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Polsby Popper 9 Yale Law Pol Rev 301

Polsby Popper 9 Yale Law Pol Rev 301

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The Third Criterion:
Compactness Procedural Safeguard
Against Partisan Gerrymandering
Daniel Polsby and Robert Popper
The health democracies, whatever type and range, depends wretched
technical detail-electoral procedure. All the rest secondary. the aftermath the decennial census, reapportionment and its wayward
stepchild gerrymandering have again become topics the hour. 1991
1992, based the new census, state legislatures will establish new boundaries
for congressional and state legislative districts. order conform the
constitutional mandate that districts have equal populations one person, one
vote states will have redraw district lines account for population shifts
tllat have accumulated over the past ten years. Yet reapportionment, made
necessary delity democratic principles, also will bring witll gerryman-
dering. Gerrymandering, broadly speaking, any manipulation district lines
for partisan purposes. There are different varieties gerrymandering, includ-
ing racial gerrymandering, remedial racial gerrymandering, and collusive
bipartisan gerrymandering. Partisan gerrymandering, the most common kirld Daniel Polsby the Kirkland Ellis Pmfcssor Law Nortltwrstcm University. Robert Popper associate Orrlck, I-Ierringtnn Sutcli New York. Many people
helped and challenged ptepateti this article, but particular, grateful aclcrlowledgemcnt must
made least the following: Lynn Baker, Pamela Karlan, Bill Stuntz, and the participants the
University Virginia Legal Studis worlshop; Michael itts, Michael Moore, Stephen Morse, retry
Newman, Mcnalcllirn Speigel, anti the participants the University orrennsylvattia law School workshop;
Robert Bennett, Robert Bums, Mayer Freed, Mark Grady, David Haddock, Cary Lawson, and Victor
Rasenblunl the Nortllwestenl law faculty; John Beukenla the Minnesota Ear; Bruce Cain the
University California political science culty; and Brendan Duffy Raymond Marketing, inc.
always, utc mnventicnal ahsolutions apply. Jose Oirrana Gasser, Tl-IE REVOLT Masses 153 (1932). Under Article Section4 the Constitution, statelcgislaturcs excrcisethe districting power subject supcrvening congressional regulation. The constitutional basis for this requirement the Equal Protection Clause the Founeenth
Amendment for state elections, at, the case (edcral elections, Article Section the Canstitttlion,
which provides that representatives shall elected the people. See Reynolds Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1954) (state legislatures); Wesbarry Sanders, 376 u.s. (1964) (federal districts). Gray Sanders. 377. U.S. 368, 381 (1963); see lzlra Reynolds, 377 U.S. 558. Sn, e.g.. Richard Engstrom, nts Supreme calm and Equipapulous Genymandering:
Remaining Obstacle the Qua:/or}-a(rand Efzctivekeprnentmion, 1976 M112. ST. 277, 278-234). Gomillion Lightfoot, set us. 329 (1950). Race-conscious line d.rawing one oftlle remedies available under the Voting Rights Aztof 1965, U.S.C. 1973 (1983); :55 United Jewish Org. Williamshurg Carey, $30 US. l44 (1977). See e.g., Gzffney Cummings, 412 us. 735 (t973) (upholding bipartisangcrrynlanderlng accent
between Democratic and Republican members Connecticut legislature). Other kinds districts,
including school, hospital, tax judicial districts, also can get-tyntantleted.
I-Ieinonline Yale Poly Rev. :01 1991
Yale Law Policy Review Vol. 9:301, 1991
and the subject this paper, undertaken the political party control state legislature help itself and injure its competitor. should not surprising that redistricting the occasion for much
gamey partisan brawling, for the districting game legislators are ghting
for their own political lives and that their party, just surely
election campaign, but with more durable results. Depending how district
lines are drawn, party with only minority the popular vote can assert
control over majority seats the state assembly and over its state
delegation the national House Representatives. More typically, party
that enjoys only small majority popular support over its principal competi-
tor will, through its control the districting process, translate this popular
edge into preemptive institutional dominance.
Potential remedies for gerrymandering, Bernard Grofman has pointed
out, come two varieties: political and formal. political remedy, for
example, might require that redistricting plan satisfy panel bipartisan
commissioners, that adopted superrnajority the legislature. The
remedy propose formal. addition adhering criteria which mandate
that representational districts composed contiguous territories and have
equal populations, suggest that those who district boundaries must
also required respect third criterion, the constraint compactness.
Without the ability distend district lines include exclude
blocks voters whose political loyalties are lcnown, not practically
possible gerrymander. The diagnostic mark the gerrymander the
noncompact district. Anyone who eyeballs few legislative district maps
quickly will learn recognize gerrymanders, although admittedly with imper-
fect accuracy. But one need not rely seat~of-thevpants reckoning the
sort noncompactness that implies gerrymandering. number mathemati
cal measures compactness exist, some which are more difficult
apply than the one person, one vote standard Reynolds Sims. These
measurements are useful because they correspond closely mapma.ker
practical ability gerrymander districts. One these compactness measures, show part III.D, the best way measure the kind non-com-
pactness that required for workable gerrymander. Bernard nan, Crireriafar Di:m ng:A Social Science Perspective, UCLA REV. 77,
79, 93-99 (1925).
10. 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1954).
l-leinonline (ale Po1 Rev. :02 1591
The Third Criterion GERRYMANDERING AND PoLlr1cs the time Elbridge Gerry, the eponymous gerrymanderer, and for
almost 200 years until Baker Carr, abusive partisan districting was
relatively simple matter because there was constitutional requirement that
districs equinumerous. Malapportionment was powerful tool for
diluting the opposition votes that partisans needed other.
With the advent one person, one vote and periodic reapportionment,
the focus partisan districting changed. Creative gerrymandering now has
replaced the older strategy malapportionment through legislative inaction.
Although districts must equal population, tlley need not have any particu-
lar shape character, and they still may manipulated suit partisan needs.
Happily for partisans, the apportionment revolution coincided with technical
innovations computers and market research that made modern gerry-
mandering both easy and effective. Professional advice effective gerry-
mandering now staple the political consulting business.
The techniques for gerrymandering are simple and widely understood.
single-member districts, only one legislator can win election. Any support
beyond fifty-percent plus-one therefore super uous, or, from the party
point view, wasted. The partisan mapmaker seeks draw lines which
concentrate the opposition electoral support just few districts (called
pacldng stacking), while the same time creating many more districts
11. Eum GRIFFITH, THE Rlsls AND Devsmmemor r1-na Grunmmnsx (1907).
12. 369 U.S. 185 (1962). Baker established thejusticiahility ofconstitzlllianal challenges 1nalappnr-
tinned districts.
13. Until U.S.C. 7.1 amended 1929, there was statutory requirement that distxictsbe equal population and compact, but both requirements were routinely ignored. See Riciulnn Connlsx, THE
AWORHDNLENT CASE n.32 (1970); re: 01:0. Colegrovl: Green. 318 U.S. 549, 551, S55 (1946).
Since 1929, equivalent statutory provision has been the boolu.
14. See infra part IILA.
15. Gerrymandering rpnwure for desktop computers increasu power and sophistication almost
the month, with correlative augmentation: the capabilities those with the political authority draw
district boundaries. See Anderson Dnhlstrom, Technological Gerrymaildering. URBAN LAWYER 59,
73-75 (1990); William Schmidt, New Age 4;/ Genynlanderingr Polmcaz Magic canpnrrrrr, N.Y.
Tums, January 10. 1939 A1; Mitch Belts, Genynmndel-lug Made Easy 1990. CoMlnrrelrwolu_u,
Aug. 28, 1989, The generation computers which drew the gerrymandlen afthe 1980: are almost
certainly obsolete. Now, for example, there the Tnpogmpitisal Integration Geographic Encoding and
Referencing (TIGER), the us. Census liurmws new, high-tech map ofAmerica [lhall means that
anyone can quite cheaply buy detailed computerized map any state accuraIe down street lev- loaded with demographic data. Combined with other new technology this mans that almost anyone
will able draw their own politiml maps. S22 Drawing Salamandzrs, ECDNDMISL Ian. 1990,
26, 30.
16. 35:, Ag, David Anderson, Note, When Restraint Rrqrttrrs Activism: Partisan Gerlynmrldeling
and the Smllu Qua Am, Srmroxn Rev. 1549, 1557 (1990) 1931 Indiana, the] Republican
State Committee enlisted Market Opinion Research, Inc, Michigan market research rm, assist
the creation ofa Republican gerrymander. The Committee housed the computer equipment its headquar-
ters and paid $250,000 Market Opinion Research for their services Computer systems assist redistricting first appeared the mid-1960:, 1971 state party organizations used cnmputers
extensively. These systems were archaic today standards.).
l-lein0nline Yale Po1 Rev. 303 1991
Yale Law Policy Review Vol. 9:301, 1991
where his own party commands smaller, but still safe, majority crack-
ing). The net result that many more the opposition party supporters
have thei.r votes squandered being thrown into connived landslides. The
gerrymandering party can thus win more seats proportion its electoral
support than would the district lines were drawn without regard for
partisan considerations. this section show how gerrymandering real danger, injury the practice constitutional democracy. part this project, examine
whether gerrymandering illicit activity really exists apart from the
legitimate give-and-take partisan politics. the process, are led nition the intent gerrymander, Genymandering and Political Iheary
Gerrymandering icts harm democratic institutions, although this harm easier characterize than prove. For example, while reasonable
suggest that constituents are not accurately represented gerrymandered
legislature, those who believe this assertion (we include ourselves) must take faith, for know way prove it. Indeed, there generally
accepted theory how legislature supposed ect its constituenm
interests and values.
There are better ways, however, frame the political-theoretical argument
against gerrymandering. Gerrymandering violates the American constitutional
tradition conceding legislatures power self-selection. Self-constitutive
legislatures, self-constitutive governing institutions any kind, make
sense under Constitution whose most arresting innovation was the dispersion power. Legislatures are legislatures not because they say they are (any
body can make that claim) but because constitution says they are. sure, there nothing specific the Constitution that forbids gerrymander-
ing, any more than there speci language that forbids the excessive, unfair, abusive exercise any delegated power, but the very idea democracy
17. Cracking somewhat ohscurely refers the fact the oppositions support. has heen ineffectually
18. There not even agreement how legislator supposed represent the peaple
delegate,a trustee, agent, urrsomething else. Words like pnrt11ying, signifying, mitrorirug, making present have been applied the inef hle idea representation. See BJ. Diggs. Practical
Representation. REPRF rl0N (Pennock Chapman eds.. 1968); Roland Pennock, Political
Representation.-An Overview, REi>RFsEN1AiioN,.tupm, 27; Charles Black, IL, Representation law and Equity, REPRESENTATION, supra, 131, 140.
19. C12 JOHN bocxe, Two TREATISE GOVERNMENT, 212, 216 (JM. Dont Sons 1924)
(discussing executive interference with composition legislature) nie constitution the legislative first and fundamental the society without which one man, number men, atnorngst
them can have authority making laws that shall binding the rest li]f others than those whom
the society midi authorised thereunm choose, another way than the society hath prescribed,
those chosen are not the legislative appointed the people
Heinoniii-is Yale Po1 Rev. 304 1591
The Third Criterion
that embedded the Constitution certainly forbids legislatures from insulat-
ing themselves from the popular will. The members partially
self-constitilted legislature depend degree upon one another rather than
upon their constituents for their tenure office. Whatever representation
means, cannot possibly mean that.
Thus Martin Shapiro has aptly described gerrymandering pathology democracy. Gerrymandering introduces chronic, self-perpetuating
skew into the business popular representation, matter how the term ned. perversion democratic procedure, the problem resists correction democratic means. Those control the districting process can gerry-
mander the opposition into electoral irrelevance. the nal analysis, then,
the pathology democracy problem overwhelming that -for most
Americans good will, including those who happen judges over
20. Wesberry Sanders, 376 US. (1964). held that Ihe clause, chosen the People,
Article Section the Constitution requiru federal congressional districts conform the equal
population standard. rhedissenting opinion oflustice Harlan has persuaded scholars that urehistcricalhasis
for this interpretation largely absent. See, z.g. art Auerbacll, The Rerzpporlionmau Cam: one Person,
One Vote On: Vote, On: Value. 1964 SUP. REV, typically suggested that the Fourteenth
Amendment provides more appropriate grounds the standard. 1.1. The werbeny argtllrlent, however,
that malapportionment deprives the People oftlle power constitute the legislature more the point,
and applies equally gerrymandering.
21. Martin Shapiro, Gerrymanderirtg, Fnimers, and the Supreme Court, UCLA REV. 227, 239
22. has long been reoognired that anti-democratic practice can effectively poison democratic
institutions and prevent reform. Justice Clark, concurring Baker Carr, wrote that would not
consider intervention this Court into delicate field there were any other reliefawilahle the
people Tennessee which llley could effect rcapponiarunent their legislature. 369 186, 259
(l96Z). The majority the voters [in Tennessee] have been caught legislative slm yaclcet.
mhe legislative policy has riveted the present seals the Assernhly their respective constimencies, and the votes oftlleir illcumbentsa reapportionlnenl any kind prevented. The people have beeurebu the hands the Assembly; they have tried the constitutional convention route, but since the call must
originate the Assembly it, too, has been fruitleu. Id. 51259. See also Reynolds Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
570 0964) (lack available political remedy results minority stranglehold the State Legirlahlre);
WMCA Lamenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 652 (1954) (call for constitutional convent New York must pass
both houses and even convened, delegates would sent from current districts Maryland Committee Tawea, 377 US. 656, 669 (X964) Although over rpporlionment bills were introduoed into the
General Assembly between 1951 and 1960, all railed pass hecause opposition legislators from the
less populous countit:s.); Davis Mann, :77 us. 572, 639 (1964) (no adequate political remedy): Roman Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 706 (1960 (no adequate political state constitutional remedy).
The discussion tile text pertains state legislatures, which must district themselves The same
considerations apply where state legislatures create iedernl congressional districts. Under Article Section the Constitution, Congress has the power constimte itself, even indirectly, regulating the
manner which stale legislatures draw congressional districts. one would expect Congress forego ulls
prerogative long stale legislatures behave themselves and discmnflt few incumbents.
23. Even the lnenlhers the minority opposition who make the legislature have perverse
incentive nothing about the current gerrymander, because they typically reside the packed
districts; they are the bene ciaries those carefully corutructed supermajorities which form half the
gerrymander equation. They well might think twice aboutthe suggestion that they agree asrtuller mtrgin victory for the good the party.
ilelrlol-llil-re Yale i... i=o1y Rev. 305 1591
Yale Law Policy Review Vol. 9:301, 1991
comes judicial role and capacity problems. Gerrymandering bad, bad
thing. And there nobody around fix except the courts.
Effective gerrymandering special threat the Madisonian version
constitutional democracy because the way affects the system
single-member district representation. The strategies for electoral success
single-member districts are quite different from those that apply multi-
member districts. single-member district, the dominant strategy
acquire the support majority voters, those who cluster near the mid-
dle the political spectrum. Multi~memher districts, where candidate can
win coming second fth twenty- fth, depending how many
candidates may elected from the district, allow the election candidates
whose views are the fringe, even the extreme fringe the electorate The
characteristic single-member districts that gerrymandering seeks defeat the tendency such districts center the political debate. single-member districts, political factions that wish politically uential have incentive compromise their differences. Robert Dahl
has summarized the Madisonian argument: faction consists less than majority, can controlled the operation [what Madison called] the republican principle voting the legislative
body, ie., the majority can vote down the minority [while the] development [a] majority faction can limited the electorate numerous, extended, and
diverse interests.
Generally, one issue fanatics who not move towards the political center will
tend ignored. contrast, multi-member system ampli local differences. Factions
rather than coalitions will send representatives the assembly, struggle for
their factions enthusiasmsl undiluted the need for compromise. The political
attitudes the membership will _have greater variance than Madisonian
assembly, and greater potential for fragmentation and paralysis because
the wide gulf that will lie between the extremes. Voters multi-member
districts have one advantage over their counterparts single-member districts that they are more likely have the opportunity vote for candidate
whose views, priority and intensity, nearly approximate their own. single mernber district system that gerrymandered, however, possesses
the worst aspects both Madisonian democracy and proportional representa-
tion. even less proportionally representative the voters than ordinary
24. Shapiro, supra note 21, 251 (characterizing the View afthose who support the justiciahility
gerrymandering claims).
1D. (James Madison).
26. Se: Ferdinand Hermens. Reprzrzmazianand Pmparrional Reprzsenmlion, Crtoosmo
ELECIDIKALSYSTEM: Issues AND ALTERNATIVES 16-17 (Arend Lijpharl and Bernard Grofman eds. 1984).
27. See Id.: :2: also Maurice Duverger, Which i. the Eu! Electoral Syrtem? CHOOSING
ELECIORAL smm, supra note 25. 32.
Heir-ionline Yale Pa1y Rev. 305 1591
The Third Criterion
single member district system, which always contains natural skew against
minorities. the same time, the bene ciaries gerrymanders, less needful forming local coalitions making compromises assure their success, are
also less needful being near the political center their districts. They are, brief, more likely ideologues. The district system has always been
something balancing act, seeking afford minorities protection from the
domination the majority that occurs under statewide electoral systems, while
also seeking preserve the bene majority rule. Gerrymandering strips
minorities the protections that districts were meant provide.
Despite its apparent problems, gerrymandering has had defenders. Peter
Schuck, although not quite friend the practice, has suggested that gerry-
mandering some its aspects could actually bene democracy because
reinforce[s] the majority partys capacity govern alone, making easier attribute responsibility for political acts, and thus furthers the goal party
accountability. Admittedly, governability and accountability are good things,
but they cannot defended without reference fair process. defense rigged elections say that least they have decisive outcomes. Stuffing
ballot boxes, enlisting squads goons intimidate voters, also reinforces
the majority partys capacity govern alone, and makes easier at1rib-
ute responsibility. Nor does much advance the argument for gerrymander-
ing argue, Schuck does, that the practice hard effectively and that may back re. True enough and equally true stuffing ballot boxes and
2s. See text accompanying note 52.
29. rbere good evidence that the Founders valued the faction-diluting character represenmibu place. Rather than representation wealth, profession, indeed any other principle
organization which would advance the kinds interests that would admitted Ihe game
politics, the authors the Constitution deliberarely chose geographical representation. rlrey believed
this principle possessed randomizing effect the rnakc dnbe voting public. Thus. for example, when
Hamilton argued that the wealthy and the well-bom factiorl would not come dominate the
legislnzure through abuse are voting process, asked:
Are the wealthy and the well~bom, they are called, con ned particular spots the seven!
Slams? Have they, some rnirseuleus instinct foresight, set apart each lbern common
place residence? Are they only met with the lnwns cities? are they. the
contrary, scattered over the face nftlle wunuy avarice chance may have happened cast
their own lot mat their predecessors?
THE FEDERALBT No. 60, 370-71 (Clinton Rossiler ed. 1951). The gel1ylnanderer art defeat this
randomizing ect editing the list factions with which will later have contend.
Writing friend i785 about his ideas for the Kentucky constitution, Madison stated that
representation cannot done adlerwise man geographical description. MARVIN Mavens. THE More rlns FOUNDER: Saunas or- rrn: PEILYFICAL THOUGHT mass Mnmson (1981). would
mindreading attribute loo much this sentence were considered isolation from the rest
Madison thought, but further warranty that the basic constitutive problem district making was
one that considered important.
30. Davis Barltlemer, 473 US. 109, 130 0936); ney Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973).
31. Peter Schuck. Di: mrkesr nickel: Panlrun Genymandering and the Judicial Regulattan
Politics, COLUM. REV. 1325. 1361 (1987).
32. See, :.g., id. 1341-45; Bruce Cain, Sinlplz v.1. Complex Crireriafur Partisan Genymanden
ing: Comment Nierni and Gmfmarl, UCLA REV. 213, 225-26 (1935); MICHAEL BARONE
GRANT UIIFLVSA, THE ALMANAC AMERICAN Potmcs 1936 9i; see alsa Davis. 473 U.S. 152
l-lei;-loriline Isle Po1y Rev. 307 1991
Yale Law Policy Review Vol. 9:301, 1991
hiring goon squads, Ferdinand Marcos and Anastazio Somosa found out
their sorrow. confusing say both that gerrymandering may good thing, and
that, luckily, rarely successful, but gerrymandering pathology
democracy, either assertion beside the point. Also spurious the implication
that the practice partisan gerrymandering somehow fair because both
parties and thus, over time, its effects will wash. Democratic ballot
box stuffing Chicago not meaningfully cured Republican ballot box
stuffing downstate. Ballot box stuffing contrary democracy, whether
not affects the outcome this that election and whether not both
parties practice it. gerrymandering similar, then the remedy can hardly more gerrymandering.
Some commentators belittle the real-world impact gerrymandering
American politics, but gerrymandering antidemocratic practice
should not matter that its impact transient cannot rmly quanti ed. sure, gerrymander impact rarely can segregated from the pull
countless other factors, such personalities, local issues, current events,
incumbency effects, and media leanings, that sway supposedly
sway elections.3 But this point cuts both ways. Gen-ymanders may well
more effective than imagine. effective gerrymander may discourage
minority-party voters from even going the polls. Further, majority party,
its power swollen effective gerrymandering, controls legislative committee
chairs and committee agendas, which can manipulated amplify its elector- dominance. candidate who wins one election because gerrymandering
will thereafter enjoy the non-gerrymander bene incumbency and
enhanced name recognition. Thus, while genymanders such may rapidly
decay because the mobility the population, the fruits gerrymandering
may well decay much more slowly. Finally, successfully forces opposition
incumbents run against one another newly merged district, gerryman-
der may set off intra par1y dissension that further debilitates the minority party the polls.
(1986) Connor, 1., concurring). the technology ofgerrymandering becomes more powerful, however, assume that these well-known risks will diminish.
33. S22, 24., MICHAEL BARONE AND GRANT Unrusa, THE ALMANAC AMERICAN Pourics IBS4 as, 313, 994 (discussing California, Indiana and Pennsylvania).
34. 5:2, 2.3.. Out the Dinricring Thicket, wasn. Posr, Apr. 23, 1983, A16; Banana
Unrusa, slqml note 33, (gerrymanders have litile impact because effects wear air with time);
Norman Ornstein. Gencrir afa Gerrymalider, WALL STJ., May 1935 (disparities between voles
cast for, and scan won Democrats House Representatives attributable partisan voting patterns,
not gerrymandering).
35. This point made those seeking dismiss the impact gerrymandering politics.
See. e.g., Scliuck, supra note 31, me; Ornstein, supra note 34.
36, See Warren Lee Kostmski, Parry and lncurnberuy Parrwar Smile Elecrians: ends, Pmenu
andMudeI:, AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1213 (1973); Robert Erilsun, Research Note, The Adviznmg:
tmmimicy Carigressioual Elections, Four? 395 (Spring 1971).
Hemonline Yale Pol Rev. 305 1951
The Third Criterion
The question whether gerrymandering good bad democratic practice
simply cannot avoided, either invoking the possibility that gerrymander-
ing might not matter (because also might) shifting the burden proof its detractors quantify its harm. gerrymandering pathology
democracy, polite electoral fraud, argue below, its friends must defend good thing. Gerrymandermg and Parnsan.vhip
Most scholars who have noticed the gerrymandering problem argue that
courts should not attempt anything about it. The arguments have two
basic themes, although authors often interweave elements both. One ap-
proach holds that there judicial antidote for gerrymandering for the most
fundamental reason, namely that has independent existence, but merely sore loser epithet for redistricting argument that lost. Another ap-
proach concedes that gerrymandering exists and problematic activity, but
argues that the intent gerrymander indistinguishable from the intent
obtain partisan political uence power generally. one seriously doubts that gerrymandering, and plenty it, has been
going for years. Politicians most likely gerrymander whenever they can,
and they are often disarmingly unselfconscious about admitting it. They hire
the most clever consultants money can buy, who well understand the game they
are playing and the risks and rewards playing it. The dispute over the
existence gerrymandering concerned with deeper problem, which cannot dismissed without analysis. possible characterize gerrymandering optical illusion, something the eye the beholder that, upon deeper
37. The testimunygiven inDavi. for example, fairly illuruative, MR. SUSSMAN What Iwould
like you rim again give whatever reasons were operative your mind maintaining
creating districs MR, DAILEY: Tolitzical. MR. SUSSMAN: What were lhepolilical cIars7
MR. DAILEY: wanted save many incumbent Republicans possible. Davis Banderner,
478 [L5, 109, ll6 n.5 (1986); and elsewhere: one Repuhlicanl-louse memberconcisely put it, [t]lIe
name the game keep power. 177-72 (Powell, 1., concurring pan and dissenting part).
The same unguarded candor was exhibited the late Rep. Phil Burton, who masterminded lire 1980
California redistricting and generally conceded one gerryrnandering modern masters.
publicly joked that his zig-zagging district lines were our contribution modern art. With respect
Califomia newly drawn Fifth Congressional District, then represented his brother, Burton shied, Oh,
its gorgeous, curls and inn like snake. Frederick Lowell Teresa Cnigie, calm-min
Renpponiorrmznt Struggle: crasrir Clash Bzrwenr law and Paiirrcr, P01. 745, 246 (1925)
(citations omitted). Burton considered his own behavior ll) justi offsetting Republican gerryman-
dering places like Indiana. 1.1.
Rep. George Brown was one ofthe laene ciarirs Phil Burton dexterity. 1988, Brown told the
Wall Street Journals Paul Gigot: good gerrymander essential. [This district] probably safe for for another two terms, jusr time for another gerrymlnder 1990, noted Gigut. then hopes redraw new, smaller seal that will safely Demo