was called Proposal and, after passed margin percent percent, the resulting enactment became Article 26, the MichiganConstitution. noted, the amendment broad terms. Section states, relevant part, follows: 
(1) The University Michigan, Michigan StateUniversity, Wayne State University, and any other public college university, community college, orschool district shall not discriminate against, grant preferential treatment to, any individual group onthe basis race, sex, color, ethnicity, national origin the operation public employment, public education, public contracting. 
(2) The state shall not discriminate against, grant preferential treatment to, any individual group the basis race, sex, color, ethnicity, national origin the operation public employment, public education, public contracting. 
(3) For the purposes this section state includes, 
Opinion KENNEDY, 
but not necessarily limited to, the state itself, any city, county, any public college, university, community college, school district, other political subdivision governmental instrumentality within theState Michigan not included sub-section 1. 
Section was challenged two cases. Among theplaintiffs the suits were the Coalition Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality Any Means Necessary (BAMN); students;faculty; and prospective applicants Michigan publicuniversities. The named defendants included then-Governor Jennifer Granholm, the Board Regents theUniversity Michigan, the Board Trustees Michigan State University, and the Board Governors WayneState University.  The Michigan Attorney General was granted leave intervene defendant.  The United States District Court for the Eastern District Michiganconsolidated the cases. 2008, the District Court granted summary judgmentto Michigan, thus upholding Proposal BAMN Regents Univ. Mich., 539 Supp. 924. The District Court denied motion reconsider the grant summary judgment. 592 Supp. 948. panel the United States Court Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the grantof summary judgment. 652 607 (2011). Judge Gibbons dissented from that holding. Id., 633646.  The panel majority held that Proposal had violated the principles elaborated this Court Washington Seattle School Dist. No. 458 457 (1982), and the casesthat Seattle relied upon. 
The Court Appeals, sitting banc, agreed with thepanel decision. 701 466 (CA6 2012). The majorityopinion determined that Seattle mirrors the [case] before us. Id., 475.  Seven judges dissented number opinions. The Court granted certiorari.  568 ___ 
Opinion KENNEDY, 
(2013).
Before the Court addresses the question presented, important note what this case not about. not about the constitutionality, the merits, race-conscious admissions policies higher education.  The consideration race admissions presents complex questions, inpart addressed last Term Fisher University Texas Austin, 570  (2013). Fisher, the Court did not disturb the principle that the consideration race admissions permissible, provided that certain conditions are met. this case, Fisher, that principle not challenged. The question here concerns not the permissibility race-conscious admissions policies under theConstitution but whether, and what manner, voters the States may choose prohibit the consideration racial preferences governmental decisions, particularwith respect school admissions.
This Court has noted that some States have decided prohibit race-conscious admissions policies. Grutter, the Court noted: Universities California, Florida, and Washington State, where racial preferences admissionsare prohibited state law, are currently engaged experimenting with wide variety alternative approaches. Universities other States can and should draw the most promising aspects these race-neutral alternatives they develop. 539 S., 342 (citing United States Lopez, 514 549, 581 (1995)(KENNEDY, J., concurring) ([T]he States may performtheir role laboratories for experimentation devisevarious solutions where the best solution far from clear)). this way, Grutter acknowledged the significance dialogue regarding this contested and complex policy question among and within States.  There was recognition that our federal structure permits innovation and experimentation and enables greater citizen involvement democratic processes.  Bond United States, 564 ,  (2011) (slip op., (quoting Gregory Ashcroft, 501 452, 458 (1991)). While this case arises Michigan, the decision the States voters reflects part the national dialogue regarding the wisdom and practicality race-conscious admissions policies higher education. See, e.g., Coalition for Economic Equity Wilson, 122 692 (CA9 1997). Michigan, the State Constitution invests independent boards trustees with plenary authority over public universities, including admissions policies.  Mich. Const., Art. VIII, 5; see also Federated Publications, Inc. Board Trustees Mich. State Univ., 460 Mich. 75, 8687, 594 491, 497 (1999).  Although the members the boards are elected, some evidence the record suggeststhey delegated authority over admissions policy the faculty. But whether the boards the faculty set thespecific policy, Michigans public universities did consider race factor admissions decisions before 2006. holding 26 invalid the context student admissions state universities, the Court Appeals relied inprimary part Seattle, supra, which deemed control the case. But that determination extends Seattles holdingin case presenting quite different issues reach conclusion that mistaken here.  Before explaining thisfurther, necessary consider the relevant cases thatpreceded Seattle and the background against which Seattle itself arose. 
Though has not been prominent the arguments the parties, this Courts decision Reitman Mulkey, 387 369 (1967), proper beginning point for discussing the controlling decisions. Mulkey, voters amended the California Constitution prohibit any statelegislative interference with owners prerogative todecline sell rent residential property any basis.Two different cases gave rise Mulkey. one couplecould not rent apartment, and the other couple 
Opinion KENNEDY, 
were evicted from their apartment.  Those adverse actions were account race. both cases the complaining parties were barred, account race, from invoking the protection Californias statutes; and, result, theywere unable lease residential property. This Court concluded that the state constitutional provision was adenial equal protection.  The Court agreed with the California Supreme Court that the amendment operated insinuate the State into the decision discriminate encouraging that practice.  The Court noted the immediate design and intent the amendment was establis[h] purported constitutional right privately discriminate. Id., 374 (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis deleted). The Court agreed that the amendmentexpressly authorized and constitutionalized the privateright discriminate.  Id., 376. The effect the state constitutional amendment was significantly encourage and involve the State private racial discriminations. Id., 381. dissent joined three other Justices,Justice Harlan disagreed with the majoritys holding.  Id., 387. The dissent reasoned that California, the action its voters, simply wanted the State remain neutral inthis area, that the State was not party discrimination. Id., 389. That dissenting voice did not prevail against the majoritys conclusion that the state action inquestion encouraged discrimination, causing real and specific injury.
The next precedent relevance, Hunter Erickson, 393 385 (1969), central the arguments the respondents make the instant case. Hunter, the Court for the first time elaborated what the Court Appeals herestyled the political process doctrine.  There, the Akron City Council found that the citizens Akron consisted people different race[s], many whom live incircumscribed and segregated areas, under sub-standard unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded condi
Opinion KENNEDY, 
tions, because discrimination the sale, lease, rental and financing housing. Id., 391. address the problem, Akron enacted fair housing ordinance prohibit that sort discrimination. response, votersamended the city charter overturn the ordinance and torequire that any additional antidiscrimination housing ordinance approved referendum. But most other ordinances regulating the real property market were not subject those threshold requirements. Id., 390. The plaintiff, black woman Akron, Ohio, alleged that herreal estate agent could not show her certain residencesbecause the owners had specified they would not sell toblack persons.
Central the Courts reasoning Hunter was that the charter amendment was enacted circumstances where widespread racial discrimination the sale and rental ofhousing led segregated housing, forcing many live unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded conditions.  Id., 391. The Court stated: It against thisbackground that the referendum required [the charter amendment] must assessed. Ibid.  Akron attempted tocharacterize the charter amendment simply publicdecision move slowly the delicate area race relations and means to allow the people Akron toparticipate the decision. Id., 392.  The Court rejected Akrons flawed justifications for its discrimination, justifications that their own terms had the effect acknowledging the targeted nature the charter amendment. Ibid.  The Court noted, furthermore, that the charter amendment was unnecessary general means public control over the city council; for the people Akronalready were empowered overturn ordinances referendum. Id., 390,  The Court found that the citycharter amendment, singling out antidiscrimination ordinances, places special burden racial minoritieswithin the governmental process, thus becoming
Opinion KENNEDY, 
permissible any other government action taken withthe invidious intent injure racial minority.  Id., 391. Justice Harlan filed concurrence. argued the citycharter amendment has the clear purpose making itmore difficult for certain racial and religious minorities toachieve legislation that their interest. Id., 395. But without regard the sentence just quoted, Hunter rests the unremarkable principle that the State may not alter the procedures government target racial minorities. The facts Hunter established that invidious discrimination would the necessary result the procedural restructuring.  Thus, Mulkey and Hunter, there was demonstrated injury the basis race that, byreasons state encouragement participation, becamemore aggravated.
 Seattle the third case principal relevance here.There, the school board adopted mandatory busing program alleviate racial isolation minority studentsin local schools. Voters who opposed the school boards busing plan passed state initiative that barred busing todesegregate. The Court first determined that, althoughwhite well Negro children benefit from diversity, the school boards plan inures primarily the benefit ofthe minority. 458 S., 472.  The Court next found that the practical effect the state initiative was toremov[e] the authority address racial problemand only racial problemfrom the existing decisionmaking body, such way burden minority interests because advocates busing now must seek relief from the state legislature, from the statewide electorate.  Id., 
474. The Court therefore found that the initiative had explicitly us[ed] the racial nature decision determine the decisionmaking process.  Id., 470 (emphasis deleted). 
Seattle best understood case which the state action question (the bar busing enacted the 
Opinion KENNEDY, 
States voters) had the serious risk, not purpose, causing specific injuries account race, just hadbeen the case Mulkey and Hunter. Although there hadbeen judicial finding jure segregation with respect Seattles school district, appears though school segregation the district the 1940s and 1950s may have been the partial result school board policies thatpermitted white students transfer out black schools while restricting the transfer black students into white schools. Parents Involved Community Schools Seattle School Dist. No. 551 701, 807808 (2007) (BREYER, J., dissenting). 1977, the National Association for the Advancement Colored People (NAACP) fileda complaint with the Office for Civil Rights, federal agency.  The NAACP alleged that the school board had maintained system jure segregation. Specifically,the complaint alleged that the Seattle School Board hadcreated perpetuated unlawful racial segregationthrough, e.g., certain school-transfer criteria, construction program that needlessly built new schools whiteareas, district line-drawing criteria, the maintenance ofinferior facilities black schools, the use explicit racial criteria the assignment teachers and other staff, and general pattern delay respect the implementation promised desegregation efforts.  Id., 810. part settlement with the Office for Civil Rights, the school board implemented the Seattle Plan, which used busing and mandatory reassignments between elementary schools reduce racial imbalance and which was the subject the state initiative issue Seattle. See 551 S., 807812. this Court held Parents Involved, the school boards purported remedial action would not permissible today absent showing jure segregation.  Id., 720721. That holding prompted JUSTICE BREYER observe dissent, noted above, that one permissible 
Opinion KENNEDY, 
reading the record was that the school board had maintained policies perpetuate racial segregation theschools. all events must understand Seattle Seattle understood itself, case which neither the State nor the United States challenge[d] the propriety race-conscious student assignments for the purpose ofachieving integration, even absent finding prior jure segregation. 458 472, 15. other words the legitimacy and constitutionality the remedyin question (busing for desegregation) was assumed, and Seattle must understood that basis. Ibid. Seattle involved state initiative that was carefully tailored tointerfere only with desegregative busing.  Id., 471. The Seattle Court, accepting the validity the school boards busing remedy predicate its analysis the constitutional question, found that the States disapproval theschool boards busing remedy was aggravation the very racial injury which the State itself was complicit. 
The broad language used Seattle, however, went well beyond the analysis needed resolve the case. The Court there seized upon the statement Justice Harlans concurrence Hunter that the procedural change that casehad the clear purpose making more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities achieve legislation that their interest.  385 S., 395.  That language, taken the context the facts Hunter, best read simply describe the necessity for finding anequal protection violation where specific injuries fromhostile discrimination were issue.  The Seattle Court, however, used the language from the Hunter concurrence establish new and far-reaching rationale.  Seattle stated that where government policy inures primarilyto the benefit the minority and minorities con- sider the policy  in their interest,  then any state action that place[s] effective decisionmaking authority over that policy at different level government must 
Opinion KENNEDY, reviewed under strict scrutiny.  458 S., 472, 474. essence, according the broad reading Seattle, any state action with racial focus that makes more difficult for certain racial minorities than for other groups achieve legislation that their interest subject tostrict scrutiny. this reading Seattle that the Court Appeals found controlling here.  And that reading must rejected.
The broad rationale that the Court Appeals adopted goes beyond the necessary holding and the meaning the precedents said support it; and the instant caseneither the formulation the general rule just set forth nor the precedents cited authenticate suffice invalidate Proposal The expansive reading Seattle has principled limitation and raises serious questions compatibility with the Courts settled equal protection jurisprudence. the extent Seattle read require the Court determine and declare which political policiesserve the interest group defined racial terms, thatrationale was unnecessary the decision Seattle; has support precedent; and raises serious constitutional concerns. That expansive language does not providea proper guide for decisions and should not deemed authoritative controlling. The rule that the Court Appeals elaborated and respondents seek establish here would contradict central equal protection principles. cautioning against impermissible racial stereotypes, this Court has rejected the assumption that members the same racial groupregardless their age, education, economic status, the community which they livethink alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates the polls. Shaw Reno, 509 630, 647 (1993); see also Metro Broadcasting, Inc. FCC, 497 547, 636 (1990) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (rejecting the demeaning notion that members defined racial groups ascribe certain minority views 
Opinion KENNEDY, 
that must different from those other citizens). cannot entertained serious proposition that allindividuals the same race think alike.  Yet that proposition would necessary beginning point were the Seattle formulation control, the Court Appeals held did this case. And were deemed necessary probe how some races define their own interest political matters,still another beginning point would define individuals according race. But society which those linesare becoming more blurred, the attempt define racebased categories also raises serious questions its own. Government action that classifies individuals the basis race inherently suspect and carries the danger ofperpetuating the very racial divisions the polity seeks totranscend. Cf. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 147 854, 858 (CA9 1998) (school district delineating racial categories for purposes racial balancing).Were courts embark upon this venture not only would undertaken with clear legal standards acceptedsources guide judicial decision but also would result in, least impose high risk of, inquiries and categories dependent upon demeaning stereotypes, classifications questionable constitutionality their own terms.
Even assuming these initial steps could taken amanner consistent with sound analytic and judicialframework, the court would next required determinethe policy realms which certain groupsgroups definedby racehave political interest.  That undertaking,again without guidance from any accepted legal standards, would risk, turn, the creation incentives for those who support oppose certain policies cast the debate terms racial advantage disadvantage.  Thus could racial antagonisms and conflict tend arise the context judicial decisions courts undertook announce what particular issues public policy should beclassified advantageous some group defined race. 
Opinion KENNEDY, 
This risk inherent adopting the Seattle formulation. 
There would apparent limiting standards defining what public policies should included what Seattle called policies that inur[e] primarily the benefit the minority and that minorities consider  intheir interest.   458 S., 472, 474.  Those who seek represent the interests particular racial groups couldattempt advance those aims demanding equalprotection ruling that any number matters foreclosedfrom voter review participation. nation which governmental policies are wide ranging, those who seek limit voter participation might tempted, were this Court adopt the Seattle formulation, urge that group they choose define race racial stereotypes are advantaged disadvantaged any number lawsor decisions. Tax policy, housing subsidies, wage regulations, and even the naming public schools, highways, and monuments are just few examples what could become list subjects that some organizations could insist should beyond the power voters decide, beyond the power legislature decide when enactinglimits the power local authorities other governmental entities address certain subjects.  Racial division would validated, not discouraged, were the Seattle formulation, and the reasoning the Court Appeals inthis case, remain force. 
Perhaps, when enacting policies exercise democratic self-government, voters will determine that racebased preferences should adopted.  The constitutional validity some those choices regarding racial preferences not issue here.  The holding the instant caseis simply that the courts may not disempower the votersfrom choosing which path follow. the realm policydiscussions the regular give-and-take debate ought context which rancor discord based race are avoided, not invited. And these factors are inter
Opinion KENNEDY, 
jected, surely ought not the invitation insistence the courts. 
One response these concerns may that objections the larger consequences the Seattle formulation need not confronted this case, for here race was undoubted subject the ballot issue. But number problems raised Seattle, such racial definitions, still apply. And this principal flaw the ruling the Court Appeals does remain: Here there was infliction specific injury the kind issue Mulkey and Hunter and the history the Seattle schools.  Here there precedent for extending these cases restrict the right ofMichigan voters determine that race-based preferencesgranted Michigan governmental entities should beended. should also noted that the judgment the Court ofAppeals this case necessity calls into question other long-settled rulings similar state policies. The California Supreme Court has held that California constitutional amendment prohibiting racial preferences public contracting does not violate the rule set down Seattle. Coral Constr., Inc. City and County San Francisco, Cal. 4th 315, 235 947 (2010).  The Court Appealsfor the Ninth Circuit has held that the same amendment, which also barred racial preferences public education,does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Wilson, 122 692 (1997). the Court were affirm the essential rationale the Court Appeals the instant case, thoseholdings would invalidated, least would put inserious question. The Court, affirming the judgmentnow before it, essence would announce finding that the past years state public debate this issue have been improper. And were the argument made that Coral might still stand because involved racial preferences inpublic contracting while this case concerns racial preferences university admissions, the implication would 
Opinion KENNEDY, 
that the constitutionality laws forbidding racial preferences depends the policy interest stake, the concernthat, already explained, the voters deem wise avoid because its divisive potential. The instant case presents the question involved Coral and Wilson but not involved Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle. That question not howto address prevent injury caused account race butwhether voters may determine whether policy racebased preferences should continued. approving Proposal and thereby adding 26 their State Constitution, the Michigan voters exercised theirprivilege enact laws basic exercise their democratic power. the federal system States respond, through the enactment positive law, the initiative those who seek voice shaping the destiny their own times. Bond, 564 S.,  (slip op., 9).  Michiganvoters used the initiative system bypass public officials who were deemed not responsive the concerns amajority the voters with respect policy grantingrace-based preferences that raises difficult and delicateissues. 
The freedom secured the Constitution consists, oneof its essential dimensions, the right the individualnot injured the unlawful exercise governmental power. The mandate for segregated schools, Brown Board Education, 347 483 (1954); wrongful invasion the home, Silverman United States, 365 505 (1961); punishing protester whose viewsoffend others, Texas Johnson, 491 397 (1989); and scores other examples teach that individual liberty has constitutional protection, and that libertys full extent and meaning may remain yet discovered and affirmed.Yet freedom does not stop with individual rights. Our constitutional system embraces, too, the right citizens todebate they can learn and decide and then, through the political process, act concert try shape the course 
Opinion KENNEDY, their own times and the course nation that must strive always make freedom ever greater and more secure. Here Michigan voters acted concert and statewide seek consensus and adopt policy difficult subject against historical background race America that has been source tragedy and persisting injustice. That history demands that continue learn,to listen, and remain open new approaches areto aspire always constitutional order which allpersons are treated with fairness and equal dignity.  Were the Court rule that the question addressed Michiganvoters too sensitive complex within the grasp the electorate; that the policies issue remain toodelicate resolved save university officials faculties, acting some remove from immediate public scrutiny and control; that these matters are arcane thatthe electorates power must limited because the people cannot prudently exercise that power even after full debate, that holding would unprecedented restriction the exercise fundamental right held notjust one person but all common. the right speak and debate and learn and then, matter political will, act through lawful electoral process.
The respondents this case insist that difficult question public policy must taken from the reach thevoters, and thus removed from the realm public discussion, dialogue, and debate election campaign.  Quite addition the serious First Amendment implications that position with respect any particular election, inconsistent with the underlying premises responsible, functioning democracy.  One those premises that democracy has the capacityand the dutyto learnfrom its past mistakes; discover and confront persistingbiases; and respectful, rationale deliberation rise above those flaws and injustices. That process impeded,not advanced, court decrees based the proposition 
Opinion KENNEDY, 
that the public cannot have the requisite repose discusscertain issues. demeaning the democratic process presume that the voters are not capable deciding anissue this sensitivity decent and rational grounds. The process public discourse and political debate should not foreclosed even there risk that during public campaign there will those, both sides, who seek use racial division and discord their own political advantage. informed public can, and must, rise above this. The idea democracy that can, and must, mature. Freedom embraces the right, indeed the duty, engage rational, civic discourse order determine how best form consensus shape the destiny the Nation and its people. These First Amendment dynamicswould disserved this Court were say that the question here issue beyond the capacity the voters todebate and then determine. 
These precepts are not inconsistent with the wellestablished principle that when hurt injury inflicted racial minorities the encouragement command laws other state action, the Constitution requires redress the courts.  Cf. Johnson California, 543 499, 511512 (2005) ([S]earching judicial review necessary guard against invidious discrimination); Edmonson Leesville Concrete Co., 500 614, 619 (1991) (Racial discrimination invidious all contexts). already noted, those were the circumstancesthat the Court found present Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle. But those circumstances are not present here. 
For reasons already discussed, Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle are not precedents that stand for the conclusion that Michigans voters must disempowered from acting.Those cases were ones which the political restriction question was designed used, was likely used, encourage infliction injury reason race.  What stake here not whether injury will inflicted but 
Opinion KENNEDY, 
whether government can instructed not follow course that entails, first, the definition racial categories and, second, the grant favored status persons someracial categories and not others.  The electorates instruction governmental entities not embark upon the course race-defined and race-based preferences wasadopted, must assume, because the voters deemed preference system unwise, account what votersmay deem its latent potential become itself source ofthe very resentments and hostilities based race that this Nation seeks put behind it. Whether those adverse results would follow is, and should be, the subject debate. Voters might likewise consider, after debate andreflection, that programs designed increase diversityconsistent with the Constitutionare necessary part progress transcend the stigma past racism. 
This case not about how the debate about racial preferences should resolved. about who may resolve it. There authority the Constitution the UnitedStates this Courts precedents for the Judiciary set aside Michigan laws that commit this policy determinationto the voters. See Sailors Board Ed. County Kent, 387 105, 109 (1967) (Save and unless the state, county, municipal government runs afoul afederally protected right, has vast leeway the management its internal affairs).  Deliberative debate sensitive issues such racial preferences all too often may shade into rancor.  But that does not justify removingcertain court-determined issues from the voters reach. Democracy does not presume that some subjects are eithertoo divisive too profound for public debate. 
The judgment the Court Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. ordered.
 JUSTICE KAGAN took part the consideration decision this case. 
ROBERTS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT THE UNITED STATES 
No. 12682 
BILL SCHUETTE, ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHI-
GAN, PETITIONER COALITION DEFEND AF- 
FIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION AND IMMI- 
GRANT RIGHTS AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITY ANY MEANS NECESSARY (BAMN), AL. WRIT CERTIORARI THE UNITED STATES COURT 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 
[April 22, 2014]

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, concurring. 
The dissent devotes pages expounding its own policy preferences favor taking race into account incollege admissions, while nonetheless concluding that do[es] not mean suggest that the virtues adoptingrace-sensitive admissions policies should inform the legalquestion before the Court. Post, (opinion SOTOMAYOR, J.).  The dissent concedes that the governing boards the States various universities could have implemented policy making illegal discriminateagainst, grant preferential treatment to, any individual the basis race.  See post, 3435. the dissents view, the governing boards conclude that drawing racial distinctions university admissions undesirable counterproductive, they are permissibly exercising their policymaking authority.  But others who might reachthe same conclusion are failing take race seriously. 
The dissent states that [t]he way stop discrimination the basis race speak openly and candidly the subject race.  Post, 46. And urges that [r]acematters because the slights, the snickers, the silentjudgments that reinforce that most crippling thoughts: 
ROBERTS, J., concurring 
I not belong here.  Ibid. But not out touch with reality conclude that racial preferences maythemselves have the debilitating effect reinforcing precisely that doubt, andif sothat the preferences domore harm than good.  Post, 45. disagree with the dissents views the costs and benefits racial preferences not wish away, rather than confront racial inequality. Post, 46. People can disagree good faith this issue, but similarly does more harm than good question the openness and candor those either side the debate.* 
 JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR question the relationshipbetween Washington Seattle School Dist. No. 458 457 (1982), and Parents Involved Community Schools Seattle School Dist. No. 551 701 (2007).  See post, (SCALIA, J., concurring judgment); post, 23, (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).  The pluralitytoday addresses that issue, explaining that the race-conscious action Parents Involved was unconstitutional given the absence showingof prior jure segregation. Parents Involved, supra, 720721 (majority opinion), 736 (plurality opinion); see ante, Todays plurality notes that the Court Seattle assumed the constitutionality the busing remedy issue there,  even absent finding prior jure segregation.   Ante, (quoting Seattle, supra, 472, 15). The assumption which Seattle proceeded did not constitute finding sufficient justify the race-conscious action Parents Involved, though doubtless pertinent analyzing Seattle. As this Court held Parents Involved, the [Seattle] school boards purported remedialaction would not permissible today absent showing jure segregation, but we must understand Seattle Seattle understood itself. Ante, 910 (emphasis added). 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 

SUPREME COURT THE UNITED STATES 
No. 12682 
BILL SCHUETTE, ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHI-
GAN, PETITIONER COALITION DEFEND AF- 
FIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION AND IMMI- 
GRANT RIGHTS AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITY ANY MEANS NECESSARY (BAMN), AL. WRIT CERTIORARI THE UNITED STATES COURT 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 
[April 22, 2014] 

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,concurring the judgment. has come this. Called upon explore the jurisprudential twilight zone between two errant lines precedent, confront frighteningly bizarre question: Does the Equal Protection Clause the Fourteenth Amendment forbid what its text plainly requires? Needless say(except that this case obliges say it), the questionanswers itself. The Constitution proscribes governmentdiscrimination the basis race, and state-provided education exception. Grutter Bollinger, 539 306, 349 (2003) (SCALIA, J., concurring part and dissenting part). precisely this understandingthe correct understandingof the federal Equal ProtectionClause that the people the State Michigan have adopted for their own fundamental law. adopting it,they did not simultaneously offend it. 
Even taking this Courts sorry line race-basedadmissions cases given, find the question presented only slightly less strange: Does the Equal ProtectionClause forbid State from banning practice that theClause barelyand only provisionallypermits? React
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 
ing those race-based-admissions decisions, some Stateswhether deterred the prospect costly litigation; aware that Grutters bell may soon toll, see 539 S., 343; simply opposed principle the notion benign racial discriminationhave gotten out the racial-preferences business altogether. And with our express encouragement: Universities California, Flor-ida, and Washington State, where racial preferences admissions are prohibited state law, are currently engaging experimenting with wide variety alternative approaches. Universities other States can and should draw the most promising aspects these raceneutral alternatives they develop. Id., 342 (emphasis added). Respondents seem think this admonition was merely jest.1 The experiment, they maintain, notonly over; never rightly began.  Neither the people the States nor their legislatures ever had the option directing subordinate public-university officials cease considering the race applicants, since that would deny members those minority groups the option enacting policy designed further their interest, thus denying them the equal protection the laws.  Never mind that hotly disputed whether the practice race-based admissions ever racial minoritys interest. Cf. id., 371373 (THOMAS, J., concurring part and dissenting part). And never mind that, were public university stake its defense race-based-admissions policy theground that was designed benefit primarily minorities (as opposed all students, regardless color, enhancing diversity), would hold the policy unconstitutional. See id., 322325. 
But the battleground for this case not the constitu
 1For simplicitys sake, use respondent respondents throughout the opinion describe only those parties who are adverse topetitioner, not Eric Russell, respondent who supports petitioner. 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 
tionality race-based admissionsat least, not quite. Rather, the so-called political-process doctrine, derived from this Courts opinions Washington Seattle School Dist. No. 458 457 (1982), and Hunter Erickson, 393 385 (1969). agree with those parts the plurality opinion that repudiate this doctrine.  But not agree with its reinterpretation Seattle and Hunter, which makes them stand part for the cloudy and doctrinally anomalous proposition that whenever state action poses the serious risk causing specific injuries account race, denies equal protection. Ante, would instead reaffirm that the ordinary principles ourlaw [and] our democratic heritage require plaintiffs alleging equal protection violations stemming from fa- cially neutral acts prove intent and causation and not merely the existence racial disparity. Freeman Pitts, 503 467, 506 (1992) (SCALIA, J., concurring) (citing Washington Davis, 426 229 (1976)). would further hold that law directing state actors provide equalprotection (to say the least) facially neutral, and cannot violate the Constitution. Section the Michigan Constitution (formerly Proposal rightly stands. 

The political-process doctrine has its roots two our cases. The first Hunter. 1964, the Akron City Council passed fair-housing ordinance assur[ing] equalopportunity all persons live decent housing facilities regardless race, color, religion, ancestry national origin.  393 S., 386.  Soon after, the citys voters passed amendment the Akron City Charter statingthat any ordinance enacted the council that regulates commercial transactions real property on the basis race, color, religion, national origin ancestryincluding the already enacted 1964 ordinancemust first 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment approved majority the electors voting thequestion later referendum.  Id., 387. The questionwas whether the charter amendment denied equal protection. Answering yes, the Court explained that althoughthe law its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentilein identical manner, the reality that the laws impactfalls the minority. The majority needs protection against discrimination.  Id., 391. placing specialburden racial minorities within the governmentalprocesses, the amendment disadvantage[d] racialminority by making more difficult enact legislation its behalf.  Id., 391, 393. 
The reasoning Seattle piece.  Resolving eliminate all [racial] imbalance from the Seattle public schools, the city school board passed mandatory busing and pupil-reassignment plan the sort typically imposedon districts guilty jure segregation. 458 S., 460461. year later, the citizens the State Washington passed Initiative 350, which directed (with exceptions) that no school shall directly indirectly require any student attend school other than the school which geographically nearest next nearest the students place residence and which offers the course study pursued such student, permitting only courtordered race-based busing.  Id., 462. The lower courts held Initiative 350 unconstitutional, and affirmed, announcing the prelude our analysisas though were beyond debatethat the Equal Protection Clauseforbade laws that subtly distor[t] governmental processes such way place special burdens the ability ofminority groups achieve beneficial legislation.  Id., 
467. 
The first question Seattle was whether the subjectmatter Initiative 350 was racial issue, triggering Hunter and its process doctrine.  458 S., 471472. was undoubtedly. true that whites and blacks were 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 
counted among both the supporters and the opponents ofInitiative 350. Id., 472. was equally clear that both white and black children benefitted from desegre- gated schools. Ibid. Nonetheless, concluded that desegregation inures primarily the benefit the minority, andis designed for that purpose.  Ibid. (emphasis added). any event, was enough that minorities may consider busing for integration legislation that theirinterest.  Id., 474 (quoting Hunter, supra, 395 (Harlan, J., concurring)). proceeded the heart the political-processanalysis. held Initiative 350 unconstitutional, since removed the authority address racial problemand only racial problemfrom the existing decisionmaking body, such way burden minority interests. Seattle, 458 S., 474.  Although school boards inWashington retained authority over other studentassignment issues and over most matters educational policy generally, under Initiative 350, minorities favoring race-based busing would have surmount considerablyhigher hurdle than the mere petitioning local assembly: They now must seek relief from the state legislature, from the statewide electorate, different level government.  Ibid. 
The relentless logic Hunter and Seattle would point similar conclusion this case. those cases, one level government exercised borrowed authority over apparently racial issue, until higher level government called the loan. too here. those cases, deemed the revocation equal-protection violation regardless whether facially classified according race reflectedan invidious purpose discriminate.  Here, the Court Appeals did the same.
The plurality sees differently. Though it, too, dis-avows the political-process-doctrine basis which Hunter and Seattle were decided, ante, 1014, does not take 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 
the next step overruling those cases. Rather, reinterprets them beyond recognition. Hunter, the pluralitysuggests, was case which the challenged act had target[ed] racial minorities.  Ante, Maybe, but the Hunter Court neither found that nor considered relevant, bypassing the question intent entirely, satisfied that its newly minted political-process theory sufficedto invalidate the charter amendment. for Seattle, what was really going on, according theplurality, was that Initiative 350 had the consequence (if not the purpose) preserving the harms effected prior jure segregation.  Thus, the political restriction inquestion was designed used, was likely used, encourage infliction injury reason race.  Ante, 17. That conclusion derived not from the opinion butfrom recently discovered evidence that the city Seattle had been cause its schools racial imbalance all along: Although there had been judicial finding juresegregation with respect Seattles school district, itappears though school segregation the district the1940s and 1950s may have been the partial result ofschool board policies. Ante, 9.2 That the districts effort end racial imbalance had been stymied Initiative 350 meant that the people, passing it, somehow had become complicit Seattles equal-protection-denying status quo, whether they knew not.  Hence, there was Seattle government-furthered infliction 
 2The plurality cites evidence from JUSTICE BREYERs dissent Parents Involved Community Schools Seattle School Dist. No. 551 701 (2007), suggest that the city had been partial cause ofits segregation problem.  Ante, The plurality Parents Involved criticized that dissent for relying irrelevant evidence, for elid[ingthe] distinction between jure and facto segregation, and for casually intimat[ing] that Seattles school attendance patterns reflect[ed] illegal segregation.  551 S., 736737, and 15.  Todays plurality sides with the dissent and repeats its errors. 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 
specificand, presumably, constitutionalinjury.  Ante, 14. 
Once again this describes what our opinion Seattle might have been, but assuredly not what was.  The opinion assumes throughout that Seattles schools suffered most from facto segregation, see, e.g., 458 S., 474, 475that is, segregation not the product state action but private choices, having constitutionalimplications, Freeman, 503 S., 495496.  Nor did anywhere state that the current racial imbalance was the (judicially remediable) effect prior jure segregation.  Absence jure segregation the effects jure segregation was necessary premise the Seattle opinion. That what made the issue busing and pupil reassignment matter political choice rather thanjudicial mandate.3 And precisely because was questionfor the political branches decide, the mannerwhich isto say, the processof its resolution implicated the Courts new process theory. The opinion itself says this: [I]n theabsence constitutional violation, the desirability and efficacy school desegregation are matters resolvedthough the political process.  For present purposes, isenough [to hold reallocation that political decision higher level unconstitutional] that minorities may consider busing for integration legislation that their interest. 458 S., 474 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Patently atextual, unadministrable, and contrary our traditional equal-protection jurisprudence, Hunter and  
3Or the Court assumed.  See 458 S., 472, (Appellantsand the United States not challenge the propriety race-consciousstudent assignments for the purpose achieving integration, even absent finding prior jure segregation. therefore not specifically pass that issue). 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 
Seattle should overruled. 
The problems with the political-process doctrine beginwith its triggering prong, which assigns court the taskof determining whether law that reallocates policy- making authority concerns racial issue. Seattle, 458 S., 473. Seattle takes couple dissatisfying cracks atdefining this crucial term. suggests that issue isracial adopting one position the question would at bottom inur[e] primarily the benefit the minority, andis designed for that purpose.  Id., 472. irrelevant that, Hunter and Seattle, 458 S., 472, both the racial minority and the racial majority benefit from the policy question, and members both groups favor it. Judges should instead focus their guesswork their own juridical sense what primarily for the benefit minorities. Cf. ibid. (regarding dispositive what ourcases suggest beneficial minorities). second thought, maybe judges need only ask this question: possible that minorities may consider the policy question in their interest? Id., 474. so, you can besure that you are dealing with racial issue.4 
 4The dissents version this test just scattershot.  Since, according the dissent, the doctrine forbids reconfigur[ing] the politicalprocess manner that burdens only racial minority, post, (opinion SOTOMAYOR, J.) (emphasis added), must that that thereason the underlying issue (that is, the issue concerning which the process has been reconfigured) racial that the policy question benefits only racial minority (if also benefitted persons not belonging racial majority, then the political-process reconfiguration would burden them well). second thought: The issue racial the policy benefits primarily racial minority and  [is] designed for thatpurpose,  post, 44. This the standard Seattle purported apply.But under that standard, 26 does not affect racial issue, becauseunder Grutter Bollinger, 539 306 (2003), race-based admissions policies may not constitutionally designed for [the] purpose, Seattle, supra, 472, benefitting primarily racial minorities, butmust designed for the purpose achieving educational benefits for students all races, Grutter, supra, 322325. the dissent must 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment good can come such random judicial musing.  The plurality gives two convincing reasons why.  For one thing,it involves judges the dirty business dividing the Nation into racial blocs, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. FCC, 497 547, 603, 610 (1990) (OConnor, J., dissenting); ante, 1113.  That task difficult unappealing. (Does half-Latino, halfAmerican Indian haveLatino interests, American-Indian interests, both, half both?5) What worse, the exercise promotes the noxious fiction that, knowing only persons color ethnicity, can sure that has predetermined set policy interests, thus reinforc[ing] the perception that members the same racial groupregardless their age,education, economic status, the community whichthey livethink alike, [and] share the same politicalinterests.6 Shaw Reno, 509 630, 647 (1993).Whether done judge school board, such racialstereotyping [is] odds with equal protection mandates. Miller Johnson, 515 900, 920 (1995).
But that not the racial issue prongs only defect.More fundamentally, misreads the Equal ProtectionClause protect particular group[s], construction thatwe have tirelessly repudiated long line cases understanding equal protection personal right. 
 mean that issue racial long the policy question has theincidental effect (an effect not flowing from its design) benefiting primarily racial minorities. 5And how many members particular racial group must take thesame position issue before suppose that the position the entire groups interest?  Not every member, the dissent suggests, post, 44. Beyond that, who knows? Five percent? Eighty-five percent? 6The dissent proves point.  After assertingwithout citation,though and many others all races deny itthat common-sense reality that affirmative action benefits racial minorities, post, 16, the dissent suggests throughout, e.g., post, 30, that that view reality necessarily shared members racial minorities thatthey must favor affirmative action. 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. Pea, 515 200, 224, 230 (1995). basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments the Constitution protect persons, not groups. Id., 227; Metro Broadcasting, supra, 636 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting).7  Yet Seattle insists that only those political-process alterations that burden racial minorities deny equal protection.  The majority, after all,needs protection against discrimination. 458 S., 468 (quoting Hunter, 393 S., 391). the years since Seattle, have repeatedly rejected a reading the guarantee equal protection under which the level scrutiny varies according the ability different groups defend their interests the representative process. Richmond Croson Co., 488 469, 495 (1989).Meant obliterate rather than endorse the practice racial classifications, the Fourteenth Amendments guarantees obtai[n] with equal force regardless the race ofthose burdened benefitted.  Miller, supra, 904 (quoting Croson, supra, 494 (plurality opinion)); Adarand, supra, 223, 227.  The Equal Protection Clausecannot mean one thing when applied one individualand something else when applied person another color. both are not accorded the same protection notequal. Regents Univ. Cal. Bakke, 438 265, 289290 (1978) (opinion Powell, J.). 
The dissent trots out the old saw, derived from dictum footnote, that legislation motivated prejudice 
 7The dissent contends, post, 39, that this point ignores the obvious: Discrimination against individual occurs because that individuals membership particular group.  No, not ignore the obvious; the dissent that misses the point. course discrimination against group constitutes discrimination against each member ofthat group.  But since persons and not groups that are protected,one cannot say, the dissent would, that the Constitution prohibitsdiscrimination against minority groups, but not against majority groups. 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 
against discrete and insular minorities merits more exacting judicial scrutiny. Post, (quoting United States Carolene Products, 304 144, 152153, 4). say derived from that dictum (expressed the four-Justice majority seven-Justice Court) because the dictum itself merely said [n]or need enquire whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may special condition, id., 153, (emphasis added). The dissent does not argue, course, that suchprejudice produced 26.  Nor does explain why certainracial minorities Michigan qualify insular, meaning that other groups will not form coalitions with themand, critically, not because lack common interests but because prejudice.  Strauss, Carolene Products Obsolete? 2010 Ill. Rev. 1251, 1257.  Nor does even make the case that groups discreteness and insu-larity are political liabilities rather than political strengths8a serious question that alone demonstratesthe prudence the Carolene Products dictumizers leaving the enquir[y] for another day. for the question whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily expected bring aboutrepeal undesirable legislation subjected more exacting judicial scrutiny, the Carolene Products Court found unnecessary consider [that] now. 304 S., 152, the dissent thinks that worth considering today, should explain why the election universitys governing board political process which can 
 8Cf., e.g., Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, Harv. Rev. 713, 723724 (1985) (Other things being equal, discreteness and insularity will normally source enormous bargaining advantage, not disadvantage, for group engaged pluralist American politics.Except for special cases, the concerns that underlie Carolene should lead judges protect groups that possess the opposite characteristicfrom the ones Carolene emphasizesgroups that are anonymous anddiffuse rather than discrete and insular ). 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 
ordinarily expected bring about repeal undesirablelegislation, but Michigan voters ability amend their Constitution not. seems quite the opposite. Amending the Constitution requires the approval onlya majority the electors voting the question.  Mich. Const., Art. XII, 2. contrast, voting favorableboard (each which has eight members) the threemajor public universities requires electing majorityvote least different candidates, several whom would running during different election cycles.  See BAMN Regents Univ. Mich., 701 466, 508 (CA6 2012) (Sutton, J., dissenting). Michigan voters, instead amending their Constitution, had pursued thedissents preferred path electing board members promising abolish race-sensitive admissions policies, post, would have been harder, not easier, for racial minorities favoring affirmative action overturn that decision. But the more important point that should not designour jurisprudence conform dictum footnote afour-Justice opinion. Moving from the appalling the absurd, turn now tothe second part the Hunter-Seattle analysiswhich isapparently more administrable than the first, compare post, 46 (BREYER, J., concurring judgment) (Thiscase does not involve reordering the politicalprocess), with post, 2529 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (yes, does). This part the inquiry directs court todetermine whether the challenged act place[s] effective decisionmaking authority over [the] racial issue different level government. Seattle, 458 S., 474. The laws both Hunter and Seattle were thought fail this test. both cases, the effect the challengedaction was redraw decisionmaking authority over racialmattersand only over racial mattersin such way 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment place comparative burdens minorities.  458 S., 475, 17. This, said, State may not do. contrast, another line cases, have emphasized the near-limitless sovereignty each State design its governing structure sees fit.  Generally, a State isafforded wide leeway when experimenting with the appropriate allocation state legislative power and may createpolitical subdivisions such cities and counties asconvenient agencies for exercising such the governmental powers the state may entrusted them.  Holt Civic Club Tuscaloosa, 439 60, (1978) (quoting Hunter Pittsburgh, 207 161, 178 (1907)). Accordingly, States have absolute discretion determine the number, nature and duration the powersconferred upon [municipal] corporations and the territoryover which they shall exercised. Holt Civic Club, supra, 71. would seem without saying that aState may give certain powers cities, later assign the same powers counties, and even reclaim them for itself. 
Taken the limits its logic, Hunter-Seattle the gaping exception that nearly swallows the rule structural state sovereignty. indeed the Fourteenth Amendment forbids States place effective decisionmakingauthority over racial issues different level[s] government, then must true that the Amendments ratification 1868 worked partial ossification eachStates governing structure, rendering basically irrevocable the power any subordinate state official who, theday before the Fourteenth Amendments passage, happened enjoy legislatively conferred authority over aracial issue. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, that subordinate entity (suppose city council) could itselftake action the issue, action either favorable unfavorable minorities. could even reverse itself later. What could not do, however, redelegate its power toan even lower level state government (such city
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 
council committee) without forfeiting it, since the necessary effect wresting back would put additionalobstacle the path minorities. Likewise, entityor official higher the state chain (e.g., county board) could exercise authority over the issue.  Nor, even, could the state legislature, the people constitutional amendment, revoke the legislative conferral power tothe subordinate, whether the city council, its subcommittee, the county board.  Seattles logic would createaffirmative-action safe havens wherever subordinate offi- cials public universities (1) traditionally have enjoyedeffective decisionmaking authority over admissions policy but (2) have not yet used that authority prohibit race-conscious admissions decisions.  The mere existence subordinates discretion over the matter would work kind reverse pre-emption. a strange notionalien our systemthat local governmental bodies can forever pre-empt the ability Statethe sovereign powertoaddress matter compelling concern the State.  458 S., 495 (Powell, J., dissenting).  But that precisely what the political-process doctrine contemplates. 
Perhaps the spirit Seattle especially disquieted enactments constitutional amendments. That appears the dissents position.  The problem with 26, suggests, that amending Michigans Constitution issimply not part that States existing political process. E.g., post, 41.  What peculiar notion: that arevision States fundamental law, made preciselythe manner that law prescribes, the very people who are the source that laws authority, not part thepolitical process which, but for those people and thatlaw, would not exist.  This will surely come news thepeople Michigan, who, since 1914, have amended their Constitution times. Brief for Gary Segura al. Amici Curiae 12.  Even so, the dissent concludes that the amendment attacked here worked illicit chang[ing] [of] the basic rules the political process that State the middle the game.  Post,  Why, one might ask, not the amendment provision the Michigan Constitution one (perhaps the most basic one) the rules the States political process? And why does democratic invocation that provision not qualify working through the existing political process, post, 41?9 part ways with Hunter, Seattle, and think) the plurality for additional reason: Each endorses version ofthe proposition that facially neutral law may deny equalprotection solely because has disparate racial impact.Few equal-protection theories have been squarely and soundly rejected. An unwavering line cases from thisCourt holds that violation the Equal Protection Clause requires state action motivated discriminatory intent, Hernandez New York, 500 352, 372373 (1991) (OConnor, J., concurring judgment), and that official action will not held unconstitutional solely because results racially disproportionate impact, Arlington Heights Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 252, 264265 (1977).  Indeed, affirmed this principle the same day decided Seattle: [E]ven when neutral law has disproportionately adverse effect aracial minority, the Fourteenth Amendment violatedonly discriminatory purpose can shown.  Crawford Board Ed. Los Angeles, 458 527, 537538  9The dissent thinks not understand its argument.  Only when amending Michigans Constitution violates Hunter-Seattle, says, that constitutionally prescribed activity necessarily not part the States existing political process.  Post, 21, understand the argument quite well; and see quite well that begs the question.  Why Michigans action here unconstitutional?  Because violates Hunter-Seattle. And why does violate Hunter-Seattle?  Because not part the States existing political process. And why not part the States existing political process?  Because violates Hunter-Seattle. 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 
(1982).
Notwithstanding our dozens cases confirming theexception-less nature the Washington Davis rule, the plurality opinion leaves ajar effects-test escape hatchmodeled after Hunter and Seattle, suggesting that stateaction denies equal protection when ha[s] the serious risk, not purpose, causing specific injuries account race, either designed used, likely used, encourage infliction injury reason race. Ante, (emphasis added). Since these formulationsenable determination equal-protection violationwhere there discriminatory intent, they are inconsistent with the long Washington Davis line cases.10 
Respondents argue that need not bother with thediscriminatory-purpose test, since 26 may struck more straightforwardly racial classification.  Admitting(as they must) that 26 does not its face distribut[e]burdens benefits the basis individual racial classifications, Parents Involved Community Schools Seattle School Dist. No. 551 701, 720 (2007), respondents rely Seattles statement that when the political process the decisionmaking mechanism used address racially conscious legislationand only such legislationis singled out for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment, then that singling out racial classification. 458 S., 485, 486, 30.  But this just the political-process theory bedecked different doctrinal 
 10According the dissent, Hunter-Seattle fills important doctrinal gap left open Washington Davis, since Hunter-Seattles rule unique among equal-protection principlesmakes clear that the majority may not alter political process with the goal prevent[ing] minority groups from partaking that process equal footing.  Post, 33. Nonsense. There gap. manipulate the ground rules, post, 34, ri[g] the contest, post, 35, order harm personsbecause their race deny equal protection under Washington Davis. 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment 
dress. law that neither says nor implies that persons are treated differently account their race not racial classification. Crawford, supra, 537.  That particularly true statutes mandating equal treatment.[A] law that prohibits the State from classifying individuals race fortiori does not classify individuals race. Coalition for Economic Equity Wilson, 122 692, 702 (CA9 1997) (OScannlain, J.).
Thus, the question this case, every case which neutral state action said deny equal protection onaccount race, whether the action reflects raciallydiscriminatory purpose. Seattle stresses that singling outthe political processes affecting racial issues for uniquely disadvantageous treatment inevitably raises dangers impermissible motivation. 458 S., 486, 30.  True enough, but that motivation must proved.  And respondents not have prayer proving here.  The District Court noted that, under conventional equal protection doctrine, the suit was doom[ed].  539 Supp.2d 924, 951 (ED Mich. 2008).  Though the Court Appeals did not opine this question, would not leave for them remand. view, any law expressly requiring state actors afford all persons equal protectionof the laws (such Initiative 350 Seattle, though not the charter amendment Hunter) does notcannot deny to any person equal protection the laws, S.Const., Amdt. 14, 1, regardless whatever evidence seemingly foul purposes plaintiffs may cook the trial court. Justice Harlan observed over century ago, [o]ur Constitution color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.  Plessy Ferguson, 163 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion).  The people Michigan wish the same for their governing charter. would 
SCALIA, J., concurring judgment shameful for stand their way.11 
 11And doubly shameful equate the majority behind 26 with the majority responsible for Jim Crow. Post, 12 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). 
BREYER, J., concurring judgment 

SUPREME COURT THE UNITED STATES 
No. 12682 
BILL SCHUETTE, ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHI-
GAN, PETITIONER COALITION DEFEND AF- 
FIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION AND IMMI- 
GRANT RIGHTS AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITY ANY MEANS NECESSARY (BAMN), AL. WRIT CERTIORARI THE UNITED STATES COURT 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 
[April 22, 2014]

 JUSTICE BREYER, concurring the judgment. 
Michigan has amended its Constitution forbid stateuniversities and colleges discriminate against, grant preferential treatment to, any individual group thebasis race, sex, color, ethnicity, national origin the operation public employment, public education, orpublic contracting. Mich. Const., Art. 26. here focus the prohibition grant[ing] preferential treatment the basis race public education. agree with the plurality that the amendment isconsistent with the Federal Equal Protection Clause. Const., Amdt. 14. But believe this for different reasons. 
First, not address the amendment insofar forbids the use race-conscious admissions programsdesigned remedy past exclusionary racial discrimination the direct effects that discrimination.  Application the amendment that context would presentdifferent questions which may demand different answers.Rather, here address the amendment only applies to, and forbids, programs that, Grutter Bollinger, 539 306 (2003), rest upon one justification: using 
BREYER, J., concurring judgment 
race the admissions process solely order obtai[n] the educational benefits that flow from diverse student body, id., 328 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Second, dissenting Parents Involved Community Schools Seattle School Dist. No. 551 701 (2007), explained why believe race-conscious programs this kind are constitutional, whether implemented lawschools, universities, high schools, elementary schools. concluded that the Constitution does not authorize judges either forbid require the adoption diversity-seeking race-conscious solutions (of the kind issuehere) such serious problems how best administer Americas schools help create society that includes all Americans. Id., 862. continue believe that the Constitution permits,though does not require, the use the kind raceconscious programs that are now barred the Michigan Constitution. The serious educational problems that facedAmericans the time this Court decided Grutter endure. See, e.g., Mullis, Martin, Foy, Drucker, Progress International Reading Literacy Study, 2011International Results Reading 38, Exh. 1.1 (2012) (elementary-school students numerous other countriesoutperform their counterparts the United States reading); Mullis, Martin, Foy, Arora, Trends International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), 2011 International Results Mathematics 40, Exh. 1.1 (2012) (same mathematics); Martin, Mullis, P.Foy, Stanco, TIMSS, 2011 International Results inScience, 38, Exh. 1.1 (2012) (same science); Organisation Economic Co-operation Development (OECD), Education Glance 2013: OECD Indicators (Table A2.1a) (secondary-school graduation rate lower theUnited States than numerous other countries); McKinsey Co., The Economic Impact the Achievement Gap Americas Schools (Apr. 2009) (same; United States 
BREYER, J., concurring judgment 
ranks 18th industrialized nations).  And low educational achievement continues correlated with income and race. See, e.g., National Center for Education Statistics, Digest Education Statistics, Advance Release Selected 2013 Digest Tables (Table 104.20) (White Americans more likely have completed high school thanAfrican-Americans Hispanic-Americans), online http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest (as visited Apr. 15, 2014, and available Clerk Courts case file); id., Table 
219.75 (Americans bottom quartile income most likely drop out high school); id., Table 302.60 (WhiteAmericans more likely enroll college than African-Americans Hispanic-Americans); id., Table 302.30 (middle- and high-income Americans more likely enrollin college than low-income Americans). 
The Constitution allows local, state, and national communities adopt narrowly tailored race-conscious programs designed bring about greater inclusion and diversity. But the Constitution foresees the ballot box, not the courts, the normal instrument for resolving differences and debates about the merits these programs. Compare Parents Involved, 551 S., 839 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (identifying studies showing the benefits racially integrated education), with id., 761763 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (identifying studies suggesting racially integrated schools may not confer educational benefits). short, the Constitution creates democratic political system through which the people themselves must together find answers disagreements this kind. Id., 862 (BREYER, J., dissenting). 
Third, cases such Hunter Erickson, 393 385 (1969), and Washington Seattle School Dist. No. 458 457 (1982), reflect important principle, namely, that individuals ability participate meaningfully the political process should independent his race. Although racial minorities, like other political minorities, 
BREYER, J., concurring judgment 
will not always succeed the polls, they must have thesame opportunity others secure through the ballotbox policies that reflect their preferences. view, however, neither Hunter nor Seattle applies here. And the parties not here suggest that the amendment violates the Equal Protection Clause not under the Hunter-Seattle doctrine. 
Hunter and Seattle involved efforts manipulate the political process way not here issue.  Both cases involved restructuring the political process thatchanged the political level which policies were enacted.In Hunter, decisionmaking was moved from the elected city council the local electorate large.  393 S., 389390. And Seattle, decisionmaking elected school board was replaced with decisionmaking thestate legislature and electorate large.  458 S., 466. 
This case, contrast, does not involve reordering ofthe political process; does not fact involve the movement decisionmaking from one political level another. Rather, here, Michigan law delegated broad policymaking authority elected university boards, see Mich. Const.,Art. VIII, 5, but those boards delegated admissionsrelated decisionmaking authority unelected universityfaculty members and administrators, see, e.g., Bylaws ofUniv. Mich. Bd. Regents 8.01; Mich. State Univ.Bylaws Bd. Trustees, Preamble; Mich. State Univ.Bylaws for Academic Governance 4.4.3; Wayne StateUniv. Stat. 23409, 23412. Although the boards unquestionably retained the power set policy regarding race-conscious admissions, see post, 2529 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting), fact faculty members and administrators set the race-conscious admissions policiesin question. (It often true that elected bodies including, for example, school boards, city councils, and state legislatureshave the power enact policies, but infact delegate that power administrators.)  Although 
BREYER, J., concurring judgment 
limited times the university boards were advised the content their race-conscious admissions policies, see 701 466, 481482 (CA6 2012), knowledge board voted accept reject any those policies.  Thus, unelected faculty members and administrators, not voters ortheir elected representatives, adopted the race-conscious admissions programs affected Michigans constitutionalamendment. The amendment took decisionmaking authority away from these unelected actors and placed inthe hands the voters. 
Why does this matter? For one thing, considered conceptually, the doctrine set forth Hunter and Seattle does not easily fit this case. those cases minorities had participated the political process and they had won. The majoritys subsequent reordering the politicalprocess repealed the minoritys successes and made more difficult for the minority succeed the future.The majority thereby diminished the minoritys ability participate meaningfully the electoral process.  But one cannot easily characterize the movement the decisionmaking mechanism issue herefrom administrative process electoral processas diminishing the minoritys ability participate meaningfully the political process. There prior electoral process which the minority participated. 
For another thing, extend the holding Hunter and Seattle reach situations which decisionmaking authority moved from administrative body politicalone would pose significant difficulties.  The administrative process encompasses vast numbers decisionmakersanswering numerous policy questions hosts differentfields. See Free Enterprise Fund Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 477, ___ (2010) (BREYER, J., dissenting). Administrative bodies modify programs indetail, and decisionmaking authority within the administrative process frequently moves arounddue amend
BREYER, J., concurring judgment 
ments statutes, new administrative rules, and evolvingagency practice. thus particularly difficult this context for judges determine when change the locus decisionmaking authority places comparative structural burden racial minority.  And apply Hunter and Seattle the administrative process would, tending hinder change, risk discouraging experimentation, interfering with efforts see when and how raceconscious policies work.
Finally, the principle that underlies Hunter and Seattle runs against competing principle, discussed above.This competing principle favors decisionmaking thoughthe democratic process. Just this principle stronglysupports the right the people, their elected representatives, adopt race-conscious policies for reasons inclusion, must give them the right vote not so. have said, discussion here limited circumstances which decisionmaking moved from un-elected administrative body politically responsive one, and which the targeted race-conscious admissions programs consider race solely order obtain the educational benefits diverse student body. need now decide more than whether the Federal Constitution permits Michigan apply its constitutional amendment those circumstances. would hold that does.  Therefore, concur the judgment the Court. 
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT THE UNITED STATES 
No. 12682 
BILL SCHUETTE, ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHI-
GAN, PETITIONER COALITION DEFEND AF- 
FIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION AND IMMI- 
GRANT RIGHTS AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITY ANY MEANS NECESSARY (BAMN), AL. WRIT CERTIORARI THE UNITED STATES COURT 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 
[April 22, 2014] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, dissenting. are fortunate live democratic society.  But without checks, democratically approved legislation canoppress minority groups. For that reason, our Constitution places limits what majority the people may do. This case implicates one such limit: the guarantee equal protection the laws.  Although that guarantee traditionally understood prohibit intentional discriminationunder existing laws, equal protection does not end there.Another fundamental strand our equal protection jurisprudence focuses process, securing all citizens the right participate meaningfully and equally selfgovernment.  That right the bedrock our democracy,for preserves all other rights.
Yet know the history our Nation understandits long and lamentable record stymieing the right ofracial minorities participate the political process. first, the majority acted with open, invidious purpose. Notwithstanding the command the Fifteenth Amendment, certain States shut racial minorities out the political process altogether withholding the right 
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 
vote. This Court intervened preserve that right. The majority tried again, replacing outright bans votingwith literacy tests, good character requirements, poll taxes, and gerrymandering.  The Court was not fooled; invalidated those measures, too. The majority persisted.This time, although allowed the minority access thepolitical process, the majority changed the ground rules the process make more difficult for the minority,and the minority alone, obtain policies designed tofoster racial integration.  Although these political restructurings may not have been discriminatory purpose, the Court reaffirmed the right minority members oursociety participate meaningfully and equally the political process.
This case involves this last chapter discrimination: Amajority the Michigan electorate changed the basicrules the political process that State manner thatuniquely disadvantaged racial minorities.1  Prior the enactment the constitutional initiative issue here, all the admissions policies Michigans public colleges and universitiesincluding race-sensitive admissions poli- cies2were the hands each institutions governing  course not mean suggest that Michigans voters acted withanything like the invidious intent, see infra